The point of no return in vetoing self-initiated movements

A theory of the skill-performance relationship

The skill-performance relationship is a cornerstone of a meritocratic society. People are selected for schools, colleges and jobs based on the premise that more skillful individuals perform better. Scientific understanding of the skill-performance relationship demands that the effect of skill on performance is objectively assessed without subjective, social, and political considerations. One of the best areas for this analysis is sports. In many sports settings, the skill-performance relationship can objectively be examined at the technical, behavioral, psychological, and neurological levels. This examination reveals that skill and performance are inextricably intertwined. While skill affects performance, performance in turn defines and affects skill. To disentangle the previously confusing and interchangeable use of these key constructs, the paper presents a theoretical model specifying that ability and effort have their own direct effects on performance, as well as indirect effects on performance through skill possession and skill execution in cognitive and physical domains of human performance. Thus, ability and skill are not the same. Although skill is a key determinant of performance, recent theory and research suggests that successful performers are successful not just because of their skills per se, but because they take advantage of their skills by creating more occurrences of momentum, making them last longer, and using them to bounce back faster from streaks of unsuccessful performance. Thus, momentum is an important mediator of the effects of skill on performance.

Libet's legacy: A primer to the neuroscience of volition

The neuroscience of volition is an emerging subfield of the brain sciences, with hundreds of papers on the role of consciousness in action formation published each year. This makes the state-of-the-art in the discipline poorly accessible to newcomers and difficult to follow even for experts in the field. Here we provide a comprehensive summary of research in this field since its inception that will be useful to both groups. We also discuss important ideas that have received little coverage in the literature so far. We systematically reviewed a set of 2220 publications, with detailed consideration of almost 500 of the most relevant papers. We provide a thorough introduction to the seminal work of Benjamin Libet from the 1960s to 1980s. We also discuss common criticisms of Libet's method, including temporal introspection, the interpretation of the assumed physiological correlates of volition, and various conceptual issues. We conclude with recent advances and potential future directions in the field, highlighting modern methodological approaches to volition, as well as important recent findings.

Rapid, systematic updating of movement by accumulated decision evidence

Acting in the natural world requires not only deciding among multiple options but also converting decisions into motor commands. How the dynamics of decision formation influence the fine kinematics of response movement remains, however, poorly understood. Here we investigate how the accumulation of decision evidence shapes the response orienting trajectories in a task where freely-moving rats combine prior expectations and auditory information to select between two possible options. Response trajectories and their motor vigor are initially determined by the prior. Rats movements then incorporate sensory information as early as 60 ms after stimulus onset by accelerating or slowing depending on how much the stimulus supports their initial choice. When the stimulus evidence is in strong contradiction, rats change their mind and reverse their initial trajectory. Human subjects performing an equivalent task display a remarkably similar behavior. We encapsulate these results in a computational model that, by mapping the decision variable onto the movement kinematics at discrete time points, captures subjects' choices, trajectories and changes of mind. Our results show that motor responses are not ballistic. Instead, they are systematically and rapidly updated, as they smoothly unfold over time, by the parallel dynamics of the underlying decision process.

Motor cortex activation during visuomotor transformations: evoked potentials during overt and imagined movements

Despite the prevalence of visuomotor transformations in our motor skills, their mechanisms remain incompletely understood, especially when imagery actions are considered such as mentally picking up a cup or pressing a button. Here, we used a stimulus-response task to directly compare the visuomotor transformation underlying overt and imagined button presses. Electroencephalographic activity was recorded while participants responded to highlights of the target button while ignoring the second, non-target button. Movement-related potentials (MRPs) and event-related desynchronization occurred for both overt movements and motor imagery (MI), with responses present even for non-target stimuli. Consistent with the activity accumulation model where visual stimuli are evaluated and transformed into the eventual motor response, the timing of MRPs matched the response time on individual trials. Activity-accumulation patterns were observed for MI, as well. Yet, unlike overt movements, MI-related MRPs were not lateralized, which appears to be a neural marker for the distinction between generating a mental image and transforming it into an overt action. Top-down response strategies governing this hemispheric specificity should be accounted for in future research on MI, including basic studies and medical practice.

Clarifying the nature of stochastic fluctuations and accumulation processes in spontaneous movements

Experiments on choice-predictive brain signals have played an important role in the debate on free will. In a seminal study, Benjamin Libet and colleagues found that a negative-going EEG signal, the readiness potential (RP), can be observed over motor-related brain regions even hundreds of ms before the time of the conscious decision to move. If the early onset of the readiness potential is taken as an indicator of the "brain's decision to move" this could mean that this decision is made early, by unconscious brain activity, rather than later, at the time when the subject believes to have decided. However, an alternative kind of interpretation, involving ongoing stochastic fluctuations, has recently been brought to light. This stochastic decision model (SDM) takes its inspiration from leaky accumulator models of perceptual decision making. It suggests that the RP originates from an accumulation of ongoing stochastic fluctuations. In this view, the decision happens only at a much later stage when an accumulated noisy signal (plus imperative) reaches a threshold. Here, we clarify a number of confusions regarding both the evidence for the stochastic decision model as well as the interpretation that it offers. We will explore several points that we feel are in need of clarification: (a) the empirical evidence for the role of stochastic fluctuations is so far only indirect; (b) the interpretation of animal studies is unclear; (c) a model that is deterministic during the accumulation stage can explain the data in a similar way; (d) the primary focus in the literature has been on the role of random fluctuations whereas the deterministic aspects of the model have been largely ignored; (e) contrary to the original interpretation, the deterministic component of the model is quantitatively the dominant input into the accumulator; and finally (f) there is confusion regarding the role of "imperative" in the SDM and its link to "evidence" in perceptual decision making. Our aim is not to rehabilitate the role of the RP in the free will debate. Rather we aim to address some confusions regarding the evidence for accumulators playing a role in these preparatory brain processes.

Scratching the structure of moral agency: insights from philosophy applied to neuroscience

This paper explores the intersection between neuroscience and philosophy, particularly in the areas of moral philosophy and philosophy of mind. While traditional philosophical questions, such as those relating to free will and moral motivation, have been subject to much debate, the rise of neuroscience has led to a reinterpretation of these questions considering empirical evidence. This has led to tensions between those who believe neuroscience can provide definitive answers to very complex philosophical questions and those who are skeptical about the scope of these studies. However, the paper argues that neuroscientists and philosophers can work together to generate major scientific and social advances. To contribute to bridge the gap, in this paper we expose the complexity of moral experience from a philosophical point of view and point to two great challenges and gaps to cover from neurosciences.

Feeling ready: neural bases of prospective motor readiness judgements

The idea that human agents voluntarily control their actions, including their spontaneous movements, strongly implies an anticipatory awareness of action. That is, agents should be aware they are about to act before actually executing a movement. Previous research has identified neural signals that could underpin prospective conscious access to motor preparation, including the readiness potential and the beta-band event-related desynchronization. In this study, we ran two experiments to test whether these two neural precursors of action also tracka subjective feeling of readiness. In Experiment 1, we combined a self-paced action task with an intention-probing design where participants gave binary responses to indicate whether they felt they had been about to move when a probe was presented. In Experiment 2, participants reported their feeling of readiness on a graded scale. We found that the feeling of readiness reliably correlates with the beta-band amplitude, but not with the readiness potential.

