Processing of visual social-communication cues during a social-perception of action task in autistic and non-autistic observers

Social perception and communication differ between those with and without autism, even when verbal fluency and intellectual ability are equated. Previous work found that observers responded more quickly to an actor's points if the actor had chosen by themselves where to point instead of being directed where to point. Notably, this 'choice-advantage' effect decreased across non-autistic participants as the number of autistic-like traits and tendencies increased (Pesquita et al., 2016). Here, we build on that work using the same task to study individuals over a broader range of the spectrum, from autistic to non-autistic, measuring both response initiation and mouse movement times, and considering the response to each actor separately. Autistic and non-autistic observers viewed videos of three different actors pointing to one of two locations, without knowing that the actors were sometimes freely choosing to point to one target and other times being directed where to point. All observers exhibited a choice-advantage overall, meaning they responded more rapidly when actors were freely choosing versus when they were directed, indicating a sensitivity to the actors' postural cues and movements. Our fine-grained analyses found a more robust choice-advantage to some actors than others, with autistic observers showing a choice-advantage only in response to one of the actors, suggesting that both actor and observer characteristics influence the overall effect. We briefly explore existing actor characteristics that may have contributed to this effect, finding that both duration of exposure to pre-movement cues and kinematic cues of the actors likely influence the choice advantage to different degrees across the groups. Altogether, the evidence suggested that both autistic and non-autistic individuals could detect the choice-advantage signal, but that for autistic observers the choice-advantage was actor specific. Notably, we found that the influence of the signal, when present, was detected early for all actors by the non-autistic observers, but detected later and only for one actor by the autistic observers. Altogether, we have more accurately characterized the ability of social-perception in autistic individuals as intact, but highlighted that detection of signal is likely delayed/distributed compared to non-autistic observers and that it is important to investigate actor characteristics that may influence detection and use of their social-perception signals.

Win-win or lose-lose: Children prefer the form of equality

In middle childhood, children's sense of fairness further develops, they are willing to pay a cost to maintain equality. Win-win and lose-lose are two forms of equality. Win-win equality refers to both parties maximizing benefits, while lose-lose equality means both parties incurring the maximum loss. Win-win equality allows third party upholding fairness to gain more reputational benefits without the violator being punished, embodying the principle of "benefiting oneself without harming others". On the other hand, lose-lose equality is a more deterrent form of fairness with the violator getting punished, and the third-party might experience a situation of "effort without appreciation." However, the specific form of equality which school-aged children prefer still requires further exploration. Therefore, adopting the dictator game paradigm of third-party punishment, we design two experiments to investigate the fairness preference of first to fourth-grade children when acting as a third party and to clarify patterns of age-related changes. Study 1 (N = 111) explored children's preferred form of fairness under advantageous inequity conditions. Study 2 (N = 122) further examined children's fairness preferences in disadvantageous inequity situations. The findings suggest that when confronted with inequitable distributions, whether rooted in disadvantageous or advantageous inequity, children display a notable tendency to utilize third-party punishment to achieve an equal allocation. Meanwhile, this tendency strengthens as they progress in grade levels. Notably, children consistently manifest a preference for win-win equality, highlighting their inclination towards mutually beneficial outcomes.

Effects of Induced Mood on Attention and Decision Strategies in Risky Choice

The effects of induced incidental moods on patterns of information search and decision outcomes were investigated in a risky choice task with mixed-domain problems. Viewing of short videos was used to induce either happy or sad mood in participants, who then made choices between pairs of options consisting of a probabilistic gain coupled with a probabilistic loss. Eyetracking measures of information search, specifically frequencies of transitions between key aspects of the decision alternatives, were analyzed and related to use of heuristic or analytic compensatory strategies. Data were also gathered in a control condition, where participants were instructed to use an EV-calculation strategy, a prototypical integrative compensatory strategy. Results showed significant differences in choices and attention transitions between the EV-instruction and the induced mood conditions, but minimal differences between the happy and sad induced mood conditions. Participants in the induced mood conditions showed relatively more evidence of heuristic strategy use, but analytic strategies remained the modal strategy in all conditions. Importantly, key types of attention transitions were shown to reliably predict the frequency of observed choices consistent with optimal (EV- maximizing) and certain heuristic strategies.

Is impulsivity related to attentional bias in cigarette smokers? An exploration across levels of nicotine dependency and deprivation

Research has largely focused on how attentional bias to smoking-related cues and impulsivity independently influence the development and maintenance of cigarette smoking, with limited exploration of the relationship between these mechanisms. The current experiments systematically assessed relationships between multiple dimensions of impulsivity and attentional bias, at different stages of attention, in smokers varying in nicotine dependency and deprivation. Nonsmokers (NS; n  = 26), light-satiated smokers (LS; n  = 25), heavy-satiated smokers (HS; n  = 23) and heavy 12-hour nicotine-deprived smokers (HD; n  = 30) completed the Barratt Impulsivity Scale, delayed discounting task, stop-signal task, information sampling task and a visual dot-probe assessing initial orientation (200 ms) and sustained attention (2000 ms) toward smoking-related cues. Sustained attention to smoking-related cues was present in both HS and LS, while initial orientation bias was only evident in HS. HS and LS also had greater levels of trait motor and nonplanning impulsivity and heightened impulsive choice on the delay discounting task compared with NS, while heightened trait attentional impulsivity was only found in HS. In contrast, in HD, nicotine withdrawal was associated with no attentional bias but heightened reflection impulsivity, poorer inhibitory control and significantly lower levels of impulsive choice relative to satiated smokers. Trait and behavioral impulsivity were not related to the extent of attentional bias to smoking-related cues at any stage of attention, level of nicotine dependency or state of deprivation. Findings have both clinical and theoretical implications, highlighting the unique and independent roles impulsivity and attentional bias may play at different stages of the nicotine addiction cycle.

Prefrontal activity during IOWA Gambling Task in young adult women

This study aims to investigate the relationships between personality traits of impulsivity, using the UPPS-P Impulsive Behaviour Scales shortened version, and prefrontal cortex (PFC) activity during the IOWA Gambling Task (IGT) in young adult women. The study included a sample of 83 young, healthy females (19.8 ± 1.4 years), who voluntarily took part in the study. Repeated measures analysis during the IGT revealed a significant increase in HbO (all p <.001; ηp2 >.31) and a decrease in Hbr (all p <.003; ηp2 >.08) in all prefrontal quadrants. This increase in oxygenation occurs primarily during the choice period under ambiguity (r =.23; p =.039). Additionally, there was a significant linear decrease in selecting the decks associated with a high frequency of losses (p <.001), while the favorable deck with low losses showed a linear increase (F = 12.96; p <.001). Notably, discrepancies were found between UPPS-P and IGT impulsivity ratings. The Lack of Perseverance and Lack of Premeditation scales from the UPPS-P were identified as significant predictors of HbO levels, mainly in the two quadrants of the left hemisphere's, lateral (adjusted R2 =.23; p <.001; f2 =.34) and rostral (adjusted R2 =.13; p <.002; f2 =.17). These findings suggest that young adult women predominantly adopt a punishment-avoidance strategy during IGT, exhibiting increased activation in the left hemisphere, especially during the task's initial phase characterized by ambiguity.

