Neuroethical considerations: cognitive liberty and converging technologies for improving human cognition

Brain Data in Context: Are New Rights the Way to Mental and Brain Privacy?

The potential to collect brain data more directly, with higher resolution, and in greater amounts has heightened worries about mental and brain privacy. In order to manage the risks to individuals posed by these privacy challenges, some have suggested codifying new privacy rights, including a right to "mental privacy." In this paper, we consider these arguments and conclude that while neurotechnologies do raise significant privacy concerns, such concerns are-at least for now-no different from those raised by other well-understood data collection technologies, such as gene sequencing tools and online surveillance. To better understand the privacy stakes of brain data, we suggest the use of a conceptual framework from information ethics, Helen Nissenbaum's "contextual integrity" theory. To illustrate the importance of context, we examine neurotechnologies and the information flows they produce in three familiar contexts-healthcare and medical research, criminal justice, and consumer marketing. We argue that by emphasizing what is distinct about brain privacy issues, rather than what they share with other data privacy concerns, risks weakening broader efforts to enact more robust privacy law and policy.

The Mystery of Mental Integrity: Clarifying Its Relevance to Neurotechnologies

The concept of mental integrity is currently a significant topic in discussions concerning the regulation of neurotechnologies. Technologies such as deep brain stimulation and brain-computer interfaces are believed to pose a unique threat to mental integrity, and some authors have advocated for a legal right to protect it. Despite this, there remains uncertainty about what mental integrity entails and why it is important. Various interpretations of the concept have been proposed, but the literature on the subject is inconclusive. Here we consider a number of possible interpretations and argue that the most plausible one concerns neurotechnologies that bypass one's reasoning capacities, and do so specifically in ways that reliably lead to alienation from one's mental states. This narrows the scope of what constitutes a threat to mental integrity and offers a more precise role for the concept to play in the ethical evaluation of neurotechnologies.

Persuasive Technology and computational manipulation: hypernudging out of mental self-determination

Artificial Intelligence, unperceived, can acquire the user's data, find connections not visible by a human being, profile the users, and aim at persuading them, resulting in Persuasive Technology (PT). During the persuasive process, PT can use manipulation, finding and using routes to affect System 1, the primordial brain of individuals, in the absence of their awareness, undermining their decision-making processes. Multiple international and European bodies recognized that AI systems could use manipulation at an unprecedented degree via second-generation dark patterns such as the hypernudge and that computational manipulation constitutes a risk for autonomy and different, overlapping, fundamental rights such as privacy, informational self-determination and freedom of thought. However, there is a lack of shared ideas regarding which fundamental rights are violated by computational manipulation and which fundamental rights can protect individuals against it. The right to be let alone and the right to hold and express a thought differ from the right to create a thought, being in control of the decision-making process and free from cognitive interferences operated by computational manipulation. Therefore, this paper argues in favor of recognizing a newly emerged fundamental right, the right to mental self-determination, tailored to the unprecedented abilities of AI-driven manipulative technologies.

Minding Rights: Mapping Ethical and Legal Foundations of 'Neurorights'

The rise of neurotechnologies, especially in combination with artificial intelligence (AI)-based methods for brain data analytics, has given rise to concerns around the protection of mental privacy, mental integrity and cognitive liberty - often framed as "neurorights" in ethical, legal, and policy discussions. Several states are now looking at including neurorights into their constitutional legal frameworks, and international institutions and organizations, such as UNESCO and the Council of Europe, are taking an active interest in developing international policy and governance guidelines on this issue. However, in many discussions of neurorights the philosophical assumptions, ethical frames of reference and legal interpretation are either not made explicit or conflict with each other. The aim of this multidisciplinary work is to provide conceptual, ethical, and legal foundations that allow for facilitating a common minimalist conceptual understanding of mental privacy, mental integrity, and cognitive liberty to facilitate scholarly, legal, and policy discussions.

Neurorights – Do we Need New Human Rights? A Reconsideration of the Right to Freedom of Thought

Progress in neurotechnology and Artificial Intelligence (AI) provides unprecedented insights into the human brain. There are increasing possibilities to influence and measure brain activity. These developments raise multifaceted ethical and legal questions. The proponents of neurorights argue in favour of introducing new human rights to protect mental processes and brain data. This article discusses the necessity and advantages of introducing new human rights focusing on the proposed new human right to mental self-determination and the right to freedom of thought as enshrined in Art.18 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Art. 9 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). I argue that the right to freedom of thought can be coherently interpreted as providing comprehensive protection of mental processes and brain data, thus offering a normative basis regarding the use of neurotechnologies. Besides, I claim that an evolving interpretation of the right to freedom of thought is more convincing than introducing a new human right to mental self-determination.