Beta rhythmicity in human motor cortex reflects neural population coupling that modulates subsequent finger coordination stability

Human behavior is not performed completely as desired, but is influenced by the inherent rhythmicity of the brain. Here we show that anti-phase bimanual coordination stability is regulated by the dynamics of pre-movement neural oscillations in bi-hemispheric primary motor cortices (M1) and supplementary motor area (SMA). In experiment 1, pre-movement bi-hemispheric M1 phase synchrony in beta-band (M1-M1 phase synchrony) was online estimated from 129-channel scalp electroencephalograms. Anti-phase bimanual tapping preceded by lower M1-M1 phase synchrony exhibited significantly longer duration than tapping preceded by higher M1-M1 phase synchrony. Further, the inter-individual variability of duration was explained by the interaction of pre-movement activities within the motor network; lower M1-M1 phase synchrony and spectral power at SMA were associated with longer duration. The necessity of cortical interaction for anti-phase maintenance was revealed by sham-controlled repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation over SMA in another experiment. Our results demonstrate that pre-movement cortical oscillatory coupling within the motor network unknowingly influences bimanual coordination performance in humans after consolidation, suggesting the feasibility of augmenting human motor ability by covertly monitoring preparatory neural dynamics.

Breathing is coupled with voluntary initiation of mental imagery

Previous research has suggested that bodily signals from internal organs are associated with diverse cortical and subcortical processes involved in sensory-motor functions, beyond homeostatic reflexes. For instance, a recent study demonstrated that the preparation and execution of voluntary actions, as well as its underlying neural activity, are coupled with the breathing cycle. In the current study, we investigated whether such breathing-action coupling is limited to voluntary motor action or whether it is also present for mental actions not involving any overt bodily movement. To answer this question, we recorded electroencephalography (EEG), electromyography (EMG), and respiratory signals while participants were conducting a voluntary action paradigm including self-initiated motor execution (ME), motor imagery (MI), and visual imagery (VI) tasks. We observed that the voluntary initiation of ME, MI, and VI are similarly coupled with the respiration phase. In addition, EEG analysis revealed the existence of readiness potential (RP) waveforms in all three tasks (i.e., ME, MI, VI), as well as a coupling between the RP amplitude and the respiratory phase. Our findings show that the voluntary initiation of both imagined and overt action is coupled with respiration, and further suggest that the breathing system is involved in preparatory processes of voluntary action by contributing to the temporal decision of when to initiate the action plan, regardless of whether this culminates in overt movements.

From the origins to the stream of consciousness and its neural correlates

There are now dozens of very different theories of consciousness, each somehow contributing to our understanding of its nature. The science of consciousness needs therefore not new theories but a general framework integrating insights from those, yet not making it a still-born "Frankenstein" theory. First, the framework must operate explicitly on the stream of consciousness, not on its static description. Second, this dynamical account must also be put on the evolutionary timeline to explain the origins of consciousness. The Cognitive Evolution Theory (CET), outlined here, proposes such a framework. This starts with the assumption that brains have primarily evolved as volitional subsystems of organisms, inherited from primitive (fast and random) reflexes of simplest neural networks, only then resembling error-minimizing prediction machines. CET adopts the tools of critical dynamics to account for metastability, scale-free avalanches, and self-organization which are all intrinsic to brain dynamics. This formalizes the stream of consciousness as a discrete (transitive, irreflexive) chain of momentary states derived from critical brain dynamics at points of phase transitions and mapped then onto a state space as neural correlates of a particular conscious state. The continuous/discrete dichotomy appears naturally between the brain dynamics at the causal level and conscious states at the phenomenal level, each volitionally triggered from arousal centers of the brainstem and cognitively modulated by thalamocortical systems. Their objective observables can be entropy-based complexity measures, reflecting the transient level or quantity of consciousness at that moment.

The sense of agency in emerging technologies for human–computer integration: A review

Human–computer integration is an emerging area in which the boundary between humans and technology is blurred as users and computers work collaboratively and share agency to execute tasks. The sense of agency (SoA) is an experience that arises by a combination of a voluntary motor action and sensory evidence whether the corresponding body movements have somehow influenced the course of external events. The SoA is not only a key part of our experiences in daily life but also in our interaction with technology as it gives us the feeling of “I did that” as opposed to “the system did that,” thus supporting a feeling of being in control. This feeling becomes critical with human–computer integration, wherein emerging technology directly influences people’s body, their actions, and the resulting outcomes. In this review, we analyse and classify current integration technologies based on what we currently know about agency in the literature, and propose a distinction between body augmentation, action augmentation, and outcome augmentation. For each category, we describe agency considerations and markers of differentiation that illustrate a relationship between assistance level (low, high), agency delegation (human, technology), and integration type (fusion, symbiosis). We conclude with a reflection on the opportunities and challenges of integrating humans with computers, and finalise with an expanded definition of human–computer integration including agency aspects which we consider to be particularly relevant. The aim this review is to provide researchers and practitioners with guidelines to situate their work within the integration research agenda and consider the implications of any technologies on SoA, and thus overall user experience when designing future technology.

Good scientific practice in EEG and MEG research: Progress and perspectives

Good scientific practice (GSP) refers to both explicit and implicit rules, recommendations, and guidelines that help scientists to produce work that is of the highest quality at any given time, and to efficiently share that work with the community for further scrutiny or utilization. For experimental research using magneto- and electroencephalography (MEEG), GSP includes specific standards and guidelines for technical competence, which are periodically updated and adapted to new findings. However, GSP also needs to be regularly revisited in a broader light. At the LiveMEEG 2020 conference, a reflection on GSP was fostered that included explicitly documented guidelines and technical advances, but also emphasized intangible GSP: a general awareness of personal, organizational, and societal realities and how they can influence MEEG research. This article provides an extensive report on most of the LiveMEEG contributions and new literature, with the additional aim to synthesize ongoing cultural changes in GSP. It first covers GSP with respect to cognitive biases and logical fallacies, pre-registration as a tool to avoid those and other early pitfalls, and a number of resources to enable collaborative and reproducible research as a general approach to minimize misconceptions. Second, it covers GSP with respect to data acquisition, analysis, reporting, and sharing, including new tools and frameworks to support collaborative work. Finally, GSP is considered in light of ethical implications of MEEG research and the resulting responsibility that scientists have to engage with societal challenges. Considering among other things the benefits of peer review and open access at all stages, the need to coordinate larger international projects, the complexity of MEEG subject matter, and today's prioritization of fairness, privacy, and the environment, we find that current GSP tends to favor collective and cooperative work, for both scientific and for societal reasons.

