The Role of Adults in Poliovirus Transmission to Infants and Children

We draw attention to a neglected aspect of poliovirus transmission—the likely role of adults in sustaining transmission—which has important policy and practical implications for addressing the perplexing phenomenon of continued virus circulation.

Updated characterization of poliovirus transmission in Pakistan and Afghanistan and the impacts of different outbreak response vaccine options

Background

Pakistan and Afghanistan remain the only reservoirs of wild poliovirus transmission. Prior modeling suggested that before the COVID-19 pandemic, plans to stop the transmission of serotype 1 wild poliovirus (WPV1) and persistent serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2) did not appear on track to succeed.

Methods

We updated an existing poliovirus transmission and Sabin-strain oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) evolution model for Pakistan and Afghanistan to characterize the impacts of immunization disruptions and restrictions on human interactions (i.e., population mixing) due to the COVID-19 pandemic. We also consider different options for responding to outbreaks and for preventive supplementary immunization activities (SIAs).

Results

The modeling suggests that with some resumption of activities in the fall of 2020 to respond to cVDPV2 outbreaks and full resumption on January 1, 2021 of all polio immunization activities to pre-COVID-19 levels, Pakistan and Afghanistan would remain off-track for stopping all transmission through 2023 without improvements in quality.

Conclusions

Using trivalent OPV (tOPV) for SIAs instead of serotype 2 monovalent OPV (mOPV2) offers substantial benefits for ending the transmission of both WPV1 and cVDPV2, because tOPV increases population immunity for both serotypes 1 and 2 while requiring fewer SIA rounds, when effectively delivered in transmission areas.

Modeling Undetected Live Poliovirus Circulation After Apparent Interruption of Transmission: Borno and Yobe in Northeast Nigeria

Silent circulation of polioviruses complicates the polio endgame by affecting the confidence with which we can certify successful eradication (i.e., the end of transmission everywhere) given a long enough period of time with active surveillance and no observed detections. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative continues to use three years without observing paralytic cases caused by wild poliovirus (WPV) infection as an indication of sufficient confidence that poliovirus circulation stopped (assuming good surveillance). Prior modeling demonstrated the complexities of real populations and the imperfect nature of real surveillance systems, and highlighted the need for modeling the specific last reservoirs of undetected circulation. We use a poliovirus transmission model developed for Borno and Yobe to characterize the probability of undetected poliovirus circulation once apparent die-out occurs (i.e., in the absence of epidemiological signals) for WPV serotypes 1 and 3. Specifically, we convert the model to a stochastic form that supports estimates of confidence about no circulation given the time since the last detected event and considering the quality of both immunization and surveillance activities for these states. We find high confidence of no WPV3 circulation, and increasing confidence of WPV1 circulation, which we anticipate will imply high confidence in the absence of any detected cases in mid-2020 so long as Borno and Yobe maintain similar or achieve improved conditions. Our results confirm that gaps in poliovirus surveillance or reaching elimination with borderline sufficient population immunity can substantially increase the time to reach a high confidence about no undetected poliovirus transmission.

Modeling and Managing Poliovirus Risks: We are Where we are…

This introduction for the third special issue on modeling poliovirus risks provides context for the current status of global polio eradication efforts and gives an overview of the individual papers included in the issue. Although risk analysis continues to support the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI), efforts to finish the job remained off track at the beginning of 2020 and prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, as discussed in the special issue. The disruptions associated with COVID-19 occurring now will inevitably change the polio eradication trajectory, and future studies will need to characterize the impacts of these disruptions on the polio endgame.

Disease Surveillance Investments and Administration: Limits to Information Value in Pakistan Polio Eradication

In Pakistan, annual poliovirus investment decisions drive quantities of supplemental immunization campaigns districts receive. In this article, we assess whether increased spending on poliovirus surveillance is associated with greater likelihood of correctly identifying districts at high risk of polio with assignment of an elevated "risk ranking." We reviewed programmatic documents from Pakistan for the period from 2012-2017, recording whether districts had been classified as "high risk" or "low risk" in each year. Through document review, we developed a decision tree to describe the ranking decisions. Then, integrating data from the World Health Organization and Global Polio Eradication Initiative, we constructed a Bayesian decision network reflecting investments in polio surveillance and immunization campaigns, surveillance metrics, disease incidence, immunization rates, and occurrence of polio cases. We test these factors for statistical association with the outcome of interest-a change in risk rank between the beginning and the end of the one-year time period. We simulate different spending scenarios and predict their impact on district risk ranking in future time periods. We find that per district spending increases are associated with increased identification of cases of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP). However, the low specificity of AFP investment and the largely invariant ranking of district risk means that even large increases in surveillance spending are unlikely to promote major changes in risk rankings at the current stage of the Pakistan polio eradication campaign.

Insights From Modeling Preventive Supplemental Immunization Activities as a Strategy to Eliminate Wild Poliovirus Transmission in Pakistan and Afghanistan

Many countries use supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) with oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) to keep their population immunity to transmission high using preventive, planned SIAs (pSIAs) and outbreaks response SIAs (oSIAs). Prior studies suggested that investment in pSIAs saved substantial health and financial costs due to avoided outbreaks. However, questions remain about the benefits of SIAs, particularly with the recent introduction of inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) into routine immunization in all OPV-using countries. The mounting costs of polio eradication activities and the need to respond to oSIAs threatens the use of limited financial resources for pSIAs, including in the remaining countries with endemic transmission of serotype 1 wild poliovirus (WPV1) (i.e., Pakistan and Afghanistan). A recent updated global poliovirus transmission model suggested that the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) is not on track to stop transmission of WPV1 in Pakistan and Afghanistan. We use the updated global model to explore the role of pSIAs to achieve WPV1 eradication. We find that unless Pakistan and Afghanistan manage to increase the quality of bivalent OPV (bOPV) pSIAs, which we model as intensity (i.e., sufficiently high-coverage bOPV pSIAs that reach missed children), the model does not lead to successful eradication of WPV1. Achieving WPV1 eradication, the global objectives of the GPEI, and a successful polio endgame depend on effective and sufficient use of OPV. IPV use plays a negligible role in stopping transmission in Pakistan and Afghanistan and most other countries supported by the GPEI, and more IPV use will not help to stop transmission.

Reflections on Modeling Poliovirus Transmission and the Polio Eradication Endgame

The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) partners engaged modelers during the past nearly 20 years to support strategy and policy discussions and decisions, and to provide estimates of the risks, costs, and benefits of different options for managing the polio endgame. Limited efforts to date provided insights related to the validation of the models used for GPEI strategy and policy decisions. However, modeling results only influenced decisions in some cases, with other factors carrying more weight in many key decisions. In addition, the results from multiple modeling groups do not always agree, which supports selection of some strategies and/or policies counter to the recommendations from some modelers but not others. This analysis reflects on our modeling, and summarizes our premises and recommendations, the outcomes of these recommendations, and the implications of key limitations of models with respect to polio endgame strategy. We briefly review the current state of the GPEI given epidemiological experience as of early 2020, which includes failure of the GPEI to deliver on the objectives of its 2013-2018 strategic plan despite full financial support. Looking ahead, we provide context for why the GPEI strategy of global oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) cessation to end all cases of poliomyelitis looks infeasible given the current state of the GPEI and the failure to successfully stop all transmission of serotype 2 live polioviruses within four years of the April-May 2016 coordinated cessation of serotype 2 OPV use in routine immunization.