Optogenetic Inhibition of Rat Anterior Cingulate Cortex Impairs the Ability to Initiate and Stay on Task

Our prior research has identified neural correlates of cognitive control in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), leading us to hypothesize that the ACC is necessary for increasing attention as rats flexibly learn new contingencies during a complex reward-guided decision-making task. Here, we tested this hypothesis by using optogenetics to transiently inhibit the ACC, while rats of either sex performed the same two-choice task. ACC inhibition had a profound impact on behavior that extended beyond deficits in attention during learning when expected outcomes were uncertain. We found that ACC inactivation slowed and reduced the number of trials rats initiated and impaired both their accuracy and their ability to complete sessions. Furthermore, drift-diffusion model analysis suggested that free-choice performance and evidence accumulation (i.e., reduced drift rates) were degraded during initial learning-leading to weaker associations that were more easily overridden in later trial blocks (i.e., stronger bias). Together, these results suggest that in addition to attention-related functions, the ACC contributes to the ability to initiate trials and generally stay on task.

Recent Opioid Use Impedes Range Adaptation in Reinforcement Learning in Human Addiction

BACKGROUND

Drugs like opioids are potent reinforcers thought to co-opt value-based decisions by overshadowing other rewarding outcomes, but how this happens at a neurocomputational level remains elusive. Range adaptation is a canonical process of fine-tuning representations of value based on reward context. Here, we tested whether recent opioid exposure impacts range adaptation in opioid use disorder, potentially explaining why shifting decision making away from drug taking during this vulnerable period is so difficult.

METHODS

Participants who had recently (<90 days) used opioids (n = 34) or who had abstained from opioid use for ≥ 90 days (n = 20) and comparison control participants (n = 44) completed a reinforcement learning task designed to induce robust contextual modulation of value. Two models were used to assess the latent process that participants engaged while making their decisions: 1) a Range model that dynamically tracks context and 2) a standard Absolute model that assumes stationary, objective encoding of value.

RESULTS

Control participants and ≥90-days-abstinent participants with opioid use disorder exhibited choice patterns consistent with range-adapted valuation. In contrast, participants with recent opioid use were more prone to learn and encode value on an absolute scale. Computational modeling confirmed the behavior of most control participants and ≥90-days-abstinent participants with opioid use disorder (75%), but a minority in the recent use group (38%), was better fit by the Range model than the Absolute model. Furthermore, the degree to which participants relied on range adaptation correlated with duration of continuous abstinence and subjective craving/withdrawal.

CONCLUSIONS

Reduced context adaptation to available rewards could explain difficulty deciding about smaller (typically nondrug) rewards in the aftermath of drug exposure.

Life-History Trade-Offs in Drosophila: Flies Select a Diet to Maximize Reproduction at the Expense of Lifespan

Macronutrient intake impacts physiology, behavior, and gene expression in a wide range of organisms. We used the response surface methodology to compare how life history traits, lifespan, and reproduction differ as a function of protein and carbohydrate intakes under choice and no-choice feeding regimens in the fruit fly, Drosophila melanogaster. We found that when offered a choice of nutritionally complementary foods mated female flies regulated toward a protein to carbohydrate ratio (P:C) that was associated with shortened lifespan and maximal egg production when compared to response surfaces derived from flies fed 1 of a range of fixed diets differing in P:C (no-choice regimen). This difference in lifespan between choice and no-choice feeding was not seen in males or virgin flies, reflecting the fact that increased protein intake is triggered by mating to support egg production. However, whereas in mated females a higher P:C intake was associated with greater egg production under both choice and no-choice feeding, contrary to expectations, choice-fed mated flies laid fewer eggs than no-choice flies on equivalent macronutrient intakes, perhaps reflecting that they had to ingest twice the volume of food to attain an equivalent intake of nutrients than no-choice flies on a diet of equivalent P:C ratio.

The importance of choice and agency in animal models of addiction

The aim of this short commentary is twofold. First, it uncovers and outlines in broad strokes a historical, albeit oft-overlooked, trend toward a growing place for choice and agency in the design of animal models of addiction. Next, it tries to draw from this historical trend some perspectives and implications for future research.

Pre-acquired Functional Connectivity Predicts Choice Inconsistency

Economic choice theories usually assume that humans maximize utility in their choices. However, studies have shown that humans make inconsistent choices, leading to suboptimal behavior, even without context-dependent manipulations. Previous studies showed that activation in value and motor networks are associated with inconsistent choices at the moment of choice. Here, we investigated if the neural predispositions, measured before a choice task, can predict choice inconsistency in a later risky choice task. Using functional connectivity (FC) measures from resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (rsfMRI), derived before any choice was made, we aimed to predict subjects' inconsistency levels in a later-performed choice task. We hypothesized that rsfMRI FC measures extracted from value and motor brain areas would predict inconsistency. Forty subjects (21 females) completed a rsfMRI scan before performing a risky choice task. We compared models that were trained on FC that included only hypothesized value and motor regions with models trained on whole-brain FC. We found that both model types significantly predicted inconsistency levels. Moreover, even the whole-brain models relied mostly on FC between value and motor areas. For external validation, we used a neural network pretrained on FC matrices of 37,000 subjects and fine-tuned it on our data and again showed significant predictions. Together, this shows that the tendency for choice inconsistency is predicted by predispositions of the nervous system and that synchrony between the motor and value networks plays a crucial role in this tendency.

Loss, gain and choice difficulty in gambling patients: Neural and behavioural processes

Impaired decision-making is often displayed by individuals suffering from gambling disorder (GD). Since there are a variety of different phenomena influencing decision-making, we focused in this study on the effects of GD on neural and behavioural processes related to loss aversion and choice difficulty. Behavioural responses as well as brain images of 23 patients with GD and 20 controls were recorded while they completed a mixed gambles task, where they had to decide to either accept or reject gambles with different amounts of potential gain and loss. We found no behavioural loss aversion in either group and no group differences regarding loss and gain-related choice behaviour, but there was a weaker relation between choice difficulty and decision time in patients with GD. Similarly, we observed no group differences in processing of losses or gains, but choice difficulty was weaker associated with brain activity in the right anterior insula and anterior cingulate cortex in patients with GD. Our results showed for the first time the effects of GD on neural processes related to choice difficulty. In addition, our findings on choice difficulty give new insights on the psychopathology of GD and on neural processes related to impaired decision-making in GD.

