The reputational and social network benefits of prosociality in an Andean community

Examining the connection between position-based power and social status across 70 cultures

Even in the most egalitarian societies, hierarchies of power and status shape social life. However, power and received status are not synonymous-individuals in positions of power may or may not be accorded the respect corresponding to their role. Using a cooperatively collected dataset from 18,096 participants across 70 cultures, we investigate, through a survey-based correlational design, when perceived position-based power (operationalized as influence and control) of various powerholders is associated with their elevated social status (operationalized as perceived respect and instrumental social value). We document that the positive link between power and status characterizes most cultural regions, except for WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) and Post-Soviet regions. The strength of this association depends on individual and cultural factors. First, the perceived other-orientation of powerholders amplifies the positive link between perceived power and status. The perceived self-orientation of powerholders weakens this relationship. Second, among cultures characterized by low Self-Expression versus Harmony (e.g., South Korea, Taiwan), high Embeddedness (e.g., Senegal), and high Cultural Tightness (e.g., Malaysia), the association between power and status tends to be particularly strong. The results underline the importance of both individual perceptions and societal values in how position-based power relates to social status.

Multiple Reputations: Selective Attention to Competence and Character

Reputation is multidimensional, with some traits being more relevant than others in particular contexts. Can people selectively respond to reputational cues relevant to the task at hand? Across three studies, we examined how people weigh cues about helpfulness and competence when forming expectations about strangers' behavior. Using adapted investment games, we varied whether a stranger's helpfulness or competence predicted participants' future payoffs. We found that when helpfulness is task-relevant (Experiments 1 and 2), participants correctly use this cue in investment decisions. When competence matters most (Experiment 3), participants use it as the primary cue. Overall, a high reputation for outcome-irrelevant characteristics did not compensate for a low reputation for the outcome-relevant reputational cue. However, we also find an asymmetric spillover: Decision-makers prefer cooperating with others who are highly competent and highly helpful, regardless of task demands. We discuss our results within the theoretical framework of person perception and theories of reputation.

Socio-economic predictors of Inuit hunting choices and their implications for climate change adaptation

In the Arctic, seasonal variation in the accessibility of the land, sea ice and open waters influences which resources can be harvested safely and efficiently. Climate stressors are also increasingly affecting access to subsistence resources. Within Inuit communities, people differ in their involvement with subsistence activities, but little is known about how engagement in the cash economy (time and money available) and other socio-economic factors shape the food production choices of Inuit harvesters, and their ability to adapt to rapid ecological change. We analyse 281 foraging trips involving 23 Inuit harvesters from Kangiqsujuaq, Nunavik, Canada using a Bayesian approach modelling both patch choice and within-patch success. Gender and income predict Inuit harvest strategies: while men, especially men from low-income households, often visit patches with a relatively low success probability, women and high-income hunters generally have a higher propensity to choose low-risk patches. Inland hunting, marine hunting and fishing differ in the required equipment and effort, and hunters may have to shift their subsistence activities if certain patches become less profitable or less safe owing to high costs of transportation or climate change (e.g. navigate larger areas inland instead of targeting seals on the sea ice). Our finding that household income predicts patch choice suggests that the capacity to maintain access to country foods depends on engagement with the cash economy. This article is part of the theme issue 'Climate change adaptation needs a science of culture'.

The influence of altruistic personality, interpersonal distance and social observation on prosocial behavior: An event-related potential (ERP) study

The psychological mechanisms that high and low altruists exhibit in different contexts remain unknown. This study examined the underlying mechanisms of the effect of altruistic personality, social observation, and interpersonal distance on prosocial behavior using event-related potentials (ERPs). Participants with high and low altruism were asked to make prosocial or non-prosocial choices toward different interpersonal distances (friends, acquaintances, or strangers) under the (non)observer condition. The electrophysiological responses to the choice stimuli were simultaneously recorded. The behavioral results demonstrated that high altruists had more prosocial choices, and these choices were unaffected by interpersonal distance and social observation. However, low altruists made more prosocial choices toward friends and acquaintances under the observer than nonobserver conditions, whereas their prosocial choices toward strangers showed no difference. The ERP results demonstrated that low altruists showed more negative N2 when the choice stimuli were toward strangers and acquaintances or under the nonobserver condition. Furthermore, low altruists showed larger P3 under the observer than nonobserver conditions when the choice stimuli were toward friends and acquaintances, while this difference was absent when the choice stimuli were toward strangers. However, for high altruists, no effect of interpersonal distance and social observation was observed in N2 and P3. These results suggest that the prosocial behavior of low altruists is mainly driven by reputational incentives, whereas high altruists are primarily motivated by concern about the well-being of others. Our findings provide insights into the prosocial behavior of high and low altruists in different contexts and support the empathy-altruism hypothesis.

A pull versus push framework for reputation

Reputation is a powerful driver of human behavior. Reputation systems incentivize 'actors' to take reputation-enhancing actions, and 'evaluators' to reward actors with positive reputations by preferentially cooperating with them. This article proposes a reputation framework that centers the perspective of evaluators by suggesting that reputation systems can create two fundamentally different incentives for evaluators to reward positive reputations. Evaluators may be pulled towards 'good' actors to benefit directly from their reciprocal cooperation, or pushed to cooperate with such actors by normative pressure. I discuss how psychology and behavior might diverge under pull versus push mechanisms, and use this framework to deepen our understanding of the empirical reputation literature and suggest ways that we may better leverage reputation for social good.

