Confidence controls perceptual evidence accumulation

Dynamic modulation of confidence based on the metacognitive skills of collaborators

In collaborative decision-making contexts, people typically share their metacognitive experience of confidence to convey the degree of certainty in their decisions. To reach collective decisions, collaborators' individual beliefs can be aggregated and weighted according to their respective confidence, thereby enhancing group accuracy beyond individual capabilities. Previous joint decision-making studies have shown that individuals tend to adopt the same scale for communicating their levels of confidence. However, confidence judgments vary not only in terms of metacognitive bias, that is whether individuals tend to report generally low or high confidence, but also in terms of metacognitive accuracy, or how well the confidence judgments align with choice accuracy. In the first two experiments, where the metacognitive accuracy of the collaborator was manipulated and explicitly communicated to participants, individuals increased their average confidence levels as the metacognitive accuracy of the collaborator decreased, while their own metacognitive accuracy remained unaffected. Trial-wise analyses showed that participants differentially adapted their confidence after a collaborator made a wrong group decision, depending on the metacognitive accuracy of the collaborator. In two follow up studies, we showed that both manipulations (i.e. manipulating objective differences in the metacognitive accuracies of the collaborators and explicitly communicating these differences) were necessary for these effects to emerge. Our findings shed light on how collaborative decision-making contexts can dynamically affect metacognitive processes.

Optimal metacognitive decision strategies in signal detection theory

Signal detection theory (SDT) has long provided the field of psychology with a simple but powerful model of how observers make decisions under uncertainty. SDT can distinguish sensitivity from response bias and characterize optimal decision strategies. Whereas classical SDT pertains to "type 1" judgments about the world, recent work has extended SDT to quantify sensitivity for metacognitive or "type 2" judgments about one's own type 1 processing, e.g. confidence ratings. Here we further advance the application of SDT to the study of metacognition by providing a formal account of normative metacognitive decision strategies - i.e., type 2 (confidence) criterion setting - for ideal observers. Optimality is always defined relative to a given objective. We use SDT to derive formulae for optimal type 2 criteria under four distinct objectives: maximizing type 2 accuracy, maximizing type 2 reward, calibrating confidence to accuracy, and maximizing the difference between type 2 hit rate and false alarm rate. Where applicable, we consider these optimization contexts alongside their type 1 counterparts (e.g. maximizing type 1 accuracy) to deepen understanding. We examine the different strategies implied by these formulae and further consider how optimal type 2 criterion setting differs when metacognitive sensitivity deviates from SDT expectation. The theoretical framework provided here can be used to better understand the metacognitive decision strategies of real observers. Possible applications include characterizing observers' spontaneously chosen metacognitive decision strategies, assessing their ability to fine-tune metacognitive decision strategies to optimize a given outcome when instructed, determining over- or under-confidence relative to an optimal standard, and more. This framework opens new avenues for enriching our understanding of metacognition.

Empirically Integrating the Evidence for Different Predictive Coding Components Using Auditory False Perception

Perception is a probabilistic estimation of the sensory information we receive at any given time and is shaped by an internal model generated by the brain by assimilating information over the life course. This predictive system in the brain has several components-(i) the internal model, (ii) the model-based prediction called priors, (iii) the weighted difference between the prior and sensory input called prediction error (PE) and (iv) the weighted sum of the prior and input called perceptual inference. Until now, different studies have explored the independent components of this predictive coding system, and we, for the first time to our knowledge, integrate them. To do this, we induce a conditioned hallucination (CH) illusion by means of a multisensory integration paradigm and use this as a model to study the behavioral and electrophysiological responses to this experience. Additionally, we also probe their predictive coding system using a well-established local-global auditory oddball paradigm. By comparing the behavioral and electrophysiological components of people more and less likely to perceive an illusion in the two paradigms, we observed that high perceivers place more confidence in their internal model and low perceivers in the sensory information. Furthermore, high perceivers were more sensitive than low perceivers to PEs that were generated by a change in the context of the sensory information, which served as a measure of a change in the internal model itself. As an exploratory analysis, we also observed that the objective likelihood of perceiving an illusion was corrected to the self-reported likelihood of perceiving an illusion in a day-to-day setting, which disappears when controlled for the perceptual threshold. These results taken together start to give us an idea as to how a person's innate bias-either towards a learned model or external information may-affect their perception in a sensory context.

Perceptual learning improves discrimination but does not reduce distortions in appearance

Human perceptual sensitivity often improves with training, a phenomenon known as "perceptual learning." Another important perceptual dimension is appearance, the subjective sense of stimulus magnitude. Are training-induced improvements in sensitivity accompanied by more accurate appearance? Here, we examined this question by measuring both discrimination (sensitivity) and estimation (appearance) responses to near-horizontal motion directions, which are known to be repulsed away from horizontal. Participants performed discrimination and estimation tasks before and after training in either the discrimination or the estimation task or none (control group). Human observers who trained in either discrimination or estimation exhibited improvements in discrimination accuracy, but estimation repulsion did not decrease; instead, it either persisted or increased. Hence, distortions in perception can be exacerbated after perceptual learning. We developed a computational observer model in which perceptual learning arises from increases in the precision of underlying neural representations, which explains this counterintuitive finding. For each observer, the fitted model accounted for discrimination performance, the distribution of estimates, and their changes with training. Our empirical findings and modeling suggest that learning enhances distinctions between categories, a potentially important aspect of real-world perception and perceptual learning.

The confidence-noise confidence-boost (CNCB) model of confidence rating data

Over the last decade, different approaches have been proposed to interpret confidence rating judgments obtained after perceptual decisions. One very popular approach is to compute meta-d' which is a global measure of the sensibility to discriminate the confidence rating distributions for correct and incorrect perceptual decisions. Here, we propose a generative model of confidence based on two main parameters, confidence noise and confidence boost, that we call CNCB model. Confidence noise impairs confidence judgements above and beyond how sensory noise affects perceptual sensitivity. The confidence boost parameter reflects whether confidence uses the same information that was used for perceptual decisions, or some new information. This CNCB model offers a principled way to estimate a confidence efficiency measure that is a theory-driven alternative to the popular M-ratio. We then describe two scenarios to estimate the confidence boost parameter, one where the experiment uses more than two confidence levels, the other where the experiment uses more than two stimulus strengths. We also extend the model to experiments using continuous confidence ratings and describe how the model can be fitted without binning these ratings. The continuous confidence model includes a non-linear mapping between objective and subjective confidence probabilities that can be estimated. Altogether, the CNCB model should help interpret confidence rating data at a deeper level. This manuscript is accompanied by a toolbox that will allow researchers to estimate all the parameters of the CNCB model in confidence ratings datasets. Some examples of re-analyses of previous datasets are provided in S1 File.

