What emotions might be like in other animals

Prefrontal encoding of an internal model for emotional inference

A key function of brain systems mediating emotion is to learn to anticipate unpleasant experiences. Although organisms readily associate sensory stimuli with aversive outcomes, higher-order forms of emotional learning and memory require inference to extrapolate the circumstances surrounding directly experienced aversive events to other indirectly related sensory patterns that were not part of the original experience. This type of learning requires internal models of emotion, which flexibly track directly experienced and inferred aversive associations. Although the brain mechanisms of simple forms of aversive learning have been well studied in areas such as the amygdala1-4, whether and how the brain forms and represents internal models of emotionally relevant associations are not known5. Here we report that neurons in the rodent dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) encode a flexible internal model of emotion by linking sensory stimuli in the environment with aversive events, whether they were directly or indirectly associated with that experience. These representations form through a multi-step encoding mechanism involving recruitment and stabilization of dmPFC cells that support inference. Although dmPFC population activity encodes all salient associations, dmPFC neurons projecting to the amygdala specifically represent and are required to express inferred associations. Together, these findings reveal how internal models of emotion are encoded in the dmPFC to regulate subcortical systems for recall of inferred emotional memories.

A consensus on the definition of positive animal welfare

The concept of animal welfare is evolving due to progress in our scientific understanding of animal biology and changing societal expectations. Animal welfare science has been primarily concerned with minimizing suffering, but there is growing interest in also promoting positive experiences, grouped under the term positive animal welfare (PAW). However, there are discrepancies in the use of the term PAW. An interdisciplinary group arrived at a consensus that 'PAW can be defined as the animal flourishing through the experience of predominantly positive mental states and the development of competence and resilience. PAW goes beyond ensuring good physical health and the prevention and alleviation of suffering. It encompasses animals experiencing positive mental states resulting from rewarding experiences, including having choices and opportunities to actively pursue goals and achieve desired outcomes'. The definition also considers individual and species-specific differences. It provides a framework for researchers to investigate PAW and thereby generate innovative, informative and reproducible science. Studies of PAW can contribute to a richer picture of an animal's life and may elucidate the biological foundations of happiness. The definition creates opportunities to inspire scientific progress in animal biology and to align animal care practices, legislation and markets with societal expectations.

When virtual reality becomes psychoneuroendocrine reality: A stress(or) review

This review article was awarded the Dirk Hellhammer award from ISPNE in 2023. It explores the dynamic relationship between stressors and stress from a historical view as well as a vision towards the future of stress research via virtual reality (VR). We introduce the concept of a "syncytium," a permeable boundary that blurs the distinction between stress and stressor, in order to understand why the field of stress biology continues to inadequately measure stress alone as a proxy for the force of external stressors. Using Virtual Reality (VR) as an illustrative example to explicate the black box of stressors, we examine the distinction between 'immersion' and 'presence' as analogous terms for stressor and stress, respectively. We argue that the conventional psychological approaches to stress measurement and appraisal theory unfortunately fall short in quantifying the force of the stressor, leading to reverse causality fallacies. Further, the concept of affordances is introduced as an ecological or holistic tool to measure and design a stressor's force, bridging the gap between the external environment and an individual's physiological response to stress. Affordances also serve to ameliorate shortcomings in stress appraisal by integrating ecological interdependencies. By combining VR and psychobiological measures, this paper aims to unravel the complexity of the stressor-stress syncytium, highlighting the necessity of assessing both the internal and external facets to gain a holistic understanding of stress physiology and shift away from reverse causality reasoning. We find that the utility of VR extends beyond presence to include affordance-based measures of immersion, which can effectively model stressor force. Future research should prioritize the development of tools that can measure both immersion and presence, thereby providing a more comprehensive understanding of how external stressors interact with individual psychological states.

Metacognition as a window into subjective affective experience

When patients seek professional help for mental disorders, they often do so because of troubling subjective affective experiences. While these subjective states are at the center of the patient's symptomatology, scientific tools for studying them and their cognitive antecedents are limited. Here, we explore the use of concepts and analytic tools from the science of consciousness, a field of research that has faced similar challenges in having to develop robust empirical methods for addressing a phenomenon that has been considered difficult to pin down experimentally. One important strand is the operationalization of some relevant processes in terms of metacognition and confidence ratings, which can be rigorously studied in both humans and animals. By assessing subjective experience with similar approaches, we hope to develop new scientific approaches for studying affective processes and promoting psychological resilience in the face of debilitating emotional experiences.

