The computational and neural basis of cognitive control: charted territory and new frontiers

Subliminal and supraliminal processing of reward-related stimuli in anorexia nervosa

BACKGROUND

Previous studies have highlighted the role of the brain reward and cognitive control systems in the etiology of anorexia nervosa (AN). In an attempt to disentangle the relative contribution of these systems to the disorder, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate hemodynamic responses to reward-related stimuli presented both subliminally and supraliminally in acutely underweight AN patients and age-matched healthy controls (HC).

METHODS

fMRI data were collected from a total of 35 AN patients and 35 HC, while they passively viewed subliminally and supraliminally presented streams of food, positive social, and neutral stimuli. Activation patterns of the group × stimulation condition × stimulus type interaction were interrogated to investigate potential group differences in processing different stimulus types under the two stimulation conditions. Moreover, changes in functional connectivity were investigated using generalized psychophysiological interaction analysis.

RESULTS

AN patients showed a generally increased response to supraliminally presented stimuli in the inferior frontal junction (IFJ), but no alterations within the reward system. Increased activation during supraliminal stimulation with food stimuli was observed in the AN group in visual regions including superior occipital gyrus and the fusiform gyrus/parahippocampal gyrus. No group difference was found with respect to the subliminal stimulation condition and functional connectivity.

CONCLUSION

Increased IFJ activation in AN during supraliminal stimulation may indicate hyperactive cognitive control, which resonates with clinical presentation of excessive self-control in AN patients. Increased activation to food stimuli in visual regions may be interpreted in light of an attentional food bias in AN.

Adaptive Engagement of Cognitive Control in Context-Dependent Decision Making

Many decisions require a context-dependent mapping from sensory evidence to action. The capacity for flexible information processing of this sort is thought to depend on a cognitive control system in frontoparietal cortex, but the costs and limitations of control entail that its engagement should be minimized. Here, we show that humans reduce demands on control by exploiting statistical structure in their environment. Using a context-dependent perceptual discrimination task and model-based analyses of behavioral and neuroimaging data, we found that predictions about task context facilitated decision making and that a quantitative measure of context prediction error accounted for graded engagement of the frontoparietal control network. Within this network, multivariate analyses further showed that context prediction error enhanced the representation of task context. These results indicate that decision making is adaptively tuned by experience to minimize costs while maintaining flexibility.

Temporal dynamics of reactive cognitive control as revealed by event-related brain potentials

Reactive cognitive control refers to a complementary set of cognitive operations by which individuals monitor for and detect the presence of goal-interfering conflict (i.e., conflict monitoring/evaluation) and, subsequently, initiate attention-focusing and response selection processes to bolster goal-directed action in the face of such conflict (regulative control). The purpose of the current study was to characterize the nature of conflict adaptation in both components of this dynamic process across sequences of trials and, more broadly, across time as participants complete a cognitive control task. Fifty-two young adults completed a standard arrow flanker task while behavioral and ERP data were recorded. Multilevel modeling of sequences of compatible and incompatible trials over time showed that, whereas response time data demonstrated a typical conflict adaptation effect throughout the task, N2 and frontal slow wave (FSW) indices of conflict monitoring and regulative control, respectively, demonstrated significant conflict adaptation only during the early part of the task. Moreover, although differential change in N2 and FSW over time suggested that conflict monitoring and regulative control were dissociable, a reciprocal relation between them was maintained throughout the task and was not present in a component theoretically unrelated to conflict adaptation (visual attention-related N1). Findings are discussed in terms of compensatory processes that help to maintain goal-directed performance even as control-related neural responses become fatigued.

Compulsivity in opioid dependence

OBJECTIVE

This study aimed to investigate the relationship between compulsivity versus impulsivity and structural MRI abnormalities in opioid dependence.

METHOD

We recruited 146 participants: i) patients with a history of opioid dependence due to chronic heroin use (n=24), ii) heroin users stabilised on methadone maintenance treatment (n=48), iii) abstinent participants with a history of opioid dependence due to heroin use (n=24) and iv) healthy controls (n=50). Compulsivity was measured using Intra/Extra-Dimensional (IED) Task and impulsivity was measured using the Cambridge Gambling Task (CGT). Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) data were also obtained.

RESULTS

As hypothesised, compulsivity was negatively associated with impulsivity (p<0.02). Testing for the neural substrates of compulsivity versus impulsivity, we found a higher compulsivity/impulsivity ratio associated with significantly decreased white matter adjacent to the nucleus accumbens, bed nucleus of stria terminalis and rostral cingulate in the abstinent group, compared to the other opioid dependent groups. In addition, self-reported duration of opioid exposure correlated negatively with bilateral globus pallidus grey matter reductions.

CONCLUSION

Our findings are consistent with Volkow & Koob's addiction models and underline the important role of compulsivity versus impulsivity in opioid dependence. Our results have implications for the treatment of opioid dependence supporting the assertion of different behavioural and biological phenotypes in the opioid dependence and abstinence syndromes.

