Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from asymptomatic and presymptomatic individuals in healthcare settings despite medical masks and eye protection

In Support of Universal Admission Testing for SARS-CoV-2 During Significant Community Transmission

Many hospitals have stopped or are considering stopping universal admission testing for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). We discuss reasons why admission testing should still be part of a layered system to prevent hospital-acquired SARS-CoV-2 infections during times of significant community transmission. These include the morbidity of SARS-CoV-2 in vulnerable patients, the predominant contribution of presymptomatic and asymptomatic people to transmission, the high rate of transmission between patients in shared rooms, and data suggesting surveillance testing is associated with fewer nosocomial infections. Preferences of diverse patient populations, particularly the hardest-hit communities, should be surveyed and used to inform prevention measures. Hospitals' ethical responsibility to protect patients from serious infections should predominate over concerns about costs, labor, and inconvenience. We call for more rigorous data on the incidence and morbidity of nosocomial SARS-CoV-2 infections and more research to help determine when to start, stop, and restart universal admission testing and other prevention measures.

Cost-Effectiveness of Universal Asymptomatic Preoperative SARS-CoV-2 Polymerase Chain Reaction Screening: A Cost-Utility Analysis

BACKGROUND

An early report has shown the clinical benefit of the asymptomatic preoperative severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) screening test, and some clinical guidelines recommended this test. However, the cost-effectiveness of asymptomatic screening was not evaluated. We aimed to investigate the cost-effectiveness of universal preoperative screening of asymptomatic patients for SARS-CoV-2 using polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing.

METHODS

We evaluated the cost-effectiveness of asymptomatic screening using a decision tree model from a payer perspective, assuming that the test-positive rate was 0.07% and the screening cost was 8500 Japanese yen (JPY) (approximately 7601 US dollars [USD]). The input parameter was derived from the available evidence reported in the literature. A willingness-to-pay threshold was set at 5 000 000 JPY/quality-adjusted life-year (QALY).

RESULTS

The incremental cost of 1 death averted was 74 469 236 JPY (approximately 566 048 USD) and 291 123 368 JPY/QALY (approximately 2 212 856 USD/QALY), which was above the 5 000 000 JPY/QALY willingness-to-pay threshold. The incremental cost-effectiveness ratio fell below 5 000 000 JPY/QALY only when the test-positive rate exceeded 0.739%. However, when the probability of developing a postoperative pulmonary complication among SARS-CoV-2-positive patients was below 0.22, asymptomatic screening was never cost-effective, regardless of how high the test-positive rate became.

CONCLUSIONS

Asymptomatic preoperative universal SARS-CoV-2 PCR screening is not cost-effective in the base case analysis. The cost-effectiveness mainly depends on the test-positive rate, the frequency of postoperative pulmonary complications, and the screening costs; however, no matter how high the test-positive rate, the cost-effectiveness is poor if the probability of developing postoperative pulmonary complications among patients positive for SARS-CoV-2 is sufficiently reduced.

Impact of SARS-CoV-2 Prevention Measures on Non-SARS-CoV-2 Hospital-Onset Respiratory Viral Infections: An Incidence Trend Analysis From 2015-2023

We reviewed hospital-onset respiratory viral infections, 2015-2023, in one hospital to determine whether Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) transmission prevention measures prevented non-SARS-CoV-2 respiratory viral infections. Masking, employee symptom attestations, and screening patients and visitors for symptoms were associated with a 44%-53% reduction in hospital-onset influenza and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), accounting for changes in community incidence.

Whole-genome sequencing to investigate transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in the acute healthcare setting: a systematic review

BACKGROUND

Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) has been used widely to elucidate transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in acute healthcare settings, and to guide infection, prevention, and control (IPC) responses.

AIM

To systematically appraise available literature, published between January 1st, 2020 and June 30th, 2022, describing the implementation of WGS in acute healthcare settings to characterize nosocomial SARS-CoV-2 transmission.

METHODS

Searches of the PubMed, Embase, Ovid MEDLINE, EBSCO MEDLINE, and Cochrane Library databases identified studies in English reporting the use of WGS to investigate SARS-CoV-2 transmission in acute healthcare environments. Publications involved data collected up to December 31st, 2021, and findings were reported in accordance with the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses statement.

FINDINGS

In all, 3088 non-duplicate records were retrieved; 97 met inclusion criteria, involving 62 outbreak analyses and 35 genomic surveillance studies. No publications from low-income countries were identified. In 87/97 (90%), WGS supported hypotheses for nosocomial transmission, while in 46 out of 97 (47%) suspected transmission events were excluded. An IPC intervention was attributed to the use of WGS in 18 out of 97 (18%); however, only three (3%) studies reported turnaround times ≤7 days facilitating near real-time IPC action, and none reported an impact on the incidence of nosocomial COVID-19 attributable to WGS.

CONCLUSION

WGS can elucidate transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in acute healthcare settings to enhance epidemiological investigations. However, evidence was not identified to support sequencing as an intervention to reduce the incidence of SARS-CoV-2 in hospital or to alter the trajectory of active outbreaks.