A systematic approach to brain dynamics: cognitive evolution theory of consciousness

The brain integrates volition, cognition, and consciousness seamlessly over three hierarchical (scale-dependent) levels of neural activity for their emergence: a causal or 'hard' level, a computational (unconscious) or 'soft' level, and a phenomenal (conscious) or 'psyche' level respectively. The cognitive evolution theory (CET) is based on three general prerequisites: physicalism, dynamism, and emergentism, which entail five consequences about the nature of consciousness: discreteness, passivity, uniqueness, integrity, and graduation. CET starts from the assumption that brains should have primarily evolved as volitional subsystems of organisms, not as prediction machines. This emphasizes the dynamical nature of consciousness in terms of critical dynamics to account for metastability, avalanches, and self-organized criticality of brain processes, then coupling it with volition and cognition in a framework unified over the levels. Consciousness emerges near critical points, and unfolds as a discrete stream of momentary states, each volitionally driven from oldest subcortical arousal systems. The stream is the brain's way of making a difference via predictive (Bayesian) processing. Its objective observables could be complexity measures reflecting levels of consciousness and its dynamical coherency to reveal how much knowledge (information gain) the brain acquires over the stream. CET also proposes a quantitative classification of both disorders of consciousness and mental disorders within that unified framework.

Recent Advances and Current Trends in Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) Research and Their Applications

Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) provides direct communication between the brain and an external device. BCI systems have become a trendy field of research in recent years. These systems can be used in a variety of applications to help both disabled and healthy people. Concerning significant BCI progress, we may assume that these systems are not very far from real-world applications. This review has taken into account current trends in BCI research. In this survey, one hundred most cited articles from the WOS database were selected over the last four years. This survey is divided into several sectors. These sectors are Medicine, Communication and Control, Entertainment, and Other BCI applications. The application area, recording method, signal acquisition types, and countries of origin have been identified in each article. This survey provides an overview of the BCI articles published from 2016 to 2020 and their current trends and advances in different application areas.

Central nervous system physiology

This is the second chapter of the series on the use of clinical neurophysiology for the study of movement disorders. It focusses on methods that can be used to probe neural circuits in brain and spinal cord. These include use of spinal and supraspinal reflexes to probe the integrity of transmission in specific pathways; transcranial methods of brain stimulation such as transcranial magnetic stimulation and transcranial direct current stimulation, which activate or modulate (respectively) the activity of populations of central neurones; EEG methods, both in conjunction with brain stimulation or with behavioural measures that record the activity of populations of central neurones; and pure behavioural measures that allow us to build conceptual models of motor control. The methods are discussed mainly in relation to work on healthy individuals. Later chapters will focus specifically on changes caused by pathology.

Predicting motor behavior: an efficient EEG signal processing pipeline to detect brain states with potential therapeutic relevance for VR-based neurorehabilitation

Virtual reality (VR)-based motor therapy is an emerging approach in neurorehabilitation. The combination of VR with electroencephalography (EEG) presents further opportunities to improve therapeutic efficacy by personalizing the paradigm. Specifically, the idea is to synchronize the choice and timing of stimuli in the perceived virtual world with fluctuating brain states relevant to motor behavior. Here, we present an open source EEG single-trial based classification pipeline that is designed to identify ongoing brain states predictive of the planning and execution of movements. 9 healthy volunteers each performed 1080 trials of a repetitive reaching task with an implicit two-alternative forced choice, i.e., use of the right or left hand, in response to the appearance of a visual target. The performance of the EEG decoding pipeline was assessed with respect to classification accuracy of right vs. left arm use, based on the EEG signal at the time of the stimulus. Different features, feature extraction methods, and classifiers were compared at different time windows; the number and location of informative EEG channels and the number of calibration trials needed were also quantified, as well as any benefits from individual-level optimization of pipeline parameters. This resulted in a set of recommended parameters that achieved an average 83.3% correct prediction on never-before-seen testing data, and a state-of-the-art 77.1% in a real-time simulation. Neurophysiological plausibility of the resulting classifiers was assessed by time-frequency and event-related potential analyses, as well as by Independent Component Analysis topographies and cortical source localization. We expect that this pipeline will facilitate the identification of relevant brain states as prospective therapeutic targets in closed-loop EEG-VR motor neurorehabilitation.

An end-to-end CNN with attentional mechanism applied to raw EEG in a BCI classification task

Objective.Motor-imagery (MI) classification base on electroencephalography (EEG) has been long studied in neuroscience and more recently widely used in healthcare applications such as mobile assistive robots and neurorehabilitation. In particular, EEG-based MI classification methods that rely on convolutional neural networks (CNNs) have achieved relatively high classification accuracy. However, naively training CNNs to classify raw EEG data from all channels, especially for high-density EEG, is computationally demanding and requires huge training sets. It often also introduces many irrelevant input features, making it difficult for the CNN to extract the informative ones. This problem is compounded by a dearth of training data, which is particularly acute for MI tasks, because these are cognitively demanding and thus fatigue inducing.Approach.To address these issues, we proposed an end-to-end CNN-based neural network with attentional mechanism together with different data augmentation (DA) techniques. We tested it on two benchmark MI datasets, brain-computer interface (BCI) competition IV 2a and 2b. In addition, we collected a new dataset, recorded using high-density EEG, and containing both MI and motor execution (ME) tasks, which we share with the community.Main results.Our proposed neural-network architecture outperformed all state-of-the-art methods that we found in the literature, with and without DA, reaching an average classification accuracy of 93.6% and 87.83% on BCI 2a and 2b, respectively. We also directly compare decoding of MI and ME tasks. Focusing on MI classification, we find optimal channel configurations and the best DA techniques as well as investigate combining data across participants and the role of transfer learning.Significance.Our proposed approach improves the classification accuracy for MI in the benchmark datasets. In addition, collecting our own dataset enables us to compare MI and ME and investigate various aspects of EEG decoding critical for neuroscience and BCI.

Conscious intention and human action: Review of the rise and fall of the readiness potential and Libet's clock

Is consciousness-the subjective awareness of the sensations, perceptions, beliefs, desires, and intentions of mental life-a genuine cause of human action or a mere impotent epiphenomenon accompanying the brain's physical activity but utterly incapable of making anything actually happen? This article will review the history and current status of experiments and commentary related to Libet's influential paper (Brain 106:623-664, 1983) whose conclusion "that cerebral initiation even of a spontaneous voluntary act …can and usually does begin unconsciously" has had a huge effect on debate about the efficacy of conscious intentions. Early (up to 2008) and more recent (2008 on) experiments replicating and criticizing Libet's conclusions and especially his methods will be discussed, focusing especially on recent observations that the readiness potential (RP) may only be an "artifact of averaging" and that, when intention is measured using "tone probes," the onset of intention is found much earlier and often before the onset of the RP. Based on these findings, Libet's methodology was flawed and his results are no longer valid reasons for rejecting Fodor's "good old commonsense belief/desire psychology" that "my wanting is causally responsible for my reaching.".