Exposure to automation explains religious declines

The global decline of religiosity represents one of the most significant societal shifts in recent history. After millennia of near-universal religious identification, the world is experiencing a regionally uneven trend toward secularization. We propose an explanation of this decline, which claims that automation-the development of robots and artificial intelligence (AI)-can partly explain modern religious declines. We build four unique datasets composed of more than 3 million individuals which show that robotics and AI exposure is linked to 21st-century religious declines across nations, metropolitan regions, and individual people. Key results hold controlling for other technological developments (e.g., electricity grid access and telecommunications development), socioeconomic indicators (e.g., wealth, residential mobility, and demographics), and factors implicated in previous theories of religious decline (e.g., individual choice norms). An experiment also supports our hypotheses. Our findings partly explain contemporary trends in religious decline and foreshadow where religiosity may wane in the future.

Data-driven evolutionary game models for the spread of fairness and cooperation in heterogeneous networks

Unique large-scale cooperation and fairness norms are essential to human society, but the emergence of prosocial behaviors is elusive. The fact that heterogeneous social networks prevail raised a hypothesis that heterogeneous networks facilitate fairness and cooperation. However, the hypothesis has not been validated experimentally, and little is known about the evolutionary psychological basis of cooperation and fairness in human networks. Fortunately, research about oxytocin, a neuropeptide, may provide novel ideas for confirming the hypothesis. Recent oxytocin-modulated network game experiments observed that intranasal administration of oxytocin to a few central individuals significantly increases global fairness and cooperation. Here, based on the experimental phenomena and data, we show a joint effect of social preference and network heterogeneity on promoting prosocial behaviors by building evolutionary game models. In the network ultimatum game and the prisoner's dilemma game with punishment, inequality aversion can lead to the spread of costly punishment for selfish and unfair behaviors. This effect is initiated by oxytocin, then amplified via influential nodes, and finally promotes global cooperation and fairness. In contrast, in the network trust game, oxytocin increases trust and altruism, but these effects are confined locally. These results uncover general oxytocin-initiated mechanisms underpinning fairness and cooperation in human networks.

Communicating the cost of your altruism makes you cool—competitive altruism and sexual selection in a real-life charity situation

Abstract

Maintaining a good reputation is crucial for humans. Altruism, e.g. charity, may serve as a costly signal that enhances reputation based on the real or communicated cost. Fundraising via charity running triggers competitive altruism when potential donors donate in reaction to the reputation increase of the fundraiser. Using real-life data of marathonists and half-marathonists (388 runners) and their 9281 donors, the present research focuses on how the communicated cost and goal of a charity run affected the potential donors. We analysed the introductory texts of the runners presented online according to the cost and the social benefit of the fundraising communicated by them. We have shown that emphasizing more the subjective cost of running and the social benefit of the goal, or writing a longer text, attracted more donors and, even though the average amount of donation per donor did not increase, still lead to a greater amount of donations collected overall by the fundraiser. It was also shown that a higher communicated subjective cost resulted in a higher ratio of opposite-sex donors, both in the case of male and female runners, suggesting that the communication of the cost of an altruistic act might be the object of sexual selection.

Significance statement

A good reputation is crucial for humans, as a reputable person enjoys several benefits. One way to maintain a good reputation is to be altruistic, e.g. doing charity. A seemingly high cost and a socially accepted goal may result in a higher reputation. Using data from a charity running community we demonstrate that fundraisers who emphasize their subjective cost (how difficult to run), and emphasize the good goal of the charity, attract more donors, and even though the average amount of each donation does not increase, a higher number of donors results in a greater amount of donations collected overall. Talking about the difficulties of the charity run results in a higher ratio of opposite-sex donors. Our results may be helpful to plan more successful charity events or to make a human community more altruistic and cooperative in general.

Partner choice does not predict prosociality across countries

Why does human prosociality vary around the world? Evolutionary models and laboratory experiments suggest that possibilities for partner choice (i.e. the ability to leave unprofitable relationships and strike up new ones) should promote cooperation across human societies. Leveraging the Global Preferences Survey (n = 27,125; 27 countries) and the World Values Survey (n = 54,728; 32 countries), we test this theory by estimating the associations between relational mobility, a socioecological measure of partner choice, and a wide variety of prosocial attitudes and behaviours, including impersonal altruism, reciprocity, trust, collective action and moral judgements of antisocial behaviour. Contrary to our pre-registered predictions, we found little evidence that partner choice is related to prosociality across countries. After controlling for shared causes of relational mobility and prosociality - environmental harshness, subsistence style and geographic and linguistic proximity - we found that only altruism and trust in people from another religion are positively related to relational mobility. We did not find positive relationships between relational mobility and reciprocity, generalised trust, collective action or moral judgements. These findings challenge evolutionary theories of human cooperation which emphasise partner choice as a key explanatory mechanism, and highlight the need to generalise models and experiments to global samples.

Social Support and Network Formation in a Small-Scale Horticulturalist Population

Evolutionary studies of cooperation in traditional human societies suggest that helping family and responding in kind when helped are the primary mechanisms for informally distributing resources vital to day-to-day survival (e.g., food, knowledge, money, childcare). However, these studies generally rely on forms of regression analysis that disregard complex interdependences between aid, resulting in the implicit assumption that kinship and reciprocity drive the emergence of entire networks of supportive social bonds. Here I evaluate this assumption using individual-oriented simulations of network formation (i.e., Stochastic Actor-Oriented Models). Specifically, I test standard predictions of cooperation derived from the evolutionary theories of kin selection and reciprocal altruism alongside well-established sociological predictions around the self-organisation of asymmetric relationships. Simulations are calibrated to exceptional public data on genetic relatedness and the provision of tangible aid amongst all 108 adult residents of a village of indigenous horticulturalists in Nicaragua (11,556 ordered dyads). Results indicate that relatedness and reciprocity are markedly less important to whom one helps compared to the supra-dyadic arrangement of the tangible aid network itself.

