Brief report: morality in the autistic child

Moral foundations in autistic people and people with systemizing minds

BACKGROUND

Do autistic people share the same moral foundations as typical people? Here we built on two prominent theories in psychology, moral foundations theory and the empathizing-systemizing (E-S) theory, to observe the nature of morality in autistic people and systemizers.

METHODS

In dataset 1, we measured five foundations of moral judgements (Care, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity) measured by the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) in autistic (n = 307) and typical people (n = 415) along with their scores on the Empathy Quotient (EQ) and Systemizing Quotient (SQ). In dataset 2, we measured these same five foundations along with E-S cognitive types (previously referred to as "brain types") in a large sample of typical people (N = 7595).

RESULTS

Autistic people scored the same on Care (i.e., concern for others) as typical people (h1). Their affective empathy (but not their cognitive empathy) scores were positively correlated with Care. Autistic people were more likely to endorse Fairness (i.e., giving people what they are owed, and treating them with justice) over Care (h2). Their systemizing scores were positively correlated with Fairness. Autistic people or those with a systemizing cognitive profile had lower scores on binding foundations: Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity (h3). Systemizing in typical people was positively correlated with Liberty (i.e., hypervigilance against oppression), which is a sixth moral foundation (h4). Although the majority of people in all five E-S cognitive types self-identified as liberal, with a skew towards empathizing (h5), the percentage of libertarians was highest in systemizing cognitive types (h6). E-S cognitive types accounted for 2 to 3 times more variance for Care than did sex.

LIMITATIONS

Our study is limited by its reliance on self-report measures and a focus on moral judgements rather than behavior or decision-making. Further, only dataset 2 measured political identification, therefore we were unable to assess politics in autistic people.

CONCLUSIONS

We conclude that some moral foundations in autistic people are similar to those in typical people (despite the difficulties in social interaction that are part of autism), and some are subtly different. These subtle differences vary depending on empathizing and systemizing cognitive types.

Moral judgements among neurotypical children, autistic children and adults with intellectual disability

Background: The present study investigates the possible differences between neurotypical children (NT), autistic children, and adults with intellectual disability (ID) related to (i) morality of the agent, (ii) morality of the action, and (iii) culpability in inappropriate situations. Method: Eighty-four Spanish participants (32 NT, 30 autistic children, and 22 adults with ID) responded to a task of moral transgression with an unambiguous structure (bad intention - bad outcome), where the stories were classified as first-order Theory of Mind (ToM) (based on simple desires) and second-order ToM (based on revenge). Results: Autistic group judged similarly to NT group. However, adults with ID had greater difficulty judging the (ii) morality of the action (compared with the autistic and NT group) and (iii) culpability (compared with the NT group). Also, ID adults encountered problems responding the moral questions in the balloon story (second-order ToM) and ice-cream story (first-order ToM). Conclusions: Autistic and NT children were able to make similar moral judgements, however adults with ID did not respond in the same way - as they were more benevolent in their judgements.

Neuro-Computational Foundations of Moral Preferences

Moral preferences pervade many aspects of our lives, dictating how we ought to behave, whom we can marry, and even what we eat. Despite their relevance, one fundamental question remains unanswered: Where do individual moral preferences come from? It is often thought that all types of preferences reflect properties of domain-general neural decision mechanisms that employ a common "neural currency" to value choice options in many different contexts. This view, however, appears at odds with the observation that many humans consider it intuitively wrong to employ the same scale to compare moral value (e.g., of a human life) with material value (e.g., of money). In this paper, we directly test if moral subjective values are represented by similar neural processes as financial subjective values. In a study combining fMRI with a novel behavioral paradigm, we identify neural representations of the subjective values of human lives or financial payoffs by means of structurally identical computational models. Correlating isomorphic model variables from both domains with brain activity reveals specific patterns of neural activity that selectively represent values in the moral (rTPJ) or financial (vmPFC) domain. Intriguingly, our findings show that human lives and money are valued in (at least partially) distinct neural currencies, supporting theoretical proposals that human moral behavior is guided by processes that are distinct from those underlying behavior driven by personal material benefit.