Low-level alcohol consumption during adolescence and its impact on cognitive control development

Adolescence is a critical period for maturation of cognitive control and most adolescents start experimenting with alcohol around that time. On the one hand, recent studies indicate that low control abilities predict future problematic alcohol use. On the other hand, binge drinking during young adulthood can (further) impair cognitive control. However, so far no study examined the effects of low-level alcohol use during adolescence. In the present longitudinal fMRI study, we therefore investigated the development of cognitive control in a community-based sample of 92 adolescents at ages 14, 16 and 18. Two different cognitive control functions, i.e. inhibition of pre-potent responses (operationalized by incongruence effects) and switching between different task sets, were measured within one task. Alcohol use in our sample was low (mean: 54 g/week at age 18). The study revealed that neither behavioural nor neural measures of cognitive control function at age 14 predicted alcohol use at age 18 but confirmed established predictors such as gender and personality. As expected, from age 14 to 18, cognitive control abilities were improving (decreased reaction times and/or errors), and activation of cognitive control networks (dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and pre-supplementary motor area) during incongruent trials increased. Unexpectedly, higher alcohol consumption during adolescence was associated with a more pronounced increase in cognitive performance and a smaller increase of neural activation when incongruent trials afforded inhibitory control. We conclude that low-level alcohol use during adolescence does not severely impair ongoing maturation of cognitive control abilities and networks.

Using trial-level data and multilevel modeling to investigate within-task change in event-related potentials

EEG data, and specifically the ERP, provide psychologists with the power to examine quickly occurring cognitive processes at the native temporal resolution at which they occur. Despite the advantages conferred by ERPs to examine processes at different points in time, ERP researchers commonly ignore the trial-to-trial temporal dimension by collapsing across trials of similar types (i.e., the signal averaging approach) because of constraints imposed by repeated measures ANOVA. Here, we present the advantages of using multilevel modeling (MLM) to examine trial-level data to investigate change in neurocognitive processes across the course of an experiment. Two examples are presented to illustrate the usefulness of this technique. The first demonstrates decreasing differentiation in N170 amplitude to faces of different races across the course of a race categorization task. The second demonstrates attenuation of the ERN as participants commit more errors within a task designed to measure implicit racial bias. Although the examples presented here are within the realm of social psychology, the use of MLM to analyze trial-level EEG data has the potential to contribute to a number of different theoretical domains within psychology.

Anticipating cognitive effort: roles of perceived error-likelihood and time demands

Why are some actions evaluated as effortful? In the present set of experiments we address this question by examining individuals' perception of effort when faced with a trade-off between two putative cognitive costs: how much time a task takes vs. how error-prone it is. Specifically, we were interested in whether individuals anticipate engaging in a small amount of hard work (i.e., low time requirement, but high error-likelihood) vs. a large amount of easy work (i.e., high time requirement, but low error-likelihood) as being more effortful. In between-subject designs, Experiments 1 through 3 demonstrated that individuals anticipate options that are high in perceived error-likelihood (yet less time consuming) as more effortful than options that are perceived to be more time consuming (yet low in error-likelihood). Further, when asked to evaluate which of the two tasks was (a) more effortful, (b) more error-prone, and (c) more time consuming, effort-based and error-based choices closely tracked one another, but this was not the case for time-based choices. Utilizing a within-subject design, Experiment 4 demonstrated overall similar pattern of judgments as Experiments 1 through 3. However, both judgments of error-likelihood and time demand similarly predicted effort judgments. Results are discussed within the context of extant accounts of cognitive control, with considerations of how error-likelihood and time demands may independently and conjunctively factor into judgments of cognitive effort.

Developmental increases in white matter network controllability support a growing diversity of brain dynamics

As the human brain develops, it increasingly supports coordinated control of neural activity. The mechanism by which white matter evolves to support this coordination is not well understood. Here we use a network representation of diffusion imaging data from 882 youth ages 8-22 to show that white matter connectivity becomes increasingly optimized for a diverse range of predicted dynamics in development. Notably, stable controllers in subcortical areas are negatively related to cognitive performance. Investigating structural mechanisms supporting these changes, we simulate network evolution with a set of growth rules. We find that all brain networks are structured in a manner highly optimized for network control, with distinct control mechanisms predicted in child vs. older youth. We demonstrate that our results cannot be explained by changes in network modularity. This work reveals a possible mechanism of human brain development that preferentially optimizes dynamic network control over static network architecture.

Parallel Distributed Processing Theory in the Age of Deep Networks

Parallel distributed processing (PDP) models in psychology are the precursors of deep networks used in computer science. However, only PDP models are associated with two core psychological claims, namely that all knowledge is coded in a distributed format and cognition is mediated by non-symbolic computations. These claims have long been debated in cognitive science, and recent work with deep networks speaks to this debate. Specifically, single-unit recordings show that deep networks learn units that respond selectively to meaningful categories, and researchers are finding that deep networks need to be supplemented with symbolic systems to perform some tasks. Given the close links between PDP and deep networks, it is surprising that research with deep networks is challenging PDP theory.