The explore/exploit trade-off: An ecologically valid and translational framework that can advance mechanistic understanding of eating disorders

The explore/exploit trade-off is a decision-making process that is conserved across species and balances exploring unfamiliar choices of unknown value with choosing familiar options of known value to maximize reward. This framework is rooted in behavioral ecology and has traditionally been used to study maladaptive versus adaptive non-human animal foraging behavior. Researchers have begun to recognize the potential utility of understanding human decision-making and psychopathology through the explore/exploit trade-off. In this article, we propose that explore/exploit trade-off holds promise for advancing our mechanistic understanding of decision-making processes that confer vulnerability for and maintain eating pathology due to its neurodevelopmental bases, conservation across species, and ability to be mathematically modeled. We present a model for how suboptimal explore/exploit decision-making can promote disordered eating and present recommendations for future research applying this framework to eating pathology. Taken together, the explore/exploit trade-off provides a translational framework for expanding etiologic and maintenance models of eating pathology, given developmental changes in explore/exploit decision-making that coincide in time with the emergence of eating pathology and evidence of biased explore/exploit decision-making in psychopathology. Additionally, understanding explore/exploit decision-making in eating disorders may improve knowledge of their underlying pathophysiology, informing targeted clinical interventions such as neuromodulation and pharmacotherapy. PUBLIC SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT: The explore/exploit trade-off is a cross-species decision-making process whereby organisms choose between a known option with a known reward or sampling unfamiliar options. We hypothesize that imbalanced explore/exploit decision-making can promote disordered eating and present preliminary data. We propose that explore/exploit trade-off has significant potential to advance understanding of the neurocognitive and neurodevelopmental mechanisms of eating pathology, which could ultimately guide revisions of etiologic models and inform novel interventions.

Learning to Choose: Behavioral Dynamics Underlying the Initial Acquisition of Decision-Making

Current theories of decision-making propose that decisions arise through competition between choice options. Computational models of the decision process estimate how quickly information about choice options is integrated and how much information is needed to trigger a choice. Experiments using this approach typically report data from well-trained participants. As such, we do not know how the decision process evolves as a decision-making task is learned for the first time. To address this gap, we used a behavioral design separating learning the value of choice options from learning to make choices. We trained male rats to respond to single visual stimuli with different reward values. Then, we trained them to make choices between pairs of stimuli. Initially, the rats responded more slowly when presented with choices. However, as they gained experience in making choices, this slowing reduced. Response slowing on choice trials persisted throughout the testing period. We found that it was specifically associated with increased exponential variability when the rats chose the higher value stimulus. Additionally, our analysis using drift diffusion modeling revealed that the rats required less information to make choices over time. These reductions in the decision threshold occurred after just a single session of choice learning. These findings provide new insights into the learning process of decision-making tasks. They suggest that the value of choice options and the ability to make choices are learned separately and that experience plays a crucial role in improving decision-making performance.

Value Estimation versus Effort Mobilization: A General Dissociation between Ventromedial and Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex

Deciding on a course of action requires both an accurate estimation of option values and the right amount of effort invested in deliberation to reach sufficient confidence in the final choice. In a previous study, we have provided evidence, across a series of judgment and choice tasks, for a dissociation between the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), which would represent option values, and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), which would represent the duration of deliberation. Here, we first replicate this dissociation and extend it to the case of an instrumental learning task, in which 24 human volunteers (13 women) choose between options associated with probabilistic gains and losses. According to fMRI data recorded during decision-making, vmPFC activity reflects the sum of option values generated by a reinforcement learning model and dmPFC activity the deliberation time. To further generalize the role of the dmPFC in mobilizing effort, we then analyze fMRI data recorded in the same participants while they prepare to perform motor and cognitive tasks (squeezing a handgrip or making numerical comparisons) to maximize gains or minimize losses. In both cases, dmPFC activity is associated with the output of an effort regulation model, and not with response time. Taken together, these results strengthen a general theory of behavioral control that implicates the vmPFC in the estimation of option values and the dmPFC in the energization of relevant motor and cognitive processes.

The neural representation of metacognition in preferential decision-making

Humans regularly assess the quality of their judgements, which helps them adjust their behaviours. Metacognition is the ability to accurately evaluate one's own judgements, and it is assessed by comparing objective task performance with subjective confidence report in perceptual decisions. However, for preferential decisions, assessing metacognition in preference-based decisions is difficult because it depends on subjective goals rather than the objective criterion. Here, we develop a new index that integrates choice, reaction time, and confidence report to quantify trial-by-trial metacognitive sensitivity in preference judgements. We found that the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and the right anterior insular were more activated when participants made bad metacognitive evaluations. Our study suggests a crucial role of the dmPFC-insula network in representing online metacognitive sensitivity in preferential decisions.

Attribute latencies causally shape intertemporal decisions

Intertemporal choices - decisions that play out over time - pervade our life. Thus, how people make intertemporal choices is a fundamental question. Here, we investigate the role of attribute latency (the time between when people start to process different attributes) in shaping intertemporal preferences using five experiments with choices between smaller-sooner and larger-later rewards. In the first experiment, we identify attribute latencies using mouse-trajectories and find that they predict individual differences in choices, response times, and changes across time constraints. In the other four experiments we test the causal link from attribute latencies to choice, staggering the display of the attributes. This changes attribute latencies and intertemporal preferences. Displaying the amount information first makes people more patient, while displaying time information first does the opposite. These findings highlight the importance of intra-choice dynamics in shaping intertemporal choices and suggest that manipulating attribute latency may be a useful technique for nudging.

Dopamine activity in the nigrostriatal pathway alters cue-induced risky choice patterns in female rats

Deficits in cost/benefit decision making is a critical risk factor for gambling disorder. Reward-paired cues may play an important role, as these stimuli can enhance risk preference in rats. Despite extensive research implicating the dorsal striatum in the compulsive aspects of addiction, the role of nigrostriatal dopaminergic activity in cue-induced risk preference remains unclear, particularly in females. Accordingly, we examined the effects of manipulating the dopaminergic nigrostriatal pathway on cue-induced risky choice in female rats. TH:Cre rats were trained on the cued version of the rat Gambling Task. This task was designed such that maximal reward is attained by avoiding the high-risk, high-reward options and instead favouring the options associated with lower per-trial gains, as they feature less frequent and shorter time-out penalties. Adding reward-paired audiovisual cues to the task leads to greater risky choice on average. To assess the role of the nigrostriatal pathway, a viral vector carrying either Cre-dependent inhibitory or excitatory DREADD was infused into the substantia nigra. Rats then received clozapine-N-oxide either during task acquisition or after a stable performance baseline was reached. Inhibition of this pathway accelerated the development of risk preference in early sessions and increased risky choice during performance, but long-term inhibition actually improved decision making. Activation of this pathway had minimal effects. These results provide evidence for the involvement of the dopaminergic nigrostriatal pathway in cue-induced risk preference in females, therefore shedding light on its role in cost/benefit decision-making deficits and expanding our knowledge of the female dopaminergic system.

Differences in Discounting Behavior and Brain Responses for Food and Money Reward

Most neuroeconomic research seeks to understand how value influences decision-making. The influence of reward type is less well understood. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate delay discounting of primary (i.e., food) and secondary rewards (i.e., money) in 28 healthy, normal-weighted participants (mean age = 26.77; 18 females). To decipher differences in discounting behavior between reward types, we compared how well-different option-based statistical models (exponential, hyperbolic discounting) and attribute-wise heuristic choice models (intertemporal choice heuristic, dual reasoning and implicit framework theory, trade-off model) captured the reward-specific discounting behavior. Contrary to our hypothesis of different strategies for different rewards, we observed comparable discounting behavior for money and food (i.e., exponential discounting). Higher k values for food discounting suggest that individuals decide more impulsive if confronted with food. The fMRI revealed that money discounting was associated with enhanced activity in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, involved in executive control; the right dorsal striatum, associated with reward processing; and the left hippocampus, involved in memory encoding/retrieval. Food discounting, instead, was associated with higher activity in the left temporoparietal junction suggesting social reinforcement of food decisions. Although our findings do not confirm our hypothesis of different discounting strategies for different reward types, they are in line with the notion that reward types have a significant influence on impulsivity with primary rewards leading to more impulsive choices.

