Age-related differences in function and structure of rSMG and reduced functional connectivity with DLPFC explains heightened emotional egocentricity bias in childhood

Influence of PCDH9 (rs9540720) and narcissistic personality traits on the incidence of major depressive disorder in Chinese first-year university students: findings from a 2-year cohort study

Objective: The objective of this study was to explore the influence of the polymorphism of the protocadherin 9 (PCDH9) gene and the narcissistic personality trait (NPT) on the risk of major depressive disorder (MDD) in Chinese first-year university students. Methods: A 2-year cohort study was conducted among Chinese first-year university students who were enrolled in 2018 from two universities in Shandong Province, China. The snapshot technique was used to detect the genotypes of PCDH9 (rs9540720). The Chinese version of the Composite International Diagnostic Interview was used for the MDD assessment. The NPTs were measured by 11 items based on DSM-IV. Patient Health Questionnaire-9 and the Beck Anxiety Inventory were used to assess depressive and anxiety symptoms, respectively. Logistic regression modeling was carried out to examine the relationship between rs9540720, NPTs, and the incidence of MDD. Results: A total of 5,327 students participated in the baseline and follow-up studies and provided their blood samples. PCDH9 (rs9540720) (ORGG+GA = 2.33, 95% CI: 1.35-4.02) and NPTs (OR5-9 = 2.26, 95% CI: 1.40-3.64) increased the risk of MDD onset. There was no multiplicative interaction between NPTs and Rs9540720 (OR = 1.51, 95% CI: 0.30-7.63). Furthermore, there was no additive interaction between them (RERI = 2.40, 95% CI: -0.82-5.62; AP = 0.47, 95% CI: -0.04-0.97; and S = 2.37, 95% CI: 0.54-10.33). Conclusion: PCDH9 (rs9540720) and more NPTs are the risk factors for the incidence of MDD in Chinese first-year university students.

WITHDRAWN: I feel your pain: Higher empathy is associated with higher posterior default mode network activity

The authors discovered an error in the primary analysis and have withdrawn the results from this version of the investigation.

Altered dynamic functional connectivity of the thalamus subregions in patients with schizophrenia

BACKGROUND

Previous neuroimaging studies indicated that patients with schizophrenia showed impaired thalamus and thalamo-cortical circuits. However, the dynamic functional connectivity (dFC) patterns of the thalamus remain unclear. In this study, we explored the dFC of the thalamus in SZ patients and whether clinical features are correlated with altered dFC.

METHODS

Forty-three patients with schizophrenia and 31 healthy controls underwent 3.0 T rs-fMRI. Based on the human Brainnetome atlas, the thalamus is divided into 8 subregions. Subsequently, we performed flexible least squares method to calculate the dFC of each thalamus subregions.

RESULTS

Compared with healthy controls, patients with schizophrenia exhibited increased dFC between the thalamus and cerebellar, visual-related cortex, sensorimotor-related cortex, and frontal lobe. In addition, we found that the dFC of the thalamus and the right fusiform gyrus was negatively associated with age of onset.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings demonstrated that the dFC of specific thalamus sub-regions is altered in patients with schizophrenia. Our results further suggested the dysconnectivity of thalamus plays an important role in the pathophysiology of schizophrenia.

Stress and the brain: Emotional support mediates the association between myelination in the right supramarginal gyrus and perceived chronic stress

Perceived stress, which refers to people's evaluation of a stressful event and their ability to cope with it, has emerged as a stable predictor for physical and mental health outcomes. Increasing evidence has suggested the buffering effect of social support on perceived stress. Although previous studies have investigated the brain structural features (e.g., gray matter volume) associated with perceived stress, less is known about the association between perceived chronic stress and intra-cortical myelin (ICM), which is an important microstructure of brain and is essential for healthy brain functions, and the role of social support in this association. Using a sample of 1076 healthy young adults drawn from the Human Connectome Project, we quantified the ICMby the contrast of T1w and T2w images and examined its association with perceived chronic stress during the last month and social support. Behavioral results showed that perceived chronic stress was negatively associated with both emotional support and instrumental support. Vertex-wise multiple regression analyses revealed that higher level of perceived chronic stress was significantly associated with lower ICM content of a cluster in the right supramarginal gyrus (rSMG). Interestingly, the emotional support, but not the instrumental support, significantly mediated the association of perceived chronic stress with ICM in the rSMG. Overall, the present study provides novel evidence for the cortical myelination of perceived chronic stress in humans and highlights the essential role of the rSMG in perceived chronic stress and emotional support.

Anonymity in sharing morally salient news: the causal role of the temporoparietal junction

Considering the crucial role of morality in shaping one’s reputation, exploring factors that modulate people’s decision to share morally salient news is important. Previous studies suggested that self-expression and socializing are 2 key factors for news-sharing behaviors, suggesting the key role of anonymity in such decisions. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), the present study focused on how anonymity modulates the sharing of morally salient information, as well as its neural mechanisms. Results showed that compared to moral news, people were more reluctant to share immoral news, especially when they share it with their real names shown. On the neural level, we found that this effect was associated with the activity of the left temporoparietal junction (TPJ), as well as its functional connection to its right counterpart. Dynamic causal modeling analysis revealed the moral valence of news and the anonymity of sharing modulated the effective connectivity between the left TPJ and the middle frontal gyrus as well as the medial frontal gyrus. There was no significant difference when sharing news anonymously. Further, a followed-up tDCS experiment supported the causal role of the left TPJ in this behavioral effect. Taken together, these results suggested that people concern more about social repercussion, when they share the news with their real-names shown, especially when sharing immoral news, and this effect is associated with stronger neural activation in the left TPJ, as well as changes in its functional connectivity with other brain regions.

Associations between digital media use and brain surface structural measures in preschool-aged children

The American Academy of Pediatrics recommends limits on digital media use ("screen time"), citing cognitive-behavioral risks. Media use in early childhood is ubiquitous, though few imaging-based studies have been conducted to quantify impacts on brain development. Cortical morphology changes dynamically from infancy through adulthood and is associated with cognitive-behavioral abilities. The current study involved 52 children who completed MRI and cognitive testing at a single visit. The MRI protocol included a high-resolution T1-weighted anatomical scan. The child's parent completed the ScreenQ composite measure of media use. MRI measures included cortical thickness (CT) and sulcal depth (SD) across the cerebrum. ScreenQ was applied as a predictor of CT and SD first in whole-brain regression analyses and then for regions of interest (ROIs) identified in a prior study of screen time involving adolescents, controlling for sex, age and maternal education. Higher ScreenQ scores were correlated with lower CT in right-lateralized occipital, parietal, temporal and fusiform areas, and also lower SD in right-lateralized inferior temporal/fusiform areas, with substantially greater statistical significance in ROI-based analyses. These areas support primary visual and higher-order processing and align with prior findings in adolescents. While differences in visual areas likely reflect maturation, those in higher-order areas may suggest under-development, though further studies are needed.

