How do symbols affect 3- to 4-year-olds' executive function? Evidence from a reverse-contingency task

Symbolic distancing in sharing situations restrains children's economic behavior and potentially also their inequity aversion

We examined whether representing a resource non-symbolically (i.e., as stickers) or symbolically (i.e., as tokens that could be exchanged for stickers) affected kindergartner's decisions in an Ultimatum/Inequity Game (N = 93). The game involved distribution offers, made by a fictitious child, that were either fair (i.e., same quantity for each child, i.e., 3:3) or disadvantageously unfair (i.e., less for the target child than for the fictitious child, i.e., 2:4 or 1:5). Children had to decide whether to accept or reject the offers. In the latter case, none of the children would get anything of the resource. Children rejected unfair offers more frequently than fair offers, and they rejected the offers involving the symbolic resource more frequently than offers involving the non-symbolic resource, which applied to a similar degree to fair and unfair offers. However, exploratory follow-up analyses of children's reactions to unfair offers revealed that children rejected the more unfair offer (i.e., 1:5) more frequently than the less unfair offer (i.e., 2:4) when the resource was represented non-symbolically instead of symbolically. The results suggest that the symbolic representation of a resource evokes economically less rational behavior in children and diminished their potential gain. Moreover, symbolic representations might level out children's differentiation of differently unfair offers. These findings are discussed in light of the subjective value approach and the Construal Level Theory.

Executive Functioning and External Symbols: The Role of Symbolic Understanding and Psychological Distancing

Preschool children can use external symbols to aid their executive functioning (EF). The purpose of the current study was to investigate how symbols boost EF, specifically investigating the role of psychological distancing and symbolic understanding. Preschoolers were assessed on their level of symbolic understanding and completed two EF tasks. Half the children completed the first EF task using symbols, and all children completed the second EF task without the aid of symbols. Results indicated that children in the symbol group at first did significantly worse while they were using the symbols compared to the control group, though their performance improved over time. Control group performance was significantly worse in the second EF task. Symbolic understanding was sometimes related to EF performance for children in the symbol group but not the control group. The current research highlights the complexity of symbol use to influence cognitive functioning.

How Abstract (Non-embodied) Linguistic Representations Augment Cognitive Control

Recent scholarship emphasizes the scaffolding role of language for cognition. Language, it is claimed, is a cognition-enhancing niche (Clark, 2006), a programming tool for cognition (Lupyan and Bergen, 2016), even neuroenhancement (Dove, 2019) and augments cognitive functions such as memory, categorization, cognitive control, and meta-cognitive abilities ("thinking about thinking"). Yet, the notion that language enhances or augments cognition, and in particular, cognitive control does not easily fit in with embodied approaches to language processing, or so we will argue. Accounts aiming to explain how language enhances various cognitive functions often employ a notion of abstract representation. Yet, embodied approaches to language processing have it that language processing crucially, according to some accounts even exclusively, involves embodied, modality-specific, i.e., non-abstract representations. In coming to understand a particular phrase or sentence, a prior experience has to be simulated or reenacted. The representation thus activated is embodied (modality-specific) as sensorimotor regions of the brain are thereby recruited. In this paper, we will first discuss the notion of representation, clarify what it takes for a representation to be embodied or abstract, and distinguish between conceptual and (other) linguistic representations. We will then put forward a characterization of cognitive control and examine its representational infrastructure. The remainder of the paper will be devoted to arguing that language augments cognitive control. To that end, we will draw on two lines of research, which investigate how language augments cognitive control: (i) research on the availability of linguistic labels and (ii) research on the active usage of a linguistic code, specifically, in inner speech. Eventually, we will argue that the cognition-enhancing capacity of language can be explained once we assume that it provides us with (a) abstract, non-embodied representations and with (b) abstract, sparse linguistic representations that may serve as easy-to-manipulate placeholders for fully embodied or otherwise more detailed representations.

