Viral Sequencing to Investigate Sources of SARS-CoV-2 Infection in US Healthcare Personnel

Preventing respiratory viral transmission in healthcare settings

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

The COVID-19 pandemic catalyzed new insights into respiratory viral transmission mechanisms and prevention. We review the most practical and impactful measures to prevent SARS-CoV-2 and other nosocomial respiratory viral infections in healthcare.

RECENT FINDINGS

Nosocomial respiratory viral infection rates mirror viral activity levels in the surrounding community. During peak periods ∼15-20% of hospitalized patients with respiratory viral infections may have acquired their virus in the hospital. Nosocomial respiratory viral infections are associated with increased lengths-of-stay, risk of respiratory failure, and hospital death. Most procedures contribute minimally to aerosol production compared to labored breathing, coughing, and forced expiration. Masking for source control and exposure control both decrease transmission risk, respirators more so than masks. Likewise, vaccinating healthcare workers decreases transmission risk and is associated with lower patient mortality rates, particularly in long-term care facilities. Increasing air changes, ultraviolet irradiation, and portable HEPA filtration units may also decrease transmission rates but their marginal benefit relative to current healthcare ventilation standards has yet to be established.

SUMMARY

Practical strategies to prevent nosocomial respiratory viral infections include maximizing staff and patient influenza and SARS-CoV-2 vaccination rates and implementing routine masking during patient interactions when community incidence is high.

Association between social activities and risk of COVID-19 in a cohort of healthcare personnel

Objective

Previous studies have linked social behaviors to COVID-19 risk in the general population. The impact of these behaviors among healthcare personnel, who face higher workplace exposure risks and possess greater prevention awareness, remains less explored.

Design

We conducted a Prospective cohort study from December 2021 to May 2022, using monthly surveys. Exposures included (1) a composite of nine common social activities in the past month and (2) similarity of social behavior compared to pre-pandemic. Outcomes included self-reported SARS-CoV-2 infection (primary)and testing for SARS-CoV-2 (secondary). Mixed-effect logistic regression assessed the association between social behavior and outcomes, adjusting for baseline and time-dependent covariates. To account for missed surveys, we employed inverse probability-of-censoring weighting with a propensity score approach.

Setting

An academic healthcare system.

Participants

Healthcare personnel.

Results

Of 1,302 healthcare personnel who completed ≥2 surveys, 244 reported ≥1 positive test during the study, resulting in a cumulative incidence of 19%. More social activities in the past month and social behavior similar to pre-pandemic levels were associated with increased likelihood of SARS-CoV-2 infection (recent social activity composite: OR = 1.11, 95% CI 1.02-1.21; pre-pandemic social similarity: OR = 1.14, 95% CI 1.07-1.21). Neither was significantly associated with testing for SARS-CoV-2.

Conclusions

Healthcare personnel social behavior outside work was associated with a higher risk for COVID-19. To protect the hospital workforce, risk mitigation strategies for healthcare personnel should focus on both the community and workplace.

SARS-CoV-2 seropositivity among healthcare professionals in a rural state

Objectives

We evaluated SARS-CoV-2 anti-nucleocapsid (anti-N) seroconversion and seroreversion rates, risk factors associated with SARS-CoV-2 seroconversion, and COVID-19 risk perceptions among academic healthcare center employees in a rural state.

Methods

Among employees aged ≥18 years who completed a screening survey (n = 1,377), we invited all respondents reporting previous COVID-19 (n = 85; 82 accepted) and a random selection of respondents not reporting previous COVID-19 (n = 370; 220 accepted) to participate. Participants completed surveys and provided blood samples at 3-month intervals (T0, T3, T6, T9). We used logistic regression to identify risk factors for seropositivity at T0.

Results

The cohort was primarily direct patient caregivers (205/302; 67.9%), white (278/302; 92.1%), and female (212/302; 70.2%). At T0, 86/302 (28.4%) participants were seropositive. Of the seronegative participants, 6/198 (3.0%), 6/183 (3.3%), and 14/180 (7.8%) had seroconverted at T3, T6, and T9, respectively. The overall seroreversion rate was 6.98% at T9. At T0, nursing staff (odds ratio [OR], 2.37; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.08, 5.19) and being within six feet of a non-household member outside of work (OR, 2.91; 95% CI, 1.02, 8.33) had significantly higher odds of seropositivity. Vaccination (OR, 0.05; 95% CI, 0.02, 0.12) and face mask use (OR, 0.36; 95% CI, 0.17, 0.78) were protective.

Conclusions

The seroconversion and seroreversion rates were low among participants. Public health and infection prevention measures implemented early in the COVID-19 pandemic - vaccination, face mask use, and social distancing - were associated with significantly lower odds of SARS-CoV-2 seropositivity among participants.

Characteristics of healthcare personnel with SARS-CoV-2 infection: 10 emerging infections program sites in the United States, April 2020-December 2021

BACKGROUND

Understanding characteristics of healthcare personnel (HCP) with SARS-CoV-2 infection supports the development and prioritization of interventions to protect this important workforce. We report detailed characteristics of HCP who tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 from April 20, 2020 through December 31, 2021.

METHODS

CDC collaborated with Emerging Infections Program sites in 10 states to interview HCP with SARS-CoV-2 infection (case-HCP) about their demographics, underlying medical conditions, healthcare roles, exposures, personal protective equipment (PPE) use, and COVID-19 vaccination status. We grouped case-HCP by healthcare role. To describe residential social vulnerability, we merged geocoded HCP residential addresses with CDC/ATSDR Social Vulnerability Index (SVI) values at the census tract level. We defined highest and lowest SVI quartiles as high and low social vulnerability, respectively.

RESULTS

Our analysis included 7,531 case-HCP. Most case-HCP with roles as certified nursing assistant (CNA) (444, 61.3%), medical assistant (252, 65.3%), or home healthcare worker (HHW) (225, 59.5%) reported their race and ethnicity as either non-Hispanic Black or Hispanic. More than one third of HHWs (166, 45.2%), CNAs (283, 41.7%), and medical assistants (138, 37.9%) reported a residential address in the high social vulnerability category. The proportion of case-HCP who reported using recommended PPE at all times when caring for patients with COVID-19 was lowest among HHWs compared with other roles.

CONCLUSIONS

To mitigate SARS-CoV-2 infection risk in healthcare settings, infection prevention, and control interventions should be specific to HCP roles and educational backgrounds. Additional interventions are needed to address high social vulnerability among HHWs, CNAs, and medical assistants.

COVID-19 outbreak and genomic investigation in an inpatient behavioral health unit

Background

Inpatient behavioral health units (BHUs) had unique challenges in implementing interventions to mitigate coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) transmission, in part due to socialization in BHU settings. The objective of this study was to identify the transmission routes and the efficacy of the mitigation strategies employed during a COVID-19 outbreak in an inpatient BHU during the Omicron surge from December 2021 to January 2022.

Methods

An outbreak investigation was performed after identifying 2 COVID-19-positive BHU inpatients on December 16 and 20, 2021. Mitigation measures involved weekly point prevalence testing for all inpatients, healthcare workers (HCWs), and staff, followed by infection prevention mitigation measures and molecular surveillance. Whole-genome sequencing on a subset of COVID-19-positive individuals was performed to identify the outbreak source. Finally, an outbreak control sustainability plan was formulated for future BHU outbreak resurgences.

Results

We identified 35 HCWs and 8 inpatients who tested positive in the BHU between December 16, 2021, and January 17, 2022. We generated severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) genomes from 15 HCWs and all inpatients. Phylogenetic analyses revealed 3 distinct but genetically related clusters: (1) an HCW and inpatient outbreak likely initiated by staff, (2) an HCW and inpatient outbreak likely initiated by an inpatient visitor, and (3) an HCW-only cluster initiated by staff.