Modeling Poliovirus Transmission in Borno and Yobe, Northeast Nigeria

Beginning in 2013, multiple local government areas (LGAs) in Borno and Yobe in northeast Nigeria and other parts of the Lake Chad basin experienced a violent insurgency that resulted in substantial numbers of isolated and displaced people. Northeast Nigeria represents the last known reservoir country of wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission in Africa, with detection of paralytic cases caused by serotype 1 WPV in 2016 in Borno and serotype 3 WPV in late 2012. Parts of Borno and Yobe are also problematic areas for transmission of serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses, and they continue to face challenges associated with conflict and inadequate health services in security-compromised areas that limit both immunization and surveillance activities. We model poliovirus transmission of all three serotypes for Borno and Yobe using a deterministic differential equation-based model that includes four subpopulations to account for limitations in access to immunization services and dynamic restrictions in population mixing. We find that accessibility issues and insufficient immunization allow for prolonged poliovirus transmission and potential undetected paralytic cases, although as of the end of 2019, including responsive program activities in the modeling suggest die out of indigenous serotypes 1 and 3 WPVs prior to 2020. Specifically, recent and current efforts to access isolated populations and provide oral poliovirus vaccine continue to reduce the risks of sustained and undetected transmission, although some uncertainty remains. Continued improvement in immunization and surveillance in the isolated subpopulations should minimize these risks. Stochastic modeling can build on this analysis to characterize the implications for undetected transmission and confidence about no circulation.

Global Transmission of Live Polioviruses: Updated Dynamic Modeling of the Polio Endgame

Nearly 20 years after the year 2000 target for global wild poliovirus (WPV) eradication, live polioviruses continue to circulate with all three serotypes posing challenges for the polio endgame. We updated a global differential equation-based poliovirus transmission and stochastic risk model to include programmatic and epidemiological experience through January 2020. We used the model to explore the likely dynamics of poliovirus transmission for 2019-2023, which coincides with a new Global Polio Eradication Initiative Strategic Plan. The model stratifies the global population into 72 blocks, each containing 10 subpopulations of approximately 10.7 million people. Exported viruses go into subpopulations within the same block and within groups of blocks that represent large preferentially mixing geographical areas (e.g., continents). We assign representative World Bank income levels to the blocks along with polio immunization and transmission assumptions, which capture some of the heterogeneity across countries while still focusing on global poliovirus transmission dynamics. We also updated estimates of reintroduction risks using available evidence. The updated model characterizes transmission dynamics and resulting polio cases consistent with the evidence through 2019. Based on recent epidemiological experience and prospective immunization assumptions for the 2019-2023 Strategic Plan, the updated model does not show successful eradication of serotype 1 WPV by 2023 or successful cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine serotype 2-related viruses.

Africa Regional Commission for the Certification of Poliomyelitis Eradication. Certifying the interruption of wild poliovirus transmission in the WHO African region on the turbulent journey to a polio-free world

On Aug 25 2020, the Africa Regional Commission for the Certification of Poliomyelitis Eradication declared that the WHO African region had interrupted transmission of all indigenous wild polioviruses. This declaration marks the African region as the fifth of the six WHO regions to celebrate this extraordinary achievement. Following the Yaoundé Declaration on Polio Eradication in Africa by heads of state and governments in 1996, Nelson Mandela launched the Kick Polio out of Africa campaign. In this Health Policy paper, we describe the long and turbulent journey to the certification of the interruption of wild poliovirus transmission, focusing on 2016-20, lessons learned, and the strategies and analyses that convinced the Regional Commission that the African region is free of wild polioviruses. This certification of the WHO African region shows the feasibility of polio eradication in countries with chronic insecurity, inaccessible and hard-to-reach populations, and weak health systems. Challenges have been daunting and the sacrifices enormous-dozens of health workers and volunteers have lost their lives in the pursuit of a polio-free Africa.

Case of Poliomyelitis Caused by Significantly Diverged Derivative of the Poliovirus Type 3 Vaccine Sabin Strain Circulating in the Orphanage

Significantly divergent polioviruses (VDPV) derived from the oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) from Sabin strains, like wild polioviruses, are capable of prolonged transmission and neuropathology. This is mainly shown for VDPV type 2. Here we describe a molecular-epidemiological investigation of a case of VDPV type 3 circulation leading to paralytic poliomyelitis in a child in an orphanage, where OPV has not been used. Samples of feces and blood serum from the patient and 52 contacts from the same orphanage were collected twice and investigated. The complete genome sequencing was performed for five polioviruses isolated from the patient and three contact children. The level of divergence of the genomes of the isolates corresponded to approximately 9–10 months of evolution. The presence of 61 common substitutions in all isolates indicated a common intermediate progenitor. The possibility of VDPV3 transmission from the excretor to susceptible recipients (unvaccinated against polio or vaccinated with inactivated poliovirus vaccine, IPV) with subsequent circulation in a closed children’s group was demonstrated. The study of the blood sera of orphanage residents at least twice vaccinated with IPV revealed the absence of neutralizing antibodies against at least two poliovirus serotypes in almost 20% of children. Therefore, a complete rejection of OPV vaccination can lead to a critical decrease in collective immunity level. The development of new poliovirus vaccines that create mucosal immunity for the adequate replacement of OPV from Sabin strains is necessary.

Review of poliovirus modeling performed from 2000 to 2019 to support global polio eradication

INTRODUCTION

Over the last 20 years (2000-2019) the partners of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) invested in the development and application of mathematical models of poliovirus transmission as well as economics, policy, and risk analyses of polio endgame risk management options, including policies related to poliovirus vaccine use during the polio endgame.

AREAS COVERED

This review provides a historical record of the polio studies published by the three modeling groups that primarily performed the bulk of this work. This review also systematically evaluates the polio transmission and health economic modeling papers published in English in peer-reviewed journals from 2000 to 2019, highlights differences in approaches and methods, shows the geographic coverage of the transmission modeling performed, identified common themes, and discusses instances of similar or conflicting insights or recommendations.

EXPERT OPINION

Polio modeling performed during the last 20 years substantially impacted polio vaccine choices, immunization policies, and the polio eradication pathway. As the polio endgame continues, national preferences for polio vaccine formulations and immunization strategies will likely continue to change. Future modeling will likely provide important insights about their cost-effectiveness and their relative benefits with respect to controlling polio and potentially achieving and maintaining eradication.

