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Sun Y, Keskinocak P, Steimle LN, Kovacs SD, Wassilak SG. Modeling the spread of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 outbreaks and interventions: A case study of Nigeria. Vaccine X 2024; 18:100476. [PMID: 38617838 PMCID: PMC11011220 DOI: 10.1016/j.jvacx.2024.100476] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/09/2023] [Revised: 03/12/2024] [Accepted: 03/15/2024] [Indexed: 04/16/2024] Open
Abstract
Background Despite the successes of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, substantial challenges remain in eradicating the poliovirus. The Sabin-strain (live-attenuated) virus in oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) can revert to circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) in under-vaccinated communities, regain neurovirulence and transmissibility, and cause paralysis outbreaks. Since the cessation of type 2-containing OPV (OPV2) in 2016, there have been cVDPV type 2 (cVDPV2) outbreaks in four out of six geographical World Health Organization regions, making these outbreaks a significant public health threat. Preparing for and responding to cVDPV2 outbreaks requires an updated understanding of how different factors, such as outbreak responses with the novel type of OPV2 (nOPV2) and the existence of under-vaccinated areas, affect the disease spread. Methods We built a differential-equation-based model to simulate the transmission of cVDPV2 following reversion of the Sabin-strain virus in prolonged circulation. The model incorporates vaccinations by essential (routine) immunization and supplementary immunization activities (SIAs), the immunity induced by different poliovirus vaccines, and the reversion process from Sabin-strain virus to cVDPV. The model's outcomes include weekly cVDPV2 paralytic case counts and the die-out date when cVDPV2 transmission stops. In a case study of Northwest and Northeast Nigeria, we fit the model to data on the weekly cVDPV2 case counts with onset in 2018-2021. We then used the model to test the impact of different outbreak response scenarios during a prediction period of 2022-2023. The response scenarios included no response, the planned response (based on Nigeria's SIA calendar), and a set of hypothetical responses that vary in the dates at which SIAs started. The planned response scenario included two rounds of SIAs that covered almost all areas of Northwest and Northeast Nigeria except some under-vaccinated areas (e.g., Sokoto). The hypothetical response scenarios involved two, three, and four rounds of SIAs that covered the whole Northwest and Northeast Nigeria. All SIAs in tested outbreak response scenarios used nOPV2. We compared the outcomes of tested outbreak response scenarios in the prediction period. Results Modeled cVDPV2 weekly case counts aligned spatiotemporally with the data. The prediction results indicated that implementing the planned response reduced total case counts by 79% compared to no response, but did not stop the transmission, especially in under-vaccinated areas. Implementing the hypothetical response scenarios involving two rounds of nOPV2 SIAs that covered all areas further reduced cVDPV2 case counts in under-vaccinated areas by 91-95% compared to the planned response, with greater impact from completing the two rounds at an earlier time, but it did not stop the transmission. When the first two rounds were completed in early April 2022, implementing two additional rounds stopped the transmission in late January 2023. When the first two rounds were completed six weeks earlier (i.e., in late February 2022), implementing one (two) additional round stopped the transmission in early February 2023 (late November 2022). The die out was always achieved last in the under-vaccinated areas of Northwest and Northeast Nigeria. Conclusions A differential-equation-based model of poliovirus transmission was developed and validated in a case study of Northwest and Northeast Nigeria. The results highlighted (i) the effectiveness of nOPV2 in reducing outbreak case counts; (ii) the need for more rounds of outbreak response SIAs that covered all of Northwest and Northeast Nigeria in 2022 to stop the cVDPV2 outbreaks; (iii) that persistent transmission in under-vaccinated areas delayed the progress towards stopping outbreaks; and (iv) that a quicker outbreak response would avert more paralytic cases and require fewer SIA rounds to stop the outbreaks.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yuming Sun
- H. Milton Stewart School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Pinar Keskinocak
- H. Milton Stewart School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Lauren N. Steimle
- H. Milton Stewart School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA
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Nigatu T, Abraham L, Willems H, Tilaye M, Tiruneh F, Gebru F, Tafesse Z, Getachew B, Bulcha M, Tewfik S, Alemu T. The status of immunization program and challenges in Ethiopia: A mixed method study. SAGE Open Med 2024; 12:20503121241237115. [PMID: 38516641 PMCID: PMC10956145 DOI: 10.1177/20503121241237115] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/31/2023] [Accepted: 02/19/2024] [Indexed: 03/23/2024] Open
Abstract
Introduction Immunization helps reduce morbidity and mortality attributable to severe vaccine-preventable childhood illnesses. However, vaccination coverage and the quality of immunization data remain challenging in Ethiopia. This has led to poor planning, suboptimal vaccination coverage, and the resurgence of vaccine-preventable disease outbreaks in under-immunized pocket areas. The problem is further compounded by the occurrence of the COVID-19 pandemic and the disruption of the health information system due to recurrent conflict. This study assessed the current status of the immunization service and its challenges in Ethiopia. Methods A mixed-methods study was conducted in three regions of Ethiopia from 21 to 31 May, 2023. A survey of administrative reports was done in a total of 69 health facilities in 14 woredas (districts). Nine KIIs were conducted at a district level among immunization coordinators selected from three regions to explore the challenges of the immunization program. Linear regression and descriptive statistics were used to analyze the quantitative data. Thematic analysis was applied to analyze the qualitative data. The findings from the qualitative data were triangulated to supplement the quantitative results. Result Two-thirds (66.4%) of the children were fully vaccinated, having received all vaccines, including the first dose of the MCV1, by 12 months of age, as reported through administrative reports collected from health facility records. Catchment area population size and region were significantly associated with the number of fully immunized children (p < 0.001 and p = 0.005, respectively). The vaccination dropout rates of the first to third dose of pentavalent vaccine and the first dose of pentavalent vaccine to the first dose of MCV1 were 8.6% and 7.4%, respectively. A considerable proportion of health facilities lack accurate data to calculate vaccination coverage, while most of them lack accurate data for dropout rates. Longer waiting time, interruptions in vaccine supply or shortage, inaccessibility of health facilities, internal conflict and displacement, power interruption and refrigerator breakdown, poor counseling practice, and caretakers' lack of awareness, fear of side effects, and forgetfulness were the reasons for the dropout rate and low coverage. The result also showed that internal conflict and displacement have significantly affected immunization coverage, with the worst effects seen on the most marginalized populations. Conclusion The study revealed low vaccination coverage, a high dropout rate, and poor quality of immunization data. Access and vaccination coverage among marginalized community groups (e.g., orphans and street children) were also low. Hence, interventions to address organizational, behavioral, technical, and contextual (conflict and the resulting internal displacement) bottlenecks affecting the immunization program should be addressed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tariku Nigatu
- JSI Research and Training Institute Inc., Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
| | - Loko Abraham
- JSI Research and Training Institute Inc., Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
| | - Herman Willems
- JSI Research and Training Institute Inc., Boston, MA, USA
| | - Mesfin Tilaye
- United States Agency for International Development, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
| | | | - Fantay Gebru
- JSI Research and Training Institute Inc., Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
| | - Zergu Tafesse
- JSI Research and Training Institute Inc., Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
| | | | - Mulualem Bulcha
- JSI Research and Training Institute Inc., Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
| | - Sami Tewfik
- JSI Research and Training Institute Inc., Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
| | - Tadesse Alemu
- JSI Research and Training Institute Inc., Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
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Kalkowska DA, Badizadegan K, Thompson KM. Outbreak management strategies for cocirculation of multiple poliovirus types. Vaccine 2023:S0264-410X(23)00429-2. [PMID: 37121801 DOI: 10.1016/j.vaccine.2023.04.037] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/20/2023] [Accepted: 04/11/2023] [Indexed: 05/02/2023]
Abstract
Prior modeling studies showed that current outbreak management strategies are unlikely to stop outbreaks caused by type 1 wild polioviruses (WPV1) or circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) in many areas, and suggested increased risks of outbreaks with cocirculation of more than one type of poliovirus. The surge of type 2 poliovirus transmission that began in 2019 and continues to date, in conjunction with decreases in preventive supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) for poliovirus types 1 and 3, has led to the emergence of several countries with cocirculation of more than one type of poliovirus. Response to these emerging cocirculation events is theoretically straightforward, but the different formulations, types, and inventories of oral poliovirus vaccines (OPVs) available for outbreak response present challenging practical questions. In order to demonstrate the implications of using different vaccine options and outbreak campaign strategies, we applied a transmission model to a hypothetical population with conditions similar to populations currently experiencing outbreaks of cVDPVs of both types 1 and 2. Our results suggest prevention of the largest number of paralytic cases occurs when using (1) trivalent OPV (tOPV) (or coadministering OPV formulations for all three types) until one poliovirus outbreak type dies out, followed by (2) using a type-specific OPV until the remaining poliovirus outbreak type also dies out. Using tOPV first offers a lower overall expected cost, but this option may be limited by the willingness to expose populations to type 2 Sabin OPV strains. For strategies that use type 2 novel OPV (nOPV2) concurrently administered with bivalent OPV (bOPV, containing types 1 and 3 OPV) emerges as a leading option, but questions remain about feasibility, logistics, type-specific take rates, and coadministration costs.
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Kalkowska DA, Wassilak SGF, Wiesen E, F Estivariz C, Burns CC, Badizadegan K, Thompson KM. Complexity of options related to restarting oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) in national immunization programs after OPV cessation. Gates Open Res 2023; 7:55. [PMID: 37547300 PMCID: PMC10403636 DOI: 10.12688/gatesopenres.14511.1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 03/09/2023] [Indexed: 08/08/2023] Open
Abstract
Background: The polio eradication endgame continues to increase in complexity. With polio cases caused by wild poliovirus type 1 and circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses of all three types (1, 2 and 3) reported in 2022, the number, formulation, and use of poliovirus vaccines poses challenges for national immunization programs and vaccine suppliers. Prior poliovirus transmission modeling of globally-coordinated type-specific cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) assumed creation of Sabin monovalent OPV (mOPV) stockpiles for emergencies and explored the potential need to restart OPV if the world reached a specified cumulative threshold number of cases after OPV cessation. Methods: We document the actual experience of type 2 OPV (OPV2) cessation and reconsider prior modeling assumptions related to OPV restart. We develop updated decision trees of national immunization options for poliovirus vaccines considering different possibilities for OPV restart. Results: While OPV restart represented a hypothetical situation for risk management and contingency planning to support the 2013-2018 Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) Strategic Plan, the actual epidemiological experience since OPV2 cessation raises questions about what, if any, trigger(s) could lead to restarting the use of OPV2 in routine immunization and/or plans for potential future restart of type 1 and 3 OPV after their respective cessation. The emergency use listing of a genetically stabilized novel type 2 OPV (nOPV2) and continued evaluation of nOPV for types 1 and/or 3 add further complexity by increasing the combinations of possible OPV formulations for OPV restart. Conclusions: Expanding on a 2019 discussion of the logistical challenges and implications of restarting OPV, we find a complex structure of the many options and many issues related to OPV restart decisions and policies as of early 2023. We anticipate many challenges for forecasting prospective vaccine supply needs during the polio endgame due to increasing potential combinations of poliovirus vaccine choices.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Steven GF Wassilak
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Eric Wiesen
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Concepcion F Estivariz
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Cara C Burns
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, USA, Atlanta, GA, USA
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Kalkowska DA, Pallansch MA, Wassilak SGF, Cochi SL, Thompson KM. Serotype 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV2) choices and the consequences of delaying outbreak response. Vaccine 2023; 41 Suppl 1:A136-A141. [PMID: 33994237 PMCID: PMC11027208 DOI: 10.1016/j.vaccine.2021.04.061] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 12.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/19/2021] [Revised: 04/22/2021] [Accepted: 04/28/2021] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) faces substantial challenges with managing outbreaks of serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV2s) in 2021. A full five years after the globally coordinated removal of serotype 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV2) from trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (tOPV) for use in national immunization programs, cVDPV2s did not die out. Since OPV2 cessation, responses to outbreaks caused by cVDPV2s mainly used serotype 2 monovalent OPV (mOPV2) from a stockpile. A novel vaccine developed from a genetically stabilized OPV2 strain (nOPV2) promises to potentially facilitate outbreak response with lower prospective risks, although its availability and properties in the field remain uncertain. Using an established global poliovirus transmission model and building on a related analysis that characterized the impacts of disruptions in GPEI activities caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, we explore the implications of trade-offs associated with delaying outbreak response to avoid using mOPV2 by waiting for nOPV2 availability (or equivalently, delayed responses waiting for national validation of meeting the criteria for nOPV2 initial use). Consistent with prior modeling, responding as quickly as possible with available mOPV2 promises to reduce the expected burden of disease in the outbreak population and to reduce the chances for the outbreak virus to spread to other areas. Delaying cVDPV2 outbreak response (e.g., modeled as no response January-June 2021) to wait for nOPV2 can considerably increase the total expected cases (e.g., by as many as 1,300 cVDPV2 cases in the African region during 2021-2023) and increases the likelihood of triggering the need to restart widescale preventive use of an OPV2-containing vaccine in national immunization programs that use OPV. Countries should respond to any cVDPV2 outbreaks quickly with rounds that achieve high coverage using any available OPV2, and plan to use nOPV2, if needed, once it becomes widely available based on evidence that it is as effective but safer in populations than mOPV2.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Mark A Pallansch
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Steven G F Wassilak
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Stephen L Cochi
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
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Mayo-Wilson C, Zollman KJS. The computational philosophy: simulation as a core philosophical method. SYNTHESE 2021; 199:3647-3673. [PMID: 33716324 PMCID: PMC7944252 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-020-02950-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/13/2019] [Accepted: 11/03/2020] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
Modeling and computer simulations, we claim, should be considered core philosophical methods. More precisely, we will defend two theses. First, philosophers should use simulations for many of the same reasons we currently use thought experiments. In fact, simulations are superior to thought experiments in achieving some philosophical goals. Second, devising and coding computational models instill good philosophical habits of mind. Throughout the paper, we respond to the often implicit objection that computer modeling is "not philosophical."