Oxytocin and the Punitive Hub-Dynamic Spread of Cooperation in Human Social Networks

Human society operates on large-scale cooperation. However, individual differences in cooperativeness and incentives to free ride on others' cooperation make large-scale cooperation fragile and can lead to reduced social welfare. Thus, how individual cooperation spreads through human social networks remains puzzling from ecological, evolutionary, and societal perspectives. Here, we identify oxytocin and costly punishment as biobehavioral mechanisms that facilitate the propagation of cooperation in social networks. In three laboratory experiments (n = 870 human participants: 373 males, 497 females), individuals were embedded in heterogeneous networks and made repeated decisions with feedback in games of trust (n = 342), ultimatum bargaining (n = 324), and prisoner's dilemma with punishment (n = 204). In each heterogeneous network, individuals at central positions (hub nodes) were given intranasal oxytocin (or placebo). Giving oxytocin (vs matching placebo) to central individuals increased their trust and enforcement of cooperation norms. Oxytocin-enhanced norm enforcement, but not elevated trust, explained the spreading of cooperation throughout the social network. Moreover, grounded in evolutionary game theory, we simulated computer agents that interacted in heterogeneous networks with central nodes varying in terms of cooperation and punishment levels. Simulation results confirmed that central cooperators' willingness to punish noncooperation allowed the permeation of the network and enabled the evolution of network cooperation. These results identify an oxytocin-initiated proximate mechanism explaining how individual cooperation facilitates network-wide cooperation in human society and shed light on the widespread phenomenon of heterogeneous composition and enforcement systems at all levels of life.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Human society operates on large-scale cooperation. Yet because cooperation is exploitable by free riding, how cooperation in social networks emerges remains puzzling from evolutionary and societal perspectives. Here we identify oxytocin and altruistic punishment as key factors facilitating the propagation of cooperation in human social networks. Individuals played repeated economic games in heterogeneous networks where individuals at central positions were given oxytocin or placebo. Oxytocin-enhanced cooperative norm enforcement, but not elevated trust, explained cooperation spreading throughout the social network. Evolutionary simulations confirmed that central cooperators' willingness to punish noncooperation allowed the permeation of the network and enabled the evolution of cooperation. These results identify an oxytocin-initiated proximate mechanism explaining how individual cooperation facilitates network-wide cooperation in human social networks.

Hadza hunter-gatherers with greater exposure to other cultures share more with generous campmates

Humans are motivated to compete for access to valuable social partners, which is a function of their willingness to share and ability to generate resources. However, relative preferences for each trait should be responsive to socioecological conditions. Here, we test the flexibility of partner choice psychology among Hadza hunter-gatherers of Tanzania. Ninety-two Hadza ranked their campmates on generosity and foraging ability and then shared resources with those campmates. We found Hadza with greater exposure to other cultures shared more with campmates ranked higher on generosity, whereas Hadza with lower exposure showed a smaller preference for sharing with generous campmates. This moderating effect was specific to generosity-regardless of exposure, Hadza showed only a small preference for sharing with better foragers. We argue this difference in preferences is due to high exposure Hadza having more experience cooperating with others in the absence of strong norms of sharing, and thus are exposed to greater variance in willingness to cooperate among potential partners increasing the benefits of choosing partners based on generosity. As such, participants place a greater emphasis on choosing more generous partners, highlighting the flexibility of partner preferences.

Social foraging can benefit artisanal fishers who interact with wild dolphins

Abstract

Social foraging decisions depend on individual payoffs. However, it is unclear how individual variation in phenotypic and behavioural traits can influence these payoffs, thereby the decisions to forage socially or individually. Here, we studied how individual traits influence foraging tactics of net-casting fishers who interact with wild dolphins. While net-casting is primarily an individual activity, in the traditional fishery with dolphins, fishers can choose between fishing in cooperative groups or solitarily. Our semi-structured interviews with fishers show their social network is mapped onto these foraging tactics. By quantifying the fishers’ catch, we found that fishers in cooperative groups catch more fish per capita than solitary fishers. By quantifying foraging and social traits of fishers, we found that the choice between foraging tactics—and whom to cooperate with—relates to differences in peer reputation and to similarities in number of friends, propensity to fish with relatives, and frequency of interaction with dolphins. These findings indicate different payoffs between foraging tactics and that by choosing the cooperative partner fishers likely access other benefits such as social prestige and embeddedness. These findings reveal the importance of not only material but also non-material benefits of social foraging tactics, which can have implications for the dynamics of this rare fishery. Faced with the current fluctuation in fishing resource availability, the payoffs of both tactics may change, affecting the fishers’ social and foraging decisions, potentially threatening the persistence of this century-old fishery involving humans and wildlife.

Significance statement

Social foraging theory proposes that decisions to forage in groups are primarily driven by cost–benefit trade-offs that individuals experience, but it remains unclear whether, and how much, individual foragers’ characteristics influence these trade-offs and consequently the choice to forage in social groups. We study the artisanal net-casting fishers who choose between cooperating with each other or fishing alone when engaging in a rare interaction with wild dolphins. Our findings suggest that cooperative fishers capture more fish than solitary fishers, and that by choosing cooperative partners based on similarities and differences in key social (peer reputation, kinship, friendships) and foraging (fishing frequency) traits; these fishers also experience higher social prestige and more social embeddedness. These results suggest that material gains from foraging—but also non-material benefits accrued from socializing with like-minded individuals—can influence the dynamics of human social foraging.

