Biosecurity risk factors for highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N8) virus infection in duck farms, France

Qualitative studies on farm managers perception of risk from HPAIV and implementation of biosecurity measures on UK poultry farms

The epidemic of high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 in the United Kingdom and Northern Europe from 2021 to 2023 has dwarfed all previous incursions. This fact has driven the need to review biosecurity behaviours and perceptions of virus incursions on commercial poultry farms. This study used qualitative methods to evaluate farm managers' perceptions of biosecurity and their implementation of measures as recommended by the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA). Thirteen farm managers across different regions of England and Wales were recruited between May and September 2023 to take part in the study. Qualitative semi-structured interviews were held with managers to discuss various topics relating to biosecurity and avian influenza (AI). Biosecurity measures being used across the farm by managers and staff were also observed to help understand biosecurity behaviours. Interviews were transcribed and analysed to identify themes and patterns amongst the data, along with extensive notes collated during the farm visits. Findings showed that farms' use of biosecurity with respect to disinfection regimes and use of foot dips were both well cited and observed. Similarly, farm managers were all highly likely to refer to the use of farm-specific and shed-specific rubber boots, while also citing stricter requirements for visitors and delivery/maintenance. Biosecurity concerning the layout of the premises, fencing, access to changing rooms and the general age and maintenance of buildings and sheds required significant improvement across many farms. Additionally, farm managers expressed strong feelings of stress and anxiety in recent years, particularly those who had experienced an AI outbreak recently. We argue that factors such as risk perceptions, remits of control, feelings of responsibility and autonomy, and consequences on mental health, are all factors that can inform how farm managers respond to outbreaks and implement or sustain biosecurity on farms. A greater emphasis on providing regular and tailored training and educational resources for the industry would be beneficial as would further services focusing on reducing the burden on farmers' mental health. This research provides insight into the application and shortcomings of biosecurity implementation on commercial poultry farms. It also identifies farmer perceptions and experiences shaping implementation on farms. However, this highlights that the onus for improving biosecurity cannot remain solely with farm managers and workers. Further research exploring the role of other stakeholders in the industry would help bridge remaining gaps in our understanding of biosecurity implementation.

Training With an Evaluation Framework: Outcomes From a Biosecurity Training Intervention in Commercial Poultry Farms in Tamil Nadu, South India

The study aimed to investigate the assessment of farm profiles, knowledge gain, and adoption behaviours of biosecurity practices following a training intervention in commercial poultry farms in Tamil Nadu. A total of 89 farmers from commercial desi (32), layer (30), and broiler (27) farms participated in the training program. The biosecurity assessment used an evaluation framework with a two-day training program. Participants completed pre- and post-training surveys to measure knowledge gained during the training. Additionally, we conducted a follow-up evaluation of adoption behaviours after 90 days of training intervention. Questionnaire data were analysed using paired sample t-test, chi-square, and regression analysis. Results revealed that 89% of the trainees were male, 90% were in the age group between 21 and 60 years, and 88% had a secondary education level or higher. Further, 56.2% of farmers had 5-20 years of experience in poultry farming, and 46.1% of farmers revealed that the significant source of income is from poultry farming and agricultural practices. A pre- and post-survey data comparison showed that all the farmers had significant knowledge gain (p < 0.01) in all the categories of structural and operational biosecurity practices immediately after the training. The farmer's educational qualification significantly influences the knowledge gain except for dead bird disposal (p < 0.05). Commercial desi and layer farmers have more pre-existing knowledge compared to broiler farmers. The broiler farmers showed the highest knowledge gain compared to layer and commercial desi farmers. Still, there was no significant difference between knowledge gain among different types of poultry farmers (p > 0.05). The adoption behaviour measured after 90 days significantly increased in all categories (p < 0.05) except for rodent and pest control. This comprehensive study provided valuable insights regarding farmers' existing knowledge and the impact of training on some behavioural changes to improve biosecurity. The study concluded that a tailored training program is essential to educate small-scale producers about biosecurity measures to prevent poultry food-borne diseases.

Advisers' perception of biosecurity implementation on large-scale poultry farms in Europe

Biosecurity is a fundamental preventive tool to control animal infectious diseases. The relationship between advisers and farmers plays a key role in determining farmers' compliance with on-farm biosecurity measures (BMs). The aims of this survey were (1) to provide an overview on the implementation of biosecurity in European poultry farms as declared by the advisers and (2) to better understand advisers' perception of the reasons why farmers do not comply with biosecurity rules and pinpoint potential obstacles to their implementation. One hundred and fifty-seven advisers working in various poultry sectors (breeders, enclosed and free-range layers, enclosed and free-range meat poultry) were interviewed to give their opinion on the implementation of 62 BMs. The advisers' replies (n = 6485) on the implementation of BMs were reported as "always" (67.6 %), "sometimes" (19.8 %) and "never" (8.1 %) implemented. The advisers from the local governmental institutions declared a significantly lower percentage of "always implemented" replies (62 %) than those from other categories (producer organisations (73.7 %), companies (73.8 %) and veterinary clinics (67 %)). Regardless of the poultry sector, the most commonly implemented BMs declared by the advisers were the "daily surveillance of birds", "flock register", "rodent control" and "feed storage protection". The BMs declared as the least commonly implemented were "visitors and personnel showering before entering the poultry house" for all the surveyed productions and "personnel hand washing" for all the production types except breeders. Some hygiene practices were also declared to be poorly implemented in most of the surveyed productions such as the "cleaning/disinfection of the rendering tank after each collection", the "presence of concrete area around the house", the "use of separate material for the poultry house" and the "restriction of domestic animals entering the site" and especially in meat poultry "the bacterial self-check of the house" and "the cleaning/disinfection of the feed silo between each flock". According to the advisers 'reports, the reasons why farmers do not comply with biosecurity on their farm were insufficient knowledge of biosecurity issues ("not enough training" 12.3 % and "not enough advice" 8.5 %), low awareness of the expected benefits ("no known advantages" 14 % and "not useful" 4.6 %), the lack of time (17.8 %), financial issues (16.8 %) and the unsuitability of the measures (17.4 %). This study highlighted, from the European advisers 'point of view, the shortcomings of the implementation of biosecurity on poultry farms and a room of improvement requiring adapted and tailored support measures for a better biosecurity compliance.

