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Sabel I, Stavropoulos L, Grisham JR. Through the mind's eye: mapping associations between hoarding tendencies and voluntary and involuntary mental imagery. Behav Cogn Psychother 2025:1-16. [PMID: 40222948 DOI: 10.1017/s1352465825000074] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 04/15/2025]
Abstract
BACKGROUND Preliminary evidence suggests that mental imagery may be an important clinical feature in hoarding. Individuals who hoard use objects as receptacles for memories, and experience more frequent, intrusive and distressing images compared with the general community. However, the specific nature of these associations remains poorly understood. AIMS We aimed to investigate whether hoarding traits were related to the ability to voluntarily generate imagery in different sensory modalities, and uniquely with the tendency to experience negative intrusive imagery. We also aimed to understand the mechanism by which mental imagery experiences may confer vulnerability to hoarding problems. METHOD Undergraduates (n=328) completed questionnaires assessing hoarding, beliefs about objects, imagining ability across the senses, and negative intrusive imagery, as well as symptom measures of depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder and post-traumatic stress. We conducted Pearson's correlations, hierarchical regressions, and mediational analyses. RESULTS Hoarding tendencies were associated with reduced visualising ability, but not with the capacity to deliberately generate imagery in other senses. Hoarding was also uniquely associated with the tendency to experience negative involuntary imagery when controlling for symptoms of depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and post-traumatic stress. Object-memory beliefs partially mediated the relationship between hoarding and reduced visualising ability. Object attachment partially mediated the relationship between hoarding and negative intrusive imagery. CONCLUSIONS Results suggest that visualisation difficulties may promote a reliance on objects to facilitate recall, and experiencing negative intrusive imagery may strengthen object attachment. Findings may inform imagery-based conceptualisations and treatments of hoarding problems, such as imagery training or modification interventions.
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Affiliation(s)
- I Sabel
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
| | - L Stavropoulos
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
| | - J R Grisham
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
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2
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Liu J, Zhan M, Hajhajate D, Spagna A, Dehaene S, Cohen L, Bartolomeo P. Visual mental imagery in typical imagers and in aphantasia: A millimeter-scale 7-T fMRI study. Cortex 2025; 185:113-132. [PMID: 40031090 DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2025.01.013] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/20/2024] [Revised: 12/06/2024] [Accepted: 01/22/2025] [Indexed: 03/05/2025]
Abstract
Most of us effortlessly describe visual objects, whether seen or remembered. Yet, around 4% of people report congenital aphantasia: they struggle to visualize objects despite being able to describe their visual appearance. What neural mechanisms create this disparity between subjective experience and objective performance? Aphantasia can provide novel insights into conscious processing and awareness. We used ultra-high field 7T fMRI to establish the neural circuits involved in visual mental imagery and perception, and to elucidate the neural mechanisms associated with the processing of internally generated visual information in the absence of imagery experience in congenital aphantasia. Ten typical imagers and 10 aphantasic individuals performed imagery and perceptual tasks in five domains: object shape, object color, written words, faces, and spatial relationships. In typical imagers, imagery tasks activated left-hemisphere frontoparietal areas, the relevant domain-preferring areas in the ventral temporal cortex partly overlapping with the perceptual domain-preferring areas, and a domain-general area in the left fusiform gyrus (the Fusiform Imagery Node). The results were valid for each individual participant. In aphantasic individuals, imagery activated similar visual areas, but there was reduced functional connectivity between the Fusiform Imagery Node and frontoparietal areas. Our results unveil the domain-general and domain-specific circuits of visual mental imagery, their functional disorganization in aphantasia, and support the general hypothesis that conscious visual experience - whether perceived or imagined - depends on the integrated activity of high-level visual cortex and frontoparietal networks.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jianghao Liu
- Sorbonne Université, Inserm, CNRS, Paris Brain Institute, ICM, Hôpital de la Pitié-Salpêtrière, Paris, France; Dassault Systèmes, Vélizy-Villacoublay, France.
| | - Minye Zhan
- Sorbonne Université, Inserm, CNRS, Paris Brain Institute, ICM, Hôpital de la Pitié-Salpêtrière, Paris, France; Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Université Paris-Saclay, CEA, INSERM, CNRS ELR9003, NeuroSpin Center, Gif/Yvette, France
| | - Dounia Hajhajate
- Sorbonne Université, Inserm, CNRS, Paris Brain Institute, ICM, Hôpital de la Pitié-Salpêtrière, Paris, France; IRCCS SYNLAB SDN, Via E. Gianturco 113, Naples, Italy
| | - Alfredo Spagna
- Department of Psychology, Columbia University in the City of New York, NY, 10027, USA
| | - Stanislas Dehaene
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Université Paris-Saclay, CEA, INSERM, CNRS ELR9003, NeuroSpin Center, Gif/Yvette, France; Collège de France, Université Paris-Sciences-Lettres (PSL), 11 Place Marcelin Berthelot, Paris, France
| | - Laurent Cohen
- Sorbonne Université, Inserm, CNRS, Paris Brain Institute, ICM, Hôpital de la Pitié-Salpêtrière, Paris, France; AP-HP, Hôpital de la Pitié Salpêtrière, Fédération de Neurologie, Paris, France
| | - Paolo Bartolomeo
- Sorbonne Université, Inserm, CNRS, Paris Brain Institute, ICM, Hôpital de la Pitié-Salpêtrière, Paris, France.
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3
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Jassim N, McCoy B, Yip EWC, Allison C, Baron-Cohen S, Lawson RP. The "Tetris effect": autistic and non-autistic people share an implicit drive for perceptual cohesion. Mol Autism 2025; 16:22. [PMID: 40140977 PMCID: PMC11948850 DOI: 10.1186/s13229-025-00654-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/19/2024] [Accepted: 03/07/2025] [Indexed: 03/28/2025] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND When working on jigsaw puzzles, we mentally "combine" two pieces to form a composite image even before physically fitting them together. This happens when the separate pieces could logically create a cohesive picture and not when they are mismatched or incoherent. The capacity of the brain to combine individual elements to form possible wholes serves as the basis of perceptual organisation. This drive for perceptual cohesion-the "Tetris effect"-can be seen in the famous game, where people automatically perceive logical combinations from separate pieces. However, it is unclear how this presents in populations known to have perceptual differences, such as autistic people. Theories on the inclination to process local over global details in autism and autistic strengths in pattern recognition lead to conflicting predictions regarding the drive for perceptual cohesion in autistic compared to non-autistic people. METHODS In this large-scale (n = 470) pre-registered online behavioural study, we aimed to replicate previous research conducted on neurotypical participants and to extend this work to autistic participants. We used two tasks with Tetris-style stimuli to examine how autistic (n = 196) and non-autistic (n = 274) adults implicitly perceive possible wholes from individual parts. Data were analysed using logistic mixed-effects regression models and hierarchical Signal Detection Theory modelling. RESULTS Overall, we replicated the results from the original study in finding participants are more likely to perceive parts as wholes when there is the potential to form a whole, compared to when there is not. However, we found no differences between autistic and non-autistic participants across both tasks. LIMITATIONS Although power calculations were carried out to assess sample sizes needed to detect a group difference, given the small effect size (Cohen's d = 0.37) in the original study, it may be that any existing group differences are still undetectable with the current sample size. CONCLUSIONS We conclude that the "Tetris effect" is ubiquitous and seen in both neurotypical and neurodiverse populations. Our findings challenge the deficit-focussed narrative often seen in the autism literature and highlight the similarities in task performance between autistic and non-autistic participants.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nazia Jassim
- Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK.
- Department of Psychiatry, Autism Research Centre, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK.
| | - Brónagh McCoy
- Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
| | | | - Carrie Allison
- Department of Psychiatry, Autism Research Centre, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
| | - Simon Baron-Cohen
- Department of Psychiatry, Autism Research Centre, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
| | - Rebecca P Lawson
- Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
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4
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Silvanto J, Nagai Y. How Interoception and the Insula Shape Mental Imagery and Aphantasia. Brain Topogr 2025; 38:27. [PMID: 39912831 DOI: 10.1007/s10548-025-01101-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/06/2024] [Accepted: 01/16/2025] [Indexed: 02/07/2025]
Abstract
A major question in cognitive neuroscience is understanding the neural basis of mental imagery, particularly in cases of its absence, known as aphantasia. While research in this field has focused on the role of sensory domains, we propose that the key to understanding imagery lies in the intertwining of sensory processing and autonomic responses. Interoception plays a crucial role in mental imagery by anchoring experiences in first-person physiological signals, providing a self-referential perspective, and grounding the imagery in the body while also enabling its emotional aspects. Moreover, interoception contributes to the sense of agency and volitional control, as well as body schema-hallmarks of voluntary mental imagery. Therefore, imagery should be approached as an integrated phenomenon that combines sensory-specific information with interoceptive signals. At the neural level, this process engages the insula and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), regions vital for synthesizing information across cognitive, emotional, and physical domains, as well as for supporting self-awareness. From this perspective, aphantasia may reflect a suboptimal functioning of the insula/ACC, which can account for its associations with deficits in autobiographical memory, emotion perception, and conditions such as autism and dyspraxia.