Why consciousness?

Conscious emotions drive all we do, except for automatic tasks like breathing. Specifically, they enable the operation of incentives-like hunger for eating-that motivate us to perform tasks that are vital to our lives. Indeed, we act because we want to act, and desire is an emotion. Next, we want to act because we expect the action to lead to some positive emotion such as pleasure, enjoyment, satisfaction, comfort, fulfillment, …. Finally, to feel this emotion, we must perceive-consciously experience-the outer world. Conscious emotions also operate indirectly, as when driving an automobile: Though most driving is nonconscious, each particular journey is consciously undertaken for some specific reason; also, emotions operated consciously during the period in which driving was being learned, and for some time afterwards. In short, we suggest that the adaptive function of consciousness is to enable conscious emotions to operate.

Consciousness, the affectome, and human life

I have been working on interactions between conscious and non-conscious processes since the late 1970s. In this commentary, I offer a perspective on conscious/non-conscious interactions that might a useful adjunct to the Human Affectome Project as it evolves.

Transcutaneous Auricular Vagus Nerve Stimulation to Improve Emotional State

Emotional experiences are a part of our lives. The maladaptive functioning of an individual's emotional field can lead to emotional disturbances of various kinds, such as anxiety and depression. Currently, there is an increasing prevalence of emotional disorders that cause great human suffering and high socioeconomic costs. Emotional processing has a biological basis. The major neuroscientific theories of emotion are based on biological functioning, and all of them take into account the anatomy and function of the tenth cranial nerve: the vagus nerve. The vagus nerve connects the subdiaphragmatic and supradiaphragmatic areas and modulates emotional processing as the basis of interoceptive functioning. Auricular vagus nerve stimulation is a new and innovative neuromodulation technique based on the function of the vagus nerve. Several interventions have shown that this new neurostimulation technique is a very promising resource for treating emotional disorders. In this paper, we summarise three neuroscientific theories of emotion, explain what transcutaneous auricular nerve stimulation is, and present arguments for its use and continued research.

Decoding the language of fear: Unveiling objective and subjective indicators in rodent models through a systematic review and meta-analysis

While rodent models are vital for studying mental disorders, the underestimation of construct validity of fear indicators has led to limitations in translating to effective clinical treatments. Addressing this gap, we systematically reviewed 5054 articles from the 1960 s, understanding underlying theoretical advancement, and selected 68 articles with at least two fear indicators for a three-level meta-analysis. We hypothesized correlations between different indicators would elucidate similar functions, while magnitude differences could reveal distinct neural or behavioral mechanisms. Our findings reveal a shift towards using freezing behavior as the primary fear indicator in rodent models, and strong, moderate, and weak correlations between freezing and conditioned suppression ratios, 22-kHz ultrasonic vocalizations, and autonomic nervous system responses, respectively. Using freezing as a reference, moderator analysis shows treatment types and fear stages significantly influenced differences in magnitudes between two indicators. Our analysis supports a two-system model of fear in rodents, where objective and subjective fears could operate on a threshold-based mechanism.

Cephalopods and the law

In this My word Daniel Osorio explains why cephalopod molluscs were protected by a European Union directive on laboratory animal legislation in 2013, and how the scientific community responded to the challenges posed by this development.

Consciousness beyond the human case

There is growing interest in the relationship been AI and consciousness. Joseph LeDoux and Jonathan Birch thought it would be a good moment to put some of the big questions in this area to some leading experts. The challenge of addressing the questions they raised was taken up by Kristin Andrews, Nicky Clayton, Nathaniel Daw, Chris Frith, Hakwan Lau, Megan Peters, Susan Schneider, Anil Seth, Thomas Suddendorf, and Marie Vanderkerckhoeve.