Four Puzzles of Reputation-Based Cooperation : Content, Process, Honesty, and Structure

Research in various disciplines has highlighted that humans are uniquely able to solve the problem of cooperation through the informal mechanisms of reputation and gossip. Reputation coordinates the evaluative judgments of individuals about one another. Direct observation of actions and communication are the essential routes that are used to establish and update reputations. In large groups, where opportunities for direct observation are limited, gossip becomes an important channel to share individual perceptions and evaluations of others that can be used to condition cooperative action. Although reputation and gossip might consequently support large-scale human cooperation, four puzzles need to be resolved to understand the operation of reputation-based mechanisms. First, we need empirical evidence of the processes and content that form reputations and how this may vary cross-culturally. Second, we lack an understanding of how reputation is determined from the muddle of imperfect, biased inputs people receive. Third, coordination between individuals is only possible if reputation sharing and signaling is to a large extent reliable and valid. Communication, however, is not necessarily honest and reliable, so theoretical and empirical work is needed to understand how gossip and reputation can effectively promote cooperation despite the circulation of dishonest gossip. Fourth, reputation is not constructed in a social vacuum; hence we need a better understanding of the way in which the structure of interactions affects the efficiency of gossip for establishing reputations and fostering cooperation.

Networks of reliable reputations and cooperation: a review

Reputation has been shown to provide an informal solution to the problem of cooperation in human societies. After reviewing models that connect reputations and cooperation, we address how reputation results from information exchange embedded in a social network that changes endogenously itself. Theoretical studies highlight that network topologies have different effects on the extent of cooperation, since they can foster or hinder the flow of reputational information. Subsequently, we review models and empirical studies that intend to grasp the coevolution of reputations, cooperation and social networks. We identify open questions in the literature concerning how networks affect the accuracy of reputations, the honesty of shared information and the spread of reputational information. Certain network topologies may facilitate biased beliefs and intergroup competition or in-group identity formation that could lead to high cooperation within but conflicts between different subgroups of a network. Our review covers theoretical, experimental and field studies across various disciplines that target these questions and could explain how the dynamics of interactions and reputations help or prevent the establishment and sustainability of cooperation in small- and large-scale societies.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

The content and structure of reputation domains across human societies: a view from the evolutionary social sciences

Reputations are an essential feature of human sociality and the evolution of cooperation and group living. Much scholarship has focused on reputations, yet typically on a narrow range of domains (e.g. prosociality and aggressiveness), usually in isolation. Humans can develop reputations, however, from any collective information. We conducted exploratory analyses on the content, distribution and structure of reputation domain diversity across cultures, using the Human Relations Area Files ethnographic database. After coding ethnographic texts on reputations from 153 cultures, we used hierarchical modelling, cluster analysis and text analysis to provide an empirical view of reputation domains across societies. Findings suggest: (i) reputational domains vary cross-culturally, yet reputations for cultural conformity, prosociality, social status and neural capital are widespread; (ii) reputation domains are more variable for males than females; and (iii) particular reputation domains are interrelated, demonstrating a structure consistent with dimensions of human uniqueness. We label these features: cultural group unity, dominance, neural capital, sexuality, social and material success and supernatural healing. We highlight the need for future research on the evolution of cooperation and human sociality to consider a wider range of reputation domains, as well as their social, ecological and gender-specific variability. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

Reputation and socio-ecology in humans

Reputation is a fundamental feature of human sociality as it sustains cooperative relationships among unrelated individuals. Research from various disciplines provides insights on how individuals form impressions of others, condition their behaviours based on the reputation of their interacting partners and spread or learn such reputations. However, past research has often neglected the socio-ecological conditions that can shape reputation systems and their effect on cooperation. Here, we outline how social environments, cultural values and institutions come to play a crucial role in how people navigate reputation systems. Moreover, we illustrate how these socio-ecological dimensions affect the interdependence underlying social interactions (e.g. potential recipients of reputational benefits, degree of dependence) and the extent to which reputation systems promote cooperation. To do so, we review the interdisciplinary literature that illustrates how reputation systems are shaped by the variation of prominent ecological features. Finally, we discuss the implications of a socio-ecological approach to the study of reputation and outline potential avenues for future research. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

Cooperating to show that you care: costly helping as an honest signal of fitness interdependence

Social organisms often need to know how much to trust others to cooperate. Organisms can expect cooperation from another organism that depends on them (i.e. stake or fitness interdependence), but how do individuals assess fitness interdependence? Here, we extend fitness interdependence into a signalling context: costly helping behaviour can honestly signal one's stake in others, such that those who help are trusted more. We present a mathematical model in which agents help others based on their stake in the recipient's welfare, and recipients use that information to assess whom to trust. At equilibrium, helping is a costly signal of stake: helping is worthwhile for those who value the recipient (and thus will repay any trust), but is not worthwhile for those who do not value the recipient (and thus will betray the trust). Recipients demand signals when they value the signallers less and when the cost of betrayed trust is higher; signal costs are higher when signallers have more incentive to defect. Signalling systems are more likely when the trust games resemble Prisoner's Dilemmas, Stag Hunts or Harmony Games, and are less likely in Snowdrift Games. Furthermore, we find that honest signals need not benefit recipients and can even occur between hostile parties. By signalling their interdependence, organisms benefit from increased trust, even when no future interactions will occur. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