Metacognition in the listening brain

How do you know you have heard right? Metacognition, the ability to assess and monitor one's own cognitive state, is key to understanding human communication in complex environments. However, the foundational role of metacognition in hearing and communication is only beginning to be explored, and the neuroscience behind it is an emerging field: how does confidence express in neural dynamics of the listening brain? What is known about auditory metaperceptual alterations as a hallmark phenomenon in psychosis, dementia, or hearing loss? Building on Bayesian ideas of auditory perception and auditory neuroscience, 'meta-listening' offers a framework for more comprehensive research into how metacognition in humans and non-humans shapes the listening brain.

The strength of confidence is involved in controlling the intensity of attentional allocation

Subjective confidence and uncertainty are closely related to cognition and behavior. However, direct evidence that subjective confidence controls attention allocation is lacking. This study aimed to clarify whether subjective confidence could be involved in controlling attention allocation and intensity. We created a model for predicting the participants' subjective confidence and verified its validity. Then, an electroencephalogram was recorded while the participants engaged in a behavioral task aimed to allocate their attention based on their confidence level. We observed a negative correlation where trials with higher confidence were associated with shorter reaction times to the target. Regarding event-related potentials (ERPs), we observed higher P1 potentials (early component of the ERP waveform after stimulus onset) in the ipsilateral occipital area during target presentation. Additionally, we observed lower frontoparietal P3a potentials (component of the ERP waveform associated with attention) in the high-confidence condition. We observed a higher alpha (8-12 Hz) power in the ipsilateral occipitoparietal area of the target presentation in the low-confidence condition. Subjective confidence might influence attentional allocation and intensity, possibly achieved by suppressing processing in the target-absent space. Our findings provided important insights into the role of subjective confidence in cognitive and behavioral control.

Touch-driven advantages in reaction time but not in performance in a cross-sensory comparison of reinforcement learning

Recent research has highlighted a notable confidence bias in the haptic sense, yet its impact on learning relative to other senses remains unexplored. This online study investigated learning behaviour across visual, auditory, and haptic modalities using a probabilistic selection task on computers and mobile devices, employing dynamic and ecologically valid stimuli to enhance generalisability. We analysed reaction time as an indicator of confidence, alongside learning speed and task accuracy. Our results revealed the fastest reaction times with haptic stimuli, suggesting heightened perceptual confidence, whereas visual stimuli were the slowest, and auditory stimuli were intermediate. Despite these differences, all modalities demonstrated consistent learning speeds and accuracies. These findings support the 'common currency' hypothesis of perceptual confidence, facilitating modality-independent meta-representations for efficient decision-making. Additionally, reaction times were significantly faster on touch-based mobile devices compared to computers, underscoring the metacognitive efficiency of haptic feedback in technology-enhanced environments. The combination of faster reaction time in the haptic modality without sacrificing accuracy and the enhanced efficiency of touch-based interfaces advocates for the integration of haptics in technological designs to boost efficiency while maintaining a high level of precision.

Flexibility in choosing decision policies in gathering discrete evidence over time

The brain can remarkably adapt its decision-making process to suit the dynamic environment and diverse aims and demands. The brain's flexibility can be classified into three categories: flexibility in choosing solutions, decision policies, and actions. We employ two experiments to explore flexibility in decision policy: a visual object categorization task and an auditory object categorization task. Both tasks required participants to accumulate discrete evidence over time, with the only difference being the sensory state of the stimuli. We aim to investigate how the brain demonstrates flexibility in selecting decision policies in different sensory contexts when the solution and action remain the same. Our results indicate that the decision policy of the brain in integrating information is independent of inter-pulse interval across these two tasks. However, the decision policy based on how the brain ranks the first and second pulse of evidence changes flexibly. We show that the sequence of pulses does not affect the choice accuracy in the auditory mode. However, in the visual mode, the first pulse had the larger leverage on decisions. Our research underscores the importance of incorporating diverse contexts to improve our understanding of the brain's flexibility in real-world decision-making.

Metacognition biases information seeking in assessing ambiguous news

How do we assess the veracity of ambiguous news, and does metacognition guide our decisions to seek further information? In a controlled experiment, participants evaluated the veracity of ambiguous news and decided whether to seek extra information. Confidence in their veracity judgments did not predict accuracy, showing limited metacognitive ability when facing ambiguous news. Despite this, confidence in one's judgment was the primary driver of the demand for additional information about the news. Lower confidence predicted a stronger desire for extra information, regardless of the veracity judgment. Two key news characteristics led individuals to confidently misinterpret both true and fake news. News imprecision and news tendency to polarize opinions increased the likelihood of misjudgment, highlighting individuals' vulnerability to ambiguity. Structural equation modeling revealed that the demand for disambiguating information, driven by uncalibrated metacognition, became increasingly ineffective as individuals are drawn in by the ambiguity of the news. Our results underscore the importance of metacognitive abilities in mediating the relationship between assessing ambiguous information and the decision to seek or avoid more information.

Neurobehavioral meaning of pupil size

Pupil size is a widely used metric of brain state. It is one of the few signals originating from the brain that can be readily monitored with low-cost devices in basic science, clinical, and home settings. It is, therefore, important to investigate and generate well-defined theories related to specific interpretations of this metric. What exactly does it tell us about the brain? Pupils constrict in response to light and dilate during darkness, but the brain also controls pupil size irrespective of luminosity. Pupil size fluctuations resulting from ongoing "brain states" are used as a metric of arousal, but what is pupil-linked arousal and how should it be interpreted in neural, cognitive, and computational terms? Here, we discuss some recent findings related to these issues. We identify open questions and propose how to answer them through a combination of well-defined tasks, neurocomputational models, and neurophysiological probing of the interconnected loops of causes and consequences of pupil size.