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Affiliation(s)
- Conor Mayo-Wilson
- Department of Philosophy, University of Washington, Savery Hall, Room 361, Box 353350 , Seattle, WA 98195 USA
| | - Kevin J. S. Zollman
- Department of Philosophy, Carnegie Mellon University, Baker Hall 161, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 USA
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Thompson KM, Kalkowska DA. Reflections on Modeling Poliovirus Transmission and the Polio Eradication Endgame. RISK ANALYSIS : AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE SOCIETY FOR RISK ANALYSIS 2021; 41:229-247. [PMID: 32339327 PMCID: PMC7983882 DOI: 10.1111/risa.13484] [Citation(s) in RCA: 23] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/02/2019] [Revised: 03/27/2020] [Accepted: 03/27/2020] [Indexed: 05/06/2023]
Abstract
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) partners engaged modelers during the past nearly 20 years to support strategy and policy discussions and decisions, and to provide estimates of the risks, costs, and benefits of different options for managing the polio endgame. Limited efforts to date provided insights related to the validation of the models used for GPEI strategy and policy decisions. However, modeling results only influenced decisions in some cases, with other factors carrying more weight in many key decisions. In addition, the results from multiple modeling groups do not always agree, which supports selection of some strategies and/or policies counter to the recommendations from some modelers but not others. This analysis reflects on our modeling, and summarizes our premises and recommendations, the outcomes of these recommendations, and the implications of key limitations of models with respect to polio endgame strategy. We briefly review the current state of the GPEI given epidemiological experience as of early 2020, which includes failure of the GPEI to deliver on the objectives of its 2013-2018 strategic plan despite full financial support. Looking ahead, we provide context for why the GPEI strategy of global oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) cessation to end all cases of poliomyelitis looks infeasible given the current state of the GPEI and the failure to successfully stop all transmission of serotype 2 live polioviruses within four years of the April-May 2016 coordinated cessation of serotype 2 OPV use in routine immunization.
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Kalkowska DA, Franka R, Higgins J, Kovacs SD, Forbi JC, Wassilak SG, Pallansch MA, Thompson KM. Modeling Poliovirus Transmission in Borno and Yobe, Northeast Nigeria. RISK ANALYSIS : AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE SOCIETY FOR RISK ANALYSIS 2021; 41:289-302. [PMID: 32348621 PMCID: PMC7814397 DOI: 10.1111/risa.13485] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/17/2020] [Revised: 03/18/2020] [Accepted: 03/27/2020] [Indexed: 05/05/2023]
Abstract
Beginning in 2013, multiple local government areas (LGAs) in Borno and Yobe in northeast Nigeria and other parts of the Lake Chad basin experienced a violent insurgency that resulted in substantial numbers of isolated and displaced people. Northeast Nigeria represents the last known reservoir country of wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission in Africa, with detection of paralytic cases caused by serotype 1 WPV in 2016 in Borno and serotype 3 WPV in late 2012. Parts of Borno and Yobe are also problematic areas for transmission of serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses, and they continue to face challenges associated with conflict and inadequate health services in security-compromised areas that limit both immunization and surveillance activities. We model poliovirus transmission of all three serotypes for Borno and Yobe using a deterministic differential equation-based model that includes four subpopulations to account for limitations in access to immunization services and dynamic restrictions in population mixing. We find that accessibility issues and insufficient immunization allow for prolonged poliovirus transmission and potential undetected paralytic cases, although as of the end of 2019, including responsive program activities in the modeling suggest die out of indigenous serotypes 1 and 3 WPVs prior to 2020. Specifically, recent and current efforts to access isolated populations and provide oral poliovirus vaccine continue to reduce the risks of sustained and undetected transmission, although some uncertainty remains. Continued improvement in immunization and surveillance in the isolated subpopulations should minimize these risks. Stochastic modeling can build on this analysis to characterize the implications for undetected transmission and confidence about no circulation.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Richard Franka
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Jeff Higgins
- Geospatial Research, Analysis and Services Program, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Stephanie D. Kovacs
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Joseph C. Forbi
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Steven G.F Wassilak
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Mark A. Pallansch
- Division of Viral Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Kimberly M. Thompson
- Kid Risk, Inc., 7512 Dr. Phillips Blvd. #50-523 Orlando, FL 32819
- Corresponding author:
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Kalkowska DA, Pallansch MA, F. Wassilak SG, Cochi SL, Thompson KM. Global Transmission of Live Polioviruses: Updated Dynamic Modeling of the Polio Endgame. RISK ANALYSIS : AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE SOCIETY FOR RISK ANALYSIS 2021; 41:248-265. [PMID: 31960533 PMCID: PMC7787008 DOI: 10.1111/risa.13447] [Citation(s) in RCA: 36] [Impact Index Per Article: 12.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/16/2019] [Revised: 10/30/2019] [Accepted: 12/02/2019] [Indexed: 05/05/2023]
Abstract
Nearly 20 years after the year 2000 target for global wild poliovirus (WPV) eradication, live polioviruses continue to circulate with all three serotypes posing challenges for the polio endgame. We updated a global differential equation-based poliovirus transmission and stochastic risk model to include programmatic and epidemiological experience through January 2020. We used the model to explore the likely dynamics of poliovirus transmission for 2019-2023, which coincides with a new Global Polio Eradication Initiative Strategic Plan. The model stratifies the global population into 72 blocks, each containing 10 subpopulations of approximately 10.7 million people. Exported viruses go into subpopulations within the same block and within groups of blocks that represent large preferentially mixing geographical areas (e.g., continents). We assign representative World Bank income levels to the blocks along with polio immunization and transmission assumptions, which capture some of the heterogeneity across countries while still focusing on global poliovirus transmission dynamics. We also updated estimates of reintroduction risks using available evidence. The updated model characterizes transmission dynamics and resulting polio cases consistent with the evidence through 2019. Based on recent epidemiological experience and prospective immunization assumptions for the 2019-2023 Strategic Plan, the updated model does not show successful eradication of serotype 1 WPV by 2023 or successful cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine serotype 2-related viruses.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Mark A. Pallansch
- Division of Viral Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Steven G. F. Wassilak
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Stephen L. Cochi
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
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Kalkowska DA, Thompson KM. Health and Economic Outcomes Associated with Polio Vaccine Policy Options: 2019-2029. RISK ANALYSIS : AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE SOCIETY FOR RISK ANALYSIS 2021; 41:364-375. [PMID: 33590519 PMCID: PMC7895457 DOI: 10.1111/risa.13664] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/13/2020] [Accepted: 12/04/2020] [Indexed: 05/08/2023]
Abstract
The polio endgame remains complicated, with many questions about future polio vaccines and national immunization policies. We simulated possible future poliovirus vaccine routine immunization policies for countries stratified by World Bank Income Levels and estimated the expected costs and cases using an updated integrated dynamic poliovirus transmission, stochastic risk, and economic model. We consider two reference cases scenarios: one that achieves the eradication of all wild polioviruses (WPVs) by 2023 and one in which serotype 1 WPV (WPV1) transmission continues. The results show that the addition of inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) to routine immunization in all countries substantially increased the expected costs of the polio endgame, without substantially increasing its expected health or economic benefits. Adding a second dose of IPV to the routine immunization schedules of countries that currently include a single IPV dose further increases costs and does not appear economically justified in the reference case that does not stop WPV transmission. For the reference case that includes all WPV eradication, adding a second IPV dose at the time of successful oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) cessation represents a cost-effective option. The risks and costs of needing to restart OPV use change the economics of the polio endgame, although the time horizon used for modeling impacts the overall economic results. National health leaders will want to consider the expected health and economic net benefits of their national polio vaccine strategies recognizing that preferred strategies may differ.
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Thompson KM, Kalkowska DA. Review of poliovirus modeling performed from 2000 to 2019 to support global polio eradication. Expert Rev Vaccines 2020; 19:661-686. [PMID: 32741232 PMCID: PMC7497282 DOI: 10.1080/14760584.2020.1791093] [Citation(s) in RCA: 30] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/28/2020] [Accepted: 06/22/2020] [Indexed: 01/03/2023]
Abstract
INTRODUCTION Over the last 20 years (2000-2019) the partners of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) invested in the development and application of mathematical models of poliovirus transmission as well as economics, policy, and risk analyses of polio endgame risk management options, including policies related to poliovirus vaccine use during the polio endgame. AREAS COVERED This review provides a historical record of the polio studies published by the three modeling groups that primarily performed the bulk of this work. This review also systematically evaluates the polio transmission and health economic modeling papers published in English in peer-reviewed journals from 2000 to 2019, highlights differences in approaches and methods, shows the geographic coverage of the transmission modeling performed, identified common themes, and discusses instances of similar or conflicting insights or recommendations. EXPERT OPINION Polio modeling performed during the last 20 years substantially impacted polio vaccine choices, immunization policies, and the polio eradication pathway. As the polio endgame continues, national preferences for polio vaccine formulations and immunization strategies will likely continue to change. Future modeling will likely provide important insights about their cost-effectiveness and their relative benefits with respect to controlling polio and potentially achieving and maintaining eradication.
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Cheng E, Gambhirrao N, Patel R, Zhowandai A, Rychtář J, Taylor D. A game-theoretical analysis of poliomyelitis vaccination. J Theor Biol 2020; 499:110298. [PMID: 32371008 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2020.110298] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/31/2019] [Revised: 04/21/2020] [Accepted: 04/26/2020] [Indexed: 12/15/2022]
Abstract
Poliomyelitis is a worldwide disease that has nearly been eradicated thanks to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative. Nevertheless, the disease is currently still endemic in three countries. In this paper, we incorporate the vaccination in a two age-class model of polio dynamics. Our main objective is to see whether mandatory vaccination policy is needed or if polio could be almost eradicated by a voluntary vaccination. We perform game theoretical analysis and compare the herd immunity vaccination levels with the Nash equilibrium vaccination levels. We show that the gap between two vaccination levels is too large. We conclude that the mandatory vaccination policy is therefore needed to achieve a complete eradication.