Risk factors for the incursion of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus into poultry and other captive bird holdings in Denmark from 2020 to 2023: A case-control study

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) is a major concern in terms of animal and human health. Between October 2020 and September 2023, there were 36 HPAI outbreaks detected in poultry and other captive birds in Denmark. However, it is often not possible to determine the exact route of introduction. We conducted a case-control study to compare the odds of exposure to a range of potential risk factors for HPAI virus incursion into Danish poultry or other captive bird holdings with HPAI outbreaks (cases) and with no HPAI outbreaks (controls) during the HPAI epidemiological seasons 2020/2021, 2021/2022 and 2022/2023. The owners of 38 % of the eligible case holdings and 45 % of the eligible control holdings declined to participate, suggesting that HPAI virus infection is a sensitive subject for some owners. The study population included 18 cases and 34 controls. We collected data primarily through questionnaire-based interviews and estimated odds ratios (OR) within a Bayesian framework using a Beta conjugate prior to define the odds directly, with Monte Carlo integration from these posterior distributions of odds to estimate the relevant OR with 95 % credible intervals (CI) and Bayesian p-values. The results indicated that the odds of observing wild waterfowl or gulls on the roof or around farm buildings compared to observing none within 500 m of the holding was higher for case holdings (OR: 18.7, 95 % CI: 3.1-148, p: 0.022). This information can be used for future risk-based monitoring, biosecurity management and placement of captive bird holdings.

Spatial risk modelling of highly pathogenic avian influenza in France: Fattening duck farm activity matters

In this study, we present a comprehensive analysis of the key spatial risk factors and predictive risk maps for HPAI infection in France, with a focus on the 2016-17 and 2020-21 epidemic waves. Our findings indicate that the most explanatory spatial predictor variables were related to fattening duck movements prior to the epidemic, which should be considered as indicators of farm operational status, e.g., whether they are active or not. Moreover, we found that considering the operational status of duck houses in nearby municipalities is essential for accurately predicting the risk of future HPAI infection. Our results also show that the density of fattening duck houses could be used as a valuable alternative predictor of the spatial distribution of outbreaks per municipality, as this data is generally more readily available than data on movements between houses. Accurate data regarding poultry farm densities and movements is critical for developing accurate mathematical models of HPAI virus spread and for designing effective prevention and control strategies for HPAI. Finally, our study identifies the highest risk areas for HPAI infection in southwest and northwest France, which is valuable for informing national risk-based strategies and guiding increased surveillance efforts in these regions.

The correlation between on-farm biosecurity and animal welfare indices in large-scale turkey production

This research aimed to determine the association between biosecurity and animal welfare measures in large-scale fattening turkey farms in Hungary. Large-scale farms raising male fattening turkeys across Hungary were contacted, with 24 agreeing to participate. The Biocheck.UGent questionnaire was used to evaluate biosecurity measures, and Animal Welfare Indicators (AWIN) protocol was used for welfare assessment. The association between biosecurity and welfare indicators was investigated by correlation testing and prediction accuracy using random forest classification. The areas of biosecurity that were shown to be closely linked to the welfare index were the organization of the farm (farm management, supply of materials), the control and hygienic measures implemented between farm structures, cleaning and disinfection measures on the farm, and control and hygienic measures implemented in the case of farm workers and visitors upon entrance and exit. The study highlighted the link between biosecurity and animal welfare in turkey production, concluding that enhanced biosecurity measures correlate with better welfare outcomes and emphasizing the need for comprehensive and well-implemented biosecurity protocols.

The impact of epidemic experiences on biosecurity behavior of pig farmers: an analysis based on protection motivation theory

Farm biosecurity is considered an important component of "One Health". Biosecurity measures are crucial for preventing and controlling outbreaks and spread of diseases on farms. Protection motivation theory (PMT) links perception of risk and coping ability with taking preventive actions. Based on field survey data of pig farmers, this study utilizes OLS and mediating effect model to explore the impact and mechanism of epidemic experiences on farmers' implementation of biosecurity measures. The research findings are as follows: first, epidemic experiences significantly promote farmers' implementation of biosecurity measures. The conclusion remains robust after addressing potential endogeneity issues. Second, epidemic experiences, through accumulated experience, further encourage farmers to implement biosecurity measures. Third, the impact of epidemic experiences on farmers' biosecurity behavior shows heterogeneity in farm size. Compared to small-scale farmers, epidemic experiences have a greater promoting effect on biosecurity behavior of professional farmers. Therefore, emphasizing farmers' epidemic experiences, enhancing biosecurity training, and increasing farmers' awareness are of significant importance in promoting farmers' implementation of biosecurity measures.

Multivariate variable selection in N-of-1 observational studies via additive Bayesian networks

An N-of-1 observational design characterizes associations among several variables over time in a single individual. Traditional statistical models recommended for experimental N-of-1 trials may not adequately model these observational relationships. We propose an additive Bayesian network using a generalized linear mixed-effects model for the local mean as a novel method for modeling each of these relationships in a data-driven manner. We validate our approach via simulation studies and apply it to a 12-month observational N-of-1 study exploring the impact of stress on daily exercise engagement. We demonstrate the improved performance of the additive Bayesian network to recover the underlying network structure. From the empirical study, we found statistically discernible associations between reports of stress and physical activity on a population level, but these associations may differ at an individual level.

Risk of invasive waterfowl interaction with poultry production: Understanding potential for avian pathogen transmission via species distribution models

Recent outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza have devastated poultry production across the United States, with more than 77 million birds culled in 2022-2024 alone. Wild waterfowl, including various invasive species, host numerous pathogens, including highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV), and have been implicated as catalysts of disease outbreaks among native fauna and domestic birds. In major poultry-producing states like Arkansas, USA, where the poultry sector is responsible for significant economic activity (>$4 billion USD in 2022), understanding the risk of invasive waterfowl interactions with domestic poultry is critical. Here, we assessed the risk of invasive waterfowl-poultry interaction in Arkansas by comparing the density of poultry production sites (chicken houses) to areas of high habitat suitability for two invasive waterfowl species, (Egyptian Goose [Alopochen aegyptiaca] and Mute Swan [Cygnus olor]), known to host significant pathogens, including avian influenza viruses. The percentage of urban land cover was the most important habitat characteristic for both invasive waterfowl species. At the 95% confidence interval, chicken house densities in areas highly suitable for both species (Egyptian Goose = 0.91 ± 0.11 chicken houses/km2; Mute Swan = 0.61 ± 0.03 chicken houses/km2) were three to five times higher than chicken house densities across the state (0.17 ± 0.01 chicken houses/km2). We show that northwestern and western Arkansas, both areas of high importance for poultry production, are also at high risk of invasive waterfowl presence. Our results suggest that targeted monitoring efforts for waterfowl-poultry contact in these areas could help mitigate the risk of avian pathogen exposure in Arkansas and similar regions with high poultry production.

