Fearful apes or emotional cooperative breeders?

The "fearful ape hypothesis" is interesting but is currently underspecified. We need more research on whether it is specific to fear, specific to humans (or even cooperative breeders in general), what is included in "fear," and whether these patterns would indeed evolve despite arms races to extract help from audiences. Specifying these will result in a more testable hypothesis.

Greater traditionalism predicts COVID-19 precautionary behaviors across 27 societies

People vary both in their embrace of their society's traditions, and in their perception of hazards as salient and necessitating a response. Over evolutionary time, traditions have offered avenues for addressing hazards, plausibly resulting in linkages between orientations toward tradition and orientations toward danger. Emerging research documents connections between traditionalism and threat responsivity, including pathogen-avoidance motivations. Additionally, because hazard-mitigating behaviors can conflict with competing priorities, associations between traditionalism and pathogen avoidance may hinge on contextually contingent tradeoffs. The COVID-19 pandemic provides a real-world test of the posited relationship between traditionalism and hazard avoidance. Across 27 societies (N = 7844), we find that, in a majority of countries, individuals' endorsement of tradition positively correlates with their adherence to costly COVID-19-avoidance behaviors; accounting for some of the conflicts that arise between public health precautions and other objectives further strengthens this evidence that traditionalism is associated with greater attention to hazards.

Disgust sensitivity relates to attitudes toward gay men and lesbian women across 31 nations

Previous work has reported a relation between pathogen-avoidance motivations and prejudice toward various social groups, including gay men and lesbian women. It is currently unknown whether this association is present across cultures, or specific to North America. Analyses of survey data from adult heterosexuals ( N = 11,200) from 31 countries showed a small relation between pathogen disgust sensitivity (an individual-difference measure of pathogen-avoidance motivations) and measures of antigay attitudes. Analyses also showed that pathogen disgust sensitivity relates not only to antipathy toward gay men and lesbians, but also to negativity toward other groups, in particular those associated with violations of traditional sexual norms (e.g., prostitutes). These results suggest that the association between pathogen-avoidance motivations and antigay attitudes is relatively stable across cultures and is a manifestation of a more general relation between pathogen-avoidance motivations and prejudice towards groups associated with sexual norm violations.

Third-party punishers do not compete to be chosen as partners in an experimental game

Third-party punishment is thought to act as an honest signal of cooperative intent and such signals might escalate when competing to be chosen as a partner. Here, we investigate whether partner choice competition prompts escalating investment in third-party punishment. We also consider the case of signalling via helpful acts to provide a direct test of the relative strength of the two types of signals. Individuals invested more in third-party helping than third-party punishment and invested more in both signals when observed compared to when investments would be unseen. We found no clear effect of partner choice (over and above mere observation) on investments in either punishment or helping. Third-parties who invested more than a partner were preferentially chosen for a subsequent Trust Game although the preference to interact with the higher investor was more pronounced in the help than in the punishment condition. Third-parties who invested more were entrusted with more money and investments in third-party punishment or helping reliably signalled trustworthiness. Individuals who did not invest in third-party helping were more likely to be untrustworthy than those who did not invest in third-party punishment. This supports the conception of punishment as a more ambiguous signal of cooperative intent compared to help.

Honesty and dishonesty in gossip strategies: a fitness interdependence analysis

Gossip, or sharing information about absent others, has been identified as an effective solution to free rider problems in situations with conflicting interests. Yet, the information transmitted via gossip can be biased, because gossipers may send dishonest information about others for personal gains. Such dishonest gossip makes reputation-based cooperation more difficult to evolve. But when are people likely to share honest or dishonest gossip? We build formal models to provide the theoretical foundation for individuals' gossip strategies, taking into account the gossiper's fitness interdependence with the receiver and the target. Our models across four different games suggest a very simple rule: when there is a perfect match (mismatch) between fitness interdependence and the effect of honest gossip, the gossiper should always be honest (dishonest); however, in the case of a partial match, the gossiper should make a choice based on their fitness interdependence with the receiver and the target and the marginal cost/benefit in terms of pay-off differences caused by possible choices of the receiver and the target in the game. Moreover, gossipers can use this simple rule to make optimal decisions even under noise. We discuss empirical examples that support the predictions of our model and potential extensions.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