Confidence control for efficient behaviour in dynamic environments

Signatures of confidence emerge during decision-making, implying confidence may be of functional importance to decision processes themselves. We formulate an extension of sequential sampling models of decision-making in which confidence is used online to actively moderate the quality and quantity of evidence accumulated for decisions. The benefit of this model is that it can respond to dynamic changes in sensory evidence quality. We highlight this feature by designing a dynamic sensory environment where evidence quality can be smoothly adapted within the timeframe of a single decision. Our model with confidence control offers a superior description of human behaviour in this environment, compared to sequential sampling models without confidence control. Using multivariate decoding of electroencephalography (EEG), we uncover EEG correlates of the model's latent processes, and show stronger EEG-derived confidence control is associated with faster, more accurate decisions. These results support a neurobiologically plausible framework featuring confidence as an active control mechanism for improving behavioural efficiency.

Bayesian confidence in optimal decisions

The optimal way to make decisions in many circumstances is to track the difference in evidence collected in favor of the options. The drift diffusion model (DDM) implements this approach and provides an excellent account of decisions and response times. However, existing DDM-based models of confidence exhibit certain deficits, and many theories of confidence have used alternative, nonoptimal models of decisions. Motivated by the historical success of the DDM, we ask whether simple extensions to this framework might allow it to better account for confidence. Motivated by the idea that the brain will not duplicate representations of evidence, in all model variants decisions and confidence are based on the same evidence accumulation process. We compare the models to benchmark results, and successfully apply four qualitative tests concerning the relationships between confidence, evidence, and time, in a new preregistered study. Using computationally cheap expressions to model confidence on a trial-by-trial basis, we find that a subset of model variants also provide a very good to excellent account of precise quantitative effects observed in confidence data. Specifically, our results favor the hypothesis that confidence reflects the strength of accumulated evidence penalized by the time taken to reach the decision (Bayesian readout), with the penalty applied not perfectly calibrated to the specific task context. These results suggest there is no need to abandon the DDM or single accumulator models to successfully account for confidence reports. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Top-Down Task Goals Induce the Retrieval State

Engaging the retrieval state (Tulving, 1983) impacts processing and behavior (Long and Kuhl, 2019, 2021; Smith et al., 2022), but the extent to which top-down factors-explicit instructions and goals-versus bottom-up factors-stimulus properties such as repetition and similarity-jointly or independently induce the retrieval state is unclear. Identifying the impact of bottom-up and top-down factors on retrieval state engagement is critical for understanding how control of task-relevant versus task-irrelevant brain states influence cognition. We conducted between-subjects recognition memory tasks on male and female human participants in which we varied test phase goals. We recorded scalp electroencephalography and used an independently validated mnemonic state classifier (Long, 2023) to measure retrieval state engagement as a function of top-down task goals (recognize old vs detect new items) and bottom-up stimulus repetition (hits vs correct rejections (CRs)). We find that whereas the retrieval state is engaged for hits regardless of top-down goals, the retrieval state is only engaged during CRs when the top-down goal is to recognize old items. Furthermore, retrieval state engagement is greater for low compared to high confidence hits when the task goal is to recognize old items. Together, these results suggest that top-down demands to recognize old items induce the retrieval state independent from bottom-up factors, potentially reflecting the recruitment of internal attention to enable access of a stored representation.

Behavioral and neural measures of confidence using a novel auditory pitch identification task

Observers can discriminate between correct versus incorrect perceptual decisions with feelings of confidence. The centro-parietal positivity build-up rate (CPP slope) has been suggested as a likely neural signature of accumulated evidence, which may guide both perceptual performance and confidence. However, CPP slope also covaries with reaction time, which also covaries with confidence in previous studies, and performance and confidence typically covary; thus, CPP slope may index signatures of perceptual performance rather than confidence per se. Moreover, perceptual metacognition-including neural correlates-has largely been studied in vision, with few exceptions. Thus, we lack understanding of domain-general neural signatures of perceptual metacognition outside vision. Here we designed a novel auditory pitch identification task and collected behavior with simultaneous 32-channel EEG in healthy adults. Participants saw two tone labels which varied in tonal distance on each trial (e.g., C vs D, C vs F), then heard a single auditory tone; they identified which label was correct and rated confidence. We found that pitch identification confidence varied with tonal distance, but performance, metacognitive sensitivity (trial-by-trial covariation of confidence with accuracy), and reaction time did not. Interestingly, however, while CPP slope covaried with performance and reaction time, it did not significantly covary with confidence. We interpret these results to mean that CPP slope is likely a signature of first-order perceptual processing and not confidence-specific signals or computations in auditory tasks. Our novel pitch identification task offers a valuable method to examine the neural correlates of auditory and domain-general perceptual confidence.

A low-dimensional approximation of optimal confidence

Human decision making is accompanied by a sense of confidence. According to Bayesian decision theory, confidence reflects the learned probability of making a correct response, given available data (e.g., accumulated stimulus evidence and response time). Although optimal, independently learning these probabilities for all possible data combinations is computationally intractable. Here, we describe a novel model of confidence implementing a low-dimensional approximation of this optimal yet intractable solution. This model allows efficient estimation of confidence, while at the same time accounting for idiosyncrasies, different kinds of biases and deviation from the optimal probability correct. Our model dissociates confidence biases resulting from the estimate of the reliability of evidence by individuals (captured by parameter α), from confidence biases resulting from general stimulus independent under and overconfidence (captured by parameter β). We provide empirical evidence that this model accurately fits both choice data (accuracy, response time) and trial-by-trial confidence ratings simultaneously. Finally, we test and empirically validate two novel predictions of the model, namely that 1) changes in confidence can be independent of performance and 2) selectively manipulating each parameter of our model leads to distinct patterns of confidence judgments. As a tractable and flexible account of the computation of confidence, our model offers a clear framework to interpret and further resolve different forms of confidence biases.

Individual differences in working memory impact the trajectory of non-native speech category learning

What is the role of working memory over the course of non-native speech category learning? Prior work has predominantly focused on how working memory might influence learning assessed at a single timepoint. Here, we substantially extend this prior work by examining the role of working memory on speech learning performance over time (i.e., over several months) and leverage a multifaceted approach that provides key insights into how working memory influences learning accuracy, maintenance of knowledge over time, generalization ability, and decision processes. We found that the role of working memory in non-native speech learning depends on the timepoint of learning and whether individuals learned the categories at all. Among learners, across all stages of learning, working memory was associated with higher accuracy as well as faster and slightly more cautious decision making. Further, while learners and non-learners did not have substantially different working memory performance, learners had faster evidence accumulation and more cautious decision thresholds throughout all sessions. Working memory may enhance learning by facilitating rapid category acquisition in initial stages and enabling faster and slightly more careful decision-making strategies that may reduce the overall effort needed to learn. Our results have important implications for developing interventions to improve learning in naturalistic language contexts.

