Sustained ethical analysis of global dilemmas and country-level decision making during and post the COVID-19 pandemic: A systematic review

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the vulnerability of countries worldwide and their abilities to cope with the fast-paced demands of the research and medical community. A key to promoting ethical decision-making frameworks is by calibrating the sustainability at regional, national, and global levels to incorporate coordinated reforms. We performed a sustained ethical analysis and critically reviewed evidence addressing country-level responses to practices during the COVID-19 pandemic using PubMed (MEDLINE), Scopus, and CINAHL. The World Health Organization's ethical framework proposed for the entire population during the pandemic was applied to thematically delineate findings under equality, best outcomes (utility), prioritizing the worst off, and prioritizing those tasked with helping others. The findings demarcate ethical concerns about the validity of drug and vaccine trials in developing and developed countries, hints of unjust healthcare organizational policies, lack of equal allocation of pertinent resources, miscalculated allocation of resources to essential workers and stratified populations.

Among equity and dignity: an argument-based review of European ethical guidelines under COVID-19

BACKGROUND

Under COVID-19 pandemic, many organizations developed guidelines to deal with the ethical aspects of resources allocation. This study describes the results of an argument-based review of ethical guidelines developed at the European level. It aims to increase knowledge and awareness about the moral relevance of the outbreak, especially as regards the balance of equity and dignity in clinical practice and patient's care.

METHOD

According to the argument-based review framework, we started our research from the following two questions: what are the ethical principles adopted by the ethical guidelines produced at the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak related to resource allocation? And what are the practical consequences in terms of 'priority' of access, access criteria, management of the decision-making process and patient care?

RESULTS

Twenty-two ethical guidelines met our inclusion criteria and the results of our analysis are organized into 4 ethical concepts and related arguments: the equity principle and emerging ethical theories; triage criteria; respecting patient's dignity, and decision making and quality of care.

CONCLUSION

Further studies can investigate the practical consequences of the application of the guidelines described, in terms of quality of care and health care professionals' moral distress.

Worth living or worth dying? The views of the general public about allowing disabled children to die

BACKGROUND

Decisions about withdrawal of life support for infants have given rise to legal battles between physicians and parents creating intense media attention. It is unclear how we should evaluate when life is no longer worth living for an infant. Public attitudes towards treatment withdrawal and the role of parents in situations of disagreement have not previously been assessed.

METHODS

An online survey was conducted with a sample of the UK public to assess public views about the benefit of life in hypothetical cases similar to real cases heard by the UK courts (eg, Charlie Gard, Alfie Evans). We then evaluated these public views in comparison with existing ethical frameworks for decision-making.

RESULTS

One hundred and thirty participants completed the survey. The majority (94%) agreed that an infant's life may have no benefit when well-being falls below a critical level. Decisions to withdraw treatment were positively associated with the importance of use of medical resources, the infant's ability to have emotional relationships, and mental abilities. Up to 50% of participants in each case believed it was permissible to either continue or withdraw treatment.

CONCLUSION

Despite the controversy, our findings indicate that in the most severe cases, most people agree that life is not worth living for a profoundly disabled infant. Our survey found wide acceptance of at least the permissibility of withdrawal of treatment across a range of cases, though also a reluctance to overrule parents' decisions. These findings may be useful when constructing guidelines for clinical practice.

Donor blood screening and moral responsibility: how safe should blood be?

Some screening tests for donor blood that are used by blood services to prevent transfusion-transmission of infectious diseases offer relatively few health benefits for the resources spent on them. Can good ethical arguments be provided for employing these tests nonetheless? This paper discusses-and ultimately rejects-three such arguments. According to the 'rule of rescue' argument, general standards for cost-effectiveness in healthcare may be ignored when rescuing identifiable individuals. The argument fails in this context, however, because we cannot identify beforehand who will benefit from additional blood screening tests. On the 'imposed risk' argument, general cost-effectiveness standards do not apply when healthcare interventions impose risks on patients. This argument ignores the fact that imposing risks on patients is inevitable in healthcare and that these risks can be countered only within reasonable limits. Finally, the 'manufacturing standard' argument premises that general cost-effectiveness standards do not apply to procedures preventing the contamination of manufactured medical products. We contend that while this argument seems reasonable insofar as commercially manufactured medical products are concerned, publicly funded blood screening tests should respect the standards for general healthcare. We conclude that these particular arguments are unpersuasive, and we offer directions to advance the debate.