Neurorights as Hohfeldian Privileges

This paper argues that calls for neurorights propose an overcomplicated approach. It does this through analysis of ‘rights’ using the influential framework provided by Wesley Hohfeld, whose analytic jurisprudence is still well regarded in its clarificatory approach to discussions of rights. Having disentangled some unclarities in talk about rights, the paper proposes the idea of ‘novel human rights’ is not appropriate for what is deemed worth protecting in terms of mental integrity and cognitive liberty. That is best thought of in terms of Hohfeld’s account of ‘right’ as privilege. It goes on to argue that as privileges, legal protections are not well suited to these cases. As such, they cannot be ‘novel human rights’. Instead, protections for mental integrity and cognitive liberty are best accounted for in terms of familiar and established rational and discursive norms. Mental integrity is best thought of as evaluable in terms of familiar rational norms, and cognitive freedom is constrained by appraisals of sense-making. Concerns about how neurotechnologies might pose particular challenges to mental integrity and cognitive liberty are best protected through careful use of existing legislation on data protection, not novel rights, as it is via data that risks to integrity and liberty are manifested.

Achieving cognitive liberty Nita A. Farahany St. Martin's Press, 2023. 288 pp

Neurotechnologies necessitate new thinking on human rights.

Cognitive liberty and the psychedelic humanities

This research aims to conceptualize cognitive liberty and the psychedelic humanities by examining their constitutive elements. The importance of this study lies in the fact that it is widespread to talk about psychedelic science nowadays, but there is a significant gap in the research. For instance, the role and importance of the humanities need to be acknowledged. Regarding cognitive liberty, this research considers that people have the right to use or refrain from using emerging neurotechnologies and psychedelics. People's freedom of choice vis-à-vis these technologies must be protected, in particular with regard to coercive and non-consensual uses. Firstly, an analysis will be carried out of the constitutive elements of cognitive liberty, especially within the context of a philosophical approach. Secondly, this research will address some arguments for the philosophical uses of psychedelics. Finally, this paper will discuss the scope and significance of psychedelic humanities as a vein of research. Cognitive liberty is a crucial concept for the psychedelic humanities, likely to broaden our understanding of consciousness studies and reflect on ethical and social issues related to scientific research. Cognitive liberty is an update of freedom of thought according to the challenges of the 21st century. In addition, this paper will highlight the possible philosophical uses of psychedelic substances to broaden the research scope since, at present, the ritual and therapeutic uses of psychedelics have the most significant legitimacy. Recognition of philosophical uses demonstrates that learning from non-clinical uses of psychedelics is possible. The psychedelic humanities represent an underexplored avenue of research that can contribute to a better understanding of the interplay between science and culture.

Novel Neurorights: From Nonsense to Substance

This paper analyses recent calls for so called “neurorights”, suggested novel human rights whose adoption is allegedly required because of advances in neuroscience, exemplified by a proposal of the Neurorights Initiative. Advances in neuroscience and technology are indeed impressive and pose a range of challenges for the law, and some novel applications give grounds for human rights concerns. But whether addressing these concerns requires adopting novel human rights, and whether the proposed neurorights are suitable candidates, are a different matter. This paper argues that the proposed rights, as individuals and a class, should not be adopted and lobbying on their behalf should stop. The proposal tends to promote rights inflationism, is tainted by neuroexceptionalism and neuroessentialism, and lacks grounding in relevant scholarship. None of the proposed individual rights passes quality criteria debated in the field. While understandable from a moral perspective, the proposal is fundamentally flawed from a legal perspective. Rather than conjuring up novel human rights, existing rights should be further developed in face of changing societal circumstances and technological possibilities.