What the eyes, confidence, and partner's identity can tell about change of mind

Perceptual confidence reflects the ability to evaluate the evidence that supports perceptual decisions. It is thought to play a critical role in guiding decision-making. However, only a few empirical studies have actually investigated the function of perceptual confidence. To address this issue, we designed a perceptual task in which participants provided a confidence judgment on the accuracy of their perceptual decision. Then, they viewed the response of a machine or human partner, and they were instructed to decide whether to keep or change their initial response. We observed that confidence predicted participants' changes of mind more than task difficulty and perceptual accuracy. Additionally, interacting with a machine, compared to a human, decreased confidence and increased participants tendency to change their initial decision, suggesting that both confidence and changes of mind are influenced by contextual factors, such as the identity of a partner. Finally, variations in confidence judgments but not change of mind were correlated with pre-response pupil dynamics, indicating that arousal changes are linked to confidence computations. This study contributes to our understanding of the factors influencing confidence and changes of mind and also evaluates the possibility of using pupil dynamics as a proxy of confidence.

Metacognitive evaluation of postdecisional perceptual representations

Perceptual confidence is thought to arise from metacognitive processes that evaluate the underlying perceptual decision evidence. We investigated whether metacognitive access to perceptual evidence is constrained by the hierarchical organization of visual cortex, where high-level representations tend to be more readily available for explicit scrutiny. We found that the ability of human observers to evaluate their confidence did depend on whether they performed a high-level or low-level task on the same stimuli, but was also affected by manipulations that occurred long after the perceptual decision. Confidence in low-level perceptual decisions degraded with more time between the decision and the response cue, especially when backward masking was present. Confidence in high-level tasks was immune to backward masking and benefitted from additional time. These results can be explained by a model assuming confidence heavily relies on postdecisional internal representations of visual stimuli that degrade over time, where high-level representations are more persistent.

The online metacognitive control of decisions

Difficult decisions typically involve mental effort, which scales with the deployment of cognitive (e.g., mnesic, attentional) resources engaged in processing decision-relevant information. But how does the brain regulate mental effort? A possibility is that the brain optimizes a resource allocation problem, whereby the amount of invested resources balances its expected cost (i.e. effort) and benefit. Our working assumption is that subjective decision confidence serves as the benefit term of the resource allocation problem, hence the "metacognitive" nature of decision control. Here, we present a computational model for the online metacognitive control of decisions or oMCD. Formally, oMCD is a Markov Decision Process that optimally solves the ensuing resource allocation problem under agnostic assumptions about the inner workings of the underlying decision system. We demonstrate how this makes oMCD a quasi-optimal control policy for a broad class of decision processes, including -but not limited to- progressive attribute integration. We disclose oMCD's main properties (in terms of choice, confidence and response time), and show that they reproduce most established empirical results in the field of value-based decision making. Finally, we discuss the possible connections between oMCD and most prominent neurocognitive theories about decision control and mental effort regulation.

Learning and metacognition under volatility in GD: Lower learning rates and distorted coupling between action and confidence

Background and aims

Decisions and learning processes are under metacognitive control, where confidence in one's actions guides future behaviour. Indeed, studies have shown that being more confident results in less action updating and learning, and vice versa. This coupling between action and confidence can be disrupted, as has been found in individuals with high compulsivity symptoms. Patients with Gambling Disorder (GD) have been shown to exhibit both higher confidence and deficits in learning.

Methods

In this study, we tested the hypotheses that patients with GD display increased confidence, reduced action updating and lower learning rates. Additionally, we investigated whether the action-confidence coupling was distorted in patients with GD. To address this, 27 patients with GD and 30 control participants performed a predictive inference task designed to assess action and confidence dynamics during learning under volatility. Action-updating, confidence and their coupling were assessed and computational modeling estimated parameters for learning rates, error sensitivity, and sensitivity to environmental changes.

Results

Contrary to our expectations, results revealed no significant group differences in action updating or confidence levels. Nevertheless, GD patients exhibited a weakened coupling between confidence and action, as well as lower learning rates.

Discussion and conclusions

This suggests that patients with GD may underutilize confidence when steering future behavioral choices. Ultimately, these findings point to a disruption of metacognitive control in GD, without a general overconfidence bias in neutral, non-incentivized volatile learning contexts.

Top-down task goals induce the retrieval state

Engaging the retrieval state (Tulving, 1983) impacts processing and behavior (Long & Kuhl, 2019, 2021; Smith, Moore, & Long, 2022), but the extent to which top-down factors - explicit instructions and goals - vs. bottom-up factors - stimulus properties such as repetition and similarity - jointly or independently induce the retrieval state is unclear. Identifying the impact of bottom-up and top-down factors on retrieval state engagement is critical for understanding how control of task-relevant vs. task-irrelevant brain states influence cognition. We conducted between-subjects recognition memory tasks on male and female human participants in which we varied test phase goals. We recorded scalp electroencephalography and used an independently validated mnemonic state classifier (Long, 2023) to measure retrieval state engagement as a function of top-down task goals (recognize old vs. detect new items) and bottom-up stimulus repetition (hits vs. correct rejections). We find that whereas the retrieval state is engaged for hits regardless of top-down goals, the retrieval state is only engaged during correct rejections when the top-down goal is to recognize old items. Furthermore, retrieval state engagement is greater for low compared to high confidence hits when the task goal is to recognize old items. Together, these results suggest that top-down demands to recognize old items induce the retrieval state independent from bottom-up factors, potentially reflecting the recruitment of internal attention to enable access of a stored representation.

Significance Statement

Both top-down goals and automatic bottom-up influences may lead us into a retrieval brain state - a whole-brain pattern of activity that supports our ability to remember the past. Here we tested the extent to which top-down vs. bottom-up factors independently influence the retrieval state by manipulating participants' goals and stimulus repetition during a memory test. We find that in response to the top-down goal to recognize old items, the retrieval state is engaged for both old and new probes, suggesting that top-down and bottom-up factors independently engage the retrieval state. Our interpretation is that top-down demands recruit internal attention in service of the attempt to access a stored representation.