Theory of Mind and Moral Decision-Making in the Context of Autism Spectrum Disorder

Social impairment in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) has been linked to Theory of Mind (ToM) deficits. However, little research has investigated the relationship between ToM and moral decision-making in children with ASD. This study compared moral decision-making and ToM between aggregate-matched ASD and neurotypical boys (n = 38 per group; aged 6-12). In a third-party resource allocation task manipulating recipient merit, wealth, and health, neurotypical children allocated significantly more resources to the morally deserving recipient, suggesting equitable allocation. A comparatively larger portion of the ASD group allocated equally. ToM emerged as a predictor of moral decision-making. We suggest that ToM (cognitive empathy) deficits may underly atypical moral decision-making in ASD by limiting the integration of empathic arousal (affective empathy) with moral information.

Morality in autism spectrum disorder: A systematic review

Moral reasoning and decision making help guide behavior and facilitate interpersonal relationships. Accounts of morality that position commonsense psychology as the foundation of moral development, (i.e., rationalist theories) have dominated research in morality in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Given the well-documented differences in commonsense psychology among autistic individuals, researchers have investigated whether the development and execution of moral judgement and reasoning differs in this population compared with neurotypical individuals. In light of the diverse findings of investigations of moral development and reasoning in ASD, a summation and critical evaluation of the literature could help make sense of what is known about this important social-cognitive skill in ASD. To that end, we conducted a systematic review of the literature investigating moral decision making among autistic children and adults. Our search identified 29 studies. In this review, we synthesize the research in the area and provide suggestions for future research. Such research could include the application of an alternative theoretical framework to studying morality in autism spectrum disorder that does not assume a deficits-based perspective.

Moral foundations theory in autism spectrum disorder: A qualitative investigation

LAY ABSTRACT

Morality is important for how humans treat each other and non-human animals. Differences in moral thinking have been found between autistic and neurotypical individuals. This research has relied on ways of thinking about moral psychology that suggest that mature morals develop as individuals learn to take the perspectives of others. Yet, even autistic individuals, who sometimes differ in their ability to take others' perspectives, make moral judgements that are similar to neurotypical individuals. Moral foundations theory suggests that moral psychology is not hierarchical but differs depending on culture. This theory could therefore help make sense of similarities and differences in autistic and neurotypical moral thinking. Moral foundations theory has not yet been investigated among autistic individuals. In this study, we interviewed autistic adults as a first attempt at understanding how moral foundations theory fits with autistic moral thinking. We found that all five moral foundations of moral foundations theory were represented in the interviews, yet certain foundations appeared more prominent than others. The autistic adults interviewed in our study discussed issues of care and fairness more than of loyalty, authority or purity when prompted to discuss moral transgressions. Future research should use quantitative methods to compare groups of autistic and neurotypical individuals to clarify similarities and differences in moral thinking between the groups.

ADHD and Judgments of Impulsivity in Rule Violations

Participants with ADHD (n = 45) and participants without ADHD (n = 130, total n = 175) judged hypothetical moral and conventional rule violations that varied the impulsivity of the act, the ADHD diagnosis, and the gender of the actor in order to examine (1) social reasoning about impulsiveness and (2) whether participants infer impulsiveness from the characteristics of the actor, including gender and ADHD-status. Moral violations were judged more negatively than conventional violations, even when they were impulsive. The characteristics of the actor influenced judgments in that participants judged boys' behavior as more acceptable, as having less control, and as deserving of less punishment compared to girls. In addition, actors who were described as having ADHD were judged overall more positively. Participants with ADHD judged that all actors should receive similar punishment, regardless of the actor's ADHD diagnosis, while participants without ADHD judged actors with ADHD should receive less punishment than those without.

Brief Report: Young Children with Autism Can Generate Intent-Based Moral Judgments

Past research suggested that, due to difficulties in mentalistic reasoning, individuals with autism tend to base their moral judgments on the outcome of agents' actions rather than on agents' intentions. In a novel task, aimed at reducing the processing demands required to represent intentions and generate a judgment, autistic children were presented with agents that accidentally harmed or attempted but failed to harm others and were asked to judge those agents. Most of the times, children blamed the character who attempted to harm and exculpated the accidental wrongdoer, suggesting that they generated intent-based moral judgments. These findings suggest that processing limitations rather than lack of conceptual competence explain the poor performance reported in previous research on moral judgment in autism.

Intuitive Moral Reasoning in High-Functioning Autism Spectrum Disorder: A Matter of Social Schemas?