On Neurorights

In recent years, philosophical-legal studies on neuroscience (mainly in the fields of neuroethics and neurolaw) have given increasing prominence to a normative analysis of the ethical-legal challenges in the mind and brain sciences in terms of rights, freedoms, entitlements and associated obligations. This way of analyzing the ethical and legal implications of neuroscience has come to be known as “neurorights.” Neurorights can be defined as the ethical, legal, social, or natural principles of freedom or entitlement related to a person’s cerebral and mental domain; that is, the fundamental normative rules for the protection and preservation of the human brain and mind. Although reflections on neurorights have received ample coverage in the mainstream media and have rapidly become a mainstream topic in the public neuroethics discourse, the frequency of such reflections in the academic literature is still relatively scarce. While the prominence of the neurorights debate in public opinion is crucial to ensure public engagement and democratic participation in deliberative processes on this issue, its relatively sporadic presence in the academic literature poses a risk of semantic-normative ambiguity and conceptual confusion. This risk is exacerbated by the presence of multiple and not always reconcilable terminologies. Several meta-ethical, normative ethical, and legal-philosophical questions need to be solved in order to ensure that neurorights can be used as effective instruments of global neurotechnology governance and be adequately imported into international human rights law. To overcome the shortcomings above, this paper attempts to provide a comprehensive normative-ethical, historical and conceptual analysis of neurorights. In particular, it attempts to (i) reconstruct a history of neurorights and locate these rights in the broader history of idea, (ii) outline a systematic conceptual taxonomy of neurorights, (iii) summarize ongoing policy initiatives related to neurorights, (iv) proactively address some unresolved ethico-legal challenges, and (v) identify priority areas for further academic reflection and policy work in this domain.

Is Virtually Everything Possible? The Relevance of Ethics and Human Rights for Introducing Extended Reality in Forensic Psychiatry

Extended Reality (XR) systems, such as Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR), provide a digital simulation either of a complete environment, or of particular objects within the real world. Today, XR is used in a wide variety of settings, including gaming, design, engineering, and the military. In addition, XR has been introduced into psychology, cognitive sciences and biomedicine for both basic research as well as diagnosing or treating neurological and psychiatric disorders. In the context of XR, the simulated 'reality' can be controlled and people may safely learn to cope with their feelings and behavior. XR also enables to simulate environments that cannot easily be accessed or created otherwise. Therefore, Extended Reality systems are thought to be a promising tool in the resocialization of criminal offenders, more specifically for purposes of risk assessment and treatment of forensic patients. Employing XR in forensic settings raises ethical and legal intricacies which are not raised in case of most other healthcare applications. Whereas a variety of normative issues of XR have been discussed in the context of medicine and consumer usage, the debate on XR in forensic settings is, as yet, straggling. By discussing two general arguments in favor of employing XR in criminal justice, and two arguments calling for caution in this regard, the present paper aims to broaden the current ethical and legal debate on XR applications to their use in the resocialization of criminal offenders, mainly focusing on forensic patients.

Brain Recording, Mind-Reading, and Neurotechnology: Ethical Issues from Consumer Devices to Brain-Based Speech Decoding

Brain reading technologies are rapidly being developed in a number of neuroscience fields. These technologies can record, process, and decode neural signals. This has been described as 'mind reading technology' in some instances, especially in popular media. Should the public at large, be concerned about this kind of technology? Can it really read minds? Concerns about mind-reading might include the thought that, in having one's mind open to view, the possibility for free deliberation, and for self-conception, are eroded where one isn't at liberty to privately mull things over. Themes including privacy, cognitive liberty, and self-conception and expression appear to be areas of vital ethical concern. Overall, this article explores whether brain reading technologies are really mind reading technologies. If they are, ethical ways to deal with them must be developed. If they are not, researchers and technology developers need to find ways to describe them more accurately, in order to dispel unwarranted concerns and address appropriately those that are warranted.

Deep Fakes and Memory Malleability: False Memories in the Service of Fake News

Deep fakes have rapidly emerged as one of the most ominous concerns within modern society. The ability to easily and cheaply generate convincing images, audio, and video via artificial intelligence will have repercussions within politics, privacy, law, security, and broadly across all of society. In light of the widespread apprehension, numerous technological efforts aim to develop tools to distinguish between reliable audio/video and the fakes. These tools and strategies will be particularly effective for consumers when their guard is naturally up, for example during election cycles. However, recent research suggests that not only can deep fakes create credible representations of reality, but they can also be employed to create false memories. Memory malleability research has been around for some time, but it relied on doctored photographs or text to generate fraudulent recollections. These recollected but fake memories take advantage of our cognitive miserliness that favors selecting those recalled memories that evoke our preferred weltanschauung. Even responsible consumers can be duped when false but belief-consistent memories, implanted when we are least vigilant can, like a Trojan horse, be later elicited at crucial dates to confirm our pre-determined biases and influence us to accomplish nefarious goals. This paper seeks to understand the process of how such memories are created, and, based on that, proposing ethical and legal guidelines for the legitimate use of fake technologies.