Effective connectivity reveals distinctive patterns in response to others' genuine affective experience of disgust

Empathy is significantly influenced by the identification of others' emotions. In a recent study, we have found increased activation in the anterior insular cortex (aIns) that could be attributed to affect sharing rather than perceptual saliency, when seeing another person genuinely experiencing pain as opposed to merely acting to be in pain. In that prior study, effective connectivity between aIns and the right supramarginal gyrus (rSMG) was revealed to represent what another person really feels. In the present study, we used a similar paradigm to investigate the corresponding neural signatures in the domain of empathy for disgust - with participants seeing others genuinely sniffing unpleasant odors as compared to pretending to smell something disgusting (in fact the disgust expressions in both conditions were acted for reasons of experimental control). Consistent with the previous findings on pain, we found stronger activations in aIns associated with affect sharing for genuine disgust (inferred) compared with pretended disgust. However, instead of rSMG we found engagement of the olfactory cortex. Using dynamic causal modeling (DCM), we estimated the neural dynamics of aIns and the olfactory cortex between the genuine and pretended conditions. This revealed an increased excitatory modulatory effect for genuine disgust compared to pretended disgust. For genuine disgust only, brain-to-behavior regression analyses highlighted a link between the observed modulatory effect and a few empathic traits. Altogether, the current findings complement and expand our previous work, by showing that perceptual saliency alone does not explain responses in the insular cortex. Moreover, it reveals that different brain networks are implicated in a modality-specific way when sharing the affective experiences associated with pain vs. disgust.

Emotional Ego- and Altercentric Biases in High-Functioning Autism Spectrum Disorder: Behavioral and Neurophysiological Evidence

Self-other distinction is a crucial aspect of social cognition, as it allows us to differentiate our own mental and emotional states from those of others. Research suggests that this ability might be impaired in individuals on the autism spectrum, but convincing evidence of self-other distinction difficulties in the emotional domain is lacking. Here we aimed at evaluating emotional self-other distinction abilities in autistic and non-autistic adults, in two behavioral pilot studies and one fMRI study. By using a newly developed virtual ball-tossing game that induced simultaneous positive and negative emotional states in each participant and another person, we were able to measure emotional egocentric and altercentric biases (namely the tendency to ascribe self-/other-related emotions to others/ourselves, respectively). Despite no behavioral differences, individuals on the autism spectrum showed decreased activation (1) in the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) during active overcoming of the emotional egocentric bias vs. passive game viewing, and (2) in the right supramarginal gyrus (rSMG) during ego- vs. altercentric biases, compared to neurotypical participants. These results suggest a different recruitment of these two regions in autistic individuals when dealing with conflicting emotional states of oneself and another person. Furthermore, they highlight the importance of considering different control conditions when interpreting the involvement of rTPJ and rSMG during self-other distinction processes.

Resting-State Functional Connectivity Associated With Extraversion and Agreeableness in Adolescence

Although adolescence is a period in which developmental changes occur in brain connectivity, personality formation, and peer interaction, few studies have examined the neural correlates of personality dimensions related to social behavior within adolescent samples. The current study aims to investigate whether adolescents’ brain functional connectivity is associated with extraversion and agreeableness, personality dimensions linked to peer acceptance, social network size, and friendship quality. Considering sex-variant neural maturation in adolescence, we also examined sex-specific associations between personality and functional connectivity. Using resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data from a community sample of 70 adolescents aged 12–15, we examined associations between self-reported extraversion and agreeableness and seed-to-whole brain connectivity with the amygdala as a seed region of interest. Then, using 415 brain regions that correspond to 8 major brain networks and subcortex, we explored neural connectivity within brain networks and across the whole-brain. We conducted group-level multiple regression analyses with the regressors of extraversion, agreeableness, and their interactions with sex. Results demonstrated that amygdala connectivity with the postcentral gyrus, middle temporal gyrus, and the temporal pole is positively associated with extraversion in girls and negatively associated with extraversion in boys. Agreeableness was positively associated with amygdala connectivity with the middle occipital cortex and superior parietal cortex, in the same direction for boys and girls. Results of the whole-brain connectivity analysis revealed that the connectivity of the postcentral gyrus, located in the dorsal attention network, with regions in default mode network (DMN), salience/ventral attention network, and control network (CON) was associated with extraversion, with most connections showing positive associations in girls and negative associations in boys. For agreeableness, results of the within-network connectivity analysis showed that connections within the limbic network were positively associated with agreeableness in boys while negatively associated with or not associated with agreeableness in girls. Results suggest that intrinsic functional connectivity may contribute to adolescents’ individual differences in extraversion and agreeableness and highlights sex-specific neural connectivity patterns associated with the two personality dimensions. This study deepens our understanding of the neurobiological correlates of adolescent personality that may lead to different developmental trajectories of social experience.

Neural dynamics between anterior insular cortex and right supramarginal gyrus dissociate genuine affect sharing from perceptual saliency of pretended pain

Empathy for pain engages both shared affective responses and self-other distinction. In this study, we addressed the highly debated question of whether neural responses previously linked to affect sharing could result from the perception of salient affective displays. Moreover, we investigated how the brain network involved in affect sharing and self-other distinction underpinned our response to a pain that is either perceived as genuine or pretended (while in fact both were acted for reasons of experimental control). We found stronger activations in regions associated with affect sharing (anterior insula [aIns] and anterior mid-cingulate cortex) as well as with affective self-other distinction (right supramarginal gyrus [rSMG]), in participants watching video clips of genuine vs. pretended facial expressions of pain. Using dynamic causal modeling, we then assessed the neural dynamics between the right aIns and rSMG in these two conditions. This revealed a reduced inhibitory effect on the aIns to rSMG connection for genuine pain compared to pretended pain. For genuine pain only, brain-to-behavior regression analyses highlighted a linkage between this inhibitory effect on the one hand, and pain ratings as well as empathic traits on the other. These findings imply that if the pain of others is genuine and thus calls for an appropriate empathic response, neural responses in the aIns indeed seem related to affect sharing and self-other distinction is engaged to avoid empathic over-arousal. In contrast, if others merely pretend to be in pain, the perceptual salience of their painful expression results in neural responses that are down-regulated to avoid inappropriate affect sharing and social support.

