When Pigs Fly: Pandemic influenza enters the 21st century

Comparative evolution of influenza A virus H1 and H3 head and stalk domains across host species

IMPORTANCE

For decades, researchers have studied the rapid evolution of influenza A viruses for vaccine design and as a useful model system for the study of host/parasite evolution. By performing an exhaustive analysis of hemagglutinin protein (HA) sequences from 49 lineages independently evolving in birds, swine, canines, equines, and humans over the last century, our work uncovers surprising features of HA evolution. In particular, the canine H3 stalk, unlike human H3 and H1 stalk domains, is not evolving slowly, suggesting that evolution in the stalk domain is not universally constrained across all host species. Therefore, a broader multi-host perspective on HA evolution may be useful during the evaluation and design of stalk-targeted vaccine candidates.

Accelerating Bayesian inference of dependency between mixed-type biological traits

Inferring dependencies between mixed-type biological traits while accounting for evolutionary relationships between specimens is of great scientific interest yet remains infeasible when trait and specimen counts grow large. The state-of-the-art approach uses a phylogenetic multivariate probit model to accommodate binary and continuous traits via a latent variable framework, and utilizes an efficient bouncy particle sampler (BPS) to tackle the computational bottleneck-integrating many latent variables from a high-dimensional truncated normal distribution. This approach breaks down as the number of specimens grows and fails to reliably characterize conditional dependencies between traits. Here, we propose an inference pipeline for phylogenetic probit models that greatly outperforms BPS. The novelty lies in 1) a combination of the recent Zigzag Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (Zigzag-HMC) with linear-time gradient evaluations and 2) a joint sampling scheme for highly correlated latent variables and correlation matrix elements. In an application exploring HIV-1 evolution from 535 viruses, the inference requires joint sampling from an 11,235-dimensional truncated normal and a 24-dimensional covariance matrix. Our method yields a 5-fold speedup compared to BPS and makes it possible to learn partial correlations between candidate viral mutations and virulence. Computational speedup now enables us to tackle even larger problems: we study the evolution of influenza H1N1 glycosylations on around 900 viruses. For broader applicability, we extend the phylogenetic probit model to incorporate categorical traits, and demonstrate its use to study Aquilegia flower and pollinator co-evolution.

Swine Backyard Production Systems in Central Chile: Characterizing Farm Structure, Animal Management, and Production Value Chain

Backyard production systems (BPS) are highly distributed in central Chile. While poultry BPS have been extensively characterized, there remains a notable gap in the characterization of swine BPS in central Chile. In addition, there is evidence that zoonotic pathogens, such as influenza A virus and Salmonella spp., are circulating in backyard poultry and pigs. A total of 358 BPS located in central Chile were evaluated between 2013 and 2015 by interviewing farm owners. Severe deficiencies in biosecurity measures were observed. The value chain of swine backyard production identified food, veterinary care (visits and products), and replacement or breeding animals as the primary inputs to the backyard. The most common origin of swine replacements was from outside the BPS (63%). The main outputs of the system were identified as meat and live animals, including piglets and breeding animals. In 16% of BPS, breeding animals were lent to other BPS, indicating the existence of animals and animal product movement in and out of backyard farms. Results from this study indicate that swine BPS in central Chile represents an animal-human interface that demands special attention for implementing targeted preventive measures to prevent the introduction and spread of animal pathogens and the emergence of zoonotic pathogens.

N6-methyladenosine reader protein YTHDC1 regulates influenza A virus NS segment splicing and replication

N6-methyladenosine (m6A) modification on viral RNAs has a profound impact on infectivity. m6A is also a highly pervasive modification for influenza viral RNAs. However, its role in virus mRNA splicing is largely unknown. Here, we identify the m6A reader protein YTHDC1 as a host factor that associates with influenza A virus NS1 protein and modulates viral mRNA splicing. YTHDC1 levels are enhanced by IAV infection. We demonstrate that YTHDC1 inhibits NS splicing by binding to an NS 3' splicing site and promotes IAV replication and pathogenicity in vitro and in vivo. Our results provide a mechanistic understanding of IAV-host interactions, a potential therapeutic target for blocking influenza virus infection, and a new avenue for the development of attenuated vaccines.