A critical review of risk-sensitive foraging

Foraging is risk sensitive if choices depend on the variability of returns from the options as well as their mean return. Risk-sensitive foraging is important in behavioural ecology, psychology and neurophysiology. It has been explained both in terms of mechanisms and in terms of evolutionary advantage. We provide a critical review, evaluating both mechanistic and evolutionary accounts. Some derivations of risk sensitivity from mechanistic models based on psychophysics are not convincing because they depend on an inappropriate use of Jensen's inequality. Attempts have been made to link risk sensitivity to the ecology of a species, but again these are not convincing. The field of risk-sensitive foraging has provided a focus for theoretical and empirical work and has yielded important insights, but we lack a simple and empirically defendable general account of it in either mechanistic or evolutionary terms. However, empirical analysis of choice sequences under theoretically motivated experimental designs and environmental settings appears a promising avenue for mapping the scope and relative merits of existing theories. Simply put, the devil is in the sequence.

Altruism, reciprocity, and probability: Examining relations through a discounting framework

Probability and reciprocation have been implicated as key variables for understanding altruism and cooperation. Social discounting, which describes the decline in reward value as the recipient increases in social distance, has provided a framework through which to examine altruistic and cooperative choice. A previous study introduced reciprocal discounting as a way of studying perceived altruism from others (termed reciprocal altruism). But probability discounting has not yet been examined in relation to reciprocal discounting. In order to extend research on reciprocal discounting, the present study evaluated correlations between social, reciprocal, and probability discounting as well as relations between standard social distance (used in social discounting) and reciprocal social distance (the participant's perceived social distance placement on someone else's list) among 129 participants. Upon evaluation, the fit of median reciprocal discount rates to the hyperbolic form was replicated. A strong correlation between social and reciprocal discount rates and a moderate correlation between social and probability discount rates were found as well. Additionally, reciprocal and probability discount rates yielded moderate correlations while reciprocal and standard social distance analyses revealed more correspondence between reward values when persons were socially close (i.e., Person 1) or socially distant (i.e., Person 100). This study provides further evidence that reciprocation and probability likely impact altruistic choice while laying groundwork for further investigations into social distance.

Choice impulsivity after repeated social stress is associated with increased perineuronal nets in the medial prefrontal cortex

Repeated stress can predispose to substance abuse. However, behavioral and neurobiological adaptations that link stress to substance abuse remain unclear. This study investigates whether intermittent social defeat (ISD), a stress protocol that promotes drug-seeking behavior, alters intertemporal decision-making and cortical inhibitory function in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). Male long evans rats were trained in a delay discounting task (DDT) where rats make a choice between a fast (1 s) small reward (1 sugar pellet) and a large reward (3 sugar pellets) that comes with a time delay (10 s or 20 s). A decreased preference for delayed rewards was used as an index of choice impulsivity. Rats were exposed to ISD and tested in the DDT 24 h after each stress episode, and one- and two-weeks after the last stress episode. Immunohistochemistry was performed in rat's brains to evaluate perineuronal nets (PNNs) and parvalbumin GABA interneurons (PV) labeling as markers of inhibitory function in mPFC. ISD significantly decreased the preference for delayed large rewards in low impulsive, but not high impulsive, animals. ISD also increased the density of PNNs in the mPFC. These results suggest that increased choice impulsivity and cortical inhibition predispose animals to seek out rewards after stress.

How do animals weigh conflicting information about reward sources over time? Comparing dynamic averaging models

Optimal foraging theory suggests that animals make decisions which maximize their food intake per unit time when foraging, but the mechanisms animals use to track the value of behavioral alternatives and choose between them remain unclear. Several models for how animals integrate past experience have been suggested. However, these models make differential predictions for the occurrence of spontaneous recovery of choice: a behavioral phenomenon in which a hiatus from the experimental environment results in animals reverting to a behavioral allocation consistent with a reward distribution from the more distant past, rather than one consistent with their most recently experienced distribution. To explore this phenomenon and compare these models, three free-operant experiments with rats were conducted using a serial reversal design. In Phase 1, two responses (A and B) were baited with pellets on concurrent variable interval schedules, favoring option A. In Phase 2, lever baiting was reversed to favor option B. Rats then entered a delay period, where they were maintained at weight in their home cages and no experimental sessions took place. Following this delay, preference was assessed using initial responding in test sessions where levers were presented, but not baited. Models were compared in performance, including an exponentially weighted moving average, the Temporal Weighting Rule, and variants of these models. While the data provided strong evidence of spontaneous recovery of choice, the form and extent of recovery was inconsistent with the models under investigation. Potential interpretations are discussed in relation to both the decision rule and valuation functions employed.

Predictions about reward outcomes in rhesus monkeys

Human infants and nonhuman animals respond to surprising events by looking longer at unexpected than expected situations. These looking responses provide core cognitive evidence that nonverbal minds make predictions about possible outcomes and detect when these predictions fail to match reality. We propose that this phenomenon has crucial parallels with the processes of reward prediction error, indexing the difference between expected and actual reward outcomes. Most work on reward prediction errors to date involves neurobiological techniques that cannot be implemented in many relevant populations, so we developed a novel behavioral task to assess monkeys' predictions about reward outcomes using looking time responses. In Study 1, we tested how semi-free-ranging monkeys (n = 210) responded to positive error (more rewards than expected), negative error (less rewards than expected), and a number control. We found that monkeys looked longer at a given reward when it was unexpectedly large or small, compared to when the same quantity was expected. In Study 2, we compared responses in the positive error condition in monkeys ranging from infancy to old age (n = 363), to assess lifespan changes in sensitivity to reward predictions. We found that adolescent monkeys showed heightened responses to unexpected rewards, similar to patterns seen in humans, but showed no changes during aging. These results suggest that monkeys' looking responses can be used to track their predictions about rewards, and that monkeys share some developmental signatures of reward sensitivity with humans, providing a new approach to access cognitive processes underlying reward-based decision making. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Multiple timescales of temporal context in risky choice: Behavioral identification and relationships to physiological arousal

Context-dependence is fundamental to risky monetary decision-making. A growing body of evidence suggests that temporal context, or recent events, alters risk-taking at a minimum of three timescales: immediate (e.g. trial-by-trial), neighborhood (e.g. a group of consecutive trials), and global (e.g. task-level). To examine context effects, we created a novel monetary choice set with intentional temporal structure in which option values shifted between multiple levels of value magnitude ("contexts") several times over the course of the task. This structure allowed us to examine whether effects of each timescale were simultaneously present in risky choice behavior and the potential mechanistic role of arousal, an established correlate of risk-taking, in context-dependency. We found that risk-taking was sensitive to immediate, neighborhood, and global timescales: risk-taking decreased following large (vs. small) outcome amounts, increased following large positive (but not negative) shifts in context, and increased when cumulative earnings exceeded expectations. We quantified arousal with skin conductance responses, which were related to the global timescale, increasing with cumulative earnings, suggesting that physiological arousal captures a task-level assessment of performance. Our results both replicate and extend prior research by demonstrating that risky decision-making is consistently dynamic at multiple timescales and that the role of arousal in risk-taking extends to some, but not all timescales of context-dependence.