Conclusions

Distinct transmission clusters are consistent with multiple, independent SARS-CoV-2 introductions with further inpatient transmission occurring in communal settings. The implemented outbreak control plan comprised of enhanced personal protective equipment requirements, limited socialization, and molecular surveillance likely minimized disruptions to patient care as a model for future pandemics.

Outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 in a Rural Community Hospital during Omicron Predominance

Healthcare-associated infections due to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has increased since the discovery of the Omicron variant. We describe a SARS-CoV-2 outbreak in the medicine-surgery unit of a rural community hospital at the time of high community transmission of Omicron variant in our county. The outbreak occurred in the medicine-surgery unit of an 89-bed rural community hospital in northern Maine. The characteristics of the patients and healthcare workers (HCWs) affected by the outbreak are described. Patient and HCW data collected as part of the outbreak investigation were used in this report. The outbreak control measures implemented are also described. A total of 24 people tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 including 11 patients and 13 HCWs. A total of 12 of the 24 (50%) persons were symptomatic, and rhinorrhea was the most common symptom noted (8/12, 67%). None of the symptomatic persons had gastrointestinal symptoms or symptoms of a loss of sense of smell or taste. All HCWs were vaccinated and 8 of the 11 patients were vaccinated. Outbreak control measures in the affected unit included implementation of full PPE (N95 respirators, eye protection, gowns and gloves) during all patient care, serial testing of employees and patients in the affected unit, cohorting positive patients, closing visitation and thorough environmental cleaning including use of ultraviolet (UV) light disinfection. This outbreak exemplifies the high transmissibility of the Omicron variant of SARS-CoV-2. The outbreak occurred despite a well-established infection control program. We noted that serial testing, use of N95 respirators during all patient care and UV disinfection were some of the measures that could be successful in outbreak control.

Whole-genome sequencing to investigate transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in the acute healthcare setting: a systematic review

BACKGROUND

Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) has been used widely to elucidate transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in acute healthcare settings, and to guide infection, prevention, and control (IPC) responses.

AIM

To systematically appraise available literature, published between January 1st, 2020 and June 30th, 2022, describing the implementation of WGS in acute healthcare settings to characterize nosocomial SARS-CoV-2 transmission.

METHODS

Searches of the PubMed, Embase, Ovid MEDLINE, EBSCO MEDLINE, and Cochrane Library databases identified studies in English reporting the use of WGS to investigate SARS-CoV-2 transmission in acute healthcare environments. Publications involved data collected up to December 31st, 2021, and findings were reported in accordance with the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses statement.

FINDINGS

In all, 3088 non-duplicate records were retrieved; 97 met inclusion criteria, involving 62 outbreak analyses and 35 genomic surveillance studies. No publications from low-income countries were identified. In 87/97 (90%), WGS supported hypotheses for nosocomial transmission, while in 46 out of 97 (47%) suspected transmission events were excluded. An IPC intervention was attributed to the use of WGS in 18 out of 97 (18%); however, only three (3%) studies reported turnaround times ≤7 days facilitating near real-time IPC action, and none reported an impact on the incidence of nosocomial COVID-19 attributable to WGS.

CONCLUSION

WGS can elucidate transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in acute healthcare settings to enhance epidemiological investigations. However, evidence was not identified to support sequencing as an intervention to reduce the incidence of SARS-CoV-2 in hospital or to alter the trajectory of active outbreaks.

Associations between an international COVID-19 job exposure matrix and SARS-CoV-2 infection among 2 million workers in Denmark

OBJECTIVES

This study investigates the associations between the Danish version of a job exposure matrix for COVID-19 (COVID-19-JEM) and Danish register-based SARS-CoV-2 infection information across three waves of the pandemic. The COVID-19-JEM consists of four dimensions on transmission: two on mitigation measures, and two on precarious work characteristics.

METHODS

The study comprised 2 021 309 persons from the Danish working population between 26 February 2020 and 15 December 2021. Logistic regression models were applied to assess the associations between the JEM dimensions and overall score and SARS-CoV-2 infection across three infection waves, with peaks in March-April 2020, December-January 2021, and February-March 2022. Sex, age, household income, country of birth, wave, residential region and during wave 3 vaccination status were accounted for.

RESULTS

Higher risk scores within the transmission and mitigation dimensions and the overall JEM score resulted in higher odds ratios (OR) of a SARS-CoV-2 infection. OR attenuated across the three waves with ranges of 1.08-5.09 in wave 1, 1.06-1.60 in wave 2, and 1.05-1.45 in those not (fully) vaccinated in wave 3. In wave 3, no associations were found for those fully vaccinated. In all waves, the two precarious work dimensions showed weaker or inversed associations.

CONCLUSIONS

The COVID-19-JEM is a promising tool for assessing occupational exposure to SARS-CoV-2 and other airborne infectious agents that mainly spread between people who are in close contact with each other. However, its usefulness depends on applied restrictions and the vaccination status in the population of interest.

SARS-CoV-2 infections in "less visible" hospital staff: The roles and safety of environmental services and allied health professionals

BACKGROUND

During the early SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, all healthcare workers had specific and essential functions. However, environmental services (e.g., cleaning staff) and allied health professionals (e.g., physiotherapists) are often less recognised inpatient care. The aim of our study was to evaluate SARS-CoV-2-infection rates and describe risk factors relevant to workplace transmission and occupational safety amongst healthcare workers in COVID-19 hospitals before the introduction of SARS-CoV-2-specific vaccines.

METHODS

This cross-sectional study (from May 2020 to March 2021, standardised WHO early-investigation protocol) is evaluating workplace or health-related data, COVID-19-patient proximity, personal protective equipment (PPE) use, and adherence to infection prevention and control (IPC) measures, anti-SARS-CoV-2-antibody status, and transmission pathways.

RESULTS

Out of n = 221 HCW (n = 189 cleaning/service staff; n = 32 allied health professionals), n = 17 (7.7 %) were seropositive. While even SARS-CoV-2-naïve HCW reported SARS-CoV-2-related symptoms, airway symptoms, loss of smell or taste, and appetite were the most specific for a SARS-CoV-2-infection. Adherence to IPC (98.6 %) and recommended PPE use (98.2 %) were high and not associated with seropositivity. In 70.6 %, transmission occurred in private settings; in 23.5 %, at the workplace (by interaction with SARS-CoV-2-positive colleagues [17.6 %] or patient contact [5.9 %]), or remained unclear (one case).

CONCLUSIONS

Infection rates were higher in all assessed 'less visible' healthcare-worker groups compared to the general population. Our data indicates that, while IPC measures and PPE may have contributed to the prevention of patient-to-healthcare-worker transmissions, infections were commonly acquired outside of work and transmitted between healthcare workers within the hospital. This finding emphasises the importance of ongoing education on transmission prevention and regular infection screenings at work.

Considerations for de-escalating universal masking in healthcare centers

Three years after the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, better knowledge on the transmission of respiratory viral infections (RVI) including the contribution of asymptomatic infections encouraged most healthcare centers to implement universal masking. The evolution of the SARS-CoV-2 epidemiology and improved immunization of the population call for the infection and prevention control community to revisit the masking strategy in healthcare. In this narrative review, we consider factors for de-escalating universal masking in healthcare centers, addressing compliance with the mask policy, local epidemiology, the level of protection provided by medical face masks, the consequences of absenteeism and presenteeism, as well as logistics, costs, and ecological impact. Most current national and international guidelines for mask use are based on the level of community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. Actions are now required to refine future recommendations, such as establishing a list of the most relevant RVI to consider, implement reliable local RVI surveillance, and define thresholds for activating masking strategies. Considering the epidemiological context (measured via sentinel networks or wastewater analysis), and, if not available, considering a time period (winter season) may guide to three gradual levels of masking: (i) standard and transmission-based precautions and respiratory etiquette, (ii) systematic face mask wearing when in direct contact with patients, and (iii) universal masking. Cost-effectiveness analysis of the different strategies is warranted in the coming years. Masking is just one element to be considered along with other preventive measures such as staff and patient immunization, and efficient ventilation.

