Understanding the municipal-level design and adaptation of pay-for-performance schemes across two states of Brazil

The design of complex health systems interventions, such as pay for performance (P4P), can be critical to determining such programmes' success. In P4P programmes, the design of financial incentives is crucial in shaping how these programmes work. However, the design of such schemes is usually homogenous across providers within a given scheme. Consequently, there is a limited understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of P4P design elements from the implementers' perspective. This study takes advantage of the unique context of Brazil, where municipalities adapted the federal incentive design, resulting in variations in incentive design across municipalities. The study aims to understand why municipalities in Brazil chose certain P4P design features, the associated challenges, and the local adaptations made to address problems in scheme design. This study was a multiple-case study design relying on qualitative data from twenty municipalities from two states in northeastern Brazil. We conducted two key informant interviews with municipal-level stakeholders and focus group discussions with primary care providers. We also reviewed municipal PMAQ laws in each municipality. We found substantial variation in the design choices made by municipalities regarding 'who was incentivised', the 'payment size' and 'frequency'. Design choices affected relationships within municipalities and within teams. Challenges were chiefly associated with fairness relating to 'who received the incentive', 'what is incentivised', and the 'incentive size'. Adaptations were made to improve fairness, mostly in response to pressure from the healthcare workers. The significant variation in design choices across municipalities and providers' response to them highlights the importance of considering local context in the design and implementation of P4P schemes and ensuring flexibility to accommodate local preferences and emerging needs. Attention is needed to ensure the choice of 'who is incentivised' and the 'size of incentives' are inclusive and fair, and the allocation and 'use of funds' are transparent.

Does pay-for-performance design matter? Evidence from Brazil

Pay-for-performance (P4P) schemes have been shown to have mixed effects on health care outcomes. A challenge in interpreting this evidence is that P4P is often considered a homogenous intervention, when in practice schemes vary widely in their design. Our study contributes to this literature by providing a detailed depiction of incentive design across municipalities within a national P4P scheme in Brazil (PMAQ) and exploring the association of alternative design typologies with the performance of primary health /care providers. We carried out a nation-wide survey of municipal health managers to characterize the scheme design, based on the size of the bonus, the providers incentivized, and the frequency of payment. Using OLS regressions and controlling for municipality characteristics, we examined whether each design feature was associated with better family health team performance. To capture potential interactions between design features, we used cluster analysis to group municipalities into five design typologies and then examined associations with quality of care. A majority of the municipalities included in our study used some of the PMAQ funds to provide bonuses to family health team workers, while the remaining municipalities spent the funds in the traditional way using input-based budgets. Frequent bonus payments (monthly) and higher size bonus allocations (share of 20-80%) were strongly associated with better team performance, while who within a team was eligible to receive bonuses did not in isolation appear to influence performance. The cluster analysis showed what combinations of design features were associated with better performance. The PMAQ score in the 'large bonus/many workers/high-frequency' cluster was 8.44 points higher than the 'no bonus' cluster, equivalent to a difference of 21.7% in the mean PMAQ score. Evidence from our study shows how design features can potentially influence health provider performance, informing the design of more effective P4P schemes.

A Randomized Controlled Trial of a Pay-for-Performance Initiative to Reduce Costs of Care for High-Need Psychiatric Patients

OBJECTIVE

Pay-for-performance (P4P) initiatives hold promise for improving health care delivery but are rarely applied to behavioral health or tested in randomized controlled trials (RCTs). This RCT examined the effectiveness of a P4P initiative to reduce total cost of 24-hour care among patients with high needs for psychiatric care in a large county in California.

METHODS

From August 2016 to March 2022, a total of 652 adult residents of Santa Clara County, California, were enrolled in a P4P initiative (mean±SD age=46.7±13.3 years, 61% male, 51% White, and 60% diagnosed as having a bipolar or psychotic disorder). Participants were randomly assigned to usual full-service partnerships from the county (N=327) or a comparable level of care from a contractor who agreed to a schedule of financial penalties and rewards based on whether enrollees (N=325) used more or less care than a historical cohort of similar county patients. The primary outcome was total cost of 24-hour psychiatric services. Secondary outcomes were costs of each of the 24-hour care services.

RESULTS

The proportion of the total sample that used 24-hour psychiatric services decreased over the 36-month study period. Intent-to-treat analyses revealed no differences between the two study conditions in total care costs during the follow-up period. No significant care utilization differences were observed between the two conditions in most of the individual 24-hour services.

CONCLUSIONS

A P4P initiative for high-need patients was no more effective than usual care for reducing costs of 24-hour psychiatric care.