The nature and neurobiology of fear and anxiety: State of the science and opportunities for accelerating discovery

Fear and anxiety play a central role in mammalian life, and there is considerable interest in clarifying their nature, identifying their biological underpinnings, and determining their consequences for health and disease. Here we provide a roundtable discussion on the nature and biological bases of fear- and anxiety-related states, traits, and disorders. The discussants include scientists familiar with a wide variety of populations and a broad spectrum of techniques. The goal of the roundtable was to take stock of the state of the science and provide a roadmap to the next generation of fear and anxiety research. Much of the discussion centered on the key challenges facing the field, the most fruitful avenues for future research, and emerging opportunities for accelerating discovery, with implications for scientists, funders, and other stakeholders. Understanding fear and anxiety is a matter of practical importance. Anxiety disorders are a leading burden on public health and existing treatments are far from curative, underscoring the urgency of developing a deeper understanding of the factors governing threat-related emotions.

A new understanding of the cognitive reappraisal technique: an extension based on the schema theory

Cognitive reappraisal is a widely utilized emotion regulation strategy that involves altering the personal meaning of an emotional event to enhance attention to emotional responses. Despite its common use, individual differences in cognitive reappraisal techniques and the spontaneous recovery, renewal, and reinstatement of negative responses across varying contexts may limit its effectiveness. Furthermore, detached reappraisal could cause distress for clients. According to Gross's theory, cognitive reappraisal is an effortless process that can occur spontaneously. When guided language triggers cognitive reappraisal as an emotion regulation strategy in laboratory or counseling settings, clients experience improved emotional states, but this induced strategy may not necessarily guide them in regulating emotions in similar future situations. Therefore, effectively applying cognitive reappraisal techniques in clinical practice to help clients alleviate emotional distress in daily life remains a significant concern. Exploring the mechanism of cognitive reappraisal reveals that reconstructing stimulus meaning is akin to extinction learning, which entails fostering cognitive contingency that the original stimulus provoking negative emotions will no longer result in negative outcomes in the current context. However, extinction learning is a new learning process rather than an elimination process. The activation of new learning relies on the presentation of critical cues, with contextual cues often playing a vital role, such as a safe laboratory or consulting room environment. We propose a new understanding of cognitive reappraisal based on the schema theory and the dual-system theory, emphasizing the significance of environmental interaction and feedback in constructing new experiences and updating schemata. This approach ultimately enriches the schema during training and integrates the new schema into long-term memory. Bottom-up behavioral experiences as schema enrichment training provide the foundation for top-down regulation to function. This method can assist clients in activating more suitable schemata probabilistically when encountering stimuli in real life, forming stable emotions, and achieving transfer and application across diverse contexts.

The Scientific Study of Consciousness Cannot and Should Not Be Morally Neutral

A target question for the scientific study of consciousness is how dimensions of consciousness, such as the ability to feel pain and pleasure or reflect on one's own experience, vary in different states and animal species. Considering the tight link between consciousness and moral status, answers to these questions have implications for law and ethics. Here we point out that given this link, the scientific community studying consciousness may face implicit pressure to carry out certain research programs or interpret results in ways that justify current norms rather than challenge them. We show that because consciousness largely determines moral status, the use of nonhuman animals in the scientific study of consciousness introduces a direct conflict between scientific relevance and ethics-the more scientifically valuable an animal model is for studying consciousness, the more difficult it becomes to ethically justify compromises to its well-being for consciousness research. Finally, in light of these considerations, we call for a discussion of the immediate ethical corollaries of the body of knowledge that has accumulated and for a more explicit consideration of the role of ideology and ethics in the scientific study of consciousness.

Only Words Count; the Rest Is Mere Chattering: A Cross-Disciplinary Approach to the Verbal Expression of Emotional Experience

The analysis of sequences of words and prosody, meter, and rhythm provided in an interview addressing the capacity to identify and describe emotions represents a powerful tool to reveal emotional processing. The ability to express and identify emotions was analyzed by means of the Toronto Structured Interview for Alexithymia (TSIA), and TSIA transcripts were analyzed by Natural Language Processing to shed light on verbal features. The brain correlates of the capacity to translate emotional experience into words were determined through cortical thickness measures. A machine learning methodology proved that individuals with deficits in identifying and describing emotions (n = 7) produced language distortions, frequently used the present tense of auxiliary verbs, and few possessive determiners, as well as scarcely connected the speech, in comparison to individuals without deficits (n = 7). Interestingly, they showed high cortical thickness at left temporal pole and low at isthmus of the right cingulate cortex. Overall, we identified the neuro-linguistic pattern of the expression of emotional experience.