Key predictors of psychological distress and wellbeing in Australian frontline healthcare workers during COVID-19 (Omicron wave)

Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic has led to significant challenges for frontline healthcare workers' (FHW), raising many mental health and wellbeing concerns for this cohort. To facilitate identification of risk and protective factors to inform treatment and interventions, this study investigated key predictors of psychological distress and subjective wellbeing in FHWs.

Methods

During the Omicron wave of the COVID-19 pandemic (January 2022), Victorian (Australia) doctors, nurses, allied health and non-medical staff from Emergency Departments, Intensive Care units, Aged Care, Hospital In The Home, and COVID Wards completed a cross-sectional survey consisting of the Kessler 6 item (Psychological Distress), Personal Wellbeing Index (Subjective Wellbeing), Coronavirus Health Impact Survey tool (COVID-19 related factors) and occupational factors. Multivariable linear regressions were used to evaluate unadjusted and adjusted associations. Relative weight analysis was used to compare and identify key predictors.

Results

Out of 167 participants, 18.1% screened positive for a probable mental illness and a further 15.3% screened positive for low wellbeing. Key risk factors for greater psychological distress included COVID infection worries, relationship stress and younger age. For both psychological distress and lower wellbeing, health status and supervisor support were key protective factors, while infection risks were key risk factors. Only positive changes in relationship quality was protective of lower wellbeing.

Conclusion

This study highlights the significance of social determinants and individual level factors alongside work related factors, in influencing FHWs' mental health and wellbeing during public health crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Findings suggest that future interventions and supports should take a more holistic approach that considers work, social and individual level factors when supporting FHWs' mental health and wellbeing.

SARS-CoV-2 Outbreak Investigation Using Contact Tracing and Whole-Genome Sequencing in an Ontario Tertiary Care Hospital

Genomic epidemiology can facilitate an understanding of evolutionary history and transmission dynamics of a severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) outbreak. We used next-generation sequencing techniques to study SARS-CoV-2 genomes isolated from patients and health care workers (HCWs) across five wards of a Canadian hospital with an ongoing SARS-CoV-2 outbreak. Using traditional contact tracing methods, we show transmission events between patients and HCWs, which were also supported by the SARS-CoV-2 lineage assignments. The outbreak predominantly involved SARS-CoV-2 B.1.564.1 across all five wards, but we also show evidence of community introductions of lineages B.1, B.1.1.32, and B.1.231, falsely assumed to be outbreak related. Altogether, our study exemplifies the value of using contact tracing in combination with genomic epidemiology to understand the transmission dynamics and genetic underpinnings of a SARS-CoV-2 outbreak. IMPORTANCE Our manuscript describes a SARS-CoV-2 outbreak investigation in an Ontario tertiary care hospital. We use traditional contract tracing paired with whole-genome sequencing to facilitate an understanding of the evolutionary history and transmission dynamics of this SARS-CoV-2 outbreak in a clinical setting. These advancements have enabled the incorporation of phylogenetics and genomic epidemiology into the understanding of clinical outbreaks. We show that genomic epidemiology can help to explore the genetic evolution of a pathogen in real time, enabling the identification of the index case and helping understand its transmission dynamics to develop better strategies to prevent future spread of SARS-CoV-2 in congregate, clinical settings such as hospitals.

The evolution of workplace risk for Covid-19 in Canadian healthcare workers and its relation to vaccination: A nested case-referent study

BACKGROUND

During the early months of the Covid-19 pandemic, studies demonstrated that healthcare workers (HCWs) were at increased risk of infection. Few modifiable risks were identified. It is largely unknown how these evolved over time.

METHODS

A prospective case-referent study was established and nested within a cohort study of Canadian HCWs. Cases of Covid-19, confirmed by polymerase chain reaction, were matched with up to four referents on job, province, gender, and date of first vaccination. Cases and referents completed a questionnaire reporting exposures and experiences in the 21 days before case date. Participants were recruited from October 2020 to March 2022. Workplace factors were examined by mixed-effects logistic regression allowing for competing exposures. A sensitivity analysis was limited to those for whom family/community transmission seemed unlikely.

RESULTS

533 cases were matched with 1697 referents. Among unvaccinated HCWs, the risk of infection was increased if they worked hands-on with patients with Covid-19, on a ward designated for care of infected patients, or handled objects used by infected patients. Sensitivity analysis identified work in residential institutions and geriatric wards as high risk for unvaccinated HCWs. Later, with almost universal HCW vaccination, risk from working with infected patients was much reduced but cases were more likely than referents to report being unable to access an N95 mask or that decontaminated N95 masks were reused.

CONCLUSIONS

These results suggest that, after a rocky start, the risks of Covid-19 infection from work in health care are now largely contained in Canada but with need for continued vigilance.

The prevalence of probable mental health disorders among hospital healthcare workers during COVID-19: A systematic review and meta-analysis

OBJECTIVES

The mental health impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic continue to be documented worldwide with systematic reviews playing a pivotal role. Here we present updated findings from our systematic review and meta-analysis on the mental health impacts among hospital healthcare workers during COVID-19.

METHODS

We searched MEDLINE, CINAHL, PsycINFO, Embase and Web Of Science Core Collection between 1st January 2000 to 17th February 2022 for studies using validated methods and reporting on the prevalence of diagnosed or probable mental health disorders in hospital healthcare workers during the COVID-19 pandemic. A meta-analysis of proportions and odds ratio was performed using a random effects model. Heterogeneity was investigated using test of subgroup differences and 95 % prediction intervals.

RESULTS

The meta-analysis included 401 studies, representing 458,754 participants across 58 countries. Pooled prevalence of depression was 28.5 % (95 % CI: 26.3-30.7), anxiety was 28.7 % (95 % CI: 26.5-31.0), PTSD was 25.5 % (95 % CI: 22.5-28.5), alcohol and substance use disorder was 25.3 % (95 % CI: 13.3-39.6) and insomnia was 24.4 % (95 % CI: 19.4-29.9). Prevalence rates were stratified by physicians, nurses, allied health, support staff and healthcare students, which varied considerably. There were significantly higher odds of probable mental health disorders in women, those working in high-risk units and those providing direct care.

LIMITATIONS

Majority of studies used self-report measures which reflected probable mental health disorders rather than actual diagnosis.

CONCLUSIONS

These updated findings have enhanced our understanding of at-risk groups working in hospitals. Targeted support and research towards these differences in mental health risks are recommended to mitigate any long-term consequences.

