What Cognitive Representations Support Primate Theory of Mind?

Bonobos point more for ignorant than knowledgeable social partners

Numerous uniquely human phenomena, from teaching to our most complex forms of cooperation, depend on our ability to tailor our communication to the knowledge and ignorance states of our social partners. Despite four decades of research into the "theory of mind" capacities of nonhuman primates, there remains no evidence that primates can communicate on the basis of their mental state attributions, to enable feats of coordination. Moreover, recent reevaluation of the experimental literature has questioned whether primates can represent others' ignorance at all. The present preregistered study investigated whether bonobos are capable of attributing knowledge or ignorance about the location of a hidden food reward to a cooperative human partner, and utilizing this attribution to modify their communicative behavior in the service of coordination. Bonobos could receive a reward that they had watched being hidden under one of several cups, if their human partner could locate the reward. If bonobos can represent a partner's ignorance and are motivated to communicate based on this mental state attribution, they should point more frequently, and more quickly, to the hidden food's location when their partner is ignorant about that location than when he is knowledgeable. Bonobos indeed flexibly adapted the frequency and speed of their communication to their partner's mental state. These findings suggest that apes can represent (and act on) others' ignorance in some form, strategically and appropriately communicating to effectively coordinate with an ignorant partner and change his behavior.

Individual differences in sociocognitive traits in semi-free-ranging rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta)

Characterizing individual differences in cognition is crucial for understanding the evolution of cognition as well as to test the biological consequences of different cognitive traits. Here, we harnessed the strengths of a uniquely large, naturally-living primate population at the Cayo Santiago Biological Field Station to characterized individual differences in rhesus monkey performance across two social cognitive tasks. A total of n = 204 semi-free-ranging adult rhesus monkeys participated in a data collection procedure, where we aimed to test individuals on both tasks at two time-points that were one year apart. In the socioemotional responses task, we assessed monkeys' attention to conspecific photographs with neutral versus negative emotional expressions. We found that monkeys showed overall declines in interest in conspecific photographs with age, but relative increases in attention to threat stimuli specifically, and further that these responses exhibited long-term stability across repeated testing. In the gaze following task we assessed monkeys' propensity to co-orient with an experimenter. Here, we found no evidence for age-related change in responses, and responses showed only limited repeatability over time. Finally, we found some evidence for common individual variation for performance across the tasks: monkeys that showed greater interest in conspecific photographs were more likely to follow a human's gaze. These results show how studies of comparative cognitive development and aging can provide insights into the evolution of cognition, and identify core primate social cognitive traits that may be related across and within individuals.

Living cognition and the nature of organisms

There is no consensus about what cognition is. Different perspectives conceptualize it in different ways. In the same vein, there is no agreement about which systems are truly cognitive. This begs the question, what makes a process or a system cognitive? One of the most conspicuous features of cognition is that it is a set of processes. Cognition, in the end, is a collection of processes such as perception, memory, learning, decision-making, problem-solving, goal-directedness, attention, anticipation, communication, and maybe emotion. There is a debate about what they mean, and which systems possess these processes. One aspect of this problem concerns the level at which cognition and the single processes are conceptualized. To make this scenario clear, evolutionary and self-maintenance arguments are taken. Given the evolutive landscape, one sees processes shared by all organisms and their derivations in specific taxa. No matter which side of the complexity spectrum one favors, the similarities of the simple processes with the complex ones cannot be ignored, and the differences of some complex processes with their simple versions cannot be blurred. A final cognitive framework must make sense of both sides of the spectrum, their differences and similarities. Here, we discuss from an evolutionary perspective the basic elements shared by all living beings and whether these may be necessary and sufficient for understanding the cognitive process. Following these considerations, cognition can be expanded to every living being. Cognition is the set of informational and dynamic processes an organism must interact with and grasp aspects of its world. Understood at their most basic level, perception, memory, learning, problem-solving, decision-making, action, and other cognitive processes are basic features of biological functioning.

Reading minds or reading scripts? De-intellectualising theory of mind

Understanding the origins of human social cognition is a central challenge in contemporary science. In recent decades, the idea of a 'Theory of Mind' (ToM) has emerged as the most popular way of explaining unique features of human social cognition. This default view has been progressively undermined by research on 'implicit' ToM, which suggests that relevant precursor abilities may already be present in preverbal human infants and great apes. However, this area of research suffers from conceptual difficulties and empirical limitations, including explanatory circularity, over-intellectualisation, and inconsistent empirical replication. Our article breaks new ground by adapting 'script theory' for application to both linguistic and non-linguistic agents. It thereby provides a new theoretical framework able to resolve the aforementioned issues, generate novel predictions, and provide a plausible account of how individuals make sense of the behaviour of others. Script theory is based on the premise that pre-verbal infants and great apes are capable of basic forms of agency-detection and non-mentalistic goal understanding, allowing individuals to form event-schemata that are then used to make sense of the behaviour of others. We show how script theory circumvents fundamental problems created by ToM-based frameworks, explains patterns of inconsistent replication, and offers important novel predictions regarding how humans and other animals understand and predict the behaviour of others.