Think twice: Re-assessing confidence improves visual metacognition

Metacognition is a fundamental feature of human behavior that has adaptive functional value. Current understanding of the factors that influence metacognition remains incomplete, and we lack protocols to improve metacognition. Here, we introduce a two-step confidence choice paradigm to test whether metacognitive performance may improve by asking subjects to reassess their initial confidence. Previous work on perceptual and mnemonic decision-making has shown that (type 1) perceptual sensitivity benefits from reassessing the primary choice, however, it is not clear whether such an effect occurs for type 2 confidence choices. To test this hypothesis, we ran two separate online experiments, in which participants completed a type 1 task followed by two consecutive confidence choices. The results of the two experiments indicated that metacognitive sensitivity improved after re-evaluation. Since post-decisional evidence accumulation following the first confidence choice is likely to be minimal, this metacognitive improvement is better accounted for by an attenuation of metacognitive noise during the process of confidence generation. Thus, here we argue that metacognitive noise may be filtered out by additional post-decisional processing, thereby improving metacognitive sensitivity. We discuss the ramifications of these findings for models of metacognition and for developing protocols to train and manipulate metacognitive processes.

A confidence framing effect: Flexible use of evidence in metacognitive monitoring

Human behavior is flexibly regulated by specific goals of cognitive tasks. One notable example is goal-directed modulation of metacognitive behavior, where logically equivalent decision-making problems can yield different patterns of introspective confidence depending on the frame in which they are presented. While this observation highlights the important heuristic nature of metacognitive monitoring, computational mechanisms underlying this phenomenon remain elusive. We confirmed the confidence framing effect in two-alternative dot-number discrimination and in previously published preference-choice data, demonstrating distinctive confidence patterns between "choose more" or "choose less" frames. Formal model comparisons revealed a simple confidence heuristic behind this phenomenon, which assigns greater weight to chosen than unchosen stimulus evidence. This computation appears to be based on internal evidence constituted under specific task demands rather than physical stimulus intensity itself, a view justified in terms of ecological rationality. These results shed light on the adaptive nature of human decision-making and metacognitive monitoring.

Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis

Determining the psychological, computational, and neural bases of confidence and uncertainty holds promise for understanding foundational aspects of human metacognition. While a neuroscience of confidence has focused on the mechanisms underpinning subpersonal phenomena such as representations of uncertainty in the visual or motor system, metacognition research has been concerned with personal-level beliefs and knowledge about self-performance. I provide a road map for bridging this divide by focusing on a particular class of confidence computation: propositional confidence in one's own (hypothetical) decisions or actions. Propositional confidence is informed by the observer's models of the world and their cognitive system, which may be more or less accurate-thus explaining why metacognitive judgments are inferential and sometimes diverge from task performance. Disparate findings on the neural basis of uncertainty and performance monitoring are integrated into a common framework, and a new understanding of the locus of action of metacognitive interventions is developed.

Interpersonal alignment of neural evidence accumulation to social exchange of confidence

Private, subjective beliefs about uncertainty have been found to have idiosyncratic computational and neural substrates yet, humans share such beliefs seamlessly and cooperate successfully. Bringing together decision making under uncertainty and interpersonal alignment in communication, in a discovery plus pre-registered replication design, we examined the neuro-computational basis of the relationship between privately held and socially shared uncertainty. Examining confidence-speed-accuracy trade-off in uncertainty-ridden perceptual decisions under social vs isolated context, we found that shared (i.e. reported confidence) and subjective (inferred from pupillometry) uncertainty dynamically followed social information. An attractor neural network model incorporating social information as top-down additive input captured the observed behavior and demonstrated the emergence of social alignment in virtual dyadic simulations. Electroencephalography showed that social exchange of confidence modulated the neural signature of perceptual evidence accumulation in the central parietal cortex. Our findings offer a neural population model for interpersonal alignment of shared beliefs.

Expressions for Bayesian confidence of drift diffusion observers in fluctuating stimuli tasks

We introduce a new approach to modelling decision confidence, with the aim of enabling computationally cheap predictions while taking into account, and thereby exploiting, trial-by-trial variability in stochastically fluctuating stimuli. Using the framework of the drift diffusion model of decision making, along with time-dependent thresholds and the idea of a Bayesian confidence readout, we derive expressions for the probability distribution over confidence reports. In line with current models of confidence, the derivations allow for the accumulation of "pipeline" evidence that has been received but not processed by the time of response, the effect of drift rate variability, and metacognitive noise. The expressions are valid for stimuli that change over the course of a trial with normally-distributed fluctuations in the evidence they provide. A number of approximations are made to arrive at the final expressions, and we test all approximations via simulation. The derived expressions contain only a small number of standard functions, and require evaluating only once per trial, making trial-by-trial modelling of confidence data in stochastically fluctuating stimuli tasks more feasible. We conclude by using the expressions to gain insight into the confidence of optimal observers, and empirically observed patterns.

Differences in metacognitive functioning between obsessive-compulsive disorder patients and highly compulsive individuals from the general population

BACKGROUND

Our confidence, a form of metacognition, guides our behavior. Confidence abnormalities have been found in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). A first notion based on clinical case-control studies suggests lower confidence in OCD patients compared to healthy controls. Contrarily, studies in highly compulsive individuals from general population samples showed that obsessive-compulsive symptoms related positively or not at all to confidence. A second notion suggests that an impairment in confidence estimation and usage is related to compulsive behavior, which is more often supported by studies in general population samples. These opposite findings call into question whether findings from highly compulsive individuals from the general population are generalizable to OCD patient populations.

METHODS

To test this, we investigated confidence at three hierarchical levels: local confidence in single decisions, global confidence in task performance and higher-order self-beliefs in 40 OCD patients (medication-free, no comorbid diagnoses), 40 controls, and 40 matched highly compulsive individuals from the general population (HComp).

RESULTS

In line with the first notion we found that OCD patients exhibited relative underconfidence at all three hierarchical levels. In contrast, HComp individuals showed local and global overconfidence and worsened metacognitive sensitivity compared with OCD patients, in line with the second notion.

CONCLUSIONS

Metacognitive functioning observed in a general highly compulsive population, often used as an analog for OCD, is distinct from that in a clinical OCD population, suggesting that OC symptoms in these two groups relate differently to (meta)cognitive processes. These findings call for caution in generalizing (meta)cognitive findings from general population to clinical samples.