[Respiratory infections: Additional transmission-based precautions in healthcare facilities]

INTRODUCTION

In health care, measures against cross-transmission of microorganisms are codified by standard precautions, and if necessary, they are supplemented by additional precautions.

STATE OF THE ART

Several factors impact transmission of microorganisms via the respiratory route: size and quantity of the emitted particles, environmental conditions, nature and pathogenicity of the microorganisms, and degree of host receptivity. While some microorganisms necessitate additional airborne or droplet precautions, others do not.

PROSPECTS

For most microorganisms, transmission patterns are well-understood and transmission-based precautions are well-established. For others, measures to prevent cross-transmission in healthcare facilities remain under discussion.

CONCLUSIONS

Standard precautions are essential to the prevention of microorganism transmission. Understanding of the modalities of microorganism transmission is essential to implementation of additional transmission-based precautions, particularly in view of opting for appropriate respiratory protection.

Investigation of a cluster of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infections in a hospital administration building

OBJECTIVE

To investigate a cluster of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infections in employees working on 1 floor of a hospital administration building.

METHODS

Contact tracing was performed to identify potential exposures and all employees were tested for SARS-CoV-2. Whole-genome sequencing was performed to determine the relatedness of SARS-CoV-2 samples from infected personnel and from control cases in the healthcare system with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) during the same period. Carbon dioxide levels were measured during a workday to assess adequacy of ventilation; readings >800 parts per million (ppm) were considered an indication of suboptimal ventilation. To assess the potential for airborne transmission, DNA-barcoded aerosols were released, and real-time polymerase chain reaction was used to quantify particles recovered from air samples in multiple locations.

RESULTS

Between December 22, 2020, and January 8, 2021, 17 coworkers tested positive for SARS-CoV-2, including 13 symptomatic and 4 asymptomatic individuals. Of the 5 cluster SARS-CoV-2 samples sequenced, 3 were genetically related, but these employees denied higher-risk contacts with one another. None of the sequences from the cluster were genetically related to the 17 control sequences of SARS-CoV-2. Carbon dioxide levels increased during a workday but never exceeded 800 ppm. DNA-barcoded aerosol particles were dispersed from the sites of release to locations throughout the floor; 20% of air samples had >1 log₁₀ particles.

CONCLUSIONS

In a hospital administration building outbreak, sequencing of SARS-CoV-2 confirmed transmission among coworkers. Transmission occurred despite the absence of higher-risk exposures and in a setting with adequate ventilation based on monitoring of carbon dioxide levels.

Asymptomatic screening for severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) as an infection prevention measure in healthcare facilities: Challenges and considerations

Testing of asymptomatic patients for severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) (ie, "asymptomatic screening) to attempt to reduce the risk of nosocomial transmission has been extensive and resource intensive, and such testing is of unclear benefit when added to other layers of infection prevention mitigation controls. In addition, the logistic challenges and costs related to screening program implementation, data noting the lack of substantial aerosol generation with elective controlled intubation, extubation, and other procedures, and the adverse patient and facility consequences of asymptomatic screening call into question the utility of this infection prevention intervention. Consequently, the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America (SHEA) recommends against routine universal use of asymptomatic screening for SARS-CoV-2 in healthcare facilities. Specifically, preprocedure asymptomatic screening is unlikely to provide incremental benefit in preventing SARS-CoV-2 transmission in the procedural and perioperative environment when other infection prevention strategies are in place, and it should not be considered a requirement for all patients. Admission screening may be beneficial during times of increased virus transmission in some settings where other layers of controls are limited (eg, behavioral health, congregate care, or shared patient rooms), but widespread routine use of admission asymptomatic screening is not recommended over strengthening other infection prevention controls. In this commentary, we outline the challenges surrounding the use of asymptomatic screening, including logistics and costs of implementing a screening program, and adverse patient and facility consequences. We review data pertaining to the lack of substantial aerosol generation during elective controlled intubation, extubation, and other procedures, and we provide guidance for when asymptomatic screening for SARS-CoV-2 may be considered in a limited scope.

Prospective Surveillance of Respiratory Infections in British Antarctic Survey Bases During the COVID-19 Pandemic

BACKGROUND

The British Antarctic bases offer a semiclosed environment for assessing the transmission and persistence of seasonal respiratory viruses.

METHODS

Weekly swabbing was performed for respiratory pathogen surveillance (including SARS-CoV-2), at 2 British Antarctic Survey bases, during 2020: King Edward Point (KEP, 30 June to 29 September, 9 participants, 124 swabs) and Rothera (9 May to 6 June, 27 participants, 127 swabs). Symptom questionnaires were collected for any newly symptomatic cases that presented during this weekly swabbing period.

RESULTS

At KEP, swabs tested positive for non-SARS-CoV-2 seasonal coronavirus (2), adenovirus (1), parainfluenza 3 (1), and respiratory syncytial virus B (1). At Rothera, swabs tested positive for non-SARS-CoV-2 seasonal coronavirus (3), adenovirus (2), parainfluenza 4 (1), and human metapneumovirus (1). All bacterial agents identified were considered to be colonizers and not pathogenic.

