The influence of performance on action-effect integration in sense of agency

The role of self-related information in the sense of agency

Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the subjective experience of controlling one's actions and their subsequent consequences. The present study endeavors to investigate the impact of how different degrees of self-related stimuli as action outcomes on the sense of agency by observing the temporal binding effect. Results showed that self-related sound significantly altered temporal binding, notably influencing outcome binding. A post-hoc explanation model effectively elucidated the role of self-related information in the formation of the sense of agency.

Feelings of responsibility and temporal binding: A comparison of two measures of the sense of agency

Temporal binding refers to a subjective shortening of the interval between an action and its perceptual consequences. Temporal binding has often been used by researchers to indirectly measure participants' sense of agency (SoA), or the subjective sense of causing something to happen. Other studies have proposed links between temporal binding and feelings of moral responsibility. The present study compared subjective interval estimates to feelings of responsibility in a between-subjects design (Exp 1) and a within-subjects design (Exp 2). Participants either estimated the interval between two events (two tones in the passive condition, or a keypress followed by a tone in active conditions) or rated their feeling of responsibility for the tone(s). Manipulations of participant involvement and choice impacted feelings of responsibility more than temporal estimates. Overall, the two dependent variables followed different patterns, suggesting subjective interval estimates may not be a reliable proxy for feelings of responsibility.

Cognitive load decreases the sense of agency during continuous action

The sense of agency that normally accompanies voluntary actions depends on a combination of sensory predictions and other inferences. For example, when people manipulate moving objects and rate their degree of control, control ratings are influenced by proximal correlations between motor commands and visual feedback as well as the overall success or failure of the action. The relative importance of sensory predictions vs. post hoc feedback may depend on the availability and perceived reliability of those cues, which is context dependent. The present study investigated how increasing cognitive load during a visuomotor tracking task influences the sense of agency, and whether cognitive load influences the extent to which control ratings depend on sensory predictions vs. post hoc feedback. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants performed a dual task that involved tracking a moving target using a joystick while rehearsing 3, 5, or 7 digits. Control ratings decreased as memory set size increased, even though set size had no significant effect on objective tracking error. Experiment 3 replicated this finding while also manipulating the favorability of feedback presented after each trial. Control ratings were correlated with post hoc feedback, but there was no significant interaction between feedback and cognitive load. These results suggest that sensorimotor predictions, performance feedback, and availability of working memory resources can all influence sense of agency. The hypothesis that people rely more on post hoc feedback to rate control when they are distracted was not supported.

Effects of Collaborative Training Using Virtual Co-embodiment on Motor Skill Learning

Virtual reality (VR) is a promising tool for motor skill learning. Previous studies have indicated that observing and following a teacher's movements from a first-person perspective using VR facilitates motor skill learning. Conversely, it has also been pointed out that this learning method makes the learner so strongly aware of the need to follow that it weakens their sense of agency (SoA) for motor skills and prevents them from updating the body schema, thereby preventing long-term retention of motor skills. To address this problem, we propose applying "virtual co-embodiment" to motor skill learning. Virtual co-embodiment is a system in which a virtual avatar is controlled based on the weighted average of the movements of multiple entities. Because users in virtual co-embodiment overestimate their SoA, we hypothesized that learning using virtual co-embodiment with a teacher would improve motor skill retention. In this study, we focused on learning a dual task to evaluate the automation of movement, which is considered an essential element of motor skills. As a result, learning in virtual co-embodiment with the teacher improves motor skill learning efficiency compared with sharing the teacher's first-person perspective or learning alone.

Induced feelings of external influence during instructed imaginations in healthy subjects