Impact of reimbursement systems on patient care - a systematic review of systematic reviews

BACKGROUND

There is not yet sufficient scientific evidence to answer the question of the extent to which different reimbursement systems influence patient care and treatment quality. Due to the asymmetry of information between physicians, health insurers and patients, market-based mechanisms are necessary to ensure the best possible patient care. The aim of this study is to investigate how reimbursement systems influence multiple areas of patient care in form of structure, process and outcome indicators.

METHODS

For this purpose, a systematic literature review of systematic reviews is conducted in the databases PubMed, Web of Science and the Cochrane Library. The reimbursement systems of salary, bundled payment, fee-for-service and value-based reimbursement are examined. Patient care is divided according to the three dimensions of structure, process, and outcome and evaluated in eight subcategories.

RESULTS

A total of 34 reviews of 971 underlying primary studies are included in this article. International studies identified the greatest effects in categories resource utilization and quality/health outcomes. Pay-for-performance and bundled payments were the most commonly studied models. Among the systems examined, fee-for-service and value-based reimbursement systems have the most positive impact on patient care.

CONCLUSION

Patient care can be influenced by the choice of reimbursement system. The factors for successful implementation need to be further explored in future research.

Pay-for-performance programs effectiveness in healthcare: the case of the end-stage renal disease quality incentive program

This paper focuses on Medicare's End-Stage Renal Disease Quality Incentive Program (QIP). QIP aims to promote high-quality services in outpatient dialysis facilities by tying their payments to their performance on pre-specified quality measures. In this paper, employing principal-agent theory, we examine the effectiveness of QIP by exploring the changes in various clinical/operational measures when they become a part of the program as a performance measure. We study five QIP quality measures; two are operational: hospitalization and readmission. And three others are clinical: blood transfusion, hypercalcemia, and dialysis adequacy. Overall, we observe a significant improvement in all QIP quality measures after being included in the program, except for readmission. We recommend adjusting the weight and redesigning the readmission measure for Medicare to incentivize providers to reduce readmission. We also discuss establishing care coordination and employing data-driven clinical decision support systems as opportunities for dialysis facilities to improve the care delivery process.

Diabetes self-management education on the sustainability of metabolic control in type 2 diabetes patients: Diabetes share care program in Taiwan

BACKGROUND

Diabetes self-management education (DSME) improves glycemic and metabolic control. However, the frequency, duration and sustainability of DSME for improving metabolic control have not been well studied.

METHODS

The Diabetes Share Care Program (DSCP) stage 1 provided DSME every 3 months. If participants entering DSCP stage 1 ≥ 2 years and HbA1c < 7%, they can be transferred to stage 2 (DSME frequency: once a year). Three-to-one matching between DSCP stage 1 and stage 2 groups based on the propensity score method to match the two groups in terms of HbA1c and diabetes duration. We identified 311 people living with type 2 diabetes in DSCP stage 1 and 86 in stage 2 and evaluated their metabolic control and healthy behaviors annually for 5 years.

RESULTS

In the first year, HbA1c in the DSCP stage 2 group was significantly lower than that in the stage 1 group. In the first and the fifth years, the percentage of patients achieving HbA1c < 7% was significantly higher in the DSCP stage 2 group than the stage 1 group. There was no significant difference in other metabolic parameters between the two groups during the 5-year follow-up. Self-monitoring of blood glucose (SMBG) frequency was associated with a reduced HbA1c after 5 years (95% CI: -0.0665 to -0.0004).

CONCLUSION

We demonstrated sustainable effects of at least 2-year DSME on achieving better glycemic control for at least 1 year. SMBG contributed to improved glycemic control. The results may be applied to the reimbursement strategy in diabetes education.

Use of statewide financial incentives to improve documentation of hernia and mesh characteristics in ventral hernia repair

BACKGROUND

Documentation of intraoperative details is critical for understanding and advancing hernia care, but is inconsistent in practice. Therefore, to improve data capture on a statewide level, we implemented a financial incentive targeting documentation of hernia defect size and mesh use.

METHODS

The Abdominal Hernia Care Pathway (AHCP), a voluntary pay for performance (P4P) initiative, was introduced in 2021 within the statewide Michigan Surgical Quality Collaborative (MSQC). This consisted of an organizational-level financial incentive for achieving 80% performance on eight specific process measures for ventral hernia surgery, including complete documentation of hernia defect size and location, as well as mesh characteristics and fixation technique. Comparisons were made between AHCP and non-AHCP sites in 2021.