CONCLUSIONS

At KEP, the timeline indicated that the parainfluenza 3 and adenovirus infections could have been linked to some of the symptomatic cases that presented. For the other viruses, the only other possible sources were the visiting ship crew members. At Rothera, the single symptomatic case presented too early for this to be linked to the subsequent viral detections, and the only other possible source could have been a single nonparticipating staff member.

What were the historical reasons for the resistance to recognizing airborne transmission during the COVID-19 pandemic?

The question of whether SARS-CoV-2 is mainly transmitted by droplets or aerosols has been highly controversial. We sought to explain this controversy through a historical analysis of transmission research in other diseases. For most of human history, the dominant paradigm was that many diseases were carried by the air, often over long distances and in a phantasmagorical way. This miasmatic paradigm was challenged in the mid to late 19th century with the rise of germ theory, and as diseases such as cholera, puerperal fever, and malaria were found to actually transmit in other ways. Motivated by his views on the importance of contact/droplet infection, and the resistance he encountered from the remaining influence of miasma theory, prominent public health official Charles Chapin in 1910 helped initiate a successful paradigm shift, deeming airborne transmission most unlikely. This new paradigm became dominant. However, the lack of understanding of aerosols led to systematic errors in the interpretation of research evidence on transmission pathways. For the next five decades, airborne transmission was considered of negligible or minor importance for all major respiratory diseases, until a demonstration of airborne transmission of tuberculosis (which had been mistakenly thought to be transmitted by droplets) in 1962. The contact/droplet paradigm remained dominant, and only a few diseases were widely accepted as airborne before COVID-19: those that were clearly transmitted to people not in the same room. The acceleration of interdisciplinary research inspired by the COVID-19 pandemic has shown that airborne transmission is a major mode of transmission for this disease, and is likely to be significant for many respiratory infectious diseases.

Prevention of SARS-CoV-2 and respiratory viral infections in healthcare settings: current and emerging concepts

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

COVID-19 has catalyzed a wealth of new data on the science of respiratory pathogen transmission and revealed opportunities to enhance infection prevention practices in healthcare settings.

RECENT FINDINGS

New data refute the traditional division between droplet vs airborne transmission and clarify the central role of aerosols in spreading all respiratory viruses, including Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), even in the absence of so-called 'aerosol-generating procedures' (AGPs). Indeed, most AGPs generate fewer aerosols than talking, labored breathing, or coughing. Risk factors for transmission include high viral loads, symptoms, proximity, prolonged exposure, lack of masking, and poor ventilation. Testing all patients on admission and thereafter can identify early occult infections and prevent hospital-based clusters. Additional prevention strategies include universal masking, encouraging universal vaccination, preferential use of N95 respirators when community rates are high, improving native ventilation, utilizing portable high-efficiency particulate air filters when ventilation is limited, and minimizing room sharing when possible.

SUMMARY

Multifaceted infection prevention programs that include universal testing, masking, vaccination, and enhanced ventilation can minimize nosocomial SARS-CoV-2 infections in patients and workplace infections in healthcare personnel. Extending these insights to other respiratory viruses may further increase the safety of healthcare and ready hospitals for novel respiratory viruses that may emerge in the future.

Survey of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) infection control policies at leading US academic hospitals in the context of the initial pandemic surge of the severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) omicron variant

OBJECTIVE

To assess coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) infection policies at leading US medical centers in the context of the initial wave of the severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) omicron variant.

DESIGN

Electronic survey study eliciting hospital policies on masking, personal protective equipment, cohorting, airborne-infection isolation rooms (AIIRs), portable HEPA filters, and patient and employee testing.

SETTING AND PARTICIPANTS

"Hospital epidemiologists from U.S. News top 20 hospitals and 10 hospitals in the CDC Prevention Epicenters program."  As it is currently written, it implies all 30 hospitals are from the CDC Prevention Epicenters program, but that only applies to 10 hospitals.  Alternatively, we could just say "Hospital epidemiologists from 30 leading US hospitals."

METHODS

Survey results were reported using descriptive statistics.

RESULTS

Of 30 hospital epidemiologists surveyed, 23 (77%) completed the survey between February 15 and March 3, 2022. Among the responding hospitals, 18 (78%) used medical masks for universal masking and 5 (22%) used N95 respirators. 16 hospitals (70%) required universal eye protection. 22 hospitals (96%) used N95s for routine COVID-19 care and 1 (4%) reserved N95s for aerosol-generating procedures. 2 responding hospitals (9%) utilized dedicated COVID-19 wards; 8 (35%) used mixed COVID-19 and non-COVID-19 units; and 13 (57%) used both dedicated and mixed units. 4 hospitals (17%) used AIIRs for all COVID-19 patients, 10 (43%) prioritized AIIRs for aerosol-generating procedures, 3 (13%) used alternate risk-stratification criteria (not based on aerosol-generating procedures), and 6 (26%) did not routinely use AIIRs. 9 hospitals (39%) did not use portable HEPA filters, but 14 (61%) used them for various indications, most commonly as substitutes for AIIRs when unavailable or for specific high-risk areas or situations. 21 hospitals (91%) tested asymptomatic patients on admission, but postadmission testing strategies and preferred specimen sites varied substantially. 5 hospitals (22%) required regular testing of unvaccinated employees and 1 hospital (4%) reported mandatory weekly testing even for vaccinated employees during the SARS-CoV-2 omicron surge.