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Affiliation(s)
- Emily Cheng
- Department of Biomedical Engineering, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284-3068, USA.
| | - Neeha Gambhirrao
- Department of Biomedical Engineering, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284-3068, USA.
| | - Rohani Patel
- Department of Biomedical Engineering, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284-3068, USA.
| | - Aufia Zhowandai
- Department of Biology, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284-2012, USA.
| | - Jan Rychtář
- Department of Mathematics and Applied Mathematics, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284-2014, USA.
| | - Dewey Taylor
- Department of Mathematics and Applied Mathematics, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284-2014, USA.
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Thompson KM, Kalkowska DA. Logistical challenges and assumptions for modeling the failure of global cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV). Expert Rev Vaccines 2019; 18:725-736. [PMID: 31248293 PMCID: PMC6816497 DOI: 10.1080/14760584.2019.1635463] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/27/2022]
Abstract
Introduction: The inability to successfully stop all use of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) as part of the polio endgame and/or the possibilities of reintroduction of live polioviruses after successful OPV cessation may imply the need to restart OPV production and use, either temporarily or permanently. Areas covered: Complementing prior work that explored the risks of potential OPV restart, we discuss the logistical challenges and implications of restarting OPV in the future, and we develop appropriate assumptions for modeling the possibility of OPV restart. The complexity of phased cessation of the three OPV serotypes implies different potential combinations of OPV use long term. We explore the complexity of polio vaccine choices and key unresolved policy questions that may impact continuing and future use of OPV and/or inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV). We then characterize the assumptions required to quantitatively model OPV restart in prospective global-integrated economic policy models for the polio endgame. Expert commentary: Depending on the timing, restarting production of OPV would imply some likely delays associated with ramp-up, re-licensing, and other logistics that would impact the availability and costs of restarting the use of OPV in national immunization programs after globally coordinated cessation of one or more OPV serotypes.
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Brouwer AF, Masters NB, Eisenberg JNS. Quantitative Microbial Risk Assessment and Infectious Disease Transmission Modeling of Waterborne Enteric Pathogens. Curr Environ Health Rep 2019; 5:293-304. [PMID: 29679300 DOI: 10.1007/s40572-018-0196-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 25] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/20/2022]
Abstract
PURPOSE OF REVIEW Waterborne enteric pathogens remain a global health threat. Increasingly, quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA) and infectious disease transmission modeling (IDTM) are used to assess waterborne pathogen risks and evaluate mitigation. These modeling efforts, however, have largely been conducted independently for different purposes and in different settings. In this review, we examine the settings where each modeling strategy is employed. RECENT FINDINGS QMRA research has focused on food contamination and recreational water in high-income countries (HICs) and drinking water and wastewater in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). IDTM research has focused on large outbreaks (predominately LMICs) and vaccine-preventable diseases (LMICs and HICs). Human ecology determines the niches that pathogens exploit, leading researchers to focus on different risk assessment research strategies in different settings. To enhance risk modeling, QMRA and IDTM approaches should be integrated to include dynamics of pathogens in the environment and pathogen transmission through populations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Andrew F Brouwer
- Department of Epidemiology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, 48109, USA
| | - Nina B Masters
- Department of Epidemiology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, 48109, USA
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Kalkowska DA, Duintjer Tebbens RJ, Pallansch MA, Thompson KM. Modeling Undetected Live Poliovirus Circulation After Apparent Interruption of Transmission: Pakistan and Afghanistan. RISK ANALYSIS : AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE SOCIETY FOR RISK ANALYSIS 2019; 39:402-413. [PMID: 30296340 PMCID: PMC7842182 DOI: 10.1111/risa.13214] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/06/2023]
Abstract
Since most poliovirus infections occur with no paralytic symptoms, the possibility of silent circulation complicates the confirmation of the end of poliovirus transmission. Based on empirical field experience and theoretical modeling results, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative identified three years without observing paralytic cases from wild polioviruses with good acute flaccid paralysis surveillance as an indication of sufficient confidence that poliovirus circulation stopped. The complexities of real populations and the imperfect nature of real surveillance systems subsequently demonstrated the importance of specific modeling for areas at high risk of undetected circulation, resulting in varying periods of time required to obtain the same level of confidence about no undetected circulation. Using a poliovirus transmission model that accounts for variability in transmissibility and neurovirulence for different poliovirus serotypes and characterizes country-specific factors (e.g., vaccination and surveillance activities, demographics) related to wild and vaccine-derived poliovirus transmission in Pakistan and Afghanistan, we consider the probability of undetected poliovirus circulation for those countries once apparent die-out occurs (i.e., in the absence of any epidemiological signals). We find that gaps in poliovirus surveillance or reaching elimination with borderline sufficient population immunity could significantly increase the time to reach high confidence about interruption of live poliovirus transmission, such that the path taken to achieve and maintain poliovirus elimination matters. Pakistan and Afghanistan will need to sustain high-quality surveillance for polioviruses after apparent interruption of transmission and recognize that as efforts to identify cases or circulating live polioviruses decrease, the risks of undetected circulation increase and significantly delay the global polio endgame.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Mark A Pallansch
- Division of Viral Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
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Duintjer Tebbens RJ, Thompson KM. Evaluation of Proactive and Reactive Strategies for Polio Eradication Activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan. RISK ANALYSIS : AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE SOCIETY FOR RISK ANALYSIS 2019; 39:389-401. [PMID: 30239026 PMCID: PMC7857157 DOI: 10.1111/risa.13194] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/08/2018] [Revised: 08/21/2018] [Accepted: 08/24/2018] [Indexed: 05/21/2023]
Abstract
Only Pakistan and Afghanistan reported any polio cases caused by serotype 1 wild polioviruses (WPV1s) in 2017. With the dwindling cases in both countries and pressure to finish eradication with the least possible resources, a danger exists of inappropriate prioritization of efforts between the two countries and insufficient investment in the two countries to finish the job. We used an existing differential-equation-based poliovirus transmission and oral poliovirus (OPV) evolution model to simulate a proactive strategy to stop transmission, and different hypothetical reactive strategies that adapt the quality of supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) in response to observed polio cases in Pakistan and Afghanistan. To account for the delay in perception and adaptation, we related the coverage of the SIAs in high-risk, undervaccinated subpopulations to the perceived (i.e., smoothed) polio incidence. Continuation of the current frequency and quality of SIAs remains insufficient to eradicate WPV1 in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Proactive strategies that significantly improve and sustain SIA quality lead to WPV1 eradication and the prevention of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) outbreaks. Reactive vaccination efforts that adapt moderately quickly and independently to changes in polio incidence in each country may succeed in WPV1 interruption after several cycles of outbreaks, or may interrupt WPV1 transmission in one country but subsequently import WPV1 from the other country or enable the emergence of cVDPV outbreaks. Reactive vaccination efforts that adapt independently and either more rapidly or more slowly to changes in polio incidence in each country may similarly fail to interrupt WPV1 transmission and result in oscillations of the incidence. Reactive strategies that divert resources to the country of highest priority may lead to alternating large outbreaks. Achieving WPV1 eradication and subsequent successful OPV cessation in Pakistan and Afghanistan requires proactive and sustained efforts to improve vaccination intensity in under-vaccinated subpopulations while maintaining high population immunity elsewhere.
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Duintjer Tebbens RJ, Kalkowska DA, Thompson KM. Global certification of wild poliovirus eradication: insights from modelling hard-to-reach subpopulations and confidence about the absence of transmission. BMJ Open 2019; 9:e023938. [PMID: 30647038 PMCID: PMC6340450 DOI: 10.1136/bmjopen-2018-023938] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/02/2018] [Revised: 11/29/2018] [Accepted: 11/30/2018] [Indexed: 11/10/2022] Open
Abstract
OBJECTIVE To explore the extent to which undervaccinated subpopulations may influence the confidence about no circulation of wild poliovirus (WPV) after the last detected case. DESIGN AND PARTICIPANTS We used a hypothetical model to examine the extent to which the existence of an undervaccinated subpopulation influences the confidence about no WPV circulation after the last detected case as a function of different characteristics of the subpopulation (eg, size, extent of isolation). We also used the hypothetical population model to inform the bounds on the maximum possible time required to reach high confidence about no circulation in a completely isolated and unvaccinated subpopulation starting either at the endemic equilibrium or with a single infection in an entirely susceptible population. RESULTS It may take over 3 years to reach 95% confidence about no circulation for this hypothetical population despite high surveillance sensitivity and high vaccination coverage in the surrounding general population if: (1) ability to detect cases in the undervaccinated subpopulation remains exceedingly small, (2) the undervaccinated subpopulation remains small and highly isolated from the general population and (3) the coverage in the undervaccinated subpopulation remains very close to the minimum needed to eradicate. Fully-isolated hypothetical populations of 4000 people or less cannot sustain endemic transmission for more than 5 years, with at least 20 000 people required for a 50% chance of at least 5 years of sustained transmission in a population without seasonality that starts at the endemic equilibrium. Notably, however, the population size required for persistent transmission increases significantly for realistic populations that include some vaccination and seasonality and/or that do not begin at the endemic equilibrium. CONCLUSIONS Significant trade-offs remain inherent in global polio certification decisions, which underscore the need for making and valuing investments to maximise population immunity and surveillance quality in all remaining possible WPV reservoirs.
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Duintjer Tebbens RJ, Kalkowsa DA, Thompson KM. Poliovirus containment risks and their management. Future Virol 2018; 13:617-628. [PMID: 33598044 DOI: 10.2217/fvl-2018-0079] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/21/2022]
Abstract
Aim Assess risks related to breaches of poliovirus containment. Method Using a dynamic transmission model, we explore the variability among different populations in the vulnerability to poliovirus containment breaches as population immunity to transmission declines after oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) cessation. Results Although using OPV instead of wild poliovirus (WPV) seed strains for inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) production offers some expected risk reintroduction of live polioviruses from IPV manufacturing facilities, OPV seed strain releases may become a significant threat within 5-10 years of OPV cessation in areas most conducive to fecal-oral poliovirus transmission, regardless of IPV use. Conclusions Efforts to quantify the risks demonstrate the challenges associated with understanding and managing relatively low-probability and high-consequence containment failure events.
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Duintjer Tebbens RJ, Pallansch MA, Cochi SL, Ehrhardt D, Farag N, Hadler S, Hampton LM, Martinez M, Wassilak SG, Thompson KM. Modeling Poliovirus Transmission in Pakistan and Afghanistan to Inform Vaccination Strategies in Undervaccinated Subpopulations. RISK ANALYSIS : AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE SOCIETY FOR RISK ANALYSIS 2018; 38:1701-1717. [PMID: 29314143 PMCID: PMC7879700 DOI: 10.1111/risa.12962] [Citation(s) in RCA: 25] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/24/2017] [Revised: 11/18/2017] [Accepted: 11/22/2017] [Indexed: 05/11/2023]
Abstract
Due to security, access, and programmatic challenges in areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, both countries continue to sustain indigenous wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission and threaten the success of global polio eradication and oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) cessation. We fitted an existing differential-equation-based poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model to Pakistan and Afghanistan using four subpopulations to characterize the well-vaccinated and undervaccinated subpopulations in each country. We explored retrospective and prospective scenarios for using inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) in routine immunization or supplemental immunization activities (SIAs). The undervaccinated subpopulations sustain the circulation of serotype 1 WPV and serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus. We find a moderate impact of past IPV use on polio incidence and population immunity to transmission mainly due to (1) the boosting effect of IPV for individuals with preexisting immunity from a live poliovirus infection and (2) the effect of IPV-only on oropharyngeal transmission for individuals without preexisting immunity from a live poliovirus infection. Future IPV use may similarly yield moderate benefits, particularly if access to undervaccinated subpopulations dramatically improves. However, OPV provides a much greater impact on transmission and the incremental benefit of IPV in addition to OPV remains limited. This study suggests that despite the moderate effect of using IPV in SIAs, using OPV in SIAs remains the most effective means to stop transmission, while limited IPV resources should prioritize IPV use in routine immunization.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Mark A. Pallansch
- Division of Viral Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Stephen L. Cochi
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Derek Ehrhardt
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Noha Farag
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Stephen Hadler
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Lee M. Hampton
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Maureen Martinez
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Steve G.F Wassilak
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
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Tebbens RJD, Thompson KM. Using integrated modeling to support the global eradication of vaccine-preventable diseases. SYSTEM DYNAMICS REVIEW 2018; 34:78-120. [PMID: 34552305 PMCID: PMC8455164 DOI: 10.1002/sdr.1589] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/16/2017] [Accepted: 02/11/2018] [Indexed: 05/17/2023]
Abstract
The long-term management of global disease eradication initiatives involves numerous inherently dynamic processes, health and economic trade-offs, significant uncertainty and variability, rare events with big consequences, complex and inter-related decisions, and a requirement for cooperation among a large number of stakeholders. Over the course of more than 16 years of collaborative modeling efforts to support the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, we developed increasingly complex integrated system dynamics models that combined numerous analytical approaches, including differential equation-based modeling, risk and decision analysis, discrete-event and individual-based simulation, probabilistic uncertainty and sensitivity analysis, health economics, and optimization. We discuss the central role of systems thinking and system dynamics in the overall effort and the value of integrating different modeling approaches to appropriately address the trade-offs involved in some of the policy questions. We discuss practical challenges of integrating different analytical tools and we provide our perspective on the future of integrated modeling.