The Natural Tendency for Wide and Careful Listening: Exploring the Relationship Between Open-Mindedness and Psychological Science

We take open-mindedness to be a component of intellectual humility, as much of the recent empirical literature regarding intellectual humility does but contrary to what some philosophers think. More particularly, we understand intellectual humility as having a self-directed component, which is concerned primarily with the regulation of confidence we have on our own epistemic goods and capacities, and an other-directed component, which is concerned primarily with one's epistemic openness to others so to improve one's epistemic situation. Given that the open-minded person is disposed give new ideas serious consideration, it is crucial that she both listens widely and carefully to other's ideas. In this paper, we examine whether there is evidence to suggest that we have a natural, evolved tendency for this wide and careful listening related to open-mindedness. We conclude that there is indication of a natural tendency for wide listening, especially an in-group tendency. However, careful listening lacks more substantive empirical studies. It seems that human infants are much more inclined to be charitable and attentive to in-group cues or opinions. This is important evidence to deconstruct the idea of a natural tendency of virtuous intellectual humility that opens up the discussion for the role of social learning in cultivating and maintaining a virtuous life.

Can 18-Month-Olds Revise Attributed Beliefs?

Successful social interactions rely on flexibly tracking and revising others' beliefs. These can be revised prospectively, new events leading to new beliefs, or retrospectively, when realizing that an attribution may have been incorrect. However, whether infants are capable of such belief revisions is an open question. We tested whether 18-month-olds can revise an attributed FB into a TB when they learn that a person may have witnessed an event that they initially thought she could not see. Infants first observed Experimenter 1 (E1) hiding two objects into two boxes. Then E1 left the room, and the locations of the objects were swapped. Infants then accompanied Experimenter 2 (E2) to the adjacent room. In the FB-revised-to-TB condition, infants observed E1 peeking into the experimental room through a one-way mirror, whereas in the FB-stays-FB condition, they observed E1 reading a book. After returning to the experimental room E1 requested an object by pointing to one of the boxes. In the FB-stays-FB condition, most infants chose the non-referred box, congruently with the agent's FB. However, in the FB-revised-to-TB condition, most infants chose the other, referred box. Thus, 18-month-olds revised an already attributed FB after receiving evidence that this attribution might have been wrong.

Mechanisms of collective learning: how can animal groups improve collective performance when repeating a task?

Learning is ubiquitous in animals: individuals can use their experience to fine-tune behaviour and thus to better adapt to the environment during their lifetime. Observations have accumulated that, at the collective level, groups can also use their experience to improve collective performance. Yet, despite apparent simplicity, the links between individual learning capacities and a collective's performance can be extremely complex. Here we propose a centralized and broadly applicable framework to begin classifying this complexity. Focusing principally on groups with stable composition, we first identify three distinct ways through which groups can improve their collective performance when repeating a task: each member learning to better solve the task on its own, members learning about each other to better respond to one another and members learning to improve their complementarity. We show through selected empirical examples, simulations and theoretical treatments that these three categories identify distinct mechanisms with distinct consequences and predictions. These mechanisms extend well beyond current social learning and collective decision-making theories in explaining collective learning. Finally, our approach, definitions and categories help generate new empirical and theoretical research avenues, including charting the expected distribution of collective learning capacities across taxa and its links to social stability and evolution. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'Collective behaviour through time'.

Canine perspective-taking

An important question in the study of canine cognition is how dogs understand humans, given that they show impressive abilities for interacting and communicating with us. In this review, we describe and discuss studies that have investigated dogs' perspective-taking abilities. There is solid evidence that dogs are not only sensitive to the gaze of others, but also their attention. We specifically address the question whether dogs have the ability to take the perspective of others and thus come to understand what others can or cannot perceive. From the latter, they may then infer what others know and use this representation to anticipate what others do next. Still, dogs might simply rely on directly observable cues and on what they themselves can perceive when they assess what others can perceive. And instead of making inferences from representations of others' mental states, they may have just learned that certain behaviours of ours lead to certain outcomes. However, recent research seems to challenge this low-level explanation. Dogs have solved several perspective-taking tasks instantly and reliably across a large number of variations, including geometrical gaze-following, stealing in the dark, concealing information from others, and Guesser/Knower differentiation. In the latter studies, dogs' choices between two human informants were strongly influenced by cues related to the humans' visual access to the food, even when the two informants behaved identically. And finally, we review a recent study that found dogs reacting differently to misleading suggestions of human informants that have either a true or false belief about the location of food. We discuss this surprising result in terms of the comprehension of reality-incongruent mental states, which is considered as a hallmark of Theory of Mind acquisition in human development. Especially on the basis of the latter findings, we conclude that pet dogs might be sensitive to what others see, know, intend, and believe. Therefore, this ability seems to have evolved not just in the corvid and primate lineages, but also in dogs.

Young children infer and manage what others think about them

We care about what others think of us and often try to present ourselves in a good light. What cognitive capacities underlie our ability to think (or even worry) about reputation, and how do these concerns manifest as strategic self-presentational behaviors? Even though the tendency to modify one's behaviors in the presence of others emerges early in life, the degree to which these behaviors reflect a rich understanding of what others think about the self has remained an open question. Bridging prior work on reputation management, communication, and theory of mind development in early childhood, here we investigate young children's ability to infer and revise others' mental representation of the self. Across four experiments, we find that 3- and 4-y-old children's decisions about to whom to communicate (Experiment 1), what to communicate (Experiments 2 and 3), and which joint activity to engage in with a partner (Experiment 4) are systematically influenced by the partner's observations of the children's own past performance. Children in these studies chose to present self-relevant information selectively and strategically when it could revise the partner's outdated, negative representation of the self. Extending research on children's ability to engage in informative communication, these results demonstrate the sophistication of early self-presentational behaviors: Even young children can draw rich inferences about what others think of them and communicate self-relevant information to revise these representations.