Personal responsibility within health policy: unethical and ineffective

This paper argues against incorporating assessments of individual responsibility into healthcare policies by expanding an existing argument and offering a rebuttal to an argument in favour of such policies. First, it is argued that what primarily underlies discussions surrounding personal responsibility and healthcare is not causal responsibility, moral responsibility or culpability, as one might expect, but biases towards particular highly stigmatised behaviours. A challenge is posed for proponents of taking personal responsibility into account within health policy to either expand the debate to also include socially accepted behaviours or to provide an alternative explanation of the narrowly focused discussion. Second, a critical response is offered to arguments that claim that policies based on personal responsibility would lead to several positive outcomes including healthy behaviour change, better health outcomes and decreases in healthcare spending. It is argued that using individual responsibility as a basis for resource allocation in healthcare is unlikely to motivate positive behaviour changes, and is likely to increase inequality which may lead to worse health outcomes overall. Finally, the case of West Virginia's Medicaid reform is examined, which raises a worry that policies focused on personal responsibility have the potential to lead to increases in medical spending overall.

Distributive justice and the harm to medical professionals fighting epidemics

The exposure of doctors, nurses and other medical professionals to risks in the context of epidemics is significant. While traditional medical ethics offers the thought that these dangers may limit the extent to which a duty to care is applicable in such situations, it has less to say about what we might owe to medical professionals who are disadvantaged in these contexts. Luck egalitarianism, a responsibility-sensitive theory of distributive justice, appears to fare particularly badly in that regard. If we want to maintain that medical professionals are responsible for their decisions to help, cure and care for the vulnerable, luck egalitarianism seems to imply that their claim of justice to medical attention in case of infection is weak or non-existent. The article demonstrates how a recent interpretation of luck egalitarianism offers a solution to this problem. Redefining luck egalitarianism as concerned with responsibility for creating disadvantages, rather than for incurring disadvantage as such, makes it possible to maintain that medical professionals are responsible for their choices and that those infected because of their choice to help fight epidemics have a full claim of justice to medical attention.

Allocation of antiretroviral drugs to HIV-infected patients in Togo: perspectives of people living with HIV and healthcare providers

AIM

To explore the way people living with HIV and healthcare providers in Togo judge the priority of HIV-infected patients regarding the allocation of antiretroviral drugs.

METHOD

From June to September 2015, 200 adults living with HIV and 121 healthcare providers living in Togo were recruited for the study. They were presented with stories of a few lines depicting the situation of an HIV-infected patient and were instructed to judge the extent to which the patient should be given priority for antiretroviral drugs. The stories were composed by systematically varying the levels of four factors: (a) the severity of HIV infection, (b) the financial situation of the patient, (c) the patient's family responsibilities and (d) the time elapsed since the first consultation.

RESULTS

Five clusters were identified: 65% of the participants expressed the view that patients who are poor and severely sick should be treated as a priority, 13% prioritised treatment of patients who are poor and parents of small children, 12% expressed the view that the poor should be treated as a priority, 4% preferred that the sickest be treated as a priority and 6% wanted all patients to get treatment.

CONCLUSIONS

WHO's guideline regarding antiretroviral therapy allocation (the sickest first as the sole criterion) currently in use in many African countries does not reflect the preferences of Togolese people living with HIV. For most HIV-infected patients in Togo, patients who cannot get treatment on their own should be treated as a priority.

Antimicrobial stewardship programmes: bedside rationing by another name?