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Duintjer Tebbens RJ, Hampton LM, Thompson KM. Planning for globally coordinated cessation of bivalent oral poliovirus vaccine: risks of non-synchronous cessation and unauthorized oral poliovirus vaccine use. BMC Infect Dis 2018; 18:165. [PMID: 29631539 PMCID: PMC5892013 DOI: 10.1186/s12879-018-3074-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/10/2017] [Accepted: 03/28/2018] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND Oral polio vaccine (OPV) containing attenuated serotype 2 polioviruses was globally withdrawn in 2016, and bivalent OPV (bOPV) containing attenuated serotype 1 and 3 polioviruses needs to be withdrawn after the certification of eradication of all wild polioviruses to eliminate future risks from vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs). To minimize risks from VDPVs, the planning and implementation of bOPV withdrawal should build on the experience with withdrawing OPV containing serotype 2 polioviruses while taking into account similarities and differences between the three poliovirus serotypes. METHODS We explored the risks from (i) a failure to synchronize OPV cessation and (ii) unauthorized post-cessation OPV use for serotypes 1 and 3 in the context of globally-coordinated future bOPV cessation and compared the results to similar analyses for serotype 2 OPV cessation. RESULTS While the risks associated with a failure to synchronize cessation and unauthorized post-cessation OPV use appear to be substantially lower for serotype 3 polioviruses than for serotype 2 polioviruses, the risks for serotype 1 appear similar to those for serotype 2. Increasing population immunity to serotype 1 and 3 poliovirus transmission using pre-cessation bOPV supplemental immunization activities and inactivated poliovirus vaccine in routine immunization reduces the risks of circulating VDPVs associated with non-synchronized cessation or unauthorized OPV use. CONCLUSIONS The Global Polio Eradication Initiative should synchronize global bOPV cessation during a similar window of time as occurred for the global cessation of OPV containing serotype 2 polioviruses and should rigorously verify the absence of bOPV in immunization systems after its cessation.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Lee M. Hampton
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA USA
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Thompson KM, Duintjer Tebbens RJ. Lessons From Globally Coordinated Cessation of Serotype 2 Oral Poliovirus Vaccine for the Remaining Serotypes. J Infect Dis 2017; 216:S168-S175. [PMID: 28838198 PMCID: PMC5853947 DOI: 10.1093/infdis/jix128] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/19/2016] [Revised: 03/06/2017] [Accepted: 03/13/2017] [Indexed: 12/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Background Comparing model expectations with the experience of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) containing serotype 2 (OPV2) cessation can inform risk management for the expected cessation of OPV containing serotypes 1 and 3 (OPV13). Methods We compare the expected post-OPV2-cessation OPV2-related viruses from models with the evidence available approximately 6 months after OPV2 cessation. We also model the trade-offs of use vs nonuse of monovalent OPV (mOPV) for outbreak response considering all 3 serotypes. Results Although too early to tell definitively, the observed die-out of OPV2-related viruses in populations that attained sufficiently intense trivalent OPV (tOPV) use prior to OPV2 cessation appears consistent with model expectations. As expected, populations that did not intensify tOPV use prior to OPV2 cessation show continued circulation of serotype 2 vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs). Failure to aggressively use mOPV to respond to circulating VDPVs results in a high risk of uncontrolled outbreaks that would require restarting OPV. Conclusions Ensuring a successful endgame requires more aggressive OPV cessation risk management than has occurred to date for OPV2 cessation. This includes maintaining high population immunity to transmission up until OPV13 cessation, meeting all prerequisites for OPV cessation, and ensuring sufficient vaccine supply to prevent and respond to outbreaks.
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Thompson KM, Duintjer Tebbens RJ. Lessons From the Polio Endgame: Overcoming the Failure to Vaccinate and the Role of Subpopulations in Maintaining Transmission. J Infect Dis 2017; 216:S176-S182. [PMID: 28838194 PMCID: PMC5853387 DOI: 10.1093/infdis/jix108] [Citation(s) in RCA: 29] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/28/2022] Open
Abstract
Background Recent detections of circulating serotype 2 vaccine-derived poliovirus in northern Nigeria (Borno and Sokoto states) and Pakistan (Balochistan Province) and serotype 1 wild poliovirus in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Nigeria (Borno) represent public health emergencies that require aggressive response. Methods We demonstrate the importance of undervaccinated subpopulations, using an existing dynamic poliovirus transmission and oral poliovirus vaccine evolution model. We review the lessons learned during the polio endgame about the role of subpopulations in sustaining transmission, and we explore the implications of subpopulations for other vaccine-preventable disease eradication efforts. Results Relatively isolated subpopulations benefit little from high surrounding population immunity to transmission and will sustain transmission as long as they do not attain high vaccination coverage. Failing to reach such subpopulations with high coverage represents the root cause of polio eradication delays. Achieving and maintaining eradication requires addressing the weakest links, which includes immunizing populations in insecure areas and/or with disrupted or poor-performing health systems and managing the risks of individuals with primary immunodeficiencies who can excrete vaccine-derived poliovirus long-term. Conclusions Eradication efforts for vaccine-preventable diseases need to create performance expectations for countries to immunize all people living within their borders and maintain high coverage with appropriate interventions.Keywords. Polio; eradication; transmission; heterogeneity.
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Thompson KM, Badizadegan ND. Modeling the Transmission of Measles and Rubella to Support Global Management Policy Analyses and Eradication Investment Cases. RISK ANALYSIS : AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE SOCIETY FOR RISK ANALYSIS 2017; 37:1109-1131. [PMID: 28561947 DOI: 10.1111/risa.12831] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/11/2016] [Revised: 04/03/2017] [Accepted: 04/06/2017] [Indexed: 06/07/2023]
Abstract
Policy makers responsible for managing measles and rubella immunization programs currently use a wide range of different vaccines formulations and immunization schedules. With endemic measles and rubella transmission interrupted in the region of the Americas, all five other regions of the World Health Organization (WHO) targeting the elimination of measles transmission by 2020, and increasing adoption of rubella vaccine globally, integrated dynamic disease, risk, decision, and economic models can help national, regional, and global health leaders manage measles and rubella population immunity. Despite hundreds of publications describing models for measles or rubella and decades of use of vaccines that contain both antigens (e.g., measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine or MMR), no transmission models for measles and rubella exist to support global policy analyses. We describe the development of a dynamic disease model for measles and rubella transmission, which we apply to 180 WHO member states and three other areas (Puerto Rico, Hong Kong, and Macao) representing >99.5% of the global population in 2013. The model accounts for seasonality, age-heterogeneous mixing, and the potential existence of preferentially mixing undervaccinated subpopulations, which create heterogeneity in immunization coverage that impacts transmission. Using our transmission model with the best available information about routine, supplemental, and outbreak response immunization, we characterize the complex transmission dynamics for measles and rubella historically to compare the results with available incidence and serological data. We show the results from several countries that represent diverse epidemiological situations to demonstrate the performance of the model. The model suggests relatively high measles and rubella control costs of approximately $3 billion annually for vaccination based on 2013 estimates, but still leads to approximately 17 million disability-adjusted life years lost with associated costs for treatment, home care, and productivity loss costs of approximately $4, $3, and $47 billion annually, respectively. Combined with vaccination and other financial cost estimates, our estimates imply that the eradication of measles and rubella could save at least $10 billion per year, even without considering the benefits of preventing lost productivity and potential savings from reductions in vaccination. The model should provide a useful tool for exploring the health and economic outcomes of prospective opportunities to manage measles and rubella. Improving the quality of data available to support decision making and modeling should represent a priority as countries work toward measles and rubella goals.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kimberly M Thompson
- Kid Risk, Inc., Orlando, FL, USA
- University of Central Florida College of Medicine, Orlando, FL, USA
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Koopman JS, Henry CJ, Park JH, Eisenberg MC, Ionides EL, Eisenberg JN. Dynamics affecting the risk of silent circulation when oral polio vaccination is stopped. Epidemics 2017; 20:21-36. [PMID: 28283373 PMCID: PMC5608688 DOI: 10.1016/j.epidem.2017.02.013] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/07/2016] [Revised: 02/20/2017] [Accepted: 02/20/2017] [Indexed: 12/15/2022] Open
Abstract
Silent circulation (SC) of wild polio viruses (WPV) when oral polio vaccine (OPV) use is stopped, could threaten eradication. We analyzed a model designed to develop theory about mechanisms and factors that lead to SC and how SC risks can be assessed using surveillance data. Prolonged low-level SC emerges as a threshold phenomenon through a mechanism related to balancing contributions of different populations to the effective reproduction number. Factors that promote this mechanism are many years of inadequate vaccination efforts, ongoing waning of immunity against transmission years after last OPV or WPV infection, low transmissibility of OPV, and high transmission conditions. Analyzing acute flaccid paralysis surveillance or environmental surveillance data by themselves cannot assess the risk that an SC threshold has been passed, but new methods to analyze them jointly could do so.
Waning immunity could allow transmission of polioviruses without causing poliomyelitis by promoting silent circulation (SC). Undetected SC when oral polio vaccine (OPV) use is stopped could cause difficult to control epidemics. Little is known about waning. To develop theory about what generates SC, we modeled a range of waning patterns. We varied both OPV and wild polio virus (WPV) transmissibility, the time from beginning vaccination to reaching low polio levels, and the infection to paralysis ratio (IPR). There was longer SC when waning continued over time rather than stopping after a few years, when WPV transmissibility was higher or OPV transmissibility was lower, and when the IPR was higher. These interacted in a way that makes recent emergence of prolonged SC a possibility. As the time to reach low infection levels increased, vaccine rates needed to eliminate polio increased and a threshold was passed where prolonged low-level SC emerged. These phenomena were caused by increased contributions to the force of infection from reinfections. The resulting SC occurs at low levels that would be difficult to detect using environmental surveillance. For all waning patterns, modest levels of vaccination of adults shortened SC. Previous modeling studies may have missed these phenomena because (1) they used models with no or very short duration waning and (2) they fit models to paralytic polio case counts. Our analyses show that polio case counts cannot predict SC because nearly identical polio case count patterns can be generated by a range of waning patterns that generate different patterns of SC. We conclude that the possibility of prolonged SC is real but unquantified, that vaccinating modest fractions of adults could reduce SC risk, and that joint analysis of acute flaccid paralysis and environmental surveillance data can help assess SC risks and ensure low risks before stopping OPV.