Eye-tracking as a window into primate social cognition

Over the past decade, noninvasive, restraint-free eye-tracking research with primates has transformed our understanding of primate social cognition. The use of this technology with many primate species allows for the exploration and comparison of how these species attend to and understand social agents and interactions. The ability to compare and contrast the cognitive capacities of various primate species, including humans, provides insight into the evolutionary mechanisms and selective pressures that have likely shaped social cognition in similar and divergent ways across the primate order. In this review, we begin by discussing noninvasive behavioral methods used to measure primate gaze and attention before the introduction of noninvasive, restraint-free eye-tracking methodologies. Next, we focus on findings from recent eye-tracking research on primate social cognition, beginning with simple visual and search mechanisms. We then discuss the results that have built on this basic understanding of how primates view images and videos, exploring discrimination and knowledge of social agents, following social cues, tracking perspectives and predicting behavior, and the combination of eye-tracking and other behavioral and physiological methods. Finally, we discuss some future directions of noninvasive eye-tracking research on primate social cognition and current eye-tracking work-in-progress that builds on these previous studies, investigating underexplored socio-cognitive capacities and utilizing new methodologies.

How do we interpret questions? Simplified representations of knowledge guide humans' interpretation of information requests

This paper investigates the cognitive mechanisms supporting humans' interpretation of requests for information. Learners can only search for a piece of information if they know that they are ignorant about it. Thus, in principle, the interpretation of requests for information could be guided by representations of Socratic ignorance (tracking what people know that they do not know). Alternatively, the interpretation of requests for information could be simplified by relying primarily on simple knowledge tracking (i.e., merely tracking what people know). We judged these hypotheses by testing two-and-a-half-year-old toddlers (N = 18), five- to seven-year-old children (N = 72), and adults (N = 384). In our experiments, a speaker asked a question that could be disambiguated by tracking her state of knowledge. We manipulated the speakers' visuals to modulate the complexity of the ignorance representation required to disambiguate their questions. Toddlers showed no tendency to appeal to representations of Socratic ignorance when disambiguating questions (Pilot S1). Five- to seven-year-olds exhibited a similar pattern of results, and they performed better when information requests could be disambiguated using simple knowledge tracking (Studies 1a-1b). Adults used representations of Socratic ignorance to interpret questions, but were more confident when simple knowledge tracking was sufficient to disambiguate information requests (Studies 2-3). Moreover, adults disambiguated questions as if speakers could request information about things that they were ignorant of, even when speakers had no reason to know about their ignorance (Studies 3-4). Thus, the interpretation of requests for information rests primarily on simple knowledge tracking-and not on representations of Socratic ignorance-a heuristic that reduces processing costs.

The evolution of knowledge during the Cambrian explosion

Phillips et al. make a compelling case for a reversal in the current paradigm in "other minds" research by considering the representation of other people's knowledge more basic than the attribution of belief. Unfortunately, they only discuss primates. In this commentary, I argue that the representation of others' knowledge is an evolutionary ancient trait, first appearing during the Cambrian explosion.

Ignorance matters

The ability to reason about ignorance is an important and often overlooked representational capacity. Phillips and colleagues assume that knowledge representations are inevitably accompanied by ignorance representations. We argue that this is not necessarily the case, as agents who can reason about knowledge often fail on ignorance tasks, suggesting that ignorance should be studied as a separate representational capacity.

Three cognitive mechanisms for knowledge tracking

We welcome Phillips et al.'s proposal to separate the understanding of "knowledge" from that of "beliefs." We argue that this distinction is best specified at the level of the cognitive mechanisms. Three distinct mechanisms are discussed: tagging one's own representations with those who share the same reality; representing others' representations (metarepresenting knowledge); and attributing dispositions to provide useful information.

Representing knowledge, belief, and everything in between: Representational complexity in humans and other apes

Building on Phillips and colleagues' case for the primacy of knowledge, we advocate for attention to diversity in mentalizing constructs within, as well as between, knowledge and belief. Ultimately, as great apes and other animals show, the development and evolution of theory of mind may reflect a much greater range of incremental elaborations of representational or computational complexity.

Cleaner fish are sensitive to what their partners can and cannot see

Much of human experience is informed by our ability to attribute mental states to others, a capacity known as theory of mind. While evidence for theory of mind in animals to date has largely been restricted to primates and other large-brained species, the use of ecologically-valid competitive contexts hints that ecological pressures for strategic deception may give rise to components of theory of mind abilities in distantly-related taxonomic groups. In line with this hypothesis, we show that cleaner wrasse (Labroides dimidiatus) exhibit theory of mind capacities akin to those observed in primates in the context of their cooperative cleaning mutualism. These results suggest that ecological pressures for strategic deception can drive human-like cognitive abilities even in very distantly related species.