Young children can overcome their weak inhibitory control, if they conceptualize a task in the right way

This article investigates the process of task conceptualization, through which participants turn the instructions on a task into a mental representation of that task. We provide the first empirical evidence that this process of conceptualization can directly influence the inhibitory demands of a task. Data from Experiments 1 and 2 (both n = 24) suggested that robust difficulties on inhibitory tasks can be overcome if preschoolers conceptualize the tasks in a way that avoids the need for inhibitory control. Experiment 3 (n = 60) demonstrated that even when all other aspects of a task are identical, simply changing how the rules are introduced can influence whether such a conceptualization is adopted - thereby influencing children's performance on the task. An appreciation of the process of conceptualization is essential for our understanding of how inhibitory control and knowledge interact in early development.

Fine Motor Control Underlies the Association Between Response Inhibition and Drawing Skill in Early Development

Previous research shows that the development of response inhibition and drawing skill are linked. The current research investigated whether this association reflects a more fundamental link between response inhibition and motor control. In Experiment 1, 3- and 4-year-olds (n = 100) were tested on measures of inhibition, fine motor control, and drawing skill. Data revealed an association between inhibition and fine motor control, which was responsible for most of the association observed with drawing skill. Experiment 2 (n = 100) provided evidence that, unlike fine motor control, gross motor control and inhibition were not associated (after controlling for IQ). Alternative explanations for the link between inhibition and fine motor control are outlined, including a consideration of how these cognitive processes may interact during development.

Acute effect of vigorous aerobic exercise on the inhibitory control in adolescents

Objective:

To assess the acute effect of vigorous aerobic exercise on the inhibitory control in adolescents.

Methods:

Controlled, randomized study with crossover design. Twenty pubertal individuals underwent two 30-minute sessions: (1) aerobic exercise session performed between 65% and 75% of heart rate reserve, divided into 5 min of warm-up, 20 min at the target intensity and 5 min of cool down; and (2) control session watching a cartoon. Before and after the sessions, the computerized Stroop test-Testinpacs™ was applied to evaluate the inhibitory control. Reaction time (ms) and errors (n) were recorded.

Results:

The control session reaction time showed no significant difference. On the other hand, the reaction time of the exercise session decreased after the intervention (p<0.001). The number of errors made at the exercise session were lower than in the control session (p=0.011). Additionally, there was a positive association between reaction time (Δ) of the exercise session and age (r²=0.404, p=0.003).

Conclusions:

Vigorous aerobic exercise seems to promote acute improvement in the inhibitory control in adolescents. The effect of exercise on the inhibitory control performance was associated with age, showing that it was reduced at older age ranges.

Executive function and magnitude skills in preschool children

Executive function (EF) has been highlighted as a potentially important factor for mathematical understanding. The relation has been well established in school-aged children but has been less explored at younger ages. The current study investigated the relation between EF and mathematics in preschool-aged children. Participants were 142 typically developing 3- and 4-year-olds. Controlling for verbal ability, a significant positive correlation was found between EF and general math abilities in this age group. Importantly, we further examined this relation causally by varying the EF load on a magnitude comparison task. Results suggested a developmental pattern where 3-year-olds' performance on the magnitude comparison task was worst when EF was taxed the most. Conversely, 4-year-olds performed well on the magnitude task despite varying EF demands, suggesting that EF might play a critical role in the development of math concepts.

Measuring inhibitory control in children and adults: brain imaging and mental chronometry

Jean Piaget underestimated the cognitive capabilities of infants, preschoolers, and elementary schoolchildren, and overestimated the capabilities of adolescents and even adults which are often biased by illogical intuitions and overlearned strategies (i.e., “fast thinking” in Daniel Kahneman’s words). The crucial question is now to understand why, despite rich precocious knowledge about physical and mathematical principles observed over the last three decades in infants and young children, older children, adolescents and even adults are nevertheless so often bad reasoners. We propose that inhibition of less sophisticated solutions (or heuristics) by the prefrontal cortex is a domain-general executive ability that supports children’s conceptual insights associated with more advanced Piagetian stages, such as number-conservation and class inclusion. Moreover, this executive ability remains critical throughout the whole life and even adults may sometimes need “prefrontal pedagogy” in order to learn inhibiting intuitive heuristics (or biases) in deductive reasoning tasks. Here we highlight some of the discoveries from our lab in the field of cognitive development relying on two methodologies used for measuring inhibitory control: brain imaging and mental chronometry (i.e., the negative priming paradigm). We also show that this new approach opens an avenue for re-examining persistent errors in standard classroom-learning tasks.