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Affiliation(s)
- J S Koopman
- Department of Epidemiology, University of Michigan School of Public Health, United States.
| | - C J Henry
- Department of Epidemiology, University of Michigan School of Public Health, United States
| | - J H Park
- Department of Statistics, University of Michigan School of Literature, Science, and the Arts, United States
| | - M C Eisenberg
- Department of Epidemiology, University of Michigan School of Public Health, United States
| | - E L Ionides
- Department of Statistics, University of Michigan School of Literature, Science, and the Arts, United States
| | - J N Eisenberg
- Department of Epidemiology, University of Michigan School of Public Health, United States
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Duintjer Tebbens RJ, Thompson KM. Costs and Benefits of Including Inactivated in Addition to Oral Poliovirus Vaccine in Outbreak Response After Cessation of Oral Poliovirus Vaccine Use. MDM Policy Pract 2017; 2:2381468317697002. [PMID: 30288417 PMCID: PMC6124926 DOI: 10.1177/2381468317697002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/17/2016] [Accepted: 12/02/2016] [Indexed: 01/24/2023] Open
Abstract
Background: After stopping serotype 2-containing oral poliovirus vaccine use, serotype 2 poliovirus outbreaks may still occur and require outbreak response supplemental immunization activities (oSIAs). Current oSIA plans include the use of both serotype 2 monovalent oral poliovirus vaccine (mOPV2) and inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV). Methods: We used an existing model to compare the effectiveness of mOPV2 oSIAs with or without IPV in response to a hypothetical postcessation serotype 2 outbreak in northwest Nigeria. We considered strategies that co-administer IPV with mOPV2, use IPV only for older age groups, or use only IPV during at least one oSIA. We considered the cost and supply implications and estimated from a societal perspective the incremental cost-effectiveness and incremental net benefits of adding IPV to oSIAs in the context of this hypothetical outbreak in 2017. Results: Adding IPV to the first or second oSIA resulted in a 4% to 6% reduction in expected polio cases compared to exclusive mOPV2 oSIAs. We found the greatest benefit of IPV use if added preemptively as a ring around the initial oSIA target population, and negligible benefit if added to later oSIAs or older age groups. We saw an increase in expected polio cases if IPV replaced mOPV2 during an oSIA. None of the oSIA strategies that included IPV for this outbreak represented a cost-effective or net beneficial intervention compared to reliance on mOPV2 only. Conclusions: While adding IPV to oSIAs results in marginal improvements in performance, the poor cost-effectiveness and current limited IPV supply make it economically unattractive for high-risk settings in which IPV does not significantly affect transmission.
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Duintjer Tebbens RJ, Thompson KM. The potential benefits of a new poliovirus vaccine for long-term poliovirus risk management. Future Microbiol 2016; 11:1549-1561. [DOI: 10.2217/fmb-2016-0126] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/06/2023] Open
Abstract
Aim: To estimate the incremental net benefits (INBs) of a hypothetical ideal vaccine with all of the advantages and no disadvantages of existing oral and inactivated poliovirus vaccines compared with current vaccines available for future outbreak response. Methods: INB estimates based on expected costs and polio cases from an existing global model of long-term poliovirus risk management. Results: Excluding the development costs, an ideal poliovirus vaccine could offer expected INBs of US$1.6 billion. The ideal vaccine yields small benefits in most realizations of long-term risks, but great benefits in low-probability–high-consequence realizations. Conclusion: New poliovirus vaccines may offer valuable insurance against long-term poliovirus risks and new vaccine development efforts should continue as the world gathers more evidence about polio endgame risks.
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Tebbens RJD, Hampton LM, Wassilak SGF, Pallansch MA, Cochi SL, Thompson KM. Maintenance and Intensification of Bivalent Oral Poliovirus Vaccine Use Prior to its Coordinated Global Cessation. ACTA ACUST UNITED AC 2016; 7. [PMID: 28690915 DOI: 10.4172/2157-7560.1000340] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/09/2022]
Abstract
OBJECTIVE To examine the impact of different bivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (bOPV) supplemental immunization activity (SIA) strategies on population immunity to serotype 1 and 3 poliovirus transmission and circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) risks before and after globally-coordinated cessation of serotype 1 and 3 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV13 cessation). METHODS We adapt mathematical models that previously informed vaccine choices ahead of the trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine to bOPV switch to estimate the population immunity to serotype 1 and 3 poliovirus transmission needed at the time of OPV13 cessation to prevent subsequent cVDPV outbreaks. We then examine the impact of different frequencies of SIAs using bOPV in high risk populations on population immunity to serotype 1 and 3 transmission, on the risk of serotype 1 and 3 cVDPV outbreaks, and on the vulnerability to any imported bOPV-related polioviruses. RESULTS Maintaining high population immunity to serotype 1 and 3 transmission using bOPV SIAs significantly reduces 1) the risk of outbreaks due to imported serotype 1 and 3 viruses, 2) the emergence of indigenous cVDPVs before or after OPV13 cessation, and 3) the vulnerability to bOPV-related polioviruses in the event of non-synchronous OPV13 cessation or inadvertent bOPV use after OPV13 cessation. CONCLUSION Although some reduction in global SIA frequency can safely occur, countries with suboptimal routine immunization coverage should each continue to conduct at least one annual SIA with bOPV, preferably more, until global OPV13 cessation. Preventing cVDPV risks after OPV13 cessation requires investments in bOPV SIAs now through the time of OPV13 cessation.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Lee M Hampton
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Steven G F Wassilak
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Mark A Pallansch
- Division of Viral Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Stephen L Cochi
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
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Duintjer Tebbens RJ, Hampton LM, Thompson KM. Implementation of coordinated global serotype 2 oral poliovirus vaccine cessation: risks of inadvertent trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine use. BMC Infect Dis 2016; 16:237. [PMID: 27246198 PMCID: PMC4888482 DOI: 10.1186/s12879-016-1537-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 42] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/30/2015] [Accepted: 05/04/2016] [Indexed: 11/10/2022] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND The endgame for polio eradication includes coordinated global cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), starting with the cessation of vaccine containing OPV serotype 2 (OPV2) by switching all trivalent OPV (tOPV) to bivalent OPV (bOPV). The logistics associated with this global switch represent a significant undertaking, with some possibility of inadvertent tOPV use after the switch. METHODS We used a previously developed poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model to explore the relationships between the extent of inadvertent tOPV use, the time after the switch of the inadvertent tOPV use and corresponding population immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus transmission, and the ability of the inadvertently introduced viruses to cause a serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2) outbreak in a hypothetical population. We then estimated the minimum time until inadvertent tOPV use in a supplemental immunization activity (SIA) or in routine immunization (RI) can lead to a cVDPV2 outbreak in realistic populations with properties like those of northern India, northern Pakistan and Afghanistan, northern Nigeria, and Ukraine. RESULTS At low levels of inadvertent tOPV use, the minimum time after the switch for the inadvertent use to cause a cVDPV2 outbreak decreases sharply with increasing proportions of children inadvertently receiving tOPV. The minimum times until inadvertent tOPV use in an SIA or in RI can lead to a cVDPV2 outbreak varies widely among populations, with higher basic reproduction numbers, lower tOPV-induced population immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus transmission prior to the switch, and a lower proportion of transmission occurring via the oropharyngeal route all resulting in shorter times. In populations with the lowest expected immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus transmission after the switch, inadvertent tOPV use in an SIA leads to a cVDPV2 outbreak if it occurs as soon as 9 months after the switch with 0.5 % of children aged 0-4 years inadvertently receiving tOPV, and as short as 6 months after the switch with 10-20 % of children aged 0-1 years inadvertently receiving tOPV. In the same populations, inadvertent tOPV use in RI leads to a cVDPV2 outbreak if 0.5 % of OPV RI doses given use tOPV instead of bOPV for at least 20 months after the switch, with the minimum length of use dropping to at least 9 months if inadvertent tOPV use occurs in 50 % of OPV RI doses. CONCLUSIONS Efforts to ensure timely and complete tOPV withdrawal at all levels, particularly from locations storing large amounts of tOPV, will help minimize risks associated with the tOPV-bOPV switch. Under-vaccinated populations with poor hygiene become at risk of a cVDPV2 outbreak in the event of inadvertent tOPV use the soonest after the tOPV-bOPV switch and therefore should represent priority areas to ensure tOPV withdrawal from all OPV stocks.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Lee M Hampton
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, 30333, USA
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Implementation of coordinated global serotype 2 oral poliovirus vaccine cessation: risks of potential non-synchronous cessation. BMC Infect Dis 2016; 16:231. [PMID: 27230071 PMCID: PMC4880825 DOI: 10.1186/s12879-016-1536-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 38] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/30/2015] [Accepted: 05/04/2016] [Indexed: 11/30/2022] Open
Abstract
Background The endgame for polio eradication involves coordinated global cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) with cessation of serotype 2 OPV (OPV2 cessation) implemented in late April and early May 2016 and cessation of serotypes 1 and 3 OPV (OPV13 cessation) currently planned for after 2018. The logistics associated with globally switching all use of trivalent OPV (tOPV) to bivalent OPV (bOPV) represent a significant undertaking, which may cause some complications, including delays that lead to different timing of the switch across shared borders. Methods Building on an integrated global model for long-term poliovirus risk management, we consider the expected vulnerability of different populations to transmission of OPV2-related polioviruses as a function of time following the switch. We explore the relationship between the net reproduction number (Rn) of OPV2 at the time of the switch and the time until OPV2-related viruses imported from countries still using OPV2 can establish transmission. We also analyze some specific situations modeled after populations at high potential risk of circulating serotype 2 vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2) outbreaks in the event of a non-synchronous switch. Results Well-implemented tOPV immunization activities prior to the tOPV to bOPV switch (i.e., tOPV intensification sufficient to prevent the creation of indigenous cVDPV2 outbreaks) lead to sufficient population immunity to transmission to cause die-out of any imported OPV2-related viruses for over 6 months after the switch in all populations in the global model. Higher Rn of OPV2 at the time of the switch reduces the time until imported OPV2-related viruses can establish transmission and increases the time during which indigenous OPV2-related viruses circulate. Modeling specific connected populations suggests a relatively low vulnerability to importations of OPV2-related viruses that could establish transmission in the context of a non-synchronous switch from tOPV to bOPV, unless the gap between switch times becomes very long (>6 months) or a high risk of indigenous cVDPV2s already exists in the importing and/or the exporting population. Conclusions Short national discrepancies in the timing of the tOPV to bOPV switch will likely not significantly increase cVDPV2 risks due to the insurance provided by tOPV intensification efforts, although the goal to coordinate national switches within the globally agreed April 17-May 1, 2016 time window minimized the risks associated with cross-border importations.