McAuliffe et al. demonstrate that in the context of cooperative cleaning, wild-caught female cleaner wrasse are more likely to cheat when their partners are out of view. This provides evidence that cleaner wrasse possess a building block of theory of mind: sensitivity to what others can and cannot see.

Dedicated Representation of Others in the Macaque Frontal Cortex: From Action Monitoring and Prediction to Outcome Evaluation

Social neurophysiology has increasingly addressed how several aspects of self and other are distinctly represented in the brain. In social interactions, the self–other distinction is fundamental for discriminating one’s own actions, intentions, and outcomes from those that originate in the external world. In this paper, we review neurophysiological experiments using nonhuman primates that shed light on the importance of the self–other distinction, focusing mainly on the frontal cortex. We start by examining how the findings are impacted by the experimental paradigms that are used, such as the type of social partner or whether a passive or active interaction is required. Next, we describe the 2 sociocognitive systems: mirror and mentalizing. Finally, we discuss how the self–other distinction can occur in different domains to process different aspects of social information: the observation and prediction of others’ actions and the monitoring of others’ rewards.

Inferential social learning: cognitive foundations of human social learning and teaching

Social learning is often portrayed as a passive process of copying and trusting others. This view, however, does not fully capture what makes human social learning so powerful: social information is often 'curated' by helpful teachers. I argue that both learning from others (social learning) and helping others learn (teaching) can be characterized as probabilistic inferences guided by an intuitive understanding of how people think, plan, and act. Consistent with this idea, even young children draw rich inferences from evidence provided by others and generate informative evidence that helps others learn. By studying social learning and teaching through a common theoretical lens, inferential social learning provides an integrated account of how human cognition supports acquisition and communication of abstract knowledge.

Minimal physicalism as a scale-free substrate for cognition and consciousness

Theories of consciousness and cognition that assume a neural substrate automatically regard phylogenetically basal, nonneural systems as nonconscious and noncognitive. Here, we advance a scale-free characterization of consciousness and cognition that regards basal systems, including synthetic constructs, as not only informative about the structure and function of experience in more complex systems but also as offering distinct advantages for experimental manipulation. Our "minimal physicalist" approach makes no assumptions beyond those of quantum information theory, and hence is applicable from the molecular scale upwards. We show that standard concepts including integrated information, state broadcasting via small-world networks, and hierarchical Bayesian inference emerge naturally in this setting, and that common phenomena including stigmergic memory, perceptual coarse-graining, and attention switching follow directly from the thermodynamic requirements of classical computation. We show that the self-representation that lies at the heart of human autonoetic awareness can be traced as far back as, and serves the same basic functions as, the stress response in bacteria and other basal systems.

Tactical deception in sociosexual behaviour of stump-tailed macaques (Macaca arctoides): an exploratory study

Tactical deception (TD) is a social strategy in which a subject performs an action to its own benefit causing disadvantage for a competitor. In primates, the cognitive mechanisms involved in TD have been described at different levels. Sneaky mating is a common context within which to study TD because in many primate groups, dominant males monopolize access to females and subordinate males must find a way to copulate with females avoiding the alpha’s presence. The objective of this study was to explore which of the TD behavioural strategies are involved in the male sociosexual behaviour of a group of stump-tailed macaques (Macaca arctoides). We found that the subordinate males participated in more interactions when they were in a section of the enclosure where the alpha male was not present. The alpha male had more copulation interactions, but the beta male’s interactions lasted longer on average. Our data offer evidence in support of the hypothesis that stump-tailed macaques may use TD strategies that are related to operant conditioning.

How do non-human primates represent others' awareness of where objects are hidden?

Although non-human primates (NHPs) generally appear to predict how knowledgeable agents use knowledge to guide their behavior, the cognitive mechanisms that enable this remain poorly understood. We assessed the conditions under which NHPs' representations of an agent's awareness break down. Free-ranging rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) watched as an agent observed a target object being hidden in one of two boxes. While the agent could no longer see the boxes, the box containing the object flipped open and the object either changed in size/shape (Experiment 1) or color (Experiment 2). Monkeys looked longer when the agent searched for the object incorrectly rather than correctly following the color change (a non-geometric manipulation), but not the size/shape change (a geometric manipulation). Even though the agent maintained knowledge of the object's location in both cases, monkeys no longer expected the agent to search correctly after it had been geometrically (but not non-geometrically) manipulated. Experiment 3 confirmed that monkeys were sensitive to the color manipulation used in Experiment 2, making it unlikely that a failure to perceive the color manipulation accounted for our findings. Our results show that NHPs do not always expect that knowledgeable agents will act on their knowledge to obtain their goals, consistent with heuristic-based accounts of how NHPs represent others' mental states. These findings also suggest that geometric changes that occur outside the agent's perceptual access may disrupt attribution of awareness more so than non-geometric changes.