Metacognition, public health compliance, and vaccination willingness

Metacognition, our ability to reflect on our own beliefs, manifests itself in the confidence we have in these beliefs, and helps us guide our behavior in complex and uncertain environments. Here, we provide empirical tests of the importance of metacognition during the pandemic. Bayesian and frequentist analyses demonstrate that citizens with higher metacognitive sensitivity-where confidence differentiates correct from incorrect COVID-19 beliefs-reported higher willingness to vaccinate against COVID-19, and higher compliance with recommended public health measures. Notably, this benefit of accurate introspection held controlling for the accuracy of COVID-19 beliefs. By demonstrating how vaccination willingness and compliance may relate to insight into the varying accuracy of beliefs, rather than only the accuracy of the beliefs themselves, this research highlights the critical role of metacognitive ability in times of crisis. However, we do not find sufficient evidence to conclude that citizens with higher metacognitive sensitivity were more likely to comply with recommended public health measures when controlling for the absolute level of the confidence citizens had in their COVID-19 beliefs.

Self-motion perception and sequential decision-making: where are we heading?

To navigate and guide adaptive behaviour in a dynamic environment, animals must accurately estimate their own motion relative to the external world. This is a fundamentally multisensory process involving integration of visual, vestibular and kinesthetic inputs. Ideal observer models, paired with careful neurophysiological investigation, helped to reveal how visual and vestibular signals are combined to support perception of linear self-motion direction, or heading. Recent work has extended these findings by emphasizing the dimension of time, both with regard to stimulus dynamics and the trade-off between speed and accuracy. Both time and certainty-i.e. the degree of confidence in a multisensory decision-are essential to the ecological goals of the system: terminating a decision process is necessary for timely action, and predicting one's accuracy is critical for making multiple decisions in a sequence, as in navigation. Here, we summarize a leading model for multisensory decision-making, then show how the model can be extended to study confidence in heading discrimination. Lastly, we preview ongoing efforts to bridge self-motion perception and navigation per se, including closed-loop virtual reality and active self-motion. The design of unconstrained, ethologically inspired tasks, accompanied by large-scale neural recordings, raise promise for a deeper understanding of spatial perception and decision-making in the behaving animal. This article is part of the theme issue 'Decision and control processes in multisensory perception'.

Prior information differentially affects discrimination decisions and subjective confidence reports

According to Bayesian models, both decisions and confidence are based on the same precision-weighted integration of prior expectations ("priors") and incoming information ("likelihoods"). This assumes that priors are integrated optimally and equally in decisions and confidence, which has not been tested. In three experiments, we quantify how priors inform decisions and confidence. With a dual-decision task we create pairs of conditions that are matched in posterior information, but differ on whether the prior or likelihood is more informative. We find that priors are underweighted in discrimination decisions, but are less underweighted in confidence about those decisions, and this is not due to differences in processing time. The same patterns remain with exogenous probabilistic cues as priors. With a Bayesian model we quantify the weighting parameters for the prior at both levels, and find converging evidence that priors are more optimally used in explicit confidence, even when underused in decisions.

Evidence or Confidence: What Is Really Monitored during a Decision?

Assessing our confidence in the choices we make is important to making adaptive decisions, and it is thus no surprise that we excel in this ability. However, standard models of decision-making, such as the drift-diffusion model (DDM), treat confidence assessment as a post hoc or parallel process that does not directly influence the choice, which depends only on accumulated evidence. Here, we pursue the alternative hypothesis that what is monitored during a decision is an evolving sense of confidence (that the to-be-selected option is the best) rather than raw evidence. Monitoring confidence has the appealing consequence that the decision threshold corresponds to a desired level of confidence for the choice, and that confidence improvements can be traded off against the resources required to secure them. We show that most previous findings on perceptual and value-based decisions traditionally interpreted from an evidence-accumulation perspective can be explained more parsimoniously from our novel confidence-driven perspective. Furthermore, we show that our novel confidence-driven DDM (cDDM) naturally generalizes to decisions involving any number of alternative options - which is notoriously not the case with traditional DDM or related models. Finally, we discuss future empirical evidence that could be useful in adjudicating between these alternatives.

Natural statistics support a rational account of confidence biases

Previous work has sought to understand decision confidence as a prediction of the probability that a decision will be correct, leading to debate over whether these predictions are optimal, and whether they rely on the same decision variable as decisions themselves. This work has generally relied on idealized, low-dimensional models, necessitating strong assumptions about the representations over which confidence is computed. To address this, we used deep neural networks to develop a model of decision confidence that operates directly over high-dimensional, naturalistic stimuli. The model accounts for a number of puzzling dissociations between decisions and confidence, reveals a rational explanation of these dissociations in terms of optimization for the statistics of sensory inputs, and makes the surprising prediction that, despite these dissociations, decisions and confidence depend on a common decision variable.

Feeling lucky? prospective and retrospective cues for sensorimotor confidence

On a daily basis, humans interact with the outside world using judgments of sensorimotor confidence, constantly evaluating our actions for success. We ask, what sensory and motor-execution cues are used in making these judgements and when are they available? Two sources of temporally distinct information are prospective cues, available prior to the action (e.g., knowledge of motor noise and past performance), and retrospective cues specific to the action itself (e.g., proprioceptive measurements). We investigated the use of these two cues in two tasks, a secondary motor-awareness task and a main task in which participants reached toward a visual target with an unseen hand and then made a continuous judgment of confidence about the success of the reach. Confidence was reported by setting the size of a circle centered on the reach-target location, where a larger circle reflects lower confidence. Points were awarded if the confidence circle enclosed the true endpoint, with fewer points returned for larger circles. This incentivized accurate reaches and attentive reporting to maximize the score. We compared three Bayesian-inference models of sensorimotor confidence based on either prospective cues, retrospective cues, or both sources of information to maximize expected gain (i.e., an ideal-performance model). Our findings showed two distinct strategies: participants either performed as ideal observers, using both prospective and retrospective cues to make the confidence judgment, or relied solely on prospective information, ignoring retrospective cues. Thus, participants can make use of retrospective cues, evidenced by the behavior observed in our motor-awareness task, but these cues are not always included in the computation of sensorimotor confidence.