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Affiliation(s)
- Juha Silvanto
- Centre for Cognitive and Brain Sciences, University of Macau, Macau SAR, China.
- School of Psychology, University of Surrey, Stag Hill, University Campus, Guildford, UK.
| | - Yoko Nagai
- School of Psychology, University of Surrey, Stag Hill, University Campus, Guildford, UK.
- Department of Clinical Neuroscience, Brighton and Sussex Medical School, University of Sussex, Brighton, BN1 9 RY, UK.
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5
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Michel M, Morales J, Block N, Lau H. Aphantasia as imagery blindsight. Trends Cogn Sci 2025; 29:8-9. [PMID: 39694732 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2024.11.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/24/2024] [Revised: 10/24/2024] [Accepted: 11/02/2024] [Indexed: 12/20/2024]
Affiliation(s)
- Matthias Michel
- Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT, Cambridge, MA, USA; Department of Philosophy, NYU, New York, NY, USA
| | - Jorge Morales
- Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA; Department of Philosophy, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA
| | - Ned Block
- Department of Philosophy, NYU, New York, NY, USA
| | - Hakwan Lau
- RIKEN Center for Brain Science, Wako, Japan; Center for Neuroscience Imaging Research, Institute for Basic Science, Suwon, South Korea; Department of Biomedical Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, Suwon, South Korea.
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Cabbai G, Racey C, Simner J, Dance C, Ward J, Forster S. Sensory representations in primary visual cortex are not sufficient for subjective imagery. Curr Biol 2024; 34:5073-5082.e5. [PMID: 39419033 DOI: 10.1016/j.cub.2024.09.062] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/29/2024] [Revised: 08/10/2024] [Accepted: 09/23/2024] [Indexed: 10/19/2024]
Abstract
The contemporary definition of mental imagery is characterized by two aspects: a sensory representation that resembles, but does not result from, perception, and an associated subjective experience. Neuroimaging demonstrated imagery-related sensory representations in primary visual cortex (V1) that show striking parallels to perception. However, it remains unclear whether these representations always reflect subjective experience or if they can be dissociated from it. We addressed this question by comparing sensory representations and subjective imagery among visualizers and aphantasics, the latter with an impaired ability to experience imagery. Importantly, to test for the presence of sensory representations independently of the ability to generate imagery on demand, we examined both spontaneous and voluntary imagery forms. Using multivariate fMRI, we tested for decodable sensory representations in V1 and subjective visual imagery reports that occurred either spontaneously (during passive listening of evocative sounds) or in response to the instruction to voluntarily generate imagery of the sound content (always while blindfolded inside the scanner). Among aphantasics, V1 decoding of sound content was at chance during voluntary imagery, and lower than in visualizers, but it succeeded during passive listening, despite them reporting no imagery. In contrast, in visualizers, decoding accuracy in V1 was greater in voluntary than spontaneous imagery (while being positively associated with the reported vividness of both imagery types). Finally, for both conditions, decoding in precuneus was successful in visualizers but at chance for aphantasics. Together, our findings show that V1 representations can be dissociated from subjective imagery, while implicating a key role of precuneus in the latter.
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Affiliation(s)
- Giulia Cabbai
- School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QH, UK; Sussex Neuroscience, School of Life Sciences, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK.
| | - Chris Racey
- School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QH, UK; Sussex Neuroscience, School of Life Sciences, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
| | - Julia Simner
- School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QH, UK; Sussex Neuroscience, School of Life Sciences, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
| | - Carla Dance
- School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QH, UK
| | - Jamie Ward
- School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QH, UK; Sussex Neuroscience, School of Life Sciences, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
| | - Sophie Forster
- School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QH, UK; Sussex Neuroscience, School of Life Sciences, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
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7
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Korda Ž, Walcher S, Körner C, Benedek M. Internal coupling: Eye behavior coupled to visual imagery. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2024; 165:105855. [PMID: 39153584 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2024.105855] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/07/2024] [Revised: 08/02/2024] [Accepted: 08/13/2024] [Indexed: 08/19/2024]
Abstract
Our eyes do not only respond to visual perception but also to internal cognition involving visual imagery, which can be referred to as internal coupling. This review synthesizes evidence on internal coupling across diverse domains including episodic memory and simulation, visuospatial memory, numerical cognition, object movement, body movement, and brightness imagery. In each domain, eye movements consistently reflect distinct aspects of mental imagery typically akin to those seen in corresponding visual experiences. Several findings further suggest that internal coupling may not only coincide with but also supports internal cognition as evidenced by improved cognitive performance. Available theoretical accounts suggest that internal coupling may serve at least two functional roles in visual imagery: facilitating memory reconstruction and indicating shifts in internal attention. Moreover, recent insights into the neurobiology of internal coupling highlight substantially shared neural pathways in externally and internally directed cognition. The review concludes by identifying open questions and promising avenues for future research such as exploring moderating roles of context and individual differences in internal coupling.
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Affiliation(s)
- Živa Korda
- Department of Psychology, University of Graz, Graz, Austria.
| | - Sonja Walcher
- Department of Psychology, University of Graz, Graz, Austria
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8
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Reeder RR, Pounder Z, Figueroa A, Jüllig A, Azañón E. Non-visual spatial strategies are effective for maintaining precise information in visual working memory. Cognition 2024; 251:105907. [PMID: 39067318 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105907] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/02/2024] [Revised: 06/28/2024] [Accepted: 07/23/2024] [Indexed: 07/30/2024]
Abstract
Visual working memory content is commonly thought to be composed of a precise visual representation of stimulus information (e.g., color, shape). Nevertheless, previous research has shown that individuals represent this visual information in different formats, historically dichotomized into "verbal" and "visual" formats. With growing popular knowledge of aphantasia, or the absence of sensory mental imagery, recent studies have demonstrated that individuals with aphantasia perform similarly to individuals with typical imagery on visual working memory tasks. This suggest that the use of non-visual strategies may be sufficient to perform visual working memory tasks, which were previously thought to be strictly visual. To investigate the effects of different strategies on performance in a visual working memory task, we recruited individuals across the visual imagery spectrum and tested their ability to identify relatively small (3°), medium (6°), or large (10°) changes in the degree of orientation of gratings held in working memory. Subsequently, participants indicated the extent to which they used five different strategies: visual, spatial, verbal, semantic, and sensorimotor. Results revealed that individuals with aphantasia and typical imagery performed similarly to each other across all task difficulty levels. Individuals with typical imagery dominantly used visuospatial strategies, but surprisingly, individuals with aphantasia overwhelmingly preferred the use of non-visual spatial and sensorimotor strategies over verbal strategies. These results suggest that non-visual spatial and sensorimotor strategies can be adopted in visual working memory tasks and these strategies are equally effective as visuospatial strategies. This calls for a rethinking of the "visual" versus "verbal" dichotomy, and provides evidence for the use of other non-visual mental representations in working memory tasks.
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Affiliation(s)
- Reshanne R Reeder
- Department of Psychology, Institute of Population Health, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK.
