Studies on the efficacy of hyperbaric rendering procedures in inactivating bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and scrapie agents

Optimization and evaluation of new decontamination procedures inactivating human prions

BACKGROUND

Prions are protein-only infectious agents for which no prophylactic or curative treatment exists. Infectivity bioassays based on hamster-263K prions allowed to identify processes capable of inactivating prions on medical devices. However, a 2016 publication study revealed that detergent formulations effective against hamster strain had poor efficacy against human strains. Shortly after, three probable cases of accidental Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease underscored the risk for scientists, health workers, and patients exposed to contaminated materials. The governmental guidelines were modified and emphasizing the need for formulations effective against human prions and robust in vitro and in vivo evaluation protocols. Here, we aimed to compare infectivity bioassays with those of their PMCA counterparts to propose a robust method for evaluating prionicide treatments against human prions.

METHODS

Stainless steel wires were contaminated with two humanized prion strains. The wires were then treated with different protocols based on a new formulation termed TFD Premium and WHO references. Residual prion seeding activity and infectivity on the wire and in wastewater were quantified using mb-PMCA and ad hoc bioassays. For vCJD, PMCA compared humanized prions and a human-derived prion isolate.

FINDINGS

TFD Premium proved more efficient at decontaminating humanized prions than 1 N NaOH for 1 hour at room temperature. Tg650-sCJD-VV2 were more resistant to inactivation than vCJD prions. For vCJD, strain from both sources shown similar resistant profile against TFD Premium. Finally, there was perfect alignment between the highly sensitive PMCA cell-free assay and the bioassays.

Stability of BSE infectivity towards heat treatment even after proteolytic removal of prion protein

The unconventional infectious agents of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) are prions. Their infectivity co-appears with PrPSc, aberrant depositions of the host's cellular prion protein (PrPC). Successive heat treatment in the presence of detergent and proteolysis by a keratinase from Bacillus licheniformis PWD-1 was shown before to destroy PrPSc from bovine TSE (BSE) and sheep scrapie diseased brain, however data regarding expected reduction of infectivity were still lacking. Therefore, transgenic Tgbov XV mice which are highly BSE susceptible were used to quantify infectivity before and after the bovine brain treatment procedure. Also four immunochemical analyses were applied to compare the levels of PrPSc. After heating at 115 °C with or without subsequent proteolysis, the original BSE infectivity of 106.2-6.4 ID50 g-1 was reduced to a remaining infectivity of 104.6-5.7 ID50 g-1 while strain characteristics were unaltered, even after precipitation with methanol. Surprisingly, PrPSc depletion was 5-800 times higher than the loss of infectivity. Similar treatment was applied on other prion strains, which were CWD1 in bank voles, 263 K scrapie in hamsters and sheep PG127 scrapie in tg338 ovinized mice. In these strains however, infectivity was already destroyed by heat only. These findings show the unusual heat resistance of BSE and support a role for an additional factor in prion formation as suggested elsewhere when producing prions from PrPC. Leftover material in the remaining PrPSc depleted BSE preparation offers a unique substrate for searching additional elements for prion infectivity and improving our concept about the nature of prions.

Eliminating transmissibility of bovine spongiform encephalopathy by dry-heat treatment

Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) prion is more resistant to heat inactivation compared to other prions, but the effect of heat inactivation has been reported to differ depending on the BSE-contaminated tissue state or heating type. We aimed to evaluate the secure level of inactivation of original BSE transmissibility by dry-heating. Cattle tissues affected with BSE were subjected to dry-heat treatment for 20 min at various temperatures ranging from 150 to 1000 °C. To assess the inactivation effect, we conducted protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA) and follicular dendritic cell (FDC) assays in transgenic mice expressing bovine prion protein genes. Under dry-heating at 600 °C or higher, BSE cattle tissues lost their transmissibility in transgenic mice. In contrast, transmissibility was detected in the cattle tissues treated at temperatures of 400 °C or lower through the FDC assay combined with PMCA. In this study, we confirmed that transmissibility was eliminated in BSE-affected cattle tissues by dry-heating at 600 °C or higher.