The Relative Contributions of Occupational and Community Risk Factors for COVID-19 among Hospital Workers: The HOP-COVID Cohort Study

The relative contributions of occupational and community sources of COVID-19 among health-care workers (HCWs) are still subject to debate. In a cohort study at a 2814-bed tertiary medical center (five hospitals) in the Paris area of France, we assessed the proportion of hospital-acquired cases among staff and identified risk factors. Between May 2020 and June 2021, HCWs were invited to complete a questionnaire on their COVID-19 risk factors. RT-PCR and serology test results were retrieved from the virology department. Mixed-effects logistic regression was used to account for clustering by hospital. The prevalence of COVID-19 was 15.6% (n = 213/1369 respondents) overall, 29.7% in the geriatric hospitals, and 56.8% of the infections were hospital-acquired. On multivariable analyses adjusted for COVID-19 incidence and contact in the community, a significantly higher risk was identified for staff providing patient care (especially nursing assistants), staff from radiology/functional assessment units and stretcher services, and staff working on wards with COVID-19 clusters among patients or HCWs. The likelihood of infection was greater in geriatric wards than in intensive care units. The presence of significant occupational risk factors after adjustment for community exposure is suggestive of a high in-hospital risk and emphasizes the need for stronger preventive measures-especially in geriatric settings. Clinicaltrials.gov NCT04386759.

SARS-CoV-2 Genomic Diversity in Households Highlights the Challenges of Sequence-Based Transmission Inference

The reliability of sequence-based inference of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) transmission is not clear. Sequence data from infections among household members can define the expected genomic diversity of a virus along a defined transmission chain. SARS-CoV-2 cases were identified prospectively among 2,369 participants in 706 households. Specimens with a reverse transcription-PCR cycle threshold of ≤30 underwent whole-genome sequencing. Intrahost single-nucleotide variants (iSNV) were identified at a ≥5% frequency. Phylogenetic trees were used to evaluate the relationship of household and community sequences. There were 178 SARS-CoV-2 cases in 706 households. Among 147 specimens sequenced, 106 yielded a whole-genome consensus with coverage suitable for identifying iSNV. Twenty-six households had sequences from multiple cases within 14 days. Consensus sequences were indistinguishable among cases in 15 households, while 11 had ≥1 consensus sequence that differed by 1 to 2 mutations. Sequences from households and the community were often interspersed on phylogenetic trees. Identification of iSNV improved inference in 2 of 15 households with indistinguishable consensus sequences and in 6 of 11 with distinct ones. In multiple-infection households, whole-genome consensus sequences differed by 0 to 1 mutations. Identification of shared iSNV occasionally resolved linkage, but the low genomic diversity of SARS-CoV-2 limits the utility of "sequence-only" transmission inference. IMPORTANCE We performed whole-genome sequencing of SARS-CoV-2 from prospectively identified cases in three longitudinal household cohorts. In a majority of multi-infection households, SARS-CoV-2 consensus sequences were indistinguishable, and they differed by 1 to 2 mutations in the rest. Importantly, even with modest genomic surveillance of the community (3 to 5% of cases sequenced), it was not uncommon to find community sequences interspersed with household sequences on phylogenetic trees. Identification of shared minority variants only occasionally resolved these ambiguities in transmission linkage. Overall, the low genomic diversity of SARS-CoV-2 limits the utility of "sequence-only" transmission inference. Our work highlights the need to carefully consider both epidemiologic linkage and sequence data to define transmission chains in households, hospitals, and other transmission settings.

Understanding Early Pandemic Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 Transmission in a Medical Center by Incorporating Public Sequencing Databases to Mitigate Bias

BACKGROUND

Throughout the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic, healthcare workers (HCWs) have faced risk of infection from within the workplace via patients and staff as well as from the outside community, complicating our ability to resolve transmission chains in order to inform hospital infection control policy. Here we show how the incorporation of sequences from public genomic databases aided genomic surveillance early in the pandemic when circulating viral diversity was limited.

METHODS

We sequenced a subset of discarded, diagnostic SARS-CoV-2 isolates between March and May 2020 from Boston Medical Center HCWs and combined this data set with publicly available sequences from the surrounding community deposited in GISAID with the goal of inferring specific transmission routes.

RESULTS

Contextualizing our data with publicly available sequences reveals that 73% (95% confidence interval, 63%-84%) of coronavirus disease 2019 cases in HCWs are likely novel introductions rather than nosocomial spread.

CONCLUSIONS

We argue that introductions of SARS-CoV-2 into the hospital environment are frequent and that expanding public genomic surveillance can better aid infection control when determining routes of transmission.

Genomic Investigation to Identify Sources of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 Infection Among Healthcare Personnel in an Acute Care Hospital

Background

Identifying the source of healthcare personnel (HCP) coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is important to guide occupational safety efforts. We used a combined whole genome sequencing (WGS) and epidemiologic approach to investigate the source of HCP COVID-19 at a tertiary-care center early in the COVID-19 pandemic.

Methods

Remnant nasopharyngeal swab samples from HCP and patients with polymerase chain reaction-proven COVID-19 from a period with complete sample retention (14 March 2020 to 10 April 2020) at Rush University Medical Center in Chicago, Illinois, underwent viral RNA extraction and WGS. Genomes with >90% coverage underwent cluster detection using a 2 single-nucleotide variant genetic distance cutoff. Genomic clusters were evaluated for epidemiologic linkages, with strong linkages defined by evidence of time/location overlap.

Results

We analyzed 1031 sequences, identifying 49 clusters that included ≥1 HCP (265 patients, 115 HCP). Most HCP infections were not healthcare associated (88/115 [76.5%]). We did not identify any strong epidemiologic linkages for patient-to-HCP transmission. Thirteen HCP cases (11.3%) were attributed to a potential patient source (weak evidence involving nonclinical staff that lacked location data to prove or disprove contact with patients in same cluster). Fourteen HCP cases (12.2%) were attributed to HCP source (11 with strong evidence).

Conclusions

Using genomic and epidemiologic data, we found that most HCP severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infections were not healthcare associated. We did not find strong evidence of patient-to-HCP transmission of SARS-CoV-2.

Identifying Contact Risks for SARS-CoV-2 Transmission to Healthcare Workers during Outbreak on COVID-19 Ward

We assessed the risk for different exposures to SARS-CoV-2 during a COVID-19 outbreak among healthcare workers on a hospital ward in late 2020. We found working with isolated COVID-19 patients did not increase the risk of COVID-19 among workers, but working shifts with presymptomatic healthcare coworkers did.

Prevention of SARS-CoV-2 and respiratory viral infections in healthcare settings: current and emerging concepts

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

COVID-19 has catalyzed a wealth of new data on the science of respiratory pathogen transmission and revealed opportunities to enhance infection prevention practices in healthcare settings.

RECENT FINDINGS

New data refute the traditional division between droplet vs airborne transmission and clarify the central role of aerosols in spreading all respiratory viruses, including Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), even in the absence of so-called 'aerosol-generating procedures' (AGPs). Indeed, most AGPs generate fewer aerosols than talking, labored breathing, or coughing. Risk factors for transmission include high viral loads, symptoms, proximity, prolonged exposure, lack of masking, and poor ventilation. Testing all patients on admission and thereafter can identify early occult infections and prevent hospital-based clusters. Additional prevention strategies include universal masking, encouraging universal vaccination, preferential use of N95 respirators when community rates are high, improving native ventilation, utilizing portable high-efficiency particulate air filters when ventilation is limited, and minimizing room sharing when possible.

SUMMARY

Multifaceted infection prevention programs that include universal testing, masking, vaccination, and enhanced ventilation can minimize nosocomial SARS-CoV-2 infections in patients and workplace infections in healthcare personnel. Extending these insights to other respiratory viruses may further increase the safety of healthcare and ready hospitals for novel respiratory viruses that may emerge in the future.

Reconstruction of transmission chains of SARS-CoV-2 amidst multiple outbreaks in a geriatric acute-care hospital: a combined retrospective epidemiological and genomic study

Background

There is ongoing uncertainty regarding transmission chains and the respective roles of healthcare workers (HCWs) and elderly patients in nosocomial outbreaks of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in geriatric settings.