RESULTS

Of 69 eligible sites, 47 participated in the AHCP in 2021. There were N = 5362 operations (4169 at AHCP sites; 1193 at non-AHCP sites). At AHCP sites, 69.8% of operations had complete hernia documentation, compared to 50.5% at non-AHCP sites (p < 0.0001). At AHCP sites, 91.4% of operations had complete mesh documentation, compared to 86.5% at non-AHCP sites (p < 0.0001). The site-level hernia documentation goal of 80% was reached by 14 of 47 sites (range 14-100%). The mesh documentation goal was reached by 41 of 47 sites (range 4-100%).

CONCLUSIONS

Addition of an organizational-level financial incentive produced marked gains in documentation of intra-operative details across a statewide surgical collaborative. The relatively large effect size-19.3% for hernia-is remarkable among P4P initiatives. This result may have been facilitated by surgeons' direct role in documenting hernia size and mesh use. These improvements in data capture will foster understanding of current hernia practices on a large scale and may serve as a model for improvement in collaboratives nationally.

Impact of pay-for-performance for stroke unit access on mortality in Queensland, Australia: an interrupted time series analysis

Background

Stroke unit care provides substantial benefits for all subgroups of patient with stroke, but consistent access has been difficult to achieve in many healthcare systems. Pay-for-performance incentives have been introduced widely in attempt to improve quality and efficiency in healthcare, but there is limited evidence of positive impact when they are targeted at hospitals. In 2012, a pay-for-performance program targeting stroke unit access was co-designed and implemented within a clinical quality improvement network across public hospitals in Queensland, Australia. We assessed the impact on access to specialist care and mortality following stroke.

Methods

We used interrupted time series analysis on linked hospital and death registry data to compare changes in level (absolute proportions) and trends in outcomes (stroke/coronary care unit admission, 6-month mortality) for stroke, and a control condition of myocardial infarction (MI) without pay-for-performance incentive, from 2009 before, to 2017 after introduction of the pay-for-performance scheme in 2012.

Findings

We included 23,572 patients with stroke and 39,511 with MI. Following pay-for-performance introduction, stroke unit access increased by an absolute 35% (95% CI 29, 41) more than historical trend prediction, with greater impact for regional/rural residents (41% vs major city 24%) where baseline access was lowest (18% vs major city residents 53%). Historical upward 6-month mortality trends following stroke (+0.11%/month) reversed to a downward slope (-0.05%/month) with pay-for-performance; difference -0.16%/month (95% CI -0.29, -0.03). In contrast, access to coronary care and mortality trends for MI controls were unchanged, difference-in-difference for mortality -0.18%, (95% CI -0.34, -0.02).

Interpretation

This clinician led pay-for-performance incentive stimulated significant improvements in stroke unit access, reduced regional disparities; and resulted in a sustained decline in 6-month mortality. As our findings contrast with lack of effect in most hospital directed pay-for-performance programs, differences in design and context provide insights for optimal program design.

Funding

Queensland Advancing Clinical Research Fellowship, National Health and Medical Research Council Senior Research Fellowship.

Comparison of pay-for-performance (P4P) programs in primary care of selected countries: a comparative study

BACKGROUND

Pay for performance (P4P) schemes provide financial incentives or facilities to health workers based on the achievement of predetermined performance goals. Various P4P programs have been implemented around the world. There is a question of which model is suitable for p4p implementation to achieve better results. The purpose of this study is to compare pay for performance models in different countries.

METHODS

This is a descriptive-comparative study comparing the P4P model in selected countries in 2022. Data for each country are collected from reliable databases and are tabulated to compare their payment models. the standard framework of the P4P model is used for data analysis.

RESULTS

we used the standard P4P model framework to compare pay for performance programs in the primary care sector of selected countries because this framework can demonstrate all the necessary features of payment programs, including performance domains and measures, basis for reward or penalty, nature of the reward or penalty, and data reporting. The results of this study show that although the principles of P4P are almost similar in the selected countries, the biggest difference is in the definition of performance domains and measures.

CONCLUSIONS

Designing an effective P4P program is very complex, and its success depends on a variety of factors, from the socioeconomic and cultural context and the healthcare goals of governments to the personal characteristics of the healthcare provider. considering these factors and the general framework of the features of P4P programs are critical to the success of the p4p design and implementation.

Alternative Reimbursement Models for Health Providers in High-Performance Sport: Stakeholder Experiences and Perceptions

BACKGROUND

Value-based healthcare provider reimbursement models have been proposed as an alternative to traditional fee-for-service arrangements that can align financial reimbursement more closely to the outcomes of value to patients and society. This study aimed to investigate stakeholder perceptions and experiences of different reimbursement systems for healthcare providers in high-performance sport, with a focus on fee-for-service versus salaried provider models.