The psychopathological phenomenon of delusions of influence comprises variable disturbances of the self-environment-border leading to the feeling of external influence on thoughts, feelings, impulses or behaviors. Delusions of influence are a hallmark in psychotic illness, but nevertheless, attenuated forms can also appear in healthy individuals. Here we present a newly developed paradigm to induce and assess feelings of external influence during instructed imaginations in healthy individuals. In the current study, we asked 60 healthy individuals to visually imagine different objects. To induce feelings of external influence, we applied one of three different physical setups (low-amplitude transcranial direct current stimulation, eye contact, or skin-to-skin hand touch), and informed the participants whether or not an external influence was attempted during the respective trial. The physical setup (setup vs. no setup, Z = -3.847, p < 0.001, r = 0.497) as well as the information given to the participants (confirmation vs. negation, Z = -5.218, p < 0.001, r = 0.674) alone were able to modulate the feeling of external influence in all three interventions. The impact of information (whether influence was attempted or not attempted) significantly exceeded the impact of the physical setup on the ratings of experienced external influence (Z = -2.394, p = 0.016, r = 0.310). Moreover, the response latency correlated with the estimated feeling of external influence (r _S = 0.392, p = 0.002). Additional analyses addressed the influence of the emotional content of imagined objects and examined the intensity and emotional valence of the imaginations. Further supplemental analyses correlated external influence estimation of the participants with other psychopathological measures (trait markers for supernatural beliefs, proneness to hallucinations, and delusions and attributional style). In conclusion, this study endorses a quantitative model of psychopathological characteristics, in this case feelings of external influence that can be induced by external cues.

The sense of agency for brain disorders: A comprehensive review and proposed framework

Sense of Agency (SoA) refers to the feeling of control over voluntary actions and the outcomes of those actions. Several brain disorders are characterized by an abnormal SoA. To date, there is no robust treatment for aberrant agency across disorders; this is, in large part, due to gaps in our understanding of the cognitive mechanisms and neural correlates of the SoA. This apparent gap stems from a lack of synthesis in established findings. As such, the current review reconciles previously established findings into a novel neurocognitive framework for future investigations of the SoA in brain disorders, which we term the Agency in Brain Disorders Framework (ABDF). In doing so, we highlight key top-down and bottom-up cues that contribute to agency prospectively (i.e., prior to action execution) and retrospectively (i.e., after action execution). We then examine brain disorders, including schizophrenia, autism spectrum disorders (ASD), obsessive-compulsive disorders (OCD), and cortico-basal syndrome (CBS), within the ABDF, to demonstrate its potential utility in investigating neurocognitive mechanisms underlying phenotypically variable presentations of the SoA in brain disorders.

Perception and control: individual difference in the sense of agency is associated with learnability in sensorimotor adaptation

Adaptive motor learning refers to the ability to adjust to novel disturbances in the environment as a way of minimizing sensorimotor errors. It is known that such processes show large individual differences and are linked to multiple perceptual and cognitive processes. On the other hand, the sense of agency refers to the subjective feeling of control during voluntary motor control. Is the sense of agency just a by-product of the control outcome, or is it actually important for motor control and learning? To answer this question, this study takes an approach based on individual differences to investigate the relationship between the sense of agency and learnability in sensorimotor adaptation. Specifically, we use an adaptive motor learning task to measure individual differences in the efficiency of motor learning. Regarding the sense of agency, we measure the perceptual sensitivity of detecting an increase or a decrease in control when the actual level of control gradually increases or decreases, respectively. The results of structure equation modelling reveal a significant influence of perceptual sensitivity to increased control on motor learning efficiency. On the other hand, the link between perceptual sensitivity to decreased control and motor learning is nonsignificant. The results show that the sense of agency in detecting increased control is associated with the actual ability of sensorimotor adaptation: people who are more sensitive in detecting their control in the environment can also more quickly adjust their behaviors to novel disturbances to acquire better control, compared to people who have a less sensitive sense of agency. Finally, the results also reveal that the processes of increasing control and decreasing control may be partially independent.