Antimicrobial therapy is a cornerstone of therapy in critically ill patients; however, the wide use of antibiotics has resulted in increased antimicrobial resistance and outbreaks of resistant disease. To counter this, many hospitals have instituted antimicrobial stewardship programmes as a way to reduce the inappropriate use of antibiotics. However, uptake of antimicrobial stewardship programmes has been variable, as many clinicians fear that they may put individual patients at risk of treatment failure. In this paper, I argue that antimicrobial stewardship programmes are indeed a form of bedside rationing, and explore the risks and benefits of such programmes for individual patients in the intensive care unit, and the critically ill population in general. Using Norman Daniels' Accountability for Reasonableness as a framework for evaluating resource allocation policies, I conclude that antimicrobial stewardship programmes are an ethically sound form of bedside rationing.

Vaccine testing for emerging infections: the case for individual randomisation

During the 2014-2015 Ebola outbreak in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, many opposed the use of individually randomised controlled trials to test candidate Ebola vaccines. For a raging fatal disease, they explained, it is unethical to relegate some study participants to control arms. In Zika and future emerging infections, similar opposition may hinder urgent vaccine research, so it is best to address these questions now. This article lays out the ethical case for individually randomised control in testing vaccines against many emerging infections, including lethal infections in low-income countries, even when at no point in the trial do the controls receive the countermeasures being tested. When individual randomisation is feasible-and it often will be-it tends to save more lives than alternative designs would. And for emerging infections, individual randomisation also tends as such to improve care, access to the experimental vaccine and prospects for all participants relative to their opportunities absent the trial, and no less than alternative designs would. That obtains even under placebo control and without equipoise-requiring which would undermine individual randomisation and the alternative designs that opponents proffered. Our arguments expound four often-neglected factors: benefits to non-participants, benefits to participants once a trial is over including post-trial access to the study intervention, participants' prospects before randomisation to arms and the near-inevitable disparity between arms in any randomised controlled trial.

Income-based equity weights in healthcare planning and policy

Recent research indicates that there is a gap in life expectancy between the rich and the poor. This raises the question: should we on egalitarian grounds use income-based equity weights when we assess benefits of alternative benevolent interventions, so that health benefits to the poor count for more? This article provides three egalitarian arguments for using income-based equity weights under certain circumstances. If income inequality correlates with inequality in health, we have reason to use income-based equity weights on the ground that health inequality is bad. If income inequality correlates with inequality in opportunity for health, we have reason to use such weights on the ground that inequality in opportunity for health is bad. If income inequality correlates with inequality in well-being, income-based equity weights should be used to mitigate inequality in well-being. Three different ways in which to construe income-based equity weights are introduced and discussed. They can be based on relative income inequality, on income rankings and on capped absolute income. The article does not defend any of these types of weighting schemes, but argues that in order to settle which of these types of weighting scheme to choose, more empirical research is needed.

Appealing to the crowd: ethical justifications in Canadian medical crowdfunding campaigns

Medical crowdfunding is growing in terms of the number of active campaigns, amount of funding raised and public visibility. Little is known about how campaigners appeal to potential donors outside of anecdotal evidence collected in news reports on specific medical crowdfunding campaigns. This paper offers a first step towards addressing this knowledge gap by examining medical crowdfunding campaigns for Canadian recipients. Using 80 medical crowdfunding campaigns for Canadian recipients, we analyse how Canadians justify to others that they ought to contribute to funding their health needs. We find the justifications campaigners tend to fall into three themes: personal connections, depth of need and giving back. We further discuss how these appeals can understood in terms of ethical justifications for giving and how these justifications should be assessed in light of the academic literature on ethical concerns raised by medical crowdfunding.

From protection to entitlement: selecting research subjects for early phase clinical trials involving breakthrough therapies

Our goals are to (1) set forth and defend a multiprinciple system for selecting individuals who meet trial eligibility criteria to participate in early phase clinical trials testing chimeric antigen receptor (CAR T-cell) for acute lymphoblastic leukaemia when demand for participation exceeds spaces available in a trial; (2) show the relevance of these selection criteria to other breakthrough experimental therapies; (3) argue that distinct distributive justice criteria apply to breakthrough experimental therapies, standard research and healthcare and (4) argue that as evidence of benefit increases, the emphasis of justice in research shifts from protecting subjects from harm to ensuring fair access to benefits.