Heart rate variability predicts decline in sensorimotor rhythm control

Objective.Voluntary control of sensorimotor rhythms (SMRs, 8-12 Hz) can be used for brain-computer interface (BCI)-based operation of an assistive hand exoskeleton, e.g. in finger paralysis after stroke. To gain SMR control, stroke survivors are usually instructed to engage in motor imagery (MI) or to attempt moving the paralyzed fingers resulting in task- or event-related desynchronization (ERD) of SMR (SMR-ERD). However, as these tasks are cognitively demanding, especially for stroke survivors suffering from cognitive impairments, BCI control performance can deteriorate considerably over time. Therefore, it would be important to identify biomarkers that predict decline in BCI control performance within an ongoing session in order to optimize the man-machine interaction scheme.Approach.Here we determine the link between BCI control performance over time and heart rate variability (HRV). Specifically, we investigated whether HRV can be used as a biomarker to predict decline of SMR-ERD control across 17 healthy participants using Granger causality. SMR-ERD was visually displayed on a screen. Participants were instructed to engage in MI-based SMR-ERD control over two consecutive runs of 8.5 min each. During the 2nd run, task difficulty was gradually increased.Main results.While control performance (p= .18) and HRV (p= .16) remained unchanged across participants during the 1st run, during the 2nd run, both measures declined over time at high correlation (performance: -0.61%/10 s,p= 0; HRV: -0.007 ms/10 s,p< .001). We found that HRV exhibited predictive characteristics with regard to within-session BCI control performance on an individual participant level (p< .001).Significance.These results suggest that HRV can predict decline in BCI performance paving the way for adaptive BCI control paradigms, e.g. to individualize and optimize assistive BCI systems in stroke.

Online detection of movement during natural and self-initiated reach-and-grasp actions from EEG signals

Movement intention detection using electroencephalography (EEG) is a challenging but essential component of brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) for people with motor disabilities.Objective.The goal of this study is to develop a new experimental paradigm to perform asynchronous online detection of movement based on low-frequency time-domain EEG features, concretely on movement-related cortical potentials. The paradigm must be easily transferable to people without any residual upper-limb movement function and the BCI must be independent of upper-limb movement onset measurements and external cues.Approach. In a study with non-disabled participants, we evaluated a novel BCI paradigm to detect self-initiated reach-and-grasp movements. Two experimental conditions were involved. In one condition, participants performed reach-and-grasp movements to a target and simultaneously shifted their gaze towards it. In a control condition, participants solely shifted their gaze towards the target (oculomotor task). The participants freely decided when to initiate the tasks. After eye artefact correction, the EEG signals were time-locked to the saccade onset and the resulting amplitude features were exploited on a hierarchical classification approach to detect movement asynchronously.Main results. With regards to BCI performance, 54.1% (14.4% SD) of the movements were correctly identified, and all participants achieved a performance above chance-level (around 12%). An average of 21.5% (14.1% SD) of the oculomotor tasks were falsely detected as upper-limb movement. In an additional rest condition, 1.7 (1.6 SD) false positives per minute were measured. Through source imaging, movement information was mapped to sensorimotor, posterior parietal and occipital areas.Significance. We present a novel approach for movement detection using EEG signals which does not rely on upper-limb movement onset measurements or on the presentation of external cues. The participants' behaviour closely matches the natural behaviour during goal-directed reach-and-grasp movements, which also constitutes an advantage with respect to current BCI protocols.

Joseph Delboeuf on time as the mechanism of free will

In the early 1880s, Joseph Delboeuf proposed a little-known but ingenious solution to the problem the law of the conservation of energy poses for free will. When energy is transferred between two bodies, the law of energy conservation requires that the energy before and after the transfer be the same, but it says nothing of the time it must take. If we could delay this transfer, Delboeuf proposed, we could alter the course of matter without compromising the conservation of energy. This article begins by tracing the early history of the conflict between free will and the first law of thermodynamics and by recounting some initial attempts to resolve it. It next describes Delboeuf’s theory and the arguments that were made against it, before situating it with respect to some recent developments in the philosophy and psychology of free will.

Consciousness, decision making, and volition: freedom beyond chance and necessity

What is the role of consciousness in volition and decision-making? Are our actions fully determined by brain activity preceding our decisions to act, or can consciousness instead affect the brain activity leading to action? This has been much debated in philosophy, but also in science since the famous experiments by Libet in the 1980s, where the current most common interpretation is that conscious free will is an illusion. It seems that the brain knows, up to several seconds in advance what "you" decide to do. These studies have, however, been criticized, and alternative interpretations of the experiments can be given, some of which are discussed in this paper. In an attempt to elucidate the processes involved in decision-making (DM), as an essential part of volition, we have developed a computational model of relevant brain structures and their neurodynamics. While DM is a complex process, we have particularly focused on the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) for its emotional, and the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) for its cognitive aspects. In this paper, we present a stochastic population model representing the neural information processing of DM. Simulation results seem to confirm the notion that if decisions have to be made fast, emotional processes and aspects dominate, while rational processes are more time consuming and may result in a delayed decision. Finally, some limitations of current science and computational modeling will be discussed, hinting at a future development of science, where consciousness and free will may add to chance and necessity as explanation for what happens in the world.

Impulsivity traits and awareness of motor intention in Parkinson's disease: a proof-of-concept study

INTRODUCTION

In patients with Parkinson's disease (PD), impulsivity is still a matter of investigation. It has been hypothesized that impulsive personality traits may favour impulse control disorder (ICD) onset during dopaminergic therapy. In healthy subjects, a relationship between the awareness of motor intention and impulsive personality traits assessed by the Barratt impulsivity scale (BIS-11) has been reported. The aim of this study was to evaluate the relationship between the awareness of voluntary action and impulsivity traits in PD.

METHODS

Twenty-eight PD patients (stages I-III on the Hoehn and Yahr scale) underwent an impulsivity trait assessment by the BIS-11 scale and a task based on the Libet's clock. Participants were requested to perform a self-initiated movement and report the time they first feel their intention to move (W-judgement) or the time of the actual movement (M-judgement).

RESULTS

In patients with higher BIS-11 scores, the time lag between the W-judgement and the actual movement was significantly lower than in patients with lower BIS-11. No difference emerged in the M-judgement.

CONCLUSION

Data suggest that also in PD patients, the impulsive personality trait is related to a "delayed" awareness of motor intention and therefore to a shorter interval to allow a conscious "veto" of the impending action. Characterization of the temporal profile of awareness of motor intention could prove useful in identifying PD patients at risk of developing ICDs during dopaminergic treatment.

