Intellectual property and biotechnology: the U.S. internal experience--Part II

Continuing the discussion begun in the March 2006 issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, this paper further documents the failure of the United States to adequately consider possible modifications in the traditional robust system of intellectual property rights as applied to biotechnology. It discusses concrete suggestions for alternative disclosure requirements, for exemptions for research tools, and for improved access to clinical advances. In each of these cases, the modifications might be more responsive to the full set of relevant values.

University-based science and biotechnology products: defining the boundaries of intellectual property

The pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries have long relied on patenting as the primary means of allocating ownership and control over new discoveries. Yet, patent protection is a double-edged sword that has major implications for the future of innovation in biomedical science in the United States. Excessive "upstream" patenting of genes and molecular targets could hinder further research by creating a need for expensive and inefficient cross-licensing. However, limiting such basic science patenting could allow private entities to use the results of years of costly publicly funded research to produce and market lucrative products without compensating university- or public sector-based innovators. Academic and other nonprofit research centers would, therefore, be deprived of revenue for pursuing novel therapeutics or other seminal research work that may not be patentable. Recent court cases illustrate the inherent conflicts in allocating ownership and control of basic biomedical discoveries. Several options exist to avoid the complex problems of overlapping basic science patents while still rewarding pivotal discoveries and encouraging further innovation. These include establishing basic science patent pools and mandating arbitration arrangements that would assign credit and royalties for biotechnology innovations that depend on prior research that was performed, financed, or both in the public sector.

Genomic patenting and the utility requirement

This paper analyses the ways in which genomic knowledge is portrayed as useful knowledge in gene patenting in order to fulfil the 'utility'/'industrial applicability' requirement for patentability. It gives examples of utility claims in gene patents and asks whether genomics (as opposed to genetics) changes our ideas about what is useful and what can be patented. It puts forward a provisional classification of different types of utility and argues that merely identifying the physiological function of a gene diverges radically from our commonsense understanding of what it is for an invention to be useful. Furthermore, social, political and ethical issues inevitably arise when discussing the utility requirement, because an invention cannot be useful in isolation from a social context.

Stem cell technologies: regulation, patents and problems

Human embryonic stem cell research promises to deliver in the future a whole range of therapeutic treatments, but currently governments in different jurisdictions must try to regulate this burgeoning area. Part of the problem has been, and continues to be, polarised community opinion on the use of human embryonic stem cells for research. This article compares the approaches of the Australian, United Kingdom and United States governments in regulating human embryonic stem cell research. To date, these governments have approached the issue through implementing legislation or policy to control research. Similarly, the three jurisdictions have viewed the patentability of human embryonic stem cell technologies in their own ways with different policies being adopted by the three patent offices. This article examines these different approaches and discusses the inevitable concerns that have been raised due to the lack of a universal approach in relation to the regulation of research; the patenting of stem cell technologies; and the effects patents granted are having on further human embryonic stem cell research.

Human-nonhuman chimeras: a regulatory proposal on the blurring of species lines

The chimera of modern biotechnology is defined broadly as a single organism composed of a mixture of materials from two or more organisms possessing distinct genetic backgrounds. Unlike the United States, which does not regulate chimeras directly, Canada has responded to the unregulated pursuit of chimera technology by banning certain chimeras as part of comprehensive legislation designed to regulate human reproductive technologies. In 2004, the Canadian Parliament passed the Assisted Human Reproduction Act despite criticism urging greater legislative justification for the Act's provisions and modification to it statutory definitions. Because current regulatory mechanisms in the United States, including patent law and administrative oversight, fail to regulate chimera technology, the United States should enact new legislation, using Canada's legislation as a model, to prohibit embryonic chimeras and to regulate other human-nonhuman combinations. Unregulated biotechnology threatens to disrupt legal and social institutions; therefore, the United States must make a balanced effort now to protect the public interest.