Interspecies Transmission from Pigs to Ferrets of Antigenically Distinct Swine H1 Influenza A Viruses with Reduced Reactivity to Candidate Vaccine Virus Antisera as Measures of Relative Zoonotic Risk

During the last decade, endemic swine H1 influenza A viruses (IAV) from six different genetic clades of the hemagglutinin gene caused zoonotic infections in humans. The majority of zoonotic events with swine IAV were restricted to a single case with no subsequent transmission. However, repeated introduction of human-seasonal H1N1, continual reassortment between endemic swine IAV, and subsequent drift in the swine host resulted in highly diverse swine IAV with human-origin genes that may become a risk to the human population. To prepare for the potential of a future swine-origin IAV pandemic in humans, public health laboratories selected candidate vaccine viruses (CVV) for use as vaccine seed strains. To assess the pandemic risk of contemporary US swine H1N1 or H1N2 strains, we quantified the genetic diversity of swine H1 HA genes, and identified representative strains from each circulating clade. We then characterized the representative swine IAV against human seasonal vaccine and CVV strains using ferret antisera in hemagglutination inhibition assays (HI). HI assays revealed that 1A.3.3.2 (pdm09) and 1B.2.1 (delta-2) demonstrated strong cross reactivity to human seasonal vaccines or CVVs. However, swine IAV from three clades that represent more than 50% of the detected swine IAVs in the USA showed significant reduction in cross-reactivity compared to the closest CVV virus: 1A.1.1.3 (alpha-deletion), 1A.3.3.3-clade 3 (gamma), and 1B.2.2.1 (delta-1a). Representative viruses from these three clades were further characterized in a pig-to-ferret transmission model and shown to exhibit variable transmission efficiency. Our data prioritize specific genotypes of swine H1N1 and H1N2 to further investigate in the risk they pose to the human population.

Influenza A Viruses and Zoonotic Events-Are We Creating Our Own Reservoirs?

Zoonotic infections of humans with influenza A viruses (IAVs) from animal reservoirs can result in severe disease in individuals and, in rare cases, lead to pandemic outbreaks; this is exemplified by numerous cases of human infection with avian IAVs (AIVs) and the 2009 swine influenza pandemic. In fact, zoonotic transmissions are strongly facilitated by manmade reservoirs that were created through the intensification and industrialization of livestock farming. This can be witnessed by the repeated introduction of IAVs from natural reservoirs of aquatic wild bird metapopulations into swine and poultry, and the accompanied emergence of partially- or fully-adapted human pathogenic viruses. On the other side, human adapted IAV have been (and still are) introduced into livestock by reverse zoonotic transmission. This link to manmade reservoirs was also observed before the 20th century, when horses seemed to have been an important reservoir for IAVs but lost relevance when the populations declined due to increasing industrialization. Therefore, to reduce zoonotic events, it is important to control the spread of IAV within these animal reservoirs, for example with efficient vaccination strategies, but also to critically surveil the different manmade reservoirs to evaluate the emergence of new IAV strains with pandemic potential.

Primary Pandemic Prevention

Over the last few decades, hundreds of human pathogens have emerged at a rate unprecedented in human history. Emerged from where? Mostly from animals. The AIDS virus is blamed on the butchering of primates in the African bushmeat trade, we created mad cow disease when we turned cows into carnivores and cannibals, and SARS and COVID-19 have been traced back to the exotic wild animal trade. Our last pandemic, swine flu in 2009, arose not from some backwater wet market in Asia, however. It was largely made-in-the-USA on pig production operations in the United States. In this new Age of Emerging Diseases, there are now billions of animals overcrowded and intensively confined in filthy factory farms for viruses to incubate and mutate within. Today's industrial farming practices have given viruses billions more spins at pandemic roulette. How can we stop the emergence of pandemic viruses in the first place? Whenever possible, treat the cause. The largest and oldest association of public health professionals in the world, the American Public Health Association, has called for a moratorium on factory farming for nearly two decades. Indeed, factory farms are a public health menace. In addition to discontinuing the intensive confinement practices of animal agriculture, we should continue to research, develop, and invest in innovative plant-based and cultivated meat technologies to move away from raising billions of feathered and curly-tailed test tubes for viruses with pandemic potential to mutate within.