Stochasticity Versus Determinacy in Neurobiology: From Ion Channels to the Question of the "Free Will"

If one accepts that decisions are made by the brain and that neuronal mechanisms obey deterministic physical laws, it is hard to deny what some brain researchers postulate, such as "We do not do what we want, but we want what we do" and "We should stop talking about freedom. Our actions are determined by physical laws." This point of view has been substantially supported by spectacular neurophysiological experiments demonstrating action-related brain activity (readiness potentials, blood oxygen level-dependent signals) occurring up to several seconds before an individual becomes aware of his/her decision to perform the action. This report aims to counter the deterministic argument for the absence of free will by using experimental data, supplemented by computer simulations, to demonstrate that biological systems, specifically brain functions, are built on principle randomness, which is introduced already at the lowest level of neuronal information processing, the opening and closing of ion channels. Switching between open and closed states follows physiological laws but also makes use of randomness, which is apparently introduced by Brownian motion - principally unavoidable under all life-compatible conditions. Ion-channel stochasticity, manifested as noise, function is not smoothed out toward higher functional levels but can even be amplified by appropriate adjustment of the system's non-linearities. Examples shall be given to illustrate how stochasticity can propagate from ion channels to single neuron action potentials to neuronal network dynamics to the interactions between different brain nuclei up to the control of autonomic functions. It is proposed that this intrinsic stochasticity helps to keep the brain in a flexible state to explore diverse alternatives as a prerequisite of free decision-making.

What Is the Readiness Potential?

The readiness potential (RP), a slow buildup of electrical potential recorded at the scalp using electroencephalography, has been associated with neural activity involved in movement preparation. It became famous thanks to Benjamin Libet (Brain 1983;106:623-642), who used the time difference between the RP and self-reported time of conscious intention to move to argue that we lack free will. The RP's informativeness about self-generated action and derivatively about free will has prompted continued research on this neural phenomenon. Here, we argue that recent advances in our understanding of the RP, including computational modeling of the phenomenon, call for a reassessment of its relevance for understanding volition and the philosophical problem of free will.

People confabulate with high confidence when their decisions are supported by weak internal variables

People can introspect on their internal state and report the reasons driving their decisions but choice blindness (CB) experiments suggest that this ability can sometimes be a retrospective illusion. Indeed, when presented with deceptive cues, people justify choices they did not make in the first place, suggesting that external cues largely contribute to introspective processes. Yet, it remains unclear what are the respective contributions of external cues and internal decision variables in forming introspective report. Here, using a brain–computer interface, we show that internal variables continue to be monitored but are less impactful than deceptive external cues during CB episodes. Moreover, we show that deceptive cues overturn the classical relationship between confidence and accuracy: introspective failures are associated with higher confidence than genuine introspective reports. We tracked back the origin of these overconfident confabulations by revealing their prominence when internal decision evidence is weak and variable. Thus, introspection is neither a direct reading of internal variables nor a mere retrospective illusion, but rather reflects the integration of internal decision evidence and external cues, with CB being a special instance where internal evidence is inconsistent.

Suppress Me if You Can: Neurofeedback of the Readiness Potential

Voluntary movements are usually preceded by a slow, negative-going brain signal over motor areas, the so-called readiness potential (RP). To date, the exact nature and causal role of the RP in movement preparation have remained heavily debated. Although the RP is influenced by several motorical and cognitive factors, it has remained unclear whether people can learn to exert mental control over their RP, for example, by deliberately suppressing it. If people were able to initiate spontaneous movements without eliciting an RP, this would challenge the idea that the RP is a necessary stage of the causal chain leading up to a voluntary movement. We tested the ability of participants to control the magnitude of their RP in a neurofeedback experiment. Participants performed self-initiated movements, and after every movement, they were provided with immediate feedback about the magnitude of their RP. They were asked to find a strategy to perform voluntary movements such that the RPs were as small as possible. We found no evidence that participants were able to to willfully modulate or suppress their RPs while still eliciting voluntary movements. This suggests that the RP might be an involuntary component of voluntary action over which people cannot exert conscious control.

Evidence accumulation under uncertainty - a neural marker of emerging choice and urgency

To interact meaningfully with its environment, an agent must integrate external information with its own internal states. However, information about the environment is often noisy. In this study, we identify a neural correlate that tracks how asymmetries between competing alternatives evolve over the course of a decision. In our task participants had to monitor a stream of discrete visual stimuli over time and decide whether or not to act, on the basis of either strong or ambiguous evidence. We found that the classic P3 event-related potential evoked by sequential evidence items tracked decision-making processes and predicted participants' categorical choices on a single trial level, both when evidence was strong and when it was ambiguous. The P3 amplitudes in response to evidence supporting the eventually selected option increased over trial time as decisions evolved, being maximally different from the P3 amplitudes evoked by competing evidence at the time of decision. Computational modelling showed that both the neural dynamics and behavioural primacy and recency effects can be explained by a combination of (a) competition between mutually inhibiting accumulators for the two categorical choice outcomes, and (b) a context-dependant urgency signal. In conditions where evidence was presented at a low rate, urgency increased faster than in conditions when evidence was very frequent. We also found that the readiness potential, a classic marker of endogenously initiated actions, was observed preceding movements in all conditions - even when those were strongly driven by external evidence.

To Go or Not to Go: Degrees of Dynamic Inhibitory Control Revealed by the Function of Grip Force and Early Electrophysiological Indices

A critical issue in executive control is how the nervous system exerts flexibility to inhibit a prepotent response and adapt to sudden changes in the environment. In this study, force measurement was used to capture “partial” unsuccessful trials that are highly relevant in extending the current understanding of motor inhibition processing. Moreover, a modified version of the stop-signal task was used to control and eliminate potential attentional capture effects from the motor inhibition index. The results illustrate that the non-canceled force and force rate increased as a function of stop-signal delay (SSD), offering new objective indices for gauging the dynamic inhibitory process. Motor response (time and force) was a function of delay in the presentation of novel/infrequent stimuli. A larger lateralized readiness potential (LRP) amplitude in go and novel stimuli indicated an influence of the novel stimuli on central motor processing. Moreover, an early N1 component reflects an index of motor inhibition in addition to the N2 component reported in previous studies. Source analysis revealed that the activation of N2 originated from inhibitory control associated areas: the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG), pre-motor cortex, and primary motor cortex. Regarding partial responses, LRP and error-related negativity (ERNs) were associated with error correction processes, whereas the N2 component may indicate the functional overlap between inhibition and error correction. In sum, the present study has developed reliable and objective indices of motor inhibition by introducing force, force-rate and electrophysiological measures, further elucidating our understandings of dynamic motor inhibition and error correction.

The Readiness Potential reflects planning-based expectation, not uncertainty, in the timing of action

Actions are guided by a combination of external cues, internal intentions, and stored knowledge. Self-initiated voluntary actions, produced without immediate external cues, may be preceded by a slow EEG Readiness Potential (RP) that progressively increases prior to action. The cognitive significance of this neural event is controversial. Some accounts link the RP to the fact that timing of voluntary actions is generated endogenously, without external constraints. Others link it to the unique role of a planning process, and therefore of temporal expectation, in voluntary actions. In many previous experiments, actions are unconstrained by external cues, but also potentially involve preplanning and anticipation. To separate these factors, we developed a reinforcement learning paradigm where participants learned, through trial and error, the optimal time to act. If the RP reflects freedom from external constraint, its amplitude should be greater early in learning, when participants do not yet know when to act. Conversely, if the RP reflects planning, it should be greater later on, when participants have learned, and plan in advance, the time of action. We found that RP amplitudes grew with learning, suggesting that this neural activity reflects planning and anticipation for the forthcoming action, rather than freedom from external constraint.