How small-scale societies achieve large-scale cooperation

For most of our species' history, humans have lived in relatively small subsistence communities, often called small-scale societies. While these groups lack centralized institutions, they can and often do maintain large-scale cooperation. Here, we explore several mechanisms promoting cooperation in small-scale societies, including (a) the development of social norms that encourage prosocial behavior, (b) reciprocal exchange relationships, (c) reputation that facilitates high-cost cooperation, (d) relational wealth, and (e) risk buffering institutions. We illustrate these with ethnographic and psychological evidence from contemporary small-scale societies. We argue that these mechanisms for cooperation helped past and present small-scale communities adapt to diverse ecological and social niches.

No good deed goes unpunished: the social costs of prosocial behaviour

Performing costly helpful behaviours can allow individuals to improve their reputation. Those who gain a good reputation are often preferred as interaction partners and are consequently better able to access support through cooperative relationships with others. However, investing in prosocial displays can sometimes yield social costs: excessively generous individuals risk losing their good reputation, and even being vilified, ostracised or antisocially punished. As a consequence, people frequently try to downplay their prosocial actions or hide them from others. In this review, we explore when and why investments in prosocial behaviour are likely to yield social costs. We propose two key features of interactions that make it more likely that generous individuals will incur social costs when: (a) observers infer that helpful behaviour is motivated by strategic or selfish motives; and (b) observers infer that helpful behaviour is detrimental to them. We describe how the cognition required to consider ulterior motives emerges over development and how these tendencies vary across cultures - and discuss how the potential for helpful actions to result in social costs might place boundaries on prosocial behaviour as well as limiting the contexts in which it might occur. We end by outlining the key avenues and priorities for future research.

How evolutionary behavioural sciences can help us understand behaviour in a pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic has brought science into the public eye and to the attention of governments more than ever before. Much of this attention is on work in epidemiology, virology and public health, with most behavioural advice in public health focusing squarely on 'proximate' determinants of behaviour. While epidemiological models are powerful tools to predict the spread of disease when human behaviour is stable, most do not incorporate behavioural change. The evolutionary basis of our preferences and the cultural evolutionary dynamics of our beliefs drive behavioural change, so understanding these evolutionary processes can help inform individual and government decision-making in the face of a pandemic. Lay summary: The COVID-19 pandemic has brought behavioural sciences into the public eye: Without vaccinations, stopping the spread of the virus must rely on behaviour change by limiting contact between people. On the face of it, "stop seeing people" sounds simple. In practice, this is hard. Here we outline how an evolutionary perspective on behaviour change can provide additional insights. Evolutionary theory postulates that our psychology and behaviour did not evolve to maximize our health or that of others. Instead, individuals are expected to act to maximise their inclusive fitness (i.e, spreading our genes) - which can lead to a conflict between behaviours that are in the best interests for the individual, and behaviours that stop the spread of the virus. By examining the ultimate explanations of behaviour related to pandemic-management (such as behavioural compliance and social distancing), we conclude that "good of the group" arguments and "one size fits all" policies are unlikely to encourage behaviour change over the long-term. Sustained behaviour change to keep pandemics at bay is much more likely to emerge from environmental change, so governments and policy makers may need to facilitate significant social change - such as improving life experiences for disadvantaged groups.

Broadening Perspectives on the Evolution of Human Paternal Care and Fathers’ Effects on Children

Unlike most mammals, human fathers cooperate with mothers to care for young to an extraordinary degree. Human paternal care likely evolved alongside our unique life history strategy of raising slow-developing, energetically costly children, often in rapid succession. Adaptive frameworks generally assume that paternal provisioning played a critical role in this pattern's emergence. We draw on nonhuman primate data to propose that nonprovisioning forms of low-cost hominin male care were potentially foundational and ratcheted up through evolutionary time, helping facilitate social contexts for later subsistence specialization and sharing. We then argue for expanding the breadth of anthropological research on paternal effects in families, particularly in three domains: direct care and teaching;social capital cultivation; and reduction of family conflict. Anthropologists can greatly contribute to conversations about the determinants of children's development across contexts, but we need to ask more expansive questions about the pathways through which caregivers (including fathers) affect child outcomes.

Best response dynamics improve sustainability and equity outcomes in common-pool resources problems, compared to imitation dynamics

Shared resource extraction among profit-seeking individuals involves a tension between individual benefit and the collective well-being represented by the persistence of the resource. Many game theoretic models explore this scenario, but these models tend to assume either best response dynamics (where individuals instantly switch to better paying strategies) or imitation dynamics (where individuals copy successful strategies from neighbours), and do not systematically compare predictions under the two assumptions. Here we propose an iterated game on a social network with payoff functions that depend on the state of the resource. Agents harvest the resource, and the strategy composition of the population evolves until an equilibrium is reached. The system is then repeatedly perturbed and allowed to re-equilibrate. We compare model predictions under best response and imitation dynamics. Compared to imitation dynamics, best response dynamics increase sustainability of the system, the persistence of cooperation while decreasing inequality and debt corresponding to the Gini index in the agents' cumulative payoffs. Additionally, for best response dynamics, the number of strategy switches before equilibrium fits a power-law distribution under a subset of the parameter space, suggesting the system is in a state of self-organized criticality. We find little variation in most mean results over different network topologies; however, there is significant variation in the distributions of the raw data, equality of payoff, clustering of like strategies and power-law fit. We suggest the primary mechanisms driving the difference in sustainability between the two strategy update rules to be the clustering of like strategies as well as the time delay imposed by an imitation processes. Given the strikingly different outcomes for best response versus imitation dynamics for common-pool resource systems, our results suggest that modellers should choose strategy update rules that best represent decision-making in their study systems.