Evolving epidemiology of poliovirus serotype 2 following withdrawal of the serotype 2 oral poliovirus vaccine

Although there have been no cases of serotype 2 wild poliovirus for more than 20 years, transmission of serotype 2 vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV2) and associated paralytic cases in several continents represent a threat to eradication. The withdrawal of the serotype 2 component of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV2) was implemented in April 2016 to stop VDPV2 emergence and secure eradication of all serotype 2 poliovirus. Globally, children born after this date have limited immunity to prevent transmission. Using a statistical model, we estimated the emergence date and source of VDPV2s detected between May 2016 and November 2019. Outbreak response campaigns with monovalent OPV2 are the only available method to induce immunity to prevent transmission. Yet our analysis shows that using monovalent OPV2 is generating more paralytic VDPV2 outbreaks with the potential for establishing endemic transmission. A novel OPV2, for which two candidates are currently in clinical trials, is urgently required, together with a contingency strategy if this vaccine does not materialize or perform as anticipated.

Updated modelling of the prevalence of immunodeficiency-associated long-term vaccine-derived poliovirus (iVDPV) excreters

Conditions and evidence continue to evolve related to the prediction of the prevalence of immunodeficiency-associated long-term vaccine-derived poliovirus (iVDPV) excreters, which affect assumptions related to forecasting risks and evaluating potential risk management options. Multiple recent reviews provided information about individual iVDPV excreters, but inconsistencies among the reviews raise some challenges. This analysis revisits the available evidence related to iVDPV excreters and provides updated model estimates that can support future risk management decisions. The results suggest that the prevalence of iVDPV excreters remains highly uncertain and variable, but generally confirms the importance of managing the risks associated with iVDPV excreters throughout the polio endgame in the context of successful cessation of all oral poliovirus vaccine use.

Global certification of wild poliovirus eradication: insights from modelling hard-to-reach subpopulations and confidence about the absence of transmission

OBJECTIVE

To explore the extent to which undervaccinated subpopulations may influence the confidence about no circulation of wild poliovirus (WPV) after the last detected case.

DESIGN AND PARTICIPANTS

We used a hypothetical model to examine the extent to which the existence of an undervaccinated subpopulation influences the confidence about no WPV circulation after the last detected case as a function of different characteristics of the subpopulation (eg, size, extent of isolation). We also used the hypothetical population model to inform the bounds on the maximum possible time required to reach high confidence about no circulation in a completely isolated and unvaccinated subpopulation starting either at the endemic equilibrium or with a single infection in an entirely susceptible population.

RESULTS

It may take over 3 years to reach 95% confidence about no circulation for this hypothetical population despite high surveillance sensitivity and high vaccination coverage in the surrounding general population if: (1) ability to detect cases in the undervaccinated subpopulation remains exceedingly small, (2) the undervaccinated subpopulation remains small and highly isolated from the general population and (3) the coverage in the undervaccinated subpopulation remains very close to the minimum needed to eradicate. Fully-isolated hypothetical populations of 4000 people or less cannot sustain endemic transmission for more than 5 years, with at least 20 000 people required for a 50% chance of at least 5 years of sustained transmission in a population without seasonality that starts at the endemic equilibrium. Notably, however, the population size required for persistent transmission increases significantly for realistic populations that include some vaccination and seasonality and/or that do not begin at the endemic equilibrium.

CONCLUSIONS

Significant trade-offs remain inherent in global polio certification decisions, which underscore the need for making and valuing investments to maximise population immunity and surveillance quality in all remaining possible WPV reservoirs.

Assessing the Risk of Vaccine-derived Outbreaks After Reintroduction of Oral Poliovirus Vaccine in Postcessation Settings

Background

The Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategic Plan 2013-2018 calls for the gradual withdrawal of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) from routine immunization. We aimed to quantify the transmission potential of Sabin strains from OPV when it is reintroduced, accidentally or deliberately, in a community vaccinated with inactivated poliovirus vaccine alone.

Methods

We built an individual-based stochastic epidemiological model that allows independent spread of 3 Sabin serotypes and differential transmission rates within versus between households. Model parameters were estimated by fitting to data from a prospective cohort in Mexico. We calculated the effective reproductive number for the Mexico cohort and simulated scenarios of Sabin strain resurgence under postcessation conditions, projecting the risk of prolonged circulation, which could lead to circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV).

Results

The estimated effective reproductive number for naturally infected individuals was about 1 for Sabin 2 and Sabin 3 (OPV2 and OPV3) in a postcessation setting. Most transmission events occurred between households. We estimated the probability of circulation for >9 months to be (1) <<1% for all 3 serotypes when 90% of children <5 years of age were vaccinated in a hypothetical outbreak control campaign; (2) 45% and 24% for Sabin 2 and Sabin 3, respectively, when vaccine coverage dropped to 10%; (3) 37% and 8% for Sabin 2 and Sabin 3, respectively, when a single active shedder appeared in a community.

Conclusions

Critical factors determining the risk of cVDPV emergence are the scale at which OPV is reintroduced and the between-household transmission rate for poliovirus, with intermediate values posing the greatest risk.

Spatial Analyses of Oral Polio Vaccine Transmission in an Community Vaccinated With Inactivated Polio Vaccine

Background

Understanding the spatial dynamics of oral polio vaccine (OPV) transmission will improve resource targeting. Mexico provides a natural laboratory, as it uses inactivated polio vaccine routinely as well as OPV bi-annually.

Methods

Using geospatial maps, we measured the distance and density of OPV vaccinees' shedding in the areas nearest to unvaccinated households in 3 Mexican villages. Comparison of transmission to unvaccinated households utilized a mixed effects logistic regression with random effects for household and time, adjusted for age, gender, area, and running water.

Results

The median distance from an unvaccinated household to its nearest OPV-shedding household was 85 meters (interquartile range, 46-145) and the median number of vaccinees shedding OPV within 200 m was 3 (2-6). Transmission to unvaccinated households occurred by day 1. There was no association (odds ratio [OR] 1.04; 95% credible interval [CrI] 0.92-1.16) between the distance from OPV shedding and the odds of transmission. The number of OPV vaccinees shedding within 200 m came close to a significant association with unvaccinated transmission (OR 0.93; CrI 0.84-1.01), but this was not the case for households 100 or 500 m apart. Results were consistent across the 3 villages.

Conclusions

Geospatial analysis did not predict community transmission from vaccinated to unvaccinated households, because OPV use resulted in rapid, low transmission levels. This finding supports the global cessation of OPV.

Lab Protocol Paper: Use of a High-throughput, Multiplex Reverse-transcription Quantitative Polymerase Chain Reaction Assay for Detection of Sabin Oral Polio Vaccine in Fecal Samples

Background

Global polio eradication efforts rely in part on molecular methods of detecting polioviruses, both wild and vaccine strains, from human and environmental samples. Previous assays used for detection of Sabin oral polio vaccine (OPV) in fecal samples have been labor and time intensive and vary in their sensitivity and specificity.

Methods

We developed a high-throughput, multiplex reverse-transcription quantitative polymerase chain reaction assay able to detect all 3 OPV strains in fecal samples. The assay used a KingFisher Duo Prime system for viral RNA isolation and extraction. Positive samples were retested and Sanger sequenced for verification of Sabin serotype identity.