Option similarity modulates the link between choice and memory

Choices made in everyday life are highly variable. Sometimes, you may find yourself choosing between two similar options (e.g., breakfast foods to eat) and other times between two dissimilar options (e.g., what to buy with a gift certificate). The goal of the present study was to understand how the similarity of choice options affects our ability to remember what we choose and what we did not choose. We hypothesized that choosing between similar as compared to dissimilar options would evoke a comparison-based strategy (evaluating options with respect to one another), fostering a relational form of encoding and leading to better memory for both the chosen and unchosen options. In Experiment 1, participants reported their strategy when choosing between pairs of similar or dissimilar options, revealing that participants were more likely to use a comparison-based strategy when faced with similar options. In Experiment 2, we tested memory after participants made choices between similar or dissimilar options, finding improved memory for both chosen and unchosen options from the similar compared to dissimilar choice trials. In Experiment 3, we examined strategy use when choosing between pairs of similar or dissimilar options and memory for these options. Replicating and extending the results of the first two experiments, we found that participants were more likely to use a comparison-based strategy when choosing between similar than dissimilar options, and that the positive effect of similarity on memory was stronger for unchosen than chosen options when controlling for strategy use. We interpret our results as evidence that option similarity impacts the mnemonic processes used during choice, altering what we encode and ultimately remember about our choices.

A view-based decision mechanism for rewards in the primate amygdala

Primates make decisions visually by shifting their view from one object to the next, comparing values between objects, and choosing the best reward, even before acting. Here, we show that when monkeys make value-guided choices, amygdala neurons encode their decisions in an abstract, purely internal representation defined by the monkey's current view but not by specific object or reward properties. Across amygdala subdivisions, recorded activity patterns evolved gradually from an object-specific value code to a transient, object-independent code in which currently viewed and last-viewed objects competed to reflect the emerging view-based choice. Using neural-network modeling, we identified a sequence of computations by which amygdala neurons implemented view-based decision making and eventually recovered the chosen object's identity when the monkeys acted on their choice. These findings reveal a neural mechanism in the amygdala that derives object choices from abstract, view-based computations, suggesting an efficient solution for decision problems with many objects.

Don't look back on failure: spontaneous uncertainty monitoring in chimpanzees

During computer-controlled cognitive tasks, chimpanzees often look up at the food dispenser, which activates at the same time as feedback for the correct choice but not for feedback for the incorrect choice. Do these "looking back" behaviors also indicate signs of spontaneous monitoring of their confidence in their choices? To address this question, we delayed the feedback for 1 s after their choice responses and observed their look-back behaviors during the delay period. Two chimpanzees looked up at the food dispenser significantly less frequently when their choice was incorrect (but the feedback was not given) than when it was correct. These look-back behaviors have not been explicitly trained under experimental contexts. Therefore, these results indicate that chimpanzees spontaneously change the frequency of their look-back behaviors in response to the correctness or incorrectness of their own choices, even without external feedback, suggesting that their look-back behaviors may reflect the level of "confidence" or "uncertainty" of their responses immediately before.

Adaptive decision-making depends on pupil-linked arousal in rats performing tactile discrimination tasks

Perceptual decision-making is a dynamic cognitive process and is shaped by many factors, including behavioral state, reward contingency, and sensory environment. To understand the extent to which adaptive behavior in decision-making is dependent on pupil-linked arousal, we trained head-fixed rats to perform perceptual decision-making tasks and systematically manipulated the probability of Go and No-go stimuli while simultaneously measuring their pupil size in the tasks. Our data demonstrated that the animals adaptively modified their behavior in response to the changes in the sensory environment. The response probability to both Go and No-go stimuli decreased as the probability of the Go stimulus being presented decreased. Analyses within the signal detection theory framework showed that while the animals' perceptual sensitivity was invariant, their decision criterion increased as the probability of the Go stimulus decreased. Simulation results indicated that the adaptive increase in the decision criterion will increase possible water rewards during the task. Moreover, the adaptive decision-making is dependent on pupil-linked arousal as the increase in the decision criterion was the largest during low pupil-linked arousal periods. Taken together, our results demonstrated that the rats were able to adjust their decision-making to maximize rewards in the tasks, and that adaptive behavior in perceptual decision-making is dependent on pupil-linked arousal.NEW & NOTEWORTHY Perceptual decision-making is a dynamic cognitive process and is shaped by many factors. However, the extent to which changes in sensory environment result in adaptive decision-making remains poorly understood. Our data provided new experimental evidence demonstrating that the rats were able to adaptively modify their decision criterion to maximize water reward in response to changes in the statistics of the sensory environment. Furthermore, the adaptive decision-making is dependent on pupil-linked arousal.

The road not taken: Common and distinct neural correlates of regret and relief

Humans anticipate and evaluate both obtained and counterfactual outcomes - outcomes that could have been had an alternate decision been taken - and experience associated emotions of regret and relief. Although many functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have examined the neural correlates of these emotions, there is substantial heterogeneity in their results. We conducted coordinate-based ALE and network-based ANM meta-analysis of fMRI studies of experienced regret and relief to examine commonalities and differences in their neural correlates. Regionally, we observed that the experience of both regret and relief was associated with greater activation in the right ventral striatum (VS), which is implicated in tracking reward prediction error. At the network level, regret and relief shared the reward-sensitive mesocorticolimbic network with preferential activation of the medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) for regret processing and medial cingulate cortex (MCC) for relief processing. Our research identified shared and separable brain systems subserving regret and relief experience, which may inform the treatment of regret-related mood disorders.

Inhibition and paradoxical choice

The present study evaluated the role of inhibition in paradoxical choice in pigeons. In a paradoxical choice procedure, pigeons receive a choice between two alternatives. Choosing the "suboptimal" alternative is followed 20% of the time by one cue (the S+) that is always reinforced, and 80% of the time by another cue (S-) that is never reinforced. Thus, this alternative leads to an overall reinforcement rate of 20%. Choosing the "optimal" alternative, however, is followed by one of two cues (S3 or S4), each reinforced 50% of the time. Thus, this alternative leads to an overall reinforcement rate of 50%. González and Blaisdell (2021) reported that development of paradoxical choice was positively correlated to the development of inhibition to the S- (signal that no food will be delivered on that trial) post-choice stimulus. The current experiment tested the hypothesis that inhibition to a post-choice stimulus is causally related to suboptimal preference. Following acquisition of suboptimal preference, pigeons received two manipulations: in one condition one of the cues in the optimal alternative (S4) was extinguished and, in another condition, the S- cue was partially reinforced. When tested on the choice task afterward, both manipulations resulted in a decrement in suboptimal preference. This result is paradoxical given that both manipulations made the suboptimal alternative the richer option. We discuss the implications of our results, arguing that inhibition of a post-choice cue increases attraction to or value of that choice.