Incomplete inactivation of atypical scrapie following recommended autoclave decontamination procedures

Prions are highly resistant to the decontamination procedures normally used to inactivate conventional pathogens. This is a challenging problem not only in the medical and veterinary fields for minimizing the risk of transmission from potentially infective sources but also for ensuring the safe disposal or subsequent use of animal by-products. Specific pressure autoclaving protocols were developed for this purpose, but different strains of prions have been reported to have differing resistance patterns to established prion decontamination procedures, and as additional TSE strains are identified it is necessary to determine the effectiveness of such procedures. In this study we assessed the efficacy of sterilization using the EU recommended autoclave procedure for prions (133°C, 3 Bar for 20 min) on the atypical or Nor98 (AS/Nor98) scrapie strain of sheep and goats. Using a highly sensitive murine mouse model (tg338) that overexpresses ovine PrP^C , we determined that this method of decontamination reduced the infectivity titre by 10¹⁰ . Infectivity was nonetheless still detected after applying the recommended autoclaving protocol. This shows that AS/Nor98 can survive the designated legislative decontamination conditions, albeit with a significant decrease in titre. The infectivity of a classical scrapie isolate subjected to the same decontamination conditions was reduced by 10⁶ suggesting that the AS/Nor98 isolate is less sensitive to decontamination than the classical scrapie source.

Updated quantitative risk assessment (QRA) of the BSE risk posed by processed animal protein (PAP)

EFSA was requested: to assess the impact of a proposed quantitative real-time polymerase chain reaction (qPCR) 'technical zero' on the limit of detection of official controls for constituents of ruminant origin in feed, to review and update the 2011 QRA, and to estimate the cattle bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) risk posed by the contamination of feed with BSE-infected bovine-derived processed animal protein (PAP), should pig PAP be re-authorised in poultry feed and vice versa, using both light microscopy and ruminant qPCR methods, and action limits of 100, 150, 200, 250 and 300 DNA copies. The current qPCR cannot discriminate between legitimately added bovine material and unauthorised contamination, or determine if any detected ruminant material is associated with BSE infectivity. The sensitivity of the surveillance for the detection of material of ruminant origin in feed is currently limited due to the heterogeneous distribution of the material, practicalities of sampling and test performance. A 'technical zero' will further reduce it. The updated model estimated a total BSE infectivity four times lower than that estimated in 2011, with less than one new case of BSE expected to arise each year. In the hypothetical scenario of a whole carcass of an infected cow entering the feed chain without any removal of specified risk material (SRM) or reduction of BSE infectivity via rendering, up to four new cases of BSE could be expected at the upper 95th percentile. A second model estimated that at least half of the feed containing material of ruminant origin will not be detected or removed from the feed chain, if an interpretation cut-off point of 100 DNA copies or more is applied. If the probability of a contaminated feed sample increased to 5%, with an interpretation cut-off point of 300 DNA copies, there would be a fourfold increase in the proportion of all produced feed that is contaminated but not detected.

Rapid assessment of bovine spongiform encephalopathy prion inactivation by heat treatment in yellow grease produced in the industrial manufacturing process of meat and bone meals

BACKGROUND

Prions, infectious agents associated with transmissible spongiform encephalopathy, are primarily composed of the misfolded and pathogenic form (PrPSc) of the host-encoded prion protein. Because PrPSc retains infectivity after undergoing routine sterilizing processes, the cause of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) outbreaks are suspected to be feeding cattle meat and bone meals (MBMs) contaminated with the prion. To assess the validity of prion inactivation by heat treatment in yellow grease, which is produced in the industrial manufacturing process of MBMs, we pooled, homogenized, and heat treated the spinal cords of BSE-infected cows under various experimental conditions.

RESULTS

Prion inactivation was analyzed quantitatively in terms of the infectivity and PrPSc of the treated samples. Following treatment at 140°C for 1 h, infectivity was reduced to 1/35 of that of the untreated samples. Treatment at 180°C for 3 h was required to reduce infectivity. However, PrPSc was detected in all heat-treated samples by using the protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA) technique, which amplifies PrPScin vitro. Quantitative analysis of the inactivation efficiency of BSE PrPSc was possible with the introduction of the PMCA50, which is the dilution ratio of 10% homogenate needed to yield 50% positivity for PrPSc in amplified samples.

CONCLUSIONS

Log PMCA50 exhibited a strong linear correlation with the transmission rate in the bioassay; infectivity was no longer detected when the log PMCA50 of the inoculated sample was reduced to 1.75. The quantitative PMCA assay may be useful for safety evaluation for recycling and effective utilization of MBMs as an organic resource.