| | - Zoë Pounder
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
| | | | | | - Elena Azañón
- Otto von Guericke University, Medical Faculty, Magdeburg, Germany; Leibniz Institute for Neurobiology, Magdeburg, Germany; Center for Behavioral Brain Sciences, Magdeburg, Germany; Center for Intervention and Research on Adaptive and Maladaptive Brain Circuits Underlying Mental Health (C-I-R-C), Jena-Magdeburg, Halle, Germany
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9
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Jin F, Hsu SM, Li Y. A Systematic Review of Aphantasia: Concept, Measurement, Neural Basis, and Theory Development. Vision (Basel) 2024; 8:56. [PMID: 39330760 PMCID: PMC11437436 DOI: 10.3390/vision8030056] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/11/2024] [Revised: 09/11/2024] [Accepted: 09/18/2024] [Indexed: 09/28/2024] Open
Abstract
People with aphantasia exhibit the inability to voluntarily generate or form mental imagery in their minds. Since the term "aphantasia" was proposed to describe this, it has gained increasing attention from psychiatrists, neuroscientists, and clinicians. Previous studies have mainly focused on the definition, prevalence, and measurement of aphantasia, its impacts on individuals' cognitive and emotional processing, and theoretical frameworks synthesizing existing findings, which have contributed greatly to our understanding of aphantasia. However, there are still some debates regarding the conclusions derived from existing research and the theories that were constructed from various sources of evidence. Building upon existing endeavors, this systematic review emphasizes that future research is much needed to refine the definition and diagnosis of aphantasia, strengthen empirical investigations at behavioral and neural levels, and, more importantly, develop or update theories. These multiple lines of efforts could lead to a deeper understanding of aphantasia and further guide researchers in future research directions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Feiyang Jin
- Applied Psychology Program, Department of Life Sciences, BNU-HKBU United International College, Zhuhai 519087, China
- Department of Applied Social Sciences, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong, China
| | - Shen-Mou Hsu
- Imaging Center for Integrated Body, Mind and Culture Research, National Taiwan University, Taipei 10617, Taiwan
| | - Yu Li
- Applied Psychology Program, Department of Life Sciences, BNU-HKBU United International College, Zhuhai 519087, China
- Guangdong Provincial Key Laboratory of Interdisciplinary Research and Application for Data Science, BNU-HKBU United International College, Zhuhai 519087, China
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10
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Siena MJ, Simons JS. Metacognitive Awareness and the Subjective Experience of Remembering in Aphantasia. J Cogn Neurosci 2024; 36:1578-1598. [PMID: 38319889 DOI: 10.1162/jocn_a_02120] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/08/2024]
Abstract
Individuals with aphantasia, a nonclinical condition typically characterized by mental imagery deficits, often report reduced episodic memory. However, findings have hitherto rested largely on subjective self-reports, with few studies experimentally investigating both objective and subjective aspects of episodic memory in aphantasia. In this study, we tested both aspects of remembering in aphantasic individuals using a custom 3-D object and spatial memory task that manipulated visuospatial perspective, which is considered to be a key factor determining the subjective experience of remembering. Objective and subjective measures of memory performance were taken for both object and spatial memory features under different perspective conditions. Surprisingly, aphantasic participants were found to be unimpaired on all objective memory measures, including those for object memory features, despite reporting weaker overall mental imagery experience and lower subjective vividness ratings on the memory task. These results add to newly emerging evidence that aphantasia is a heterogenous condition, where some aphantasic individuals may lack metacognitive awareness of mental imagery rather than mental imagery itself. In addition, we found that both participant groups remembered object memory features with greater precision when encoded and retrieved in the first person versus third person, suggesting a first-person perspective might facilitate subjective memory reliving by enhancing the representational quality of scene contents.
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Scholz CO. Reevaluating aphantasia representation skepticism in light of the HeXaGen model Comment on "Visual mental imagery: Evidence for a heterarchical neural architecture" by A. Spagna et al. Phys Life Rev 2024; 49:115-116. [PMID: 38579491 DOI: 10.1016/j.plrev.2024.03.012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/22/2024] [Accepted: 03/26/2024] [Indexed: 04/07/2024]
Affiliation(s)
- Christian O Scholz
- Institut für Philosophie II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universitätsstr. 150, 44801, Bochum, Germany.
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12
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Kay L, Keogh R, Pearson J. Slower but more accurate mental rotation performance in aphantasia linked to differences in cognitive strategies. Conscious Cogn 2024; 121:103694. [PMID: 38657474 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103694] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/18/2023] [Revised: 04/16/2024] [Accepted: 04/18/2024] [Indexed: 04/26/2024]
Abstract
Mental rotation tasks are frequently used as standard measures of mental imagery. However, aphantasia research has brought such use into question. Here, we assessed a large group of individuals who lack visual imagery (aphantasia) on two mental rotation tasks: a three-dimensional block-shape, and a human manikin rotation task. In both tasks, those with aphantasia had slower, but more accurate responses than controls. Both groups demonstrated classic linear increases in response time and error-rate as functions of angular disparity. In the three-dimensional block-shape rotation task, a within-group speed-accuracy trade-off was found in controls, whereas faster individuals in the aphantasia group were also more accurate. Control participants generally favoured using object-based mental rotation strategies, whereas those with aphantasia favoured analytic strategies. These results suggest that visual imagery is not crucial for successful performance in classical mental rotation tasks, as alternative strategies can be effectively utilised in the absence of holistic mental representations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lachlan Kay
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia.
| | - Rebecca Keogh
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia; School of Psychological Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia.
| | - Joel Pearson
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia.
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13
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Zeman A. Aphantasia and hyperphantasia: exploring imagery vividness extremes. Trends Cogn Sci 2024; 28:467-480. [PMID: 38548492 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2024.02.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/21/2023] [Revised: 02/09/2024] [Accepted: 02/13/2024] [Indexed: 05/12/2024]
Abstract
The vividness of imagery varies between individuals. However, the existence of people in whom conscious, wakeful imagery is markedly reduced, or absent entirely, was neglected by psychology until the recent coinage of 'aphantasia' to describe this phenomenon. 'Hyperphantasia' denotes the converse - imagery whose vividness rivals perceptual experience. Around 1% and 3% of the population experience extreme aphantasia and hyperphantasia, respectively. Aphantasia runs in families, often affects imagery across several sense modalities, and is variably associated with reduced autobiographical memory, face recognition difficulty, and autism. Visual dreaming is often preserved. Subtypes of extreme imagery appear to be likely but are not yet well defined. Initial results suggest that alterations in connectivity between the frontoparietal and visual networks may provide the neural substrate for visual imagery extremes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Adam Zeman
- Centre for Clinical Brain Sciences, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK; University of Exeter Medical School, Exeter, UK.
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14
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Pounder Z, Eardley AF, Loveday C, Evans S. No clear evidence of a difference between individuals who self-report an absence of auditory imagery and typical imagers on auditory imagery tasks. PLoS One 2024; 19:e0300219. [PMID: 38568916 PMCID: PMC10990234 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0300219] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/27/2023] [Accepted: 02/25/2024] [Indexed: 04/05/2024] Open
Abstract
Aphantasia is characterised by the inability to create mental images in one's mind. Studies investigating impairments in imagery typically focus on the visual domain. However, it is possible to generate many different forms of imagery including imagined auditory, kinesthetic, tactile, motor, taste and other experiences. Recent studies show that individuals with aphantasia report a lack of imagery in modalities, other than vision, including audition. However, to date, no research has examined whether these reductions in self-reported auditory imagery are associated with decrements in tasks that require auditory imagery. Understanding the extent to which visual and auditory imagery deficits co-occur can help to better characterise the core deficits of aphantasia and provide an alternative perspective on theoretical debates on the extent to which imagery draws on modality-specific or modality-general processes. In the current study, individuals that self-identified as being aphantasic and matched control participants with typical imagery performed two tasks: a musical pitch-based imagery and voice-based categorisation task. The majority of participants with aphantasia self-reported significant deficits in both auditory and visual imagery. However, we did not find a concomitant decrease in performance on tasks which require auditory imagery, either in the full sample or only when considering those participants that reported significant deficits in both domains. These findings are discussed in relation to the mechanisms that might obscure observation of imagery deficits in auditory imagery tasks in people that report reduced auditory imagery.
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Affiliation(s)
- Zoë Pounder
- Department of Psychology, School of Social Sciences, University of Westminster, London, United Kingdom
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
| | - Alison F. Eardley
- Department of Psychology, School of Social Sciences, University of Westminster, London, United Kingdom
| | - Catherine Loveday
- Department of Psychology, School of Social Sciences, University of Westminster, London, United Kingdom
| | - Samuel Evans
- Department of Psychology, School of Social Sciences, University of Westminster, London, United Kingdom
- Neuroimaging, King’s College London, London, United Kingdom
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15
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Krempel R, Monzel M. Aphantasia and involuntary imagery. Conscious Cogn 2024; 120:103679. [PMID: 38564857 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103679] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/25/2023] [Revised: 03/06/2024] [Accepted: 03/09/2024] [Indexed: 04/04/2024]
Abstract
Aphantasia is a condition that is often characterized as the impaired ability to create voluntary mental images. Aphantasia is assumed to selectively affect voluntary imagery mainly because even though aphantasics report being unable to visualize something at will, many report having visual dreams. We argue that this common characterization of aphantasia is incorrect. Studies on aphantasia are often not clear about whether they are assessing voluntary or involuntary imagery, but some studies show that several forms of involuntary imagery are also affected in aphantasia (including imagery in dreams). We also raise problems for two attempts to show that involuntary images are preserved in aphantasia. In addition, we report the results of a study about afterimages in aphantasia, which suggest that these tend to be less intense in aphantasics than in controls. Involuntary imagery is often treated as a unitary kind that is either present or absent in aphantasia. We suggest that this approach is mistaken and that we should look at different types of involuntary imagery case by case. Doing so reveals no evidence of preserved involuntary imagery in aphantasia. We suggest that a broader characterization of aphantasia, as a deficit in forming mental imagery, whether voluntary or not, is more appropriate. Characterizing aphantasia as a volitional deficit is likely to lead researchers to give incorrect explanations for aphantasia, and to look for the wrong mechanisms underlying it.