Research development of porphyrin-based metal-organic frameworks: targeting modalities and cancer therapeutic applications

Porphyrins are naturally occurring organic molecules that have attracted widespread attention for their potential in the field of biomedical research. Porphyrin-based metal-organic frameworks (MOFs) that utilize porphyrin molecules as organic ligands have gained attention from researchers due to their excellent results as photosensitizers in tumor photodynamic therapy (PDT). Additionally, MOFs hold significant promise and potential for other tumor therapeutic approaches due to their tunable size and pore size, excellent porosity, and ultra-high specific surface area. Active delivery of nanomaterials via targeted molecules for tumor therapy has demonstrated greater accumulation, lower drug doses, higher therapeutic efficacy, and reduced side effects relative to passive targeting through the enhanced permeation and retention effect (EPR). This paper presents a comprehensive review of the targeting methods employed by porphyrin-based MOFs in tumor targeting therapy over the past few years. It further discusses the applications of porphyrin-based MOFs for targeted cancer therapy through various therapeutic methods. The objective of this paper is to provide a valuable reference and source of ideas for targeted therapy using porphyrin-based MOF materials and to inspire further exploration of their potential in the field of cancer therapy.

Optimal policy for uncertainty estimation concurrent with decision making

Decision making often depends on vague information that leads to uncertainty, which is a quantity contingent not on choice but on probability distributions of sensory evidence and other cognitive variables. Uncertainty may be computed in parallel and interact with decision making. Here, we adapt the classic random-dot motion direction discrimination task to allow subjects to indicate their uncertainty without having to form a decision first. The subjects' choices and reaction times for perceptual decisions and uncertainty responses are measured, respectively. We then build a value-based model in which decisions are based on optimizing value computed from a drift-diffusion process. The model accounts for key features of subjects' behavior and the variation across the individuals. It explains how the addition of the uncertainty option affects perceptual decision making. Our work establishes a value-based theoretical framework for studying uncertainty and perceptual decisions that can be readily applied in future investigations of the underlying neural mechanism.

It's time for attentional control: Temporal expectation in the attentional blink

The attentional blink (AB) reveals a limitation in conscious processing of sequential targets. Although it is widely held that the AB derives from a structural bottleneck of central capacity, how the central processing is constrained is still unclear. As the AB reflects the dilemma of deploying attentional resources in the time dimension, research on temporal allocation provides an important avenue for understanding the mechanism. Here we reviewed studies regarding the role of temporal expectation in modulating the AB performance primarily based on two temporal processing strategies: interval-based and rhythm-based timings. We showed that both temporal expectations can help to organize limited resources among multiple attentional episodes, thereby mitigating the AB effect. As it turns out, scrutinizing on the AB from a temporal perspective is a promising way to comprehend the mechanisms behind the AB and conscious cognition. We also highlighted some unresolved issues and discussed potential directions for future research.

Optimal integration of kinematic and ball-flight information when perceiving the speed of a moving ball

In order to intercept a moving target such as a baseball with high spatio-temporal accuracy, the perception of the target's movement speed is important for estimating when and where the target will arrive. However, it is unclear what sources of information are used by a batter to estimate ball speed and how those sources of information are integrated to facilitate successful interception. In this study, we examined the degree to which kinematic and ball-flight information are integrated when estimating ball speed in baseball batting. Thirteen university level baseball batters performed a ball-speed evaluation task in a virtual environment where they were required to determine which of two comparison baseball pitches (i.e., a reference and comparison stimuli) they perceived to be faster. The reference and comparison stimuli had the same physical ball speed, but with different pitching movement speeds in the comparison stimuli. The task was performed under slow (125 km/h) and fast (145 km/h) ball-speed conditions. Results revealed that the perceived ball-speed was influenced by the movement speed of the pitcher's motion, with the influence of the pitcher's motion more pronounced in the fast ball-speed condition when ball-flight information was presumably less reliable. Moreover, exploratory analyses suggested that the more skilled batters were increasingly likely to integrate the two sources of information according to their relative reliability when making judgements of ball speed. The results provide important insights into how skilled performers may make judgements of speed and time to contact, and further enhance our understanding of how the ability to make those judgements might improve when developing expertise in hitting.

Metacognition tracks sensitivity following involuntary shifts of visual attention

Salient, exogenous cues have been shown to induce a temporary boost of perceptual sensitivity in their immediate vicinity. In two experiments involving uninformative exogenous cues presented at various times before a target stimulus, we investigated whether human observers (N = 100) were able to monitor the involuntary increase in performance induced by such transients. We found that an increase of perceptual sensitivity (in a choice task) and encoding precision (in a free-estimation task) occurred approximately 100 ms after cue onset, and was accompanied by an increase in confidence about the perceptual response. These simultaneous changes in sensitivity and confidence resulted in stable metacognition across conditions. These results suggest that metacognition efficiently tracks the effects of a reflexive attentional mechanism known to evade voluntary control, and illustrate a striking ability of high-level cognition to capture fleeting, low-level sensory modulations.

Consensus Goals in the Field of Visual Metacognition

Despite the tangible progress in psychological and cognitive sciences over the last several years, these disciplines still trail other more mature sciences in identifying the most important questions that need to be solved. Reaching such consensus could lead to greater synergy across different laboratories, faster progress, and increased focus on solving important problems rather than pursuing isolated, niche efforts. Here, 26 researchers from the field of visual metacognition reached consensus on four long-term and two medium-term common goals. We describe the process that we followed, the goals themselves, and our plans for accomplishing these goals. If this effort proves successful within the next few years, such consensus building around common goals could be adopted more widely in psychological science.

Confidence at the limits of human nested cognition

Metacognition is the ability to weigh the quality of our own cognition, such as the confidence that our perceptual decisions are correct. Here we ask whether metacognitive performance can itself be evaluated or else metacognition is the ultimate reflective human faculty. Building upon a classic visual perception task, we show that human observers are able to produce nested, above-chance judgements on the quality of their decisions at least up to the fourth order (i.e. meta-meta-meta-cognition). A computational model can account for this nested cognitive ability if evidence has a high-resolution representation, and if there are two kinds of noise, including recursive evidence degradation. The existence of fourth-order sensitivity suggests that the neural mechanisms responsible for second-order metacognition can be flexibly generalized to evaluate any cognitive process, including metacognitive evaluations themselves. We define the theoretical and practical limits of nested cognition and discuss how this approach paves the way for a better understanding of human self-regulation.