The BSE risk of processing meat and bone meal in nonruminant feed: a quantitative assessment for the Netherlands

The total ban on use of meat and bone meal (MBM) in livestock feed has been very successful in reducing bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) spread, but also implies a waste of high-quality proteins resulting in economic and ecological loss. Now that the BSE epidemic is fading out, a partial lifting of the MBM ban might be considered. The objective of this study was to assess the BSE risk for the Netherlands if MBM derived from animals fit for human consumption, i.e., category 3 MBM, would be used in nonruminant feed. A stochastic simulation model was constructed that calculates (1) the probability that infectivity of undetected BSE-infected cows ends up with calves and (2) the quantity of infectivity (Q(inf)) consumed by calves in case of such an incident. Three pathways were considered via which infectivity can reach cattle: (1) cross-contamination in the feed mill, (2) cross-contamination on the primary farm, and (3) pasture contamination. Model calculations indicate that the overall probability that infectivity ends up with calves is 3.2%. In most such incidents the Q(inf) is extremely small (median = 6.5 x 10(-12) ID(50); mean = 1.8 x 10(-4) ID(50)), corresponding to an average probability of 1.3 x 10(-4) that an incident results in >or=1 new BSE infections. Cross-contamination in the feed mill is the most risky pathway. Combining model results with Dutch BSE prevalence estimates for the coming years, it can be concluded that the BSE risk of using category 3 MBM derived from Dutch cattle in nonruminant feed is very low.

Comparison of the historic recycling risk for BSE in three European countries by calculating the basic reproduction ratio R0

A deterministic model of BSE transmission is used to calculate the R(0) values for specific years of the BSE epidemics in the United Kingdom (UK), the Netherlands (NL), and Switzerland (CH). In all three countries, the R(0) values decreased below 1 after the introduction of a ban on feeding meat and bone meal (MBM) to ruminants around the 1990s. A variety of additional measures against BSE led to further decrease of R(0) to about 0.06 in the years around 1998. The calculated R(0) values were consistent with the observations made on the surveillance results for UK, but were partially conflicting with the surveillance results for NL and CH. There was evidence for a dependency of the BSE epidemic in NL and CH from an infection source not considered in the deterministic transmission model. Imports of MBM and feed components can be an explanation for this discrepancy, and the importance of imports for these observations is discussed.

Exposure assessment of TSEs from the landspreading of meat and bone meal

Recent changes in European legislation have meant that certain processed abattoir waste, which has been appropriately heat treated and ground to a specified particle size, can be spread on nonpasture agricultural land. This has opened the way for the potential landspreading of mammalian meat and bone meal (mMBM) derived from animals slaughtered for human consumption. This article reports on two separate case studies (Study 1 carried out in Great Britain (GB) and Study 2 carried out in Ireland) on the potential exposure to TSE infectivity following the spreading of abattoir waste (derived from animals slaughtered for human consumption) on nonpasture agricultural land. For Study 1, the average TSE infectivity on nonpasture agricultural land per year from sheep with scrapie was found to be higher (five orders of magnitude) than that estimated for BSE in cattle (3.9 x 10(-3) Ovine Oral ID(50)/ton of soil compared to 3.3 x 10(-8) Bovine Oral ID(50)/ton of soil). The mean estimate for BSE in sheep was 8.1 x 10(-6) Ovine Oral ID(50)/ton of soil. The mean level of infectivity in mMBM was assessed to be 1.2 x 10(-5) and 2.36 x 10(-5) ID(50)/ton of mMBM for Study 1 and 2, respectively. For Study 2 the spreading of mMBM was estimated to result in infectivity on nonpasture land of 1.62 x 10(-8) Bovine Oral ID(50)/m(3). The mean simulated probability of infection per year per bovine animal was 1.11 x 10(-9). Given the low infectivity density and corresponding low risks to bovines the spreading of mMBM could be considered a viable alternative for the utilization of mMBM.

Infectious agent of sheep scrapie may persist in the environment for at least 16 years

In 1978, a rigorous programme was implemented to stop the spread of, and subsequently eradicate, sheep scrapie in Iceland. Affected flocks were culled, premises were disinfected and, after 2-3 years, restocked with lambs from scrapie-free areas. Between 1978 and 2004, scrapie recurred on 33 farms. Nine of these recurrences occurred 14-21 years after culling, apparently as the result of environmental contamination, but outside entry could not always be absolutely excluded. Of special interest was one farm with a small, completely self-contained flock where scrapie recurred 18 years after culling, 2 years after some lambs had been housed in an old sheep-house that had never been disinfected. Epidemiological investigation established with near certitude that the disease had not been introduced from the outside and it is concluded that the agent may have persisted in the old sheep-house for at least 16 years.

BSE risk assessments in the UK: a risk tradeoff?