The emergence and influence of internal states

Animal behavior is shaped by a variety of "internal states"-partially hidden variables that profoundly shape perception, cognition, and action. The neural basis of internal states, such as fear, arousal, hunger, motivation, aggression, and many others, is a prominent focus of research efforts across animal phyla. Internal states can be inferred from changes in behavior, physiology, and neural dynamics and are characterized by properties such as pleiotropy, persistence, scalability, generalizability, and valence. To date, it remains unclear how internal states and their properties are generated by nervous systems. Here, we review recent progress, which has been driven by advances in behavioral quantification, cellular manipulations, and neural population recordings. We synthesize research implicating defined subsets of state-inducing cell types, widespread changes in neural activity, and neuromodulation in the formation and updating of internal states. In addition to highlighting the significance of these findings, our review advocates for new approaches to clarify the underpinnings of internal brain states across the animal kingdom.

Temporally and anatomically specific contributions of the human amygdala to threat and safety learning

Neural plasticity in subareas of the rodent amygdala is widely known to be essential for Pavlovian threat conditioning and safety learning. However, less consistent results have been observed in human neuroimaging studies. Here, we identify and test three important factors that may contribute to these discrepancies: the temporal profile of amygdala response in threat conditioning, the anatomical specificity of amygdala responses during threat conditioning and safety learning, and insufficient power to identify these responses. We combined data across multiple studies using a well-validated human threat conditioning paradigm to examine amygdala involvement during threat conditioning and safety learning. In 601 humans, we show that two amygdala subregions tracked the conditioned stimulus with aversive shock during early conditioning while only one demonstrated delayed responding to a stimulus not paired with shock. Our findings identify cross-species similarities in temporal- and anatomical-specific amygdala contributions to threat and safety learning, affirm human amygdala involvement in associative learning and highlight important factors for future associative learning research in humans.

Larval Zebrafish as a Model for Mechanistic Discovery in Mental Health

Animal models are essential for the discovery of mechanisms and treatments for neuropsychiatric disorders. However, complex mental health disorders such as depression and anxiety are difficult to fully recapitulate in these models. Borrowing from the field of psychiatric genetics, we reiterate the framework of 'endophenotypes' - biological or behavioral markers with cellular, molecular or genetic underpinnings - to reduce complex disorders into measurable behaviors that can be compared across organisms. Zebrafish are popular disease models due to the conserved genetic, physiological and anatomical pathways between zebrafish and humans. Adult zebrafish, which display more sophisticated behaviors and cognition, have long been used to model psychiatric disorders. However, larvae (up to 1 month old) are more numerous and also optically transparent, and hence are particularly suited for high-throughput screening and brain-wide neural circuit imaging. A number of behavioral assays have been developed to quantify neuropsychiatric phenomena in larval zebrafish. Here, we will review these assays and the current knowledge regarding the underlying mechanisms of their behavioral readouts. We will also discuss the existing evidence linking larval zebrafish behavior to specific human behavioral traits and how the endophenotype framework can be applied. Importantly, many of the endophenotypes we review do not solely define a diseased state but could manifest as a spectrum across the general population. As such, we make the case for larval zebrafish as a promising model for extending our understanding of population mental health, and for identifying novel therapeutics and interventions with broad impact.