Methods

We performed a retrospective cohort study including patients with nosocomial coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in four outbreak-affected wards, and all SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR positive HCWs from a Swiss university-affiliated geriatric acute-care hospital that admitted both Covid-19 and non-Covid-19 patients during the first pandemic wave in Spring 2020. We combined epidemiological and genetic sequencing data using a Bayesian modelling framework, and reconstructed transmission dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 involving patients and HCWs, to determine who infected whom. We evaluated general transmission patterns according to case type (HCWs working in dedicated Covid-19 cohorting wards: HCWcovid; HCWs working in non-Covid-19 wards where outbreaks occurred: HCWoutbreak; patients with nosocomial Covid-19: patientnoso) by deriving the proportion of infections attributed to each case type across all posterior trees and comparing them to random expectations.

Results

During the study period (1 March to 7 May 2020), we included 180 SARS-CoV-2 positive cases: 127 HCWs (91 HCWcovid, 36 HCWoutbreak) and 53 patients. The attack rates ranged from 10% to 19% for patients, and 21% for HCWs. We estimated that 16 importation events occurred with high confidence (4 patients, 12 HCWs) that jointly led to up to 41 secondary cases; in six additional cases (5 HCWs, 1 patient), importation was possible with a posterior probability between 10% and 50%. Most patient-to-patient transmission events involved patients having shared a ward (95.2%, 95% credible interval [CrI] 84.2%-100%), in contrast to those having shared a room (19.7%, 95% CrI 6.7%-33.3%). Transmission events tended to cluster by case type: patientnoso were almost twice as likely to be infected by other patientnoso than expected (observed:expected ratio 2.16, 95% CrI 1.17-4.20, p=0.006); similarly, HCWoutbreak were more than twice as likely to be infected by other HCWoutbreak than expected (2.72, 95% CrI 0.87-9.00, p=0.06). The proportion of infectors being HCWcovid was as expected as random. We found a trend towards a greater proportion of high transmitters (≥2 secondary cases) among HCWoutbreak than patientnoso in the late phases (28.6% vs. 11.8%) of the outbreak, although this was not statistically significant.

Conclusions

Most importation events were linked to HCW. Unexpectedly, transmission between HCWcovid was more limited than transmission between patients and HCWoutbreak. This finding highlights gaps in infection control and suggests the possible areas of improvements to limit the extent of nosocomial transmission.

Funding

This study was supported by a grant from the Swiss National Science Foundation under the NRP78 funding scheme (Grant no. 4078P0_198363).

Survey of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) infection control policies at leading US academic hospitals in the context of the initial pandemic surge of the severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) omicron variant

OBJECTIVE

To assess coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) infection policies at leading US medical centers in the context of the initial wave of the severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) omicron variant.

DESIGN

Electronic survey study eliciting hospital policies on masking, personal protective equipment, cohorting, airborne-infection isolation rooms (AIIRs), portable HEPA filters, and patient and employee testing.

SETTING AND PARTICIPANTS

"Hospital epidemiologists from U.S. News top 20 hospitals and 10 hospitals in the CDC Prevention Epicenters program."  As it is currently written, it implies all 30 hospitals are from the CDC Prevention Epicenters program, but that only applies to 10 hospitals.  Alternatively, we could just say "Hospital epidemiologists from 30 leading US hospitals."

METHODS

Survey results were reported using descriptive statistics.

RESULTS

Of 30 hospital epidemiologists surveyed, 23 (77%) completed the survey between February 15 and March 3, 2022. Among the responding hospitals, 18 (78%) used medical masks for universal masking and 5 (22%) used N95 respirators. 16 hospitals (70%) required universal eye protection. 22 hospitals (96%) used N95s for routine COVID-19 care and 1 (4%) reserved N95s for aerosol-generating procedures. 2 responding hospitals (9%) utilized dedicated COVID-19 wards; 8 (35%) used mixed COVID-19 and non-COVID-19 units; and 13 (57%) used both dedicated and mixed units. 4 hospitals (17%) used AIIRs for all COVID-19 patients, 10 (43%) prioritized AIIRs for aerosol-generating procedures, 3 (13%) used alternate risk-stratification criteria (not based on aerosol-generating procedures), and 6 (26%) did not routinely use AIIRs. 9 hospitals (39%) did not use portable HEPA filters, but 14 (61%) used them for various indications, most commonly as substitutes for AIIRs when unavailable or for specific high-risk areas or situations. 21 hospitals (91%) tested asymptomatic patients on admission, but postadmission testing strategies and preferred specimen sites varied substantially. 5 hospitals (22%) required regular testing of unvaccinated employees and 1 hospital (4%) reported mandatory weekly testing even for vaccinated employees during the SARS-CoV-2 omicron surge.

CONCLUSIONS

COVID-19 infection control practices in leading hospitals vary substantially. Clearer public health guidance and transparency around hospital policies may facilitate more consistent national standards.

Evaluation of Screening Program and Phylogenetic Analysis of SARS-CoV-2 Infections among Hospital Healthcare Workers in Liège, Belgium

Healthcare workers (HCWs) are known to be at higher risk of developing severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infections although whether these risks are equal across all occupational roles is uncertain. Identifying these risk factors and understand SARS-CoV-2 transmission pathways in healthcare settings are of high importance to achieve optimal protection measures. We aimed to investigate the implementation of a voluntary screening program for SARS-CoV-2 infections among hospital HCWs and to elucidate potential transmission pathways though phylogenetic analysis before the vaccination era. HCWs of the University Hospital of Liège, Belgium, were invited to participate in voluntary reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) assays performed every week from April to December 2020. Phylogenetic analysis of SARS-CoV-2 genomes were performed for a subgroup of 45 HCWs. 5095 samples were collected from 703 HCWs. 212 test results were positive, 15 were indeterminate, and 4868 returned negative. 156 HCWs (22.2%) tested positive at least once during the study period. All SARS-CoV-2 test results returned negative for 547 HCWs (77.8%). Nurses (p < 0.05), paramedics (p < 0.05), and laboratory staff handling respiratory samples (p < 0.01) were at higher risk for being infected compared to the control non-patient facing group. Our phylogenetic analysis revealed that most positive samples corresponded to independent introduction events into the hospital. Our findings add to the growing evidence of differential risks of being infected among HCWs and support the need to implement appropriate protection measures based on each individual’s risk profile to guarantee the protection of both HCWs and patients. Furthermore, our phylogenetic investigations highlight that most positive samples correspond to distinct introduction events into the hospital.

Airflow Patterns in Double-Occupancy Patient Rooms May Contribute to Roommate-to-Roommate Transmission of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2

BACKGROUND

Hospitalized patients are at risk to acquire severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) from roommates with unrecognized coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). We hypothesized that airflow patterns might contribute to SARS-CoV-2 transmission in double-occupancy patient rooms.

METHODS

A device emitting condensed moisture was used to identify airflow patterns in double-occupancy patient rooms. Simulations were conducted to assess transfer of fluorescent microspheres, 5% sodium chloride aerosol, and aerosolized bacteriophage MS2 between patient beds 3 meters apart and to assess the effectiveness of privacy curtains and portable air cleaners in reducing transfer.

RESULTS

Air flowed from inlet vents in the center of the room to an outlet vent near the door, resulting in air currents flowing toward the bed adjacent to the outlet vent. Fluorescent microspheres (212-250-µm diameter), 5% sodium chloride aerosol, and aerosolized bacteriophage MS2 released from the inner bed were carried on air currents toward the bed adjacent to the outlet vent. Closing curtains between the patient beds reduced transfer of each of the particles. Operation of a portable air cleaner reduced aerosol transfer to the bed adjacent to the outlet vent but did not offer a benefit over closing the curtains alone, and in some situations, resulted in an increase in aerosol exposure.