EEG Changes in Time and Time-Frequency Domain During Movement Preparation and Execution in Stroke Patients

This study investigated electroencephalogram (EEG) changes during movement preparation and execution in stroke patients. EEG-based event-related potential (ERP) technology was used to measure brain activity changes. Seventeen stroke patients participated in this study and completed ERP tests that were designed to measure EEG changes during unilateral upper limb movements in preparation and execution stages, with Instruction Response Movement (IRM) and Cued Instruction Response Movement (CIRM) paradigms. EEG data were analyzed using motor potential (MP) in the time domain and the mu-rhythm and beta frequency band response mean value (R-means) in the time-frequency domain. In IRM, the MP amplitude at Cz was higher during hemiplegic arm movement than during unaffected arm movement. MP latency was shorter at Cz and the contralesional motor cortex during hemiplegic arm movement in CIRM compared to IRM. No significant differences were found in R-means among locations, between movement sides in both ERP tests. This study presents the brain activity changes in the time and time-frequency domains in stroke patients during movement preparation and execution and supports the contralesional compensation and adjacent-region compensation mechanism of post-stroke brain reconstruction. These findings may contribute to future rehabilitation research about neuroplasticity and technology development such as the brain-computer interface.

Resting-State Fluctuations Underlie Free and Creative Verbal Behaviors in the Human Brain

Resting-state fluctuations are ubiquitous and widely studied phenomena of the human brain, yet we are largely in the dark regarding their function in human cognition. Here we examined the hypothesis that resting-state fluctuations underlie the generation of free and creative human behaviors. In our experiment, participants were asked to perform three voluntary verbal tasks: a verbal fluency task, a verbal creativity task, and a divergent thinking task, during functional magnetic resonance imaging scanning. Blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD)-activity during these tasks was contrasted with a control- deterministic verbal task, in which the behavior was fully determined by external stimuli. Our results reveal that all voluntary verbal-generation responses displayed a gradual anticipatory buildup that preceded the deterministic control-related responses. Critically, the time-frequency dynamics of these anticipatory buildups were significantly correlated with resting-state fluctuations' dynamics. These correlations were not a general BOLD-related or verbal-response related result, as they were not found during the externally determined verbal control condition. Furthermore, they were located in brain regions known to be involved in language production, specifically the left inferior frontal gyrus. These results suggest a common function of resting-state fluctuations as the neural mechanism underlying the generation of free and creative behaviors in the human cortex.

User Adaptation to Closed-Loop Decoding of Motor Imagery Termination

One of the most popular methods in non-invasive brain machine interfaces (BMI) relies on the decoding of sensorimotor rhythms associated to sustained motor imagery. Although motor imagery has been intensively studied, its termination is mostly neglected.

OBJECTIVE

Here, we provide insights in the decoding of motor imagery termination and investigate the use of such decoder in closed-loop BMI.

METHODS

Participants (N = 9) were asked to perform kinesthetic motor imagery of both hands simultaneously cued with a clock indicating the initiation and termination of the action. Using electroencephalogram (EEG) signals, we built a decoder to detect the transition between event-related desynchronization and event-related synchronization. Features for this decoder were correlates of motor termination in the upper μ and β bands.

RESULTS

The decoder reached an accuracy of 76.2% (N = 9), revealing the high robustness of our approach. More importantly, this paper shows that the decoding of motor termination has an intrinsic latency mainly due to the delayed appearance of its correlates. Because the latency was consistent and thus predictable, users were able to compensate it after training.

CONCLUSION

Using our decoding system, BMI users were able to adapt their behavior and modulate their sensorimotor rhythm to stop the device (clock) accurately on time.

SIGNIFICANCE

These results show the importance of closed-loop evaluations of BMI decoders and open new possibilities for BMI control using decoding of movement termination.

Habituation of auditory startle reflex is a new sign of minimally conscious state

Neurological examination of non-communicating patients relies on a few decisive items that enable the crucial distinction between vegetative state (VS)-also coined unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS)-and minimally conscious state. Over the past 10 years, this distinction has proven its diagnostic value as well as its important prognostic value on consciousness recovery. However, clinicians are currently limited by three factors: (i) the current behavioural repertoire of minimally conscious state items is limited and restricted to a few cognitive domains in the goldstandard revised version of the Coma Recovery Scale; (ii) a proportion of ∼15-20% clinically VS/UWS patients are actually in a richer state than VS/UWS as evidenced by functional brain imaging; and (iii) the neurophysiological and cognitive interpretation of each minimally conscious state item is still unclear and debated. In the current study we demonstrate that habituation of the auditory startle reflex (hASR) tested at bedside constitutes a novel, simple and powerful behavioural sign that can accurately distinguish minimally conscious state from VS/UWS. In addition to enlarging the minimally conscious state items repertoire, and therefore decreasing the low sensitivity of current behavioural measures, we also provide an original and rigorous description of the neurophysiological basis of hASR through a combination of functional (high density EEG and 18F-fluorodeoxyglucose PET imaging) and structural (diffusion tensor imaging MRI) measures. We show that preservation of hASR is associated with the functional and structural integrity of a brain-scale fronto-parietal network, including prefrontal regions related to control of action and inhibition, and meso-parietal areas associated with minimally conscious and conscious states. Lastly, we show that hASR predicts 6-month improvement of consciousness. Taken together, our results show that hASR is a cortically-mediated behaviour, and suggest that it could be a new clinical item to clearly and accurately identify non-communicating patients who are in the minimally conscious state.

Perturbation-evoked potentials can be classified from single-trial EEG

OBJECTIVE

Loss of balance control can have serious consequences on interaction between humans and machines as well as the general well-being of humans. Perceived balance perturbations are always accompanied by a specific cortical activation, the so-called perturbation-evoked potential (PEP). In this study, we investigate the possibility to classify PEPs from ongoing EEG.

APPROACH

Fifteen healthy subjects were exposed to seated whole-body perturbations. Each participant performed 120 trials; they were rapidly tilted to the right and left, 60 times respectively.

MAIN RESULTS

We achieved classification accuracies of more than 85% between PEPs and rest EEG using a window-based classification approach. Different window lengths and electrode layouts were compared. We were able to achieve excellent classification performance (87.6 ± 8.0% accuracy) by using a short window length of 200 ms and a minimal electrode layout consisting of only the Cz electrode. The peak classification accuracy coincides in time with the strongest component of PEPs, called N1.

SIGNIFICANCE

We showed that PEPs can be discriminated against ongoing EEG with high accuracy. These findings can contribute to the development of a system that can detect balance perturbations online.