Patent first, ask questions later: morality and biotechnology in patent law

This Article explores the U.S. "patent first, ask questions later" approach to determining what subject matter should receive patent protection. Under this approach, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO or the Agency) issues patents on "anything under the sun made by man," and to the extent a patent's subject matter is sufficiently controversial, Congress acts retrospectively in assessing whether patents should issue on such interventions. This practice has important ramifications for morally controversial biotechnology patents specifically, and for American society generally. For many years a judicially created "moral utility" doctrine served as a type of gatekeeper of patent subject matter eligibility. The doctrine allowed both the USTPO and courts to deny patents on morally controversial subject matter under the fiction that such inventions were not "useful." The gate, however, is currently untended. A combination of the demise of the moral utility doctrine, along with expansive judicial interpretations of the scope of patent-eligible subject matter, has resulted in virtually no basis on which the USTPO or courts can deny patent protection to morally controversial, but otherwise patentable, subject matter. This is so despite position statements by the Agency to the contrary. Biotechnology is an area in which many morally controversial inventions are generated. Congress has been in react-mode following the issuance of a stream of morally controversial biotech patents, including patents on transgenic animals, surgical methods, and methods of cloning humans. With no statutory limits on patent eligibility, and with myriad concerns complicating congressional action following a patent's issuance, it is not Congress, the representative of the people, determining patent eligibility. Instead, it is patent applicants, scientific inventors, who are deciding matters of high public policy through the contents of the applications they file with the USTPO. This Article explores how the United States has come to be in this position, exposes latent problems with the "patent first" approach, and considers the benefits and disadvantages of the "ask questions first, patents later" approaches employed by some other countries. The Article concludes that granting patents on morally controversial biotech subject matter and then asking whether such inventions should be patentable is bad policy for the United States and its patent system, and posits workable, proactive ways for Congress to successfully guard the patent-eligibility gate.

A brief guide to understanding patentability and the meaning of patents

This author provides a brief overview to the U.S. patent system with respect to DNA-based or gene patents, examines the statutory requirements for the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and its processes of review, and explains how this system is implemented in the issue or decline of a patent. The author describes the important role played by the courts in their continuing reinterpretation and application of the patent law. He notes that many issues raised in discussions about the perceived benefits to society or general concerns arising from the patenting of gene sequences actually pertain to matters of enforcement and licensing of patents. These aspects, the author notes, lie outside of the USPTO's purview. Social questions about access to patented subject matter-such as the practice of patented gene-based diagnostic tests-must be addressed in other forums.

How can you patent genes?

What accounts for the continued lack of clarity over the legal procedures for the patenting of DNA sequences? The patenting system was built for a "bricks-and-mortar" world rather than an information economy. The fact that genes are both material molecules and informational systems helps explain the difficulty that the patent system is going to continue to have.

Patents, morality and DNA: should there be intellectual property protection of the Human Genome Project?

This article examines the appropriateness of using existing patent laws in various jurisdictions in an effort to secure protection of the work currently being carried out on the Human Genome Project. Certain ethical and practical problems which arise from current practices in Europe, USA and Japan are explored.

It is submitted that the nature of the problems are such that it might be appropriate to consider alternative means of rewarding those involved in unravelling human DNA. An attempt is made to outline some appropriate matters to consider in developing such an alternative.

Are life patents ethical? Conflict between Catholic social teaching and agricultural biotechnology's patent regime

Patents for genetic material in the industrialized North have expanded significantly over the past twenty years, playing a crucial role in the current configuration of the agricultural biotechnology industries, and raising significant ethical issues. Patents have been claimed for genes, gene sequences, engineered crop species, and the technical processes to engineer them. Most critics have addressed the human and ecosystem health implications of genetically engineered crops, but these broad patents raise economic issues as well. The Catholic social teaching tradition offers guidelines for critiquing the economic implications of this new patent regime. The Catholic principle of the universal destination of goods implies that genes, gene sequences, and engineered crop varieties are ineligible for patent protection, although the processes to engineer these should be eligible. Religious leaders are likely to make a more substantive contribution to debates about agricultural biotechnology by addressing these life patents than by speculating that genetic engineering is "playing God."