CONCLUSIONS

Airflow patterns in double-occupancy patient rooms may contribute to risk for transmission of SARS-CoV-2 between roommates. Keeping curtains closed between beds may be beneficial in reducing risk.

A systems approach to understanding SARS-CoV-2 transmission among healthcare workers in a cluster

Preventing transmission of COVID-19 between healthcare workers is essential to optimize patient, employee, and organizational outcomes. We used a systems engineering approach to analyze contact tracing interviews from a cluster of COVID-19 at our healthcare institution and identified modifiable and non-modifiable causes of transmission. Similar work system analyses may be useful to institutions in identifying multiple factors contributing to infection clusters among healthcare workers, and in developing layered infection prevention methods to further reduce transmission.

Occupational and community risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection among employees of a long-term care facility: an observational study

BACKGROUND

We investigated the contribution of both occupational and community exposure for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection among employees of a university-affiliated long-term care facility (LTCF), during the 1st pandemic wave in Switzerland (March-June 2020).

METHODS

We performed a nested analysis of a seroprevalence study among all volunteering LTCF staff to determine community and nosocomial risk factors for SARS-CoV-2 seropositivity using modified Poison regression. We also combined epidemiological and genetic sequencing data from a coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak investigation in a LTCF ward to infer transmission dynamics and acquisition routes of SARS-CoV-2, and evaluated strain relatedness using a maximum likelihood phylogenetic tree.

RESULTS

Among 285 LTCF employees, 176 participated in the seroprevalence study, of whom 30 (17%) were seropositive for SARS-CoV-2. Most (141/176, 80%) were healthcare workers (HCWs). Risk factors for seropositivity included exposure to a COVID-19 inpatient (adjusted prevalence ratio [aPR] 2.6; 95% CI 0.9-8.1) and community contact with a COVID-19 case (aPR 1.7; 95% CI 0.8-3.5). Among 18 employees included in the outbreak investigation, the outbreak reconstruction suggests 4 likely importation events by HCWs with secondary transmissions to other HCWs and patients.

CONCLUSIONS

These two complementary epidemiologic and molecular approaches suggest a substantial contribution of both occupational and community exposures to COVID-19 risk among HCWs in LTCFs. These data may help to better assess the importance of occupational health hazards and related legal implications during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Transmission of COVID-19 among healthcare workers - an epidemiological study during the first phase of the pandemic in Sweden

During the first phase of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, concerns were raised that healthcare workers (HCWs) were at high risk of infection. The aim of this study was to explore the transmission of COVID-19 among HCWs during a staff outbreak at an inpatient ward in Sweden 1 March to 31 May 2020. A mixed-methods approach was applied using several data sources. In total, 152 of 176 HCWs participated. The incidence of COVID-19 among HCWs was 33%. Among cases, 48 (96%) performed activities involving direct contact with COVID-19 patients. Contact tracing connected 78% of cases to interaction with another contagious co-worker. Only a few HCW cases reported contact with a confirmed COVID-19 case at home (n = 6; 12%) or in the community (n = 3; 6%). Multiple logistic regression identified direct care of COVID-19 patients and positive COVID-19 family contact as risk factors for infection (adjusted OR 8.4 and 9.0 respectively). Main interventions to stop the outbreak were physical distancing between HCWs, reinforcement of personal hygiene routines and rigorous surface cleaning. The personal protective equipment used in contact with patients was not changed in response to the outbreak. We highlight HCW-to-HCW transmission of COVID-19 in a hospital environment and the importance of preventing droplet and contact transmission between co-workers.

Mitigating SARS-CoV-2 Transmission in Hospitals: A Systematic Literature Review

Objectives: Hospital outbreaks of SARS-CoV-2 infection are dreaded but preventable catastrophes. We review the literature to examine the pattern of SARS-CoV-2 transmission in hospitals and identify potential vulnerabilities to mitigate the risk of infection.

Methods: Three electronic databases (PubMed, Embase and Scopus) were searched from inception to July 27, 2021 for publications reporting SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks in hospital. Relevant articles and grey literature reports were hand-searched.

Results: Twenty-seven articles that described 35 SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks were included. Despite epidemiological investigations, the primary case could not be identified in 37% of outbreaks. Healthcare workers accounted for 40% of primary cases (doctors 17%, followed by ancillary staff 11%). Mortality among infected patients was approximately 15%. By contrast, none of the infected HCWs died. Several concerning patterns were identified, including infections involving ancillary staff and healthcare worker infections from the community and household contacts.

Conclusion: Continuous efforts to train-retrain and enforce correct personal protective equipment use and regular routine screening tests (especially among ancillary staff) are necessary to stem future hospital outbreaks of SARS-CoV-2.

Occupational risk factors for severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection among healthcare personnel: A 6-month prospective analysis of the COVID-19 Prevention in Emory Healthcare Personnel (COPE) Study

Objectives:

To determine the incidence of severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection among healthcare personnel (HCP) and to assess occupational risks for SARS-CoV-2 infection.

Design:

Prospective cohort of healthcare personnel (HCP) followed for 6 months from May through December 2020.

Setting:

Large academic healthcare system including 4 hospitals and affiliated clinics in Atlanta, Georgia.

Participants:

HCP, including those with and without direct patient-care activities, working during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.

Methods:

Incident SARS-CoV-2 infections were determined through serologic testing for SARS-CoV-2 IgG at enrollment, at 3 months, and at 6 months. HCP completed monthly surveys regarding occupational activities. Multivariable logistic regression was used to identify occupational factors that increased the risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection.

Results:

Of the 304 evaluable HCP that were seronegative at enrollment, 26 (9%) seroconverted for SARS-CoV-2 IgG by 6 months. Overall, 219 participants (73%) self-identified as White race, 119 (40%) were nurses, and 121 (40%) worked on inpatient medical-surgical floors. In a multivariable analysis, HCP who identified as Black race were more likely to seroconvert than HCP who identified as White (odds ratio, 4.5; 95% confidence interval, 1.3–14.2). Increased risk for SARS-CoV-2 infection was not identified for any occupational activity, including spending >50% of a typical shift at a patient’s bedside, working in a COVID-19 unit, or performing or being present for aerosol-generating procedures (AGPs).

Conclusions:

In our study cohort of HCP working in an academic healthcare system, <10% had evidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection over 6 months. No specific occupational activities were identified as increasing risk for SARS-CoV-2 infection.

Universal Use of N95 Respirators in Healthcare Settings When Community Coronavirus Disease 2019 Rates Are High

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommends N95 respirators for all providers who see patients with possible or confirmed coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). We suggest that N95 respirators may be just as important for the care of patients without suspected COVID-19 when community incidence rates are high. This is because severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 is most contagious before symptom onset. Ironically, by the time patients are sick enough to be admitted to the hospital with COVID-19, they tend to be less contagious. The greatest threat of transmission in healthcare facilities may therefore be patients and healthcare workers with early occult infection. N95 respirators' superior fit and filtration provide superior exposure protection for healthcare providers seeing patients with early undiagnosed infection and superior source control to protect patients from healthcare workers with early undiagnosed infection. The probability of occult infection in patients and healthcare workers is greatest when community incidence rates are high. Universal use of N95 respirators may help decrease nosocomial transmission at such times.