Variability in Brain Structure and Function Reflects Lack of Peer Support

Humans are a highly social species. Complex interactions for mutual support range from helping neighbors to building social welfare institutions. During times of distress or crisis, sharing life experiences within one's social circle is critical for well-being. By translating pattern-learning algorithms to the UK Biobank imaging-genetics cohort (n = ~40 000 participants), we have delineated manifestations of regular social support in multimodal whole-brain measurements. In structural brain variation, we identified characteristic volumetric signatures in the salience and limbic networks for high- versus low-social support individuals. In patterns derived from functional coupling, we also located interindividual differences in social support in action-perception circuits related to binding sensory cues and initiating behavioral responses. In line with our demographic profiling analysis, the uncovered neural substrates have potential implications for loneliness, substance misuse, and resilience to stress.

Decreased emotional reactivity after 3-month socio-affective but not attention- or meta-cognitive-based mental training: A randomized, controlled, longitudinal fMRI study

Meditation-based mental training interventions show physical and mental health benefits. However, it remains unclear how different types of mental practice affect emotion processing at both the neuronal and the behavioural level. In the context of the ReSource project, 332 participants underwent an fMRI scan while performing an emotion anticipation task before and after three 3-month training modules cultivating 1) attention and interoceptive awareness (Presence); 2) socio-affective skills, such as compassion (Affect); 3) socio-cognitive skills, such as theory of mind (Perspective). Only the Affect module led to a significant reduction of experienced negative affect when processing images depicting human suffering. In addition, after the Affect module, participants showed significant increased activation in the right supramarginal gyrus when confronted with negative stimuli. We conclude that socio-affective, but not attention- or meta-cognitive based mental training is specifically effective to improve emotion regulation capabilities when facing adversity.

How Much of Me Do I See in Other Minds? Modulating Egocentricity in Emotion Judgments by tDCS

When inferring the mental states of others, individuals’ judgments are influenced by their own state of mind, an effect often referred to as egocentricity. Self–other differentiation is key for an accurate interpretation of other’s mental states, especially when these differ from one’s own states. It has been suggested that the right supramarginal gyrus (rSMG) is causally involved in overcoming egocentricity in the affective domain. In a double-blind randomized study, 47 healthy adults received anodal (1 mA, 20 min) or sham transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to the rSMG prior to performing a newly developed paradigm, the self–other facial emotion judgment (SOFE) task. In this task, participants made judgments of facial emotional expressions while having been previously confronted with congruent or incongruent emotion-inducing situations. To differentiate between emotional and cognitive egocentricity, participants additionally completed an established visual perspective-taking task. Our results confirmed the occurrence of emotional egocentric biases during the SOFE task. No conclusive evidence of a general role of the rSMG in emotional egocentricity was found. However, active as compared to sham tDCS induced descriptively lower egocentric biases when judging incongruent fearful faces, and stronger biases when judging incongruent happy faces, suggesting emotion-specific tDCS effects on egocentric biases. Further, we found significant tDCS effects on cognitive egocentricity. Results of the present study expanded our understanding of emotional egocentricity and point towards emotion-specific patterns of the underlying functionality.

Visual similarity and psychological closeness are neurally dissociable in the brain response to vicarious pain

Personal and vicarious experience of pain activate partially overlapping brain networks. This brain activity is further modulated by low- and high-order factors, e.g., the perceived intensity of the model's pain and the model's similarity with the onlooker, respectively. We investigated which specific aspect of similarity modulates such empathic reactivity, focusing on the potential differentiation between visual similarity and psychological closeness between the onlooker and different types of models. To this aim, we recorded fMRI data in neurotypical participants who observed painful and tactile stimuli delivered to an adult human hand, a baby human hand, a puppy dog paw, and an anthropomorphic robotic hand. The interaction between type of vicarious experience (pain, touch) and nature of model (adult, baby, dog, robot) showed that the right supramarginal gyrus (rSMG) was selectively active for visual similarity (more active during vicarious pain for the adult and baby models), while the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) was more sensitive to psychological closeness (specifically linked to vicarious pain for the baby model). These findings indicate that visual similarity and psychological closeness between onlooker and model differentially affect the activity of brain regions specifically implied in encoding interindividual sharing of sensorimotor and affective aspects of vicarious pain, respectively.

First-Person Virtual Embodiment Modulates the Cortical Network that Encodes the Bodily Self and Its Surrounding Space during the Experience of Domestic Violence

Social aggression, such as domestic violence, has been associated with a reduced ability to take on others’ perspectives. In this naturalistic imaging study, we investigated whether training human participants to take on a first-person embodied perspective during the experience of domestic violence enhances the identification with the victim and elicits brain activity associated with the monitoring of the body and surrounding space and the experience of threat. We combined fMRI measurements with preceding virtual reality exposure from either first-person perspective (1PP) or third-person perspective (3PP) to manipulate whether the domestic abuse stimulus was perceived as directed to oneself or another. We found that 1PP exposure increased body ownership and identification with the virtual victim. Furthermore, when the stimulus was perceived as directed toward oneself, the brain network that encodes the bodily self and its surrounding space was more strongly synchronized across participants and connectivity increased from premotor cortex (PM) and intraparietal sulcus towards superior parietal lobe. Additionally, when the stimulus came near the body, brain activity in the amygdala (AMG) strongly synchronized across participants. Exposure to 3PP reduced synchronization of brain activity in the personal space network, increased modulation of visual areas and strengthened functional connectivity between PM, supramarginal gyrus and primary visual cortex. In conclusion, our results suggest that 1PP embodiment training enhances experience from the viewpoint of the virtual victim, which is accompanied by synchronization in the fronto-parietal network to predict actions toward the body and in the AMG to signal the proximity of the stimulus.

Two systems for thinking about others' thoughts in the developing brain

The ability to reason about other people’s thoughts and beliefs characterizes the complex social interaction among humans. This ability, called Theory of Mind (ToM), has long been argued to develop around 4 y when children start explicitly reasoning about others' beliefs. However, when tested nonverbally, infants already show action expectations congruent with others’ beliefs before the age of 2 y. Do these behaviors reflect different systems for understanding others’ minds—an early and a later developing one—or when does ToM develop? We show that these abilities are supported by the maturation of independent brain networks, suggesting different systems for explicit verbal ToM and early nonverbal action expectations.