Control without Controllers: Toward a Distributed Neuroscience of Executive Control

Executive control refers to the regulation of cognition and behavior by mental processes and is a hallmark of higher cognition. Most approaches to understanding its mechanisms begin with the assumption that our brains have anatomically segregated and functionally specialized control modules. The modular approach is intuitive: Control is conceptually distinct from basic mental processing, so an organization that reifies that distinction makes sense. An alternative approach sees executive control as self-organizing principles of a distributed organization. In distributed systems, control and controlled processes are colocalized within large numbers of dispersed computational agents. Control then is often an emergent consequence of simple rules governing the interaction between agents. Because these systems are unfamiliar and unintuitive, here we review several well-understood examples of distributed control systems, group living insects and social animals, and emphasize their parallels with neural systems. We then reexamine the cognitive neuroscience literature on executive control for evidence that its neural control systems may be distributed.

Does mental context drift or shift?

Theories of episodic memory have generally proposed that individual memory traces are linked together by a representation of context that drifts slowly over time. Recent data challenge the notion that contextual drift is always slow and passive. In particular, changes in one's external environment or internal model induce discontinuities in memory that are reflected in sudden changes in neural activity, suggesting that context can shift abruptly. Furthermore, context change effects are sensitive to top-down goals, suggesting that contextual drift may be an active process. These findings call for revising models of the role of context in memory, in order to account for abrupt contextual shifts and the controllable nature of context change.

Cyclical population dynamics of automatic versus controlled processing: An evolutionary pendulum

Psychologists, neuroscientists, and economists often conceptualize decisions as arising from processes that lie along a continuum from automatic (i.e., "hardwired" or overlearned, but relatively inflexible) to controlled (less efficient and effortful, but more flexible). Control is central to human cognition, and plays a key role in our ability to modify the world to suit our needs. Given its advantages, reliance on controlled processing may seem predestined to increase within the population over time. Here, we examine whether this is so by introducing an evolutionary game theoretic model of agents that vary in their use of automatic versus controlled processes, and in which cognitive processing modifies the environment in which the agents interact. We find that, under a wide range of parameters and model assumptions, cycles emerge in which the prevalence of each type of processing in the population oscillates between 2 extremes. Rather than inexorably increasing, the emergence of control often creates conditions that lead to its own demise by allowing automaticity to also flourish, thereby undermining the progress made by the initial emergence of controlled processing. We speculate that this observation may have relevance for understanding similar cycles across human history, and may lend insight into some of the circumstances and challenges currently faced by our species. (PsycINFO Database Record

Subthalamic nucleus stimulation impairs emotional conflict adaptation in Parkinson's disease

The subthalamic nucleus (STN) occupies a strategic position in the motor network, slowing down responses in situations with conflicting perceptual input. Recent evidence suggests a role of the STN in emotion processing through strong connections with emotion recognition structures. As deep brain stimulation (DBS) of the STN in patients with Parkinson's disease (PD) inhibits monitoring of perceptual and value-based conflict, STN DBS may also interfere with emotional conflict processing. To assess a possible interference of STN DBS with emotional conflict processing, we used an emotional Stroop paradigm. Subjects categorized face stimuli according to their emotional expression while ignoring emotionally congruent or incongruent superimposed word labels. Eleven PD patients ON and OFF STN DBS and eleven age-matched healthy subjects conducted the task. We found conflict-induced response slowing in healthy controls and PD patients OFF DBS, but not ON DBS, suggesting STN DBS to decrease adaptation to within-trial conflict. OFF DBS, patients showed more conflict-induced slowing for negative conflict stimuli, which was diminished by STN DBS. Computational modelling of STN influence on conflict adaptation disclosed DBS to interfere via increased baseline activity.

The task novelty paradox: Flexible control of inflexible neural pathways during rapid instructed task learning

Rapid instructed task learning (RITL) is one of the most remarkable human abilities, when considered from both computational and evolutionary perspectives. A key feature of RITL is that it enables new goals to be immediately pursued (and shared) following formation of task representations. Although RITL is a form of cognitive control that engenders immense flexibility, it also seems to produce inflexible activation of action plans in inappropriate contexts. We argue that this "prepared reflex" effect arises because RITL is implemented in the brain via a "flexible hub" mechanism, in which top-down influences from the frontoparietal control network reroute pathways among procedure-implementing brain areas (e.g., perceptual and motor areas). Specifically, we suggest that RITL-based proactive control - the preparatory biasing of task-relevant functional network routes - results in inflexible associative processing, demanding compensation in the form of increased reactive (in-the-moment) control. Thus, RITL produces a computational trade-off, in which the top-down influences of flexible hubs increase overall cognitive flexibility, but at the cost of temporally localized inflexibility (the prepared reflex effect).