New Insights into the Prevention of Hospital-Acquired Pneumonia/Ventilator-Associated Pneumonia Caused by Viruses

A fifth or more of hospital-acquired pneumonias may be attributable to respiratory viruses. The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has clearly demonstrated the potential morbidity and mortality of respiratory viruses and the constant threat of nosocomial transmission and hospital-based clusters. Data from before the pandemic suggest the same can be true of influenza, respiratory syncytial virus, and other respiratory viruses. The pandemic has also helped clarify the primary mechanisms and risk factors for viral transmission. Respiratory viruses are primarily transmitted by respiratory aerosols that are routinely emitted when people exhale, talk, and cough. Labored breathing and coughing increase aerosol generation to a much greater extent than intubation, extubation, positive pressure ventilation, and other so-called aerosol-generating procedures. Transmission risk is proportional to the amount of viral exposure. Most transmissions take place over short distances because respiratory emissions are densest immediately adjacent to the source but then rapidly dilute and diffuse with distance leading to less viral exposure. The primary risk factors for transmission then are high viral loads, proximity, sustained exposure, and poor ventilation as these all increase net viral exposure. Poor ventilation increases the risk of long-distance transmission by allowing aerosol-borne viruses to accumulate over time leading to higher levels of exposure throughout an enclosed space. Surgical and procedural masks reduce viral exposure but do not eradicate it and thus lower but do not eliminate transmission risk. Most hospital-based clusters have been attributed to delayed diagnoses, transmission between roommates, and staff-to-patient infections. Strategies to prevent nosocomial respiratory viral infections include testing all patients upon admission, preventing healthcare providers from working while sick, assuring adequate ventilation, universal masking, and vaccinating both patients and healthcare workers.

Hidden hazards of SARS-CoV-2 transmission in hospitals: A systematic review

Despite their considerable prevalence, dynamics of hospital-associated COVID-19 are still not well understood. We assessed the nature and extent of air- and surface-borne SARS-CoV-2 contamination in hospitals to identify hazards of viral dispersal and enable more precise targeting of infection prevention and control. PubMed, ScienceDirect, Web of Science, Medrxiv, and Biorxiv were searched for relevant articles until June 1, 2021. In total, 51 observational cross-sectional studies comprising 6258 samples were included. SARS-CoV-2 RNA was detected in one in six air and surface samples throughout the hospital and up to 7.62 m away from the nearest patients. The highest detection rates and viral concentrations were reported from patient areas. The most frequently and heavily contaminated types of surfaces comprised air outlets and hospital floors. Viable virus was recovered from the air and fomites. Among size-fractionated air samples, only fine aerosols contained viable virus. Aerosol-generating procedures significantly increased (OR_air  = 2.56 (1.46-4.51); OR_surface  = 1.95 (1.27-2.99)), whereas patient masking significantly decreased air- and surface-borne SARS-CoV-2 contamination (OR_air  = 0.41 (0.25-0.70); OR_surface  = 0.45 (0.34-0.61)). The nature and extent of hospital contamination indicate that SARS-CoV-2 is likely dispersed conjointly through several transmission routes, including short- and long-range aerosol, droplet, and fomite transmission.

Risk Factors for SARS-CoV-2 Infection Among US Healthcare Personnel, May-December 2020

To determine risk factors for coronavirus disease (COVID-19) among US healthcare personnel (HCP), we conducted a case-control analysis. We collected data about activities outside the workplace and COVID-19 patient care activities from HCP with positive severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) test results (cases) and from HCP with negative test results (controls) in healthcare facilities in 5 US states. We used conditional logistic regression to calculate adjusted matched odds ratios and 95% CIs for exposures. Among 345 cases and 622 controls, factors associated with risk were having close contact with persons with COVID-19 outside the workplace, having close contact with COVID-19 patients in the workplace, and assisting COVID-19 patients with activities of daily living. Protecting HCP from COVID-19 may require interventions that reduce their exposures outside the workplace and improve their ability to more safely assist COVID-19 patients with activities of daily living.

Current Insights Into Respiratory Virus Transmission and Potential Implications for Infection Control Programs : A Narrative Review

Policies to prevent respiratory virus transmission in health care settings have traditionally divided organisms into Droplet versus Airborne categories. Droplet organisms (for example, influenza) are said to be transmitted via large respiratory secretions that rapidly fall to the ground within 1 to 2 meters and are adequately blocked by surgical masks. Airborne pathogens (for example, measles), by contrast, are transmitted by aerosols that are small enough and light enough to carry beyond 2 meters and to penetrate the gaps between masks and faces; health care workers are advised to wear N95 respirators and to place these patients in negative-pressure rooms. Respirators and negative-pressure rooms are also recommended when caring for patients with influenza or SARS-CoV-2 who are undergoing "aerosol-generating procedures," such as intubation. An increasing body of evidence, however, questions this framework. People routinely emit respiratory particles in a range of sizes, but most are aerosols, and most procedures do not generate meaningfully more aerosols than ordinary breathing, and far fewer than coughing, exercise, or labored breathing. Most transmission nonetheless occurs at close range because virus-laden aerosols are most concentrated at the source; they then diffuse and dilute with distance, making long-distance transmission rare in well-ventilated spaces. The primary risk factors for nosocomial transmission are community incidence rates, viral load, symptoms, proximity, duration of exposure, and poor ventilation. Failure to appreciate these factors may lead to underappreciation of some risks (for example, overestimation of the protection provided by medical masks, insufficient attention to ventilation) or misallocation of limited resources (for example, reserving N95 respirators and negative-pressure rooms only for aerosol-generating procedures or requiring negative-pressure rooms for all patients with SARS-CoV-2 infection regardless of stage of illness). Enhanced understanding of the factors governing respiratory pathogen transmission may inform the development of more effective policies to prevent nosocomial transmission of respiratory pathogens.

COVID-19 vaccine mandate for healthcare workers in the United States: a social justice policy

INTRODUCTION

Vaccination is the most effective strategy to mitigating COVID-19 and restoring societal function. As the pandemic evolves with no certainty of a herd immunity threshold, universal vaccination of at-risk populations is desirable. However, vaccine hesitancy threatens the return to normalcy, and healthcare workers (HCWs) must embrace their ambassadorial role of shoring up vaccine confidence. Unfortunately, voluntary vaccination has been suboptimal among HCWs in the United States, a priority group for whom immunization is essential for maintaining health system capacity and the safety of high-risk patients in their care. Consequently, some health systems have implemented mandates to improve compliance.

AREAS COVERED

This article discusses the ethical and practical considerations of mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policies for HCWs utilizing some components of the World Health Organization's framework and the unique context of a pandemic with evolving infection dynamics.

EXPERT OPINION

COVID-19 vaccine mandates for universal immunization of HCWs raise ethical and practical debates about their appropriateness, especially when the vaccines are pending full approval in most jurisdictions. Given the superiority of the vaccines to safety and testing protocols and their favorable safety profile, we encourage health systems to adopt vaccination mandates through participatory processes that address the concerns of stakeholders.

Explosive nosocomial outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 in a rehabilitation clinic: the limits of genomics for outbreak reconstruction

BACKGROUND

Nosocomial outbreaks of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) are frequent despite implementation of conventional infection control measures. An outbreak investigation was undertaken using advanced genomic and statistical techniques to reconstruct likely transmission chains and assess the role of healthcare workers (HCWs) in SARS-CoV-2 transmission.

METHODS

A nosocomial SARS-CoV-2 outbreak in a university-affiliated rehabilitation clinic was investigated, involving patients and HCWs, with high coverage of pathogen whole-genome sequences (WGS). The time-varying reproduction number from epidemiological data (R_t) was estimated, and maximum likelihood phylogeny was used to assess genetic diversity of the pathogen. Genomic and epidemiological data were combined into a Bayesian framework to model the directionality of transmission, and a case-control study was performed to investigate risk factors for nosocomial SARS-CoV-2 acquisition in patients.