Non-human primate token use shows possibilities but also limitations for establishing a form of currency

Non-human primates evaluate choices based on quantitative information and subjective valuation of options. Non-human primates can learn to value tokens as placeholders for primary rewards (such as food). With those tokens established as a potential form of 'currency', it is then possible to examine how they respond to opportunities to earn and use tokens in ways such as accumulating tokens or exchanging tokens with each other or with human experimenters to gain primary rewards. Sometimes, individuals make efficient and beneficial choices to obtain tokens and then exchange them at the right moments to gain optimal reward. Sometimes, they even accumulate such rewards through extended delay of gratification, or through other exchange-based interactions. Thus, non-human primates are capable of associating value to arbitrary tokens that may function as currency-like stimuli, but there also are strong limitations on how non-human primates can integrate such tokens into choice situations or use such tokens to fully 'symbolize' economic decision-making. These limitations are important to acknowledge when considering the evolutionary emergence of currency use in our species. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.

No evidence that monkeys attribute mental states to animated shapes in the Heider-Simmel videos

Human Theory of Mind (ToM) is so automatic and pervasive that we spontaneously attribute mental states to animated abstract shapes, as evidenced by the classic Heider-Simmel findings. The extent to which this represents a fundamental characteristic of primate social cognition is debated. Prior research suggests that monkeys spontaneously predict behavior and attribute basic goals to conspecifics, but it remains unclear whether, like humans, they spontaneously ascribe mental states to animated shapes. Here, we address this question by analyzing rhesus monkeys' viewing patterns of the classic Heider-Simmel animations. We hypothesized that if rhesus monkeys also spontaneously attribute mental states to animated shapes, then, like humans, they would have the longest fixation durations for theory of mind animations, medium duration fixation for goal-directed animations, and shortest fixations for animations with random motion. In contrast, if attributing mental states to animations is specific to humans and perhaps other apes, then we predict no differences in looking time across animation categories. Unlike humans, monkeys did not fixate longer on ToM videos. Critically, monkeys' viewing patterns did not correlate with humans' viewing patterns or intentionality ratings from previously published research. The only major difference in viewing patterns between animation categories tracked differences in low-level visual motion. Thus, monkeys do not view the classic Heider-Simmel animations like humans do and we found no evidence that they spontaneously attribute mental states to animated shapes.

Do young rhesus macaques know what others see?: A comparative developmental perspective

Humans undergo robust ontogenetic shifts in the theory of mind capabilities. Are these developmental changes unique to human development or are they shared with other closely related non-human species? To explore this issue, we tested the development of the theory of mind capacities in a population of 236 infant and juvenile rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). Using a looking-time method, we examined what developing monkeys know about others' perceptions. Specifically, we tested whether younger monkeys predict that a person will reach for an object where she last saw it. Overall, we found a significant interaction between a monkey's age and performance on this task (p = .014). Juvenile monkeys (between two and 5 years of age) show a nonsignificant trend towards human infant-like patterns of performance, looking longer during the unexpected condition as compared to the expected condition, though this difference is nonsignificant (p = .09). However, contrary to findings in human infants, infant rhesus macaques show a different trend. Infant monkeys on average look slightly longer on average during the expected condition than the unexpected condition, though this pattern was not significant (p = .06). Our developmental results in monkeys provide some hints about the development of the theory of mind capacities in non-humans. First, young rhesus macaques appear to show some interest in the perception of other agents. Second, young rhesus seems able to make predictions based on the visual perspective of another agent, though the developmental pattern of this ability is not as clear nor as robust as in humans. As such, though an understanding of others' perceptions is early-emerging in human infants, it may require more experience interacting with other social agents in our non-human relatives.

Knowledge before Belief

Research on the capacity to understand others' minds has tended to focus on representations of beliefs, which are widely taken to be among the most central and basic theory of mind representations. Representations of knowledge, by contrast, have received comparatively little attention and have often been understood as depending on prior representations of belief. After all, how could one represent someone as knowing something if one doesn't even represent them as believing it? Drawing on a wide range of methods across cognitive science, we ask whether belief or knowledge is the more basic kind of representation. The evidence indicates that non-human primates attribute knowledge but not belief, that knowledge representations arise earlier in human development than belief representations, that the capacity to represent knowledge may remain intact in patient populations even when belief representation is disrupted, that knowledge (but not belief) attributions are likely automatic, and that explicit knowledge attributions are made more quickly than equivalent belief attributions. Critically, the theory of mind representations uncovered by these various methods exhibit a set of signature features clearly indicative of knowledge: they are not modality-specific, they are factive, they are not just true belief, and they allow for representations of egocentric ignorance. We argue that these signature features elucidate the primary function of knowledge representation: facilitating learning from others about the external world. This suggests a new way of understanding theory of mind-one that is focused on understanding others' minds in relation to the actual world, rather than independent from it.

Do Non-Human Primates Really Represent Others' Beliefs?

Over two decades of research have produced compelling evidence that non-human primates understand some psychological states in other individuals but are unable to represent others' beliefs. Recently, three studies employing anticipatory looking (AL) paradigms reported that non-human primates do show hints of implicitly understanding the beliefs of others. However, measures of AL have been increasingly scrutinized in the human literature owing to extensive replication problems. We argue that new reports of belief representation in non-human primates using AL should be interpreted cautiously because of methodological and theoretical challenges paralleling trends in the human literature. We explore how future work can address these challenges, and conclude by identifying new evolutionary questions raised by the prospect that non-human primates implicitly represent others' beliefs without an explicit belief representation system that guides fitness-relevant behavior.