Using a schema-theoretical perspective in the field of moral cognition, we assessed response behavior of adolescent (n = 15) and adult (n = 22) individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) in comparison with adolescent (n = 22) and adult (n = 22) neurotypically developed controls. We conceptualized the Intuitive Moral Reasoning Test-in five moral dilemmas, participants had to choose between two alternative actions and assess their decision with respect to emotional valence, arousal, moral acceptability and permissibility from both the perspective of the acting person and then of the victim. Patients with ASD displayed a different decision and response behavior, particularly when the dilemmas were based on extreme life situations in combination with a social schema involving close social relationships.

Visual Encoding of Social Cues Contributes to Moral Reasoning in Autism Spectrum Disorder: An Eye-Tracking Study

Eye-tracking studies suggest that visual encoding is important for social processes such as socio-moral reasoning. Alterations to the visual encoding of faces, for example, have been linked to the social phenotype of autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) and are associated with social and communication impairments. Yet, people with ASD often perform similarly to neurotypical participants on measures of moral reasoning, supporting the hypothesis of differential mechanisms of moral reasoning in ASD. The objective of this study was to document visual encoding and moral reasoning in ASD and neurotypical individuals using a visual, ecological, sociomoral reasoning paradigm paired with eye-tracking. Two groups (ASD, Control) matched for age and IQ completed the SoMoral task, a set of picture situations describing everyday moral dilemmas, while their eye movements and pupil dilation were recorded. Moral understanding, decision-making, and justification were recorded. Participants with ASD presented a longer time to first fixation on faces. They also understood fewer dilemmas and produced fewer socially adaptive responses. Despite a similar average level of moral maturity, the justifications produced by participants with ASD were not distributed in the same way as the neurotypical participants. Visual encoding was a significant predictor of moral decision-making and moral justification for both groups. The results are discussed in the context of alternative mechanisms of moral reasoning in ASD.

Mind perception and moral judgment in autism

Social difficulties of autistic individuals have been suggested to be caused by mind blindness, the absence of a theory of mind. Numerous studies have investigated theory of mind in autism spectrum disorder or how autistic individuals represent the mental states of others. Here, we have examined, as an alternative, mind perception, namely how individuals perceive the minds of various animate and inanimate entities. Autistic and non-autistic participants demonstrated evidence of a similar two-dimensional mind perception; agency, capacity for doing (i.e., self-control, memory, plan), and experience, capacity for feeling (i.e., fear, hunger, pain). Some targets (e.g., human infant and dog) were perceived to have low agency but high experience, while others (e.g., robot and God) were perceived to have the reverse pattern. Moreover, in both autistic and non-autistic groups, the attribution of moral blame positively correlated with agency, whereas moral consideration positively correlated with experience. These results offer new evidence of social cognition, particularly conception of mind and morality, in autism. Autism Res 2018, 11: 1239-1244. © 2018 International Society for Autism Research, Wiley Periodicals, Inc. LAY SUMMARY: We found that autistic and non-autistic individuals have similar thoughts regarding the minds of various living and nonliving entities. In addition, both groups gave moral consideration or blamed entities for wrongdoing according to their conception of the minds of those entities. Autistic individuals have this mind-based moral sense, which is a pivotal element with a key role in human society.

Norms and the Flexibility of Moral Action

A complex web of social and moral norms governs many everyday human behaviors, acting as the glue for social harmony. The existence of moral norms helps elucidate the psychological motivations underlying a wide variety of seemingly puzzling behavior, including why humans help or trust total strangers. In this review, we examine four widespread moral norms: Fairness, altruism, trust, and cooperation, and consider how a single social instrument-reciprocity-underpins compliance to these norms. Using a game theoretic framework, we examine how both context and emotions moderate moral standards, and by extension, moral behavior. We additionally discuss how a mechanism of reciprocity facilitates the adherence to, and enforcement of, these moral norms through a core network of brain regions involved in processing reward. In contrast, violating this set of moral norms elicits neural activation in regions involved in resolving decision conflict and exerting cognitive control. Finally, we review how a reinforcement mechanism likely governs learning about morally normative behavior. Together, this review aims to explain how moral norms are deployed in ways that facilitate flexible moral choices.