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Duintjer Tebbens RJ, Pallansch MA, Wassilak SGF, Cochi SL, Thompson KM. Characterization of outbreak response strategies and potential vaccine stockpile needs for the polio endgame. BMC Infect Dis 2016. [PMID: 27009272 DOI: 10.1186/s1287-9016-1465-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 04/15/2023] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND Following successful eradication of wild polioviruses and planned globally-coordinated cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), national and global health leaders may need to respond to outbreaks from reintroduced live polioviruses, particularly vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs). Preparing outbreak response plans and assessing potential vaccine needs from an emergency stockpile require consideration of the different national risks and conditions as they change with time after OPV cessation. METHODS We used an integrated global model to consider several key issues related to managing poliovirus risks and outbreak response, including the time interval during which monovalent OPV (mOPV) can be safely used following homotypic OPV cessation; the timing, quality, and quantity of rounds required to stop transmission; vaccine stockpile needs; and the impacts of vaccine choices and surveillance quality. We compare the base case scenario that assumes aggressive outbreak response and sufficient mOPV available from the stockpile for all outbreaks that occur in the model, with various scenarios that change the outbreak response strategies. RESULTS Outbreak response after OPV cessation will require careful management, with some circumstances expected to require more and/or higher quality rounds to stop transmission than others. For outbreaks involving serotype 2, using trivalent OPV instead of mOPV2 following cessation of OPV serotype 2 but before cessation of OPV serotypes 1 and 3 would represent a good option if logistically feasible. Using mOPV for outbreak response can start new outbreaks if exported outside the outbreak population into populations with decreasing population immunity to transmission after OPV cessation, but failure to contain outbreaks resulting in exportation of the outbreak poliovirus may represent a greater risk. The possibility of mOPV use generating new long-term poliovirus excretors represents a real concern. Using the base case outbreak response assumptions, we expect over 25% probability of a shortage of stockpiled filled mOPV vaccine, which could jeopardize the achievement of global polio eradication. For the long term, responding to any poliovirus reintroductions may require a global IPV stockpile. Despite the risks, our model suggests that good risk management and response strategies can successfully control most potential outbreaks after OPV cessation. CONCLUSIONS Health leaders should carefully consider the numerous outbreak response choices that affect the probability of successfully managing poliovirus risks after OPV cessation.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Mark A Pallansch
- Division of Viral Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Steven G F Wassilak
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Stephen L Cochi
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
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Duintjer Tebbens RJ, Pallansch MA, Wassilak SGF, Cochi SL, Thompson KM. Characterization of outbreak response strategies and potential vaccine stockpile needs for the polio endgame. BMC Infect Dis 2016; 16:137. [PMID: 27009272 PMCID: PMC4806487 DOI: 10.1186/s12879-016-1465-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 45] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/03/2015] [Accepted: 03/11/2016] [Indexed: 11/10/2022] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND Following successful eradication of wild polioviruses and planned globally-coordinated cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), national and global health leaders may need to respond to outbreaks from reintroduced live polioviruses, particularly vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs). Preparing outbreak response plans and assessing potential vaccine needs from an emergency stockpile require consideration of the different national risks and conditions as they change with time after OPV cessation. METHODS We used an integrated global model to consider several key issues related to managing poliovirus risks and outbreak response, including the time interval during which monovalent OPV (mOPV) can be safely used following homotypic OPV cessation; the timing, quality, and quantity of rounds required to stop transmission; vaccine stockpile needs; and the impacts of vaccine choices and surveillance quality. We compare the base case scenario that assumes aggressive outbreak response and sufficient mOPV available from the stockpile for all outbreaks that occur in the model, with various scenarios that change the outbreak response strategies. RESULTS Outbreak response after OPV cessation will require careful management, with some circumstances expected to require more and/or higher quality rounds to stop transmission than others. For outbreaks involving serotype 2, using trivalent OPV instead of mOPV2 following cessation of OPV serotype 2 but before cessation of OPV serotypes 1 and 3 would represent a good option if logistically feasible. Using mOPV for outbreak response can start new outbreaks if exported outside the outbreak population into populations with decreasing population immunity to transmission after OPV cessation, but failure to contain outbreaks resulting in exportation of the outbreak poliovirus may represent a greater risk. The possibility of mOPV use generating new long-term poliovirus excretors represents a real concern. Using the base case outbreak response assumptions, we expect over 25% probability of a shortage of stockpiled filled mOPV vaccine, which could jeopardize the achievement of global polio eradication. For the long term, responding to any poliovirus reintroductions may require a global IPV stockpile. Despite the risks, our model suggests that good risk management and response strategies can successfully control most potential outbreaks after OPV cessation. CONCLUSIONS Health leaders should carefully consider the numerous outbreak response choices that affect the probability of successfully managing poliovirus risks after OPV cessation.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Mark A Pallansch
- Division of Viral Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Steven G F Wassilak
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Stephen L Cochi
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
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Houy N. The case for periodic OPV routine vaccination campaigns. J Theor Biol 2015; 389:20-7. [PMID: 26523796 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.09.032] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/27/2015] [Revised: 09/13/2015] [Accepted: 09/23/2015] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
The possibility of periodic routine vaccination campaigns (PRVCs) is introduced in the context of a search for optimal oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) administration strategies. Like the usual continuous routine vaccination campaign (CRVC), PRVCs target only newborns. However, they are not necessarily implemented continuously in time. Using a dynamic and compartmental polio transmission model in a stochastic context, it is shown that some PRVCs can achieve much greater efficiency than CRVC in terms of probability of wild poliovirus (WPV) eradication, even though they never outperform CRVC in terms of total number of paralytic infections. Moreover, these PRVCs results can be obtained at a lower price than CRVC. It is also shown that, even though PRVCs do not perform better than pulse vaccination campaigns (PVCs) when only epidemiological outputs are valued, they can do so when a cost-benefit analysis is preferred.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nicolas Houy
- Université de Lyon, Lyon F-69007, France; CNRS, GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, Ecully F-69130, France.
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Disease elimination and re-emergence in differential-equation models. J Theor Biol 2015; 387:174-80. [PMID: 26471072 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.09.037] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/11/2015] [Revised: 09/24/2015] [Accepted: 09/28/2015] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Abstract
Traditional differential equation models of disease transmission are often used to predict disease trajectories and evaluate the effectiveness of alternative intervention strategies. However, such models cannot account explicitly for probabilistic events, such as those that dominate dynamics when disease prevalence is low during the elimination and re-emergence phases of an outbreak. To account for the dynamics at low prevalence, i.e. the elimination and risk of disease re-emergence, without the added analytical and computational complexity of a stochastic model, we develop a novel application of control theory. We apply our approach to analyze historical data of measles elimination and re-emergence in Iceland from 1923 to 1938, predicting the temporal trajectory of local measles elimination and re-emerge as a result of disease migration from Copenhagen, Denmark.
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Duintjer Tebbens RJ, Thompson KM. Managing the risk of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus during the endgame: oral poliovirus vaccine needs. BMC Infect Dis 2015; 15:390. [PMID: 26404780 PMCID: PMC4582727 DOI: 10.1186/s12879-015-1114-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 25] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/21/2015] [Accepted: 09/07/2015] [Indexed: 12/17/2022] Open
Abstract
Background The Global Polio Eradication Initiative plans for coordinated cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) use, beginning with serotype 2-containing OPV (i.e., OPV2 cessation) followed by the remaining two OPV serotypes (i.e., OPV13 cessation). The risk of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) outbreaks after OPV cessation of any serotype depends on the serotype-specific population immunity to transmission prior to its cessation. Methods Based on an existing integrated global model of poliovirus risk management policies, we estimate the serotype-specific OPV doses required to manage population immunity for a strategy of intensive supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) shortly before OPV cessation of each serotype. The strategy seeks to prevent any cVDPV outbreaks after OPV cessation, although actual events remain stochastic. Results Managing the risks of OPV cessation of any serotype depends on achieving sufficient population immunity to transmission to transmission at OPV cessation. This will require that countries with sub-optimal routine immunization coverage and/or conditions that favor poliovirus transmission conduct SIAs with homotypic OPV shortly before its planned coordinated cessation. The model suggests the need to increase trivalent OPV use in SIAs by approximately 40 % or more during the year before OPV2 cessation and to continue bOPV SIAs between the time of OPV2 cessation and OPV13 cessation. Conclusions Managing the risks of cVDPVs in the polio endgame will require serotype-specific OPV SIAs in some areas prior to OPV cessation and lead to demands for additional doses of the vaccine in the short term that will affect managers and manufacturers.
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Duintjer Tebbens RJ, Thompson KM. Managing the risk of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus during the endgame: oral poliovirus vaccine needs. BMC Infect Dis 2015. [PMID: 26404780 DOI: 10.1186/s12879-12015-11114-12876] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 04/14/2023] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND The Global Polio Eradication Initiative plans for coordinated cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) use, beginning with serotype 2-containing OPV (i.e., OPV2 cessation) followed by the remaining two OPV serotypes (i.e., OPV13 cessation). The risk of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) outbreaks after OPV cessation of any serotype depends on the serotype-specific population immunity to transmission prior to its cessation. METHODS Based on an existing integrated global model of poliovirus risk management policies, we estimate the serotype-specific OPV doses required to manage population immunity for a strategy of intensive supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) shortly before OPV cessation of each serotype. The strategy seeks to prevent any cVDPV outbreaks after OPV cessation, although actual events remain stochastic. RESULTS Managing the risks of OPV cessation of any serotype depends on achieving sufficient population immunity to transmission to transmission at OPV cessation. This will require that countries with sub-optimal routine immunization coverage and/or conditions that favor poliovirus transmission conduct SIAs with homotypic OPV shortly before its planned coordinated cessation. The model suggests the need to increase trivalent OPV use in SIAs by approximately 40 % or more during the year before OPV2 cessation and to continue bOPV SIAs between the time of OPV2 cessation and OPV13 cessation. CONCLUSIONS Managing the risks of cVDPVs in the polio endgame will require serotype-specific OPV SIAs in some areas prior to OPV cessation and lead to demands for additional doses of the vaccine in the short term that will affect managers and manufacturers.
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Duintjer Tebbens RJ, Pallansch MA, Cochi SL, Wassilak SGF, Thompson KM. An economic analysis of poliovirus risk management policy options for 2013-2052. BMC Infect Dis 2015; 15:389. [PMID: 26404632 PMCID: PMC4582932 DOI: 10.1186/s12879-015-1112-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 57] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/09/2015] [Accepted: 09/07/2015] [Indexed: 01/05/2023] Open
Abstract
Background The Global Polio Eradication Initiative plans for coordinated cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) after interrupting all wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission, but many questions remain related to long-term poliovirus risk management policies. Methods We used an integrated dynamic poliovirus transmission and stochastic risk model to simulate possible futures and estimate the health and economic outcomes of maintaining the 2013 status quo of continued OPV use in most developing countries compared with OPV cessation policies with various assumptions about global inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) adoption. Results Continued OPV use after global WPV eradication leads to continued high costs and/or high cases. Global OPV cessation comes with a high probability of at least one outbreak, which aggressive outbreak response can successfully control in most instances. A low but non-zero probability exists of uncontrolled outbreaks following a poliovirus reintroduction long after OPV cessation in a population in which IPV-alone cannot prevent poliovirus transmission. We estimate global incremental net benefits during 2013–2052 of approximately $16 billion (US$2013) for OPV cessation with at least one IPV routine immunization dose in all countries until 2024 compared to continued OPV use, although significant uncertainty remains associated with the frequency of exportations between populations and the implementation of long term risk management policies. Conclusions Global OPV cessation offers the possibility of large future health and economic benefits compared to continued OPV use. Long-term poliovirus risk management interventions matter (e.g., IPV use duration, outbreak response, containment, continued surveillance, stockpile size and contents, vaccine production site requirements, potential antiviral drugs, and potential safer vaccines) and require careful consideration. Risk management activities can help to ensure a low risk of uncontrolled outbreaks and preserve or further increase the positive net benefits of OPV cessation. Important uncertainties will require more research, including characterizing immunodeficient long-term poliovirus excretor risks, containment risks, and the kinetics of outbreaks and response in an unprecedented world without widespread live poliovirus exposure. Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:10.1186/s12879-015-1112-8) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Mark A Pallansch
- Division of Viral Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA.
| | - Stephen L Cochi
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA.
| | - Steven G F Wassilak
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA.
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Duintjer Tebbens RJ, Pallansch MA, Cochi SL, Wassilak SGF, Thompson KM. An economic analysis of poliovirus risk management policy options for 2013-2052. BMC Infect Dis 2015. [PMID: 26404632 DOI: 10.1186/s12879-12015-11112-12878] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 04/15/2023] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND The Global Polio Eradication Initiative plans for coordinated cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) after interrupting all wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission, but many questions remain related to long-term poliovirus risk management policies. METHODS We used an integrated dynamic poliovirus transmission and stochastic risk model to simulate possible futures and estimate the health and economic outcomes of maintaining the 2013 status quo of continued OPV use in most developing countries compared with OPV cessation policies with various assumptions about global inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) adoption. RESULTS Continued OPV use after global WPV eradication leads to continued high costs and/or high cases. Global OPV cessation comes with a high probability of at least one outbreak, which aggressive outbreak response can successfully control in most instances. A low but non-zero probability exists of uncontrolled outbreaks following a poliovirus reintroduction long after OPV cessation in a population in which IPV-alone cannot prevent poliovirus transmission. We estimate global incremental net benefits during 2013-2052 of approximately $16 billion (US$2013) for OPV cessation with at least one IPV routine immunization dose in all countries until 2024 compared to continued OPV use, although significant uncertainty remains associated with the frequency of exportations between populations and the implementation of long term risk management policies. CONCLUSIONS Global OPV cessation offers the possibility of large future health and economic benefits compared to continued OPV use. Long-term poliovirus risk management interventions matter (e.g., IPV use duration, outbreak response, containment, continued surveillance, stockpile size and contents, vaccine production site requirements, potential antiviral drugs, and potential safer vaccines) and require careful consideration. Risk management activities can help to ensure a low risk of uncontrolled outbreaks and preserve or further increase the positive net benefits of OPV cessation. Important uncertainties will require more research, including characterizing immunodeficient long-term poliovirus excretor risks, containment risks, and the kinetics of outbreaks and response in an unprecedented world without widespread live poliovirus exposure.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Mark A Pallansch
- Division of Viral Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA.
| | - Stephen L Cochi
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA.
| | - Steven G F Wassilak
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA.