Two Problematic Foundations of Neuroethics and Pragmatist Reconstructions

Common understandings of neuroethics, that is, of its distinctive nature, are premised on two distinct sets of claims: (1) neuroscience can change views about the nature of ethics itself and neuroethics is dedicated to reaping such an understanding of ethics, and (2) neuroscience poses challenges distinct from other areas of medicine and science and neuroethics tackles those issues. Critiques have rightfully challenged both claims, stressing how the first may lead to problematic forms of reductionism whereas the second relies on debatable assumptions about the nature of bioethics specialization and development. Informed by philosophical pragmatism and our experience in neuroethics, we argue that these claims are ill founded and should give way to pragmatist reconstructions; namely, that neuroscience, much like other areas of empirical research on morality, can provide useful information about the nature of morally problematic situations, but does not need to promise radical and sweeping changes to ethics based on neuroscientism. Furthermore, the rationale for the development of neuroethics as a specialized field need not to be premised on the distinctive nature of the issues it tackles or of neurotechnologies. Rather, it can espouse an understanding of neuroethics as both a scholarly and a practical endeavor dedicated to resolving a series of problematic situations raised by neurological and psychiatric conditions.

Cognitive enhancement for the ageing world: opportunities and challenges

Population ageing and the global burden of dementia pose a major challenge for human societies and a priority for public health. Cognitive enhancement,i.e.the targeted amplification of core cognitive abilities, is raising increasing attention among researchers as an effective strategy to complement traditional therapeutic and assistive approaches, and reduce the impact of age-related cognitive disability. In this paper, we discuss the possible applicability of cognitive enhancement for public health purposes to mitigate the burden of population ageing and dementia. After discussing the promises and challenges associated with enhancing ageing citizens and people with cognitive disabilities, we argue that global societies have a moral obligation to consider the careful use of cognitive enhancement technologies as a possible strategy to improve individual and public health. In addition, we address a few primary normative issues and possible objections that could arise from the implementation of public health-oriented cognitive enhancement technologies.

Big Brain Data: On the Responsible Use of Brain Data from Clinical and Consumer-Directed Neurotechnological Devices

The focus of this paper are the ethical, legal and social challenges for ensuring the responsible use of “big brain data”—the recording, collection and analysis of individuals’ brain data on a large scale with clinical and consumer-directed neurotechnological devices. First, I highlight the benefits of big data and machine learning analytics in neuroscience for basic and translational research. Then, I describe some of the technological, social and psychological barriers for securing brain data from unwarranted access. In this context, I then examine ways in which safeguards at the hardware and software level, as well as increasing “data literacy” in society, may enhance the security of neurotechnological devices and protect the privacy of personal brain data. Regarding ethical and legal ramifications of big brain data, I first discuss effects on the autonomy, the sense of agency and authenticity, as well as the self that may result from the interaction between users and intelligent, particularly closed-loop, neurotechnological devices. I then discuss the impact of the “datafication” in basic and clinical neuroscience research on the just distribution of resources and access to these transformative technologies. In the legal realm, I examine possible legal consequences that arises from the increasing abilities to decode brain states and their corresponding subjective phenomenological experiences on the hitherto inaccessible privacy of these information. Finally, I discuss the implications of big brain data for national and international regulatory policies and models of good data governance.

Freedom of Thought and Mental Integrity: The Moral Requirements for Any Neural Prosthesis

There are many kinds of neural prostheses available or being researched today. In most cases they are intended to cure or improve the condition of patients affected by some cerebral deficiency. In other cases, their goal is to provide new means to maintain or improve an individual's normal performance. In all these circumstances, one of the possible risks is that of violating the privacy of brain contents (which partly coincide with mental contents) or of depriving individuals of full control over their thoughts (mental states), as the latter are at least partly detectable by new prosthetic technologies. Given the (ethical) premise that the absolute privacy and integrity of the most relevant part of one's brain data is (one of) the most valuable and inviolable human right(s), I argue that a (technical) principle should guide the design and regulation of new neural prostheses. The premise is justified by the fact that whatever the coercion, the threat or the violence undergone, the person can generally preserve a "private repository" of thought in which to defend her convictions and identity, her dignity, and autonomy. Without it, the person may end up in a state of complete subjection to other individuals. The following functional principle is that neural prostheses should be technically designed and built so as to prevent such outcomes. They should: (a) incorporate systems that can find and signal the unauthorized detection, alteration, and diffusion of brain data and brain functioning; (b) be able to stop any unauthorized detection, alteration, and diffusion of brain data. This should not only regard individual devices, but act as a general (technical) operating principle shared by all interconnected systems that deal with decoding brain activity and brain functioning.