CONCLUSIONS

COVID-19 infection control practices in leading hospitals vary substantially. Clearer public health guidance and transparency around hospital policies may facilitate more consistent national standards.

SARS-CoV-2 Transmission and Prevention in the Era of the Delta Variant

The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) delta variant transmits much more rapidly than prior SARS-CoV-2 viruses. The primary mode of transmission is via short range aerosols that are emitted from the respiratory tract of an index case. There is marked heterogeneity in the spread of this virus, with 10% to 20% of index cases contributing to 80% of secondary cases, while most index cases have no subsequent transmissions. Vaccination, ventilation, masking, eye protection, and rapid case identification with contact tracing and isolation can all decrease the transmission of this virus.

Airflow Patterns in Double-Occupancy Patient Rooms May Contribute to Roommate-to-Roommate Transmission of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2

BACKGROUND

Hospitalized patients are at risk to acquire severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) from roommates with unrecognized coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). We hypothesized that airflow patterns might contribute to SARS-CoV-2 transmission in double-occupancy patient rooms.

METHODS

A device emitting condensed moisture was used to identify airflow patterns in double-occupancy patient rooms. Simulations were conducted to assess transfer of fluorescent microspheres, 5% sodium chloride aerosol, and aerosolized bacteriophage MS2 between patient beds 3 meters apart and to assess the effectiveness of privacy curtains and portable air cleaners in reducing transfer.

RESULTS

Air flowed from inlet vents in the center of the room to an outlet vent near the door, resulting in air currents flowing toward the bed adjacent to the outlet vent. Fluorescent microspheres (212-250-µm diameter), 5% sodium chloride aerosol, and aerosolized bacteriophage MS2 released from the inner bed were carried on air currents toward the bed adjacent to the outlet vent. Closing curtains between the patient beds reduced transfer of each of the particles. Operation of a portable air cleaner reduced aerosol transfer to the bed adjacent to the outlet vent but did not offer a benefit over closing the curtains alone, and in some situations, resulted in an increase in aerosol exposure.

CONCLUSIONS

Airflow patterns in double-occupancy patient rooms may contribute to risk for transmission of SARS-CoV-2 between roommates. Keeping curtains closed between beds may be beneficial in reducing risk.

COVID-19: the case for aerosol transmission

The COVID-19 pandemic is the most severe pandemic caused by a respiratory virus since the 1918 influenza pandemic. As is the case with other respiratory viruses, three modes of transmission have been invoked: contact (direct and through fomites), large droplets and aerosols. This narrative review makes the case that aerosol transmission is an important mode for COVID-19, through reviewing studies about bioaerosol physiology, detection of infectious SARS-CoV-2 in exhaled bioaerosols, prolonged SARS-CoV-2 infectivity persistence in aerosols created in the laboratory, detection of SARS-CoV-2 in air samples, investigation of outbreaks with manifest involvement of aerosols, and animal model experiments. SARS-CoV-2 joins influenza A virus as a virus with proven pandemic capacity that can be spread by the aerosol route. This has profound implications for the control of the current pandemic and for future pandemic preparedness.

Reuse of Personal Protective Equipment: Results of a Human Factors Study Using Fluorescence to Identify Self-Contamination During Donning and Doffing

BACKGROUND

At least 115,000 health and care workers (HCWs) are estimated to have lost their lives to COVID-19, according to the the chief of the World Health Organization (WHO). Personal protective equipment (PPE) is the first line of defense for HCWs against infectious diseases. At the height of the pandemic, PPE supplies became scarce, necessitating reuse, which increased the occupational COVID-19 risks to HCWs. Currently, there are few robust studies addressing PPE reuse and practice variability, leaving HCWs vulnerable to accidental contamination and harm.

OBJECTIVE

The objective of this study was to assess potential HCW contamination during PPE donning, doffing, and reuse.

METHODS

The study included 28 active acute care physicians, nurses, and nurse practitioners that evaluated 5 simulated patients with COVID-like symptoms while donning and doffing PPE between each patient encounter. An N95 mask was contaminated with a transparent fluorescent gel applied to the outside of the N95 mask to simulate contamination that might occur during reuse. Participants were evaluated after PPE doffing for each encounter using a black light to assess for face and body contamination.

RESULTS

All participants had multiple sites of contamination, predominantly on their head and neck. None of the participants were able to don and doff PPE without contaminating themselves during five consecutive simulation cycles.

CONCLUSIONS

The current Centers for Disease Control and Prevention PPE guidelines for donning and doffing fall short in protecting HCWs. They do not adequately protect HCWs from contamination. There is an urgent need for PPE and workflow redesign.

New Zealand Emergency Department COVID-19 Preparedness: a cross-sectional survey and narrative view

OBJECTIVE

Our objective was to assess the level of COVID-19 preparedness of emergency departments (EDs) in Aotearoa New Zealand (NZ) through the views of emergency medicine specialists working in district health boards around the country. Given the limited experience NZ hospitals have had with SARS-CoV-2, a comparison of current local practice with recent literature from other countries identifying known weaknesses may help prevent future healthcare worker infections in NZ.