A real-time colourimetric reverse transcription loop-mediated isothermal amplification (RT-LAMP) assay for the rapid detection of highly pathogenic H5 clade 2.3.4.4b avian influenza viruses

Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIV) are a major threat to the global poultry industry and public health due to their zoonotic potential. Since 2016, Europe and France have faced major epizootics caused by clade 2.3.4.4b H5 HPAIV. To reduce sample-to-result times, point-of-care testing is urgently needed to help prevent further outbreaks and the propagation of the virus. This study presents the design of a novel real-time colourimetric reverse transcription loop-mediated isothermal amplification (RT-LAMP) assay for the detection of clade 2.3.4.4b H5 HPAIV. A clinical validation of this RT-LAMP assay was performed on 198 pools of clinical swabs sampled in 52 poultry flocks during the H5 HPAI 2020-2022 epizootics in France. This RT-LAMP assay allowed the specific detection of HPAIV H5Nx clade 2.3.4.4b within 30 min with a sensitivity of 86.11%. This rapid, easy-to-perform, inexpensive, molecular detection assay could be included in the HPAIV surveillance toolbox.

Biosecurity implementation on large-scale poultry farms in Europe: A qualitative interview study with farmers

Biosecurity is an essential tool for rearing healthy animals. Biosecurity measures (BMs) are well known in poultry production, but it is difficult to assess actual implementation on farms. The aims of this qualitative study were (1) to provide an overview of biosecurity implementation according to poultry farmers in Europe; and (2) to better understand the reported reasons and potential obstacles for not implementing the measures. In seven European Union Member States, 192 farmers (118 under contract with a company and 68 independents) working in seven different categories of poultry production were interviewed on 62 BMs to determine the frequency of implementation and the reasons for non-implementation. Most of the replies (n = 7791) concerning BM implementation were reported by the farmers as "always" implemented (81%), statistically higher for breeders (87%) and layers (82%) and lower for independent farms versus farms under contract with a company (79.5% and 82.5%, respectively). Regardless the poultry production category, the most frequently implemented BMs declared by the farmers were daily surveillance of birds, rodent control and feed storage protection. Standard hygiene practices were also mentioned as high-implementation measures for most production categories, with some deficiencies, such as rendering tank disinfection after each collection and, for meat poultry, disinfection of the feed silo and bacterial control of house cleaning and disinfection between each cycle. The entry of vehicles and individuals onto poultry farms, especially during critical points of eggs collection for breeders and layers, as well as the presence of other animals, such as the "all in/all out" practice, particularly in layers and ducks, were also reported as the least commonly practiced measures. The main reasons for not implementing the measures (n = 1683 replies) were low awareness and poor knowledge of the expected benefits of biosecurity ("no known advantages" 14%, and "not useful" 12%), the lack of training ("not enough training" 5% and "advice" 7%), lack of time (19%), and financial aspects (17%). Despite the good overall biosecurity mentioned by the farmers, these findings highlight certain deficiencies, suggesting room for improvement and the need for targeted and tailored support of poultry farmers in Europe.

A case-control study of the infection risk of H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza in Japan during the winter of 2020-2021

In Japan, outbreaks of H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) were reported between November 2020 and March 2021 in 52 poultry farms. Understanding HPAI epidemiology would help poultry industries improve their awareness of the disease and enhance the immediate implementation of biosecurity measures. This study was a simulation-based matched case-control study to elucidate the risk factors associated with HPAI outbreaks in chicken farms in Japan. Data were collected from 42 HPAI-affected farms and 463 control farms that were within a 5-km radius of each case farm but remained uninfected. When infected farms were detected as clusters, one farm was randomly selected from each cluster, considering the possibility that the cluster was formed by farm-to-farm transmission within an epidemic area. For each case farm, up to three control farms were selected within a 5-km radius. Overall, 26 case farms (16 layer and 10 broiler farms) and 75 control farms (45 layer and 30 broiler farms) were resampled 1000 times for the conditional logistic regression model with explanatory variables comprising geographical factors and farm flock size. A larger flock size and shorter distance to water bodies from the farm were found to increase infection risk in layer farms. Similarly, in broiler farms, a shorter distance to water bodies increased infection risk. On larger farms, frequent access of farm staff and instrument carriages to premises could lead to increased infection risk. Waterfowl visiting water bodies around farms may also be associated with infection risk.

Field and laboratory investigation of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N6 and H5N8 in Quang Ninh province, Vietnam, 2020 to 2021

BACKGROUND

Avian influenza (AI) is a contagious disease that causes illness and death in poultry and humans. High pathogenicity AI (HPAI) H5N6 outbreaks commonly occur in Quang Ninh province bordering China. In June 2021, the first HPAI H5N8 outbreak occurred at a Quang Ninh chicken farm.

OBJECTIVES

This study examined the risk factors associated with HPAI H5N6 and H5N8 outbreaks in Quang Ninh.

METHODS

A retrospective case-control study was conducted in Quang Ninh from Nov 2021 to Jan 2022. The cases were households with susceptible poultry with two or more clinical signs and tested positive by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction. The controls were households in the same village as the cases but did not show clinical symptoms of the disease. Logistic regression models were constructed to assess the risk factors associated with HPAI outbreaks at the household level.

RESULTS

There were 38 cases with H5N6 clade 2.3.4.4h viruses (n = 35) and H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4b viruses (n = 3). Compared to the 112 controls, raising poultry in uncovered or partially covered ponds (odds ratio [OR], 7.52; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.44-39.27), poultry traders visiting the farm (OR, 8.66; 95% CI, 2.7-27.69), farms with 50-2,000 birds (OR, 3.00; 95% CI, 1.06-8-51), and farms with ≥ 2,000 birds (OR, 11.35; 95% CI, 3.07-41.94) were significantly associated with HPAI outbreaks.