Results

The 95% lower limit of detection was determined to be 3 copies per reaction for Sabin 1 and 3 and 4 copies per reaction for Sabin 2, with no cross-reactivity between the 3 serotypes and their primers. A total of 554 samples (3.6%) were positive, with 304 positive samples (54.9%) containing >1 serotype. Of the positive samples, 476 (85.9%) contained enough RNA to be sequenced, and of these all sequences were Sabin serotypes. The previous assay we used could process 48 samples in a 10-hour period, whereas the new assay processed >100 samples in 6 hours.

Conclusions

The new high-throughput, multiplex reverse-transcription quantitative polymerase chain reaction assay allowed for sensitive and specific detection of OPV serotypes while greatly decreasing sample handling and processing time. We were able to sequence 72.4% of the 210 positive samples in the cycle threshold range of 35-37.

Characterization of Household and Community Shedding and Transmission of Oral Polio Vaccine in Mexican Communities With Varying Vaccination Coverage

Background

The World Health Assembly 2012 Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategic Plan calls for the eventual cessation of all oral polio vaccines (OPVs), to be replaced with inactivated polio vaccine (IPV); however, IPV induces less robust mucosal immunity than OPV. This study characterized household and community OPV shedding and transmission after OPV vaccination within primarily IPV-vaccinated communities.

Methods

Households in 3 IPV-vaccinated Mexican communities were randomized to receive 3 levels of OPV vaccination coverage (70%, 30%, or 10%). Ten stool samples were collected from all household members over 71 days. Analysis compared vaccinated subjects, household contacts of vaccinated subjects, and subjects in unvaccinated households. Logistic and Cox regression models were fitted to characterize transmission of OPV by coverage and household vaccination status.

Results

Among 148 vaccinated children, 380 household contacts, and 1124 unvaccinated community contacts, 78%, 18%, and 7%, respectively, shed OPV. Community and household contacts showed no differences in transmission (odds ratio [OR], 0.67; 95% confidence interval [CI], .37-1.20), in shedding trajectory (OR, 0.61; 95% CI, .35-1.07), or in time to shedding (hazard ratio, 0.68; 95% CI, .39-1.19). Transmission began as quickly as 1 day after vaccination and persisted as long as 71 days after vaccination. Transmission within unvaccinated households differed significantly across vaccination coverage communities, with the 70% community experiencing the most transmissions (15%), and the 10% community experiencing the least (4%). These trends persisted over time and in the time to first shedding analyses.

Conclusions

Transmission did not differ between household contacts of vaccinees and unvaccinated households. Understanding poliovirus transmission dynamics is important for postcertification control.

Validation of a High-throughput, Multiplex, Real-time Qualitative Polymerase Chain Reaction Assay for the Detection of Sabin Oral Polio Vaccine in Environmental Samples

Background

Currently, the primary mechanism for poliovirus detection is acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance, with environmental sampling serving as a complement. However, as AFP cases drop, environmental surveillance will become increasingly critical for poliovirus detection. Mexico provides a natural environment to study oral polio vaccine (OPV) transmission, as it provides routine injected polio vaccine immunization and biannual OPV campaigns in February and May.

Methods

As part of a study of OPV transmission in which 155 children were vaccinated with OPV, monthly sewage samples were collected from rivers leading from 3 indigenous Mexican villages (Capoluca, Campo Grande, and Tuxpanguillo) from February to May 2015. Samples were also collected from October 2015 to October 2017, during which time there were standard OPV campaigns. Samples were analyzed for the presence of OPV serotypes, using a real-time qualitative polymerase chain reaction assay capable of detecting as few as 9, 12, and 10 copies/100 µL of viral ribonucleic acid for OPV serotypes 1, 2, and 3 (OPV-1, -2, and -3), respectively. Included here are 54 samples, taken up to November 2016.

Results

Of the 54 samples, 13 (24%) were positive for OPV. After the vaccination of 155 children in February 2015, OPV was found 2 months after vaccination. After unrestricted OPV administration in February 2016, OPV was detected in sewage up to 8 months after vaccination. OPV-3 was found in 11 of the 13 positive samples (85%), OPV-2 was found in 3 positive samples (23%), and OPV-1 was found in 1 sample (8%).

Conclusions

OPV can be detected even when small amounts of the vaccine are introduced into a community, as shown by OPV-positive sewage samples even when only 155 children were vaccinated. When OPV vaccination was unrestricted, sewage samples were positive up to 8 months after vaccination, implying community OPV circulation for at least 8 months. OPV-3 was the serotype most found in these samples, indicating prolonged transmission of OPV-3 when compared to the other serotypes. Future work could compare the phylogenetic variance of OPV isolates from sewage after OPV vaccinations.

Modeling Poliovirus Transmission in Pakistan and Afghanistan to Inform Vaccination Strategies in Undervaccinated Subpopulations

Due to security, access, and programmatic challenges in areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, both countries continue to sustain indigenous wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission and threaten the success of global polio eradication and oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) cessation. We fitted an existing differential-equation-based poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model to Pakistan and Afghanistan using four subpopulations to characterize the well-vaccinated and undervaccinated subpopulations in each country. We explored retrospective and prospective scenarios for using inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) in routine immunization or supplemental immunization activities (SIAs). The undervaccinated subpopulations sustain the circulation of serotype 1 WPV and serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus. We find a moderate impact of past IPV use on polio incidence and population immunity to transmission mainly due to (1) the boosting effect of IPV for individuals with preexisting immunity from a live poliovirus infection and (2) the effect of IPV-only on oropharyngeal transmission for individuals without preexisting immunity from a live poliovirus infection. Future IPV use may similarly yield moderate benefits, particularly if access to undervaccinated subpopulations dramatically improves. However, OPV provides a much greater impact on transmission and the incremental benefit of IPV in addition to OPV remains limited. This study suggests that despite the moderate effect of using IPV in SIAs, using OPV in SIAs remains the most effective means to stop transmission, while limited IPV resources should prioritize IPV use in routine immunization.

Poliovirus Excretion in Children with Primary Immunodeficiency Disorders, India

Prolonged excretion of poliovirus can occur in immunodeficient patients who receive oral polio vaccine, which may lead to propagation of highly divergent vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs), posing a concern for global polio eradication. This study aimed to estimate the proportion of primary immunodeficient children with enterovirus infection and to identify the long-term polio/nonpolio enterovirus excreters in a tertiary care unit in Mumbai, India. During September 2014–April 2017, 151 patients received diagnoses of primary immunodeficiency (PID). We isolated 8 enteroviruses (3 polioviruses and 5 nonpolio enteroviruses) in cell culture of 105 fecal samples collected from 42 patients. Only 1 patient with severe combined immunodeficiency was identified as a long-term VDPV3 excreter (for 2 years after identification of infection). Our results show that the risk of enterovirus excretion among children in India with PID is low; however, systematic screening is necessary to identify long-term poliovirus excreters until the use of oral polio vaccine is stopped.