Human social interaction crucially relies on the ability to infer what other people think. Referred to as Theory of Mind (ToM), this ability has long been argued to emerge around 4 y of age when children start passing traditional verbal ToM tasks. This developmental dogma has recently been questioned by nonverbal ToM tasks passed by infants younger than 2 y of age. How do young children solve these tests, and what is their relation to the later-developing verbal ToM reasoning? Are there two different systems for nonverbal and verbal ToM, and when is the developmental onset of mature adult ToM? To address these questions, we related markers of cortical brain structure (i.e., cortical thickness and surface area) of 3- and 4-y-old children to their performance in novel nonverbal and traditional verbal TM tasks. We showed that verbal ToM reasoning was supported by cortical surface area and thickness of the precuneus and temporoparietal junction, classically involved in ToM in adults. Nonverbal ToM reasoning, in contrast, was supported by the cortical structure of a distinct and independent neural network including the supramarginal gyrus also involved in emotional and visual perspective taking, action observation, and social attention or encoding biases. This neural dissociation suggests two systems for reasoning about others’ minds—mature verbal ToM that emerges around 4 y of age, whereas nonverbal ToM tasks rely on different earlier-developing possibly social-cognitive processes.

Connectivity patterns of cognitive control network in first episode medication-naive depression and remitted depression

BACKGROUND

Cognitive dysfunctions, such as impaired cognitive control, are frequently observed in patients with major depressive disorder (MDD). Although the cognitive control network (CCN) is widely considered a core feature of major depressive disorder (MDD), the relationship between cognitive dysfunction and symptom dimensions remains unclear. This study investigated differences in resting-state functional connectivity of the cognitive control network (CCN) between first-episode medication-naive MDD patients and remitted MDD.

METHODS

We collected resting-state functional MRI (rs-fMRI) data from 22 first-episode medication-naive major depressive disorder (fMDD) patients, 20 patients previously diagnosed with MDD in the remitted phase of depression (rMDD), and 20 healthy controls (HC). The CCN was derived from fMRI images using independent component analysis (ICA), a data-driven image analysis method.

RESULTS

Changes in functional connectivity (FC) within the CCN was mainly attenuated in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the left inferior parietal lobule, while strengthened in the right dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and the right insula in both fMDD and rMDD groups. Compared with the fMDD group, the rMDD group had decreased FC in the bilateral insula and the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Further analysis explored that the FC in the bilateral insula, the right dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and the right inferior parietal lobule were correlated positively cognitive disturbance factor scores in both patients groups.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings are in agreement with the previous findings that the cognitive control network are impaired in MDD. Furthermore, our results suggest that the alteration of CCN might underpin the cognitive disturbance and the distinct patterns of the CCN between fMDD and rMDD patients may be an important target for effective cognitive remediation in MDD.

Do you hear what I see? An audio-visual paradigm to assess emotional egocentricity bias

We often use our own emotions to understand other people's emotions. However, emotional egocentric biases (EEB), namely the tendency to use one's own emotional state when relating to others' emotions, may hinder this process, especially when emotions are incongruent. We capitalised on the classic EEB task to develop a new version that is easier to implement and control. Unlike the original EEB task that relies on a combination of private (e.g. touch) and public (e.g. vision) sensory information, our EEB task (AV-EEB) used audio-visual stimuli to evoke congruent/incongruent emotions in participants. Auditory and visual signals are both public, in that they can be shared among individuals, and make the task easier to implement and control. We provide lab-based and online validations of the AV-EEB, and demonstrate a positive relationship between EEB and social negative potency. This new, easily implemented version of the EEB task can accelerate the investigation of egocentricity biases in several research areas.

Functional connectivity of reflective and brooding rumination in depressed and healthy women

Ruminative thinking is related to an increased risk for major depressive disorder (MDD) and perpetuates negative mood states. Rumination, uncontrollable negative thoughts about the self, may comprise both reflective and brooding components. However, only brooding rumination is consistently associated with increased negativity bias and negative coping styles, while reflective rumination has a less clear relationship with negative outcomes in healthy and depressed participants. The current study examined seed-to-voxel (S2.V) resting-state functional connectivity (FC) in a sample of healthy (HC) and depressed (MDD) adult women (HC: n=50, MDD: n=33). The S2V FC of six key brain regions, including the left and right amygdala, anterior and posterior cingulate cortex (ACC, PCC), and medial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices (mPFC, dlPFC), was correlated with self-reported reflective and brooding rumination. Results indicate that HC and MDD participants had increased brooding rumination associated with decreased FC between the left amygdala and the right temporal pole. Moreover, reflective rumination was associated with distinct FC of the mPFC, PCC, and ACC with parietal, occipital, and cingulate regions. Depressed participants, compared with HC, exhibited decreased FC between the PCC and a region in the right middle frontal gyrus. The results of the current study add to the understanding of the neural underpinnings of different forms of self-related cognition-brooding and reflective rumination-in healthy and depressed women.

Egocentric bias in emotional understanding of children and adults

This study examined whether egocentric bias in emotional understanding occurs in children and adults. Children aged 8 and 9 years (third graders), 11 and 12 years (sixth graders), and 15 and 16 years (tenth graders), as well as adults, participated. They were presented with two types of stories in both negative and positive contexts. In one story, an actor intentionally harmed or helped a protagonist. In the other story, an actor accidentally harmed or helped a protagonist. In the knowledge condition, the protagonists in both stories watched the actors and therefore knew that the actors intentionally or accidentally harmed or helped. In the ignorance condition, the protagonists in both stories did not watch the actors and therefore did not know the actors' intentions. Participants were asked which protagonists felt sadder or happier. Not only in the knowledge condition but also in the ignorance condition, all age groups judged that the protagonists who were harmed or helped by the actors' intentional actions felt sadder or happier than the protagonists who were harmed or helped by the actors' accidental actions, aligning with participants' current knowledge. This tendency was greater in third and sixth graders than in tenth graders and adults. These results indicate that egocentric bias in emotional understanding occurred irrespective of age and negative or positive context, although this bias was stronger at younger ages.

Empathy and emotion regulation: An integrative account

How we understand and respond to others' emotions (i.e., empathy) may be influenced by the regulatory processes that are used to shape which emotions we and others have (i.e., emotion regulation). Empathy and emotion regulation are complex multidimensional constructs and the relationship between their component processes is not well characterized. To enable future work to examine their relationship more closely, this chapter presents an integrative framework of empathy and emotion regulation. We begin by delineating the component processes that underlie empathy and emotion regulation, and the neural underpinnings of these processes. We then present an integrative framework describing the processes of empathy and how these may be acted upon by distinct regulatory strategies. We conclude with a brief consideration of contextual influences on empathy and emotion regulation using a reward-based heuristic.

Unique brain regions involved in positive versus negative emotional modulation of pain

Background and aims

Research has shown that negative emotions increase perceived pain whereas positive emotions reduce pain. Here we aim to investigate the neural mechanisms underlying this phenomenon.

