Why and When Beliefs Change

Large environmental changes reduce valence-dependent belief updating

When updating beliefs, humans tend to integrate more desirable information than undesirable information. In stable environments (low uncertainty and high predictability), this asymmetry favors motivation towards action and perceived self-efficacy. However, in changing environments (high uncertainty and low predictability), this process can lead to risk underestimation and increase unwanted costs. Here, we examine how people (n = 388) integrate threatening information during an abrupt environmental change (mandatory quarantine during the COVID-19 pandemic). Given that anxiety levels are associated with the magnitude of the updating belief asymmetry; we explore its relationship during this particular context. We report a significant reduction in asymmetrical belief updating during a large environmental change as individuals integrated desirable and undesirable information to the same extent. Moreover, this result was supported by computational modeling of the belief update task. However, we found that the reduction in asymmetrical belief updating was not homogeneous among people with different levels of Trait-anxiety. Individuals with higher levels of Trait-anxiety maintained a valence-dependent updating, as it occurs in stable environments. On the other hand, updating behavior was not associated with acute anxiety (State-Anxiety), health concerns (Health-Anxiety), or having positive expectations (Trait-Optimism). These results suggest that highly uncertain environments can generate adaptive changes in information integration. At the same time, it reveals the vulnerabilities of individuals with higher levels of anxiety to adapt the way they learn.

Manifestations, social impact, and decay of conceptual beliefs: A cultural perspective

INTRODUCTION

Believing comprises multifaceted processes that integrate information from the outside world through meaning-making processes with personal relevance.

METHODS

Qualitative Review of the current literature in social cognitive neuroscience.

RESULTS

Although believing develops rapidly outside an individual's conscious awareness, it results in the formation of beliefs that are stored in memory and play an important role in determining an individual's behavior. Primal beliefs reflect an individual's experience of objects and events, whereas conceptual beliefs are based on narratives that are held in social groups. Conceptual beliefs can be about autobiographical, political, religious, and other aspects of life and may be encouraged by participation in group rituals. We hypothesize that assertions of future gains and rewards that transcend but are inherent in these codices provide incentives to follow the norms and rules of social groups.

CONCLUSION

The power of conceptual beliefs to provide cultural orientation is likely to fade when circumstances and evidence make it clear that what was asserted no longer applies.

Motivated Cognition in Cooperation

Successful cooperation is tightly linked to individuals' beliefs about their interaction partners, the decision setting, and existing norms, perceptions, and values. This article reviews and integrates findings from judgment and decision-making, social and cognitive psychology, political science, and economics, developing a systematic overview of the mechanisms underlying motivated cognition in cooperation. We elaborate on how theories and concepts related to motivated cognition developed in various disciplines define the concept and describe its functionality. We explain why beliefs play such an essential role in cooperation, how they can be distorted, and how this fosters or harms cooperation. We also highlight how individual differences and situational factors change the propensity to engage in motivated cognition. In the form of a construct map, we provide a visualization of the theoretical and empirical knowledge structure regarding the role of motivated cognition, including its many interdependencies, feedback loops, and moderating influences. We conclude with a brief suggestion for a future research agenda based on this compiled evidence.

Psychological inoculation strategies to fight climate disinformation across 12 countries

Decades after the scientific debate about the anthropogenic causes of climate change was settled, climate disinformation still challenges the scientific evidence in public discourse. Here we present a comprehensive theoretical framework of (anti)science belief formation and updating to account for the psychological factors that influence the acceptance or rejection of scientific messages. We experimentally investigated, across 12 countries (N = 6,816), the effectiveness of six inoculation strategies targeting these factors-scientific consensus, trust in scientists, transparent communication, moralization of climate action, accuracy and positive emotions-to fight real-world disinformation about climate science and mitigation actions. While exposure to disinformation had strong detrimental effects on participants' climate change beliefs (δ = -0.16), affect towards climate mitigation action (δ = -0.33), ability to detect disinformation (δ = -0.14) and pro-environmental behaviour (δ = -0.24), we found almost no evidence for protective effects of the inoculations (all δ < 0.20). We discuss the implications of these findings and propose ways forward to fight climate disinformation.

Better characterizing sleep beliefs for personalized sleep health promotion: the French sleep beliefs scale validation study

Background

The Sleep Beliefs Scale (SBS) is a well-known tool to design and monitor personalized sleep health promotion at an individual and population level. The lack of an established French version limits the development of effective interventions targeting these populations. Thus, the aim of this study was to validate the French version of the SBS in a representative sample of the general population.

Methods

Quota sampling was used to recruit 1,004 participants (18-65 years, mean age: 43 years, 54% of female) who underwent an online survey to complete the SBS, and to assess sleep schedules, sleep quality and disorders, and mental health. Cronbach's α coefficient, confirmatory factor analysis, item-internal consistency (IIC), and item discriminant validity (IDV) of the SBS were computed to assess internal validity while bivariate associations with sleep schedules, sleep quality and disorders, and mental health were used to assess external convergent and discriminant validity.