Assessing the role of reward in task selection using a reward-based voluntary task switching paradigm

People exhibit a remarkable ability to both maintain controlled focus on executing a single task and flexibly shift between executing several tasks. Researchers studying human multitasking have traditionally focused on the cognitive control mechanisms that allow for such stable and flexible task execution, but there has been a recent interest in how cognitive control mechanisms drive the decision of task selection. The present research operationalizes a foraging analogy to investigate what factors drive the decision to either exploit task repetitions or explore task switches. A novel paradigm-reward-based voluntary task switching-ascribes point values to tasks where the overall goal is to accumulate points as quickly as possible. The reward structure generally rewards switching tasks, thereby juxtaposing the motivation to gain increased reward (by exploring task switches) against the motivation to perform quickly (by exploiting task repetitions). Results suggest that people are highly sensitive to changes in both reward and effort demands when making task selections, and that the task selection process is efficient and flexible. We argue that a cost-benefit mechanism might underlie decisions in multitasking contexts, whereby people compute task selections based on both the reward available for selecting a task and the effort necessary to execute a task.

Functional Neuroimaging in Traumatic Brain Injury: From Nodes to Networks

Since the invention of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), thousands of studies in healthy and clinical samples have enlightened our understanding of the organization of cognition in the human brain and neuroplastic changes following brain disease and injury. Increasingly, studies involve analyses rooted in complex systems theory and analysis applied to clinical samples. Given the complexity in available approaches, concise descriptions of the theoretical motivation of network techniques and their relationship to traditional approaches and theory are necessary. To this end, this review concerns the use of fMRI to understand basic cognitive function and dysfunction in the human brain scaling from emphasis on basic units (or "nodes") in the brain to interactions within and between brain networks. First, major themes and theoretical issues in the scientific study of the injured brain are introduced to contextualize these analyses, particularly concerning functional "brain reorganization." Then, analytic approaches ranging from the voxel level to the systems level using graph theory and related approaches are reviewed as complementary approaches to examine neurocognitive processes following TBI. Next, some major findings relevant to functional reorganization hypotheses are discussed. Finally, major open issues in functional network analyses in neurotrauma are discussed in theoretical, analytic, and translational terms.

Effects of Cognitive Load on Driving Performance: The Cognitive Control Hypothesis

OBJECTIVE

The objective of this paper was to outline an explanatory framework for understanding effects of cognitive load on driving performance and to review the existing experimental literature in the light of this framework.

BACKGROUND

Although there is general consensus that taking the eyes off the forward roadway significantly impairs most aspects of driving, the effects of primarily cognitively loading tasks on driving performance are not well understood.

METHOD

Based on existing models of driver attention, an explanatory framework was outlined. This framework can be summarized in terms of the cognitive control hypothesis: Cognitive load selectively impairs driving subtasks that rely on cognitive control but leaves automatic performance unaffected. An extensive literature review was conducted wherein existing results were reinterpreted based on the proposed framework.

RESULTS

It was demonstrated that the general pattern of experimental results reported in the literature aligns well with the cognitive control hypothesis and that several apparent discrepancies between studies can be reconciled based on the proposed framework. More specifically, performance on nonpracticed or inherently variable tasks, relying on cognitive control, is consistently impaired by cognitive load, whereas the performance on automatized (well-practiced and consistently mapped) tasks is unaffected and sometimes even improved.

CONCLUSION

Effects of cognitive load on driving are strongly selective and task dependent.

APPLICATION

The present results have important implications for the generalization of results obtained from experimental studies to real-world driving. The proposed framework can also serve to guide future research on the potential causal role of cognitive load in real-world crashes.

Short-term Internet search using makes people rely on search engines when facing unknown issues

The Internet search engines, which have powerful search/sort functions and ease of use features, have become an indispensable tool for many individuals. The current study is to test whether the short-term Internet search training can make people more dependent on it. Thirty-one subjects out of forty subjects completed the search training study which included a pre-test, a six-day’s training of Internet search, and a post-test. During the pre- and post- tests, subjects were asked to search online the answers to 40 unusual questions, remember the answers and recall them in the scanner. Un-learned questions were randomly presented at the recalling stage in order to elicited search impulse. Comparing to the pre-test, subjects in the post-test reported higher impulse to use search engines to answer un-learned questions. Consistently, subjects showed higher brain activations in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex in the post-test than in the pre-test. In addition, there were significant positive correlations self-reported search impulse and brain responses in the frontal areas. The results suggest that a simple six-day’s Internet search training can make people dependent on the search tools when facing unknown issues. People are easily dependent on the Internet search engines.

Annual Research Review: On the relations among self-regulation, self-control, executive functioning, effortful control, cognitive control, impulsivity, risk-taking, and inhibition for developmental psychopathology

BACKGROUND

Self-regulation (SR) is central to developmental psychopathology, but progress has been impeded by varying terminology and meanings across fields and literatures.