Methods

While undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging of the brain, 20 healthy adult females were presented with negative, neutral, and positive emotion-evoking visual stimuli in combination with the presentation of a noxious thermal stimulus to the hand. Participants rated the intensity and unpleasantness of the noxious thermal stimulus during each of the valence conditions. General linear model analyses were performed on the imaging data for each valence condition and specific contrasts were run.

Results

Significant differences were detected for the emotional modulation of pain (EMP) between the positive and negative conditions. Unique to the positive condition, there was increased activity in the inferior parietal, parahippocampal/perirhinal, precuneus/superior parietal, and the prefrontal cortices. Unique to the negative condition, there was increased activity in anterior and posterior cingulate and angular gyrus.

Conclusions

Positive and negative EMP appear to involve different brain regions.

Implications

Although there is some overlap in the brain regions involved in the positive and negative EMP, brain regions unique to each condition are identified and, moreover, the regions identified are involved in internal and external focus, respectively, pointing to a potential mechanism underlying this phenomenon.

Dissociating Empathy From Perspective-Taking: Evidence From Intra- and Inter-Individual Differences Research

Humans have the capacity to share others' emotions, be they positive or negative. Elicited by the observed or imagined emotion of another person, an observer develops a similar emotional state herself. This capacity, empathy, is one of the pillars of social understanding and interaction as it creates a representation of another's inner, mental state. Empathy needs to be dissociated from other social emotions and, crucially, also from cognitive mechanisms of understanding others, the ability to take others' perspective. Here, we describe the conceptual distinctions of these constructs and review behavioral and neural evidence that dissociates them. The main focus of the present review lies on the intraindividual changes in empathy and perspective-taking across the lifespan and on interindividual differences on subclinical and clinical levels. The data show that empathy and perspective-taking recruit distinct neural circuits and can be discerned already during early and throughout adult development. Both capacities also vary substantially between situations and people. Differences can be systematically related to situational characteristics as well as personality traits and mental disorders. The clear distinction of affect sharing from other social emotions like compassion and from cognitive perspective-taking, argues for a clear-cut terminology to describe these constructs. In our view, this speaks against using empathy as an umbrella term encompassing all affective and cognitive routes to understanding others. Unifying the way we speak about these phenomena will help to further research on their underlying mechanisms, psychopathological alterations, and plasticity in training and therapy.

Yoga Practitioners Uniquely Activate the Superior Parietal Lobule and Supramarginal Gyrus During Emotion Regulation

Chronic stress contributes to both mental and physical illness. A high prevalence and cost of stress-related illnesses North America warrants investigation into alternative or complementary therapies which may help reduce adverse reactions to stressful stimuli. Emotion regulation is the process of monitoring and adjusting emotional responses to environmental stimuli and stressors. Individuals who participate in physical activity are less likely to have adverse responses to potentially stressful situations, potentially due to adaptions in emotion regulation. Yoga is a form of physical activity involving stretching exercises and meditation, that may lessen individuals’ levels of stress and anxiety and improve emotion regulation. High-frequency heart rate variability (HF-HRV) is considered a measure of parasympathetic nervous system (PNS) activity during the emotion regulation. Measuring HRV and brain activity using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) offers a useful, noninvasive approach to evaluating “neurovisceral” components of emotion regulation. We aimed to determine whether yoga practitioners (YP) exhibit different patterns of brain activation compared to recreational athletes (RA) without current yoga experience, while viewing emotionally arousing visual stimuli. Our secondary aim was to examine potential differences across groups in HRV throughout the presentation of these stimuli. Analysis of fMRI data during exposure to emotion-evoking (EE) stimuli revealed that the YP group activated two unique brain areas, namely the superior parietal lobule and the supramarginal gyrus. These areas have been associated with attentional awareness and reduced egocentric bias, processes that have been implicated in emotion regulation by others. The RA group activated the inferior middle frontal cortex, an area associated with cognitive reappraisal during emotion regulation. The YP group also demonstrated a trend towards a higher ratio of low- to high-frequency HRV compared to the RA group. The present findings support the presence of experience-dependent neurovisceral mechanisms associated with emotion regulation. Individuals who practice yoga regulate their neurovisceral responses to potentially stressful external stimuli in a different manner than recreational athletes who do not engage in yoga practice. The present study had a small sample size (RA: n = 12; YP: n = 19), which should be taken into account when interpreting the results.

Emotional Empathy as a Mechanism of Synchronisation in Child-Robot Interaction

Simulating emotional experience, emotional empathy is the fundamental ingredient of interpersonal communication. In the speaker-listener scenario, the speaker is always a child, the listener is a human or a toy robot. Two groups of neurotypical children aged 6 years on average composed the population: one Japanese (n = 20) and one French (n = 20). Revealing potential similarities in communicative exchanges in both groups when in contact with a human or a toy robot, the results might signify that emotional empathy requires the implication of an automatic identification. In this sense, emotional empathy might be considered a broad idiosyncrasy, a kind of synchronisation, offering the mind a peculiar form of communication. Our findings seem to be consistent with the assumption that children's brains would be constructed to simulate the feelings of others in order to ensure interpersonal synchronisation.

Pain Mirrors: Neural Correlates of Observing Self or Others' Facial Expressions of Pain

Facial expressions of pain are able to elicit empathy and adaptive behavioral responses in the observer. An influential theory posits that empathy relies on an affective mirror mechanism, according to which emotion recognition relies upon the internal simulation of motor and interoceptive states triggered by emotional stimuli. We tested this hypothesis comparing representations of self or others' expressions of pain in nineteen young healthy female volunteers by means of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We hypothesized that one's own facial expressions are more likely to elicit the internal simulation of emotions, being more strictly related to self. Video-clips of the facial expressions of each volunteer receiving either painful or non-painful mechanical stimulations to their right hand dorsum were recorded and used as stimuli in a 2 × 2 (Self/Other; Pain/No-Pain) within-subject design. During each trial, a 2 s video clip was presented, displaying either the subject's own neutral or painful facial expressions (Self No-Pain, SNP; Self Pain, SP), or the expressions of other unfamiliar volunteers (Others' No-Pain, ONP; Others' Pain, OP), displaying a comparable emotional intensity. Participants were asked to indicate whether each video displayed a pain expression. fMRI signals were higher while viewing Pain than No-Pain stimuli in a large bilateral array of cortical areas including middle and superior temporal, supramarginal, superior mesial and inferior frontal (IFG) gyri, anterior insula (AI), anterior cingulate (ACC), and anterior mid-cingulate (aMCC) cortex, as well as right fusiform gyrus. Bilateral activations were also detected in thalamus and basal ganglia. The Self vs. Other contrast showed signal changes in ACC and aMCC, IFG, AI, and parietal cortex. A significant interaction between Self and Pain [(SP vs. SNP) >(OP vs. ONP)] was found in a pre-defined region of aMCC known to be also active during noxious stimulation. These findings demonstrate that the observation of one's own and others' facial expressions share a largely common neural network, but self-related stimuli induce generally higher activations. In line with our hypothesis, selectively greater activity for self pain-related stimuli was found in aMCC, a medial-wall region critical for pain perception and recognition.