Results

The mean score on the SBS was 12.3 ± 4.9. Item 19 ("Quiet & Dark") showed the highest rate of correct answers (n = 801, 79.8%), while item 20 ("Recovering sleep") showed the lowest rate of correct answers (n = 246, 24.5%). Overall, the SBS showed satisfactory internal consistency (α = 0.87) and confirmed the three-factor structure proposed by the original study. All items were found consistent (IIC > 0.4) and discriminant (IIC > IDV) except for item 20 ("recovering lost sleep by sleeping for a long time"). Females, older participants, and subjects with short time-in-bed, poor sleep quality, insomnia, and circadian rhythm disorder had higher SBS scores while participants with depressive symptoms had lower SBS scores.

Conclusion

We successfully translated and validated the French version of the SBS in a representative sample, making it a reliable instrument for researchers and clinicians to assess and target sleep beliefs. Correct answers vary from 25 to 80% which underlines the importance of continuing sleep health promotion campaigns by targeting poorly understood behaviors. Our findings also shed light on the fickleness of beliefs that are prone to vary within individuals across time, in step with societal changes. Several associated factors were identified, thus contributing to our understanding of sleep beliefs and offering insights for personalized approaches to enhance sleep health and overall well-being.

Factors influencing the update of beliefs regarding controversial political issues

Selectively integrating new information contributes to belief polarization and compromises public discourse. To better understand factors that underlie biased belief updating, I conducted three pre-registered studies covering different controversial political issues. The main hypothesis was that cognitively devaluing new information hinders belief updating. Support for this hypothesis was found in only one of the three issues. The only factor that consistently influenced belief updating across issues was the discrepancy between prior beliefs and new information. These results suggest that usually people do use evidence to correct their beliefs, but may refuse to do so if doubts about its generalizability arise.

Confidence is predicted by pre- and post-choice decision signal dynamics

It is well established that one's confidence in a choice can be influenced by new evidence encountered after commitment has been reached, but the processes through which post-choice evidence is sampled remain unclear. To investigate this, we traced the pre- and post-choice dynamics of electrophysiological signatures of evidence accumulation (Centro-parietal Positivity, CPP) and motor preparation (mu/beta band) to determine their sensitivity to participants' confidence in their perceptual discriminations. Pre-choice CPP amplitudes scaled with confidence both when confidence was reported simultaneously with choice, and when reported 1 second after the initial direction decision with no intervening evidence. When additional evidence was presented during the post-choice delay period, the CPP exhibited sustained activation after the initial choice, with a more prolonged build-up on trials with lower certainty in the alternative that was finally endorsed, irrespective of whether this entailed a change-of-mind from the initial choice or not. Further investigation established that this pattern was accompanied by later lateralisation of motor preparation signals toward the ultimately chosen response and slower confidence reports when participants indicated low certainty in this response. These observations are consistent with certainty-dependent stopping theories according to which post-choice evidence accumulation ceases when a criterion level of certainty in a choice alternative has been reached, but continues otherwise. Our findings have implications for current models of choice confidence, and predictions they may make about EEG signatures.

The shadowing effect of initial expectation on learning asymmetry

Evidence for positivity and optimism bias abounds in high-level belief updates. However, no consensus has been reached regarding whether learning asymmetries exist in more elementary forms of updates such as reinforcement learning (RL). In RL, the learning asymmetry concerns the sensitivity difference in incorporating positive and negative prediction errors (PE) into value estimation, namely the asymmetry of learning rates associated with positive and negative PEs. Although RL has been established as a canonical framework in characterizing interactions between agent and environment, the direction of learning asymmetry remains controversial. Here, we propose that part of the controversy stems from the fact that people may have different value expectations before entering the learning environment. Such a default value expectation influences how PEs are calculated and consequently biases subjects' choices. We test this hypothesis in two learning experiments with stable or varying reinforcement probabilities, across monetary gains, losses, and gain-loss mixed environments. Our results consistently support the model incorporating both asymmetric learning rates and the initial value expectation, highlighting the role of initial expectation in value updating and choice preference. Further simulation and model parameter recovery analyses confirm the unique contribution of initial value expectation in accessing learning rate asymmetry.

Decisions under uncertainty are more messy than they seem

Conviction Narrative Theory (CNT) is conceptually so multifaceted as to make critical evaluation difficult. It also omits one course of action: Active engagement with the world. Parsing the developmental and mechanistic processes within CNT would allow for a rigorous research programme to put the account under test. I propose a unifying account based on active inference.

Actively Open-Minded Thinking and Its Measurement

Actively open-minded thinking (AOT) is measured by items that tap the willingness to consider alternative opinions, sensitivity to evidence contradictory to current beliefs, the willingness to postpone closure, and reflective thought. AOT scales are strong predictors of performance on heuristics and biases tasks and of the avoidance of reasoning traps such as superstitious thinking and belief in conspiracy theories. Nevertheless, AOT is most commonly measured with questionnaires rather than performance indicators. Questionnaire contamination becomes even more of a danger as the AOT concept is expanded into new areas such as the study of fake news, misinformation, ideology, and civic attitudes. We review our 25-year history of studying the AOT concept and developing our own AOT scale. We present a 13-item scale that both is brief and accommodates many previous criticisms and refinements. We include a discussion of why AOT scales are such good predictors of performance on heuristics and biases tasks. We conclude that it is because such scales tap important processes of cognitive decoupling and decontextualization that modernity increasingly requires. We conclude by discussing the paradox that although AOT scales are potent predictors of performance on most rational thinking tasks, they do not predict the avoidance of myside thinking, even though it is virtually the quintessence of the AOT concept.