METHODS

The present review attempts to move that discussion forward by noting key sources of prior confusion such as measurement-concept confounding, and then arguing the following major points.

RESULTS

First, the field needs a domain-general construct of SR that encompasses SR of action, emotion, and cognition and involves both top-down and bottom-up regulatory processes. This does not assume a shared core process across emotion, action, and cognition, but is intended to provide clarity on the extent of various claims about kinds of SR. Second, top-down aspects of SR need to be integrated. These include (a) basic processes that develop early and address immediate conflict signals, such as cognitive control and effortful control (EC), and (b) complex cognition and strategies for addressing future conflict, represented by the regulatory application of complex aspects of executive functioning. Executive function (EF) and cognitive control are not identical to SR because they can be used for other activities, but account for top-down aspects of SR at the cognitive level. Third, impulsivity, risk-taking, and disinhibition are distinct although overlapping; a taxonomy of the kinds of breakdowns of SR associated with psychopathology requires their differentiation. Fourth, different aspects of the SR universe can be organized hierarchically in relation to granularity, development, and time. Low-level components assemble into high-level components. This hierarchical perspective is consistent across literatures.

CONCLUSIONS

It is hoped that the framework outlined here will facilitate integration and cross-talk among investigators working from different perspectives, and facilitate individual differences research on how SR relates to developmental psychopathology.

The test of both worlds: identifying feature binding and control processes in congruency sequence tasks by means of action dynamics

Cognitive control processes enable us to act flexibly in a world posing ever-changing demands on our cognitive system. To study cognitive control, conflict tasks and especially congruency sequence effects have been regarded as a fruitful tool. However, for the last decade a dispute has arisen whether or not congruency sequence effects are indeed a valid measure of cognitive control processes. This debate has led to the development of increasingly complex paradigms involving numerous, intricately designed experimental conditions which are aimed at excluding low-level, associative learning mechanisms like feature binding as an alternative explanation for the emergence of congruency sequence effects. Here, we try to go beyond this all-or-nothing thinking by investigating the assumption that both cognitive control processes as well as feature binding mechanisms occur within trials of the same task. Based on a theoretical dual-route-model of behavior under conflict, we show that both classes of cognitive mechanisms should affect behavior at different points of the decision process. By comparing these predictions to continuous mouse movements from an adapted Simon task, we find evidence that control processes and feature binding mechanisms do indeed coexist within the task but that they follow distinct timing patterns. We argue that this dynamic approach to cognitive processing opens up new ways to investigate the diversity of co-existing processes that contribute to the selection of behavior.

Partially restored resting-state functional connectivity in women recovered from anorexia nervosa

BACKGROUND

We have previously shown increased resting-state functional connectivity (rsFC) in the frontoparietal network (FPN) and the default mode network (DMN) in patients with acute anorexia nervosa. Based on these findings we investigated within-network rsFC in patients recovered from anorexia nervosa to examine whether these abnormalities are a state or trait marker of the disease. To extend the understanding of functional connectivity in patients with anorexia nervosa, we also estimated rsFC between large-scale networks.

METHODS

Girls and women recovered from anorexia nervosa and pair-wise, age- and sex-matched healthy controls underwent a resting-state fMRI scan. Using independent component analyses (ICA), we isolated the FPN, DMN and salience network. We used standard comparisons as well as a hypothesis-based approach to test the findings of our previous rsFC study in this recovered cohort. Temporal correlations between network time-course pairs were computed to investigate functional network connectivity (FNC).

RESULTS

Thirty-one patients recovered from anorexia nervosa and 31 controls participated in our study. Standard group comparisons revealed reduced rsFC between the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and the FPN in the recovered group. Using a hypothesis-based approach we extended the previous finding of increased rsFC between the angular gyrus and the FPN in patients recovered from anorexia nervosa. No group differences in FNC were revealed.

LIMITATIONS

The study design did not allow us to conclude that the difference found in rsFC constitutes a scar effect of the disease.

CONCLUSION

This study suggests that some abnormal rsFC patterns found in patients recovered from anorexia nervosa normalize after long-term weight restoration, while distorted rsFC in the FPN, a network that has been associated with cognitive control, may constitute a trait marker of the disorder.

Alcohol words elicit reactive cognitive control in low-sensitivity drinkers

Previous ERP studies shown support for the idea that alcohol-related stimuli are particularly salient to individuals who report low sensitivity (LS) to alcohol's effects (a known risk factor for alcohol-related problems), leading such stimuli to spontaneously capture their attention and interfere with self-regulatory goal pursuit. The current study investigated LS individuals' use of reactive and proactive cognitive control in response to alcohol-related stimuli. Participants performed an alcohol Stroop task in which they indicated the font color of alcohol- and nonalcohol-related words while ERPs were recorded. The probability of alcohol and nonalcohol words was manipulated to test predictions derived from Dual Mechanisms of Control theory. Among LS individuals, infrequent alcohol-related words elicited slower responses and larger N2 amplitude, consistent with these stimuli eliciting enhanced reactive control responses. Amplitude of the frontal slow wave (FSW) component, associated with proactive control, was marginally larger among LS individuals when alcohol words were more frequent, but response accuracy was lower. These findings demonstrate that LS individuals experience conflict when presented with task-irrelevant alcohol-related stimuli, even in a context where conflict arguably should not be present. Findings further suggest that LS individuals can effectively implement reactive control to deal with this conflict when it is infrequent but have difficulty implementing proactive control in the context of more frequent conflict.