FINDINGS

The outbreak lasted from 14^th March to 12^th April 2020, and involved 37 patients (31 with WGS) and 39 employees (31 with WGS), 37 of whom were HCWs. Peak R_t was estimated to be between 2.2 and 3.6. The phylogenetic tree showed very limited genetic diversity, with 60 of 62 (96.7%) isolates forming one large cluster of identical genomes. Despite the resulting uncertainty in reconstructed transmission events, the analyses suggest that HCWs (one of whom was the index case) played an essential role in cross-transmission, with a significantly greater fraction of infections (P<2.2e-16) attributable to HCWs (70.7%) than expected given the number of HCW cases (46.7%). The excess of transmission from HCWs was higher when considering infection of patients [79.0%; 95% confidence interval (CI) 78.5-79.5%] and frail patients (Clinical Frailty Scale score >5; 82.3%; 95% CI 81.8-83.4%). Furthermore, frail patients were found to be at greater risk for nosocomial COVID-19 than other patients (adjusted odds ratio 6.94, 95% CI 2.13-22.57).

INTERPRETATION

This outbreak report highlights the essential role of HCWs in SARS-CoV-2 transmission dynamics in healthcare settings. Limited genetic diversity in pathogen genomes hampered the reconstruction of individual transmission events, resulting in substantial uncertainty in who infected whom. However, this study shows that despite such uncertainty, significant transmission patterns can be observed.

Association between Airborne Infection Isolation Room Utilization Rates and Healthcare Worker COVID-19 Infections in Two Academic Hospitals

We compared healthcare worker SARS-CoV-2 infection rates between March-August 2020 in two similar hospitals with high versus low airborne infection isolation room utilization rates but otherwise identical infection control policies. We found no difference in healthcare worker infection rates between the two hospitals nor between patient-facing vs non-patient-facing providers.

COVID-19 in Health Care Personnel: Significance of Health Care Role, Contact History, and Symptoms in Those Who Test Positive for SARS-CoV-2 Infection

OBJECTIVE

To identify significant factors that help predict whether health care personnel (HCP) will test positive for severe acute respiratory coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2).

PATIENTS AND METHODS

We conducted a prospective cohort study among 7015 symptomatic HCP from March 25, 2020, through November 11, 2020. We analyzed the associations between health care role, contact history, symptoms, and a positive nasopharyngeal swab SARS-CoV-2 polymerase chain reaction test results, using univariate and multivariable modelling.

RESULTS

Of the symptomatic HCP, 624 (8.9%) were positive over the study period. On multivariable analysis, having a health care role other than physician or advanced practice provider, contact with family or community member with known or suspected coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), and seven individual symptoms (cough, anosmia, ageusia, fever, myalgia, chills, and headache) were significantly associated with higher adjusted odds ratios for testing positive for SARS-CoV-2. For each increase in symptom number, the odds of testing positive nearly doubled (odds ratio, 1.93; 95% CI, 1.82 to 2.07, P<.001).

CONCLUSION

Symptomatic HCP have higher adjusted odds of testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 based on three distinct factors: (1) nonphysician/advanced practice provider role, (2) contact with a family or community member with suspected or known COVID-19, and (3) specific symptoms and symptom number. Differences among health care roles, which persisted after controlling for contacts, may reflect the influence of social determinants. Contacts with COVID-19-positive patients and/or HCP were not associated with higher odds of testing positive, supporting current infection control efforts. Targeted symptom and contact questionnaires may streamline symptomatic HCP testing for COVID-19.

Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in Inpatient and Outpatient Settings in a Veterans Affairs Health Care System

BACKGROUND

Health care personnel and patients are at risk to acquire severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in health care settings, including in outpatient clinics and ancillary care areas.

METHODS

Between May 1, 2020, and January 31, 2021, we identified clusters of 3 or more coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases in which nosocomial transmission was suspected in a Veterans Affairs health care system. Asymptomatic employees and patients were tested for SARS-CoV-2 if they were identified as being at risk through contact tracing investigations; for 7 clusters, all personnel and/or patients in a shared work area were tested regardless of exposure history. Whole-genome sequencing was performed to determine the relatedness of SARS-CoV-2 samples from the clusters and from control employees and patients.

RESULTS

Of 14 clusters investigated, 7 occurred in community-based outpatient clinics, 1 in the emergency department, 3 in ancillary care areas, and 3 on hospital medical/surgical wards that did not provide care for patients with known COVID-19 infection. Eighty-one of 82 (99%) symptomatic COVID-19 cases and 31 of 35 (89%) asymptomatic cases occurred in health care personnel. Sequencing analysis provided support for several transmission events between coworkers and in 2 cases supported transmission from health care personnel to patients. There were no documented transmissions from patients to personnel.

CONCLUSIONS

Clusters of COVID-19 with nosocomial transmission predominantly involved health care personnel and often occurred in outpatient clinics and ancillary care areas. There is a need for improved measures to prevent transmission of SARS-CoV-2 by health care personnel in inpatient and outpatient settings.

Assessment of SARS-CoV-2 Infection among Healthcare Workers of a German COVID-19 Treatment Center

To date, more than 160 million people have been infected with COVID-19 worldwide. In the present study, we investigated the history of SARS-CoV-2 infection among 3067 healthcare workers (HCW) in a German COVID-19 treatment center during the early phase of the pandemic (July 2020) based on the seroprevalence of SARS-CoV-2 antibodies and self-reported previous PCR results. The results demonstrate a low prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 infection (n = 107 [3.5%]) with no increased risk for employees with a high level of patient exposure in general or working in COVID-19-confined areas in particular. This suggests that the local hygiene standards implemented in our hospital during the first wave of COVID-19 pandemic were effective in preventing patient-to-HCW transmission. No evidence for highly mobile staff serving as a vector for SARS-CoV-2 transmission could be found. In addition, impairment of smell and/or taste was strongly associated with SARS-CoV-2 history.

Sources of exposure identified through structured interviews of healthcare workers who test positive for severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2): A prospective analysis at two teaching hospitals

We interviewed 1,208 healthcare workers with positive SARS-CoV-2 tests between October 2020 and June 2021 to determine likely exposure sources. Overall, 689 (57.0%) had community exposures (479 from household members), 76 (6.3%) had hospital exposures (64 from other employees including 49 despite masking), 11 (0.9%) had community and hospital exposures, and 432 (35.8%) had no identifiable source of exposure.

Transmission dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 within-host diversity in two major hospital outbreaks in South Africa

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) causes acute, highly transmissible respiratory infection in humans and a wide range of animal species. Its rapid global spread has resulted in a major public health emergency, necessitating commensurately rapid research to improve control strategies. In particular, the ability to effectively retrace transmission chains in outbreaks remains a major challenge, partly due to our limited understanding of the virus' underlying evolutionary dynamics within and between hosts. We used high-throughput sequencing whole-genome data coupled with bottleneck analysis to retrace the pathways of viral transmission in two nosocomial outbreaks that were previously characterised by epidemiological and phylogenetic methods. Additionally, we assessed the mutational landscape, selection pressures, and diversity at the within-host level for both outbreaks. Our findings show evidence of within-host selection and transmission of variants between samples. Both bottleneck and diversity analyses highlight within-host and consensus-level variants shared by putative source-recipient pairs in both outbreaks, suggesting that certain within-host variants in these outbreaks may have been transmitted upon infection rather than arising de novo independently within multiple hosts. Overall, our findings demonstrate the utility of combining within-host diversity and bottleneck estimations for elucidating transmission events in SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks, provide insight into the maintenance of viral genetic diversity, provide a list of candidate targets of positive selection for further investigation, and demonstrate that within-host variants can be transferred between patients. Together these results will help in developing strategies to understand the nature of transmission events and curtail the spread of SARS-CoV-2.