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Thompson KM, Duintjer Tebbens RJ. Health and economic consequences of different options for timing the coordinated global cessation of the three oral poliovirus vaccine serotypes. BMC Infect Dis 2015; 15:374. [PMID: 26381878 PMCID: PMC4574397 DOI: 10.1186/s12879-015-1113-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/22/2015] [Accepted: 09/07/2015] [Indexed: 11/10/2022] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND World leaders remain committed to globally-coordinated oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) cessation following successful eradication of wild polioviruses, but the best timing and strategy for implementation depend on existing and emerging conditions. METHODS Using an existing integrated global poliovirus risk management model, we explore alternatives to the current timing plan of coordinated cessation of each OPV serotype (i.e., OPV1, OPV2, and OPV3 cessation for serotypes 1, 2, and 3, respectively). We assume the current timing plan involves OPV2 cessation in 2016 followed by OPV1 and OPV3 cessation in 2019 and we compare this to alternative timing options, including cessation of all three serotypes in 2018 or 2019, and cessation of both OPV2 and OPV3 in 2017 followed by OPV1 in 2019. RESULTS If Supplemtal Immunization Activity frequency remains sufficiently high through cessation of the last OPV serotype, then all OPV cessation timing options prevent circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) outbreaks after OPV cessation of any serotype. The various OPV cessation timing options result in relatively modest differences in expected vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis cases and expected total of approximately 10-13 billion polio vaccine doses used. However, the expected amounts of vaccine of different OPV formulations needed changes dramatically with each OPV cessation timing option. Overall health economic impacts remain limited for timing options that only change the OPV formulation but preserve the currently planned year for cessation of the last OPV serotype and the global introduction of inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) introduction. Earlier cessation of the last OPV serotype or later global IPV introduction yield approximately $1 billion in incremental net benefits due to saved vaccination costs, although the logistics of implementation of OPV cessation remain uncertain and challenging. CONCLUSIONS All countries should maintain the highest possible levels of population immunity to transmission for each poliovirus serotype prior to the coordinated cessation of the OPV serotype to manage cVDPV risks. If OPV2 cessation gets delayed, then global health leaders should consider other OPV cessation timing options.
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Thompson KM, Duintjer Tebbens RJ. The differential impact of oral poliovirus vaccine formulation choices on serotype-specific population immunity to poliovirus transmission. BMC Infect Dis 2015; 15:376. [PMID: 26382234 PMCID: PMC4574692 DOI: 10.1186/s12879-015-1116-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/21/2015] [Accepted: 09/07/2015] [Indexed: 11/22/2022] Open
Abstract
Background Prior analyses demonstrated the need for some countries and the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) to conduct additional supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) with trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (tOPV) prior to globally-coordinated cessation of all serotype 2-containing OPV (OPV2 cessation) to prevent the creation of serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2) outbreaks after OPV2 cessation. The GPEI continues to focus on achieving and ensuring interruption of wild poliovirus serotype 1 (WPV1) and making vaccine choices that prioritize bivalent OPV (bOPV) for SIAs, nominally to increase population immunity to serotype 1, despite an aggressive timeline for OPV2 cessation. Methods We use an existing dynamic poliovirus transmission model of northwest Nigeria and an integrated global model for long-term poliovirus risk management to explore the impact of tOPV vs. bOPV vaccine choices on population immunity and cVDPV2 risks. Results Using tOPV instead of bOPV for SIAs leads to a minimal decrease in population immunity to transmission of serotypes 1 and 3 polioviruses, but a significantly higher population immunity to transmission of serotype 2 polioviruses. Failure to use tOPV in enough SIAs results in cVDPV2 emergence after OPV2 cessation in both the northwest Nigeria model and the global model. Despite perceptions to the contrary, prioritizing the use of bOPV over tOPV prior to OPV2 cessation does not significantly improve serotype 1 population immunity to transmission. Conclusions Immunization leaders need to focus on all three poliovirus serotypes to appropriately manage the risks of OPV cessation in the polio endgame. Focusing on population immunity to transmission to interrupt WPV1 transmission and manage pre-OPV cessation risks of cVDPVs, all countries performing poliovirus SIAs should use tOPV up until the time of OPV2 cessation, after which time they should continue to use the OPV vaccine formulation with all remaining serotypes until coordinated global cessation of those serotypes.
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Thompson KM, Duintjer Tebbens RJ. Health and economic consequences of different options for timing the coordinated global cessation of the three oral poliovirus vaccine serotypes. BMC Infect Dis 2015. [PMID: 26381878 DOI: 10.1186/s12879-12015-11113-12877] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 04/14/2023] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND World leaders remain committed to globally-coordinated oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) cessation following successful eradication of wild polioviruses, but the best timing and strategy for implementation depend on existing and emerging conditions. METHODS Using an existing integrated global poliovirus risk management model, we explore alternatives to the current timing plan of coordinated cessation of each OPV serotype (i.e., OPV1, OPV2, and OPV3 cessation for serotypes 1, 2, and 3, respectively). We assume the current timing plan involves OPV2 cessation in 2016 followed by OPV1 and OPV3 cessation in 2019 and we compare this to alternative timing options, including cessation of all three serotypes in 2018 or 2019, and cessation of both OPV2 and OPV3 in 2017 followed by OPV1 in 2019. RESULTS If Supplemtal Immunization Activity frequency remains sufficiently high through cessation of the last OPV serotype, then all OPV cessation timing options prevent circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) outbreaks after OPV cessation of any serotype. The various OPV cessation timing options result in relatively modest differences in expected vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis cases and expected total of approximately 10-13 billion polio vaccine doses used. However, the expected amounts of vaccine of different OPV formulations needed changes dramatically with each OPV cessation timing option. Overall health economic impacts remain limited for timing options that only change the OPV formulation but preserve the currently planned year for cessation of the last OPV serotype and the global introduction of inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) introduction. Earlier cessation of the last OPV serotype or later global IPV introduction yield approximately $1 billion in incremental net benefits due to saved vaccination costs, although the logistics of implementation of OPV cessation remain uncertain and challenging. CONCLUSIONS All countries should maintain the highest possible levels of population immunity to transmission for each poliovirus serotype prior to the coordinated cessation of the OPV serotype to manage cVDPV risks. If OPV2 cessation gets delayed, then global health leaders should consider other OPV cessation timing options.
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Thompson KM, Duintjer Tebbens RJ. The differential impact of oral poliovirus vaccine formulation choices on serotype-specific population immunity to poliovirus transmission. BMC Infect Dis 2015. [PMID: 26382234 DOI: 10.1186/s12879-12015-11116-12874] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 04/14/2023] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND Prior analyses demonstrated the need for some countries and the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) to conduct additional supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) with trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (tOPV) prior to globally-coordinated cessation of all serotype 2-containing OPV (OPV2 cessation) to prevent the creation of serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2) outbreaks after OPV2 cessation. The GPEI continues to focus on achieving and ensuring interruption of wild poliovirus serotype 1 (WPV1) and making vaccine choices that prioritize bivalent OPV (bOPV) for SIAs, nominally to increase population immunity to serotype 1, despite an aggressive timeline for OPV2 cessation. METHODS We use an existing dynamic poliovirus transmission model of northwest Nigeria and an integrated global model for long-term poliovirus risk management to explore the impact of tOPV vs. bOPV vaccine choices on population immunity and cVDPV2 risks. RESULTS Using tOPV instead of bOPV for SIAs leads to a minimal decrease in population immunity to transmission of serotypes 1 and 3 polioviruses, but a significantly higher population immunity to transmission of serotype 2 polioviruses. Failure to use tOPV in enough SIAs results in cVDPV2 emergence after OPV2 cessation in both the northwest Nigeria model and the global model. Despite perceptions to the contrary, prioritizing the use of bOPV over tOPV prior to OPV2 cessation does not significantly improve serotype 1 population immunity to transmission. CONCLUSIONS Immunization leaders need to focus on all three poliovirus serotypes to appropriately manage the risks of OPV cessation in the polio endgame. Focusing on population immunity to transmission to interrupt WPV1 transmission and manage pre-OPV cessation risks of cVDPVs, all countries performing poliovirus SIAs should use tOPV up until the time of OPV2 cessation, after which time they should continue to use the OPV vaccine formulation with all remaining serotypes until coordinated global cessation of those serotypes.
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Duintjer Tebbens RJ, Pallansch MA, Wassilak SGF, Cochi SL, Thompson KM. Combinations of Quality and Frequency of Immunization Activities to Stop and Prevent Poliovirus Transmission in the High-Risk Area of Northwest Nigeria. PLoS One 2015; 10:e0130123. [PMID: 26068928 PMCID: PMC4465973 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0130123] [Citation(s) in RCA: 20] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/22/2015] [Accepted: 05/18/2015] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
Background Frequent supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) with the oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) represent the primary strategy to interrupt poliovirus transmission in the last endemic areas. Materials and Methods Using a differential-equation based poliovirus transmission model tailored to high-risk areas in Nigeria, we perform one-way and multi-way sensitivity analyses to demonstrate the impact of different assumptions about routine immunization (RI) and the frequency and quality of SIAs on population immunity to transmission and persistence or emergence of circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) after OPV cessation. Results More trivalent OPV use remains critical to avoid serotype 2 cVDPVs. RI schedules with or without inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) could significantly improve population immunity if coverage increases well above current levels in under-vaccinated subpopulations. Similarly, the impact of SIAs on overall population immunity and cVDPV risks depends on their ability to reach under-vaccinated groups (i.e., SIA quality). Lower SIA coverage in the under-vaccinated subpopulation results in a higher frequency of SIAs needed to maintain high enough population immunity to avoid cVDPVs after OPV cessation. Conclusions National immunization program managers in northwest Nigeria should recognize the benefits of increasing RI and SIA quality. Sufficiently improving RI coverage and improving SIA quality will reduce the frequency of SIAs required to stop and prevent future poliovirus transmission. Better information about the incremental costs to identify and reach under-vaccinated children would help determine the optimal balance between spending to increase SIA and RI quality and spending to increase SIA frequency.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Mark A. Pallansch
- Division of Viral Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America
| | - Steven G. F. Wassilak
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America
| | - Stephen L. Cochi
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America
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Kalkowska DA, Duintjer Tebbens RJ, Grotto I, Shulman LM, Anis E, Wassilak SGF, Pallansch MA, Thompson KM. Modeling options to manage type 1 wild poliovirus imported into Israel in 2013. J Infect Dis 2015; 211:1800-12. [PMID: 25505296 PMCID: PMC7887763 DOI: 10.1093/infdis/jiu674] [Citation(s) in RCA: 65] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/24/2014] [Accepted: 12/02/2014] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND After 25 years without poliomyelitis cases caused by circulating wild poliovirus (WPV) in Israel, sewage sampling detected WPV type 1 (WPV1) in April 2013, despite high vaccination coverage with only inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) since 2005. METHODS We used a differential equation-based model to simulate the dynamics of poliovirus transmission and population immunity in Israel due to past exposure to WPV and use of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) in addition to IPV. We explored the influences of various immunization options to stop imported WPV1 circulation in Israel. RESULTS We successfully modeled the potential for WPVs to circulate without detected cases in Israel. Maintaining a sequential IPV/OPV schedule instead of switching to an IPV-only schedule in 2005 would have kept population immunity high enough in Israel to prevent WPV1 circulation. The Israeli response to WPV1 detection prevented paralytic cases; a more rapid response might have interrupted transmission more quickly. CONCLUSIONS IPV-based protection alone might not provide sufficient population immunity to prevent poliovirus transmission after an importation. As countries transition to IPV in immunization schedules, they may need to actively manage population immunity and consider continued use of OPV, to avoid the potential circulation of imported live polioviruses before globally coordinated cessation of OPV use.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Itamar Grotto
- Public Health Services Faculty of Health Sciences, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer Sheva
| | - Lester M Shulman
- Public Health Services Sackler Faculty of Medicine, Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv, Israel
| | - Emilia Anis
- Division of Epidemiology, Ministry of Health, Jerusalem
| | | | - Mark A Pallansch
- Division of Viral Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia
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Thompson KM, Kalkowska DA, Duintjer Tebbens RJ. Managing population immunity to reduce or eliminate the risks of circulation following the importation of polioviruses. Vaccine 2015; 33:1568-77. [PMID: 25701673 PMCID: PMC7907970 DOI: 10.1016/j.vaccine.2015.02.013] [Citation(s) in RCA: 35] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/26/2014] [Revised: 01/31/2015] [Accepted: 02/05/2015] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
Poliovirus importations into polio-free countries represent a major concern during the final phases of global eradication of wild polioviruses (WPVs). We extend dynamic transmission models to demonstrate the dynamics of population immunity out through 2020 for three countries that only used inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) for routine immunization: the US, Israel, and The Netherlands. For each country, we explore the vulnerability to re-established transmission following an importation for each poliovirus serotype, including the impact of immunization choices following the serotype 1 WPV importation that occurred in 2013 in Israel. As population immunity declines below the threshold required to prevent transmission, countries become at risk for re-established transmission. Although importations represent stochastic events that countries cannot fully control because people cross borders and polioviruses mainly cause asymptomatic infections, countries can ensure that any importations die out. Our results suggest that the general US population will remain above the threshold for transmission through 2020. In contrast, Israel became vulnerable to re-established transmission of importations of live polioviruses by the late 2000s. In Israel, the recent WPV importation and outbreak response use of bivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (bOPV) eliminated the vulnerability to an importation of poliovirus serotypes 1 and 3 for several years, but not serotype 2. The Netherlands experienced a serotype 1 WPV outbreak in 1992-1993 and became vulnerable to re-established transmission in religious communities with low vaccine acceptance around the year 2000, although the general population remains well-protected from widespread transmission. All countries should invest in active management of population immunity to avoid the potential circulation of imported live polioviruses. IPV-using countries may wish to consider prevention opportunities and/or ensure preparedness for response. Countries currently using a sequential IPV/OPV schedule should continue to use all licensed OPV serotypes until global OPV cessation to minimize vulnerability to circulation of imported polioviruses.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kimberly M Thompson
- Kid Risk, Inc., Orlando, FL, USA; University of Central Florida, College of Medicine, Orlando, FL, USA.