Towards new human rights in the age of neuroscience and neurotechnology

Rapid advancements in human neuroscience and neurotechnology open unprecedented possibilities for accessing, collecting, sharing and manipulating information from the human brain. Such applications raise important challenges to human rights principles that need to be addressed to prevent unintended consequences. This paper assesses the implications of emerging neurotechnology applications in the context of the human rights framework and suggests that existing human rights may not be sufficient to respond to these emerging issues. After analysing the relationship between neuroscience and human rights, we identify four new rights that may become of great relevance in the coming decades: the right to cognitive liberty, the right to mental privacy, the right to mental integrity, and the right to psychological continuity.

Noninvasive Brain Stimulation and Personal Identity: Ethical Considerations

As noninvasive brain stimulation (NIBS) technology advances, these methods may become increasingly capable of influencing complex networks of mental functioning. We suggest that these might include cognitive and affective processes underlying personality and belief systems, which would raise important questions concerning personal identity and autonomy. We give particular attention to the relationship between personal identity and belief, emphasizing the importance of respecting users' personal values. We posit that research participants and patients should be encouraged to take an active approach to considering the personal implications of altering their own cognition, particularly in cases of neurocognitive “enhancement.” We suggest that efforts to encourage careful consideration through the informed consent process would contribute usefully to studies and treatments that use NIBS.

Law, Cyborgs, and Technologically Enhanced Brains

As we become more and more enhanced with cyborg technology, significant issues of law and policy are raised. For example, as cyborg devices implanted within the body create a class of people with enhanced motor and computational abilities, how should the law and policy respond when the abilities of such people surpass those of the general population? And what basic human and legal rights should be afforded to people equipped with cyborg technology as they become more machine and less biology? As other issues of importance, if a neuroprosthetic device is accessed by a third party and done to edit one’s memory or to plant a new memory in one’s mind, or even to place an ad for a commercial product in one’s consciousness, should there be a law of cognitive liberty or of “neuro-advertising” that applies? This paper discusses laws and statutes enacted across several jurisdictions which apply to cyborg technologies with a particular emphasis on legal doctrine which relates to neuroprosthetic devices.

The is and ought of the Ethics of Neuroenhancement: Mind the Gap

Ethical perspectives on the use of stimulants to enhance human cognitive performance (neuroenhancement) are polarized between conservative and liberal theories offering opposing advice on whether individuals have a right to use neuroenhancers and what the social outcomes of neuroenhancement might be. Meanwhile, empirical evidence shows modest prevalence and guarded public attitudes toward the neuroenhancement use of stimulants. In this Perspective, we argue that the dissonance between the prescriptions of ethical theories (what ought to be) and empirical evidence (what is) has impaired our understanding of neuroenhancement practices. This dissonance is a result of three common errors in research on the ethics of neuroenhancement: (1) expecting that public perspectives will conform to a prescriptive ethical framework; (2) ignoring the socio-economic infrastructures that influence individuals' decisions on whether or not to use neuroenhancement; and (3) overlooking conflicts between fundamental ethical values namely, safety of neuroenhancement and autonomy. We argue that in order to understand neuroenhancement practices it is essential to recognize which values affect individual decisions to use or refuse to use neuroenhancement. Future research on the ethics of neuroenhancement should assess the morally significant values for stakeholders. This will fill the gap between what ought to be done and what is done with an improved understanding of what can be done within a particular context. Clarifying conflicts between competing moral values is critical in conducting research on the efficacy of substances putatively used for neuroenhancement and also on neuroenhancement practices within academic, professional and social environments.