The benefits of being seen to help others: indirect reciprocity and reputation-based partner choice

When one individual helps another, it benefits the recipient and may also gain a reputation for being cooperative. This may induce others to favour the helper in subsequent interactions, so investing in being seen to help others may be adaptive. The best-known mechanism for this is indirect reciprocity (IR), in which the profit comes from an observer who pays a cost to benefit the original helper. IR has attracted considerable theoretical and empirical interest, but it is not the only way in which cooperative reputations can bring benefits. Signalling theory proposes that paying a cost to benefit others is a strategic investment which benefits the signaller through changing receiver behaviour, in particular by being more likely to choose the signaller as a partner. This reputation-based partner choice can result in competitive helping whereby those who help are favoured as partners. These theories have been confused in the literature. We therefore set out the assumptions, the mechanisms and the predictions of each theory for how developing a cooperative reputation can be adaptive. The benefits of being seen to be cooperative may have been a major driver of sociality, especially in humans. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

Signaling benefits of partner choice decisions

When deciding whom to choose for a cooperative interaction, two features of prospective partners are especially relevant: ability to provide benefits, and willingness to provide those benefits. Often, these traits are correlated. But, when ability and willingness are in conflict, people often indicate that they value willingness over ability, even when doing so results in immediate losses. Why would such behavior be favored by natural selection acting at the level of the individual? Across nine experimental studies (seven preregistered) and a mathematical model we explore one way of explaining this costly choice, demonstrating that choosing a willing over an able partner affords one a moral reputation and makes one more likely to be chosen as a cooperation partner. In fact, even people who choose an able over a willing partner for themselves prefer others who choose a willing over an able partner. Crucial to our model, we find that valuing willingness over ability is an honest signal of both higher levels of generosity in an economic game and lower levels of trait Machiavellianism. These findings provide the first extensive exploration of the signaling benefits of partner choice decisions. Furthermore, this work provides one explanation for why we choose those who are willing over those who are able, even at a cost to ourselves: By doing so, we in turn look like good potential partners. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

The psychological foundations of reputation-based cooperation

Humans care about having a positive reputation, which may prompt them to help in scenarios where the return benefits are not obvious. Various game-theoretical models support the hypothesis that concern for reputation may stabilize cooperation beyond kin, pairs or small groups. However, such models are not explicit about the underlying psychological mechanisms that support reputation-based cooperation. These models therefore cannot account for the apparent rarity of reputation-based cooperation in other species. Here, we identify the cognitive mechanisms that may support reputation-based cooperation in the absence of language. We argue that a large working memory enhances the ability to delay gratification, to understand others' mental states (which allows for perspective-taking and attribution of intentions) and to create and follow norms, which are key building blocks for increasingly complex reputation-based cooperation. We review the existing evidence for the appearance of these processes during human ontogeny as well as their presence in non-human apes and other vertebrates. Based on this review, we predict that most non-human species are cognitively constrained to show only simple forms of reputation-based cooperation. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

Cooperating to show that you care: costly helping as an honest signal of fitness interdependence

Social organisms often need to know how much to trust others to cooperate. Organisms can expect cooperation from another organism that depends on them (i.e. stake or fitness interdependence), but how do individuals assess fitness interdependence? Here, we extend fitness interdependence into a signalling context: costly helping behaviour can honestly signal one's stake in others, such that those who help are trusted more. We present a mathematical model in which agents help others based on their stake in the recipient's welfare, and recipients use that information to assess whom to trust. At equilibrium, helping is a costly signal of stake: helping is worthwhile for those who value the recipient (and thus will repay any trust), but is not worthwhile for those who do not value the recipient (and thus will betray the trust). Recipients demand signals when they value the signallers less and when the cost of betrayed trust is higher; signal costs are higher when signallers have more incentive to defect. Signalling systems are more likely when the trust games resemble Prisoner's Dilemmas, Stag Hunts or Harmony Games, and are less likely in Snowdrift Games. Furthermore, we find that honest signals need not benefit recipients and can even occur between hostile parties. By signalling their interdependence, organisms benefit from increased trust, even when no future interactions will occur. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