Scarce and directly beneficial reputations support cooperation

A human solution to the problem of cooperation is the maintenance of informal reputation hierarchies. Reputational information contributes to cooperation by providing guidelines about previous group-beneficial or free-rider behaviour in social dilemma interactions. How reputation information could be credible, however, remains a puzzle. We test two potential safeguards to ensure credibility: (i) reputation is a scarce resource and (ii) it is not earned for direct benefits. We test these solutions in a laboratory experiment in which participants played two-person Prisoner's Dilemma games without partner selection, could observe some other interactions, and could communicate reputational information about possible opponents to each other. Reputational information clearly influenced cooperation decisions. Although cooperation was not sustained at a high level in any of the conditions, the possibility of exchanging third-party information was able to temporarily increase the level of strategic cooperation when reputation was a scarce resource and reputational scores were directly translated into monetary benefits. We found that competition for monetary rewards or unrestricted non-monetary reputational rewards helped the reputation system to be informative. Finally, we found that high reputational scores are reinforced further as they are rewarded with positive messages, and positive gossip was leading to higher reputations.

The dynamics of men's cooperation and social status in a small-scale society

We propose that networks of cooperation and allocation of social status co-emerge in human groups. We substantiate this hypothesis with one of the first longitudinal studies of cooperation in a preindustrial society, spanning 8 years. Using longitudinal social network analysis of cooperation among men, we find large effects of kinship, reciprocity and transitivity in the nomination of cooperation partners over time. Independent of these effects, we show that (i) higher-status individuals gain more cooperation partners, and (ii) individuals gain status by cooperating with individuals of higher status than themselves. We posit that human hierarchies are more egalitarian relative to other primates species, owing in part to greater interdependence between cooperation and status hierarchy.

Large-scale cooperation driven by reputation, not fear of divine punishment

Reputational considerations favour cooperation and thus we expect less cooperation in larger communities where people are less well known to each other. Some argue that institutions are, therefore, necessary to coordinate large-scale cooperation, including moralizing religions that promote cooperation through the fear of divine punishment. Here, we use community size as a proxy for reputational concerns, and test whether people in small, stable communities are more cooperative than people in large, less stable communities in both religious and non-religious contexts. We conducted a donation game on a large naturalistic sample of 501 people in 17 communities, with varying religions or none, ranging from small villages to large cities in northwestern China. We found that more money was donated by those in small, stable communities, where reputation should be more salient. Religious practice was also associated with higher donations, but fear of divine punishment was not. In a second game on the same sample, decisions were private, giving donors the opportunity to cheat. We found that donors to religious institutions were not less likely to cheat, and community size was not important in this game. Results from the donation game suggest donations to both religious and non-religious institutions are being motivated by reputational considerations, and results from both games suggest fear of divine punishment is not important. This chimes with other studies suggesting social benefits rather than fear of punishment may be the more salient motive for cooperative behaviour in real-world settings.

Content, cost, and context: A framework for understanding human signaling systems

Humans frequently perform extravagant and seemingly costly behaviors, such as widely sharing hunted resources, erecting conspicuous monumental structures, and performing dramatic acts of religious devotion. Evolutionary anthropologists and archeologists have used signaling theory to explain the function of such displays, drawing inspiration from behavioral ecology, economics, and the social sciences. While signaling theory is broadly aimed at explaining honest communication, it has come to be strongly associated with the handicap principle, which proposes that such costly extravagance is in fact an adaptation for signal reliability. Most empirical studies of signaling theory have focused on obviously costly acts, and consequently anthropologists have likely overlooked a wide range of signals that also promote reliable communication. Here, we build on recent developments in signaling theory and animal communication, developing an updated framework that highlights the diversity of signal contents, costs, contexts, and reliability mechanisms present within human signaling systems. By broadening the perspective of signaling theory in human systems, we strive to identify promising areas for further empirical and theoretical work.

Donors’ Social Class and Their Prosocial Reputation

Abstract. Donors’ social class may provide cues for others to judge their underlying motives and prosociality. We test whether donors’ social class affects their prosocial reputation through perceived authentic motivation. Across four studies, we find that low-class donors are perceived as more authentically motivated to care about others’ welfare, and thus gain more prosocial reputation as a benevolent person, compared to high-class donors. Moreover, prosocial impact salience moderates this effect: When donation is equal in the percentage of donors’ annual income, making the prosocial impact of donors’ contribution salient enhances high-class donors’ perceived authentic motivation and prosocial reputation to the same levels as those of low-class donors. These findings provide important insights into how to design efficient fundraising events or platforms.