What's so special about verbal imitation? Investigating the effect of modality on automaticity in children

Young children experience difficulty across a wide variety of situations that require them to suppress automatic responses. Verbal imitation, in contrast, is easy for children to suppress. This is all the more surprising because data from adult studies appear to be at odds with this observation. In two experiments, we investigated whether this surprising developmental finding with verbal imitation reflects a more general phenomenon-relating either to verbal responses or to auditory stimuli-or whether verbal imitation itself represents a unique case. In Experiment 1 (N=24), it was found that verbal responses were not inherently easier for 3-year-olds to inhibit than manual responses. Experiment 2 (N=24) showed that auditory stimuli did not evoke less automatic activation than visual stimuli. Taken together, these data suggest that verbal imitation is unique, or at least unusual, in being particularly easy for children to resist. It is suggested that the automaticity of verbal imitation may develop slowly and that the relation between word complexity and automaticity is likely to be a fruitful topic of further investigation.

Evidence for a relation between executive function and pretense representation in preschool children

Several theoretical formulations suggest a relation between children's pretense and executive function (EF) skills. However, there is little empirical evidence for a correlation between these constructs in early development. Preschool children (N = 104; M age = 4-0) were given batteries of EF and pretense representation measures, as well as verbal, memory, and appearance-reality control tasks. Confirmatory factor analysis revealed two separable but overlapping aspects of EF (Conflict and Delay). EF was significantly related to pretense after accounting for all controls. Understanding the pretend-reality distinction was strongly related to Conflict EF, whereas performing pretend actions was more strongly related to Delay EF. These results, although correlational, are consistent with the claim that EF skills are implicated in pretense, such as inhibiting reality and flexibly manipulating dual representations, and offer a potential mechanism by which pretend play interventions may enhance childhood EF.

Waiting by mistake: symbolic representation of rewards modulates intertemporal choice in capuchin monkeys, preschool children and adult humans

In the Delay choice task subjects choose between a smaller immediate option and a larger delayed option. This paradigm, also known as intertemporal choice task, is frequently used to assess delay tolerance, interpreting a preference for the larger delayed option as willingness to wait. However, in the Delay choice task subjects face a dilemma between two preferred responses: "go for more" (i.e., selecting the larger, but delayed, option) vs. "go for sooner" (i.e., selecting the immediate, but smaller, option). When the options consist of visible food amounts, at least some of the choices of the larger delayed option might be due to a failure to inhibit a prepotent response towards the larger option rather than to a sustained delay tolerance. To disentangle this issue, we tested 10 capuchin monkeys, 101 preschool children, and 88 adult humans in a Delay choice task with food, low-symbolic tokens (objects that can be exchanged with food and have a one-to-one correspondence with food items), and high-symbolic tokens (objects that can be exchanged with food and have a one-to-many correspondence with food items). This allows evaluating how different methods of representing rewards modulate the relative contribution of the "go for more" and "go for sooner" responses. Consistently with the idea that choices for the delayed option are sometimes due to a failure at inhibiting the prepotent response for the larger quantity, we expected high-symbolic tokens to decrease the salience of the larger option, thus reducing "go for more" responses. In fact, previous findings have shown that inhibiting prepotent responses for quantity is easier when the problem is framed in a symbolic context. Overall, opting for the larger delayed option in the visible-food version of the Delay choice task seems to partially result from an impulsive preference for quantity, rather than from a sustained delay tolerance. In capuchins and children high-symbolic stimuli decreased the individual's preference for the larger reward by distancing from its appetitive features. Conversely, the sophisticated symbolic skills of adult humans prevented the distancing effect of high-symbolic stimuli in this population, although this result may be due to methodological differences between adult humans and the other two populations under study. Our data extend the knowledge concerning the influence of symbols on both human and non-human primate behavior and add a new element to the interpretation of the Delay choice task. Since high-symbolic stimuli decrease the individual's preference for the larger reward by eliminating those choices due to prepotent responses towards the larger quantity, they allow to better discriminate responses based on genuine delay aversion. Thus, these findings invite greater caution in interpreting the results obtained with the visible-food version of the Delay choice task, which may overestimate delay tolerance.