The effects of social vs. asocial threats on group cooperation and manipulation of perceived threats

Individuals benefit from maintaining the well-being of their social groups and helping their groups to survive threats such as intergroup competition, harsh environments and epidemics. Correspondingly, much research shows that groups cooperate more when competing against other groups. However, 'social' threats (i.e. outgroups) should elicit stronger cooperation than 'asocial' threats (e.g. environments, diseases) because (a) social losses involve a competitor's gain and (b) a strong cooperative reaction to defend the group may deter future outgroup threats. We tested this prediction in a multiround public goods game where groups faced periodic risks of failure (i.e. loss of earnings) which could be overcome by sufficient cooperation. This threat of failure was framed as either a social threat (intergroup competition) or an asocial threat (harsh environment). We find that cooperation was higher in response to social threats than asocial threats. We also examined participants' willingness to manipulate apparent threats to the group: participants raised the perceived threat level similarly for social and asocial threats, but high-ranking participants increased the appearance of social threats more than low-ranking participants did. These results show that people treat social threats differently than asocial threats, and support previous work on leaders' willingness to manipulate perceived threats.

Reciprocity creates a stake in one's partner, or why you should cooperate even when anonymous

Why do we care so much for friends, even making sacrifices for them they cannot repay or never know about? When organisms engage in reciprocity, they have a stake in their partner's survival and wellbeing so the reciprocal relationship can persist. This stake (aka fitness interdependence) makes organisms willing to help beyond the existing reciprocal arrangement (e.g. anonymously). I demonstrate this with two mathematical models in which organisms play a prisoner's dilemma, and where helping keeps their partner alive and well. Both models shows that reciprocity creates a stake in partners' welfare: those who help a cooperative partner--even when anonymous--do better than those who do not, because they keep that cooperative partner in good enough condition to continue the reciprocal relationship. 'Machiavellian' cooperators, who defect when anonymous, do worse because their partners become incapacitated. This work highlights the fact that reciprocity and stake are not separate evolutionary processes, but are inherently linked.

Measuring delay discounting in a crowdsourced sample: An exploratory study

Delay discounting is a measure of preferences for smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards. Discounting has been assessed in many ways; these methods have variably and inconsistently involved measures of different lengths (single vs. multiple items), forced-choice methods, self-report methods, online and laboratory assessments, monetary and non-monetary compensation. The majority of these studies have been conducted in laboratory settings. However, over the past 20 years, behavioral data collection has increasingly shifted online. Usually, these experiments involve completing short tasks for small amounts of money, and are thus qualitatively different than experiments in the lab, which are typically more involved and in a strongly controlled environment. The present study aimed to determine how to best measure future discounting in a crowdsourced sample using three discounting measures (a single shot measure, the 27-item Kirby Monetary Choice Questionnaire, and a one-time Matching Task). We examined associations of these measures with theoretically related variables, and assessed influence of payment on responding. Results indicated that correlations between the discounting tasks and conceptually related measures were smaller than in prior laboratory experiments. Moreover, our results suggest providing monetary compensation may attenuate correlations between discounting measures and related variables. These findings suggest that incentivizing discounting measures changes the nature of measurement in these tasks.

State-dependent risk-taking

Who takes risks, and when? The relative state model proposes two non-independent selection pressures governing risk-taking: need-based and ability-based. The need-based account suggests that actors take risks when they cannot reach target states with low-risk options (consistent with risk-sensitivity theory). The ability-based account suggests that actors engage in risk-taking when they possess traits or abilities that increase the expected value of risk-taking (by increasing the probability of success, enhancing payoffs for success or buffering against failure). Adaptive risk-taking involves integrating both considerations. Risk-takers compute the expected value of risk-taking based on their state-the interaction of embodied capital relative to one's situation, to the same individual in other circumstances or to other individuals. We provide mathematical support for this dual pathway model, and show that it can predict who will take the most risks and when (e.g. when risk-taking will be performed by those in good, poor, intermediate or extreme state only). Results confirm and elaborate on the initial verbal model of state-dependent risk-taking: selection favours agents who calibrate risk-taking based on implicit computations of condition and/or competitive (dis)advantage, which in turn drives patterned individual differences in risk-taking behaviour.