Reflections on Addiction in Students Using Stimulants for Neuroenhancement: A Preliminary Interview Study

The use of stimulants for the purpose of pharmacological neuroenhancement (NE) among students is a subject of increasing public awareness. The risk of addiction development by stimulant use for NE is still unanswered. Therefore, face-to-face interviews were carried out among 18 university students experienced in the nonmedical use of methylphenidate and amphetamines for NE assessing aspects of addiction. Interviews were tape-recorded, verbatim-transcribed, and analyzed using a qualitative approach. The interviews showed that participants--the majority had current or lifetime diagnoses of misuse or addiction to alcohol or cannabis-reported an awareness of the risk of addiction development associated with stimulant use and reported various effects which may increase their likelihood of future stimulant use, for example, euphoric effects, increase of self-confidence, and motivation. They also cited measures to counteract the development of addiction as well as measures taken to normalize again after stimulant use. Students were convinced of having control over their stimulant use and of not becoming addicted to stimulants used for NE. We can conclude that behavior and beliefs of the students in our sample appear to be risky in terms of addiction development. However, long-term empirical research is needed to estimate the true risk of addiction.

Factors influencing public risk-benefit considerations of nanotechnology: Assessing the effects of mass media, interpersonal communication, and elaborative processing

This study examines the influence of mass media, interpersonal communication, and elaborative processing on public perception of benefits and risks of nanotechnology, based on a large-scale nationally representative telephone survey of U.S. adult citizens. Results indicate that cognitive processes in the form of news elaboration had a significant positive main effect on benefits outweigh risks perception. The influences of attention to science in newspapers, attention to science news on television, and interpersonal communication about science on public perception of benefits outweigh risks were moderated by elaborative processing, after controlling for socio-demographic variables, religious beliefs, trust in scientists, and scientific knowledge. The findings highlight the importance of elaborative processing when it comes to understanding how the mass media differentially influence public benefits outweigh risks perception of emerging technologies. Specifically, high elaborative processing emphasizes higher levels of perceived benefits outweigh risks than low elaborative processing. This study explores explanations for this phenomenon and offers implications for future research and policy.

What users think about the differences between caffeine and illicit/prescription stimulants for cognitive enhancement

Pharmacological cognitive enhancement (CE) is a topic of increasing public awareness. In the scientific literature on student use of CE as a study aid for academic performance enhancement, there are high prevalence rates regarding the use of caffeinated substances (coffee, caffeinated drinks, caffeine tablets) but remarkably lower prevalence rates regarding the use of illicit/prescription stimulants such as amphetamines or methylphenidate. While the literature considers the reasons and mechanisms for these different prevalence rates from a theoretical standpoint, it lacks empirical data to account for healthy students who use both, caffeine and illicit/prescription stimulants, exclusively for the purpose of CE. Therefore, we extensively interviewed a sample of 18 healthy university students reporting non-medical use of caffeine as well as illicit/prescription stimulants for the purpose of CE in a face-to-face setting about their opinions regarding differences in general and morally-relevant differences between caffeine and stimulant use for CE. 44% of all participants answered that there is a general difference between the use of caffeine and illicit/prescription stimulants for CE, 28% did not differentiate, 28% could not decide. Furthermore, 39% stated that there is a moral difference, 56% answered that there is no moral difference and one participant was not able to comment on moral aspects. Participants came to their judgements by applying three dimensions: medical, ethical and legal. Weighing the medical, ethical and legal aspects corresponded to the students' individual preferences of substances used for CE. However, their views only partly depicted evidence-based medical aspects and the ethical issues involved. This result shows the need for well-directed and differentiated information to prevent the potentially harmful use of illicit or prescription stimulants for CE.

Metilfenidato e aprimoramento cognitivo farmacológico: representações sociais de universitários

O artigo tem por objetivo apresentar o resultado da investigação das representações sociais de 20 estudantes universitários sobre o uso de metilfenidato para aprimorar o desempenho cognitivo em pessoas saudáveis. Nesta pesquisa qualitativa, de cunho exploratório, 20 universitários entre 18 e 25 anos, oriundos de cursos das áreas de saúde e humanas, foram distribuídos em três grupos focais para debater sobre o Aprimoramento Cognitivo Farmacológico. A análise dos dados revelou que entre esses estudantes houve uma maior tolerância aos métodos que alteram a neurobiologia a favor do ideal social de melhoria da performance das pessoas. Contudo, os entrevistados expressaram grande preocupação com a possibilidade de este procedimento vir a intensificar injustiças e desigualdades entre as pessoas, principalmente nas sociedades em que já existem significativas diferenças sociais. Assim, apesar de o tema ser pouco estudado no Brasil, a análise dos dados da presente investigação sugere que o Aprimoramento Cognitivo Farmacológico é um assunto atual e relevante. Não apenas por esta prática estar relacionada à construção e manutenção da subjetividade dos indivíduos em uma sociedade que prioriza a melhoria da performance cognitiva, mas também pelo risco de esta interferir em questões de igualdade e justiça social.