Evidence accumulation is not essential for generating intertemporal preference: A comparison of dynamic cognitive models of matching tasks

Intertemporal preference has been investigated mainly with a choice paradigm. However, a matching paradigm might be more informative for a proper inference about intertemporal preference and a deep understanding of the underlying cognitive mechanisms. This research involved two empirical studies using the matching paradigm and compared various corresponding dynamic models. These models were developed under either the framework of decision field theory, an exemplar theory assuming evidence accumulation, or a non-evidence-accumulation framework built upon the well-established notions of random utility and discrimination threshold (i.e., the RUDT framework). Most of these models were alternative-based whereas the others were attribute-based ones. Participants in Study 1 were required to fill in the amount of an immediate stimulus to make it as attractive as a delayed stimulus, whereas those in Study 2 needed to accomplish a more general matching task in which either the payoff amount or delay length of one stimulus was missing. Consistent behavioral regularities regarding both matching values and response times were revealed in these studies. The results of model comparison favored in general the RUDT framework as well as an attribute-based perspective on intertemporal preference. In addition, the predicted matching values and response times of the best RUDT model were also highly correlated with the observed data and replicated most observed behavioral regularities. Together, this research and previous modeling work on intertemporal choice suggest that evidence accumulation is not essential for generating intertemporal preference. Future research should examine the validity of the new framework in other preferential decisions for a more stringent test of the framework.

Behavioral read-out from population value signals in primate orbitofrontal cortex

The primate orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) has long been recognized for its role in value-based decisions; however, the exact mechanism linking value representations in the OFC to decision outcomes has remained elusive. Here, to address this question, we show, in non-human primates, that trial-wise variability in choices can be explained by variability in value signals decoded from many simultaneously recorded OFC neurons. Mechanistically, this relationship is consistent with the projection of activity within a low-dimensional value-encoding subspace onto a potentially higher-dimensional, behaviorally potent output subspace. Identifying this neural-behavioral link answers longstanding questions about the role of the OFC in economic decision-making and suggests population-level read-out mechanisms for the OFC similar to those recently identified in sensory and motor cortex.

Electrophysiological population dynamics reveal context dependencies during decision making in human frontal cortex

Evidence from monkeys and humans suggests that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) encodes the subjective value of options under consideration during choice. Data from non-human primates suggests that these value signals are context-dependent, representing subjective value in a way influenced by the decision makers' recent experience. Using electrodes distributed throughout cortical and subcortical structures, human epilepsy patients performed an auction task where they repeatedly reported the subjective values they placed on snack food items. High-gamma activity in many cortical and subcortical sites including the OFC positively correlated with subjective value. Other OFC sites showed signals contextually modulated by the subjective value of previously offered goods-a context dependency predicted by theory but not previously observed in humans. These results suggest that value and value-context signals are simultaneously present but separately represented in human frontal cortical activity.

Reliable population code for subjective economic value from heterogeneous neuronal signals in primate orbitofrontal cortex

Behavior-related neuronal signals often vary between neurons, which might reflect the unreliability of individual neurons or a truly heterogeneous code. This notion may also apply to economic ("value-based") choices and the underlying reward signals. Reward value is subjective and can be described by a nonlinearly weighted magnitude (utility) and probability. Defining subjective values relies on the continuity axiom, whose testing involves structured variations of a wide range of reward magnitudes and probabilities. Axiom compliance demonstrates understanding of the stimuli and the meaningful character of choices. Using these tests, we investigated the encoding of subjective economic value by neurons in a key economic-decision structure of the monkey brain, the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). We found that individual neurons carry heterogeneous neuronal value signals that largely fail to match the animal's choices. However, neuronal population signals matched the animal's choices well, suggesting accurate subjective economic value encoding by a heterogeneous population of unreliable neurons.

Further observations on the reinforcing value of sucrose solutions: Interaction between quantity and concentration

According to the Multiplicative Hyperbolic Model of reinforcer value (MHM), the value of a reinforcer is an increasing hyperbolic function of its size. In addition it is generally accepted that in the case of soluble reinforcers such as sucrose, value is an increasing function of molar concentration. The present experiment examined the interaction between size and concentration on the effectiveness of sucrose reinforcers in an operant choice paradigm. Rats were trained under an adjusting-magnitude schedule in which a response on lever B delivered a fixed volume of a sucrose solution, while a response on lever A delivered a 0.8-M sucrose solution, the volume of which, qA, was adjusted according to the rats' choices. When B was preferred in a given block of trials, qA was increased in the following block; when A was preferred, qA was reduced in the following block. The concentration and volume of B (cB, qB) were varied across six phases of the experiment and the corresponding indifference magnitudes of A (qA(50)) were measured. Log qA(50) increased and qB/qA(50) declined as approximately linear functions of log cB, consistent with the supposition that reinforcer value was determined by multiplicative combination of hyperbolic expressions representing concentration and volume.

Neural landscape diffusion resolves conflicts between needs across time

Animals perform flexible goal-directed behaviours to satisfy their basic physiological needs1-12. However, little is known about how unitary behaviours are chosen under conflicting needs. Here we reveal principles by which the brain resolves such conflicts between needs across time. We developed an experimental paradigm in which a hungry and thirsty mouse is given free choices between equidistant food and water. We found that mice collect need-appropriate rewards by structuring their choices into persistent bouts with stochastic transitions. High-density electrophysiological recordings during this behaviour revealed distributed single neuron and neuronal population correlates of a persistent internal goal state guiding future choices of the mouse. We captured these phenomena with a mathematical model describing a global need state that noisily diffuses across a shifting energy landscape. Model simulations successfully predicted behavioural and neural data, including population neural dynamics before choice transitions and in response to optogenetic thirst stimulation. These results provide a general framework for resolving conflicts between needs across time, rooted in the emergent properties of need-dependent state persistence and noise-driven shifts between behavioural goals.

Selective chemogenetic inactivation of corticoaccumbal projections disrupts trait choice impulsivity

Impulsive choice has enduring trait-like characteristics and is defined by preference for small immediate rewards over larger delayed ones. Importantly, it is a determining factor in the development and persistence of substance use disorder (SUD). Emerging evidence from human and animal studies suggests frontal cortical regions exert influence over striatal reward processing areas during decision-making in impulsive choice or delay discounting (DD) tasks. The goal of this study was to examine how these circuits are involved in decision-making in animals with defined trait impulsivity. To this end, we trained adolescent male rats to stable behavior on a DD procedure and then re-trained them in adulthood to assess trait-like, conserved impulsive choice across development. We then used chemogenetic tools to selectively and reversibly target corticostriatal projections during performance of the DD task. The prelimbic region of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) was injected with a viral vector expressing inhibitory designer receptors exclusively activated by designer drugs (Gi-DREADD), and then mPFC projections to the nucleus accumbens core (NAc) were selectively suppressed by intra-NAc administration of the Gi-DREADD actuator clozapine-n-oxide (CNO). Inactivation of the mPFC-NAc projection elicited a robust increase in impulsive choice in rats with lower vs. higher baseline impulsivity. This demonstrates a fundamental role for mPFC afferents to the NAc during choice impulsivity and suggests that maladaptive hypofrontality may underlie decreased executive control in animals with higher levels of choice impulsivity. Results such as these may have important implications for the pathophysiology and treatment of impulse control, SUDs, and related psychiatric disorders.