CONCLUSIONS

Combining biosecurity measures, such as restricting visitor entry and vaccination in farms with more than 50 birds, can enhance the control and prevention of HPAI in Quang Ninh and its spread across borders.

A highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4 detected in Samara Oblast, Russian Federation

Avian influenza (AI) is a global problem impacting birds and mammals, causing economic losses in commercial poultry farms and backyard settings. In 2022, over 8,500 AI cases were reported worldwide, with the H5 subtype being responsible for many outbreaks in wild and domestic birds. In the territory of the Russian Federation, outbreaks of AI have been massively reported since 2020, both among domestic bird species and wild bird species. Wild migratory birds often serve as natural reservoirs for AI viruses, and interactions between bird species can lead to the emergence of new, highly pathogenic variants through genetic recombination between strains. In order to combat the widespread outbreaks of the disease and potential risks of further spread in 2021, monitoring studies were conducted in the Samara Oblast, the southeastern region of European Russian Federation. These studies aimed to diagnose and characterize circulating AI virus variants among wild migratory birds during waterfowl hunting in areas of mass nesting. Among the 98 shot birds, a highly pathogenic A/H5N1 AI virus was detected in a Eurasian Teal from the Bolshechernigovsky district. It was classified into clade 2.3.4.4 based on the cleavage site structure of HA. Phylogenetic analysis showed a high relatedness of the identified strain in the Samara Oblast with field isolates from Russia, Nigeria, Bangladesh, and Benin. The article emphasizes the importance of monitoring AI virus spread in both wild and poultry, highlighting the need for timely information exchange to assess risks. Further comprehensive studies are necessary to understand virus dissemination pathways.

The application of biosecurity practices for preventing avian influenza in North-Eastern Italy turkey farms: An analysis of the point of view and perception of farmers

INTRODUCTION

Italian and international outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), particularly in densely populated poultry areas (DPPAs), have increased over the past few decades. These emerging risks, which endanger both human and animal health and the entire poultry industry, can be effectively limited by biosecurity measures implemented at human-animal food chain interfaces. Some problems, however, persist in the application of these measures on the part of poultry farmers, prompting the need to explore those aspects and causes that limit their implementation.

MATERIAL AND METHODS

A qualitative approach was selected for the study and a semi-structured interview technique was applied to collect data among turkey farmers (n = 29) working in the north-east of Italy. The aim of this technique was to gather data on farms in order to understand the biosecurity practices adopted and the reasons for and impediments to farmer implementation, or lack thereof. This article presents and discusses the main data collected.

RESULTS

The study revealed that farmers were familiar with the biosecurity measures necessary to contain avian influenza (AI) and other poultry diseases; personal disinfection and animal isolation practices were particularly prominent. Based on the reported procedures, managerial, economic, and psychosocial factors were among the barriers behind the failure to implement biosecurity measures. These obstacles were variously intertwined and associated with the different action settings. In particular management factors, such as lack of time to apply the rules and difficulties contingent on the farm's structural characteristics, mediate the application of biosecurity measures. In terms of communication channels, the company, particularly its technicians, proved to be the primary source of information for farmers in case of emergencies, as well as the primary source of information on the application of biosecurity measures. However, other sources of information were indicated, such as word of mouth among farmers or other non-institutional figures (relatives and acquaintances).

CONCLUSIONS

What emerged, was the need to improve not only the biosecurity management skills, but also to implement forms of cooperation among the various key stakeholders in the poultry sector. The information presented in this pilot study needs to be discussed among competent authorities, public and company veterinarians, company technicians, and farmers. Furthermore, this information will help in participatory co-planning of risk prevention and communication strategies to implement a long-term, sustainable, effective approach to address future epidemic emergencies.

EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Animal Welfare (AHAW), European Union Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza, Nielsen SS, Alvarez J, Bicout DJ, Calistri P, Canali E, Drewe JA, Garin‐Bastuji B, Gonzales Rojas JL, Gortázar C, Herskin M, Michel V, Miranda Chueca MÁ, Padalino B, Roberts HC, Spoolder H, Stahl K, Velarde A, Winckler C, Bastino E, Bortolami A, Guinat C, Harder T, Stegeman A, Terregino C, Aznar Asensio I, Mur L, Broglia A, Baldinelli F, Viltrop A. Vaccination of poultry against highly pathogenic avian influenza - part 1. Available vaccines and vaccination strategies

Several vaccines have been developed against highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), mostly inactivated whole-virus vaccines for chickens. In the EU, one vaccine is authorised in chickens but is not fully efficacious to stop transmission, highlighting the need for vaccines tailored to diverse poultry species and production types. Off-label use of vaccines is possible, but effectiveness varies. Vaccines are usually injectable, a time-consuming process. Mass-application vaccines outside hatcheries remain rare. First vaccination varies from in-ovo to 6 weeks of age. Data about immunity onset and duration in the target species are often unavailable, despite being key for effective planning. Minimising antigenic distance between vaccines and field strains is essential, requiring rapid updates of vaccines to match circulating strains. Generating harmonised vaccine efficacy data showing vaccine ability to reduce transmission is crucial and this ability should be also assessed in field trials. Planning vaccination requires selecting the most adequate vaccine type and vaccination scheme. Emergency protective vaccination is limited to vaccines that are not restricted by species, age or pre-existing vector-immunity, while preventive vaccination should prioritise achieving the highest protection, especially for the most susceptible species in high-risk transmission areas. Model simulations in France, Italy and The Netherlands revealed that (i) duck and turkey farms are more infectious than chickens, (ii) depopulating infected farms only showed limitations in controlling disease spread, while 1-km ring-culling performed better than or similar to emergency preventive ring-vaccination scenarios, although with the highest number of depopulated farms, (iii) preventive vaccination of the most susceptible species in high-risk transmission areas was the best option to minimise the outbreaks' number and duration, (iv) during outbreaks in such areas, emergency protective vaccination in a 3-km radius was more effective than 1- and 10-km radius. Vaccine efficacy should be monitored and complement other surveillance and preventive efforts.