Impaired psychomotor ability and attention in patients with persistent pain: a cross-sectional comparative study

Background and aims

Patients with pain have shown cognitive impairment across various domains. Although the pain qualities vary among patients, research has overlooked how cognitive performance is affected by the duration and persistence of pain. The current study sought to fill this gap by examining how qualitatively different pain states relate to the following cognitive functions: sustained attention, cognitive control, and psychomotor ability.

Patients and methods

Patients with musculoskeletal pain in primary care were divided into three pain groups: acute pain (duration <3 months), regularly recurrent pain (duration >3 months), and persistent pain (duration >3 months). These groups were then compared with healthy controls. The MapCog Spectra Test, the Color Word Test, and the Grooved Pegboard Test were used to measure sustained attention, cognitive control, and psychomotor ability, respectively.

Results

Patients with persistent pain showed significantly worse sustained attention and psychomotor ability compared with healthy controls. The acute pain group showed a significant decrease in psychomotor ability, and the regularly recurrent pain group showed a significant decrease in sustained attention. These results remained unchanged when age, education, and medication were taken into account.

Conclusion

Persistent musculoskeletal pain seems to impair performance on a wider range of cognitive tasks than acute or regularly recurrent pain, using pain-free individuals as a benchmark. However, there is some evidence of impairment in psychomotor ability among patients with acute pain and some impairment in sustained attention among patients with regularly recurrent pain.

Implications

Caregivers may need to adjust communication methods when delivering information to cognitively impaired patients.

Differential Effects of Executive Processes on Working Memory

Abstract. Although attention control accounts for a unique portion of the variance in working memory capacity (WMC), the way in which attention control contributes to WMC has not been thoroughly specified. The current work focused on fractionating attention control into distinctly different executive processes and examined to what extent key processes of attention control including updating, shifting, and prepotent response inhibition were related to WMC and whether these relations were different. A number of 216 university students completed experimental tasks of attention control and two measures of WMC. Latent variable analyses were employed for separating and modeling each process and their effects on WMC. The results showed that both the accuracy of updating and shifting were substantially related to WMC while the link from the accuracy of inhibition to WMC was insignificant; on the other hand, only the speed of shifting had a moderate effect on WMC while neither the speed of updating nor the speed of inhibition showed significant effect on WMC. The results suggest that these key processes of attention control exhibit differential effects on individual differences in WMC. The approach that combined experimental manipulations and statistical modeling constitutes a promising way of investigating cognitive processes.

Social exclusion modulates priorities of attention allocation in cognitive control

Many studies have investigated how exclusion affects cognitive control and have reported inconsistent results. However, these studies usually treated cognitive control as a unitary concept, whereas it actually involved two main sub-processes: conflict detection and response implementation. Furthermore, existing studies have focused primarily on exclusion’s effects on conscious cognitive control, while recent studies have shown the existence of unconscious cognitive control. Therefore, the present study investigated whether and how exclusion affects the sub-processes underlying conscious and unconscious cognitive control differently. The Cyberball game was used to manipulate social exclusion and participants subsequently performed a masked Go/No-Go task during which event-related potentials were measured. For conscious cognitive control, excluded participants showed a larger N2 but smaller P3 effects than included participants, suggesting that excluded people invest more attention in conscious conflict detection, but less in conscious inhibition of impulsive responses. However, for unconscious cognitive control, excluded participants showed a smaller N2 but larger P3 effects than included participants, suggesting that excluded people invest less attention in unconscious conflict detection, but more in unconscious inhibition of impulsive responses. Together, these results suggest that exclusion causes people to rebalance attention allocation priorities for cognitive control according to a more flexible and adaptive strategy.

Startle Habituation and Midfrontal Theta Activity in Parkinson Disease

The ability to adapt to aversive stimuli is critical for mental health. Here, we investigate the relationship between habituation to startling stimuli and startle-related activity in medial frontal cortex as measured by EEG in both healthy control participants and patients with Parkinson disease (PD). We report three findings. First, patients with PD exhibited normal initial startle responses but reduced startle habituation relative to demographically matched controls. Second, control participants had midfrontal EEG theta activity in response to startling stimuli, and this activity was attenuated in patients with PD. Finally, startle-related midfrontal theta activity was correlated with the rate of startle habituation. These data indicate that impaired startle habituation in PD is a result of attenuated midfrontal cognitive control signals. Our findings could provide insight into the frontal regulation of startle habituation.