Preparation and execution of voluntary action both contribute to awareness of intention

How and when motor intentions form has long been controversial. In particular, the extent to which motor preparation and action-related processes produce a conscious experience of intention remains unknown. Here, we used a brain-computer interface (BCI) while participants performed a self-paced movement task to trigger cues upon the detection of a readiness potential (a well-characterized brain signal that precedes movement) or in its absence. The BCI-triggered cues instructed participants either to move or not to move. Following this instruction, participants reported whether they felt they were about to move at the time the cue was presented. Participants were more likely to report an intention (i) when the cue was triggered by the presence of a readiness potential than when the same cue was triggered by its absence, and (ii) when they had just made an action than when they had not. We further describe a time-dependent integration of these two factors: the probability of reporting an intention was maximal when cues were triggered in the presence of a readiness potential, and when participants also executed an action shortly afterwards. Our results provide a first systematic investigation of how prospective and retrospective components are integrated in forming a conscious intention to move.

Re-wiring Guilt: How Advancing Neuroscience Encourages Strategic Interventions Over Retributive Justice

The increasing visibility of neuroscience employed in legal contexts has rightfully prompted critical discourse regarding the boundaries of its utility. High profile debates include some extreme positions that either undermine the relevance of neuroscience or overstate its role in determining legal responsibility. Here we adopt a conciliatory attitude, reaffirming the current value of neuroscience in jurisprudence and addressing its role in shifting normative attitudes about culpability. Adopting a balanced perspective about the interaction between two dynamic fields (science and law) allows for more fruitful consideration of practical changes likely to improve the way we engage in legal decision-making. Neuroscience provides a useful platform for addressing nuanced and multifaceted deterministic factors promoting antisocial behavior. Ultimately, we suggest that shifting normative attitudes about culpability vis-à-vis advancing neuroscience are not likely to promote major changes in the way we assign legal responsibility. Rather, it helps us to shed our harshest retributivist instincts in favor of more pragmatic strategies for combating the most conspicuous patterns promoting mass incarceration and recidivism.

Breathing is coupled with voluntary action and the cortical readiness potential

Voluntary action is a fundamental element of self-consciousness. The readiness potential (RP), a slow drift of neural activity preceding self-initiated movement, has been suggested to reflect neural processes underlying the preparation of voluntary action; yet more than fifty years after its introduction, interpretation of the RP remains controversial. Based on previous research showing that internal bodily signals affect sensory processing and ongoing neural activity, we here investigated the potential role of interoceptive signals in voluntary action and the RP. We report that (1) participants initiate voluntary actions more frequently during expiration, (2) this respiration-action coupling is absent during externally triggered actions, and (3) the RP amplitude is modulated depending on the respiratory phase. Our findings demonstrate that voluntary action is coupled with the respiratory system and further suggest that the RP is associated with fluctuations of ongoing neural activity that are driven by the involuntary and cyclic motor act of breathing.

Voluntary action and free will have been associated with cortical activity, referred to as “the readiness potential” that precedes self-initiated actions by about 1 s. Here, the authors show that the involuntary and cyclic motor act of breathing is coupled with voluntary action and the readiness potential.

Decoding Movement-Related Cortical Potentials Based on Subject-Dependent and Section-Wise Spectral Filtering

An important challenge in developing a movement-related cortical potential (MRCP)-based brain-machine interface (BMI) is an accurate decoding of the user intention for real-world environments. However, the performance remains insufficient for real-time decoding owing to the endogenous signal characteristics compared to other BMI paradigms. This study aims to enhance the MRCP decoding performance from the perspective of preprocessing techniques (i.e., spectral filtering). To the best of our knowledge, existing MRCP studies have used spectral filters with a fixed frequency bandwidth for all subjects. Hence, we propose a subject-dependent and section-wise spectral filtering (SSSF) method that considers the subjects' individual MRCP characteristics for two different temporal sections. In this study, MRCP data were acquired under a powered exoskeleton environments in which the subjects conducted self-initiated walking. We evaluated our method using both our experimental data and a public dataset (BNCI Horizon 2020). The decoding performance using the SSSF was 0.86 (±0.09), and the performance on the public dataset was 0.73 (±0.06) across all subjects. The experimental results showed a statistically significant enhancement ( ) compared with the fixed frequency bands used in previous methods on both datasets. In addition, we presented successful decoding results from a pseudo-online analysis. Therefore, we demonstrated that the proposed SSSF method can involve more meaningful MRCP information than conventional methods.

Explainable Artificial Intelligence for Neuroscience: Behavioral Neurostimulation

The use of Artificial Intelligence and machine learning in basic research and clinical neuroscience is increasing. AI methods enable the interpretation of large multimodal datasets that can provide unbiased insights into the fundamental principles of brain function, potentially paving the way for earlier and more accurate detection of brain disorders and better informed intervention protocols. Despite AI's ability to create accurate predictions and classifications, in most cases it lacks the ability to provide a mechanistic understanding of how inputs and outputs relate to each other. Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) is a new set of techniques that attempts to provide such an understanding, here we report on some of these practical approaches. We discuss the potential value of XAI to the field of neurostimulation for both basic scientific inquiry and therapeutic purposes, as well as, outstanding questions and obstacles to the success of the XAI approach.

Feeling free: External influences on endogenous behaviour

When we are presented with two equally appealing options, how does the brain break the symmetry between them and make a choice? Recent research has proposed that when no clear information can guide decisions, we use irrelevant noise to tip the scale in favour of one alternative and decide how to act. In the present study, we investigated this issue exploring how human decisions were influenced by noise in a visual signal that cued instructed or free choice. Participants were presented with random-dot kinematograms, moving unidirectionally either upwards or downwards (in instructed trials) or both upwards and downwards simultaneously (free-choice trials). By varying the coherence of dot motion, we were able to test how moment-to-moment fluctuations in motion energy could influence action selection processes. We also measured participants' awareness of such influence. Our results revealed three novel findings: Participants' choices tended to follow fluctuations in dot motion, showing that sensory noise biased "free" selection between actions, irrespective of the clarity of the free cue. However, participants appeared to remain unaware of that influence, because subjective ratings of freedom did not correlate with the degree of sensory biasing. In one exception to this general rule, we found that, when participants resisted the bias and made a choice opposite to the one suggested by the stimulus, they reported strong subjective sense of having chosen independently of the stimulation. This result suggests that inhibitory control is tightly linked to the sense of freedom of choice.

Do readiness potentials happen all the time?