Using surveillance data for early warning modelling of highly pathogenic avian influenza in Europe reveals a seasonal shift in transmission, 2016-2022

Avian influenza in wild birds and poultry flocks constitutes a problem for animal welfare, food security and public health. In recent years there have been increasing numbers of outbreaks in Europe, with many poultry flocks culled after being infected with highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI). Continuous monitoring is crucial to enable timely implementation of control to prevent HPAI spread from wild birds to poultry and between poultry flocks within a country. We here utilize readily available public surveillance data and time-series models to predict HPAI detections within European countries and show a seasonal shift that happened during 2021-2022. The output is models capable of monitoring the weekly risk of HPAI outbreaks, to support decision making.

Monitoring biosecurity in poultry production: an overview of databases reporting biosecurity compliance from seven European countries

Compliance with required on-farm biosecurity practices reduces the risk of contamination and spread of zoonotic and economically important diseases. With repeating avian influenza epidemics in the poultry industry, the need to monitor and improve the overall level of biosecurity is increasing. In practice, biosecurity compliance is assessed by various actors (e.g., academic, private and public institutions), and the results of such assessments may be recorded and gathered in databases which are seldom shared or thoroughly analyzed. This study aimed to provide an inventory of databases related to the assessment of biosecurity in poultry farms in seven major poultry-producing European countries to highlight challenges and opportunities associated with biosecurity data collection, sharing, and use. The institutions in charge of these databases were contacted and interviewed using a structured questionnaire to gather information on the main characteristics of the databases and the context of their implementation. A total of 20 databases were identified, covering the gamut of poultry species and production types. Most databases were linked to veterinary health authorities or academia, and to a lesser extent interbranch organizations. Depending on the institutions in charge, the databases serve various purposes, from providing advice to enforcing regulations. The quality of the biosecurity data collected is believed to be quite reliable, as biosecurity is mostly assessed by trained farm advisors or official veterinarians and during a farm visit. Some of the databases are difficult to analyze and/or do not offer information concerning which biosecurity measures are most or least respected. Moreover, some key biosecurity practices are sometimes absent from certain databases. Although the databases serve a variety of purposes and cover different production types, each with specific biosecurity features, their analysis should help to improve the surveillance of biosecurity in the poultry sector and provide evidence on the benefits of biosecurity.

A cross-sectional survey for the assessment of biosecurity measures in small-scale duck farms in Qalyoubia, Egypt: Comprehensive evaluation and procedural recommendations

Background and Aim: Biosecurity implementation is fundamental to combating diseases and antibiotic resistance. Therefore, this study aimed to examine the correlation between the implementation of biosecurity measures in small-scale duck farms and the incidence of infectious diseases that threaten the duck industry. Materials and Methods: Twenty small-scale duck farms of different breeds and production stages were collected as representative samples, focused on two districts in the Qalyoubia governorate, which possesses high-density small-scale farms. A 30-point structured questionnaire was designed to assess the level of biosecurity measures implemented in the sampled farms. These farms were examined for bacterial infection by cultivation, typing, and antibiotic sensitivity tests, in addition to molecular techniques for detecting suspected viral diseases. Results: The results showed that the farms had high or low levels of biosecurity; only 25% possessed high-level biosecurity. Bacteria, including Salmonella, Escherichia coli, Staphylococcus, and Pasteurella, were isolated from all sampled farms. High rates of antimicrobial resistance-reaching up to 100% were observed against some drugs. However, viral causative agents, including HPAI-H5N8, duck viral hepatitis, and goose parvovirus, were isolated from only five farms. Conclusion: The lack of commitment to biosecurity implementation, particularly personal hygiene, was observed in most sampled farms. Increasing the level of biosecurity reduced the incidence of mixed infections. Keywords: antibiotic resistance, bacterial agents, biosecurity, co-infections, small-scale duck farms, viral diseases.

Combined Phylogeographic Analyses and Epidemiologic Contact Tracing to Characterize Atypically Pathogenic Avian Influenza (H3N1) Epidemic, Belgium, 2019

The high economic impact and zoonotic potential of avian influenza call for detailed investigations of dispersal dynamics of epidemics. We integrated phylogeographic and epidemiologic analyses to investigate the dynamics of a low pathogenicity avian influenza (H3N1) epidemic that occurred in Belgium during 2019. Virus genomes from 104 clinical samples originating from 85% of affected farms were sequenced. A spatially explicit phylogeographic analysis confirmed a dominating northeast to southwest dispersal direction and a long-distance dispersal event linked to direct live animal transportation between farms. Spatiotemporal clustering, transport, and social contacts strongly correlated with the phylogeographic pattern of the epidemic. We detected only a limited association between wind direction and direction of viral lineage dispersal. Our results highlight the multifactorial nature of avian influenza epidemics and illustrate the use of genomic analyses of virus dispersal to complement epidemiologic and environmental data, improve knowledge of avian influenza epidemiologic dynamics, and enhance control strategies.

Two major epidemics of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N8 and H5N1 in domestic poultry in France, 2020-2022

The spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses worldwide has serious consequences for animal health and a major economic impact on the poultry production sector. Since 2014, Europe has been severely hit by several HPAI epidemics, with France being the most affected country. Most recently, France was again affected by two devastating HPAI epidemics in 2020-21 and 2021-22. We conducted a descriptive analysis of the 2020-21 and 2021-22 epidemics, as a first step towards identifying the poultry sector's remaining vulnerabilities regarding HPAI viruses in France. We examined the spatio-temporal distribution of outbreaks that occurred in France in 2020-21 and 2021-22, and we assessed the outbreaks' spatial distribution in relation to the 2016-17 epidemic and to the two 'high-risk zones' recently incorporated into French legislation to strengthen HPAI prevention and control. There were 468 reported outbreaks during the 2020-21 epidemic and 1375 outbreaks during the 2021-22 epidemic. In both epidemics, the outbreaks' distribution matched extremely well that of 2016-17, and most outbreaks (80.6% and 68.4%) were located in the two high-risk zones. The southwestern high-risk zone was affected in both epidemics, while the western high-risk zone was affected for the first time in 2021-22, explaining the extremely high number of outbreaks reported. As soon as the virus reached the high-risk zones, it started to spread between farms at very high rates, with each infected farm infecting between two and three other farms at the peaks of transmission. We showed that the spatial distribution model used to create the two high-risk zones was able to predict the location of outbreaks for the 2020-21 and 2021-22 epidemics. These zones were characterized by high poultry farm densities; future efforts should, therefore, focus on reducing the density of susceptible poultry in highly dense areas.