Trouble du spectre de l’autisme : une agentivité morale objective, rigoriste et émotionnelle

Le trouble du spectre de l’autisme (TSA) désigne un ensemble de troubles neurodéveloppementaux caractérisé par des difficultés de communication et d’interactions sociales, ainsi que des comportements, intérêts et activités restreints et répétitifs (1). Concernant les interactions sociales, les personnes autistes auraient notamment des difficultés d’empathie, souvent considérées comme altérant leurs capacités morales. Ainsi, plusieurs études en psychologie et en neuroscience tentent de détecter des processus empathiques défaillants à l’origine d’altérations de leur compréhension de la moralité (2-4). Les problèmes sociaux des personnes autistes se manifestent aussi par des difficultés dans leur vie affective qui concernent leurs propres états émotionnels (5-9). Je suggère que les particularités morales des personnes autistes sont issues de leurs particularités d’accès émotionnel, soit la façon dont elles se rapportent à leurs propres émotions, et non pas de déficits d’empathie. Je montrerai que ces particularités ne les empêchent en aucun cas de faire partie de la communauté morale. Les personnes autistes peuvent être de rigoureux agents moraux, c’est-à-dire qu’elles présentent une certaine intransigeance et inflexibilité morale. Ces particularités seront expliquées. À la lumière des théories sur les processus duaux, je montrerai comment leurs particularités socio-émotionnelles et morales sont toutes deux sous-tendues par une surutilisation de processus de type 2, soit une surutilisation de raisonnements cognitifs délibérés et basés sur des règles, plutôt que des processus automatiques, de type 1. L’objectif principal de cette étude sera donc de mettre en évidence les particularités qui permettent aux personnes autistes d’être des agents moraux certes inflexibles, mais néanmoins émotionnellement investis dans les situations à caractère moral.

Sociomoral Reasoning, Empathy, and Meeting Developmental Tasks During the Transition to Adulthood in Autism Spectrum Disorder

This mixed methods study investigated sociomoral reasoning, empathy, and challenging and supportive factors during the transition to adulthood in emerging adults (18-27-years-old) with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) to better understand how these variables facilitated positive developmental outcomes. Same-aged ASD (n = 22) and typically developing (TD) (n = 22) groups completed quantitative and qualitative measures assessing these constructs. Compared to the TD group, the ASD group had significantly lower sociomoral reasoning and perspective-taking, significantly higher personal distress, but similar empathic concern. Inductive content analysis showed those with ASD and better developmental outcomes more often discussed the value of informal social support and utilized perspective-taking during challenging sociomoral situations.

Judgment of moral and social transgression in schizophrenia

INTRODUCTION

Despite evidence of pervasive social-cognitive deficits in schizophrenia, little is known of moral cognition in this population. While recent research indicates that impairment of explicit moral reasoning is explained by these individuals' other cognitive deficits, their capacities for basic moral judgment are unknown.

METHODS

45 people with schizophrenia and 27 healthy controls completed the Moral-Conventional Distinction Task: a classic task that assesses judgment of violations of moral or social convention on permissibility, severity, and authority-contingence. Justifications of judgments were also probed. Basic cognition was indexed by measures of IQ, verbal memory, and information processing speed. Self-report inventories were used to assess different facets of 'empathy' (e.g., perspective-taking, or theory of mind, and empathic concern), and aggressive tendencies.

RESULTS

Groups did not differ significantly in judgments of permissibility or authority-contingency, or justifications of judgments. Patients did, however, rate violations of social (but not moral) convention more harshly. They also took longer to judge impermissibility of moral (but nor social) transgressions. Slower moral judgment in patients was associated with lower levels of self-reported empathic concern, while harsher condemnation of social transgression was associated with poorer (self-reported) perspective-taking.

CONCLUSIONS

Findings provide no evidence that moral judgment is fundamentally compromised in schizophrenia. Evidence of slower moral judgment in schizophrenia does suggest, however, that patients were less influenced by automatic aversive responses to amoral conduct. The association found between poorer (self-reported) perspective-taking and greater condemnation of social transgressions also suggests that an insensitivity to others' extenuating motives may exacerbate social misunderstandings in schizophrenia.