On the domain specificity of the mechanisms underpinning spontaneous anticipatory looks in false-belief tasks

Many studies proposed that infants' and adults' looking behavior suggest a spontaneous and implicit ability to reason about others' beliefs. It has been argued, however, that these successes are false positives due to domain-general processes, such as retroactive interference. In this study, we investigated the domain specificity of mechanisms underpinning participants' looking behavior by manipulating the dynamic cues in the event stimuli. Infants aged 15 and 20 months and adults saw animation events in which either a self-moving triangle, or a hand holding an identical inert triangle, chased an animated disk. Most 20-month-olds and adults showed belief congruent anticipatory looks in the agent-triangle condition, whereas they showed no bias in the inert triangle control condition. These results are not consistent with submentalizing accounts based on domain-general low-level processes and provide further support for domain-specific explanations positing an early-emerging mentalistic reasoning.

Hierarchy processing in human neurobiology: how specific is it?

Although human and non-human animals share a number of perceptual and cognitive abilities, they differ in their ability to process hierarchically structured sequences. This becomes most evident in the human capacity to process natural language characterized by structural hierarchies. This capacity is neuroanatomically grounded in the posterior part of left Broca's area (Brodmann area (BA) 44), located in the inferior frontal gyrus, and its dorsal white matter fibre connection to the temporal cortex. Within this neural network, BA 44 itself subserves hierarchy building and the strength of its connection to the temporal cortex correlates with the processing of syntactically complex sentences. Whether these brain structures are also relevant for other human cognitive abilities is a current debate. Here, this question will be evaluated with respect to those human cognitive abilities that are assumed to require hierarchy building, such as music, mathematics and Theory of Mind. Rather than supporting a domain-general view, the data indicate domain-selective neural networks as the neurobiological basis for processing hierarchy in different cognitive domains. Recent cross-species white matter comparisons suggest that particular connections within the networks may make the crucial difference in the brain structure of human and non-human primates, thereby enabling cognitive functions specific to humans. This article is part of the theme issue 'What can animal communication teach us about human language?'

Are monkeys able to discriminate appearance from reality?

The understanding that the perceptual appearance of the environment can differ in several ways from the reality underlies the ability to discriminate appearance from reality. Being able to realize when a misperception can lead us to behave in inappropriate ways confers an evolutionary advantage and may be a prerequisite to develop a Theory of Mind. Understanding that our own perception can differ from reality seems indeed necessary to attribute to others perceptions or beliefs different than ours. This appearance-reality discrimination ability has recently been demonstrated in great apes but no information is currently available regarding this ability in other nonhuman species. In a comparative study, we tested Tonkean macaques (Macaca tonkeana), an Old World primate species, and brown capuchins (Sapajus apella), a New World primate species. We provided monkeys with two experiments using visual illusions of size and quantity to test their ability to discriminate appearance from reality, with an experimental setup similar to the one developed by Krachun et al. (2016) on chimpanzees. A large number of brown capuchins, from different ages and both sexes, as well as two Tonkean macaques succeeded in the two experiments. By ruling out all alternative explanations (i.e. visual tracking or associative learning), our study brings the first evidence that some Old World and New World monkeys are able to discriminate appearance from reality. Our results suggest moving the evolutionary apparition of this cognitive ability earlier in time. Finally, it suggests that humans could share more Theory of Mind components with more nonhuman species than we previously thought.

Do non-human primates really represent others' ignorance? A test of the awareness relations hypothesis

Non-human primates can often predict how another agent will behave based on that agent's knowledge about the world. But how do non-human primates represent others' knowledge states? Researchers have recently proposed that non-human primates form "awareness relations" to attribute objectively true information to other minds, as opposed to human-like representations that track others' ignorance or false belief states. We present the first explicit test of the awareness relations hypothesis by examining when rhesus macaques' understanding of other agents' knowledge falters. In Experiment 1, monkeys watched an agent observe a piece of fruit (the target object) being hidden in one of two boxes. While the agent's view was occluded, either the fruit moved out of its box and directly back into it, or the box containing the fruit opened and immediately closed. We found that monkeys looked significantly longer when the agent reached incorrectly rather than correctly after the box's movement, but not after the fruit's movement. This result suggests that monkeys did not expect the agent to know the fruit's location when it briefly and arbitrarily moved while the agent could not see it, but did expect the agent to know the fruit's location when only the box moved while the agent could not see it. In Experiment 2, we replicated and extended both findings with a larger sample, a different target object, and opposite directions of motion in the test trials. These findings suggest that monkeys reason about others' knowledge of objects by forming awareness relations which are disrupted by arbitrary spatial manipulation of the target object while an agent has no perceptual access to it.