Evidence for Depressogenic Spontaneous Thoughts and Altered Resting-State Connectivity in Adolescents With a Maltreatment History

OBJECTIVE

Childhood maltreatment has been associated with major depressive disorder (MDD). Atypical self-generated thoughts (SGT), lacking in positive and privileging negative content-a feature of ruminative thinking-might represent one vulnerability factor for developing depression. Rumination in MDD has been linked to alterations in resting-state functional connectivity (RSFC) of the subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC) to the default mode network and the fronto-parietal network (FPN). This study aimed to investigate online SGT content and its variability, as well as sgACC RSFC, as potential risk markers for depression in adolescents who experienced maltreatment.

METHOD

Adolescents 12 to 16 years old (29 with maltreatment history [MT] and 39 with no maltreatment history [NMT]) performed an established mind-wandering task. Participants made nondemanding number discriminations during which intermittent questions probed their SGTs that were classified as off-task, positive, negative, self-related, other-related, past-oriented, or future-oriented. Resting-state data were acquired separately for 22 of 29 MT and 27 39 NMT adolescents, and seed-based functional connectivity analyses of the sgACC were performed.

RESULTS

MT, relative to the NMT adolescents, generated significantly fewer positively valenced thoughts, and exhibited more extreme ratings for positively valenced thoughts. MT adolescents also showed significantly reduced RSFC between the sgACC and the FPN. Group differences in depressive symptoms between the MT and NMT adolescents were partly accounted by differences in sgACC-FPN RSFC.

CONCLUSION

Adolescents who experienced maltreatment show a reduction in positively valenced spontaneous thoughts and reduced sgACC-FPN RSFC at the neural level. These may contribute to a ruminative thinking style, representing risk factors for developing depression later in life.

Very early hallucinatory experiences: a school-based study

BACKGROUND

The prevalence and clinical significance of hallucinatory experiences among children below 7 years of age remain unknown. We aimed to determine the independent influences of sensory deficits, the presence of an imaginary companion and metacognition on hallucinatory experiences. We assumed that hallucinatory experiences were associated with (a) sensory deficits, (b) the presence of an imaginary companion (IC) and (c) metacognition defaults (i.e. first- and second-order theory of mind default).

METHODS

All children in the third year of preschool from a region of Northern France underwent medical screening. We compared the prevalence rates of visual, auditory and audio-visual hallucinatory experiences based on (a) the presence of visual or auditory deficits, (b) the actual presence of an IC and (c) metacognition. The analyses were adjusted for age.

RESULTS

A total of 1,087 children aged between 5 and 7 years were included. The prevalence rates of auditory, visual and audio-visual hallucinatory experiences were 15.8%, 12.5% and 5.8%, respectively. The prevalences of different types of hallucinatory experiences were not significantly different according to sensory deficit. The prevalences of all types of hallucinatory experiences were significantly higher among children with an IC and among children with metacognition defaults.

CONCLUSIONS

The association between hallucinatory experiences and sensory deficits might concern only long-lasting deficits. The association with the presence of an IC confirms experimental findings of the likelihood of perceiving words among meaningless auditory stimuli. Relations between hallucinatory experiences and theory of mind need to be addressed in longitudinal studies.

Through your eyes or mine? The neural correlates of mental state recognition in Huntington's disease

Huntington's disease (HD) can impair social cognition. This study investigated whether patients with HD exhibit neural differences to healthy controls when they are considering mental and physical states relating to the static expressions of human eyes. Thirty-two patients with HD and 28 age-matched controls were scanned with fMRI during two versions of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task: The standard version requiring mental state judgments, and a comparison version requiring judgments about age. HD was associated with behavioral deficits on only the mental state eyes task. Contrasting the two versions of the eyes task (mental state > age judgment) revealed hypoactivation within left middle frontal gyrus and supramarginal gyrus in HD. Subgroup analyses comparing premanifest HD patients to age-matched controls revealed reduced activity in right supramarginal gyrus and increased activity in anterior cingulate during mental state recognition in these patients, while manifest HD was associated with hypoactivity in left insula and left supramarginal gyrus. When controlling for the effects of healthy aging, manifest patients exhibited declining activation within areas including right temporal pole. Our findings provide compelling evidence for a selective impairment of internal emotional status when patients with HD appraise facial features in order to make social judgements. Differential activity in temporal and anterior cingulate cortices may suggest that poor emotion regulation and emotional egocentricity underlie impaired mental state recognition in premanifest patients, while more extensive mental state recognition impairments in manifest disease reflect dysfunction in neural substrates underlying executive functions, and the experience and interpretation of emotion.

Lower cognitive control network connectivity in stroke participants with depressive features

Around one-third of people develop depression following ischaemic stroke, yet the underlying mechanisms are poorly understood. Post-stroke depression has been linked to frontal infarcts, mainly lesions in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). But depression is a network disorder that cannot be fully characterised through lesion-symptom mapping. Researchers of depression in non-stroke populations have successfully tapped into the cognitive control network (CCN) using the bilateral DLPFC as a seed, and found that CCN resting-state connectivity is reduced in even mildly depressed subjects, compared to healthy controls. Hence, we aimed to investigate the association between post-stroke depressive features and the CCN resting-state connectivity in a stroke population. We analysed DLPFC resting-state connectivity in 64 stroke participants, 20 of whom showed depressive features assessed with the Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9) at 3 months after stroke. We directly compared groups showing symptoms of depression with those who did not, and performed a regression with PHQ-9 scores in all participants, controlling for age, gender, lesion volume and stroke severity. Post-stroke depression was associated with lower connectivity between the left DLPFC and the right supramarginal gyrus (SMG) in both group and regression analyses. Neither the seed nor the results overlapped with stroke lesions. These findings confirm an important role of the left DLPFC in post-stroke depression, but now show that large-scale network disruptions following stroke associated with depressive features occur without lesions in the DLPFC.

Empathy: The Role of Expectations

To what extent can we feel what someone else feels? Data from neuroscience suggest that empathy is supported by a simulation process, namely the neural activation of the same or similar regions that subserve the representation of specific states in the observer. However, expectations significantly modulate sensory input, including affective information. For example, expecting painful stimulation can decrease the neural signal and the subjective experience thereof. For an accurate representation of the other person’s state, such top-down processes would have to be simulated as well. However, this is only partly possible, because expectations are usually acquired by learning. Therefore, it is important to be aware of possible misleading simulations that lead to misinterpretations of someone’s state.