METHODS

We conducted a cross-sectional survey of NZ emergency specialists in November 2020 to evaluate preparedness of engineering, administrative policy and personal protective equipment (PPE) use.

RESULTS

A total of 137 surveys were completed (32% response rate). More than 12% of emergency specialists surveyed reported no access to negative pressure rooms. N95 fit testing had not been performed in 15 (12%) of respondents. Most specialists (77%) work in EDs that cohort patients with COVID-19, about one-third (34%) do not use spotters during PPE doffing, and most (87%) do not have required space for physical distancing in non-patient areas. Initial PPE training, simulations and segregating patients were widespread but appear to be waning with persistent low SARS-CoV-2 prevalence. PPE shortages were not identified in NZ EDs, yet 13% of consultants do not plan to use respirators during aerosol-generating procedures on patients with COVID-19.

CONCLUSIONS

NZ emergency specialists identified significant gaps in COVID-19 preparedness, and they have a unique opportunity to translate lessons from other locations into local action. These data provide insight into weaknesses in hospital engineering, policy and PPE practice in advance of future SARS-CoV-2 endemic transmission.

Universal Use of N95 Respirators in Healthcare Settings When Community Coronavirus Disease 2019 Rates Are High

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommends N95 respirators for all providers who see patients with possible or confirmed coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). We suggest that N95 respirators may be just as important for the care of patients without suspected COVID-19 when community incidence rates are high. This is because severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 is most contagious before symptom onset. Ironically, by the time patients are sick enough to be admitted to the hospital with COVID-19, they tend to be less contagious. The greatest threat of transmission in healthcare facilities may therefore be patients and healthcare workers with early occult infection. N95 respirators' superior fit and filtration provide superior exposure protection for healthcare providers seeing patients with early undiagnosed infection and superior source control to protect patients from healthcare workers with early undiagnosed infection. The probability of occult infection in patients and healthcare workers is greatest when community incidence rates are high. Universal use of N95 respirators may help decrease nosocomial transmission at such times.

New Insights into the Prevention of Hospital-Acquired Pneumonia/Ventilator-Associated Pneumonia Caused by Viruses

A fifth or more of hospital-acquired pneumonias may be attributable to respiratory viruses. The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has clearly demonstrated the potential morbidity and mortality of respiratory viruses and the constant threat of nosocomial transmission and hospital-based clusters. Data from before the pandemic suggest the same can be true of influenza, respiratory syncytial virus, and other respiratory viruses. The pandemic has also helped clarify the primary mechanisms and risk factors for viral transmission. Respiratory viruses are primarily transmitted by respiratory aerosols that are routinely emitted when people exhale, talk, and cough. Labored breathing and coughing increase aerosol generation to a much greater extent than intubation, extubation, positive pressure ventilation, and other so-called aerosol-generating procedures. Transmission risk is proportional to the amount of viral exposure. Most transmissions take place over short distances because respiratory emissions are densest immediately adjacent to the source but then rapidly dilute and diffuse with distance leading to less viral exposure. The primary risk factors for transmission then are high viral loads, proximity, sustained exposure, and poor ventilation as these all increase net viral exposure. Poor ventilation increases the risk of long-distance transmission by allowing aerosol-borne viruses to accumulate over time leading to higher levels of exposure throughout an enclosed space. Surgical and procedural masks reduce viral exposure but do not eradicate it and thus lower but do not eliminate transmission risk. Most hospital-based clusters have been attributed to delayed diagnoses, transmission between roommates, and staff-to-patient infections. Strategies to prevent nosocomial respiratory viral infections include testing all patients upon admission, preventing healthcare providers from working while sick, assuring adequate ventilation, universal masking, and vaccinating both patients and healthcare workers.

Modes de transmission du SARS-CoV-2 : que sait-on actuellement ?

Des progrès remarquables ont été obtenus dans notre compréhension de la transmission du SARS-CoV-2 et la réduction de sa propagation. La prise en compte du risque majeur des formes asymptomatiques par le port universel du masque est une de ces avancées. Les données épidémiologiques (taux d'attaque et R₀) ainsi que l'accumulation de données en contexte clinique suggèrent une similitude de transmission du SARS-CoV-2 avec celle des autres virus respiratoires comme la grippe ou le SARS-CoV-1, un mode de transmission principal direct de personne à personne, à courte distance par les gouttelettes. La transmission aéroportée est possible mais rare, et ne semble se produire que dans des circonstances opportunistes, notamment lors de procédures médicales sur la sphère respiratoire de patients infectés, ou dans des conditions d'excrétion virale élevée en zone confinée mal ventilée. L'hygiène des mains et le port du masque sont les deux armes essentielles de prévention dans le contexte de la COVID-19.

Hypothesis: All respiratory viruses (including SARS-CoV-2) are aerosol-transmitted

The potential role of aerosol transmission for seasonal respiratory viruses has been dramatically highlighted during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. It is now evident that short-range (conversational) and long-range aerosol transmission plays at least some part in how all these respiratory viruses are transmitted between people. This article highlights and discusses various studies that form the basis for this hypothesis.