Solidarity, justice and unconditional access to healthcare

Luck egalitarianism provides a reason to object to conditionality in health incentive programmes in some cases when conditionality undermines political values such as solidarity or inclusiveness. This is the case with incentive programmes that aim to restrict access to essential healthcare services. Such programmes undermine solidarity. Yet, most people's lives are objectively worse, in one respect, in non-solidary societies, because solidarity contributes both instrumentally and directly to individuals' well-being. Because solidarity is non-excludable, undermining it will deprive both the prudent and the imprudent citizens of its goods. Thereby, undermining solidarity can make prudent citizens worse off than they would have otherwise been, out of no fault or choice of their own, but rather as a result of somebody else's imprudent choice. This goes against the spirit of luck egalitarianism. Therefore (luck egalitarian) justice can require us to save the imprudent and avoid conditionality in access to essential healthcare services.

A definition and ethical evaluation of overdiagnosis: response to commentaries

It is a privilege to have respected colleagues engage with our definition and ethical evaluation of overdiagnosis. In our response to the commentaries, we first deal with paradigmatic issues: the place of realism, the relationship between diagnostic standards and correctness and the distinction between overdiagnosis and both false-positives and medicalisation. We then discuss issues arising across the commentaries in turn. Our definition captures the range of different types of overdiagnosis, unlike a definition limited to diagnosis of harmless disease. Certain implications do flow from our definition, as noted by commentators, but we do not view them as problematic: overdiagnoses can become beneficial diagnoses as medical knowledge and practice changes over time; inadequate systems of healthcare can produce tragic overdiagnosis, and the effectiveness of treatment partly determines whether overdiagnosis occurs. Complexity and uncertainty in balancing benefits and harms is unfortunate, but not a reason to avoid making a judgement (ideally one that reflects multiple perspectives). We reaffirm that overdiagnosis, for the foreseeable future, must be estimated at a population level and defend the importance of good-quality risk communication for individuals. We acknowledge that a lot turns on the relevance of professional communities in our definition and expand our reasoning in this regard then conclude with a note on the difference between intentions and goals. We expect that it will be some time before these matters are settled and we look forward to continue debating these matters with our colleagues.

Individualised and personalised QALYs in exceptional treatment decisions

Quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) are used to determine how to allocate resources to health programmes or to treatments within those programmes in order to gain maximum utility from those limited, shared healthcare resources. However, if we use those same population- based QALYs when faced with individual treatment decisions we may act unjustly in relation to that individual or in relation to the wider population. A treatment with a population-based incremental cost-effectiveness ratio beyond our willingness to pay threshold may be denied to a patient even if, for that particular patient, the QALYs gained for the cost would fall within that threshold. When considering individual cases, it is proposed that we should take an individualised approach to the cost of treatment and response to treatment ('individualised QALYs') and a personalised approach to the valuation of health states ('personalised QALYs'). Only if we do this, can we maximise utility and give the patient a fair opportunity to benefit. Individualised and personalised QALYs also allow us to express patient choice and religious treatment preferences in terms of utility. Individualised and personalised QALYs are explored in the context of individual funding requests in the National Health Service. In preference to the concept of 'clinical exceptionality', individualised and personalised QALYs provide the potential for better and more consistent decisions and improved utility. Rather than treating unequal patients as if they were equal, individualised and personalised QALYs promote fair and unequal access to resources for some of our most unequal patients. Potential challenges are also considered.

Should uterus transplants be publicly funded?

Since 2000, 11 human uterine transplantation procedures (UTx) have been performed across Europe and Asia. Five of these have, to date, resulted in pregnancy and four live births have now been recorded. The most significant obstacles to the availability of UTx are presently scientific and technical, relating to the safety and efficacy of the procedure itself. However, if and when such obstacles are overcome, the most likely barriers to its availability will be social and financial in nature, relating in particular to the ability and willingness of patients, insurers or the state to pay. Thus, publicly funded healthcare systems such as the UK's National Health Service (NHS) will eventually have to decide whether UTx should be funded. With this in mind, we seek to provide an answer to the question of whether there exist any compelling reasons for the state not to fund UTx. The paper proceeds as follows. It assumes, at least for the sake of argument, that UTx will become sufficiently safe and cost-effective to be a candidate for funding and then asks, given that, what objections to funding there might be. Three main arguments are considered and ultimately rejected as providing insufficient reason to withhold funding for UTx. The first two are broad in their scope and offer an opportunity to reflect on wider issues about funding for infertility treatment in general. The third is narrower in scope and could, in certain forms, apply to UTx but not other assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs). The first argument suggests that UTx should not be publicly funded because doing so would be inconsistent with governments' obligations to prevent climate change and environmental pollution. The second claims that UTx does not treat a disorder and is not medically necessary. Finally, the third asserts that funding for UTx should be denied because of the availability of alternatives such as adoption and surrogacy.