Assessing the stability of polio eradication after the withdrawal of oral polio vaccine

The oral polio vaccine (OPV) contains live-attenuated polioviruses that induce immunity by causing low virulence infections in vaccine recipients and their close contacts. Widespread immunization with OPV has reduced the annual global burden of paralytic poliomyelitis by a factor of 10,000 or more and has driven wild poliovirus (WPV) to the brink of eradication. However, in instances that have so far been rare, OPV can paralyze vaccine recipients and generate vaccine-derived polio outbreaks. To complete polio eradication, OPV use should eventually cease, but doing so will leave a growing population fully susceptible to infection. If poliovirus is reintroduced after OPV cessation, under what conditions will OPV vaccination be required to interrupt transmission? Can conditions exist in which OPV and WPV reintroduction present similar risks of transmission? To answer these questions, we built a multi-scale mathematical model of infection and transmission calibrated to data from clinical trials and field epidemiology studies. At the within-host level, the model describes the effects of vaccination and waning immunity on shedding and oral susceptibility to infection. At the between-host level, the model emulates the interaction of shedding and oral susceptibility with sanitation and person-to-person contact patterns to determine the transmission rate in communities. Our results show that inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) is sufficient to prevent outbreaks in low transmission rate settings and that OPV can be reintroduced and withdrawn as needed in moderate transmission rate settings. However, in high transmission rate settings, the conditions that support vaccine-derived outbreaks have only been rare because population immunity has been high. Absent population immunity, the Sabin strains from OPV will be nearly as capable of causing outbreaks as WPV. If post-cessation outbreak responses are followed by new vaccine-derived outbreaks, strategies to restore population immunity will be required to ensure the stability of polio eradication.

Oral polio vaccine (OPV) has played an essential role in the elimination of wild poliovirus (WPV). OPV contains attenuated (weakened) yet transmissible viruses that can spread from person to person. In its attenuated form, this spread is beneficial as it generates population immunity. However, the attenuation of OPV is unstable and it can, in rare instances, revert to a virulent form and cause vaccine-derived outbreaks of paralytic poliomyelitis. Thus, OPV is both a vaccine and a source of poliovirus, and for complete eradication, its use in vaccination must be ended. After OPV is no longer used in routine immunization, as with the cessation of type 2 OPV in 2016, population immunity to polioviruses will decline. A key question is how this loss of population immunity will affect the potential of OPV viruses to spread within and across communities. To address this, we examined the roles of immunity, sanitation, and social contact in limiting OPV transmission. Our results derive from an extensive review and synthesis of vaccine trial data and community epidemiological studies. Shedding, oral susceptibility to infection, and transmission data are analyzed to systematically explain and model observations of WPV and OPV circulation. We show that in high transmission rate settings, falling population immunity after OPV cessation will lead to conditions in which OPV and WPV are similarly capable of causing outbreaks, and that this conclusion is compatible with the known safety of OPV prior to global cessation. Novel strategies will be required to ensure the stability of polio eradication for all time.

Assessing the individual risk of fecal poliovirus shedding among vaccinated and non-vaccinated subjects following national health weeks in Mexico

Background

Mexico introduced inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) into its routine immunization (RI) schedule in 2007 but continued to give trivalent oral polio vaccine (tOPV) twice a year during national health weeks (NHW) through 2015.

Objectives

To evaluate individual variables associated with poliovirus (PV) shedding among children with IPV-induced immunity after vaccination with tOPV and their household contacts.

Materials and methods

We recruited 72 children (both genders, ≤30 months, vaccinated with at least two doses of IPV) and 144 household contacts (both genders, 2 per household, children and adults) between 08/2010 and 09/2010 in Orizaba, Veracruz. Three NHW took place (one before and two after enrollment). We collected fecal samples monthly for 12 months, and tested 2500 samples for polioviruses types 1, 2 and 3 with three serotype-specific singleplex real-time RT-PCR (rRT-PCR) assays. In order to increase the specificity for OPV virus, all positive and 112 negative samples were also processed with a two-step, OPV serotype-specific multiplex rRT-PCR.

Analysis

We estimated adjusted hazard ratios (HR) and 95% CI using Cox proportional hazards regression for recurrent events models accounting for individual clustering to assess the association of individual variables with the shedding of any poliovirus for all participants and stratifying according to whether the participant had received tOPV in the month of sample collection.

Results

216 participants were included. Of the 2500 collected samples, using the singleplex rRT-PCR assay, PV was detected in 5.7% (n = 142); PV1 in 1.2% (n = 29), PV2 in 4.1% (n = 103), and PV3 in 1.9% (n = 48). Of the 256 samples processed by multiplex rRT-PCR, PV was detected in 106 (PV1 in 16.41% (n = 42), PV2 in 21.09% (n = 54), and PV3 in 23.05% (n = 59). Both using singleplex and multiplex assays, shedding of OPV among non-vaccinated children and subjects older than 5 years of age living in the same household was associated with shedding of PV2 by a household contact. All models were adjusted by sex, age, IPV vaccination and OPV shedding by the same individual during the previous month of sample collection.

Conclusion

Our results provide important evidence regarding the circulation of poliovirus in a mixed vaccination context (IPV+OPV) which mimics the “transitional phase” that occurs when countries use both vaccines simultaneously. Shedding of OPV2 by household contacts was most likely the source of infection of non-vaccinated children and subjects older than 5 years of age living in the same household.

Community transmission of type 2 poliovirus after cessation of trivalent oral polio vaccine in Bangladesh: an open-label cluster-randomised trial and modelling study

Background

Trivalent oral polio vaccine (tOPV) was replaced worldwide from April, 2016, by bivalent types 1 and 3 oral polio vaccine (bOPV) and one dose of inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) where available. The risk of transmission of type 2 poliovirus or Sabin 2 virus on re-introduction or resurgence of type 2 poliovirus after this switch is not understood completely. We aimed to assess the risk of Sabin 2 transmission after a polio vaccination campaign with a monovalent type 2 oral polio vaccine (mOPV2).

Methods

We did an open-label cluster-randomised trial in villages in the Matlab region of Bangladesh. We randomly allocated villages (clusters) to either: tOPV at age 6 weeks, 10 weeks, and 14 weeks; or bOPV at age 6 weeks, 10 weeks, and 14 weeks and either one dose of IPV at age 14 weeks or two doses of IPV at age 14 weeks and 18 weeks. After completion of enrolment, we implemented an mOPV2 vaccination campaign that targeted 40% of children younger than 5 years, regardless of enrolment status. The primary outcome was Sabin 2 incidence in the 10 weeks after the campaign in per-protocol infants who did not receive mOPV2, as assessed by faecal shedding of Sabin 2 by reverse transcriptase quantitative PCR (RT-qPCR). The effect of previous immunity on incidence was also investigated with a dynamical model of poliovirus transmission to observe prevalence and incidence of Sabin 2 virus. This trial is registered at ClinicalTrials.gov, number NCT02477046.