Hidden hazards of SARS-CoV-2 transmission in hospitals: A systematic review

Despite their considerable prevalence, dynamics of hospital-associated COVID-19 are still not well understood. We assessed the nature and extent of air- and surface-borne SARS-CoV-2 contamination in hospitals to identify hazards of viral dispersal and enable more precise targeting of infection prevention and control. PubMed, ScienceDirect, Web of Science, Medrxiv, and Biorxiv were searched for relevant articles until June 1, 2021. In total, 51 observational cross-sectional studies comprising 6258 samples were included. SARS-CoV-2 RNA was detected in one in six air and surface samples throughout the hospital and up to 7.62 m away from the nearest patients. The highest detection rates and viral concentrations were reported from patient areas. The most frequently and heavily contaminated types of surfaces comprised air outlets and hospital floors. Viable virus was recovered from the air and fomites. Among size-fractionated air samples, only fine aerosols contained viable virus. Aerosol-generating procedures significantly increased (OR_air  = 2.56 (1.46-4.51); OR_surface  = 1.95 (1.27-2.99)), whereas patient masking significantly decreased air- and surface-borne SARS-CoV-2 contamination (OR_air  = 0.41 (0.25-0.70); OR_surface  = 0.45 (0.34-0.61)). The nature and extent of hospital contamination indicate that SARS-CoV-2 is likely dispersed conjointly through several transmission routes, including short- and long-range aerosol, droplet, and fomite transmission.

Control of airborne infectious disease in buildings: Evidence and research priorities

The evolution of SARS-CoV-2 virus has resulted in variants likely to be more readily transmitted through respiratory aerosols, underscoring the increased potential for indoor environmental controls to mitigate risk. Use of tight-fitting face masks to trap infectious aerosol in exhaled breath and reduce inhalation exposure to contaminated air is of critical importance for disease control. Administrative controls including the regulation of occupancy and interpersonal spacing are also important, while presenting social and economic challenges. Indoor engineering controls including ventilation, exhaust, air flow control, filtration, and disinfection by germicidal ultraviolet irradiation can reduce reliance on stringent occupancy restrictions. However, the effects of controls-individually and in combination-on reducing infectious aerosol transfer indoors remain to be clearly characterized to the extent needed to support widespread implementation by building operators. We review aerobiologic and epidemiologic evidence of indoor environmental controls against transmission and present a quantitative aerosol transfer scenario illustrating relative differences in exposure at close-interactive, room, and building scales. We identify an overarching need for investment to implement building controls and evaluate their effectiveness on infection in well-characterized and real-world settings, supported by specific, methodological advances. Improved understanding of engineering control effectiveness guides implementation at scale while considering occupant comfort, operational challenges, and energy costs.

OUP accepted manuscript

Background

Healthcare workers (HCWs) are at risk from aerosol transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2. The aims of this study were to (1) quantify the protection provided by masks (surgical, fit-test_FAILED N95, fit-test_PASSED N95) and personal protective equipment (PPE), and (2) determine if a portable high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter can enhance the benefit of PPE.

Methods

Virus aerosol exposure experiments using bacteriophage PhiX174 were performed. An HCW wearing PPE (mask, gloves, gown, face shield) was exposed to nebulized viruses (10⁸ copies/mL) for 40 minutes in a sealed clinical room. Virus exposure was quantified via skin swabs applied to the face, nostrils, forearms, neck, and forehead. Experiments were repeated with a HEPA filter (13.4 volume-filtrations/hour).

Results

Significant virus counts were detected on the face while the participants were wearing either surgical or N95 masks. Only the fit-test_PASSED N95 resulted in lower virus counts compared to control (P = .007). Nasal swabs demonstrated high virus exposure, which was not mitigated by the surgical/fit-test_FAILED N95 masks, although there was a trend for the fit-test_PASSED N95 mask to reduce virus counts (P = .058). HEPA filtration reduced virus to near-zero levels when combined with fit-test_PASSED N95 mask, gloves, gown, and face shield.

Conclusions

N95 masks that have passed a quantitative fit-test combined with HEPA filtration protects against high virus aerosol loads at close range and for prolonged periods of time.

Healthcare-acquired clusters of COVID-19 across multiple wards in a Scottish health board

Background

Healthcare-acquired COVID-19 has been an additional burden on hospitals managing increasing numbers of patients with SARS-CoV-2. One acute hospital (W) among three in a Scottish healthboard experienced an unexpected surge of COVID-19 clusters.

Aim

To investigate possible causes of COVID-19 clusters at Hospital W.

Methods

Daily surveillance provided total numbers of patients and staff involved in clusters in three acute hospitals (H, M and W) and care homes across the healthboard. All clusters were investigated and documented, along with patient boarding, community infection rates and outdoor temperatures from October 2020 to March 2021. Selected SARS-CoV-2 strains were genotyped.

Findings

There were 19 COVID-19 clusters on 14 wards at Hospital W during the six-month study period, lasting from two to 42 days (average, five days; median, 14 days) and involving an average of nine patients (range 1–24) and seven staff (range 0–17). COVID-19 clusters in Hospitals H and M reflected community infection rates. An outbreak management team implemented a control package including daily surveillance; ward closures; universal masking; screening; restricting staff and patient movement; enhanced cleaning; and improved ventilation. Forty clusters occurred across all three hospitals before a January window-opening policy, after which there were three during the remainder of the study.