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Affiliation(s)
- Raquel Krempel
- Center for Logic, Epistemology and History of Science, State University of Campinas, R. Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, 251 - Cidade Universitária, Campinas, SP 13083-859, Brazil; Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 4200 Fifth Ave, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA.
| | - Merlin Monzel
- Department of Psychology, Personality Psychology and Biological Psychology, University of Bonn, Kaiser-Karl-Ring 9, 53111 Bonn, Germany.
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16
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Keogh R, Lau H. New ways of studying subjective experience. Neurosci Res 2024; 201:1-2. [PMID: 38307348 DOI: 10.1016/j.neures.2024.01.010] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/04/2024]
Affiliation(s)
- Rebecca Keogh
- School of Psychological Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia; School of Psychology, UNSW, Sydney, Australia
| | - Hakwan Lau
- RIKEN Center for Brain Science, Saitama, Japan.
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17
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Monzel M, Handlogten J, Reuter M. No verbal overshadowing in aphantasia: The role of visual imagery for the verbal overshadowing effect. Cognition 2024; 245:105732. [PMID: 38325233 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105732] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/27/2023] [Revised: 01/16/2024] [Accepted: 01/19/2024] [Indexed: 02/09/2024]
Abstract
The verbal overshadowing effect refers to the phenomenon that the verbal description of a past complex stimulus impairs its subsequent recognition. Theoretical explanations range from interference between different mental representations to the activation of different processing orientations or a provoked shift in the recognition criterion. In our study, 61 participants with aphantasia (= lack of mental imagery) and 70 controls participated in a verbal overshadowing paradigm. The verbal overshadowing effect did not occur in people with aphantasia, although the effect was replicated in controls. We speculate that this is either due to the lack of visual representations in people with aphantasia that verbal descriptions could interfere with, or to the absence of a shift in processing orientation during verbalisation. To rule out criterion-based explanations, further research is needed to distinguish between discriminability and response bias in people with aphantasia. Finally, data indicated that the verbal overshadowing effect may even be reversed in individuals with aphantasia, partly due to a lower memory performance in the no verbalisation condition. Effects of further variables are discussed, such as mental strategies, memory confidence, and difficulty, quantity and quality of verbalisation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Merlin Monzel
- Personality Psychology and Biological Psychology, Department of Psychology, University of Bonn, Kaiser-Karl-Ring 9, 53111 Bonn, Germany.
| | | | - Martin Reuter
- Personality Psychology and Biological Psychology, Department of Psychology, University of Bonn, Kaiser-Karl-Ring 9, 53111 Bonn, Germany
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Keogh R, Pearson J. Revisiting the blind mind: Still no evidence for sensory visual imagery in individuals with aphantasia. Neurosci Res 2024; 201:27-30. [PMID: 38311033 DOI: 10.1016/j.neures.2024.01.008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/30/2023] [Revised: 01/23/2024] [Accepted: 01/23/2024] [Indexed: 02/06/2024]
Abstract
The inability to visualise was given the name aphantasia in 2015 by Zeman and colleagues. In 2018 we published research showing that fifteen individuals who self-identified as having aphantasia also demonstrated a lack of sensory visual imagery when undergoing the binocular rivalry imagery paradigm, suggesting more than just a metacognitive difference. Here we update these findings with over fifty participants with aphantasia and show that there is evidence for a lack of sensory imagery in aphantasia. How the binocular rivalry paradigm scores relate to the vividness of visual imagery questionnaire (VVIQ) and how aphantasia can be confirmed is discussed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rebecca Keogh
- School of Psychological Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia; School of Psychology, UNSW, Sydney, Australia.
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Dawes AJ, Keogh R, Pearson J. Multisensory subtypes of aphantasia: Mental imagery as supramodal perception in reverse. Neurosci Res 2024; 201:50-59. [PMID: 38029861 DOI: 10.1016/j.neures.2023.11.009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/15/2023] [Accepted: 11/20/2023] [Indexed: 12/01/2023]
Abstract
Cognitive neuroscience research on mental imagery has largely focused on the visual imagery modality in unimodal task contexts. Recent studies have uncovered striking individual differences in visual imagery capacity, with some individuals reporting a subjective absence of conscious visual imagery ability altogether ("aphantasia"). However, naturalistic mental imagery is often multi-sensory, and preliminary findings suggest that many individuals with aphantasia also report a subjective lack of mental imagery in other sensory domains (such as auditory or olfactory imagery). In this paper, we perform a series of cluster analyses on the multi-sensory imagery questionnaire scores of two large groups of aphantasic subjects, defining latent sub-groups in this sample population. We demonstrate that aphantasia is a heterogenous phenomenon characterised by dominant sub-groups of individuals with visual aphantasia (those who report selective visual imagery absence) and multi-sensory aphantasia (those who report an inability to generate conscious mental imagery in any sensory modality). We replicate our findings in a second large sample and show that more unique aphantasia sub-types also exist, such as individuals with selectively preserved mental imagery in only one sensory modality (e.g. intact auditory imagery). We outline the implications of our findings for network theories of mental imagery, discussing how unique aphantasia aetiologies with distinct self-report patterns might reveal alterations to various levels of the sensory processing hierarchy implicated in mental imagery.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Rebecca Keogh
- School of Psychological Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
| | - Joel Pearson
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
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Dupont W, Papaxanthis C, Madden-Lombardi C, Lebon F. Explicit and implicit motor simulations are impaired in individuals with aphantasia. Brain Commun 2024; 6:fcae072. [PMID: 38515440 PMCID: PMC10957132 DOI: 10.1093/braincomms/fcae072] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/06/2023] [Revised: 01/11/2024] [Accepted: 03/13/2024] [Indexed: 03/23/2024] Open
Abstract
Individuals with aphantasia report having difficulties or an inability to generate visual images of objects or events. So far, there is no evidence showing that this condition also impacts the motor system and the generation of motor simulations. We probed the neurophysiological marker of aphantasia during explicit and implicit forms of motor simulation, i.e. motor imagery and action observation, respectively. We tested a group of individuals without any reported imagery deficits (phantasics) as well as a group of individuals self-reporting the inability to mentally simulate images or movements (aphantasics). We instructed the participants to explicitly imagine a maximal pinch movement in the visual and kinaesthetic modalities and to observe a video showing a pinch movement. By means of transcranial magnetic stimulation, we triggered motor-evoked potentials in the target right index finger. As expected, the amplitude of motor-evoked potentials, a marker of corticospinal excitability, increased for phantasics during kinaesthetic motor imagery and action observation relative to rest but not during visual motor imagery. Interestingly, the amplitude of motor-evoked potentials did not increase in any of the conditions for the group of aphantasics. This result provides neurophysiological evidence that individuals living with aphantasia have a real deficit in activating the motor system during motor simulations.
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Affiliation(s)
- William Dupont
- UFR des Sciences du Sport, INSERM UMR1093-CAPS, Université Bourgogne, Dijon F-21000, France
| | | | - Carol Madden-Lombardi
- UFR des Sciences du Sport, INSERM UMR1093-CAPS, Université Bourgogne, Dijon F-21000, France
- Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris, France
| | - Florent Lebon
- UFR des Sciences du Sport, INSERM UMR1093-CAPS, Université Bourgogne, Dijon F-21000, France
- Institut Universitaire de France (IUF), Paris, France
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21
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Contemori G, Oletto CM, Battaglini L, Bertamini M. On the relationship between foveal mask interference and mental imagery in peripheral object recognition. Proc Biol Sci 2024; 291:20232867. [PMID: 38471562 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2023.2867] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/20/2023] [Accepted: 02/02/2024] [Indexed: 03/14/2024] Open
Abstract
A delayed foveal mask affects perception of peripheral stimuli. The effect is determined by the timing of the mask and by the similarity with the peripheral stimulus. A congruent mask enhances performance, while an incongruent one impairs it. It is hypothesized that foveal masks disrupt a feedback mechanism reaching the foveal cortex. This mechanism could be part of a broader circuit associated with mental imagery, but this hypothesis has not as yet been tested. We investigated the link between mental imagery and foveal feedback. We tested the relationship between performance fluctuations caused by the foveal mask-measured in terms of discriminability (d') and criterion (C)-and the scores from two questionnaires designed to assess mental imagery vividness (VVIQ) and another exploring object imagery, spatial imagery and verbal cognitive styles (OSIVQ). Contrary to our hypotheses, no significant correlations were found between VVIQ and the mask's impact on d' and C. Neither the object nor spatial subscales of OSIVQ correlated with the mask's impact. In conclusion, our findings do not substantiate the existence of a link between foveal feedback and mental imagery. Further investigation is needed to determine whether mask interference might occur with more implicit measures of imagery.