The Influence of Competition on Motivation to Fake in Employment Interviews

Abstract. Many applicants fake, or intentionally misrepresent information, in employment interviews. Recent theories of faking propose that applicants may fake more when there are situational cues that signal intense competition for the job. We tested this proposition by manipulating the number of competitors and selection ratio in selection scenarios, and assessed individuals’ faking intentions. We also examined whether Honesty-Humility moderated the relation between competition and faking intentions. Hypotheses were tested using a between-subjects study with 775 participants. Results show that faking intentions increased with few competitors and a small selection ratio. Honesty-Humility did not moderate the relation between competition and faking intentions. Findings support competition as a situational predictor of faking intentions, lending support to models of faking.

High voice pitch mitigates the aversiveness of antisocial cues in men's speech

Speech contains both explicit social information in semantic content and implicit cues to social behaviour and mate quality in voice pitch. Voice pitch has been demonstrated to have pervasive effects on social perceptions, but few studies have examined these perceptions in the context of meaningful speech. Here, we examined whether male voice pitch interacted with socially relevant cues in speech to influence listeners' perceptions of trustworthiness and attractiveness. We artificially manipulated men's voices to be higher and lower in pitch when speaking words that were either prosocial or antisocial in nature. In Study 1, we found that listeners perceived lower-pitched voices as more trustworthy and attractive in the context of prosocial words than in the context of antisocial words. In Study 2, we found evidence that suggests this effect was driven by stronger preferences for higher-pitched voices in the context of antisocial cues, as voice pitch preferences were not significantly different in the context of prosocial cues. These findings suggest that higher male voice pitch may ameliorate the negative effects of antisocial speech content and that listeners may be particularly avoidant of those who express multiple cues to antisociality across modalities.

Why Hate the Good Guy? Antisocial Punishment of High Cooperators Is Greater When People Compete To Be Chosen

When choosing social partners, people prefer good cooperators (all else being equal). Given this preference, people wishing to be chosen can either increase their own cooperation to become more desirable or suppress others’ cooperation to make them less desirable. Previous research shows that very cooperative people sometimes get punished (“antisocial punishment”) or criticized (“do-gooder derogation”) in many cultures. Here, we used a public-goods game with punishment to test whether antisocial punishment is used as a means of competing to be chosen by suppressing others’ cooperation. As predicted, there was more antisocial punishment when participants were competing to be chosen for a subsequent cooperative task (a trust game) than without a subsequent task. This difference in antisocial punishment cannot be explained by differences in contributions, moralistic punishment, or confusion. This suggests that antisocial punishment is a social strategy that low cooperators use to avoid looking bad when high cooperators escalate cooperation.

Radical framing effects in the ultimatum game: the impact of explicit culturally transmitted frames on economic decision-making

Many studies have documented framing effects in economic games. These studies, however, have tended to use minimal framing cues (e.g. a single sentence labelling the frame), and the frames did not involve unambiguous offer expectations. Results often did not differ substantially from those in the unframed games. Here we test the hypothesis that, in contrast to the modal offer in the unframed ultimatum game (UG) (e.g. 60% to the proposer and 40% to the responder), offers in a UG explicitly framed either as a currency exchange or a windfall will closely conform to expectations for the frame and diverge substantially from the modal offer. Participants recruited from MTurk were randomized into one of two conditions. In the control condition, participants played a standard UG. In the treatment conditions, players were provided a vignette explicitly describing the frame with their roles: some were customers and bankers in a currency exchange, and others were in a windfall scenario. We predicted (i) that modal offers in the currency exchange would involve an asymmetric split where greater than 80% went to customers and less than 20% went to bankers, and (ii) that variation in windfall offers would converge onto a 50-50 split with significantly less variation than the control condition. Our first prediction was confirmed with substantial effect sizes (d = 1.09 and d = -2.04), whereas we found no evidence for our second prediction. The first result provides further evidence that it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about economic decision-making from decontextualized games.