How Children with Autism Reason about Other's Intentions: False-Belief and Counterfactual Inferences

We examine false belief and counterfactual reasoning in children with autism with a new change-of-intentions task. Children listened to stories, for example, Anne is picking up toys and John hears her say she wants to find her ball. John goes away and the reason for Anne's action changes-Anne's mother tells her to tidy her bedroom. We asked, 'What will John believe is the reason that Anne is picking up toys?' which requires a false-belief inference, and 'If Anne's mother hadn't asked Anne to tidy her room, what would have been the reason she was picking up toys?' which requires a counterfactual inference. We tested children aged 6, 8 and 10 years. Children with autism made fewer correct inferences than typically developing children at 8 years, but by 10 years there was no difference. Children with autism made fewer correct false-belief than counterfactual inferences, just like typically developing children.

The clinical utility of social information processing theory in assessing and treating offenders with autism spectrum disorder

Purpose

Social deficits are central within conceptualisations of autism spectrum disorder (ASD), and separately linked to offending behaviour. Social problem-solving interventions are often used with offenders, but little research has examined the social information processing (SIP) skills of individuals with ASD and a history of criminal offending behaviours. The paper aims to discuss this issue.

Design/methodology/approach

This conceptual paper will introduce the SIP model, review SIP research as applied to those with ASD and in forensic populations, and further consider the relevance to the assessment and treatment of offenders with ASD.

Findings

Difficulties in all areas of the SIP model are noted in ASD and research suggests these difficulties may be directly linked to behaviour.

Practical implications

It is possible that identifying SIP abilities and deficits could improve the effectiveness of rehabilitation programmes for this group.

Originality/value

This paper reviews the utility of social information models in the offending behaviour of people with ASD.

Moral understanding in children with autism

Children with autism were compared with control groups on their ability to make moral judgements. Participants were presented with pairs of vignettes in which actions were either deliberate or accidental and caused injury to a person or damage to property. Participants were asked to judge which protagonist was the naughtier and to verbally justify this judgement. Results showed that the children with autism were as likely as controls to judge culpability on the basis of motive, and to judge injury to persons as more culpable than damage to property. Children with autism also offered some appropriate verbal justifications for their judgments although most justifications were of poor quality and reiterated the story. Results are discussed in terms of theory of mind and the possible role of deficits in complex reasoning and executive functions.

Exploring the Role of Theory of Mind in Moral Judgment: The Case of Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder

This paper adds to the growing research on moral judgment (MJ) by considering whether theory of mind (ToM) might foster children's autonomous MJ achievement. A group of 30 children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) was compared in MJ and ToM with 30 typically developing (TD) children. Participants were tested for MJ with a classical Piaget's task and for ToM with a second order False Belief task. In the moral task, children were told two versions of a story: in one version the protagonist acted according to a moral intention but the action resulted in a harmful consequence; in the other version the protagonist acted according to an immoral intention, but the action resulted in a harmless consequence. Children were asked which of the two protagonists was the "naughtier." In line with previous studies, the results indicated that, while the majority of TD participants succeeded in the second order False Belief task, only few individuals with ASD showed intact perspective taking abilities. The analysis of the MJ in relation to ToM showed that children with ASD lacking ToM abilities judged guilty the protagonists of the two versions of the story in the moral task because both of them violated a moral rule or because they considered the consequences of the actions, ignoring any psychological information. These results indicate a heteronomous morality in individuals with ASD, based on the respect of learned moral rules and outcomes rather than others' subjective states.

Divergent roles of autistic and alexithymic traits in utilitarian moral judgments in adults with autism

This study investigated hypothetical moral choices in adults with high-functioning autism and the role of empathy and alexithymia in such choices. We used a highly emotionally salient moral dilemma task to investigate autistics' hypothetical moral evaluations about personally carrying out harmful utilitarian behaviours aimed at maximizing welfare. Results showed that they exhibited a normal pattern of moral judgments despite the deficits in social cognition and emotional processing. Further analyses revealed that this was due to mutually conflicting biases associated with autistic and alexithymic traits after accounting for shared variance: (a) autistic traits were associated with reduced utilitarian bias due to elevated personal distress of demanding social situations, while (b) alexithymic traits were associated with increased utilitarian bias on account of reduced empathic concern for the victim. Additionally, autistics relied on their non-verbal reasoning skills to rigidly abide by harm-norms. Thus, utilitarian moral judgments in autism were spared due to opposite influences of autistic and alexithymic traits and compensatory intellectual strategies. These findings demonstrate the importance of empathy and alexithymia in autistic moral cognition and have methodological implications for studying moral judgments in several other clinical populations.