Sex and age differences in mice models of effort-based decision-making and anergia in depression: the role of dopamine, and cerebral-dopamine-neurotrophic-factor

Mesolimbic dopamine (DA) regulates vigor in motivated behavior. While previous results have mainly been performed in male rodents, the present studies compared CD1 male and female mice in effort-based decision-making tests of motivation. These tests offered choices between several reinforcers that require different levels of effort (progressive ratio/choice task and 3-choice-T-maze task). Sweet reinforcers were used in both tasks. In the operant tasks, females worked harder as the task required more effort to access a 10% sucrose solution. Although males and females did not differ in preference for 10% vs 3% solutions under free concurrent presentation, females consumed more of the 10% solution when tested alone. The operant task requires a long period of training and changes in the DA system due to age can be mediating long-term changes in effort. Thus, age and sex factors were evaluated in the T-maze task, which requires only a short training period. Both sexes and ages were equally active when habituated to the running wheel (RW), but females consumed more sweet pellets than males, especially at an older age. Both sexes had a strong preference for the RW compared to more sedentary reinforcers in the 3-choice-T-maze test, but older animals spent less time running and ate more than the young ones. The DA-depleting agent tetrabenazine reduced time running in older mice but not in adolescents. Cerebral-dopamine-neurotrophic-factor was reduced in older mice of both sexes compared to adolescent mice. These results emphasize the importance of taking into account differences in sex and age when evaluating willingness to exert effort for specific reinforcers.

Working memory and attention in choice

We study the role of attention and working memory in choices where options are presented sequentially rather than simultaneously. We build a model where a costly attention effort is chosen, which can vary over time. Evidence is accumulated proportionally to this effort and the utility of the reward. Crucially, the evidence accumulated decays over time. Optimal attention allocation maximizes expected utility from final choice; the optimal solution takes the decay into account, so attention is preferentially devoted to later times; but convexity of the flow attention cost prevents it from being concentrated near the end. We test this model with a choice experiment where participants observe sequentially two options. In our data the option presented first is, everything else being equal, significantly less likely to be chosen. This recency effect has a natural explanation with appropriate parameter values in our model of leaky evidence accumulation, where the decline is stronger for the option observed first. Analysis of choice, response time and brain imaging data provide support for the model. Working memory plays an essential role. The recency bias is stronger for participants with weaker performance in working memory tasks. Also activity in parietal areas, coding the stored value in working, declines over time as predicted.

Abstract perceptual choice signals during action-linked decisions in the human brain

Humans can make abstract choices independent of motor actions. However, in laboratory tasks, choices are typically reported with an associated action. Consequentially, knowledge about the neural representation of abstract choices is sparse, and choices are often thought to evolve as motor intentions. Here, we show that in the human brain, perceptual choices are represented in an abstract, motor-independent manner, even when they are directly linked to an action. We measured MEG signals while participants made choices with known or unknown motor response mapping. Using multivariate decoding, we quantified stimulus, perceptual choice, and motor response information with distinct cortical distributions. Choice representations were invariant to whether the response mapping was known during stimulus presentation, and they occupied a distinct representational space from motor signals. As expected from an internal decision variable, they were informed by the stimuli, and their strength predicted decision confidence and accuracy. Our results demonstrate abstract neural choice signals that generalize to action-linked decisions, suggesting a general role of an abstract choice stage in human decision-making.

State-dependent risky choices in primates: Variation in energy budget does not affect tufted capuchin monkeys' (Sapajus spp.) risky choices

Economic models predict that rational decision makers' choices between a constant, "safe" option and a variable, "risky" option leading, on average, to the same payoff, should be random. However, a wealth of research has revealed that, when faced with risky decisions, both human and nonhuman animals deviate from economic rationality. According to the risk-sensitivity theory, individuals should prefer a safe option when they are in a positive energy state and a risky option when they are in a negative energy state. The abundance/risk hypothesis proposes that individuals should prefer risky options when diet quality exceeds their nutritional requirements. We tested how energy budget affects decision making under risk by presenting 22 capuchins belonging to two colonies (IT: N = 12, US: N = 10) with a risky choice task. Capuchins had to choose between a constant option (always four food items) and a variable option (one or seven food items with a 50% probability) in two conditions. In the Low-energy condition capuchins were tested before their main meal, whereas in the High-energy condition they were tested following a high-caloric meal. In neither colony did we find a significant difference between conditions, suggesting that the energy budget did not affect risk preferences. However, we found differences between colonies in their general response to risky choices: US capuchins were more risk-prone after selecting a safe option than a risky option and after selecting a bad (one food item) than a good (seven food items) risky option, whereas this did not hold true in IT capuchins. Furthermore, in the IT colony, males were more risk-prone under the High-energy condition compared to the Low-energy condition. Subtle differences in individual characteristics, management conditions, or stochastic founder effects may be implied, with relevant consequences for the outcomes of research on risky decision-making across laboratories.

Family first! Influence of parental investment in Guinea pigs (Cavia porcellus) prosocial choices

Literature often assumed that prosocial behaviours (behaviours that benefit others with or without a cost for the actor) would have evolved many species to improve the effectiveness of parental care (Decety and Cowell 2014). While this hypothesis is rarely questioned at a phylogenetic scale, it was never tested at an individual scale to the best of our knowledge. Therefore, we chose to study the impact of effective parental care on prosociality by comparing the prosocial tendencies of Guinea pigs before mating, during mating and after parturition. We conducted Prosocial Choice Tests on three groups of Guinea pigs (males, multiparous females, and nulliparous females). Subjects had to choose between three options: a prosocial option (subject and recipient being rewarded), a selfish option (only subject was rewarded), and a null option (no reward). Our results showed high prosociality towards their mating partner and their young both in male and in female subjects. Males became selfish towards other males after parturition. Among other interesting results, we found a direct reciprocity phenomenon. We also highlighted an ability in our subjects to consider both the identity and relationship shared with the recipient, such as tolerance (enhancing prosociality), dominance rank (being tested with a dominant recipient increasing selfish responses), and its behaviour (begging calls eliciting prosociality, while threatening ones decreasing it), to choose an option. These findings suggested that prosociality could be modulated by many factors and that the constraints and stakes induced by breeding would highly influence prosocial strategies.

Stress, intertemporal choice, and mitigation behavior during the COVID-19 pandemic

Delayed gratification is an important focus of research, given its potential relationship to forms of behavior, such as savings, susceptibility to addiction, and pro-social behaviors. The COVID-19 pandemic may be one of the most consequential recent examples of this phenomenon, with people's willingness to delay gratification affecting their willingness to socially distance themselves. COVID-19 also provides a naturalistic context by which to evaluate the ecological validity of delayed gratification. This article outlines four large-scale online experiments (total N = 12, 906) where we ask participants to perform Money Earlier or Later (MEL) decisions (e.g., $5 today vs. $10 tomorrow) and to also report stress measures and pandemic mitigation behaviors. We found that stress increases impulsivity and that less stressed and more patient individuals socially distanced more throughout the pandemic. These results help resolve longstanding theoretical debates in the MEL literature as well as provide policymakers with scientific evidence that can help inform response strategies in the future. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Value dynamics affect choice preparation during decision-making

During decision-making, neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) sequentially represent the value of each option in turn, but it is unclear how these dynamics are translated into a choice response. One brain region that may be implicated in this process is the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which strongly connects with OFC and contains many neurons that encode the choice response. We investigated how OFC value signals interacted with ACC neurons encoding the choice response by performing simultaneous high-channel count recordings from the two areas in nonhuman primates. ACC neurons encoding the choice response steadily increased their firing rate throughout the decision-making process, peaking shortly before the time of the choice response. Furthermore, the value dynamics in OFC affected ACC ramping-when OFC represented the more valuable option, ACC ramping accelerated. Because OFC tended to represent the more valuable option more frequently and for a longer duration, this interaction could explain how ACC selects the more valuable response.