Disentangling the role of poultry farms and wild birds in the spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus in Europe

In winter 2016-7, Europe was severely hit by an unprecedented epidemic of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs), causing a significant impact on animal health, wildlife conservation, and livestock economic sustainability. By applying phylodynamic tools to virus sequences collected during the epidemic, we investigated when the first infections occurred, how many infections were unreported, which factors influenced virus spread, and how many spillover events occurred. HPAIV was likely introduced into poultry farms during the autumn, in line with the timing of wild birds' migration. In Germany, Hungary, and Poland, the epidemic was dominated by farm-to-farm transmission, showing that understanding of how farms are connected would greatly help control efforts. In the Czech Republic, the epidemic was dominated by wild bird-to-farm transmission, implying that more sustainable prevention strategies should be developed to reduce HPAIV exposure from wild birds. Inferred transmission parameters will be useful to parameterize predictive models of HPAIV spread. None of the predictors related to live poultry trade, poultry census, and geographic proximity were identified as supportive predictors of HPAIV spread between farms across borders. These results are crucial to better understand HPAIV transmission dynamics at the domestic-wildlife interface with the view to reduce the impact of future epidemics.

Rapid, in-field deployable, avian influenza virus haemagglutinin characterisation tool using MinION technology

Outbreaks of avian influenza virus (AIV) from wild waterfowl into the poultry industry is of upmost significance and is an ongoing and constant threat to the industry. Accurate surveillance of AIV in wild waterfowl is critical in understanding viral diversity in the natural reservoir. Current surveillance methods for AIV involve collection of samples and transportation to a laboratory for molecular diagnostics. Processing of samples using this approach takes more than three days and may limit testing locations to those with practical access to laboratories. In potential outbreak situations, response times are critical, and delays have implications in terms of the spread of the virus that leads to increased economic cost. This study used nanopore sequencing technology for in-field sequencing and subtype characterisation of AIV strains collected from wild bird faeces and poultry. A custom in-field virus screening and sequencing protocol, including a targeted offline bioinformatic pipeline, was developed to accurately subtype AIV. Due to the lack of optimal diagnostic MinION packages for Australian AIV strains the bioinformatic pipeline was specifically targeted to confidently subtype local strains. The method presented eliminates the transportation of samples, dependence on internet access and delivers critical diagnostic information in a timely manner.

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI H5Nx, Clade 2.3.4.4.b) in Poultry and Wild Birds in Sweden: Synopsis of the 2020-2021 Season

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI, Gs/Gd lineage) was introduced to Europe in 2005 and has since caused numerous outbreaks in birds. The 2020-2021 season was the hitherto most devastating when considering bird numbers and duration in Europe. Surveillance data, virologic results and epidemiologic investigations from the 2020-2021 outbreaks in Sweden were analysed. Subtypes H5N8 and H5N5 were detected on 24 farms with poultry or other captive birds. In wild birds, subtypes H5N8, H5N5, H5N1, H5N4, H5Nx were detected in 130 out of 811 sampled birds. There was a spatiotemporal association between cases in wild birds and poultry. Based on phylogeny and epidemiology, most of the introductions of HPAI to commercial poultry were likely a result of indirect contact with wild birds. A definite route of introduction to poultry could not be established although some biosecurity breaches were observed. No spread between farms was identified but airborne spread between flocks on the same farm was suspected. Our findings exemplify the challenges posed by the continuously changing influenza viruses that seem to adapt to a broader species spectrum. This points to the importance of wild bird surveillance, compliance to biosecurity, and identification of risk factors for introduction on poultry farms.

Quantification and characterisation of commensal wild birds and their interactions with domestic ducks on a free-range farm in southwest France

The role of commensal birds in the epidemiology of pathogens in poultry farms remains unclear. Our study aimed to identify potential key species for interactions with domestic ducks on one free-range duck farm in southwest France. Methods combined direct individual observations on duck outdoor foraging areas, network analysis, and general linear mixed models of abundances. Results showed a wide diversity of wild bird species visiting foraging areas, heavily dominated in frequency by White wagtails (Motacilla alba) and Sparrows (Passer domesticus and Passer montanus). These also were the only species seen entering duck premises or perching on drinkers in the presence of ducks. Moreover, White wagtails were the species most frequently observed on the ground and in close proximity to ducks. Network analysis suggested the role of White wagtails and Sparrows in linking ducks to other wild birds on the farm. The abundance of White wagtails was positively associated with open vegetation, with the presence of ducks and particularly in the afternoon, while the abundance of Sparrows was positively associated only with the fall-winter season. By precisely characterising interactions, the study was able to identify few wild bird species which should be prioritized in infectious investigations at the interface with poultry.

Big data-based risk assessment of poultry farms during the 2020/2021 highly pathogenic avian influenza epidemic in Korea

Outbreaks of H5-type highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in poultry have been reported in various parts of the world. To respond to these continuous threats, numerous surveillance programs have been applied to poultry raising facilities as well as wild birds. In Korea, a surveillance program was developed aimed at providing a preemptive response to possible outbreaks at poultry farms. The purpose of this study is to comprehensively present the risks of HPAI evaluated by this program in relation to actual outbreak farms during the epidemic of 2020/2021. A deep learning-based risk assessment program was trained based on the pattern of livestock vehicles visiting poultry farms and HPAI outbreaks to calculate the risk of HPAI for farms linked by the movement of livestock vehicles (such farms are termed “epidemiologically linked farms”). A total of 7,984 risk assessments were conducted, and the results were categorized into four groups. The proportion of the highest risk level was greater in duck farms (13.6%) than in chicken farms (8.8%). Among the duck farms, the proportion of the highest risk level was much greater in farms where breeder ducks were raised (accounting for 26.4% of the risk) than in farms where ducks were raised to obtain meat (12.8% of the risk). A higher risk level was also found in cases where the species of the outbreak farm and epidemiologically linked farms were the same (proportion of the highest risk level = 13.2%) compared to that when the species between the two farms were different (7.9%). The overall proportion of farms with HPAI outbreaks among epidemiologically linked farms (attack rate, AR) was 1.7% as HPAI was confirmed on 67 of the 3,883 epidemiologically linked farms. The AR was highest for breeder ducks (15.3%) among duck farms and laying hens (4.8%) among chicken farms. The AR of the pairs where livestock vehicles entered the inner farm area was 1.3 times (95% confidence interval: 1.4–2.9) higher than that of all pairs. With the risk information provided, customized preventive measures can be implemented for each epidemiologically linked farm. The use of this risk assessment program would be a good example of information-based surveillance and support decision-making for controlling animal diseases.