Effect of Avatar Appearance on Detection Thresholds for Remapped Hand Movements

Hand interaction techniques in virtual reality often exploit visual dominance over proprioception to remap physical hand movements onto different virtual movements. However, when the offset between virtual and physical hands increases, the remapped virtual hand movements are hardly self-attributed, and the users become aware of the remapping. Interestingly, the sense of self-attribution of a body is called the sense of body ownership (SoBO) in the field of psychology, and the realistic the avatar, the stronger is the SoBO. Hence, we hypothesized that realistic avatars (i.e., human hands) can foster self-attribution of the remapped movements better than abstract avatars (i.e., spherical pointers), thus making the remapping less noticeable. In this article, we present an experiment in which participants repeatedly executed reaching movements with their right hand while different amounts of horizontal shifts were applied. We measured the remapping detection thresholds for each combination of shift directions (left or right) and avatar appearances (realistic or abstract). The results show that realistic avatars increased the detection threshold (i.e., lowered sensitivity) by 31.3 percent than the abstract avatars when the leftward shift was applied (i.e., when the hand moved in the direction away from the body-midline). In addition, the proprioceptive drift (i.e., the displacement of self-localization toward an avatar) was larger with realistic avatars for leftward shifts, indicating that visual information was given greater preference during visuo-proprioceptive integration in realistic avatars. Our findings quantifiably show that realistic avatars can make remapping less noticeable for larger mismatches between virtual and physical movements and can potentially improve a wide variety of hand-remapping techniques without changing the mapping itself.

Deceleration Assistance Mitigated the Trade-off Between Sense of Agency and Driving Performance

Driving assistance technology has gained traction in recent years and is becoming more widely used in vehicles. However, drivers usually experience a reduced sense of agency when driving assistance is active even though automated assistance improves driving performance by reducing human error and ensuring quick reactions. The present study examined whether driving assistance can maintain human sense of agency during early deceleration in the face of collision risk, compared with manual deceleration. In the experimental task, participants decelerate their vehicle in a driving simulator to avoid collision with a vehicle that suddenly cut in front of them and decelerated. In the assisted condition, the system performed deceleration 100 ms after the cut-in. Participants were instructed to decelerate their vehicle and follow the vehicle that cut-in. This design ensured that the deceleration assistance applied a similar control to the vehicle as the drivers intended to, only faster and smoother. Participants rated their sense of agency and their driving performance. The results showed that drivers maintained their sense of agency and improved driving performance under driving assistance. The findings provided insights into designing driving assistance that can maintain drivers' sense of agency while improving future driving performance. It is important to establish a mode of joint-control in which the system shares the intention of human drivers and provides improved execution of control.

The Sense of Agency in Driving Automation

Driving automation has been developing rapidly during the latest decade. However, all current technologies of driving automation still require human drivers’ monitoring and intervention. This means that during driving automation, the control by human driver and by the driving automation system are blended. In this case, if the human driver loses the sense of agency over the vehicle, he/she may not be able to actively engage in driving, and may excessively rely on the driving automation system. This review focuses on the subjective feeling of agency of the human driver over the vehicle in such situations. We address the possible measures of agency in driving automation, and discuss the insights from literatures on the sense of agency in joint control, robotics, automation, and driving assistance. We suggest that maintaining the sense of agency for human driver is important for ethical and safety reasons. We further propose a number of avenues for further research, which may help to better design an optimized driving automation considering human sense of agency.

Sense of agency in continuous action is influenced by outcome feedback in one-back trials

Sense of agency (SoA) is a subjective feeling that a person controls his/her own actions and causes changes in the external world. In continuous action such as controlling a dot by keypresses, SoA is influenced by actual actions during the task. Additionally, it is known that even though the actual actions were almost identical, outcome feedback (e.g., success or fail) could modulate SoA, indicating a retrospective modulation of SoA. However, it was unclear whether the SoA modulated by outcome feedback would influence SoA for an up-coming action. Here, we investigated the effects of outcome feedback in one-back trial on SoA in the present trial (i.e., prospective modulation). We conducted three experiments where participants controlled a dot to a target whose color changed unpredictably between white and blue. If the dot reached the target when the color was white (blue), participants received a text feedback of "Success" ("Fail"). However, in fact, we predetermined the outcome feedback to remove the effects of the actual performance of participants on SoA. The results showed that if the outcome feedback of the one-back trial was successful, SoA of the present trial became higher (i.e., prospective modulation) until they received the outcome feedback. Moreover, the prospectively modulated SoA was retrospectively overwritten by the outcome feedback of the present trial and likely converged to a constant level. These findings indicated that SoA was not produced by a mere sum of the prospective and retrospective factors, but rather that these factors independently influenced SoA with differential time courses.