Flexible gaze-following in rhesus monkeys

Humans are characterized by complex social cognitive abilities that emerge early in development. Comparative studies of nonhuman primates can illuminate the evolutionary history of these social capacities. We examined the cognitive skills that rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) use to follow gaze, a foundational skill in human social development. While rhesus monkeys can make inferences about others' gaze when competing, it is unclear how they think about gaze information in other contexts. In study 1, monkeys (n = 64) observed a demonstrator look upwards either in a barrier condition where a box was overhead, so that monkeys could not see the target of her gaze, or a no barrier condition where nothing blocked her view. In study 2, monkeys (n = 59) could approach to observe the target of the demonstrator's gaze when the demonstrator looked behind a barrier on the ground or, in the no barrier condition, behind a window frame in the same location. Monkeys were more likely to directly look up in study 1 if they could initially see the location where the demonstrator was looking, but they did not preferentially reorient their bodies to observe the out-of-view location when they could not see that location. In study 2, monkeys did preferentially reorient, but at low rates. This indicates that rhesus monkeys can use social cognitive processes outside of competitive contexts to model what others can or cannot see, but may not be especially motivated to see what others look at in non-competitive contexts, as they reorient infrequently or in an inconsistent fashion. These similarities and differences between gaze-following in monkeys and children can help to illuminate the evolution of human social cognition.

Is implicit Theory of Mind real but hard to detect? Testing adults with different stimulus materials

Recently, Theory of Mind (ToM) research has been revolutionized by new methods. Eye-tracking studies measuring subjects' looking times or anticipatory looking have suggested that implicit and automatic forms of ToM develop much earlier in ontogeny than traditionally assumed and continue to operate outside of subjects' awareness throughout the lifespan. However, the reliability of these implicit methods has recently been put into question by an increasing number of non-replications. What remains unclear from these accumulating non-replication findings, though, is whether they present true negatives (there is no robust phenomenon of automatic ToM) or false ones (automatic ToM is real but difficult to tap). In order to address these questions, the current study implemented conceptual replications of influential anticipatory looking ToM tasks with a new variation in the stimuli. In two separate preregistered studies, we used increasingly realistic stimuli and controlled for potential confounds. Even with these more realistic stimuli, previous results could not be replicated. Rather, the anticipatory looking pattern found here remained largely compatible with more parsimonious explanations. In conclusion, the reality and robustness of automatic ToM remains controversial.

The Protracted Maturation of Associative Layer IIIC Pyramidal Neurons in the Human Prefrontal Cortex During Childhood: A Major Role in Cognitive Development and Selective Alteration in Autism

The human specific cognitive shift starts around the age of 2 years with the onset of self-awareness, and continues with extraordinary increase in cognitive capacities during early childhood. Diffuse changes in functional connectivity in children aged 2-6 years indicate an increase in the capacity of cortical network. Interestingly, structural network complexity does not increase during this time and, thus, it is likely to be induced by selective maturation of a specific neuronal subclass. Here, we provide an overview of a subclass of cortico-cortical neurons, the associative layer IIIC pyramids of the human prefrontal cortex. Their local axonal collaterals are in control of the prefrontal cortico-cortical output, while their long projections modulate inter-areal processing. In this way, layer IIIC pyramids are the major integrative element of cortical processing, and changes in their connectivity patterns will affect global cortical functioning. Layer IIIC neurons have a unique pattern of dendritic maturation. In contrast to other classes of principal neurons, they undergo an additional phase of extensive dendritic growth during early childhood, and show characteristic molecular changes. Taken together, circuits associated with layer IIIC neurons have the most protracted period of developmental plasticity. This unique feature is advanced but also provides a window of opportunity for pathological events to disrupt normal formation of cognitive circuits involving layer IIIC neurons. In this manuscript, we discuss how disrupted dendritic and axonal maturation of layer IIIC neurons may lead into global cortical disconnectivity, affecting development of complex communication and social abilities. We also propose a model that developmentally dictated incorporation of layer IIIC neurons into maturing cortico-cortical circuits between 2 to 6 years will reveal a previous (perinatal) lesion affecting other classes of principal neurons. This "disclosure" of pre-existing functionally silent lesions of other neuronal classes induced by development of layer IIIC associative neurons, or their direct alteration, could be found in different forms of autism spectrum disorders. Understanding the gene-environment interaction in shaping cognitive microcircuitries may be fundamental for developing rehabilitation and prevention strategies in autism spectrum and other cognitive disorders.

The social neuroscience of mentalizing: challenges and recommendations

Our ability to understand and think about the mental states of other people is referred to as 'mentalizing' or 'theory of mind'. It features prominently in all social behavior, is essential for maintaining relationships, and shows pronounced individual differences. Here we review new approaches to study the underlying psychological mechanisms and discuss how they could best be investigated using modern tools from social neuroscience. We list key desiderata for the field, such as validity, specificity, and reproducibility, and link them to specific recommendations for the future. We also discuss new computational modeling approaches, and the application to psychopathology.

Retrospective attribution of false beliefs in 3-year-old children

A current debate in psychology and cognitive science concerns the nature of young children's ability to attribute and track others' beliefs. Beliefs can be attributed in at least two different ways: prospectively, during the observation of belief-inducing situations, and in a retrospective manner, based on episodic retrieval of the details of the events that brought about the beliefs. We developed a task in which only retrospective attribution, but not prospective belief tracking, would allow children to correctly infer that someone had a false belief. Eighteen- and 36-month-old children observed a displacement event, which was witnessed by a person wearing sunglasses (Experiment 1). Having later discovered that the sunglasses were opaque, 36-month-olds correctly inferred that the person must have formed a false belief about the location of the objects and used this inference in resolving her referential expressions. They successfully performed retrospective revision in the opposite direction as well, correcting a mistakenly attributed false belief when this was necessary (Experiment 3). Thus, children can compute beliefs retrospectively, based on episodic memories, well before they pass explicit false-belief tasks. Eighteen-month-olds failed in such a task, suggesting that they cannot retrospectively attribute beliefs or revise their initial belief attributions. However, an additional experiment provided evidence for prospective tracking of false beliefs in 18-month-olds (Experiment 2). Beyond identifying two different modes for tracking and updating others' mental states early in development, these results also provide clear evidence of episodic memory retrieval in young children.