Why Do You Believe in God? Relationships between Religious Belief, Analytic Thinking, Mentalizing and Moral Concern

Prior work has established that analytic thinking is associated with disbelief in God, whereas religious and spiritual beliefs have been positively linked to social and emotional cognition. However, social and emotional cognition can be subdivided into a number of distinct dimensions, and some work suggests that analytic thinking is in tension with some aspects of social-emotional cognition. This leaves open two questions. First, is belief linked to social and emotional cognition in general, or a specific dimension in particular? Second, does the negative relationship between belief and analytic thinking still hold after relationships with social and emotional cognition are taken into account? We report eight hypothesis-driven studies which examine these questions. These studies are guided by a theoretical model which focuses on the distinct social and emotional processing deficits associated with autism spectrum disorders (mentalizing) and psychopathy (moral concern). To our knowledge no other study has investigated both of these dimensions of social and emotion cognition alongside analytic thinking. We find that religious belief is robustly positively associated with moral concern (4 measures), and that at least part of the negative association between belief and analytic thinking (2 measures) can be explained by a negative correlation between moral concern and analytic thinking. Using nine different measures of mentalizing, we found no evidence of a relationship between mentalizing and religious or spiritual belief. These findings challenge the theoretical view that religious and spiritual beliefs are linked to the perception of agency, and suggest that gender differences in religious belief can be explained by differences in moral concern. These findings are consistent with the opposing domains hypothesis, according to which brain areas associated with moral concern and analytic thinking are in tension.

Great Expectations: The Role of Rules in Guiding Pro-social Behaviour in Groups with High Versus Low Autistic Traits

Measuring autistic traits in the general population has proven sensitive for examining cognition. The present study extended this to pro-social behaviour, investigating the influence of expectations to help others. A novel task describing characters in need of help was administered to students scoring high versus low on the Autism-Spectrum Quotient. Scenarios had two variants, describing either a ‘clear-cut’ or ‘ambiguous’ social rule. Participants with high versus low autistic traits were less pro-social and sympathetic overall towards the characters. The groups’ ratings of characters’ expectations were comparable, but those with high autistic traits provided more rule-based rationales in the clear-cut condition. This pattern of relatively intact knowledge in the context of reduced pro-social behaviour has implications for social skill training programmes.

Moral cognition in schizophrenia

INTRODUCTION

Disordered moral behaviour and understanding of moral rules were described early in the literature on schizophrenia; however, moral cognition has received scant attention in spite of a large literature focused on social cognitive impairments and violent behaviour in schizophrenia.

METHODS

We conducted a narrative synthesis of the literature on violence, moral judgement and schizophrenia.

RESULTS

Initial empirical research into moral cognition in schizophrenia did not fully account for the basic- and social-cognitive deficits now known to characterise schizophrenia. Importantly, research into moral cognition in autism and psychopathy, disorders in part characterised by social cognitive impairments indicates subtle patterns of difference to the moral cognition of control participants. Recent neuroeconomic studies of moral cognition in schizophrenia have indicated that individuals with schizophrenia display subtle dysfunction in their fairness-related behaviours, but not in their propensity to engage in altruistic punishment.

CONCLUSIONS

Further research has the potential to broaden our understanding of what is intact and what is impaired in moral cognition in schizophrenia and also to inform our theories of the structures subserving moral judgement in the general population. Furthermore, a more thorough understanding of moral cognitive impairments in schizophrenia may have implications for both legal process and psychosocial rehabilitation.

How (not) to draw philosophical implications from the cognitive nature of concepts: the case of intentionality

Philosophers have often appealed to intuitive judgments in various thought experiments to support or reject particular theses. Experimental philosophy is an emerging discipline that examines the cognitive nature of such intuitive judgments. In this paper, we assess the methodological and epistemological status of experimental philosophy. We focus on the Knobe effect, in which our intuitive judgment of the intentionality of an action seems to depend on the perceived moral status of that action. The debate on the philosophical implications of the Knobe effect has been framed in terms of the distinction between the competence and performance of the concept of intentionality. Some scholars seem to suggest that the Knobe effect reflects the competence (or otherwise, the performance error) of the concept of intentionality. However, we argue that these notions are purely functional and thus do not have philosophical implications, without assuming normativism, which we see as problematic in a psychological methodology. Finally, focusing on the gap between competence and rationality, we suggest future directions for experimental philosophy.