| | - Dominika A Kalkowska
- Kid Risk, Inc., Orlando, FL, USA; Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands
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Kalkowska DA, Duintjer Tebbens RJ, Pallansch MA, Cochi SL, Wassilak SGF, Thompson KM. Modeling undetected live poliovirus circulation after apparent interruption of transmission: implications for surveillance and vaccination. BMC Infect Dis 2015; 15:66. [PMID: 25886823 PMCID: PMC4344758 DOI: 10.1186/s12879-015-0791-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 48] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/20/2014] [Accepted: 01/30/2015] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND Most poliovirus infections occur with no symptoms and this leads to the possibility of silent circulation, which complicates the confirmation of global goals to permanently end poliovirus transmission. Previous simple models based on hypothetical populations assumed perfect detection of symptomatic cases and suggested the need to observe no paralytic cases from wild polioviruses (WPVs) for approximately 3-4 years to achieve 95% confidence about eradication, but the complexities in real populations and the imperfect nature of surveillance require consideration. METHODS We revisit the probability of undetected poliovirus circulation using a more comprehensive model that reflects the conditions in a number of places with different characteristics related to WPV transmission, and we model the actual environmental WPV detection that occurred in Israel in 2013. We consider the analogous potential for undetected transmission of circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses. The model explicitly accounts for the impact of different vaccination activities before and after the last detected case of paralytic polio, different levels of surveillance, variability in transmissibility and neurovirulence among serotypes, and the possibility of asymptomatic participation in transmission by previously-vaccinated or infected individuals. RESULTS We find that prolonged circulation in the absence of cases and thus undetectable by case-based surveillance may occur if vaccination keeps population immunity close to but not over the threshold required for the interruption of transmission, as may occur in northwestern Nigeria for serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus in the event of insufficient tOPV use. Participation of IPV-vaccinated individuals in asymptomatic fecal-oral transmission may also contribute to extended transmission undetectable by case-based surveillance, as occurred in Israel. We also find that gaps or quality issues in surveillance could significantly reduce confidence about actual disruption. Maintaining high population immunity and high-quality surveillance for several years after the last detected polio cases will remain critical elements of the polio end game. CONCLUSIONS Countries will need to maintain vigilance in their surveillance for polioviruses and recognize that their risks of undetected circulation may differ as a function of their efforts to manage population immunity and to identify cases or circulating live polioviruses.
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Affiliation(s)
- Dominika A Kalkowska
- Kid Risk, Inc., 10524 Moss Park Road, Site 204-364, Orlando, FL, 32832, USA.
- Delft University of Technology, Delft, Netherlands.
| | | | - Mark A Pallansch
- Division of Viral Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA.
| | - Stephen L Cochi
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA.
| | - Steven G F Wassilak
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA.
| | - Kimberly M Thompson
- Kid Risk, Inc., 10524 Moss Park Road, Site 204-364, Orlando, FL, 32832, USA.
- College of Medicine, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL, USA.
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Kalkowska DA, Duintjer Tebbens RJ, Pallansch MA, Cochi SL, Wassilak SGF, Thompson KM. Modeling undetected live poliovirus circulation after apparent interruption of transmission: implications for surveillance and vaccination. BMC Infect Dis 2015. [PMID: 25886823 DOI: 10.1186/s12879-12015-10791-12875] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 04/15/2023] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND Most poliovirus infections occur with no symptoms and this leads to the possibility of silent circulation, which complicates the confirmation of global goals to permanently end poliovirus transmission. Previous simple models based on hypothetical populations assumed perfect detection of symptomatic cases and suggested the need to observe no paralytic cases from wild polioviruses (WPVs) for approximately 3-4 years to achieve 95% confidence about eradication, but the complexities in real populations and the imperfect nature of surveillance require consideration. METHODS We revisit the probability of undetected poliovirus circulation using a more comprehensive model that reflects the conditions in a number of places with different characteristics related to WPV transmission, and we model the actual environmental WPV detection that occurred in Israel in 2013. We consider the analogous potential for undetected transmission of circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses. The model explicitly accounts for the impact of different vaccination activities before and after the last detected case of paralytic polio, different levels of surveillance, variability in transmissibility and neurovirulence among serotypes, and the possibility of asymptomatic participation in transmission by previously-vaccinated or infected individuals. RESULTS We find that prolonged circulation in the absence of cases and thus undetectable by case-based surveillance may occur if vaccination keeps population immunity close to but not over the threshold required for the interruption of transmission, as may occur in northwestern Nigeria for serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus in the event of insufficient tOPV use. Participation of IPV-vaccinated individuals in asymptomatic fecal-oral transmission may also contribute to extended transmission undetectable by case-based surveillance, as occurred in Israel. We also find that gaps or quality issues in surveillance could significantly reduce confidence about actual disruption. Maintaining high population immunity and high-quality surveillance for several years after the last detected polio cases will remain critical elements of the polio end game. CONCLUSIONS Countries will need to maintain vigilance in their surveillance for polioviruses and recognize that their risks of undetected circulation may differ as a function of their efforts to manage population immunity and to identify cases or circulating live polioviruses.
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Affiliation(s)
- Dominika A Kalkowska
- Kid Risk, Inc., 10524 Moss Park Road, Site 204-364, Orlando, FL, 32832, USA.
- Delft University of Technology, Delft, Netherlands.
| | | | - Mark A Pallansch
- Division of Viral Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA.
| | - Stephen L Cochi
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA.
| | - Steven G F Wassilak
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA.
| | - Kimberly M Thompson
- Kid Risk, Inc., 10524 Moss Park Road, Site 204-364, Orlando, FL, 32832, USA.
- College of Medicine, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL, USA.
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Thompson KM, Duintjer Tebbens RJ. Modeling the dynamics of oral poliovirus vaccine cessation. J Infect Dis 2014; 210 Suppl 1:S475-84. [PMID: 25316870 DOI: 10.1093/infdis/jit845] [Citation(s) in RCA: 79] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/04/2023] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND Oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) results in an ongoing burden of poliomyelitis due to vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis and circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs). This motivates globally coordinated OPV cessation after wild poliovirus eradication. METHODS We modeled poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution to characterize the interaction between population immunity, OPV-related virus prevalence, and the emergence of cVDPVs after OPV cessation. We explored strategies to prevent and manage cVDPVs for countries that currently use OPV for immunization and characterized cVDPV emergence risks and OPV use for outbreak response. RESULTS Continued intense supplemental immunization activities until OPV cessation represent the best strategy to prevent cVDPV emergence after OPV cessation in areas with insufficient routine immunization coverage. Policy makers must actively manage population immunity before OPV cessation to prevent cVDPVs and aggressively respond if prevention fails. Sufficiently aggressive response with OPV to interrupt transmission of the cVDPV outbreak virus will lead to die-out of OPV-related viruses used for response in the outbreak population. Further analyses should consider the risk of exportation to other populations of the outbreak virus and any OPV used for outbreak response. CONCLUSIONS OPV cessation can successfully eliminate all circulating live polioviruses in a population. The polio end game requires active risk management.
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Duintjer Tebbens RJ, Thompson KM. Modeling the potential role of inactivated poliovirus vaccine to manage the risks of oral poliovirus vaccine cessation. J Infect Dis 2014; 210 Suppl 1:S485-97. [PMID: 25316871 DOI: 10.1093/infdis/jit838] [Citation(s) in RCA: 49] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/14/2022] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND The Global Polio Eradication Initiative plans to stop all oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) after wild poliovirus eradication, starting with serotype 2. Stakeholders continue to discuss the role of using inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) to manage the risks of circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) during the end game. METHODS We use a poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model to explore the impact of various routine immunization policies involving IPV on population immunity dynamics and the probability and magnitude of cVDPV emergences following OPV cessation. RESULTS Adding a single IPV dose to an OPV-only routine immunization schedule at or just before OPV cessation produces very limited impact on the probability of cVDPV emergences and the number of expected polio cases in settings in which we expect cVDPVs in the absence of IPV use. The highest-cost option of switching to a 3-dose IPV schedule only marginally decreases cVDPV risks. Discontinuing supplemental immunization activities while introducing IPV prior to OPV cessation leads to an increase in cVDPV risks. CONCLUSIONS Introducing a dose of IPV in countries currently using OPV only for routine immunization offers protection from paralysis to successfully vaccinated recipients, but it does little to protect high-risk populations from cVDPV risks.
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Kalkowska DA, Duintjer Tebbens RJ, Thompson KM. Modeling strategies to increase population immunity and prevent poliovirus transmission in the high-risk area of northwest Nigeria. J Infect Dis 2014; 210 Suppl 1:S412-23. [PMID: 25316863 DOI: 10.1093/infdis/jit834] [Citation(s) in RCA: 41] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/14/2022] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND Nigeria continues to struggle in its efforts to eliminate circulating live polioviruses using oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV). METHODS We modeled population immunity, and we estimated cases and the timing of transmission die-out for numerous policies that could accelerate the elimination of wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) and help Nigeria manage the risks of circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs). We used a differential-equation based poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model focused on northwest Nigeria to characterize the impact and trade-offs of potential vaccination strategies, including the introduction of inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV). RESULTS Northwest Nigeria appears close to reaching the threshold of population immunity it must exceed to stop WPV1 transmission if it continues immunizing previously under-vaccinated children. Avoiding type 2 cVDPVs (cVDPV2s) will depend on using sufficient amounts of trivalent OPV, which will also reduce the risks of cVDPV2s after coordinated cessation of type 2-containing OPV (OPV2). Using IPV during the OPV cessation period may increase population immunity, but it leads to a much lower impact on cVDPV risks than ensuring sufficient trivalent OPV use prior to OPV2 cessation. CONCLUSIONS Northwest Nigeria needs to intensify and sustain its immunization efforts to achieve and maintain higher levels of population immunity.
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Affiliation(s)
- Dominika A Kalkowska
- Kid Risk, Inc, Orlando, Florida Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands
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