Findings

Between April 30, 2015, and Jan 14, 2016, individuals from 67 villages were enrolled to the study. 22 villages (300 infants) were randomly assigned tOPV, 23 villages (310 infants) were allocated bOPV and one dose of IPV, and 22 villages (329 infants) were assigned bOPV and two doses of IPV. Faecal shedding of Sabin 2 in infants who did not receive the mOPV2 challenge did not differ between children immunised with bOPV and one or two doses of IPV and those who received tOPV (15 of 252 [6%] vs six of 122 [4%]; odds ratio [OR] 1·29, 95% CI 0·45–3·72; p=0·310). However, faecal shedding of Sabin 2 in household contacts was increased significantly with bOPV and one or two doses of IPV compared with tOPV (17 of 751 [2%] vs three of 353 [1%]; OR 3·60, 95% CI 0·82–15·9; p=0·045). Dynamical modelling of within-household incidence showed that immunity in household contacts limited transmission.

Interpretation

In this study, simulating 1 year of tOPV cessation, Sabin 2 transmission was higher in household contacts of mOPV2 recipients in villages receiving bOPV and either one or two doses of IPV, but transmission was not increased in the community as a whole as shown by the non-significant difference in incidence among infants. Dynamical modelling indicates that transmission risk will be higher with more time since cessation.

Funding

Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

Considerations for the Full Global Withdrawal of Oral Polio Vaccine After Eradication of Polio

Eliminating the risk of polio from vaccine-derived polioviruses is essential for creating a polio-free world, and eliminating that risk will require stopping use of all oral polio vaccines (OPVs) once all types of wild polioviruses have been eradicated. In many ways, the experience with the global switch from trivalent OPV (tOPV) to bivalent OPV (bOPV) can inform the eventual full global withdrawal of OPV. Significant preparation will be needed for a thorough, synchronized, and full withdrawal of OPV, and such preparation would be aided by setting a reasonably firm date for OPV withdrawal as far in advance as possible, ideally at least 24 months. A shorter lead time would provide valuable flexibility for decisions about when to stop use of OPV in the context of uncertainty about whether or not all types of wild polioviruses had been eradicated, but it might increase the cost of OPV withdrawal.

Lessons From the Polio Endgame: Overcoming the Failure to Vaccinate and the Role of Subpopulations in Maintaining Transmission

Background

Recent detections of circulating serotype 2 vaccine-derived poliovirus in northern Nigeria (Borno and Sokoto states) and Pakistan (Balochistan Province) and serotype 1 wild poliovirus in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Nigeria (Borno) represent public health emergencies that require aggressive response.

Methods

We demonstrate the importance of undervaccinated subpopulations, using an existing dynamic poliovirus transmission and oral poliovirus vaccine evolution model. We review the lessons learned during the polio endgame about the role of subpopulations in sustaining transmission, and we explore the implications of subpopulations for other vaccine-preventable disease eradication efforts.

Results

Relatively isolated subpopulations benefit little from high surrounding population immunity to transmission and will sustain transmission as long as they do not attain high vaccination coverage. Failing to reach such subpopulations with high coverage represents the root cause of polio eradication delays. Achieving and maintaining eradication requires addressing the weakest links, which includes immunizing populations in insecure areas and/or with disrupted or poor-performing health systems and managing the risks of individuals with primary immunodeficiencies who can excrete vaccine-derived poliovirus long-term.

Conclusions

Eradication efforts for vaccine-preventable diseases need to create performance expectations for countries to immunize all people living within their borders and maintain high coverage with appropriate interventions.Keywords. Polio; eradication; transmission; heterogeneity.

Continued Endemic Wild Poliovirus Transmission in Security-Compromised Areas - Nigeria, 2016

On August 10, 2016, 2 years after the most recent wild poliovirus (WPV) case was reported in Nigeria (in July 2014) (1), two WPV cases were reported in the northeastern state of Borno, which has been severely affected by insurgency-related insecurity since 2013. On September 9 and 26, 2016, two additional WPV cases were reported in Borno in children whose families migrated from security-compromised, inaccessible areas of the state. All four cases were WPV serotype 1 (WPV1), with genetic differences indicating prolonged undetected transmission. A large-scale emergency response plan was developed and implemented. The plan initially called for vaccination of 815,791 children during August 15-18 in five local government areas (LGAs) in the immediate vicinity of the first two WPV cases. Subsequently, the plan was expanded to regionally synchronized supplementary immunization activities (SIAs), conducted during August 27-December 6 in five Lake Chad basin countries at increased risk for national and regional WPV1 transmission (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria). In addition, retrospective searches for missed cases of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP), enhanced environmental surveillance for polioviruses, and polio surveillance system reviews were conducted. Prolonged undetected WPV1 transmission in Borno State is a consequence of low population immunity and severe surveillance limitations associated with insurgency-related insecurity and highlights the risk for local and international WPV spread (2). Increasing polio vaccination coverage and implementing high-quality polio surveillance, especially among populations in newly secured and difficult-to-access areas in Borno and other Lake Chad basin areas are urgently needed.

Preventing Vaccine-Derived Poliovirus Emergence during the Polio Endgame

Reversion and spread of vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) to cause outbreaks of poliomyelitis is a rare outcome resulting from immunisation with the live-attenuated oral poliovirus vaccines (OPVs). Global withdrawal of all three OPV serotypes is therefore a key objective of the polio endgame strategic plan, starting with serotype 2 (OPV2) in April 2016. Supplementary immunisation activities (SIAs) with trivalent OPV (tOPV) in advance of this date could mitigate the risks of OPV2 withdrawal by increasing serotype-2 immunity, but may also create new serotype-2 VDPV (VDPV2). Here, we examine the risk factors for VDPV2 emergence and implications for the strategy of tOPV SIAs prior to OPV2 withdrawal. We first developed mathematical models of VDPV2 emergence and spread. We found that in settings with low routine immunisation coverage, the implementation of a single SIA increases the risk of VDPV2 emergence. If routine coverage is 20%, at least 3 SIAs are needed to bring that risk close to zero, and if SIA coverage is low or there are persistently "missed" groups, the risk remains high despite the implementation of multiple SIAs. We then analysed data from Nigeria on the 29 VDPV2 emergences that occurred during 2004-2014. Districts reporting the first case of poliomyelitis associated with a VDPV2 emergence were compared to districts with no VDPV2 emergence in the same 6-month period using conditional logistic regression. In agreement with the model results, the odds of VDPV2 emergence decreased with higher routine immunisation coverage (odds ratio 0.67 for a 10% absolute increase in coverage [95% confidence interval 0.55-0.82]). We also found that the probability of a VDPV2 emergence resulting in poliomyelitis in >1 child was significantly higher in districts with low serotype-2 population immunity. Our results support a strategy of focused tOPV SIAs before OPV2 withdrawal in areas at risk of VDPV2 emergence and in sufficient number to raise population immunity above the threshold permitting VDPV2 circulation. A failure to implement this risk-based approach could mean these SIAs actually increase the risk of VDPV2 emergence and spread.

Contribution of Environmental Surveillance Toward Interruption of Poliovirus Transmission in Nigeria, 2012-2015

BACKGROUND

Cases of paralysis caused by poliovirus have decreased by >99% since the 1988 World Health Assembly's resolution to eradicate polio. The World Health Organization identified environmental surveillance (ES) of poliovirus in the poliomyelitis eradication strategic plan as an activity that can complement acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance. This article summarizes key public health interventions that followed the isolation of polioviruses from ES between 2012 and 2015.