The limited impact of indeterminacy for healthcare rationing: how indeterminacy problems show the need for a hybrid theory, but nothing more

A notorious debate in the ethics of healthcare rationing concerns whether to address rationing decisions with substantial principles or with a procedural approach. One major argument in favour of procedural approaches is that substantial principles are indeterminate so that we can reasonably disagree about how to apply them. To deal with indeterminacy, we need a just decision process. In this paper I argue that it is a mistake to abandon substantial principles just because they are indeterminate. It is true that reasonable substantial principles designed to deal with healthcare rationing can be expected to be indeterminate. Yet, the indeterminacy is only partial. In some situations we can fully determine what to do in light of the principles, in some situations we cannot. The conclusion to draw from this fact is not that we need to develop procedural approaches to healthcare rationing, but rather that we need a more complex theory in which both substantial principles and procedural approaches are needed.

How long is long enough, and have we done everything we should?--Ethics of calling codes

'Calling' a code can be an ambiguous undertaking. Despite guidelines and the medical literature outlining when it is acceptable to stop resuscitation, code cessation and deciding what not to do during a code, in practice, is an art form. Familiarity with classic evidence suggesting most codes are unsuccessful may influence decisions about when to terminate resuscitative efforts, in effect enacting self-fulfilling prophesies. Code interventions and duration may be influenced by patient demographics, gender or a concern about the stewardship of scarce resources. Yet, recent evidence links longer code duration with improved outcomes, and advances in resuscitation techniques complicate attempts to standardise both resuscitation length and the application of advanced interventions. In this context of increasing clinical and moral uncertainty, discussions between patients, families and medical providers about resuscitation plans take on an increased degree of importance. For some patients, a 'bespoke' resuscitation plan may be in order.

On the random distribution of scarce doses of vaccine in response to the threat of an influenza pandemic: a response to Wardrope

Wardrope argues against my proposed non-consequentialist policy for the distribution of scarce influenza vaccine in the face of a pandemic. According to him, even if one accepts what he calls my deontological ethical theory, it does not follow that we are required to agree with my proposed randomised allocation of doses of vaccine by means of a lottery. He argues in particular that I fail to consider fully the prophylactic role of vaccination whereby it serves to protect from infection more people than are vaccinated. He concludes that: 'The benefits and burdens of vaccination are provided impartially and far more effectively by targeted vaccination than impartial lotteries.' He has shown convincingly that this conclusion can be established in the case of his particular envisaged scenario. However, Wardrope gives no reason to suppose that, in the circumstances that we actually face, targeted vaccination would constitute impartial treatment of citizens in the UK. I readily agree with Wardrope that if it should treat its citizens justly and impartially, it does not necessarily follow that the state should distribute vaccinations of the basis of a lottery. That will be a reasonable thing to do only if certain assumptions are made. These assumptions will not always be reasonable. However, they are reasonable ones to make in the actual circumstances that currently apply.

A framework for luck egalitarianism in health and healthcare

Several attempts have been made to apply the choice-sensitive theory of distributive justice, luck egalitarianism, in the context of health and healthcare. This article presents a framework for this discussion by highlighting different normative decisions to be made in such an application, some of the objections to which luck egalitarians must provide answers and some of the practical implications associated with applying such an approach in the real world. It is argued that luck egalitarians should address distributions of health rather than healthcare, endorse an integrationist theory that combines health concerns with general distributive concerns and be pluralist in their approach. It further suggests that choice-sensitive policies need not be the result of applying luck egalitarianism in this context.