Bidding to Commit

Economists and biologists have both theorized that individuals can benefit from committing to courses of action because it forces others to concede a greater share of any surpluses, but little experimental work has tested the actual benefits of such a strategy and people's willingness to so "tie their hands." Participants played a Battle-of-the-Sexes (Experiment 1) or Hawk-Dove game (Experiment 2), where one member of each pair could not change his or her action once played (committed), whereas the other could change actions in response (uncommitted). Committed players were more likely to achieve their preferred outcomes. When bidding to select roles, most participants preferred to be committed rather than uncommitted, though they bid slightly less than the committed role was actually worth. These results provide empirical support for people's willingness to use commitment to their advantage and show that commitment devices (e.g., "irrational" emotions) can bring long-term benefits.

Exploring the trade-off between quality and fairness in human partner choice

Partner choice is an important force underpinning cooperation in humans and other animals. Nevertheless, the mechanisms individuals use to evaluate and discriminate among partners who vary across different dimensions are poorly understood. Generally, individuals are expected to prefer partners who are both able and willing to invest in cooperation but how do individuals prioritize the ability over willingness to invest when these characteristics are opposed to one another? We used a modified Dictator Game to tackle this question. Choosers evaluated partners varying in quality (proxied by wealth) and fairness, in conditions when wealth was relatively stable or liable to change. When both partners were equally fair (or unfair), choosers typically preferred the richer partner. Nevertheless, when asked to choose between a rich-stingy and a poor-fair partner, choosers prioritized fairness over wealth-with this preference being particularly pronounced when wealth was unstable. The implications of these findings for real-world partner choice are discussed.

Altruism predicts mating success in humans

In order for non-kin altruism to evolve, altruists must receive fitness benefits for their actions that outweigh the costs. Several researchers have suggested that altruism is a costly signal of desirable qualities, such that it could have evolved by sexual selection. In two studies, we show that altruism is broadly linked with mating success. In Study 1, participants who scored higher on a self-report altruism measure reported they were more desirable to the opposite sex, as well as reported having more sex partners, more casual sex partners, and having sex more often within relationships. Sex moderated some of these relationships, such that altruism mattered more for men's number of lifetime and casual sex partners. In Study 2, participants who were willing to donate potential monetary winnings (in a modified dictator dilemma) reported having more lifetime sex partners, more casual sex partners, and more sex partners over the past year. Men who were willing to donate also reported having more lifetime dating partners. Furthermore, these patterns persisted, even when controlling for narcissism, Big Five personality traits, and socially desirable responding. These results suggest that altruists have higher mating success than non-altruists and support the hypothesis that altruism is a sexually selected costly signal of difficult-to-observe qualities.

The Relative State Model: Integrating Need-Based and Ability-Based Pathways to Risk-Taking

Who takes risks, and why? Does risk-taking in one context predict risk-taking in other contexts? We seek to address these questions by considering two non-independent pathways to risk: need-based and ability-based. The need-based pathway suggests that risk-taking is a product of competitive disadvantage consistent with risk-sensitivity theory. The ability-based pathway suggests that people engage in risk-taking when they possess abilities or traits that increase the probability of successful risk-taking, the expected value of the risky behavior itself, and/or have signaling value. We provide a conceptual model of decision-making under risk-the relative state model-that integrates both pathways and explicates how situational and embodied factors influence the estimated costs and benefits of risk-taking in different contexts. This model may help to reconcile long-standing disagreements and issues regarding the etiology of risk-taking, such as the domain-generality versus domain-specificity of risk or differential engagement in antisocial and non-antisocial risk-taking.