Why do alternative ways of responding improve children's performance on tests of strategic reasoning?

Changing the way in which children respond significantly improves performance across a variety of cognitive domains. However, the basis for this response-mode effect is unknown. To address this issue, the current study tested 78 preschool children on a measure of executive functioning (the windows task: Hala & Russell, ). The task requires children to point to an empty box to receive a box with a treat in it. There were four versions of the task, differing only in the way in which children made their responses. Children in the baseline condition, who pointed with their finger, performed poorly. However, children in three alternative response-mode conditions won the treat significantly more often. Strikingly, even children who pretended to be pointing with an arrow - but were in reality pointing with their finger - performed significantly better than baseline. We suggest that non-standard response modes encourage children to reflect on their actions and that this reduces the number of unreflective errors they make. The findings demonstrate that response-mode effects do not depend on the presence of a physical means of responding (such as an arrow), but can be achieved via a purely cognitive means (such as engaging in pretence).

How do alternative ways of responding influence 3- and 4-year-olds' performance on tests of executive function and theory of mind?

A total of 69 preschool children were tested on measures of false belief understanding (the Unexpected Transfer task), inhibitory control (the Grass/Snow task), and strategic reasoning (the Windows task). For each task, children indicated their response either by pointing with their index finger or by using a nonstandard response mode (pointing with a rotating arrow). The means of responding had no effect on children's performance on the Grass/Snow task or on the Unexpected Transfer task, although children performed better on the Unexpected Transfer task when the key object in the story was removed. In contrast, performance on the Windows task was significantly better when children pointed with the rotating arrow. A follow-up experiment with 79 preschoolers found that this improved performance on the Windows task was sustained even after the nonstandard response mode was removed and children again pointed with their finger. These findings together suggest that nonstandard response modes do not help children to inhibit prepotent pointing responses but may help them to formulate response strategies on reasoning tasks by discouraging unreflective impulsive responding.

Making tools isn't child's play

Tool making evidences intelligent, flexible thinking. In Experiment 1, we confirmed that 4- to 7-year-olds chose a hook tool to retrieve a bucket from a tube. In Experiment 2, 3- to 5-year-olds consistently failed to innovate a simple hook tool. Eight-year-olds performed at mature levels. In contrast, making a tool following demonstration was easy for even the youngest children. In Experiment 3, children's performance did not improve given the opportunity to manipulate the objects in a warm-up phase. Children's tool innovation lags substantially behind their ability to learn how to make tools by observing others.

Young children have a specific, highly robust bias to trust testimony

Why are young children so willing to believe what they are told? In two studies, we investigated whether it is because of a general, undifferentiated trust in other people or a more specific bias to trust testimony. In Study 1, 3-year-olds either heard an experimenter claim that a sticker was in one location when it was actually in another or saw her place an arrow on the empty location. All children searched in the wrong location initially, but those who heard the deceptive testimony continued to be misled, whereas those who saw her mark the incorrect location with an arrow quickly learned to search in the opposite location. In Study 2, children who could both see and hear a deceptive speaker were more likely to be misled than those who could only hear her. Three-year-olds have a specific, highly robust bias to trust what people--particularly visible speakers--say.

Social origins of executive function development

The chapters in this issue revisit the social origins of the development of executive function (EF) through both empirical examination of the contexts in which EF development occurs (in vivo), as well as its social antecedents and consequences. Importantly, they also point to new directions in studying the social foundations of neurodevelopment, novel methods that take the social context into account, and cultural influences on EF development.