Preventive effect of on-farm biosecurity practices against highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N6 infection on commercial layer farms in the Republic of Korea during the 2016-17 epidemic: A case-control study

Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIv) H5N6 has destructive consequences on the global poultry production system. Recently, a growing number of layer farms have been heavily damaged from the HPAIv epidemic due to the increased virulence of the virus and the intensification of the production system. Therefore, stakeholders should implement effective preventive practices at the farm level that are aligned with contingency measures at the national level to minimize poultry losses. However, numerous biosecurity protocols for layer farm workers to follow have been developed, impeding efficient prevention and control. Furthermore, the effectiveness of biosecurity practices varies with the geographical condition and inter-farm contact structures. Hence, the objective of our study was to examine the preventive effect of five biosecurity actions commonly practiced at layer farms in the Republic of Korea against HPAIv H5N6: (i) fence installation around a farm, ii) rodent control inside a farm; iii) disinfection booth for visitors for disinfection protocols, iv) an anterior room in the sheds before entering the bird area and v) boots changes when moving between sheds in the same farm. We conducted a case-control study on 114 layer case farms and 129 layer control farms during the 2016-17 HPAI epidemic. The odds ratios for five on-farm biosecurity practices implemented in those study groups were estimated as a preventive effect on the HPAI infection with covariates, including seven geographical conditions and three network metrics using Bayesian hierarchical logistic regression and geographical location weighted logistic regression. The results showed that the use of a disinfection booth for personnel reduced the odds of HPAIv H5N6 infection (adjusted odds ratio [AOR] = 0.002, 95 % credible interval [CrI] = 0.00007 - 0.025) with relatively small spatial variation (minimum AOR - maximum AOR: 0.084-0.263). Changing boots between sheds on the same farm reduced the odds of HPAIv H5N6 infection (AOR = 0.160, 95 % CrI = 0.024-0.852) with relatively wide spatial variation (minimum AOR - maximum AOR = 0.270-0.688). Therefore, enhanced personnel biosecurity protocols at the farm of entry for layer farms is recommended to effectively prevent and respond to HPAIv H5N6 infection under different local condition. Our study provides an important message for layer farmers to effectively implement on-farm biosecurity actions against HPAIv H5N6 infection at their farms by setting priorities based on their spatial condition and network position.

Additive Bayesian network analysis of the relationship between bovine respiratory disease and management practices in dairy heifer calves at pre-weaning stage

Background

Nursery farms that accept nursing and growing pre-weaned heifer calves from private dairy farms must work to prevent bovine respiratory disease (BRD). Knowledge of the BRD-associated risk factors related to calf management and calves’ condition will help to develop appropriate neonatal management practices at original farms and to identify calves at higher risk for BRD at nursery farms. In this study, the relationship between BRD and calf management practices (colostrum feeding, dam parity, serum total protein concentration at introduction (TP), body weight at introduction, introduction season, and daily average growth) was investigated using observational data from pre-weaned dairy calves introduced into a nursery farm in Hokkaido, Japan between 2014 and 2018 (n = 3185). Using additive Bayesian network (ABN) analysis, which is a multivariate statistical modelling approach, the direct and indirect associations between these factors were assessed.

Results

Colostrum feeding contributed to an increase in TP (correlation 1.02 [95 % CI, 0.94;1.10]), which was negatively associated with BRD directly (log odds ratio − 0.38 [− 0.46;−0.31]) and indirectly through increasing daily growth (correlation 0.12 [0.09;0.16]). Calves of multiparous dams had higher body weight at introduction (correlation 0.82 [0.74;0.89]), which indirectly reduced BRD risk through the increasing daily growth (correlation 0.17 [0.14;0.21]). Calves introduced during winter had the highest risk for BRD (log odds ratio 0.29 [0.15;0.44]), while those introduced in summer had the lowest risk (log odds ratio − 0.91 [− 1.06;−0.75]). The introduction season was also associated with BRD indirectly through dam parity, body weight at introduction, and daily growth.

Conclusions

The following calf management practices are recommended for preventing BRD in pre-weaned calves at nursery farms: (1) encouraging colostrum feeding to neonatal calves at their original farms; and (2) identifying calves with higher BRD risk, i.e., those without feeding colostrum, born to primiparous cattle, with low body weight at introduction, and/or introduced in winter, and paying intensive attention to the calves for rapid detection of BRD. ABN analysis applied enabled us to understand the complex inter-relationships between BRD incidence and the risk factors, which will help to reduce BRD incidence and to rear healthy calves at nursery farms.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s12917-021-03018-1.

Disinfection of various materials with 3-(trimethoxysilyl)-propyldimethyloctadecyl am-monium chloride in hatchery facilities

Objective

Surface disinfection is important in the proper running of livestock farms. However, disinfection of farm equipment and facilities is difficult because they are made of different materials, besides having large surface areas and complex structures. 3-(trimethoxysilyl)-propyldimethyloctadecyl ammonium chloride (Si-QAC) is a quaternary ammonium salt-based disinfectant that attaches to various surfaces by forming covalent bonds and maintains its disinfecting capacity for a considerable time. Our aim was to evaluate the potential use of Si-QAC for disinfection of farm equipment and facilities.

Methods

The short- and long-term antimicrobial and antiviral effects of Si-QAC were evaluated in both laboratory and farm settings using modified quantitative assessment method based on the standard operating procedures of the United States Environmental Protection Agency.

Results

Si-QAC was highly effective in controlling the growth of the Newcastle disease virus and avian pathogenic Escherichia coli. Electron microscopy revealed that the mechanism underlying the disinfection activity of Si-QAC was associated with its ability to damage the outer membrane of the pathogen cells. In the field test, Si-QAC effectively reduced viral contamination of surfaces of equipment and space.

Conclusion

Our results suggest that Si-QAC has great potential as an effective chemical for disinfecting farm equipment and facilities. This disinfectant could retain its disinfection ability longer than other commercial disinfectants and contribute to better farm biosecurity.