METHODS

The grap method was used to collect 1.75 L of raw flowing sewage every 2-4 weeks. Once collected, samples were shipped at 4 °C to a polio laboratory for concentration. ES data were then used to guide program implementation.

RESULTS

From 2012 to 2015, ES reported 97 circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV2) and 14 wild polioviruses. In 2014 alone, 54 cVDPV type 2 cases and 1 WPV type 1 case were reported. In Sokoto State, 58 cases of AFP were found from a search of 9426 households. A total of 2 252 059 inactivated polio vaccine and 2 460 124 oral polio vaccine doses were administered to children aged <5 year in Borno and Yobe states.

CONCLUSIONS

This article is among the first from Africa that relates ES findings to key public health interventions (mass immunization campaigns, inactivated polio vaccine introduction, and strengthening of AFP surveillance) that have contributed to the interruption of poliovirus transmission in Nigeria.

Comparison of three neurotropic viruses reveals differences in viral dissemination to the central nervous system

Neurotropic viruses initiate infection in peripheral tissues prior to entry into the central nervous system (CNS). However, mechanisms of dissemination are not completely understood. We used genetically marked viruses to compare dissemination of poliovirus, yellow fever virus 17D (YFV-17D), and reovirus type 3 Dearing in mice from a hind limb intramuscular inoculation site to the sciatic nerve, spinal cord, and brain. While YFV-17D likely entered the CNS via blood, poliovirus and reovirus likely entered the CNS by transport through the sciatic nerve to the spinal cord. We found that dissemination was inefficient in adult immune-competent mice for all three viruses, particularly reovirus. Dissemination of all viruses was more efficient in immune-deficient mice. Although poliovirus and reovirus both accessed the CNS by transit through the sciatic nerve, stimulation of neuronal transport by muscle damage enhanced dissemination only of poliovirus. Our results suggest that these viruses access the CNS using different pathways.

Managing the risk of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus during the endgame: oral poliovirus vaccine needs

BACKGROUND

The Global Polio Eradication Initiative plans for coordinated cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) use, beginning with serotype 2-containing OPV (i.e., OPV2 cessation) followed by the remaining two OPV serotypes (i.e., OPV13 cessation). The risk of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) outbreaks after OPV cessation of any serotype depends on the serotype-specific population immunity to transmission prior to its cessation.

METHODS

Based on an existing integrated global model of poliovirus risk management policies, we estimate the serotype-specific OPV doses required to manage population immunity for a strategy of intensive supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) shortly before OPV cessation of each serotype. The strategy seeks to prevent any cVDPV outbreaks after OPV cessation, although actual events remain stochastic.

RESULTS

Managing the risks of OPV cessation of any serotype depends on achieving sufficient population immunity to transmission to transmission at OPV cessation. This will require that countries with sub-optimal routine immunization coverage and/or conditions that favor poliovirus transmission conduct SIAs with homotypic OPV shortly before its planned coordinated cessation. The model suggests the need to increase trivalent OPV use in SIAs by approximately 40 % or more during the year before OPV2 cessation and to continue bOPV SIAs between the time of OPV2 cessation and OPV13 cessation.

CONCLUSIONS

Managing the risks of cVDPVs in the polio endgame will require serotype-specific OPV SIAs in some areas prior to OPV cessation and lead to demands for additional doses of the vaccine in the short term that will affect managers and manufacturers.

An economic analysis of poliovirus risk management policy options for 2013-2052

BACKGROUND

The Global Polio Eradication Initiative plans for coordinated cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) after interrupting all wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission, but many questions remain related to long-term poliovirus risk management policies.

METHODS

We used an integrated dynamic poliovirus transmission and stochastic risk model to simulate possible futures and estimate the health and economic outcomes of maintaining the 2013 status quo of continued OPV use in most developing countries compared with OPV cessation policies with various assumptions about global inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) adoption.

RESULTS

Continued OPV use after global WPV eradication leads to continued high costs and/or high cases. Global OPV cessation comes with a high probability of at least one outbreak, which aggressive outbreak response can successfully control in most instances. A low but non-zero probability exists of uncontrolled outbreaks following a poliovirus reintroduction long after OPV cessation in a population in which IPV-alone cannot prevent poliovirus transmission. We estimate global incremental net benefits during 2013-2052 of approximately $16 billion (US$2013) for OPV cessation with at least one IPV routine immunization dose in all countries until 2024 compared to continued OPV use, although significant uncertainty remains associated with the frequency of exportations between populations and the implementation of long term risk management policies.

CONCLUSIONS

Global OPV cessation offers the possibility of large future health and economic benefits compared to continued OPV use. Long-term poliovirus risk management interventions matter (e.g., IPV use duration, outbreak response, containment, continued surveillance, stockpile size and contents, vaccine production site requirements, potential antiviral drugs, and potential safer vaccines) and require careful consideration. Risk management activities can help to ensure a low risk of uncontrolled outbreaks and preserve or further increase the positive net benefits of OPV cessation. Important uncertainties will require more research, including characterizing immunodeficient long-term poliovirus excretor risks, containment risks, and the kinetics of outbreaks and response in an unprecedented world without widespread live poliovirus exposure.

Has Wild Poliovirus Been Eliminated from Nigeria?

Wild poliovirus type 3 (WPV3) has not been seen anywhere since the last case of WPV3-associated paralysis in Nigeria in November 2012. At the time of writing, the most recent case of wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) in Nigeria occurred in July 2014, and WPV1 has not been seen in Africa since a case in Somalia in August 2014. No cases associated with circulating vaccine-derived type 2 poliovirus (cVDPV2) have been detected in Nigeria since November 2014. Has WPV1 been eliminated from Africa? Has WPV3 been eradicated globally? Has Nigeria interrupted cVDPV2 transmission? These questions are difficult because polio surveillance is based on paralysis and paralysis only occurs in a small fraction of infections. This report provides estimates for the probabilities of poliovirus elimination in Nigeria given available data as of March 31, 2015. It is based on a model of disease transmission that is built from historical polio incidence rates and is designed to represent the uncertainties in transmission dynamics and poliovirus detection that are fundamental to interpreting long time periods without cases. The model estimates that, as of March 31, 2015, the probability of WPV1 elimination in Nigeria is 84%, and that if WPV1 has not been eliminated, a new case will be detected with 99% probability by the end of 2015. The probability of WPV3 elimination (and thus global eradication) is > 99%. However, it is unlikely that the ongoing transmission of cVDPV2 has been interrupted; the probability of cVDPV2 elimination rises to 83% if no new cases are detected by April 2016.

Combinations of Quality and Frequency of Immunization Activities to Stop and Prevent Poliovirus Transmission in the High-Risk Area of Northwest Nigeria

Background

Frequent supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) with the oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) represent the primary strategy to interrupt poliovirus transmission in the last endemic areas.