Prediction errors drive dynamic changes in neural patterns that guide behavior

Learning describes the process by which our internal expectation models of the world are updated by surprising outcomes (prediction errors [PEs]) to improve predictions of future events. However, the mechanisms through which error signals dynamically influence existing neural representations are unknown. Here, we use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in humans solving a two-step Markov decision task to investigate changes in neural activation patterns following PEs. Using a dynamic multivariate pattern analysis, we can show that PE-related fMRI responses in error-coding regions predict trial-by-trial changes in multivariate neural patterns in the orbitofrontal cortex, the precuneus, and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). Importantly, the dynamics of these pattern changes in the vmPFC also predicted upcoming changes in choice strategies and thus highlight the importance of these pattern changes for behavior.

Frontopolar cortex represents complex features and decision value during choice between environments

Important decisions often involve choosing between complex environments that define future item encounters. Despite its importance for adaptive behavior and distinct computational challenges, decision-making research primarily focuses on item choice, ignoring environment choice altogether. Here we contrast previously studied item choice in ventromedial prefrontal cortex with lateral frontopolar cortex (FPl) linked to environment choice. Furthermore, we propose a mechanism for how FPl decomposes and represents complex environments during decision making. Specifically, we trained a choice-optimized, brain-naive convolutional neural network (CNN) and compared predicted CNN activation with actual FPl activity. We showed that the high-dimensional FPl activity decomposes environment features to represent the complexity of an environment to make such choice possible. Moreover, FPl functionally connects with posterior cingulate cortex for guiding environment choice. Further probing FPl's computation revealed a parallel processing mechanism in extracting multiple environment features.

Abstract Value Encoding in Neural Populations But Not Single Neurons

An important open question in neuroeconomics is how the brain represents the value of offers in a way that is both abstract (allowing for comparison) and concrete (preserving the details of the factors that influence value). Here, we examine neuronal responses to risky and safe options in five brain regions that putatively encode value in male macaques. Surprisingly, we find no detectable overlap in the neural codes used for risky and safe options, even when the options have identical subjective values (as revealed by preference) in any of the regions. Indeed, responses are weakly correlated and occupy distinct (semi-orthogonal) encoding subspaces. Notably, however, these subspaces are linked through a linear transform of their constituent encodings, a property that allows for comparison of dissimilar option types. This encoding scheme allows these regions to multiplex decision related processes: they can encode the detailed factors that influence offer value (here, risky and safety) but also directly compare dissimilar offer types. Together these results suggest a neuronal basis for the qualitatively different psychological properties of risky and safe options and highlight the power of population geometry to resolve outstanding problems in neural coding.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT To make economic choices, we must have some mechanism for comparing dissimilar offers. We propose that the brain uses distinct neural codes for risky and safe offers, but that these codes are linearly transformable. This encoding scheme has the dual advantage of allowing for comparison across offer types while preserving information about offer type, which in turn allows for flexibility in changing circumstances. We show that responses to risky and safe offers exhibit these predicted properties in five different reward-sensitive regions. Together, these results highlight the power of population coding principles for solving representation problems in economic choice.

Critical tests of fuzzy trace theory in brain and behavior: uncertainty across time, probability, and development

Uncertainty permeates decisions from the trivial to the profound. Integrating brain and behavioral evidence, we discuss how probabilistic (varied outcomes) and temporal (delayed outcomes) uncertainty differ across age and individuals; how critical tests adjudicate between theories of uncertainty (prospect theory and fuzzy-trace theory); and how these mechanisms might be represented in the brain. The same categorical gist representations of gains and losses account for choices and eye-tracking data in both value-allocation (add money to gambles) and risky-choice tasks, disconfirming prospect theory and confirming predictions of fuzzy-trace theory. The analysis is extended to delay discounting and disambiguated choices, explaining hidden-zero effects that similarly turn on categorical distinctions between some gain and no gain, certain gain and uncertain gain, gain and loss, and now and later. Bold activation implicates dorsolateral prefrontal and posterior parietal cortices in gist strategies that are not just one tool in a grab-bag of cognitive options but rather are general strategies that systematically predict behaviors across many different tasks involving probabilistic and temporal uncertainty. High valuation (e.g., ventral striatum; ventromedial prefrontal cortex) and low executive control (e.g., lateral prefrontal cortex) contribute to risky and impatient choices, especially in youth. However, valuation in ventral striatum supports reward-maximizing and gist strategies in adulthood. Indeed, processing becomes less "rational" in the sense of maximizing gains and more noncompensatory (eye movements indicate fewer tradeoffs) as development progresses from adolescence to adulthood, as predicted. Implications for theoretically predicted "public-health paradoxes" are discussed, including gist versus verbatim thinking in drug experimentation and addiction.

Neurons in human pre-supplementary motor area encode key computations for value-based choice

Adaptive behaviour in real-world environments requires that choices integrate several variables, including the novelty of the options under consideration, their expected value and uncertainty in value estimation. Here, to probe how integration over decision variables occurs during decision-making, we recorded neurons from the human pre-supplementary motor area (preSMA), ventromedial prefrontal cortex and dorsal anterior cingulate. Unlike the other areas, preSMA neurons not only represented separate pre-decision variables for each choice option but also encoded an integrated utility signal for each choice option and, subsequently, the decision itself. Post-decision encoding of variables for the chosen option was more widely distributed and especially prominent in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Our findings position the human preSMA as central to the implementation of value-based decisions.

Does attentional suppression occur at the level of perception or decision-making? Evidence from Gaspelin et al.'s (2015) probe letter task

Visual attention is often inadvertently captured by salient stimuli. It was suggested that it is possible to prevent attentional capture in some search tasks by suppressing salient stimuli below baseline. Evidence for attentional suppression comes from a probe task that was interleaved with the main search task. In the probe task of Gaspelin et al. (Psychol Sci 26(11):1740-1750, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797615597913 ), letters were shown on the stimuli of the search display and participants had to identify as many letters as possible. Performance was found to be worse for letters shown on the distractor compared to non-salient non-target stimuli, suggesting that distractor processing was suppressed below baseline. However, it is unclear whether suppression occurred at the level of perception or decision-making because participants may have reported letters on the distractor less frequently than letters on nontargets. This decision-level bias may have degraded performance for letters on distractor compared to nontarget stimuli without changing perception. After replicating the original findings, we conducted two experiments where we avoided report bias by cueing only a single letter for report. We found that the difference between distractor and nontarget stimuli was strongly reduced, suggesting that decision-level processes contribute to attentional suppression. In contrast, the difference between target and non-target stimuli was unchanged, suggesting that it reflected perceptual-level enhancement of the target stimuli.