The relationship and difference between delay detection ability and judgment of sense of agency

Judgment of agency involves the comparison of motor intention and proprioceptive/visual feedback, in addition to a range of cognitive factors. However, few studies have experimentally examined the differences or correlations between delay detection ability and judgment of agency. Thus, the present study investigated the relationship between delay detection ability and agency judgment using the delay detection task and the agency attribution task. Fifty-eight participants performed the delay detection and agency attribution tasks, and the time windows of each measure were analyzed using logistic curve fitting. The results revealed that the time window of judgment of agency was significantly longer than that of delay detection, and there was a slight correlation between the time windows in each task. The results supported a two-step model of agency, suggesting that judgment of agency involved not only comparison of multisensory information but also several cognitive factors. The study firstly revealed the model in psychophysical experiments.

Does delay in feedback diminish sense of agency? A review

Sense of agency refers to the subjective feeling of controlling one's own action, and through it, external events. Action-effect delay is widely used to disrupt this subjective feeling. Numerous studies have shown that self-reported sense of agency decreases along with the increase in delay. I discussed the distinction between body and external agency, and the possible different effects of delay on them. Furthermore, I reviewed literature that examined the influence of delay on self-reported sense of agency, implicit measures of sense of agency, and control-based action selection, and discussed possible reasons of the reported effects. Delay influences the measures of agency via multiple possible processes, such as graded response, task performance, sensory pre-activation, and temporal perceptual sensitivity. However, the causal relation between action and effect at higher-level of judgment may remain intact even for super-second delays. I conclude that the effects of delay on the sense of agency significantly differ between different levels, and researchers willing to use delay to disturb the sense of agency should carefully clarify which process it may affect.

The interplay of exercise, placebo and nocebo effects on experimental pain

Over the last few decades, placebo, and nocebo effects in general, have been investigated at rest. This proposed study explores whether they could work even when the experience of pain occurs during a movement. Exercise itself can have a hypoalgesic effect, suggesting that placebo- and exercise-induced hypoalgesia could foster pain reduction. In the present study, we investigated the interplay of exercise, placebo and nocebo effects on pain. To this aim, we developed a machine-controlled isotonic motor task to standardize the exercise across participants and used a well-validated model of placebo and nocebo manipulations with reinforced expectations via a conditioning procedure including visual cues paired with heat painful stimulations. Participants reported expectations and pain on a trial-by-trial basis. We found that the standardized isotonic exercise elicited a reduction of pain intensity. Moreover, both exercise and placebo induced comparable hypoalgesic effects. When the exercise was added, placebo and nocebo effects were influenced by expectations but were not affected by fatigue or sex differences. Exercise-, placebo- and nocebo-induced pain modulation are likely to work through distinct mechanisms and neurophysiological research is needed to fully exploit the implications for sport, rehabilitation and pain management.

Control Changes the Way We Look at the World

The feeling of control is a fundamental aspect of human experience and accompanies our voluntary actions all the time. However, how the sense of control interacts with wider perception, cognition, and behavior remains poorly understood. This study focused on how controlling an external object influences the allocation of attention. Experiment 1 examined attention to an object that is under a different level of control from the others. Participants searched for a target among multiple distractors on screen. All the distractors were partially under the participant's control (50% control level), and the search target was either under more or less control than the distractors. The results showed that, against this background of partial control, visual attention was attracted to an object only if it was more controlled than other available objects and not if it was less controlled. Experiment 2 examined attention allocation in contexts of either perfect control or no control over most of the objects. Specifically, the distractors were under either perfect (100%) control or no (0%) control, and the search target had one of six levels of control varying from 0% to 100%. When differences in control between the distractors and the target were small, visual attention was now more strongly drawn to search targets that were less controlled than distractors, rather than more controlled, suggesting attention to objects over which one might be losing control. Experiment 3 studied the events of losing or gaining control as opposed to the states of having or not having control. ERP measures showed that P300 amplitude proportionally encoded the magnitude of both increases and decreases in degree of control. However, losing control had more marked effects on P170 and P300 than gaining an equivalent degree of control, indicating high priority for efficiently detecting failures of control. Overall, our results suggest that controlled objects preferentially attract attention in uncontrolled environments. However, once control has been registered, the brain becomes highly sensitive to subsequent loss of control. Our findings point toward careful perceptual monitoring of degree of one's own agentic control over external objects. We suggest that control has intrinsic cognitive value because perceptual systems are organized to detect it and, once it has been acquired, to maintain it.