The relationship between moral judgment and cooperation in children with high-functioning autism

This study investigated moral judgment in children with high-functioning autism and their cooperation in prisoner's dilemma game with partners of different moralities. Thirty-eight 6- to 12-year-old high-functioning autistic (HFA) children and 31 typically developing (TD) children were recruited. Children were asked to judge story protagonists' morality. After making this moral judgment correctly, they were asked to play with the morally nice and the morally naughty child in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. Results showed that both HFA and TD children made correct moral judgments, and that HFA children might even have more rigid criteria for what constitutes morally naughty acts. HFA children's cooperation did not differ depending on the morality of the interaction partner, while TD children showed higher cooperation when interacting with the morally nice than the morally naughty child did. Thus, partner's morality did influence TD children's but not HFA children's subsequent cooperation.

Better to be equal? Challenges to equality for cognitively able children with autism spectrum disorders in a social decision game

Much controversy surrounds questions about whether humans have an aversion to inequity and how a commitment to equality might play a role in cooperation and other aspects of social interactions. Examining the social decisions of children with autism spectrum disorders provides a fascinating opportunity to explore these issues. Specifically, we evaluated the possibility that children with autism spectrum disorders may be less likely than typically developing children to show a prioritisation of equality. A total of 69 typically developing (mean age 11;6 years) and 57 cognitively able children with autism spectrum disorders (mean age 11;7 years) played a social decision game in which the equality option was pitted against alternatives that varied in instrumental outcomes. Results showed that both groups were more likely to choose the equality option when there was no cost to the self. However, even though children with autism spectrum disorders appeared to view equality as preferable to causing explicit harm to others, they departed from an equality stance when there was an opportunity to increase instrumental gain without any obvious harm to the self or the other. Typically developing children, in contrast, showed similar prioritisation of equality across these contexts. Future research needs to address the question of how differences in the commitment to equality affect children’s social behaviour and relationships in daily life.

Demands in reflecting about another's motives and intentions modulate vicarious embarrassment in autism spectrum disorders

The affective responses to another person's condition depend on the ability to reflect about another's thoughts and intentions. This is relevant also for high-functioning individuals with ASD who have considerable difficulties in reading the intentions of others. With the present study we introduce a novel paradigm to induce vicarious embarrassment as a form of social pain. We predicted that the vicarious embarrassment experiences of high-functioning individuals with ASD should specifically decline in social contexts that require reflecting on another's intentions. Thirty-two young adults with high-functioning ASD were matched with regards to age, gender, and verbal IQ to a control group. Vicarious embarrassment was examined with previously validated stimuli describing 30 situations that elicit vicarious embarrassment in the observer. The situations manipulated whether the displayed protagonist either accidentally or intentionally transgressed a social norm in public and participants rated their vicarious embarrassment from the observer's perspective. The ASD group showed comparable vicarious embarrassment experience in response to observing another's accidental norm transgressions but significantly reduced vicarious embarrassment when observing another who intentionally violated socials norms. Vicarious embarrassment was significantly correlated with trait empathy in the ASD group. In complex social scenarios individuals with ASD are impaired in reporting experience of vicarious embarrassment, primarily when it is required to reflect on another's intentions. The present study thus contributes to a better understanding of how persons with ASD are affected in the diversity of empathic processes in the social, everyday life environment they are embedded in.

Decoding moral judgments from neural representations of intentions

Intentional harms are typically judged to be morally worse than accidental harms. Distinguishing between intentional harms and accidents depends on the capacity for mental state reasoning (i.e., reasoning about beliefs and intentions), which is supported by a group of brain regions including the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ). Prior research has found that interfering with activity in RTPJ can impair mental state reasoning for moral judgment and that high-functioning individuals with autism spectrum disorders make moral judgments based less on intent information than neurotypical participants. Three experiments, using multivoxel pattern analysis, find that (i) in neurotypical adults, the RTPJ shows reliable and distinct spatial patterns of responses across voxels for intentional vs. accidental harms, and (ii) individual differences in this neural pattern predict differences in participants' moral judgments. These effects are specific to RTPJ. By contrast, (iii) this distinction was absent in adults with autism spectrum disorders. We conclude that multivoxel pattern analysis can detect features of mental state representations (e.g., intent), and that the corresponding neural patterns are behaviorally and clinically relevant.