Putting the "mental" back in "mental disorders": a perspective from research on fear and anxiety

Mental health problems often involve clusters of symptoms that include subjective (conscious) experiences as well as behavioral and/or physiological responses. Because the bodily responses are readily measured objectively, these have come to be emphasized when developing treatments and assessing their effectiveness. On the other hand, the subjective experience of the patient reported during a clinical interview is often viewed as a weak correlate of psychopathology. To the extent that subjective symptoms are related to the underlying problem, it is often assumed that they will be taken care of if the more objective behavioral and physiological symptoms are properly treated. Decades of research on anxiety disorders, however, show that behavioral and physiological symptoms do not correlate as strongly with subjective experiences as is typically assumed. Further, the treatments developed using more objective symptoms as a marker of psychopathology have mostly been disappointing in effectiveness. Given that "mental" disorders are named for, and defined by, their subjective mental qualities, it is perhaps not surprising, in retrospect, that treatments that have sidelined mental qualities have not been especially effective. These negative attitudes about subjective experience took root in psychiatry and allied fields decades ago when there were few avenues for scientifically studying subjective experience. Today, however, cognitive neuroscience research on consciousness is thriving, and offers a viable and novel scientific approach that could help achieve a deeper understanding of mental disorders and their treatment.

My Fear Is Not, and Never Will Be, Your Fear: On Emotions and Feelings in Animals

Do nonhuman animals (henceforth, animals) have emotions, and if so, are these similar to ours? This opinion piece aims to add to the recent debate about this question and provides a critical re-evaluation of what can be concluded about animal and human emotions. Emotions, and their cognitive interpretation, i.e., feelings, serve important survival functions. Emotions, we believe, can exist without feelings and are unconsciously influencing our behavior more than we think, and possibly more so than feelings do. Given that emotions are expressed in body and brain, they can be inferred from these measures. We view feelings primarily as private states, which may be similar across closely related species but remain mostly inaccessible to science. Still, combining data acquired through behavioral observation with data obtained from noninvasive techniques (e.g., eyetracking, thermography, hormonal samples) and from cognitive tasks (e.g., decision-making paradigms, cognitive bias, attentional bias) provides new information about the inner states of animals, and possibly about their feelings as well. Given that many other species show behavioral, neurophysiological, hormonal, and cognitive responses to valenced stimuli equivalent to human responses, it seems logical to speak of animal emotions and sometimes even of animal feelings. At the very least, the contemporary multi-method approach allows us to get closer than ever before. We conclude with recommendations on how the field should move forward.

A First Principles Approach to Subjective Experience

Understanding the neural bases of subjective experience remains one of the great challenges of the natural sciences. Higher-order theories of consciousness are typically defended by assessments of neural activity in higher cortical regions during perception, often with disregard to the nature of the neural computations that these regions execute. We have sought to refocus the problem toward identification of those neural computations that are necessary for subjective experience with the goal of defining the sorts of neural architectures that can perform these operations. This approach removes reliance on behaviour and brain homologies for appraising whether non-human animals have the potential to subjectively experience sensory stimuli. Using two basic principles—first, subjective experience is dependent on complex processing executing specific neural functions and second, the structure-determines-function principle—we have reasoned that subjective experience requires a neural architecture consisting of stacked forward models that predict the output of neural processing from inputs. Given that forward models are dependent on appropriately connected processing modules that generate prediction, error detection and feedback control, we define a minimal neural architecture that is necessary (but not sufficient) for subjective experience. We refer to this framework as the hierarchical forward models algorithm. Accordingly, we postulate that any animal lacking this neural architecture will be incapable of subjective experience.

As soon as there was life, there was danger: the deep history of survival behaviours and the shallower history of consciousness

It is often said that fear is a universal innate emotion that we humans have inherited from our mammalian ancestors by virtue of having inherited conserved features of their nervous systems. Contrary to this common sense-based scientific point of view, I have argued that what we have inherited from our mammalian ancestors, and they from their distal vertebrate ancestors, and they from their chordate ancestors, and so forth, is not a fear circuit. It is, instead, a defensive survival circuit that detects threats, and in response, initiates defensive survival behaviours and supporting physiological adjustments. Seen in this light, the defensive survival circuits of humans and other mammals can be conceptualized as manifestations of an ancient survival function-the ability to detect danger and respond to it-that may in fact predate animals and their nervous systems, and perhaps may go back to the beginning of life. Fear, on the other hand, from my perspective, is a product of cortical cognitive circuits. This conception is not just of academic interest. It also has practical implications, offering clues as to why efforts to treat problems related to fear and anxiety are not more effective, and what might make them better. This article is part of the theme issue 'Systems neuroscience through the lens of evolutionary theory'.

Brain circuits for pain and its treatment

[Figure: see text].