Neurosurgeons' perspectives on psychosurgery and neuroenhancement: a qualitative study at one center

Object

Advances in the neurosciences are stirring debate regarding the ethical issues surrounding novel neurosurgical interventions. The application of deep brain stimulation (DBS) for treating refractory psychiatric disease, for instance, has introduced the prospect of altering disorders of mind and behavior and the potential for neuroenhancement. The attitudes of current and future providers of this technology and their position regarding its possible future applications are unknown. The authors sought to gauge the opinions of neurosurgical staff and trainees toward various uses of neuromodulation technology including psychosurgery and neuroenhancement.

Methods

The authors conducted a qualitative study involving in-depth interviews with 47 neurosurgery staff, trainees, and other neuroclinicians at a quaternary care center.

Results

Several general themes emerged from the interviews. These included universal support for psychosurgery given adequate informed consent and rigorous scientific methodology, as well as a relative consensus regarding the priority given to patient autonomy and the preservation of personal identity. Participants' attitudes toward the future use of DBS and other means of neuromodulation for cognitive enhancement and personality alteration revealed less agreement, although most participants felt that alteration of nonpathological traits is objectionable.

Conclusions

There is support in the neurosurgical community for the surgical management of refractory psychiatric disease. The use of neuromodulation for the alteration of nonpathological traits is morally and ethically dubious when it is out of sync with the values of society at large. Both DBS and neuromodulation will have far-reaching and profound public health implications.

Making sense of policy choices: understanding the roles of value predispositions, mass media, and cognitive processing in public attitudes toward nanotechnology

Using a nationally representative telephone survey of 1,015 adults in the United States, this study examines how value predispositions, communication variables, and perceptions of risks and benefits are associated with public support for federal funding of nanotechnology. Our findings show that highly religious individuals were less supportive of funding of nanotech than less religious individuals, whereas individuals who held a high deference for scientific authority were more supportive of funding of the emerging technology than those low in deference. Mass media use and elaborative processing of scientific news were positively associated with public support for funding, whereas factual scientific knowledge had no significant association with policy choices. The findings suggest that thinking about and reflecting upon scientific news promote better understanding of the scientific world and may provide a more sophisticated cognitive structure for the public to form opinions about nanotech than factual scientific knowledge. Finally, heuristic cues including trust in scientists and perceived risks and benefits of nanotech were found to be associated with public support for nanotech funding. We conclude with policy implications that will be useful for policymakers and science communication practitioners.

A ritalina no Brasil: produções, discursos e práticas

O objetivo do artigo é apresentar uma pesquisa em andamento sobre as representações sociais da ritalina no Brasil entre 1998 e 2008. Nesse período, houve um incremento considerável do uso da medicação e sua expansão para outros fins além dos terapêuticos. A ritalina tem sido usada tanto para o tratamento de patologias da atenção como para melhoria de funções cognitivas em pessoas saudáveis. A pesquisa se desdobra em dois campos de investigação, com metodologias diferenciadas. O primeiro campo investiga as publicações brasileiras, científicas e em mídia popular, sobre a ritalina, analisando os argumentos que justificam seu uso e a difusão dos resultados científicos para o público leigo nos jornais de grande circulação. O segundo campo de investigação usa a metodologia de grupos focais para explorar as representações sociais de universitários, pais de universitários e profissionais de saúde, acerca do uso da ritalina para o aprimoramento do desempenho cognitivo.

Neurophilosophical perspectives of neuroimaging in forensic psychiatry-giving way to a paradigm shift?

Forensic psychiatry is concerned with the relationship between psychiatric abnormalities and legal violations and crimes. Due to the lack of available biological criteria, evaluation and therapy in forensic psychiatry have so far been restricted to psychosocial and mental criteria of offenders' personalities. Recent advances in neurosciences allow a closer approach to the neural correlates of personality, moral judgments and decision-making. We propose to discuss the introduction of biological criteria in the field of forensic psychiatry and to establish rules as to what extent such biological criteria will be a better and more reliable choice in judging mentally ill criminals by using all available information that can be obtained by biological means. Psychosocial and subjective criteria in forensic evaluation will be more and more accomplished by biopsychosocial and objective criteria. The responsibility of having committed a criminal act will no longer be exclusively defined by judging free and voluntary decision-making, but rather by brain-behavior relationships. What is often referred to as psychosocially determined mental processes thus could be complemented by estimating the degree of biopsychosocially determined neural processes. We conclude that such a process could contribute to a paradigm shift in forensic psychiatry, which will have profound implications for offenders, forensic psychologists and psychiatrists, the law and society in general.