Temporal Uncertainty and Temporal Estimation Errors Affect Insular Activity and the Frontostriatal Indirect Pathway during Action Update: A Predictive Coding Study

Action update, substituting a prepotent behavior with a new action, allows the organism to counteract surprising environmental demands. However, action update fails when the organism is uncertain about when to release the substituting behavior, when it faces temporal uncertainty. Predictive coding states that accurate perception demands minimization of precise prediction errors. Activity of the right anterior insula (rAI) is associated with temporal uncertainty. Therefore, we hypothesize that temporal uncertainty during action update would cause the AI to decrease the sensitivity to ascending prediction errors. Moreover, action update requires response inhibition which recruits the frontostriatal indirect pathway associated with motor control. Therefore, we also hypothesize that temporal estimation errors modulate frontostriatal connections. To test these hypotheses, we collected fMRI data when participants performed an action-update paradigm within the context of temporal estimation. We fit dynamic causal models to the imaging data. Competing models comprised the inferior occipital gyrus (IOG), right supramarginal gyrus (rSMG), rAI, right presupplementary motor area (rPreSMA), and the right striatum (rSTR). The winning model showed that temporal uncertainty drove activity into the rAI and decreased insular sensitivity to ascending prediction errors, as shown by weak connectivity strength of rSMG→rAI connections. Moreover, temporal estimation errors weakened rPreSMA→rSTR connections and also modulated rAI→rSTR connections, causing the disruption of action update. Results provide information about the neurophysiological implementation of the so-called horse-race model of action control. We suggest that, contrary to what might be believed, unsuccessful action update could be a homeostatic process that represents a Bayes optimal encoding of uncertainty.

It's Not "All in Your Head": Understanding Religion From an Embodied Cognition Perspective

Theorists and researchers in the psychology of religion have often focused on the mind as the locus of religion. In this article, we suggest an embodied cognition perspective as a new dimension in studies of religion as a complement to previous research and theorizing. In contrast to the Cartesian view of the mind operating distinctly from the body, an embodied cognition framework posits religion as being grounded in an integrated and dynamic sensorimotor complex (which includes the brain). We review relevant but disparate literature in cognitive and social psychology to demonstrate that embodied cognition shapes the way that people represent the divine and other spiritual beings, guides people's moral intuitions, and facilitates bonding within religious groups. Moreover, commitments to a religious worldview are sometimes manifested in the body. We suggest several promising future directions in the study of religion from an embodied cognition perspective.

The Neuroscience of Human Decision-Making Through the Lens of Learning and Memory

We are called upon to make decisions, large and small, many times a day. Whether in the voting booth, the stock exchange, or the cafeteria line, we identify potential options, estimate and compare their subjective values, and make a choice. Decision-making has only recently become a focus for cognitive neuroscience. The last two decades have seen rapid progress in our understanding of the brain basis of at least some aspects of this rather complex aspect of cognition. This work has provided fresh perspectives on poorly understood brain regions, such as orbitofrontal cortex and ventral striatum. It has led to interesting interdisciplinary exchanges with diverse fields, notably economics, but also ecology and political science, among others. The novel perspectives arising from these exchanges have begun to be related to better understood aspects of cognition. In particular, it is increasingly clear that decision-making is tightly interlinked with learning and memory. Key early insights in decision neuroscience came from what were essentially reinforcement learning tasks. Recent work has made similar links to aspects of declarative memory. Indeed, decision-making can be seen as the link between memory of the past and future actions. This chapter reviews selected topics in decision neuroscience, with a particular focus on the links to learning and memory, and a particular emphasis on regions within prefrontal cortex.

Successful smoking cessation is associated with prefrontal cortical function during a Stroop task: A preliminary study

Although many smokers try to quit, relatively few are successful in their attempts. Here we investigated whether the ability to quit smoking is related to behavioral and neural measures of cognitive control. A functional magnetic resonance imaging study with a counting Stroop task was used to measure cognitive control in ex-smokers (N=10) who had successfully quit smoking and smokers (N=10) who continuously failed to quit smoking. Behavioral results showed a significant Stroop effect in ex-smokers and smokers. Ex-smokers exhibited less Stroop interference, indicating superior cognitive control compared with smokers. Furthermore, when incongruent trials were contrasted with congruent trials, ex-smokers showed stronger BOLD activity than smokers in the right superior frontal gyrus and anterior cingulate cortex. Although the present study does not permit us to draw strong conclusions regarding causality, the results suggest that successful smoking cessation may be mediated by superior cognitive control.

Deciding How To Decide: Self-Control and Meta-Decision Making

Many different situations related to self control involve competition between two routes to decisions: default and frugal versus more resource-intensive. Examples include habits versus deliberative decisions, fatigue versus cognitive effort, and Pavlovian versus instrumental decision making. We propose that these situations are linked by a strikingly similar core dilemma, pitting the opportunity costs of monopolizing shared resources such as executive functions for some time, against the possibility of obtaining a better outcome. We offer a unifying normative perspective on this underlying rational meta-optimization, review how this may tie together recent advances in many separate areas, and connect several independent models. Finally, we suggest that the crucial mechanisms and meta-decision variables may be shared across domains.