Structural plasticity of the social brain: Differential change after socio-affective and cognitive mental training

Although neuroscientific research has revealed experience-dependent brain changes across the life span in sensory, motor, and cognitive domains, plasticity relating to social capacities remains largely unknown. To investigate whether the targeted mental training of different cognitive and social skills can induce specific changes in brain morphology, we collected longitudinal magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) data throughout a 9-month mental training intervention from a large sample of adults between 20 and 55 years of age. By means of various daily mental exercises and weekly instructed group sessions, training protocols specifically addressed three functional domains: (i) mindfulness-based attention and interoception, (ii) socio-affective skills (compassion, dealing with difficult emotions, and prosocial motivation), and (iii) socio-cognitive skills (cognitive perspective-taking on self and others and metacognition). MRI-based cortical thickness analyses, contrasting the different training modules against each other, indicated spatially diverging changes in cortical morphology. Training of present-moment focused attention mostly led to increases in cortical thickness in prefrontal regions, socio-affective training induced plasticity in frontoinsular regions, and socio-cognitive training included change in inferior frontal and lateral temporal cortices. Module-specific structural brain changes correlated with training-induced behavioral improvements in the same individuals in domain-specific measures of attention, compassion, and cognitive perspective-taking, respectively, and overlapped with task-relevant functional networks. Our longitudinal findings indicate structural plasticity in well-known socio-affective and socio-cognitive brain networks in healthy adults based on targeted short daily mental practices. These findings could promote the development of evidence-based mental training interventions in clinical, educational, and corporate settings aimed at cultivating social intelligence, prosocial motivation, and cooperation.

The impact of empathy and reappraisal on emotional intensity recognition

Empathy represents a fundamental ability that allows for the creation and cultivation of social bonds. As part of the empathic process, individuals use their own emotional state to interpret the content and intensity of other people's emotions. Therefore, the current study was designed to test two hypotheses: (1) empathy for the pain of another will result in biased emotional intensity judgment; and (2) changing one's emotion via emotion regulation will modulate these biased judgments. To test these hypotheses, in experiment one we used a modified version of a well-known task that triggers an empathic reaction We found that empathy resulted in biased emotional intensity judgment. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of a bias in the recognition of emotional facial expressions as a function of empathy for pain. In experiment two, we replicated these findings in an independent sample, and further found that this biased emotional intensity judgment can be moderated via reappraisal. Taken together, our findings suggest that the novel task used here can be employed to further explore the relation between emotion regulation and empathy.

Imaging empathy and prosocial emotions

Empathy is a multi-faceted construct with important implications for social behavior. Based on a selective review of the neuroscientific evidence collected in humans, the present paper discusses the neural representations underlying affect sharing, its relation to mentalizing, the importance of self-other distinction, the distinction between empathy, sympathy and compassion, and how these phenomena are linked to prosocial behavior. Apart from reviewing the literature, we also highlight open questions and how they might be addressed by a research approach that tries to integrate across these diverse constructs.

When You're Happy and I Know It: Four-Year-Olds' Emotional Perspective Taking During Online Language Comprehension

Using a novel emotional perspective-taking task, this study investigated 4-year-olds' (n = 97) use of a speaker's emotional prosody to make inferences about the speaker's emotional state and, correspondingly, their communicative intent. Eye gaze measures indicated preschoolers used emotional perspective inferences to guide their real-time interpretation of ambiguous statements. However, these sensitivities were less apparent in overt responses, suggesting preschoolers' ability to integrate emotional perspective cues is at an emergent state. Perspective taking during online language processing was positively correlated with receptive vocabulary and an offline measure of emotional perspective taking, but not with cognitive perspective taking, conflict or delay inhibitory control, or working memory. Together, the results underscore how children's emerging communicative competence involves different kinds of perspective inferences with distinct cognitive underpinnings.

Opportunities and challenges for current developmental neuroscience

While developmental neuroscience can often be motivated by clinical and policy concerns, its constituent research methodologies aim to provide insights into the limits and potential of the developing brain. Our article addresses two main approaches for characterizing psychological and neural changes that occur between infancy and adolescence. Specifically, with respect to psychological change, intensely debated topics such as the nature of developmental continuity can potentially gain from the insights provided by brain data. Whereas for neuroimaging approaches, which have gained substantial traction in recent years, the advances in describing the developing “connectome” have been challenged by awareness of imaging artefacts related to behavioural aspects of development (such as motion). As these two fields (developmental psychology and neuroscience) continue to integrate by, for example, constraining psychological hypotheses with brain data and offering explanatory models of neuroimaging findings, the resolution of these challenges charts the development of the field itself.

Mechanisms and development of self-other distinction in dyads and groups

This opinion piece offers a commentary on the four papers that address the theme of the development of self and other understanding with a view to highlighting the important contribution of developmental research to understanding of mechanisms of social cognition. We discuss potential mechanisms linking self-other distinction and empathy, implications for grouping motor, affective and cognitive domains under a single mechanism, applications of these accounts for joint action and finally consider self-other distinction in group versus dyadic settings.

From shared to distinct self-other representations in empathy: evidence from neurotypical function and socio-cognitive disorders

Neuroscientific research has identified two fundamental components of empathy: shared emotional representations between self and other, and self-other distinction. The concept of shared representations suggests that during empathy, we co-represent another person's affect by engaging brain and bodily functions underpinning the first-hand experience of the emotion we are empathizing with. This possible grounding of empathy in our own emotional experiences explains the necessity for self-other distinction, which is the capacity to correctly distinguish between our own affective representations and those related to the other. In spite of the importance of these two components in empathy, several aspects still remain controversial. This paper addresses some of them and focuses on (i) the distinction between shared activations versus representations, raising the question what shared representations entail in terms of the underlying neural mechanisms, (ii) the possible mechanisms behind self-other distinction in the cognitive and the affective domains, and whether they have distinct neural underpinnings and (iii) the consequences associated with a selective impairment of one of the two components, thereby addressing their importance in mental disorders such as autism spectrum disorders, psychopathy and alexithymia.

Self-other control processes in social cognition: from imitation to empathy

We review the evidence that an ability to achieve a precise balance between representing the self and representing other people is crucial in social interaction. This ability is required for imitation, perspective-taking, theory of mind and empathy; and disruption to this ability may contribute to the symptoms of clinical and sub-clinical conditions, including autism spectrum disorder and mirror-touch synaesthesia. Moving beyond correlational approaches, a recent intervention study demonstrated that training participants to control representations of the self and others improves their ability to control imitative behaviour, and to take another's visual perspective. However, it is unclear whether these effects apply to other areas of social interaction, such as the ability to empathize with others. We report original data showing that participants trained to increase self-other control in the motor domain demonstrated increased empathic corticospinal responses (Experiment 1) and self-reported empathy (Experiment 2), as well as an increased ability to control imitation. These results suggest that the ability to control self and other representations contributes to empathy as well as to other types of social interaction.