Materials and Methods

Using a differential-equation based poliovirus transmission model tailored to high-risk areas in Nigeria, we perform one-way and multi-way sensitivity analyses to demonstrate the impact of different assumptions about routine immunization (RI) and the frequency and quality of SIAs on population immunity to transmission and persistence or emergence of circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) after OPV cessation.

Results

More trivalent OPV use remains critical to avoid serotype 2 cVDPVs. RI schedules with or without inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) could significantly improve population immunity if coverage increases well above current levels in under-vaccinated subpopulations. Similarly, the impact of SIAs on overall population immunity and cVDPV risks depends on their ability to reach under-vaccinated groups (i.e., SIA quality). Lower SIA coverage in the under-vaccinated subpopulation results in a higher frequency of SIAs needed to maintain high enough population immunity to avoid cVDPVs after OPV cessation.

Conclusions

National immunization program managers in northwest Nigeria should recognize the benefits of increasing RI and SIA quality. Sufficiently improving RI coverage and improving SIA quality will reduce the frequency of SIAs required to stop and prevent future poliovirus transmission. Better information about the incremental costs to identify and reach under-vaccinated children would help determine the optimal balance between spending to increase SIA and RI quality and spending to increase SIA frequency.

Modeling options to manage type 1 wild poliovirus imported into Israel in 2013

BACKGROUND

After 25 years without poliomyelitis cases caused by circulating wild poliovirus (WPV) in Israel, sewage sampling detected WPV type 1 (WPV1) in April 2013, despite high vaccination coverage with only inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) since 2005.

METHODS

We used a differential equation-based model to simulate the dynamics of poliovirus transmission and population immunity in Israel due to past exposure to WPV and use of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) in addition to IPV. We explored the influences of various immunization options to stop imported WPV1 circulation in Israel.

RESULTS

We successfully modeled the potential for WPVs to circulate without detected cases in Israel. Maintaining a sequential IPV/OPV schedule instead of switching to an IPV-only schedule in 2005 would have kept population immunity high enough in Israel to prevent WPV1 circulation. The Israeli response to WPV1 detection prevented paralytic cases; a more rapid response might have interrupted transmission more quickly.

CONCLUSIONS

IPV-based protection alone might not provide sufficient population immunity to prevent poliovirus transmission after an importation. As countries transition to IPV in immunization schedules, they may need to actively manage population immunity and consider continued use of OPV, to avoid the potential circulation of imported live polioviruses before globally coordinated cessation of OPV use.

Managing population immunity to reduce or eliminate the risks of circulation following the importation of polioviruses

Poliovirus importations into polio-free countries represent a major concern during the final phases of global eradication of wild polioviruses (WPVs). We extend dynamic transmission models to demonstrate the dynamics of population immunity out through 2020 for three countries that only used inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) for routine immunization: the US, Israel, and The Netherlands. For each country, we explore the vulnerability to re-established transmission following an importation for each poliovirus serotype, including the impact of immunization choices following the serotype 1 WPV importation that occurred in 2013 in Israel. As population immunity declines below the threshold required to prevent transmission, countries become at risk for re-established transmission. Although importations represent stochastic events that countries cannot fully control because people cross borders and polioviruses mainly cause asymptomatic infections, countries can ensure that any importations die out. Our results suggest that the general US population will remain above the threshold for transmission through 2020. In contrast, Israel became vulnerable to re-established transmission of importations of live polioviruses by the late 2000s. In Israel, the recent WPV importation and outbreak response use of bivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (bOPV) eliminated the vulnerability to an importation of poliovirus serotypes 1 and 3 for several years, but not serotype 2. The Netherlands experienced a serotype 1 WPV outbreak in 1992-1993 and became vulnerable to re-established transmission in religious communities with low vaccine acceptance around the year 2000, although the general population remains well-protected from widespread transmission. All countries should invest in active management of population immunity to avoid the potential circulation of imported live polioviruses. IPV-using countries may wish to consider prevention opportunities and/or ensure preparedness for response. Countries currently using a sequential IPV/OPV schedule should continue to use all licensed OPV serotypes until global OPV cessation to minimize vulnerability to circulation of imported polioviruses.

Modeling undetected live poliovirus circulation after apparent interruption of transmission: implications for surveillance and vaccination

BACKGROUND

Most poliovirus infections occur with no symptoms and this leads to the possibility of silent circulation, which complicates the confirmation of global goals to permanently end poliovirus transmission. Previous simple models based on hypothetical populations assumed perfect detection of symptomatic cases and suggested the need to observe no paralytic cases from wild polioviruses (WPVs) for approximately 3-4 years to achieve 95% confidence about eradication, but the complexities in real populations and the imperfect nature of surveillance require consideration.

METHODS

We revisit the probability of undetected poliovirus circulation using a more comprehensive model that reflects the conditions in a number of places with different characteristics related to WPV transmission, and we model the actual environmental WPV detection that occurred in Israel in 2013. We consider the analogous potential for undetected transmission of circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses. The model explicitly accounts for the impact of different vaccination activities before and after the last detected case of paralytic polio, different levels of surveillance, variability in transmissibility and neurovirulence among serotypes, and the possibility of asymptomatic participation in transmission by previously-vaccinated or infected individuals.

RESULTS

We find that prolonged circulation in the absence of cases and thus undetectable by case-based surveillance may occur if vaccination keeps population immunity close to but not over the threshold required for the interruption of transmission, as may occur in northwestern Nigeria for serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus in the event of insufficient tOPV use. Participation of IPV-vaccinated individuals in asymptomatic fecal-oral transmission may also contribute to extended transmission undetectable by case-based surveillance, as occurred in Israel. We also find that gaps or quality issues in surveillance could significantly reduce confidence about actual disruption. Maintaining high population immunity and high-quality surveillance for several years after the last detected polio cases will remain critical elements of the polio end game.

CONCLUSIONS

Countries will need to maintain vigilance in their surveillance for polioviruses and recognize that their risks of undetected circulation may differ as a function of their efforts to manage population immunity and to identify cases or circulating live polioviruses.

[Polio, the long walk to the endgame]

Although the WHO original target date for the global eradication of poliomyelitis was the year 2000 -thanks to vaccination and institutional, public and private, resources for that purpose-, in 2013 the disease remained endemic in three countries, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nigeria, and some cases were described in five others. The circulation of wild type 1 poliovirus in Israel, Gaza and the West Bank and the cases in Syria were a wakeup call, as at that time there were polioviruses derived from the oral vaccine that are still circulating among the human population and can cause the development of the disease. Travelling "from" and "to" endemic areas are factors to consider in poliovirus exportation and in its spread when it reaches areas with poor immunogenicity. Wars, terrorism, intolerance, lack of culture and proliferation of anti-vaccine groups and the rise of the anti-vaccination movement are important factors in the maintenance and expansion of the virus and in the "non-vaccination" against it. Based on the international situation to date, the Emergency Committee of WHO met in May 2014 to address the problem. It is still necessary to enhance the knowledge of the disease and its agent. In the first case to perform a differential diagnosis of flaccid paralysis and to continue vaccination programs, and in the second case to keep studying and looking for the poliovirus in environmental samples, which is a model for the study of many other viruses.