Controllability of structural brain networks

Cognitive function is driven by dynamic interactions between large-scale neural circuits or networks, enabling behaviour. However, fundamental principles constraining these dynamic network processes have remained elusive. Here we use tools from control and network theories to offer a mechanistic explanation for how the brain moves between cognitive states drawn from the network organization of white matter microstructure. Our results suggest that densely connected areas, particularly in the default mode system, facilitate the movement of the brain to many easily reachable states. Weakly connected areas, particularly in cognitive control systems, facilitate the movement of the brain to difficult-to-reach states. Areas located on the boundary between network communities, particularly in attentional control systems, facilitate the integration or segregation of diverse cognitive systems. Our results suggest that structural network differences between cognitive circuits dictate their distinct roles in controlling trajectories of brain network function.

Disorders of representation and control in semantic cognition: Effects of familiarity, typicality, and specificity

We present a case-series comparison of patients with cross-modal semantic impairments consequent on either (a) bilateral anterior temporal lobe atrophy in semantic dementia (SD) or (b) left-hemisphere fronto-parietal and/or posterior temporal stroke in semantic aphasia (SA). Both groups were assessed on a new test battery designed to measure how performance is influenced by concept familiarity, typicality and specificity. In line with previous findings, performance in SD was strongly modulated by all of these factors, with better performance for more familiar items (regardless of typicality), for more typical items (regardless of familiarity) and for tasks that did not require very specific classification, consistent with the gradual degradation of conceptual knowledge in SD. The SA group showed significant impairments on all tasks but their sensitivity to familiarity, typicality and specificity was more variable and governed by task-specific effects of these factors on controlled semantic processing. The results are discussed with reference to theories about the complementary roles of representation and manipulation of semantic knowledge.

The algorithmic anatomy of model-based evaluation

Despite many debates in the first half of the twentieth century, it is now largely a truism that humans and other animals build models of their environments and use them for prediction and control. However, model-based (MB) reasoning presents severe computational challenges. Alternative, computationally simpler, model-free (MF) schemes have been suggested in the reinforcement learning literature, and have afforded influential accounts of behavioural and neural data. Here, we study the realization of MB calculations, and the ways that this might be woven together with MF values and evaluation methods. There are as yet mostly only hints in the literature as to the resulting tapestry, so we offer more preview than review.

Multitasking versus multiplexing: Toward a normative account of limitations in the simultaneous execution of control-demanding behaviors

Why is it that behaviors that rely on control, so striking in their diversity and flexibility, are also subject to such striking limitations? Typically, people cannot engage in more than a few-and usually only a single-control-demanding task at a time. This limitation was a defining element in the earliest conceptualizations of controlled processing; it remains one of the most widely accepted axioms of cognitive psychology, and is even the basis for some laws (e.g., against the use of mobile devices while driving). Remarkably, however, the source of this limitation is still not understood. Here, we examine one potential source of this limitation, in terms of a trade-off between the flexibility and efficiency of representation ("multiplexing") and the simultaneous engagement of different processing pathways ("multitasking"). We show that even a modest amount of multiplexing rapidly introduces cross-talk among processing pathways, thereby constraining the number that can be productively engaged at once. We propose that, given the large number of advantages of efficient coding, the human brain has favored this over the capacity for multitasking of control-demanding processes.

Model-based hierarchical reinforcement learning and human action control

Recent work has reawakened interest in goal-directed or 'model-based' choice, where decisions are based on prospective evaluation of potential action outcomes. Concurrently, there has been growing attention to the role of hierarchy in decision-making and action control. We focus here on the intersection between these two areas of interest, considering the topic of hierarchical model-based control. To characterize this form of action control, we draw on the computational framework of hierarchical reinforcement learning, using this to interpret recent empirical findings. The resulting picture reveals how hierarchical model-based mechanisms might play a special and pivotal role in human decision-making, dramatically extending the scope and complexity of human behaviour.

Motivation and cognitive control: from behavior to neural mechanism

Research on cognitive control and executive function has long recognized the relevance of motivational factors. Recently, however, the topic has come increasingly to center stage, with a surge of new studies examining the interface of motivation and cognitive control. In the present article we survey research situated at this interface, considering work from cognitive and social psychology and behavioral economics, but with a particular focus on neuroscience research. We organize existing findings into three core areas, considering them in the light of currently vying theoretical perspectives. Based on the accumulated evidence, we advocate for a view of control function that treats it as a domain of reward-based decision making. More broadly, we argue that neuroscientific evidence plays a critical role in understanding the mechanisms by which motivation and cognitive control interact. Opportunities for further cross-fertilization between behavioral and neuroscientific research are highlighted.