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Affiliation(s)
- Giulio Contemori
- Department of General Psychology, University of Padova, Padova, Italy
| | | | - Luca Battaglini
- Department of General Psychology, University of Padova, Padova, Italy
| | - Marco Bertamini
- Department of General Psychology, University of Padova, Padova, Italy
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22
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Bergmann J, Petro LS, Abbatecola C, Li MS, Morgan AT, Muckli L. Cortical depth profiles in primary visual cortex for illusory and imaginary experiences. Nat Commun 2024; 15:1002. [PMID: 38307834 PMCID: PMC10837448 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-024-45065-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/19/2022] [Accepted: 01/12/2024] [Indexed: 02/04/2024] Open
Abstract
Visual illusions and mental imagery are non-physical sensory experiences that involve cortical feedback processing in the primary visual cortex. Using laminar functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in two studies, we investigate if information about these internal experiences is visible in the activation patterns of different layers of primary visual cortex (V1). We find that imagery content is decodable mainly from deep layers of V1, whereas seemingly 'real' illusory content is decodable mainly from superficial layers. Furthermore, illusory content shares information with perceptual content, whilst imagery content does not generalise to illusory or perceptual information. Together, our results suggest that illusions and imagery, which differ immensely in their subjective experiences, also involve partially distinct early visual microcircuits. However, overlapping microcircuit recruitment might emerge based on the nuanced nature of subjective conscious experience.
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Affiliation(s)
- Johanna Bergmann
- Imaging Centre of Excellence (ICE), Queen Elizabeth University Hospital, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK.
- Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaging (CCNi), School of Psychology and Neuroscience, College of Medical, Veterinary and Life Sciences, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK.
- Department of Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany.
| | - Lucy S Petro
- Imaging Centre of Excellence (ICE), Queen Elizabeth University Hospital, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
- Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaging (CCNi), School of Psychology and Neuroscience, College of Medical, Veterinary and Life Sciences, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
| | - Clement Abbatecola
- Imaging Centre of Excellence (ICE), Queen Elizabeth University Hospital, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
- Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaging (CCNi), School of Psychology and Neuroscience, College of Medical, Veterinary and Life Sciences, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
| | - Min S Li
- Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaging (CCNi), School of Psychology and Neuroscience, College of Medical, Veterinary and Life Sciences, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
- Centre for Computational Neuroscience and Cognitive Robotics, School of Psychology, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
| | - A Tyler Morgan
- Imaging Centre of Excellence (ICE), Queen Elizabeth University Hospital, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
- Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaging (CCNi), School of Psychology and Neuroscience, College of Medical, Veterinary and Life Sciences, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
- Functional MRI Core Facility, National Institute of Mental Health, NIH, Bethesda, MD, 20817, USA
| | - Lars Muckli
- Imaging Centre of Excellence (ICE), Queen Elizabeth University Hospital, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK.
- Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaging (CCNi), School of Psychology and Neuroscience, College of Medical, Veterinary and Life Sciences, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK.
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23
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Bates KE, Smith ML, Farran EK, Machizawa MG. Behavioral and Neural Correlates of Visual Working Memory Reveal Metacognitive Aspects of Mental Imagery. J Cogn Neurosci 2024; 36:272-289. [PMID: 38010290 DOI: 10.1162/jocn_a_02085] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/29/2023]
Abstract
Mental imagery (MI) is the ability to generate visual phenomena in the absence of sensory input. MI is often likened to visual working memory (VWM): the ability to maintain and manipulate visual representations. How MI is recruited during VWM is yet to be established. In a modified orientation change-discrimination task, we examined how behavioral (proportion correct) and neural (contralateral delay activity [CDA]) correlates of precision and capacity map onto subjective ratings of vividness and number of items in MI within a VWM task. During the maintenance period, 17 participants estimated the vividness of their MI or the number of items held in MI while they were instructed to focus on either precision or capacity of their representation and to retain stimuli at varying set sizes (1, 2, and 4). Vividness and number ratings varied over set sizes; however, subjective ratings and behavioral performance correlated only for vividness rating at set size 1. Although CDA responded to set size as was expected, CDA did not reflect subjective reports on high and low vividness and on nondivergent (reported the probed number of items in mind) or divergent (reported number of items diverged from probed) rating trials. Participants were more accurate in low set sizes compared with higher set sizes and in coarse (45°) orientation changes compared with fine (15°) orientation changes. We failed to find evidence for a relationship between the subjective sensory experience of precision and capacity of MI and the precision and capacity of VWM.
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24
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Arnold DH, Saurels BW, Anderson N, Andresen I, Schwarzkopf DS. Predicting the subjective intensity of imagined experiences from electrophysiological measures of oscillatory brain activity. Sci Rep 2024; 14:836. [PMID: 38191506 PMCID: PMC10774351 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-023-50760-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/19/2023] [Accepted: 12/24/2023] [Indexed: 01/10/2024] Open
Abstract
Most people can conjure images and sounds that they experience in their minds. There are, however, marked individual differences. Some people report that they cannot generate imagined sensory experiences at all (aphantasics) and others report that they have unusually intense imagined experiences (hyper-phantasics). These individual differences have been linked to activity in sensory brain regions, driven by feedback. We would therefore expect imagined experiences to be associated with specific frequencies of oscillatory brain activity, as these can be a hallmark of neural interactions within and across regions of the brain. Replicating a number of other studies, relative to a Resting-State we find that the act of engaging in auditory or in visual imagery is linked to reductions in the power of oscillatory brain activity across a broad range of frequencies, with prominent peaks in the alpha band (8-12 Hz). This oscillatory activity, however, did not predict individual differences in the subjective intensity of imagined experiences. For audio imagery, these were rather predicted by reductions within the theta (6-9 Hz) and gamma (33-38 Hz) bands, and by increases in beta (15-17 Hz) band activity. For visual imagery these were predicted by reductions in lower (14-16 Hz) and upper (29-32 Hz) beta band activity, and by an increase in mid-beta band (24-26 Hz) activity. Our data suggest that there is sufficient ground truth in the subjective reports people use to describe the intensity of their imagined sensory experiences to allow these to be linked to the power of distinct rhythms of brain activity. In future, we hope to combine this approach with better measures of the subjective intensity of imagined sensory experiences to provide a clearer picture of individual differences in the subjective intensity of imagined experiences, and of why these eventuate.
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Affiliation(s)
- Derek H Arnold
- Perception Lab, School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia.
| | - Blake W Saurels
- Perception Lab, School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia
| | - Natasha Anderson
- Perception Lab, School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia
| | - Isabella Andresen
- Perception Lab, School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia
| | - Dietrich S Schwarzkopf
- School of Optometry and Vision Science, The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand
- Experimental Psychology, University College London, London, UK
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Monzel M, Reuter M. Where's Wanda? The influence of visual imagery vividness on visual search speed measured by means of hidden object pictures. Atten Percept Psychophys 2024; 86:22-27. [PMID: 36627474 PMCID: PMC10769966 DOI: 10.3758/s13414-022-02645-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 12/20/2022] [Indexed: 01/11/2023]
Abstract
Previous research demonstrated effects of visual imagery on search speed in visual search paradigms. However, these effects were rather small, questioning their ecological validity. Thus, our present study aimed to generalize these effects to more naturalistic material (i.e., a paradigm that allows for top-down strategies in highly complex visual search displays that include overlapping stimuli while simultaneously avoiding possibly confounding search instructions). One hundred and four participants with aphantasia (= absence of voluntary mental imagery) and 104 gender and age-matched controls were asked to find hidden objects in several hidden object pictures with search times recorded. Results showed that people with aphantasia were significantly slower than controls, even when controlling for age and general processing speed. Thus, effects of visual imagery might be strong enough to influence the perception of our real-life surroundings, probably because of the involvement of visual imagery in several top-down strategies.
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Affiliation(s)
- Merlin Monzel
- Department of Psychology, Personality Psychology and Biological Psychology, University of Bonn, Kaiser-Karl-Ring 9, 53111, Bonn, Germany.
| | - Martin Reuter
- Department of Psychology, Personality Psychology and Biological Psychology, University of Bonn, Kaiser-Karl-Ring 9, 53111, Bonn, Germany
- Center for Economics and Neuroscience (CENs), Laboratory of Neurogenetics, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany
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26
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Schwarzkopf DS. What is the true range of mental imagery? Cortex 2024; 170:21-25. [PMID: 37949779 DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2023.09.013] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/15/2023] [Revised: 08/28/2023] [Accepted: 09/12/2023] [Indexed: 11/12/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Dietrich S Schwarzkopf
- School of Optometry & Vision Science, University of Auckland, New Zealand; Experimental Psychology, University College London, UK.