No effect on condemnation of short or long exposure to eye images

The effect of exposure to eye images on various behaviors has been explained as a response to an invalid cue of observation. This interpretation has been supported by an experiment showing that a short exposure to eye images increased dictator game generosity, but a long exposure did not. We attempted to conceptually replicate that finding with a different dependent variable, and found no effect of short or long exposure to eye images on moral condemnation. Thus, we failed to replicate previous work showing an effect of eye images on condemnation and therefore these results do not inform the invalid cue hypothesis. We found that women condemned more strongly than men and discuss this finding in light of functional theories of moral condemnation.

Local competition sparks concerns for fairness in the ultimatum game

Humans reject uneven divisions of resources, even at personal cost. This is observed in countless experiments using the ultimatum game, where a proposer offers to divide a resource with a responder who either accepts the division or rejects it (whereupon both earn zero). Researchers debate why humans evolved a psychology that is so averse to inequity within partnerships. We suggest that the scale of competition is crucial: under local competition with few competitors, individuals reject low offers, because they cannot afford to be disadvantaged relative to competitors. If one competes against the broader population (i.e. global competition), then it pays to accept low offers to increase one's absolute pay-off. We support this intuition with an illustrative game-theoretical model. We also conducted ultimatum games where participants received prizes based on pay-offs relative to immediate partners (local competition) versus a larger group (global competition). Participants demanded higher offers under local competition, suggesting that local competition increases people's demands for fairness and aversion to inequality.

Introduction of an algorithm for ROTEM-guided fibrinogen concentrate administration in major obstetric haemorrhage

We compared blood component requirements during major obstetric haemorrhage, following the introduction of fibrinogen concentrate. A prospective study of transfusion requirements and patient outcomes was performed for 12 months to evaluate the major obstetric haemorrhage pathway using shock packs (Shock Pack phase). The study was repeated after the pathway was amended to include fibrinogen concentrate (Fibrinogen phase). The median (IQR [range]) number of blood components given was 8.0 (3.0-14.5 [0-32]) during the Shock Pack phase, and 3.0 (2.0-5.0 [0-26]) during the Fibrinogen phase (p = 0.0004). The median (IQR [range]) quantity of fibrinogen administered was significantly greater in the Shock Pack phase, 3.2 (0-7.1 [0-20.4]) g, than in the Fibrinogen phase, 0 (0-3.0 [0-12.4]) g, p = 0.0005. Four (9.5%) of 42 patients in the Shock Pack phase developed transfusion associated circulatory overload compared with none of 51 patients in the Fibrinogen phase (p = 0.038). Fibrinogen concentrate allows prompt correction of coagulation deficits associated with major obstetric haemorrhage, reducing the requirement for blood component therapy and the attendant risks of complications.

Who cries wolf, and when? Manipulation of perceived threats to preserve rank in cooperative groups

People perform greater within-group cooperation when their groups face external threats, such as hostile outgroups or natural disasters. Researchers and social commentators suggest that high-ranking group members manipulate this "threat-dependent" cooperation by exaggerating threats in order to promote cooperation and suppress competition for their position. However, little systematic research tests this claim or possible situational moderators. In three studies, we use a cooperative group game to show that participants pay to increase others' perceptions of group threats, and spend more on manipulation when holding privileged positions. This manipulation cost-effectively elicits cooperation and sustains privilege, and is fostered by competition over position, not only position per se. Less cooperative people do more manipulation than more cooperative people do. Furthermore, these effects generalize to broader definitions of privilege. Conceptually, these results offer new insights into an understudied dimension of group behavior. Methodologically, the research extends cooperative group games to allow for analyzing more complex group dynamics.

Competition over personal resources favors contribution to shared resources in human groups

Members of social groups face a trade-off between investing selfish effort for themselves and investing cooperative effort to produce a shared group resource. Many group resources are shared equitably: they may be intrinsically non-excludable public goods, such as vigilance against predators, or so large that there is little cost to sharing, such as cooperatively hunted big game. However, group members' personal resources, such as food hunted individually, may be monopolizable. In such cases, an individual may benefit by investing effort in taking others' personal resources, and in defending one's own resources against others. We use a game theoretic “tug-of-war” model to predict that when such competition over personal resources is possible, players will contribute more towards a group resource, and also obtain higher payoffs from doing so. We test and find support for these predictions in two laboratory economic games with humans, comparing people's investment decisions in games with and without the options to compete over personal resources or invest in a group resource. Our results help explain why people cooperatively contribute to group resources, suggest how a tragedy of the commons may be avoided, and highlight unifying features in the evolution of cooperation and competition in human and non-human societies.