What is new with Artificial Intelligence? Human–agent interactions through the lens of social agency

In this article, we suggest that the study of social interactions and the development of a “sense of agency” in joint action can help determine the content of relevant explanations to be implemented in artificial systems to make them “explainable.” The introduction of automated systems, and more broadly of Artificial Intelligence (AI), into many domains has profoundly changed the nature of human activity, as well as the subjective experience that agents have of their own actions and their consequences – an experience that is commonly referred to as sense of agency. We propose to examine the empirical evidence supporting this impact of automation on individuals’ sense of agency, and hence on measures as diverse as operator performance, system explicability and acceptability. Because of some of its key characteristics, AI occupies a special status in the artificial systems landscape. We suggest that this status prompts us to reconsider human–AI interactions in the light of human–human relations. We approach the study of joint actions in human social interactions to deduce what key features are necessary for the development of a reliable sense of agency in a social context and suggest that such framework can help define what constitutes a good explanation. Finally, we propose possible directions to improve human–AI interactions and, in particular, to restore the sense of agency of human operators, improve their confidence in the decisions made by artificial agents, and increase the acceptability of such agents.

Controllability boosts neural and cognitive signatures of changes-of-mind in uncertain environments

In uncertain environments, seeking information about alternative choice options is essential for adaptive learning and decision-making. However, information seeking is usually confounded with changes-of-mind about the reliability of the preferred option. Here, we exploited the fact that information seeking requires control over which option to sample to isolate its behavioral and neurophysiological signatures. We found that changes-of-mind occurring with control require more evidence against the current option, are associated with reduced confidence, but are nevertheless more likely to be confirmed on the next decision. Multimodal neurophysiological recordings showed that these changes-of-mind are preceded by stronger activation of the dorsal attention network in magnetoencephalography, and followed by increased pupil-linked arousal during the presentation of decision outcomes. Together, these findings indicate that information seeking increases the saliency of evidence perceived as the direct consequence of one's own actions.

Perceptual confidence of visual stimulus features is associated with duration perception

It has been shown that the perceived duration of an object in the subsecond range is closely associated with its nontemporal perceptual properties, the mechanism under which remains unclear. Previous studies have revealed a modulatory effect of early visual feature processing on the apparent duration. Here, we further examined the relationship between perceptual confidence and subjective time by asking participants to simultaneously perform temporal and nontemporal perceptual judgments. The results revealed a significant effect on confidence levels. When participants' confidence in judging the coherent motion direction or relative dot numerosity increases, their perceived duration of the stimulus also appears longer. These results are discussed in the context of perceptual evidence accumulation and evaluation for the decision-making of perceptual properties. They suggest a profound contribution of object processing to the computation of subjective time and provide further insights into the mechanism of event timing.

Signal neutrality, scalar property, and collapsing boundaries as consequences of a learned multi-timescale strategy

We postulate that three fundamental elements underlie a decision making process: perception of time passing, information processing in multiple timescales and reward maximisation. We build a simple reinforcement learning agent upon these principles that we train on a random dot-like task. Our results, similar to the experimental data, demonstrate three emerging signatures. (1) signal neutrality: insensitivity to the signal coherence in the interval preceding the decision. (2) Scalar property: the mean of the response times varies widely for different signal coherences, yet the shape of the distributions stays almost unchanged. (3) Collapsing boundaries: the “effective” decision-making boundary changes over time in a manner reminiscent of the theoretical optimal. Removing the perception of time or the multiple timescales from the model does not preserve the distinguishing signatures. Our results suggest an alternative explanation for signal neutrality. We propose that it is not part of motor planning. It is part of the decision-making process and emerges from information processing on multiple timescales.

Dynamic influences on static measures of metacognition

Humans differ in their capability to judge choice accuracy via confidence judgments. Popular signal detection theoretic measures of metacognition, such as M-ratio, do not consider the dynamics of decision making. This can be problematic if response caution is shifted to alter the tradeoff between speed and accuracy. Such shifts could induce unaccounted-for sources of variation in the assessment of metacognition. Instead, evidence accumulation frameworks consider decision making, including the computation of confidence, as a dynamic process unfolding over time. Using simulations, we show a relation between response caution and M-ratio. We then show the same pattern in human participants explicitly instructed to focus on speed or accuracy. Finally, this association between M-ratio and response caution is also present across four datasets without any reference towards speed. In contrast, when data are analyzed with a dynamic measure of metacognition, v-ratio, there is no effect of speed-accuracy tradeoff.

Suprathreshold perceptual decisions constrain models of confidence

Perceptual confidence is an important internal signal about the certainty of our decisions and there is a substantial debate on how it is computed. We highlight three confidence metric types from the literature: observers either use 1) the full probability distribution to compute probability correct (Probability metrics), 2) point estimates from the perceptual decision process to estimate uncertainty (Evidence-Strength metrics), or 3) heuristic confidence from stimulus-based cues to uncertainty (Heuristic metrics). These metrics are rarely tested against one another, so we examined models of all three types on a suprathreshold spatial discrimination task. Observers were shown a cloud of dots sampled from a dot generating distribution and judged if the mean of the distribution was left or right of centre. In addition to varying the horizontal position of the mean, there were two sensory uncertainty manipulations: the number of dots sampled and the spread of the generating distribution. After every two perceptual decisions, observers made a confidence forced-choice judgement whether they were more confident in the first or second decision. Model results showed that the majority of observers were best-fit by either: 1) the Heuristic model, which used dot cloud position, spread, and number of dots as cues; or 2) an Evidence-Strength model, which computed the distance between the sensory measurement and discrimination criterion, scaled according to sensory uncertainty. An accidental repetition of some sessions also allowed for the measurement of confidence agreement for identical pairs of stimuli. This N-pass analysis revealed that human observers were more consistent than their best-fitting model would predict, indicating there are still aspects of confidence that are not captured by our modelling. As such, we propose confidence agreement as a useful technique for computational studies of confidence. Taken together, these findings highlight the idiosyncratic nature of confidence computations for complex decision contexts and the need to consider different potential metrics and transformations in the confidence computation.

Eye Movements as a Window into Decision-Making

For over 100 years, eye movements have been studied and used as indicators of human sensory and cognitive functions. This review evaluates how eye movements contribute to our understanding of the processes that underlie decision-making. Eye movement metrics signify the visual and task contexts in which information is accumulated and weighed. They indicate the efficiency with which we evaluate the instructions for decision tasks, the timing and duration of decision formation, the expected reward associated with a decision, the accuracy of the decision outcome, and our ability to predict and feel confident about a decision. Because of their continuous nature, eye movements provide an exciting opportunity to probe decision processes noninvasively in real time. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Vision Science, Volume 8 is September 2022. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.