The Readiness Potential (RP) is a slow negative EEG potential found in the seconds preceding voluntary actions. Here, we explore whether the RP is found only at this time, or if it also occurs when no action is produced. Recent theories suggest the RP reflects the average of accumulated stochastic fluctuations in neural activity, rather than a specific signal related to self-initiated action: RP-like events should then be widely present, even in the absence of actions. We investigated this hypothesis by searching for RP-like events in background EEG of an appropriate dataset for which the action-locked EEG had previously been analysed to test other hypotheses [Khalighinejad, N., Brann, E., Dorgham, A., Haggard, P. Dissociating cognitive and motoric precursors of human self-initiated action. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience. 2019, 1-14]. We used the actual mean RP as a template, and searched the entire epoch for similar neural signals, using similarity metrics that capture the temporal or spatial properties of the RP. Most EEG epochs contained a number of events that were similar to the true RP, but did not lead directly to any voluntary action. However, these RP-like events were equally common in epochs that eventually terminated in voluntary actions as in those where voluntary actions were not permitted. Events matching the temporal profile of the RP were also a poor match for the spatial profile, and vice versa. We conclude that these events are false positives, and do not reflect the same mechanism as the RP itself. Finally, applying the same template-search algorithm to simulated EEG data synthesized from different noise distributions showed that RP-like events will occur in any dataset containing the 1⁄f noise ubiquitous in EEG recordings. To summarise, we found no evidence of genuinely RP-like events at any time other than immediately prior to self-initiated actions. Our findings do not support a purely stochastic model of RP generation, and suggest that the RP may be a specific precursor of self-initiated voluntary actions.

Free will beliefs are better predicted by dualism than determinism beliefs across different cultures

Most people believe in free will. Whether this belief is warranted or not, free will beliefs (FWB) are foundational for many legal systems and reducing FWB has effects on behavior from the motor to the social level. This raises the important question as to which specific FWB people hold. There are many different ways to conceptualize free will, and some might see physical determinism as a threat that might reduce FWB, while others might not. Here, we investigate lay FWB in a large, representative, replicated online survey study in the US and Singapore (n = 1800), assessing differences in FWB with unprecedented depth within and between cultures. Specifically, we assess the relation of FWB, as measured using the Free Will Inventory, to determinism, dualism and related concepts like libertarianism and compatibilism. We find that libertarian, compatibilist, and dualist, intuitions were related to FWB, but that these intuitions were often logically inconsistent. Importantly, direct comparisons suggest that dualism was more predictive of FWB than other intuitions. Thus, believing in free will goes hand-in-hand with a belief in a non-physical mind. Highlighting the importance of dualism for FWB impacts academic debates on free will, which currently largely focus on its relation to determinism. Our findings also shed light on how recent (neuro)scientific findings might impact FWB. Demonstrating physical determinism in the brain need not have a strong impact on FWB, due to a wide-spread belief in dualism.

A proposed mechanism for mind-brain interaction using extended Bohmian quantum mechanics in Avicenna's monotheistic perspective

In quantum approaches to consciousness, the authors try to propose a model and mechanism for the mind-brain interaction using modern physics and some quantum concepts which do not exist in the classical physics. The independent effect of mind on the brain has been one of the challenging issues in the history of science and philosophy. In some recent mind-brain interaction models, the direct influence of mind on matter is either not accepted (as in Stapp's model) or not clear, and there have not been any clear mechanism for it (as in Penrose-Hameroff's model or in Eccles's model). In this manuscript we propose a model and mechanism for mind's effect on the matter using an extended Bohmian quantum mechanics and Avicenna's ideas. We show that mind and mental states can affect brain's activity without any violation of physical laws. This is a mathematical and descriptive model which shows the possibility of providing a causal model for mind's effect on matter. It is shown that this model guarantees the realistic philosophical constraints and respects the laws of nature. In addition, it is shown that it is in agreement with the Libet style experimental results and parapsychological data.

To propose this model, we obtained a modified (non-unitary) Schrödinger equation via second quantization method which affects the particle through a modified quantum potential and a new term in the continuity equation. At the second quantized level, which is equivalent to quantum field theory level (QFT), we can use the path integral formalism of Feynman. We show that there are three methods to extend Bohmian QM via path integral formalism, which has different interpretations. By numerical simulation of trajectories in the two-slits experiment, we show their differences and choose one of these methods for our mind-brain model which can be the basis for explaining some phenomena which are not possible to explain in the standard Bohmian QM.

From Freedom From to Freedom To: New Perspectives on Intentional Action

There are few concepts as relevant as that of intentional action in shaping our sense of self and the interaction with the environment. At the same time, few concepts are so elusive. Indeed, both conceptual and neuroscientific accounts of intentional agency have proven to be problematic. On the one hand, most conceptual views struggle in defining how agents can adequately exert control over their actions. On the other hand, neuroscience settles for definitions by exclusion whereby key features of human intentional actions, including goal-directness, remain underspecified. This paper reviews the existing literature and sketches how this gap might be filled. In particular, we defend a gradualist notion of intentional behavior, which revolves around the following key features: autonomy, flexibility in the integration of causal vectors, and control.

Responsibility Without Freedom? Folk Judgements About Deliberate Actions

A long-standing position in philosophy, law, and theology is that a person can be held morally responsible for an action only if they had the freedom to choose and to act otherwise. Thus, many philosophers consider freedom to be a necessary condition for moral responsibility. However, empirical findings suggest that this assumption might not be in line with common sense thinking. For example, in a recent study we used surveys to show that – counter to positions held by many philosophers – lay people consider actions to be free when they are spontaneous rather than being based on reasons. In contrast, responsibility is often considered to require that someone has thought about the alternative options. In this study we used an online survey to directly test the degree to which lay judgements of freedom and responsibility match. Specifically, we tested whether manipulations of deliberation affect freedom and responsibility judgements in the same way. Furthermore, we also tested the dependency of these judgements on a person’s belief that their decision had consequences for their personal life. We found that deliberation had an opposite effect on freedom and responsibility judgements. People were considered more free when they acted spontaneously, whereas they were considered more responsible when they deliberated about their actions. These results seem to suggest that deliberating about reasons is crucially important for the lay concept of responsibility, while for the lay notion of freedom it is perceived to be detrimental. One way of interpreting our findings for the interdisciplinary debate on free will and responsibility could be to suggest that lay beliefs match the philosophical position of semi-compatibilism. Semi-compatibilists insist that the metaphysical debate on the nature of free will can be separated from the debate on conditions of responsible agency. According to our findings the beliefs of lay people are in line with views held by semi-compatibilists, even though we did not test whether they endorse that position explicitly.

Why neuroscience does not disprove free will

While the question whether free will exists or not has concerned philosophers for centuries, empirical research on this question is relatively young. About 35 years ago Benjamin Libet designed an experiment that challenged the common intuition of free will, namely that conscious intentions are causally efficacious. Libet demonstrated that conscious intentions are preceded by a specific pattern of brain activation, suggesting that unconscious processes determine our decisions and we are only retrospectively informed about these decisions. Libet-style experiments have ever since dominated the discourse about the existence of free will and have found their way into the public media. Here we review the most important challenges to the common interpretation of Libet-style tasks and argue that the common interpretation is questionable. Brain activity preceding conscious decisions reflects the decision process rather than its outcome. Furthermore, the decision process is configured by conditional intentions that participants form at the beginning of the experiment. We conclude that Libet-style tasks do not provide a serious challenge to our intuition of free will.