Selective impairment of cognitive empathy for moral judgment in adults with high functioning autism

Faced with a moral dilemma, conflict arises between a cognitive controlled response aimed at maximizing welfare, i.e. the utilitarian judgment, and an emotional aversion to harm, i.e. the deontological judgment. In the present study, we investigated moral judgment in adult individuals with high functioning autism/Asperger syndrome (HFA/AS), a clinical population characterized by impairments in prosocial emotions and social cognition. In Experiment 1, we compared the response patterns of HFA/AS participants and neurotypical controls to moral dilemmas with low and high emotional saliency. We found that HFA/AS participants more frequently delivered the utilitarian judgment. Their perception of appropriateness of moral transgression was similar to that of controls, but HFA/AS participants reported decreased levels of emotional reaction to the dilemma. In Experiment 2, we explored the way in which demographic, clinical and social cognition variables including emotional and cognitive aspects of empathy and theory of mind influenced moral judgment. We found that utilitarian HFA/AS participants showed a decreased ability to infer other people's thoughts and to understand their intentions, as measured both by performance on neuropsychological tests and through dispositional measures. We conclude that greater prevalence of utilitarianism in HFA/AS is associated with difficulties in specific aspects of social cognition.

Neural correlates of moral reasoning in autism spectrum disorder

In our study, we tried to clarify whether patients with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) reveal different moral decision patterns as compared to healthy subjects and whether common social interaction difficulties in ASD are reflected in altered brain activation during different aspects of moral reasoning. 28 patients with high-functioning ASD and 28 healthy subjects matched for gender, age and education took part in an event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging study. Participants were confronted with textual dilemma situations followed by proposed solutions to which they could agree or disagree. On a neural level, moral decision making was associated with activation in anterior medial prefrontal regions, the temporo-parietal junction and the precuneus for both groups. However, while patients and healthy controls did not exhibit significant behavioral differences, ASD patients showed decreased activation in limbic regions, particularly the amygdala, as well as increased activation in the anterior and the posterior cingulate gyrus during moral reasoning. Alterations of brain activation in patients might thus indicate specific impairments in empathy. However, activation increases in brain regions associated with the 'default mode network' and self-referential cognition also provide evidence for an altered way of patients' cerebral processing with regard to decision making based on social information.

Moral judgment in adults with autism spectrum disorders

The ability of a group of adults with high functioning autism (HFA) or Asperger Syndrome (AS) to distinguish moral, conventional and disgust transgressions was investigated using a set of six transgression scenarios, each of which was followed by questions about permissibility, seriousness, authority contingency and justification. The results showed that although individuals with HFA or AS (HFA/AS) were able to distinguish affect-backed norms from conventional affect-neutral norms along the dimensions of permissibility, seriousness and authority-dependence, they failed to distinguish moral and disgust transgressions along the seriousness dimension and were unable to provide appropriate welfare-based moral justifications. Moreover, they judged conventional and disgust transgressions to be more serious than did the comparison group, and the correlation analysis revealed that the seriousness rating was related to their ToM impairment. We concluded that difficulties providing appropriate moral justifications and evaluating the seriousness of transgressions in individuals with HFA/AS may be explained by an impaired cognitive appraisal system that, while responsive to rule violations, fails to use relevant information about the agent's intentions and the affective impact of the action outcome in conscious moral reasoning.

Blame and forgiveness judgements among children, adolescents and adults with autism

We compared the capacity of children, adolescents and adults with and without autism to use (a) intent and severity of consequences information for attributing blame to an offender, and (b) intent and apologies information for inferring willingness to forgive. Participants were presented with two sets of six scenarios obtained by combination of intent and severity (or apology) information, and instructed to indicate appropriate levels of blame (or willingness to forgive). In the blame condition, persons with autism were able to consistently use intent information but not to the same degree as their comparison counterparts. In the forgiveness condition, intent was not taken into account for judging by persons with autism, irrespective of their age.