Risk assessments for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) should be based on the group risk and not the median individual risk. The group risk is calculated from the arithmetic mean risk, which in the case of dorsal root ganglia, is a factor of 50-fold higher than the median. For environmental routes, the arithmetic mean exposure is sufficient for risk assessment, while for food-borne routes failure to accommodate the variation in exposures to individuals across the UK population could overestimate the group risk considerably. Ignoring prion destruction by cooking could overestimate the food-borne risks still further. The recent estimate for the arithmetic mean cow-to-man species barrier of 4000 does not take into accounts either of these factors and thus may be too high. Until evidence for a threshold dose is demonstrated, public health scientists should avoid assessing safety on the basis of a 'minimum infective dose'. The incubation period observed in cattle-feeding studies, when completed, would continue to increase with decreasing dose below the ID50if there is a threshold or co-operative effect. The question is raised of whether fears over BSE in drinking water contributed to the spread of foot-and-mouth disease across the UK in 2001; a risk tradeoff.

Infectivity studies of both ash and air emissions from simulated incineration of scrapie-contaminated tissues

We investigated the effectiveness of 15 min exposures to 600 and 1000 degrees C in continuous flow normal and starved-air incineration-like conditions to inactivate samples of pooled brain macerates from hamsters infected with the 263K strain of hamster-adapted scrapie with an infectivity titer in excess of 10(9) mean lethal doses (LD50) per g. Bioassays of the ash, outflow tubing residues, and vented emissions from heating 1 g of tissue samples yielded a total of two transmissions among 21 inoculated animals from the ash of a single specimen burned in normal air at 600 degrees C. No other ash, residue, or emission from samples heated at either 600 or 1000 degrees C, under either normal or starved-air conditions, transmitted disease. We conclude that at temperatures approaching 1000 degrees C under the air conditions and combustion times used in these experiments, contaminated tissues can be completely inactivated, with no release of infectivity into the environment from emissions. The extent to which this result can be realized in actual incinerators and other combustion devices will depend on equipment design and operating conditions during the heating process.

Quantifying BSE control by calculating the basic reproduction ratio R0 for the infection among cattle

The safety of using meat and bone meal (MBM) in mammal feed was studied in view of BSE, by quantifying the risk of BSE transmission through different infection routes. This risk is embodied in the basic reproduction ratio R(0) of the infection, i.e. the average number of new infections induced by one initial infection. Only when R(0) is below 1, will the disease die out with certainty and the population will become free from BSE. Unfortunately this is a slow process due to the slow progression of the disease. We calculate R(0) explicitly from basic ingredients taking several different transmission routes into account. Several of the basic ingredients are functions of age or of infection-age. We also calculate the exponential growth rate r in terms of the same basic ingredients. Next we quantify the ingredients from available data and compute the effects on R(0) of various scenario's for controlling BSE, with examples for the UK and the Netherlands.

Identification of inter-species transmission of prion strains

The concern of the potential transmission of animal spongiform encephalopathies to humans, which arose as soon as the interspecies transmission of these diseases was recognized, has been reinforced with the emergence of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in cattle. Recent experimental findings suggest that the infectious agent causing BSE in cattle can lead to the occurrence of a new form of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These findings help us understand how the transmission to humans of an animal disease may be recognized. This can involve an indirect approach through the analysis of neurodegeneration, either in the disease host, or more specifically, in genetically well-defined experimental hosts to which the disease can be transmitted. Recent experimental studies have also shown that the different molecular features of the abnormal form of the prion protein, which accumulates in the infected tissues, can provide important clues to the relationships between different spongiform encephalopathies. However, a better understanding of the molecular features associated with the specific pathogenic behavior of different strains is required. Complex relationships between the infectious agents involved in spongiform encephalopathies and the disease host can make the recognition of a link between animal prion strains and the human disease difficult to establish.

Characterization of thermodynamic diversity between transmissible spongiform encephalopathy agent strains and its theoretical implications

Some transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) (or "prion") strains, notably those derived from bovine spongiform encephalopathy, are highly resistant to total inactivation by heat. When three TSE strains derived from sheep with scrapie were heated, little inactivation took place at low temperatures, but at higher temperatures, considerable inactivation occurred. The temperature at which substantial inactivation first occurred varied according to TSE strain, and it was calculated to be 70 degrees C for the 22C strain, 84 degrees C for ME7, and 97 degrees C for 22A by fitting the data to a model based on competition between a destructive and a protective reaction. However, PrP(Sc) from mice infected with a range of TSE strains retained similar resistance to proteinase K digestion after heating to below or above these temperatures, showing that the properties of PrP(Sc) responsible for proteinase resistance do not correlate with those conferring thermostability on the TSE agent. The simplest explanation of these data is that the causal agent contains a macromolecular component that is structurally independent of the host, that it varies covalently between TSE strains, and that it is protected by other macromolecular components. The model is in accord with the virino hypothesis, which proposes a host-independent informational molecule protected by the host protein PrP.