Harnessing the Power of Reputation: Strengths and Limits for Promoting Cooperative Behaviors

Evolutionary approaches have done much to identify the pressures that select for cooperative sentiment. This helps us understand when and why cooperation will arise, and applied research shows how these pressures can be harnessed to promote various types of cooperation. In particular, recent evidence shows how opportunities to acquire a good reputation can promote cooperation in laboratory and applied settings. Cooperation can be promoted by tapping into forces like indirect reciprocity, costly signaling, and competitive altruism. When individuals help others, they receive reputational benefits (or avoid reputational costs), and this gives people an incentive to help. Such findings can be applied to promote many kinds of helping and cooperation, including charitable donations, tax compliance, sustainable and pro-environmental behaviors, risky heroism, and more. Despite the potential advantages of using reputation to promote positive behaviors, there are several risks and limits. Under some circumstances, opportunities for reputation will be ineffective or promote harmful behaviors. By better understanding the dynamics of reputation and the circumstances under which cooperation can evolve, we can better design social systems to increase the rate of cooperation and reduce conflict.

Harnessing the power of reputation: strengths and limits for promoting cooperative behaviors

Evolutionary approaches have done much to identify the pressures that select for cooperative sentiment. This helps us understand when and why cooperation will arise, and applied research shows how these pressures can be harnessed to promote various types of cooperation. In particular, recent evidence shows how opportunities to acquire a good reputation can promote cooperation in laboratory and applied settings. Cooperation can be promoted by tapping into forces like indirect reciprocity, costly signaling, and competitive altruism. When individuals help others, they receive reputational benefits (or avoid reputational costs), and this gives people an incentive to help. Such findings can be applied to promote many kinds of helping and cooperation, including charitable donations, tax compliance, sustainable and pro-environmental behaviors, risky heroism, and more. Despite the potential advantages of using reputation to promote positive behaviors, there are several risks and limits. Under some circumstances, opportunities for reputation will be ineffective or promote harmful behaviors. By better understanding the dynamics of reputation and the circumstances under which cooperation can evolve, we can better design social systems to increase the rate of cooperation and reduce conflict.

Public reporting of health care-associated infections (HAIs): approach to choosing HAI measures

OBJECTIVE

To develop a method for selecting health care-associated infection (HAI) measures for public reporting.

CONTEXT

HAIs are common, serious, and costly adverse outcomes of medical care that affect 2 million people in the United States annually. Thirty-seven states have introduced or passed legislation requiring public reporting of HAI measures. State legislation varies widely regarding which HAIs to report, how the data are collected and reported, and public availability of results.

DESIGN

The Maryland Health Care Commission developed an HAI Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) that consisted of a group of experts in the field of healthcare epidemiology, infection prevention and control (IPC), and public health. This group reviewed public reporting systems in other states, surveyed Maryland hospitals to determine the current state of IPC programs, performed a literature review on HAI measures, and developed six criteria for ranking the measures: impact, improvability, inclusiveness, frequency, functionality, and feasibility. The committee and experts in the field then ranked each of 18 proposed HAI measures. A composite score was determined for each measure.

RESULTS

Among outcome measures, the rate of central line-associated bloodstream infections ranked highest, followed by the rate of post-coronary artery bypass grafting surgical-site infections. Among process measures, perioperative antimicrobial prophylaxis, compliance with central-line bundles, compliance with hand hygiene, and healthcare-worker influenza vaccination ranked highest.

CONCLUSIONS

Our qualitative criteria facilitated consensus on the HAI TAC and provided a useful framework for public reporting of HAI measures. Validation will be important for such approaches to be supported by the scientific community.