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27
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Blomkvist A, Marks DF. Defining and 'diagnosing' aphantasia: Condition or individual difference? Cortex 2023; 169:220-234. [PMID: 37948876 DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2023.09.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/05/2023] [Revised: 06/16/2023] [Accepted: 09/26/2023] [Indexed: 11/12/2023]
Abstract
Research into the newly-coined 'condition' of 'aphantasia', an individual difference involving the self-reported absence of voluntary visual imagery, has taken off in recent years, and more and more people are 'self-diagnosing' as aphantasic. Yet, there is no consensus on whether aphantasia should really be described as a 'condition', and there is no battery of psychometric instruments to detect or 'diagnose' aphantasia. Instead, researchers currently rely on the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) to 'diagnose' aphantasia. We review here fundamental and methodological problems affecting aphantasia research stemming from an inadequate focus on how we should define aphantasia, whether aphantasia is a pathological condition, and the extensive use of VVIQ as a 'diagnostic test' for aphantasia. Firstly, we draw attention to 'literature blindness' for visual imagery research from the 1960s-1990s concerning individual differences in visual imagery vividness. Secondly, despite aphantasia being defined as a 'condition' where voluntary visual imagery is absent as indicated by the lowest score on the VVIQ, aphantasia studies inconsistently employ samples comprised of a mixture of participants with no visual imagery and low visual imagery, and we argue that this hinders the uncovering of the underlying cause of aphantasia. Thirdly, the scores used to designate the boundary between aphantasia and non-aphantasia are arbitrary and differ between studies, compromising the possibility for cross-study comparison of results. Fourthly, the problems of 'diagnosing' aphantasia are not limited to the academic sphere, as one can 'self-diagnose' online, for example by using the variant-VVIQ on the Aphantasia Network website. However, the variant-VVIQ departs from the original in ways likely to impact validity and accuracy, which could lead people to falsely believe they have been 'diagnosed' with aphantasia by a scientifically-validated measure. Fifthly, we discuss the hypothesis that people who believe they have been 'diagnosed' with aphantasia might be vulnerable to health anxiety, distress, and stigma. We conclude with a discussion about some fundamental aspects of how to classify a disorder, and suggest the need for a new psychometric measure of aphantasia.
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Affiliation(s)
- Andrea Blomkvist
- Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Sciences, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK.
| | - David F Marks
- 13200 Arles, Bouches-du-Rhône, Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur, France
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28
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Cabbai G, Brown CRH, Dance C, Simner J, Forster S. Mental imagery and visual attentional templates: A dissociation. Cortex 2023; 169:259-278. [PMID: 37967476 DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2023.09.014] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/14/2023] [Revised: 08/10/2023] [Accepted: 09/26/2023] [Indexed: 11/17/2023]
Abstract
There is a growing interest in the relationship between mental images and attentional templates as both are considered pictorial representations that involve similar neural mechanisms. Here, we investigated the role of mental imagery in the automatic implementation of attentional templates and their effect on involuntary attention. We developed a novel version of the contingent capture paradigm designed to encourage the generation of a new template on each trial and measure contingent spatial capture by a template-matching visual feature (color). Participants were required to search at four different locations for a specific object indicated at the start of each trial. Immediately prior to the search display, color cues were presented surrounding the potential target locations, one of which matched the target color (e.g., red for strawberry). Across three experiments, our task induced a robust contingent capture effect, reflected by faster responses when the target appeared in the location previously occupied by the target-matching cue. Contrary to our predictions, this effect remained consistent regardless of self-reported individual differences in visual mental imagery (Experiment 1, N = 216) or trial-by-trial variation of voluntary imagery vividness (Experiment 2, N = 121). Moreover, contingent capture was observed even among aphantasic participants, who report no imagery (Experiment 3, N = 91). The magnitude of the effect was not reduced in aphantasics compared to a control sample of non-aphantasics, although the two groups reported substantial differences in their search strategy and exhibited differences in overall speed and accuracy. Our results hence establish a dissociation between the generation and implementation of attentional templates for a visual feature (color) and subjectively experienced imagery.
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Affiliation(s)
- Giulia Cabbai
- School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom; Sussex Neuroscience, School of Life Sciences, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom.
| | | | - Carla Dance
- School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom
| | - Julia Simner
- School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom; Sussex Neuroscience, School of Life Sciences, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom
| | - Sophie Forster
- School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom; Sussex Neuroscience, School of Life Sciences, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom
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29
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Monzel M, Dance C, Azañón E, Simner J. Aphantasia within the framework of neurodivergence: Some preliminary data and the curse of the confidence gap. Conscious Cogn 2023; 115:103567. [PMID: 37708622 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2023.103567] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/28/2023] [Revised: 08/15/2023] [Accepted: 08/22/2023] [Indexed: 09/16/2023]
Abstract
Aphantasia is a neurocognitive phenomenon affecting voluntary visual imagery, such that it is either entirely absent, or markedly impaired. Using both the social and medical models of disability, this article discusses the extent to which aphantasia can be understood as a disorder or just a form of neutral neurodivergence, given that imagery plays a central role in thinking and memory for most other people. Preliminary school performance data are presented, showing that low imagery does not necessarily complicate life, especially given compensatory strategies and low societal barriers. In addition, we discuss the consequences of labelling aphantasia a disorder with regard to self- and public stigma, and we provide further data regarding a confidence gap, by which aphantasics perceive themselves as performing worse than they objectively do. We conclude that aphantasia should be understood as neutral neurodivergence and that labelling it a disorder is not only wrong, but potentially harmful.
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Affiliation(s)
- Merlin Monzel
- Department of Psychology, University of Bonn, Kaiser-Karl-Ring 9, Bonn, Germany.
| | - Carla Dance
- School of Psychology, Pevensey Building, University of Sussex, BN1 9QJ, UK
| | - Elena Azañón
- Department of Neurology, University Medical Center, Leipziger Str. 44, 39120 Magdeburg, Germany; Center for Behavioral Brain Sciences (CBBS), Universitätsplatz 2, 39106 Magdeburg, Germany; Department of Behavioral Neurology, Leibniz Institute for Neurobiology, Brenneckestr. 6, 39118 Magdeburg, Germany; Center for Intervention and Research on adaptive and maladaptive brain Circuits underlying mental health, Jena-Magdeburg-Halle
| | - Julia Simner
- School of Psychology, Pevensey Building, University of Sussex, BN1 9QJ, UK
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Dance CJ, Hole G, Simner J. The role of visual imagery in face recognition and the construction of facial composites. Evidence from Aphantasia. Cortex 2023; 167:318-334. [PMID: 37597266 DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2023.06.015] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/08/2022] [Revised: 05/02/2023] [Accepted: 06/20/2023] [Indexed: 08/21/2023]
Abstract
People with aphantasia have a markedly impaired ability to form visual images in the mind's eye. Here, by testing people with and without aphantasia, we examine the relationship between visual imagery and face processing. We show that aphantasics have weaker face recognition than people with visual imagery, using both self-report (Prosopagnosia Index) and behavioural measures (Cambridge Face Memory Test). However, aphantasics nonetheless have a fully intact ability to construct facial composites from memory (i.e., composites produced using EFIT6 by aphantasics and imagers were rated as equally accurate in terms of their resemblance to a target face). Additionally, we show that aphantasics were less able than imagers to see the resemblance between composites and a target face, suggestive of potential issues with face matching (perception). Finally, we show that holistic and featural methods of composite construction using EFIT6 produce equally accurate composites. Our results suggest that face recognition, but not face composite construction, is facilitated by the ability to represent visual properties as 'pictures in the mind'. Our findings have implications for the study of aphantasia, and also for forensic settings, where face composite systems are commonly used to aid criminal investigations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Carla J Dance
- School of Psychology, Pevensey Building, University of Sussex, UK.
| | - Graham Hole
- School of Psychology, Pevensey Building, University of Sussex, UK
| | - Julia Simner
- School of Psychology, Pevensey Building, University of Sussex, UK
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31
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Dando CJ, Nahouli Z, Hart A, Pounder Z. Real-world implications of aphantasia: episodic recall of eyewitnesses with aphantasia is less complete but no less accurate than typical imagers. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2023; 10:231007. [PMID: 37885991 PMCID: PMC10598423 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.231007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/28/2023]
Abstract
Individuals with aphantasia report an inability to voluntarily visually image and reduced episodic memory, yet episodic accounts provided by witnesses and victims are fundamental for criminal justice. Using the mock-witness paradigm, we investigated eyewitness memory of individuals with aphantasia versus typical imagers. Participants viewed a mock crime and 48 hours later were interviewed about the event, randomly allocated to one of three conditions. Two interview conditions included techniques designed to support episodic retrieval mode, namely (i) Mental Reinstatement of Context (MRC) and (ii) Sketch Reinstatement of Context (Sketch-RC). A third Control condition did not include retrieval support. Aphantasic mock-eyewitnesses recalled 30% less correct information and accounts were less complete, but they made no more errors and were as accurate as typical imagers. Interaction effects revealed reduced correct recall and less complete accounts for aphantasic participants in MRC interviews versus Sketch-RC and Control. Aphantaisic participants in the Control outperformed those in both the Sketch-RC and MRC, although Sketch-RC improved completeness by 15% versus MRC. Our pattern of results indicates reduced mental imagery ability might be compensated for by alternative self-initiated cognitive strategies. Findings offer novel insights into episodic recall performance in information gathering interviews when ability to voluntarily visualize is impoverished.