Social Origins of Cortical Face Areas

Recently acquired fMRI data from human and macaque infants provide novel insights into the origins of cortical networks specialized for perceiving faces. Data from both species converge: cortical regions responding preferentially to faces are present and spatially organized early in infancy, although fully selective face areas emerge much later. What explains the earliest cortical responses to faces? We review two proposed mechanisms: proto-organization for simple shapes in visual cortex, and an innate subcortical schematic face template. In addition, we propose a third mechanism: infants choose to look at faces to engage in positively valenced, contingent social interactions. Activity in medial prefrontal cortex during social interactions may, directly or indirectly, guide the organization of cortical face areas.

Neural Mechanisms of Social Cognition in Primates

Activity in a network of areas spanning the superior temporal sulcus, dorsomedial frontal cortex, and anterior cingulate cortex is concerned with how nonhuman primates negotiate the social worlds in which they live. Central aspects of these circuits are retained in humans. Activity in these areas codes for primates' interactions with one another, their attempts to find out about one another, and their attempts to prevent others from finding out too much about themselves. Moreover, important features of the social world, such as dominance status, cooperation, and competition, modulate activity in these areas. We consider the degree to which activity in these regions is simply encoding an individual's own actions and choices or whether this activity is especially and specifically concerned with social cognition. Recent advances in comparative anatomy and computational modeling may help us to gain deeper insights into the nature and boundaries of primate social cognition.

Brain state flexibility accompanies motor-skill acquisition

Learning requires the traversal of inherently distinct cognitive states to produce behavioral adaptation. Yet, tools to explicitly measure these states with non-invasive imaging – and to assess their dynamics during learning – remain limited. Here, we describe an approach based on a distinct application of graph theory in which points in time are represented by network nodes, and similarities in brain states between two different time points are represented as network edges. We use a graph-based clustering technique to identify clusters of time points representing canonical brain states, and to assess the manner in which the brain moves from one state to another as learning progresses. We observe the presence of two primary states characterized by either high activation in sensorimotor cortex or high activation in a frontal-subcortical system. Flexible switching among these primary states and other less common states becomes more frequent as learning progresses, and is inversely correlated with individual differences in learning rate. These results are consistent with the notion that the development of automaticity is associated with a greater freedom to use cognitive resources for other processes. Taken together, our work offers new insights into the constrained, low dimensional nature of brain dynamics characteristic of early learning, which give way to less constrained, high-dimensional dynamics in later learning.

What do monkeys know about others' knowledge?

Recently, comparative psychologists have suggested that primates represent others' knowledge states. Evidence for this claim comes from studies demonstrating that primates expect others to maintain representations of objects when those objects are not currently visible. However, little work has explored whether nonhuman primates expect others to share the more sophisticated kinds of object knowledge that they themselves possess. We therefore investigated whether primates attribute to others knowledge that is acquired through the mental transformation of a static object representation. Specifically, we tested whether rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) expected a human demonstrator to solve a difficult rotational displacement task. In Experiment 1, monkeys watched a demonstrator hide a piece of fruit in one of two boxes. The monkey and the demonstrator then watched the boxes rotate 180°. We found that monkeys looked longer when the demonstrator reached into the box that did not contain the fruit, indicating that they expected her to be able to track the fruit to its current location. In Experiment 2, we ruled out the possibility that monkeys simply expected the demonstrator to search for the food in its true location. When the demonstrator did not witness the rotation event, monkeys looked equally long at the two reaching outcomes. These results are consistent with the interpretation that rhesus macaques expect others to dynamically update their representations of unseen objects.

Multidimensional assessment of empathic abilities in patients with insular glioma

Recent studies have provided evidence that there are two possible systems for empathy: affective empathy (AE) and cognitive empathy (CE). Neuroimaging paradigms have proven that the insular cortex is involved in empathy processing, particularly in AE. However, these observations do not provide causal evidence for the role of the insula in empathy. Although impairments in empathy have been described following insular damage in a few case studies, it is not clear whether insular cortex is involved in CE and whether these two systems are impaired independently or laterally in patients with insular gliomas. In this study, we assessed 17 patients with an insular glioma, 17 patients with a noninsular glioma, and 30 healthy controls using a method that combined a self-report empathy questionnaire with the emotion recognition task, assessment of empathy for others' pain, and the emotional perspective-taking paradigm. We found that patients with an insular glioma had lower scores for empathic concern and perspective taking than did either healthy controls or lesion controls. The patients' abilities to recognize facial emotions, perceive others' pain, and understand the emotional perspectives of others were also significantly impaired. Furthermore, we did not observe a laterality effect on either AE or CE among those with insular lesions. These findings revealed that both AE and CE are impaired in patients with an insular glioma and that the insular cortex may be a central neuroanatomical structure in both the AE and CE systems.