The role of self-other distinction in understanding others' mental and emotional states: neurocognitive mechanisms in children and adults

Social interactions come with the fundamental problem of trying to understand others' mental and affective states while under the overpowering influence of one's own concurrent thoughts and feelings. The ability to distinguish between simultaneous representations of others' current experiences as well as our own is crucial to navigate our complex social environments successfully. The developmental building blocks of this ability and how this is given rise to by functional and structural brain development remains poorly understood. In this review, I outline some of the key findings on the role of self-other distinction in understanding others' mental as well as emotional states in children and adults. I will begin by clarifying the crucial role for self-other distinction in avoiding egocentric attributions of one's own cognitive as well as affective states to others in adults and outline the underlying neural circuitry in overcoming such egocentricity. This will provide the basis for a discussion of the emergence of self-other distinction in early childhood as well as developmental changes therein throughout childhood and into adulthood. I will demonstrate that self-other distinction of cognitive and emotional states is already dissociable early in development. Concomitantly, I will show that processes of self-other distinction in cognitive and affective domains rely on adjacent but distinct neural circuitry each with unique connectivity profiles, presumably related to the nature of the distinction that needs to be made.

Preserved Self-other Distinction During Empathy in Autism is Linked to Network Integrity of Right Supramarginal Gyrus

Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) shows deficits in self-other distinction during theory of mind (ToM). Here we investigated whether ASD patients also show difficulties in self-other distinction during empathy and if potential deficits are linked to dysfunctional resting-state connectivity patterns. In a first study, ASD patients and controls performed an emotional egocentricity paradigm and a ToMtask. In the second study, resting-state connectivity of right temporo-parietal junction and right supramarginal gyrus(rSMG) were analysed using a large-scale fMRI data set. ASD patients exhibited deficient ToM but normal emotional egocentricity, which was paralleled by reduced connectivity of regions of the ToM network and unimpaired rSMG network connectivity. These results suggest spared self-other distinction during empathy and an intact rSMG network in ASD.

Empathy in depression: Egocentric and altercentric biases and the role of alexithymia

BACKGROUND

Major depressive disorder (MDD) has been associated with empathy deficits. The exact nature of these deficits and their relation to concurrent alexithymia remain unknown. Here we tested under which conditions MDD patients with high and low alexithymia show deficient empathy, particularly investigating empathic abilities when inhibition of self-related emotional states is needed and when it is not.

METHODS

Healthy controls (low: n=28, high: n=14) and currently depressed MDD patients (low: n=11, high: n=18) with low or high alexithymia performed an emotional egocentricity paradigm based on tactile stimulation. This task measures empathic judgements, when emotional states of self and other differ and inhibition of self-related emotional states is needed, and when they do not and thus empathic judgments can be based on simple projection mechanisms.

RESULTS

Only alexithymia but not depression decreased empathy, in situations when simple projection sufficed. However, when inhibition of self-related emotional states was needed, MDD patients showed an egocentric bias during empathic judgments and an altercentric bias during self emotion judgments, the latter suggesting heightened emotional contagion, both independent of alexithymia. Across the entire sample, alexithymia decreased the size of the egocentric bias.

LIMITATIONS

This study was based on a relatively sample size.

CONCLUSIONS

These results suggest that MDD patients show intact empathic judgments, when simple projection is required and no concurrent alexithymia is present. In situations when incongruent emotional states of self and other have to be resolved, MDD patients are prone to egocentric and altercentric biases.

Emotional Egocentricity Bias Across the Life-Span

In our daily lives, we often have to quickly estimate the emotions of our conspecifics in order to have successful social interactions. While this estimation process seems quite easy when we are ourselves in a neutral or equivalent emotional state, it has recently been shown that in case of incongruent emotional states between ourselves and the others, our judgments can be biased. This phenomenon, introduced to the literature with the term Emotional Egocentricity Bias (EEB), has been found to occur in young adults and, to a greater extent, in children. However, how the EEB changes across the life-span from adolescence to old age has been largely unexplored. In this study, we recruited 114 female participants subdivided in four cohorts (adolescents, young adults, middle-aged adults, older adults) to examine EEB age-related changes. Participants were administered with a recently developed paradigm which, by making use of visuo-tactile stimulation that elicits conflicting feelings in paired participants, allows the valid and reliable exploration of the EEB. Results highlighted a U-shape relation between age and EEB, revealing enhanced emotional egocentricity in adolescents and older adults compared to young and middle-aged adults. These results are in line with the neuroscientific literature which has recently shown that overcoming the EEB is associated with a greater activation of a portion of the parietal lobe, namely the right Supramarginal Gyrus (rSMG). This is an area that reaches full maturation by the end of adolescence and goes through an early decay. Thus, the age-related changes of the EEB could be possibly due to the life-span development of the rSMG. This study is the first one to show the quadratic relation between age and the EEB and set a milestone for further research exploring the neural correlates of the life-span development of the EEB. Future studies are needed in order to generalize these results to the male population and to explore gender differences related to the aging of socio- emotional processes.

Placebo analgesia and its opioidergic regulation suggest that empathy for pain is grounded in self pain

Empathy for pain activates brain areas partially overlapping with those underpinning the first-hand experience of pain. It remains unclear, however, whether such shared activations imply that pain empathy engages similar neural functions as first-hand pain experiences. To overcome the limitations of previous neuroimaging research, we pursued a conceptually novel approach: we used the phenomenon of placebo analgesia to experimentally reduce the first-hand experience of pain, and assessed whether this results in a concomitant reduction of empathy for pain. We first carried out a functional MRI experiment (n = 102) that yielded results in the expected direction: participants experiencing placebo analgesia also reported decreased empathy for pain, and this was associated with reduced engagement of anterior insular and midcingulate cortex: that is, areas previously associated with shared activations in pain and empathy for pain. In a second step, we used a psychopharmacological manipulation (n = 50) to determine whether these effects can be blocked via an opioid antagonist. The administration of the opioid antagonist naltrexone blocked placebo analgesia and also resulted in a corresponding "normalization" of empathy for pain. Taken together, these findings suggest that pain empathy may be associated with neural responses and neurotransmitter activity engaged during first-hand pain, and thus might indeed be grounded in our own pain experiences.