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Affiliation(s)
- Coral J. Dando
- Department of Psychology, School of Social Science, University of Westminster, London W1B 2HW, UK
| | | | - Alison Hart
- Department of Psychology, School of Social Science, University of Westminster, London W1B 2HW, UK
| | - Zoe Pounder
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
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32
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Monzel M, Vetterlein A, Hogeterp SA, Reuter M. No increased prevalence of prosopagnosia in aphantasia: Visual recognition deficits are small and not restricted to faces. Perception 2023; 52:629-644. [PMID: 37321679 DOI: 10.1177/03010066231180712] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/17/2023]
Abstract
Aphantasia and prosopagnosia are both rare conditions with impairments in visual cognition. While prosopagnosia refers to a face recognition deficit, aphantasics exhibit a lack of mental imagery. Current object recognition theories propose an interplay of perception and mental representations, making an association between recognition performance and visual imagery plausible. While the literature assumes a link between aphantasia and prosopagnosia, other impairments in aphantasia have been shown to be rather global. Therefore, we assumed that aphantasics do not solely exhibit impairments in face recognition but rather in general visual recognition performance, probably moderated by stimulus complexity. To test this hypothesis, 65 aphantasics were compared to 55 controls in a face recognition task, the Cambridge Face Memory Test, and a corresponding object recognition task, the Cambridge Car Memory Test. In both tasks, aphantasics performed worse than controls, indicating mild recognition deficits without face-specificity. Additional correlations between imagery vividness and performance in both tasks were found, suggesting that visual imagery influences visual recognition not only in imagery extremes. Stimulus complexity produced the expected moderation effect but only for the whole imagery-spectrum and only with face stimuli. Overall, the results imply that aphantasia is linked to a general but mild deficit in visual recognition.
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33
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Liu J, Bartolomeo P. Probing the unimaginable: The impact of aphantasia on distinct domains of visual mental imagery and visual perception. Cortex 2023; 166:338-347. [PMID: 37481856 DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2023.06.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/18/2023] [Revised: 03/09/2023] [Accepted: 06/15/2023] [Indexed: 07/25/2023]
Abstract
Different individuals experience varying degrees of vividness in their visual mental images. The distribution of these variations across different imagery domains, such as object shape, color, written words, faces, and spatial relationships, remains unknown. To address this issue, we conducted a study with 117 healthy participants who reported different levels of imagery vividness. Of these participants, 44 reported experiencing absent or nearly absent visual imagery, a condition known as "aphantasia". These individuals were compared to those with typical (N = 42) or unusually vivid (N = 31) imagery ability. We used an online version of the French-language Battérie Imagination-Perception (eBIP), which consists of tasks tapping each of the above-mentioned domains, both in visual imagery and in visual perception. We recorded the accuracy and response times (RTs) of participants' responses. Aphantasic participants reached similar levels of accuracy on all tasks compared to the other groups (Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA, BF = .02). However, their RTs were slower in both imagery and perceptual tasks (BF = 266), and they had lower confidence in their responses on perceptual tasks (BF = 7.78e5). A Bayesian regression analysis revealed that there was an inverse correlation between subjective vividness and RTs for the entire participant group: higher levels of vividness were associated with faster RTs. The pattern was similar in all the explored domains. The findings suggest that individuals with congenital aphantasia experience a slowing in processing visual information in both imagery and perception, but the precision of their processing remains unaffected. The observed performance pattern lends support to the hypotheses that congenital aphantasia is primarily a deficit of phenomenal consciousness, or that it employs alternative strategies other than visualization to access preserved visual information.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jianghao Liu
- Sorbonne Université, Inserm, CNRS, Paris Brain Institute, ICM, Hôpital de la Pitié-Salpêtrière, 75013 Paris, France; Dassault Systèmes, Vélizy-Villacoublay, France.
| | - Paolo Bartolomeo
- Sorbonne Université, Inserm, CNRS, Paris Brain Institute, ICM, Hôpital de la Pitié-Salpêtrière, 75013 Paris, France
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Beran MJ, James BT, French K, Haseltine EL, Kleider-Offutt HM. Assessing aphantasia prevalence and the relation of self-reported imagery abilities and memory task performance. Conscious Cogn 2023; 113:103548. [PMID: 37451040 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2023.103548] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/15/2021] [Revised: 06/04/2023] [Accepted: 06/29/2023] [Indexed: 07/18/2023]
Abstract
Aphantasia is the experience of having little to no visual imagery. We assessed the prevalence rate of aphantasia in 5,010 people from the general population of adults in the United States through self-report and responses to two visual imagery scales. The self-reported prevalence rate of aphantasia was 8.9% in this sample. However, not all participants who reported themselves as aphantasic showed low-imagery profiles on the questionnaire scales, and scale prevalence was much lower (1.5%). Self-reported aphantasic individuals reported lower dream frequencies and self-talk and showed poorer memory performance compared to individuals who reported average and high mental imagery. Self-reported aphantasic individuals showed a greater preference for written instruction compared to video instruction for learning a hypothetical new task although there were differences for men and women in this regard. Categorizing aphantasia using a scale measure and relying on self-identification may provide a more consistent picture of who lacks visual imagery.
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Takahashi J, Saito G, Omura K, Yasunaga D, Sugimura S, Sakamoto S, Horikawa T, Gyoba J. Diversity of aphantasia revealed by multiple assessments of visual imagery, multisensory imagery, and cognitive style. Front Psychol 2023; 14:1174873. [PMID: 37546458 PMCID: PMC10403065 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1174873] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/27/2023] [Accepted: 06/26/2023] [Indexed: 08/08/2023] Open
Abstract
Aphantasia-a condition wherein individuals have a reduced or absent construction of voluntary visual imagery-is diagnosed using either the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) or self-identification. However, a significant discrepancy exists between the proportions of aphantasia in the populations assessed using these two criteria. It is unclear why the reported proportions differ excessively and what percentage of people cannot form visual imagery. We investigated the replicability of the proportion of people with aphantasia using both criteria in the same population of participants. Therefore, we explored the potential causes of the discrepancy and characteristics of putative aphantasia in terms of multisensory imagery, cognitive style, and face recognition ability. First, we conducted an online sampling study (Study 1: N = 2,871) using the VVIQ, self-identification of a reduction in visual imagery, Questionnaire upon Mental Imagery (QMI), and Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire (VVQ). We found that 3.7 and 12.1% fulfilled the VVIQ and self-identification criteria, respectively, roughly replicating the proportions reported in previous studies. The self-identification criterion-but not the VVIQ criterion-contains items related to face recognition; hence, we suspected that face recognition ability was factor contributing to this discrepancy and conducted another online sampling study (Study 2: N = 774). We found a significant correlation between VVIQ and face recognition ability in the control group with self-identification, but not in the group defined by low VVIQ (VVIQ ≤32). As the participants in the control group with self-identification tended to exhibit moderately high VVIQ scores but low face recognition ability, we reason that the discrepancy can be partially explained by the contamination of individual differences in face recognition ability. Additional analyses of Study 1 revealed that the aphantasia group included participants who lacked all types of sensory imagery or only visual imagery in multisensory imagery and exhibited a non-specific cognitive style. This study indicates that the VVIQ alone may be insufficient to diagnose individuals who report an inability to form visual imagery. Furthermore, we highlight the importance of multiple assessments-along with the VVIQ-to better understand the diversity of imagery in aphantasia.