How Social Status Shapes Person Perception and Evaluation: A Social Neuroscience Perspective

Inferring the relative rank (i.e., status) of others is essential to navigating social hierarchies. A survey of the expanding social psychological and neuroscience literatures on status reveals a diversity of focuses (e.g., perceiver vs. agent), operationalizations (e.g., status as dominance vs. wealth), and methodologies (e.g., behavioral, neuroscientific). Accommodating this burgeoning literature on status in person perception, the present review offers a novel social neuroscientific framework that integrates existing work with theoretical clarity. This framework distinguishes between five key concepts: (1) strategic pathways to status acquisition for agents, (2) status antecedents (i.e., perceptual and knowledge-based cues that confer status rank), (3) status dimensions (i.e., domains in which an individual may be ranked, such as wealth), (4) status level (i.e., one's rank along a given dimension), and (5) the relative importance of a given status dimension, dependent on perceiver and context characteristics. Against the backdrop of this framework, we review multiple dimensions of status in the nonhuman and human primate literatures. We then review the behavioral and neuroscientific literatures on the consequences of perceived status for attention and evaluation. Finally, after proposing a social neuroscience framework, we highlight innovative directions for future social status research in social psychology and neuroscience.

Institutional multiplexity: social networks and community-based natural resource management

Natural resource management has changed profoundly in recent decades emphasizing new legislation that transfers responsibilities to local user groups. In this article, I follow changing water policies to Namibia and show that the enactment of policy in local institutions deviates from community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) blueprints and design. To understand why, I examine the theoretical premises of CBNRM. CBNRM is informed by rational choice theory which isolates economic transactions (e.g., sharing water) and assumes that people design institutions for a specific good. However, in the communities I study ethnographically, people depend on sharing multiple resources. To better understand how the degree of sharing and institutional overlaps matter, I explore empirically the concept of institutional multiplexity. Institutional multiplexity describes the number of transactions between two households in a social network. The results reveal that almost all social networks are institutionally multiplex. Institutional multiplexity implies that people cannot separate the sharing of water from sharing in other domains. Institutional multiplexity hinders the implementation of design principles such as fixing boundaries, sharing costs proportional to use, and formal sanctioning. However, it also opens other means for governing nature through social control.

Population structured by witchcraft beliefs

Anthropologists have long argued that fear of victimization through witchcraft accusations promotes cooperation in small-scale societies ¹ . Others have argued that witchcraft beliefs undermine trust and therefore reduce social cohesion ² . However, there are very few, if any, quantified empirical examples demonstrating how witchcraft labels can structure cooperation in real human communities. Here we show a case from a farming community in China where people labelled zhu were thought capable of supernatural activity, particularly poisoning food. The label was usually applied to adult women heads of household and often inherited down the female line. We found that those in zhu households were less likely to give or receive gifts or farm help to or from non-zhu households; nor did they have sexual partnerships or children with those in non-zhu households. However, those in zhu households did preferentially help and reproduce with each other. Although the tag is common knowledge to other villagers and used in cooperative and reproductive partner choice, we found no evidence that this assortment was based on cooperativeness or quality. We favour the explanation that stigmatization originally arose as a mechanism to harm female competitors. Once established, fear that the trait is transmissible may help explain the persistence of this deep-rooted cultural belief.

The Functional Architecture of the Brain Underlies Strategic Deception in Impression Management

Impression management, as one of the most essential skills of social function, impacts one's survival and success in human societies. However, the neural architecture underpinning this social skill remains poorly understood. By employing a two-person bargaining game, we exposed three strategies involving distinct cognitive processes for social impression management with different levels of strategic deception. We utilized a novel adaptation of Granger causality accounting for signal-dependent noise (SDN), which captured the directional connectivity underlying the impression management during the bargaining game. We found that the sophisticated strategists engaged stronger directional connectivity from both dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and retrosplenial cortex to rostral prefrontal cortex, and the strengths of these directional influences were associated with higher level of deception during the game. Using the directional connectivity as a neural signature, we identified the strategic deception with 80% accuracy by a machine-learning classifier. These results suggest that different social strategies are supported by distinct patterns of directional connectivity among key brain regions for social cognition.

Revisiting Psychological Mechanisms in the Anthropology of Altruism

Anthropologists have long been interested in the reasons humans choose to help some individuals and not others. Early research considered psychological mediators, such as feelings of cohesion or closeness, but more recent work, largely in the tradition of human behavioral ecology, shifted attention away from psychological measures to clearer observables, such as past behavior, genetic relatedness, affinal ties, and geographic proximity. In this paper, we assess the value of reintegrating psychological measures-perceived social closeness-into the anthropological study of altruism. Specifically, analyzing social network data from four communities in rural Bangladesh (N = 516), we show that perceived closeness has a strong independent effect on helping, which cannot be accounted for by other factors. These results illustrate the potential value of reintegrating proximate psychological measures into anthropological studies of human cooperation.

On the evolutionary origins of equity

Equity, defined as reward according to contribution, is considered a central aspect of human fairness in both philosophical debates and scientific research. Despite large amounts of research on the evolutionary origins of fairness, the evolutionary rationale behind equity is still unknown. Here, we investigate how equity can be understood in the context of the cooperative environment in which humans evolved. We model a population of individuals who cooperate to produce and divide a resource, and choose their cooperative partners based on how they are willing to divide the resource. Agent-based simulations, an analytical model, and extended simulations using neural networks provide converging evidence that equity is the best evolutionary strategy in such an environment: individuals maximize their fitness by dividing benefits in proportion to their own and their partners’ relative contribution. The need to be chosen as a cooperative partner thus creates a selection pressure strong enough to explain the evolution of preferences for equity. We discuss the limitations of our model, the discrepancies between its predictions and empirical data, and how interindividual and intercultural variability fit within this framework.