Feiring's concept of forward-looking responsibility: a dead end for responsibility in healthcare

Eli Feiring has developed a concept of forward-looking responsibility in healthcare. On this account, what matters morally in the allocation of scarce healthcare resources is not people's past behaviours but rather their commitment to take on lifestyles that will increase the benefit acquired from received treatment. According to Feiring, this is to be preferred over the backward-looking concept of responsibility often associated with luck egalitarianism. The article critically scrutinises Feiring's position. It begins by spelling out the wider implications of Feiring's view. Against this background, it shows that (i) Feiring's distinction between backward-looking and forward-looking responsibility is incompatible with the Scanlonian notion of responsibility she apparently endorses; (ii) her favoured forward-looking notion of responsibility is subject to the objections levelled against the luck egalitarian view (whatever the strength of such objections).

Justice and the NICE approach

When thinking about population level healthcare priority setting decisions, such as those made by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, good medical ethics requires attention to three main principles of health justice: (1) cost-effectiveness, an aspect of beneficence, (2) non-discrimination, and (3) priority to the worse off in terms of both current severity of illness and lifetime health. Applying these principles requires consideration of the identified patients who benefit from decisions and the unidentified patients who bear the opportunity costs.

How can bedside rationing be justified despite coexisting inefficiency? The need for 'benchmarks of efficiency'

Imperfect efficiency in healthcare delivery is sometimes given as a justification for refusing to ration or even discuss how to pursue fair rationing. This paper aims to clarify the relationship between inefficiency and rationing, and the conditions under which bedside rationing can be justified despite coexisting inefficiency. This paper first clarifies several assumptions that underlie the classification of a clinical practice as being inefficient. We then suggest that rationing is difficult to justify in circumstances where the rationing agent is or should be aware of and contributes to clinical inefficiency. We further explain the different ethical implications of this suggestion for rationing decisions made by clinicians. We argue that rationing is more legitimate when sufficient efforts are undertaken to decrease inefficiency in parallel with efforts to pursue unavoidable but fair rationing. While the qualifier 'sufficient' is crucial here, we explain why 'sufficient efforts' should be translated into 'benchmarks of efficiency' that address specific healthcare activities where clinical inefficiency can be decreased. Referring to recent consensus papers, we consider some examples of specific clinical situations where improving clinical inefficiency has been recommended and consider how benchmarks for efficiency might apply. These benchmarks should state explicitly how much inefficiency shall be reduced in a reasonable time range and why these efforts are 'sufficient'. Possible strategies for adherence to benchmarks are offered to address the possibility of non-compliance.

You cannot have your normal functioning cake and eat it too

Does biomedical enhancement challenge justice in health care? This paper argues that health care justice based on the concept of normal functioning is inadequate if enhancements are widespread. Two different interpretations of normal functioning are distinguished: the "species typical" vs. the "normal cooperator" account, showing that each version of the theory fails to account for certain egalitarian intuitions about help and assistance owed to people with health needs, where enhancements are widespread.

Moral responsibility for (un)healthy behaviour

Combatting chronic, lifestyle-related disease has become a healthcare priority in the developed world. The role personal responsibility should play in healthcare provision has growing pertinence given the growing significance of individual lifestyle choices for health. Media reporting focussing on the 'bad behaviour' of individuals suffering lifestyle-related disease, and policies aimed at encouraging 'responsibilisation' in healthcare highlight the importance of understanding the scope of responsibility ascriptions in this context. Research into the social determinants of health and psychological mechanisms of health behaviour could undermine some commonly held and tacit assumptions about the moral responsibility of agents for the sorts of lifestyles they adopt. I use Philip Petit's conception of freedom as 'fitness to be held responsible' to consider the significance of some of this evidence for assessing the moral responsibility of agents. I propose that, in some cases, factors outside the agent's control may influence behaviour in such a way as to undermine her freedom along the three dimensions described by Pettit: freedom of action; a sense of identification with one's actions; and whether one's social position renders one vulnerable to pressure from more powerful others.