Tracing the Source of Influenza A Virus Zoonoses in Interconnected Circuits of Swine Exhibitions

BACKGROUND

Since 2011, influenza A viruses circulating in US swine exhibited at county fairs are associated with >460 zoonotic infections, presenting an ongoing pandemic risk. Swine "jackpot shows" that occur before county fairs each summer intermix large numbers of exhibition swine from diverse geographic locations. We investigated the role of jackpot shows in influenza zoonoses.

METHODS

We collected snout wipe or nasal swab samples from 17 009 pigs attending 350 national, state, and local swine exhibitions across 8 states during 2016-2018.

RESULTS

Influenza was detected in 13.9% of swine sampled at jackpot shows, and 76.3% of jackpot shows had at least 1 pig test positive. Jackpot shows had 4.3-fold higher odds of detecting at least 1 influenza-positive pig compared to county fairs. When influenza was detected at a county fair, almost half of pigs tested positive, clarifying why zoonotic infections occur primarily at county fairs.

CONCLUSIONS

The earlier timing of jackpot shows and long-distance travel for repeated showing of individual pigs provide a pathway for the introduction of influenza into county fairs. Mitigation strategies aimed at curtailing influenza at jackpot shows are likely to have downstream effects on disease transmission at county fairs and zoonoses.

Current and prospective control strategies of influenza A virus in swine

BACKGROUND

Influenza A Viruses (IAV) are endemic pathogens of significant concern in humans and multiple keystone livestock species. Widespread morbidity in swine herds negatively impacts animal welfare standards and economic performance whilst human IAV pandemics have emerged from pigs on multiple occasions. To combat the rising prevalence of swine IAV there must be effective control strategies available.

MAIN BODY

The most basic form of IAV control on swine farms is through good animal husbandry practices and high animal welfare standards. To control inter-herd transmission, biosecurity considerations such as quarantining of pigs and implementing robust health and safety systems for workers help to reduce the likelihood of swine IAV becoming endemic. Closely complementing the physical on-farm practices are IAV surveillance programs. Epidemiological data is critical in understanding regional distribution and variation to assist in determining an appropriate response to outbreaks and understanding the nature of historical swine IAV epidemics and zoonoses. Medical intervention in pigs is restricted to vaccination, a measure fraught with the intrinsic difficulties of mounting an immune response against a highly mutable virus. It is the best available tool for controlling IAV in swine but is far from being a perfect solution due to its unreliable efficacy and association with an enhanced respiratory disease. Because IAV generally has low mortality rates there is a reticence in the uptake of vaccination. Novel genetic technologies could be a complementary strategy for IAV control in pigs that confers broad-acting resistance. Transgenic pigs with IAV resistance are useful as models, however the complexity of these reaching the consumer market limits them to research models. More promising are gene-editing approaches to prevent viral exploitation of host proteins and modern vaccine technologies that surpass those currently available.

CONCLUSION

Using the suite of IAV control measures that are available for pigs effectively we can improve the economic productivity of pig farming whilst improving on-farm animal welfare standards and avoid facing the extensive social and financial costs of a pandemic. Fighting 'Flu in pigs will help mitigate the very real threat of a human pandemic emerging, increase security of the global food system and lead to healthier pigs.

Influenza A Viruses: Understanding Human Host Determinants

Previous influenza A virus (IAV) pandemics have invariably been caused by the introduction of an emergent IAV strain from an animal host into a human population with no or only little pre-existing immunity to the novel strain. Although zoonotic spillover of IAVs into humans can be associated with severe disease and a high fatality rate, these strains are typically poorly adapted to humans and are unable to establish sustained transmission between humans. Given the presumably very high degree of exposure to animal populations with endemic IAV, the number of pandemics remains surprisingly low. In this review, we provide an updated perspective on the molecular mechanisms underlying the adaptation of zoonotic IAV to human hosts, and discuss the implications for future pandemics.