The evolution of inequality

Understanding how systems of political and economic inequality evolved from relatively egalitarian origins has long been a focus of anthropological inquiry. Many hypotheses have been suggested to link socio-ecological features with the rise and spread of inequality, and empirical tests of these hypotheses in prehistoric and extant societies are increasing. In this review, we synthesize several streams of theory relevant to understanding the evolutionary origins, spread, and adaptive significance of inequality. We argue that while inequality may be produced by a variety of localized processes, its evolution is fundamentally dependent on the economic defensibility and transmissibility of wealth. Furthermore, these properties of wealth could become persistent drivers of inequality only following a shift to a more stable climate in the Holocene. We conclude by noting several key areas for future empirical research, emphasizing the need for more analyses of contemporary shifts toward institutionalized inequality as well as prehistoric cases.

Multiplex social ecological network analysis reveals how social changes affect community robustness more than resource depletion

Network analysis provides a powerful tool to analyze complex influences of social and ecological structures on community and household dynamics. Most network studies of social-ecological systems use simple, undirected, unweighted networks. We analyze multiplex, directed, and weighted networks of subsistence food flows collected in three small indigenous communities in Arctic Alaska potentially facing substantial economic and ecological changes. Our analysis of plausible future scenarios suggests that changes to social relations and key households have greater effects on community robustness than changes to specific wild food resources.

Different selection pressures give rise to distinct ethnic phenomena : a functionalist framework with illustrations from the Peruvian Altiplano

Many accounts of ethnic phenomena imply that processes such as stereotyping, essentialism, ethnocentrism, and intergroup hostility stem from a unitary adaptation for reasoning about groups. This is partly justified by the phenomena's co-occurrence in correlational studies. Here we argue that these behaviors are better modeled as functionally independent adaptations that arose in response to different selection pressures throughout human evolution. As such, different mechanisms may be triggered by different group boundaries within a single society. We illustrate this functionalist framework using ethnographic work from the Quechua-Aymara language boundary in the Peruvian Altiplano. We show that different group boundaries motivate different ethnic phenomena. For example, people have strong stereotypes about socioeconomic categories, which are not cooperative units, whereas they hold fewer stereotypes about communities, which are the primary focus of cooperative activity. We also show that, despite the cross-cultural importance of ethnolinguistic boundaries, the Quechua-Aymara linguistic distinction does not strongly motivate any of these intergroup processes.

The Co-evolution of Honesty and Strategic Vigilance

We hypothesize that when honesty is not motivated by selfish goals, it reveals social preferences that have evolved for convincing strategically vigilant partners that one is a person worth cooperating with. In particular, we explain how the patterns of dishonest behavior observed in recent experiments can be motivated by preferences for social and self-esteem. These preferences have evolved because they are adaptive in an environment where it is advantageous to be selected as a partner by others and where these others are strategically vigilant: they efficiently evaluate the expected benefit of cooperating with specific partners and attend to their intentions. We specify the adaptive value of strategic vigilance and preferences for social and self-esteem. We argue that evolved preferences for social and self-esteem are satisfied by applying mechanisms of strategic vigilance to one's own behavior. We further argue that such cognitive processes obviate the need for the evolution of preferences for fairness and social norm compliance.

Men's status and reproductive success in 33 nonindustrial societies: Effects of subsistence, marriage system, and reproductive strategy

Social status motivates much of human behavior. However, status may have been a relatively weak target of selection for much of human evolution if ancestral foragers tended to be more egalitarian. We test the "egalitarianism hypothesis" that status has a significantly smaller effect on reproductive success (RS) in foragers compared with nonforagers. We also test between alternative male reproductive strategies, in particular whether reproductive benefits of status are due to lower offspring mortality (parental investment) or increased fertility (mating effort). We performed a phylogenetic multilevel metaanalysis of 288 statistical associations between measures of male status (physical formidability, hunting ability, material wealth, political influence) and RS (mating success, wife quality, fertility, offspring mortality, and number of surviving offspring) from 46 studies in 33 nonindustrial societies. We found a significant overall effect of status on RS (r = 0.19), though this effect was significantly lower than for nonhuman primates (r = 0.80). There was substantial variation due to marriage system and measure of RS, in particular status associated with offspring mortality only in polygynous societies (r = -0.08), and with wife quality only in monogamous societies (r = 0.15). However, the effects of status on RS did not differ significantly by status measure or subsistence type: foraging, horticulture, pastoralism, and agriculture. These results suggest that traits that facilitate status acquisition were not subject to substantially greater selection with domestication of plants and animals, and are part of reproductive strategies that enhance fertility more than offspring well-being.

Multiple reputation domains and cooperative behaviour in two Latin American communities

Reputations are a ubiquitous feature of human social life, and a large literature has been dedicated to explaining the relationship between prosocial reputations and cooperation in social dilemmas. However, humans form reputations in domains other than prosociality, such as economic competency that could affect cooperation. To date, no research has evaluated the relative effects of multiple reputation domains on cooperation. To bridge this gap, we analyse how prosocial and competency reputations affect cooperation in two Latin American communities (Bwa Mawego, Dominica, and Pucucanchita, Peru) across a number of social contexts (Dominica: labour contracting, labour exchange and conjugal partnership formation; Peru: agricultural and health advice network size). First, we examine the behavioural correlates of prosocial and competency reputations. Following, we analyse whether prosocial, competency, or both reputation domains explain the flow of cooperative benefits within the two communities. Our analyses suggest that (i) although some behaviours affect both reputation domains simultaneously, each reputation domain has a unique behavioural signature; and (ii) competency reputations affect cooperation across a greater number of social contexts compared to prosocial reputations. Results are contextualized with reference to the social markets in which behaviour is embedded and a call for greater theory development is stressed.