Backyard poultry flocks in France: A diversity of owners and biosecurity practices

Over the past few years, the number of backyard poultry flocks has been increasing in France. A mandatory step to improve backyard poultry management is to assess health risks by characterizing the flocks and understanding the owners' motivations for keeping poultry and their husbandry practices. A survey of backyard poultry owners was conducted in France to gather information about their motivations for owning poultry, flock characteristics, and breeding and biosecurity practices. The survey was completed by 1,160 owners. The major motivations for owning poultry flocks were egg consumption (93.3 %), recycling (72.4 %) and having pet animals (53.2 %). Most owners had already heard about avian influenza (96.7 %), but were less aware about other diseases such as Newcastle Disease (41.6 %), salmonellosis (79.1 %), or campylobacteriosis (18.6 %). Owners mainly kept only egg-layers (78.4 %), and the median size flock was five egg-layers. Owners gave eggs to their relatives, occasionally or regularly, in 86.6 % of the cases. Contacts with other family poultry owners were frequent (68.9 %) and biosecurity practices were poorly implemented: 50 % of owners did not wash their hands systematically after visiting the flock and more than 60 % of owners did not wear specific shoes. Drawing from the survey data, five profiles of family poultry flocks were identified with multiple correspondence analysis and hierarchical cluster analysis. The profiles, based on flock characteristics and owners' practices and motivations, illustrate the heterogeneity of the backyard poultry sector: 1) urban poultry, 2) traditional poultry, 3) student poultry, 4) pet poultry and 5) hobby poultry. Urban poultry consisted of recently constituted (< 2 years old), small (< 3 birds) flocks of layers, and traditional poultry of older, medium-sized flocks belonging to retired and older people. These two profiles were characterized by limited contacts (direct or indirect) with other flocks and owners. Student poultry consisted of younger owners (<30 years old) with flocks over 5 years old. Pet poultry consisted of recently established, medium-size flocks of layers located in both rural or urban environments. Hobby poultry consisted of dedicated owners who breed and sell poultry and participate in exhibitions and poultry shows. Pet and hobby poultry profiles were characterized by greater knowledge of diseases and biosecurity practices, more bird movements, and reported more frequent clinical signs. The observation of different profiles can help target veterinary and public health education messages to prevent disease transmission in backyard poultry flocks in France.

Biosecurity measures in French poultry farms are associated with farm type and location

The severe impact of recently reported Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) outbreaks have emphasized the need to better monitor biosecurity practices among the different French poultry production systems. Between October 2016 and September 2018, a large national cross-sectional study was carried out in France to assess biosecurity levels in high-risk poultry farms and identify farm biosecurity profiles, using Multiple Correspondence and Hierarchical Cluster Analyses. Results indicate that there is substantial room for improvement in cleaning and disinfection, anteroom management and delimitation of farm and production units for more than 50 % of the 1,004 analyzed farms. The farm biosecurity profile showing the highest level of biosecurity included commercial intensive poultry farms (gallinaceous poultry farms, in North-Western France), and those with a recent history of HPAI outbreak (duck farms, in South-Western France). The farms biosecurity profiles showing the lowest level of biosecurity included farms with multiple species (duck and gallinaceous poultry) or multiple production types (broilers and egg-layers), located in regions with a lower poultry density and without a recent history of HPAI outbreak. Outcomes provide support to adapt biosecurity improvement and inspection plans.

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Viruses at the Wild-Domestic Bird Interface in Europe: Future Directions for Research and Surveillance

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks in wild birds and poultry are no longer a rare phenomenon in Europe. In the past 15 years, HPAI outbreaks-in particular those caused by H5 viruses derived from the A/Goose/Guangdong/1/1996 lineage that emerged in southeast Asia in 1996-have been occuring with increasing frequency in Europe. Between 2005 and 2020, at least ten HPAI H5 incursions were identified in Europe resulting in mass mortalities among poultry and wild birds. Until 2009, the HPAI H5 virus outbreaks in Europe were caused by HPAI H5N1 clade 2.2 viruses, while from 2014 onwards HPAI H5 clade 2.3.4.4 viruses dominated outbreaks, with abundant genetic reassortments yielding subtypes H5N1, H5N2, H5N3, H5N4, H5N5, H5N6 and H5N8. The majority of HPAI H5 virus detections in wild and domestic birds within Europe coincide with southwest/westward fall migration and large local waterbird aggregations during wintering. In this review we provide an overview of HPAI H5 virus epidemiology, ecology and evolution at the interface between poultry and wild birds based on 15 years of avian influenza virus surveillance in Europe, and assess future directions for HPAI virus research and surveillance, including the integration of whole genome sequencing, host identification and avian ecology into risk-based surveillance and analyses.

European Food Safety Authority, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and European Union Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza, Adlhoch C, Fusaro A, Kuiken T, Niqueux É, Staubach C, Terregino C, Muñoz Guajardo I, Baldinelli F. Avian influenza overview May - August 2020

Between 16 May and 15 August 2020, seven highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N8) virus outbreaks were reported in Europe in poultry, with one outbreak reported in Bulgaria(n=1) andsix in Hungary (n=6) and one low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) A(H5N3) virus outbreak was reported in poultry in Italy. All six outbreaks detected in Hungary were secondary outbreaks and seem to be the tail end of the HPAI A(H5N8) epidemic that wasobserved in poultry over the winter and spring in central Europe from December 2019 (n=334).Genetic analysis of the HPAI A(H5N8) viruses isolated during this reporting period from Bulgaria and Hungary did not identify any major changes compared tothe viruses collected in the respective countries during the first months of 2020. This suggests a persistence of the virus in the two countries rather than new introductions via infectedwild birds. HPAI A(H5N8) virus has been detected in poultry and wild birds in western Russia within the reporting period, and as of the middle of September also in Kazakhstan. The presence of HPAI virus in western Russiaand in north Kazakhstan,spatially associated with autumnmigration routes of wild waterbirds, is of concern due to the possible spread of the virus via wild birds migrating to the EU.It is highly recommended thatMember States take appropriate measures to promptly detect suspected cases of HPAI, including increasing biosecurity measures. According to past experiences (2005-2006 and 2016-2017 epidemic waves), the northern and eastern European areas might be at higher risk of virus introduction in the coming autumn-winter seasonand should be the key regions where prompt response measures to early detect the virusshould be set up. One human case due to A(H9N2) avian influenza virus infection was reported during the reporting period.