Punishment, freedom, and the culture of control: the case of brain imaging and the law

The centrality of freedom as a philosophical construct is often neglected in contemporary academic circles and popular media outlets when it comes to discussions of crime, criminals, and the criminal law. This is surprising, especially since freedom—its absence or its presence—is an important ethical dimension underpinning all transgressive acts, including delinquency and crime. More specifically, the notion of freedom problematizes wayward conduct because transgression can (and does) emerge from freedom's limits rather than its excesses. What this suggests, then, is that criminality is not necessarily an artifact of one's autonomy gone awry or of making “bad” choices; rather, criminality may be a moment of self-discovery, transformation, and transcendence in which a “critical freedom” is borne. This is a period marked by living life on the edge; of contesting thresholds and boundaries in which “a plethora of original ideas, thoughts, inventions, new forms of resistance, and so forth” emerge.

Ethical issues in neuroscience

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

The study gives an overview of ethical questions raised by the progress of neuroscience in identifying and intervening in neural correlates of the mind.

RECENT FINDINGS

Ethical problems resulting from brain research have induced the emergence of a new discipline termed neuroethics. Critical questions concern issues, such as prediction of disease, psychopharmacological enhancement of attention, memory or mood, and technologies such as psychosurgery, deep-brain stimulation or brain implants. Such techniques are capable of affecting the individual's sense of privacy, autonomy and identity. Moreover, reductionist interpretations of neuroscientific results challenge notions of free will, responsibility, personhood and the self which are essential for western culture and society. They may also gradually change psychiatric concepts of mental health and illness. These tendencies call for thorough, philosophically informed analyses of research findings and critical evaluation of their underlying conceptions of humans.

SUMMARY

Advances in neuroscience raise ethical, social and legal issues in relation to the human person and the brain. Potential benefits of applying neuroimaging, psychopharmacology and neurotechnology to mentally ill and healthy persons have to be carefully weighed against their potential harm. Questions concerning underlying concepts of humans should be actively dealt with by interdisciplinary and public debate.

Ethical considerations of neuroscience research: the perspectives on neuroethics in Japan

Recent technologies and developments in neuroscience have contributed to remarkable scientific discoveries, and have also raised many new philosophical, ethical, legal, and social issues. Research in "neuroethics" has identified various ethical issues, which will be difficult for current biomedical ethics to resolve from both an experimental and a social perspective, such as criminal applications of brain scans, incidental findings during non-clinical brain imaging, and cognitive enhancement. Although American and European neuroscience societies have demonstrated immediate, concrete reactions to these ethical issues, including academic conferences, study programs, and publications, Japanese neuroscientists have so far produced little response. Ethics is tightly linked with one's religion, nationality, culture, and social background, whereas science is tightly linked with the demand, economics, and politics of the society to which individuals belong. Taken together, it is important and necessary for Japanese neuroscientists to consider the ethical problems in Japanese neuroscience. In this paper, we first review the history of neuroethics in the world, and then report the less-developed ethical issues in the Japanese neuroscience community, focusing on neuroimaging and manipulative neuroscience as a first step in discussing how to apply principles in neuroethics to this rapidly progressing field of research.

Science and technology integration for increased human potential and societal outcomes

Unifying science based on the material unity of nature at the nanoscale provides a new foundation for knowledge, innovation, and integration of technology. Revolutionary and synergistic advances at the interfaces between previously separated fields of science, engineering and areas of relevance are ready to create nano-bio-info-cogno (NBIC) transforming tools. Developments in systems approach, mathematics, and computation in conjunction with NBIC allow us to understand the natural world and scientific research as closely coupled, complex, hierarchical entities. At this unique moment of scientific and technical achievement, improvement of human performance at individual and group levels, as well as development of suitable revolutionary products, becomes possible and these are primary goals for converging new technologies. NBIC addresses long-term advances in key areas of human activity, including working, learning, aging, group interaction, organizations, and human evolution ((Roco and Bainbridge, 2003)). Fundamentally new tools, technologies, and products will be integrated into individual and social human architecture. This introductory chapter of the Annals outlines research and education trends, funding activities, and the potential of development of revolutionary products and services.