Conclusion

The winter surge of COVID-19 clusters was multi-factorial, but clearly exacerbated by moving trauma patients around the hospital. An extended infection prevention and control package including enhanced natural ventilation helped reduce COVID-19 clusters in acute hospitals.

Current Insights Into Respiratory Virus Transmission and Potential Implications for Infection Control Programs : A Narrative Review

Policies to prevent respiratory virus transmission in health care settings have traditionally divided organisms into Droplet versus Airborne categories. Droplet organisms (for example, influenza) are said to be transmitted via large respiratory secretions that rapidly fall to the ground within 1 to 2 meters and are adequately blocked by surgical masks. Airborne pathogens (for example, measles), by contrast, are transmitted by aerosols that are small enough and light enough to carry beyond 2 meters and to penetrate the gaps between masks and faces; health care workers are advised to wear N95 respirators and to place these patients in negative-pressure rooms. Respirators and negative-pressure rooms are also recommended when caring for patients with influenza or SARS-CoV-2 who are undergoing "aerosol-generating procedures," such as intubation. An increasing body of evidence, however, questions this framework. People routinely emit respiratory particles in a range of sizes, but most are aerosols, and most procedures do not generate meaningfully more aerosols than ordinary breathing, and far fewer than coughing, exercise, or labored breathing. Most transmission nonetheless occurs at close range because virus-laden aerosols are most concentrated at the source; they then diffuse and dilute with distance, making long-distance transmission rare in well-ventilated spaces. The primary risk factors for nosocomial transmission are community incidence rates, viral load, symptoms, proximity, duration of exposure, and poor ventilation. Failure to appreciate these factors may lead to underappreciation of some risks (for example, overestimation of the protection provided by medical masks, insufficient attention to ventilation) or misallocation of limited resources (for example, reserving N95 respirators and negative-pressure rooms only for aerosol-generating procedures or requiring negative-pressure rooms for all patients with SARS-CoV-2 infection regardless of stage of illness). Enhanced understanding of the factors governing respiratory pathogen transmission may inform the development of more effective policies to prevent nosocomial transmission of respiratory pathogens.

Risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission from universally masked healthcare workers to patients or residents: A prospective cohort study

In a multifacility prospective cohort study, we identified 116 acute care, 26 long-term care, and 67 rehabilitation patients who received direct care from a universally masked healthcare worker while communicable with COVID-19. Among 133(64%) patients with at least 14-day follow-up, 3 (2.3%, 95% CI, 0.77-6.4) became positive for SARS-CoV-2. Universal masking, embedded with other infection control practices, is associated with low risk of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from healthcare workers to patients and residents.

Association between Airborne Infection Isolation Room Utilization Rates and Healthcare Worker COVID-19 Infections in Two Academic Hospitals

We compared healthcare worker SARS-CoV-2 infection rates between March-August 2020 in two similar hospitals with high versus low airborne infection isolation room utilization rates but otherwise identical infection control policies. We found no difference in healthcare worker infection rates between the two hospitals nor between patient-facing vs non-patient-facing providers.

SARS-CoV-2 seroprevalence among 7950 healthcare workers in the Region of Southern Denmark

OBJECTIVE

Healthcare workers (HCWs) carry a pronounced risk of acquiring severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection. The aim of this study was to determine the seroprevalence and potential risk factors of SARS-CoV-2 infection among HCWs in the Region of Southern Denmark after the first pandemic wave in the spring of 2020.

METHODS

This was an observational study conducted between May and June 2020. SARS-CoV-2 IgG and IgM antibodies were measured in plasma. Participants were asked to complete a questionnaire consisting of demographic information, risk factors, and COVID-19-related symptoms.

RESULTS

A total of 7950 HCWs participated. The seroprevalence of SARS-CoV-2 antibodies was 2.1% (95% confidence interval (CI) 1.8-2.4%). Seropositive participants were significantly older (mean age 48.9 years vs 46.7 years in seronegative participants, P = 0.022) and a higher percentage had experienced at least one symptom of COVID-19 (P < 0.001). The seroprevalence was significantly higher among HCWs working on dedicated COVID-19 wards (3.5%; OR 2.02, 95% CI 1.44-2.84). Seroprevalence was significantly related to 11-50 close physical contacts per day outside work (OR 1.54, 95% CI 1.07-2.22).

CONCLUSIONS

The prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 antibodies was low in HCWs. However, the occupational risk of contracting the infection was found to be higher for those working on dedicated COVID-19 wards. Further, the results imply that attention should be paid to occupational risk factors in planning pandemic preparedness.

The Case for Mandating COVID-19 Vaccines for Health Care Workers

Not all health care workers have been vaccinated against COVID-19, and their reasons are multiple and varied. Some additional health care workers might decide to be vaccinated if the argument for vaccination were sufficiently clear. This article attempts to provide that clarity.