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Affiliation(s)
- Junichi Takahashi
- Faculty of Human Development and Culture, Fukushima University, Fukushima, Japan
| | - Godai Saito
- Department of Psychology, Graduate School of Arts and Letters, Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan
| | - Kazufumi Omura
- Faculty of Education, Art and Science, Yamagata University, Yamagata, Japan
| | - Daichi Yasunaga
- Faculty of Letters, College of Human and Social Sciences, Kanazawa University, Kanazawa, Japan
| | | | - Shuichi Sakamoto
- Research Institute of Electrical Communication, Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan
| | - Tomoyasu Horikawa
- NTT Communication Science Laboratories, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, Atsugi, Japan
| | - Jiro Gyoba
- Department of Psychology, College of Psychology and Education, Shokei Gakuin University, Natori, Japan
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36
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Monzel M, Vetterlein A, Reuter M. No general pathological significance of aphantasia: An evaluation based on criteria for mental disorders. Scand J Psychol 2022; 64:314-324. [PMID: 36463494 DOI: 10.1111/sjop.12887] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/07/2022] [Revised: 10/21/2022] [Accepted: 11/08/2022] [Indexed: 12/07/2022]
Abstract
As awareness of the phenomenon of aphantasia (= lack of voluntary imagery) has increased in recent years, many psychotherapists ponder its clinical implications. The present study investigates whether aphantasia meets the criteria for mental disorders, i.e. statistical rarity, impairment in activities of daily living, violation of social norms and inappropriate behavior and personal distress. Prevalence of aphantasia was determined meta-analytically based on 3,543 participants. An international sample of 156 participants with aphantasia (58.3% male; Mage = 35.23) and 131 controls (65.6% male; Mage = 28.88) was assessed with the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, the Questionnaire for the Assessment of Everyday Memory Performance and the Aphantasia Distress Questionnaire, as well as measures of depression, anxiety and well-being. The prevalence of aphantasia was estimated at 3.5 to 4.8%. Participants with aphantasia scored significantly lower than controls on every day and autobiographical memory, but not on theory of mind. A subgroup of 34.7% of participants with aphantasia reported distress significantly associated with lower well-being and high levels of anxiety and depression. The level of distress increased with poorer performance in autobiographical memory and theory of mind. Although aphantasia meets the criterion of statistical rarity, the impact on activities of daily living and personal distress is too weak to justify a classification as a mental disorder. In a subgroup, however, distress can reach clinically relevant levels. In individual cases, it is therefore advisable to conduct a psychological assessment, for example by means of the Aphantasia Distress Questionnaire.
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Affiliation(s)
- Merlin Monzel
- Department of Psychology University of Bonn Bonn Germany
| | | | - Martin Reuter
- Department of Psychology University of Bonn Bonn Germany
- Center for Economics and Neuroscience (CENs), Laboratory of Neurogenetics University of Bonn Bonn Germany
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Wittmann BC, Şatırer Y. Decreased associative processing and memory confidence in aphantasia. Learn Mem 2022; 29:412-420. [PMID: 36253008 PMCID: PMC9578376 DOI: 10.1101/lm.053610.122] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/06/2022] [Accepted: 09/08/2022] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
Abstract
Visual imagery and mental reconstruction of scenes are considered core components of episodic memory retrieval. Individuals with absent visual imagery (aphantasia) score lower on tests of autobiographical memory, suggesting that aphantasia may be associated with differences in episodic and associative processing. In this online study, we tested aphantasic participants and controls on associative recognition and memory confidence for three types of associations encoded incidentally: associations between visual-visual and audio-visual stimulus pairs, associations between an object and its location on the screen, and intraitem associations. Aphantasic participants had a lower rate of high-confidence hits in all associative memory tests compared with controls. Performance on auditory-visual associations was correlated with individual differences in a measure of object imagery in the aphantasic group but not in controls. No overall group difference in memory performance was found, indicating that visual imagery selectively contributes to memory confidence. Analysis of the encoding task revealed that aphantasics made fewer associative links between the stimuli, suggesting a role for visual imagery in associative processing of visual and auditory input. These data enhance our understanding of visual imagery contributions to associative memory and further characterize the cognitive profile of aphantasia.
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Affiliation(s)
- Bianca C Wittmann
- Department of Psychology, Justus Liebig University, 35394 Giessen, Germany
| | - Yılmaz Şatırer
- Department of Psychology, Justus Liebig University, 35394 Giessen, Germany
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38
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Cavedon-Taylor D. Aphantasia and psychological disorder: Current connections, defining the imagery deficit and future directions. Front Psychol 2022; 13:822989. [PMID: 36312098 PMCID: PMC9614338 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.822989] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/26/2021] [Accepted: 09/14/2022] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Abstract
Aphantasia is a condition characterized by a deficit of mental imagery. Since several psychopathologies are partially maintained by mental imagery, it may be illuminating to consider the condition against the background of psychological disorder. After outlining current findings and hypotheses regarding aphantasia and psychopathology, this paper suggests that some support for defining aphantasia as a lack of voluntary imagery may be found here. The paper then outlines potentially fruitful directions for future research into aphantasia in general and its relation to psychopathology in particular, including rethinking use of the SUIS to measure involuntary imagery, whether aphantasia offers protection against addiction, and whether hyperphantasia is a potential risk factor for maladaptive daydreaming, among others.
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Furman M, Fleitas-Rumak P, Lopez-Segura P, Furman M, Tafet G, de Erausquin GA, Ortiz T. Cortical activity involved in perception and imagery of visual stimuli in a subject with aphantasia. An EEG case report. Neurocase 2022; 28:344-355. [PMID: 36103716 DOI: 10.1080/13554794.2022.2122848] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/14/2022]
Abstract
Aphantasia has been described as the inability to voluntarily evoke mental images using the "mind's eye." We studied a congenital aphantasic subject using neuropsychological testsand 64 channel EEG recordings, in order to studycortical activity involved in perception and imagery evaluating event-related potentials(N170, P200, N250). The subject is in the normal range of the neuropsychological tests performed, except for specific imagery tests. The EEG results show that when he evokes the same mental image, he starts the evoking process from left temporal instead of frontal areas, he does not activate occipital visual nor left anterior parietal areas.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mariano Furman
- Departamento de Medicina Legal Psiquiatría y Patología, Facultad de Medicina, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain
| | - Pablo Fleitas-Rumak
- Departamento de Toxicología y Farmacología, Facultad de Medicina, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina
| | - Pilar Lopez-Segura
- Departamento de Medicina Legal Psiquiatría y Patología, Facultad de Medicina, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain
| | - Martín Furman
- Asociación Civil Accionar Prevención, Buenos Aires, Argentina
| | - Gustavo Tafet
- Fundación Internacional para el Desarrollo de las Neurociencias, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, Argentina
| | - Gabriel A de Erausquin
- Glenn Biggs Institute for Alzheimer and Neurodegenerative Diseases, University of Texas Health San Antonio, USA
| | - Tomás Ortiz
- Departamento de Medicina Legal Psiquiatría y Patología, Facultad de Medicina, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain
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Dawes AJ, Keogh R, Robuck S, Pearson J. Memories with a blind mind: Remembering the past and imagining the future with aphantasia. Cognition 2022; 227:105192. [PMID: 35752014 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105192] [Citation(s) in RCA: 31] [Impact Index Per Article: 10.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/09/2021] [Revised: 05/26/2022] [Accepted: 05/28/2022] [Indexed: 11/03/2022]
Abstract
Our capacity to re-experience the past and simulate the future is thought to depend heavily on visual imagery, which allows us to construct complex sensory representations in the absence of sensory stimulation. There are large individual differences in visual imagery ability, but their impact on autobiographical memory and future prospection remains poorly understood. Research in this field assumes the normative use of visual imagery as a cognitive tool to simulate the past and future, however some individuals lack the ability to visualise altogether (a condition termed "aphantasia"). Aphantasia represents a rare and naturally occurring knock-out model for examining the role of visual imagery in episodic memory recall. Here, we assessed individuals with aphantasia on an adapted form of the Autobiographical Interview, a behavioural measure of the specificity and richness of episodic details underpinning the memory of events. Aphantasic participants generated significantly fewer episodic details than controls for both past and future events. This effect was most pronounced for novel future events, driven by selective reductions in visual detail retrieval, accompanied by comparatively reduced ratings of the phenomenological richness of simulated events, and paralleled by quantitative linguistic markers of reduced perceptual language use in aphantasic participants compared to those with visual imagery. Our findings represent the first systematic evidence (using combined objective and subjective data streams) that aphantasia is associated with a diminished ability to re-experience the past and simulate the future, indicating that visual imagery is an important cognitive tool for the dynamic retrieval and recombination of episodic details during mental simulation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Alexei J Dawes
- School of Psychology, The University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia.
| | - Rebecca Keogh
- School of Psychology, The University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia; School of Psychological Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
| | - Sarah Robuck
- School of Psychology, The University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
| | - Joel Pearson
- School of Psychology, The University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
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Simner J, Dance C. Dysikonesia or Aphantasia? Understanding the impact and history of names. A reply to. Cortex 2022; 153:220-223. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2022.04.013] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/08/2022] [Revised: 04/25/2022] [Accepted: 04/26/2022] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
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