Airborne transmission of respiratory viruses

The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed critical knowledge gaps in our understanding of and a need to update the traditional view of transmission pathways for respiratory viruses. The long-standing definitions of droplet and airborne transmission do not account for the mechanisms by which virus-laden respiratory droplets and aerosols travel through the air and lead to infection. In this Review, we discuss current evidence regarding the transmission of respiratory viruses by aerosols-how they are generated, transported, and deposited, as well as the factors affecting the relative contributions of droplet-spray deposition versus aerosol inhalation as modes of transmission. Improved understanding of aerosol transmission brought about by studies of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection requires a reevaluation of the major transmission pathways for other respiratory viruses, which will allow better-informed controls to reduce airborne transmission.

Airborne transmission of respiratory viruses

The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed critical knowledge gaps in our understanding of and a need to update the traditional view of transmission pathways for respiratory viruses. The long-standing definitions of droplet and airborne transmission do not account for the mechanisms by which virus-laden respiratory droplets and aerosols travel through the air and lead to infection. In this Review, we discuss current evidence regarding the transmission of respiratory viruses by aerosols-how they are generated, transported, and deposited, as well as the factors affecting the relative contributions of droplet-spray deposition versus aerosol inhalation as modes of transmission. Improved understanding of aerosol transmission brought about by studies of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection requires a reevaluation of the major transmission pathways for other respiratory viruses, which will allow better-informed controls to reduce airborne transmission.

Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in Inpatient and Outpatient Settings in a Veterans Affairs Health Care System

BACKGROUND

Health care personnel and patients are at risk to acquire severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in health care settings, including in outpatient clinics and ancillary care areas.

METHODS

Between May 1, 2020, and January 31, 2021, we identified clusters of 3 or more coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases in which nosocomial transmission was suspected in a Veterans Affairs health care system. Asymptomatic employees and patients were tested for SARS-CoV-2 if they were identified as being at risk through contact tracing investigations; for 7 clusters, all personnel and/or patients in a shared work area were tested regardless of exposure history. Whole-genome sequencing was performed to determine the relatedness of SARS-CoV-2 samples from the clusters and from control employees and patients.

RESULTS

Of 14 clusters investigated, 7 occurred in community-based outpatient clinics, 1 in the emergency department, 3 in ancillary care areas, and 3 on hospital medical/surgical wards that did not provide care for patients with known COVID-19 infection. Eighty-one of 82 (99%) symptomatic COVID-19 cases and 31 of 35 (89%) asymptomatic cases occurred in health care personnel. Sequencing analysis provided support for several transmission events between coworkers and in 2 cases supported transmission from health care personnel to patients. There were no documented transmissions from patients to personnel.

CONCLUSIONS

Clusters of COVID-19 with nosocomial transmission predominantly involved health care personnel and often occurred in outpatient clinics and ancillary care areas. There is a need for improved measures to prevent transmission of SARS-CoV-2 by health care personnel in inpatient and outpatient settings.

COVID-19 false dichotomies and a comprehensive review of the evidence regarding public health, COVID-19 symptomatology, SARS-CoV-2 transmission, mask wearing, and reinfection

Scientists across disciplines, policymakers, and journalists have voiced frustration at the unprecedented polarization and misinformation around coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Several false dichotomies have been used to polarize debates while oversimplifying complex issues. In this comprehensive narrative review, we deconstruct six common COVID-19 false dichotomies, address the evidence on these topics, identify insights relevant to effective pandemic responses, and highlight knowledge gaps and uncertainties. The topics of this review are: 1) Health and lives vs. economy and livelihoods, 2) Indefinite lockdown vs. unlimited reopening, 3) Symptomatic vs. asymptomatic severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection, 4) Droplet vs. aerosol transmission of SARS-CoV-2, 5) Masks for all vs. no masking, and 6) SARS-CoV-2 reinfection vs. no reinfection. We discuss the importance of multidisciplinary integration (health, social, and physical sciences), multilayered approaches to reducing risk ("Emmentaler cheese model"), harm reduction, smart masking, relaxation of interventions, and context-sensitive policymaking for COVID-19 response plans. We also address the challenges in understanding the broad clinical presentation of COVID-19, SARS-CoV-2 transmission, and SARS-CoV-2 reinfection. These key issues of science and public health policy have been presented as false dichotomies during the pandemic. However, they are hardly binary, simple, or uniform, and therefore should not be framed as polar extremes. We urge a nuanced understanding of the science and caution against black-or-white messaging, all-or-nothing guidance, and one-size-fits-all approaches. There is a need for meaningful public health communication and science-informed policies that recognize shades of gray, uncertainties, local context, and social determinants of health.

Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 on a Patient Transport Van

We report 2 episodes of potential SARS-CoV-2 transmission from infected van drivers to passengers despite masking and physical distancing. Whole genome sequencing confirmed relatedness of driver and passenger SARS-CoV-2. With the heater operating, fluorescent microspheres were transported by airflow >3 meters from the front to the back of the van.

Sources of exposure identified through structured interviews of healthcare workers who test positive for severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2): A prospective analysis at two teaching hospitals

We interviewed 1,208 healthcare workers with positive SARS-CoV-2 tests between October 2020 and June 2021 to determine likely exposure sources. Overall, 689 (57.0%) had community exposures (479 from household members), 76 (6.3%) had hospital exposures (64 from other employees including 49 despite masking), 11 (0.9%) had community and hospital exposures, and 432 (35.8%) had no identifiable source of exposure.