METHODS

Three in-depth semi-structured focus group discussions and one individual interview were conducted with key stakeholders across the Australian high-performance sport system. Participants included healthcare providers, health managers, sports managers and executive personnel. An interview guide was developed using the Exploration, Preparation, Implementation, Sustainment framework, with key themes deductively mapped to the innovation, inner context and outer context domains. A total of 16 stakeholders participated in a focus group discussion or interview.

RESULTS

Participants identified several key advantages of salaried provider models over fee-for-service arrangements, including: the potential for more proactive and preventive models of care; enhanced inter-disciplinary collaboration; and the ability for providers to have a deeper understanding of context and how their role aligns with a broader set of priorities for an athlete and the organisation. Noted challenges of salaried provider models included the potential for providers to revert to reactive care delivery when not afforded adequate capacity to provide services, and difficulties for providers in demonstrating and quantifying the value of their work.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings suggest that high-performance sporting organisations seeking to improve primary prevention and multidisciplinary care should consider salaried provider arrangements. Further research to confirm these findings using prospective, experimental study designs remains a priority.

Impact of a diabetes pay-for-performance program on nonincentivized mental disorders: a panel study based on claims database analysis

BACKGROUND

Diabetes is one of the most prevalent chronic diseases with subsequent complications. The positive effects of diabetes pay-for-performance (P4P) programs on treatment outcomes have been reported. The program provides financial incentives based on physiological care indicators, but common mental disorder complications such as depression are not covered.

METHODS

This study employed a natural experimental design to examine the spillover effects of diabetes P4P program on patients with nonincentivized depressive symptoms. The intervention group consisted of diabetes patients enrolled in the DM P4P program from 2010 to 2015. Unenrolled patients were selected by propensity score matching to form the comparison group. Difference-in-differences analyses were conducted to evaluate the effects of P4P programs. We employed generalized estimating equation (GEE) models, difference-in-differences analyses and difference-in-difference-in-differences analyses to evaluate the net effect of diabetes P4P programs. Changes in medical expenses (outpatient and total health care costs) over time were analysed for the treatment and comparison groups.

RESULTS

The results showed that enrolled patients had a higher incidence of depressive symptoms than unenrolled patients. The outpatient and total care expenses of diabetes patients with depressive symptoms were lower in the intervention group than in the comparison group. Diabetes patients with depressive symptoms enrolled in the DM P4P program had lower expenses for depression-related care than those not enrolled in the program.

CONCLUSIONS

The DM P4P program benefits diabetes patients by screening for depressive symptoms and lowering accompanying health care expenses. These positive spillover effects may be an important aspect of physical and mental health in patients with chronic disease enrolled in disease management programs while contributing to the control of health care expenses for chronic diseases.

Assessing Taiwan's pay-for-performance program for diabetes care: a cost-benefit net value approach

Pay-for-Performance (P4P) to better manage chronic conditions has yielded mixed results. A better understanding of the cost and benefit of P4P is needed to improve program assessment. To this end, we assessed the effect of a P4P program using a quasi-experimental intervention and control design. Two different intervention groups were used, one consisting of newly enrolled P4P patients, and another using P4P patients who have been enrolled since the beginning of the study. Patient-level data on clinical indicators, utilization and expenditures, linked with national death registry, were collected for diabetic patients at a large regional hospital in Taiwan between 2007 and 2013. Net value, defined as the value of life years gained minus the cost of care, is calculated and compared for the intervention group of P4P patients with propensity score-matched non-P4P samples. We found that Taiwan's implementation of the P4P program for diabetic care yielded positive net values, ranging from $40,084 USD to $348,717 USD, with higher net values in the continuous enrollment model. Our results suggest that the health benefits from P4P enrollment may require a sufficient time frame to manifest, so a net value approach incorporating future predicted mortality risks may be especially important for studying chronic disease management. Future research on the mechanisms by which the Taiwan P4P program helped improve outcomes could help translate our findings to other clinical contexts.

Does the implementation of an incentive scheme increase adherence to diabetes guidelines? A retrospective cohort study of managed care enrollees

BACKGROUND

A novel incentive scheme based on a joint agreement of a large Swiss health insurance with 56 physician networks was implemented in 2018. This study evaluated the effect of its implementation on adherence to evidence-based guidelines among patients with diabetes in managed care models.

METHODS

We performed a retrospective cohort study, using health care claims data from patients with diabetes enrolled in a managed care plan (2016-2019). Guideline adherence was assessed by four evidence-based performance measures and four hierarchically constructed adherence levels. Generalized multilevel models were used to examine the effect of the incentive scheme on guideline adherence.

RESULTS

A total of 6'273 patients with diabetes were included in this study. The raw descriptive statistics showed minor improvements in guideline adherence after the implementation. After adjusting for underlying patient characteristics and potential differences between physician networks, the likelihood of receiving a test was moderately but consistently higher after the implementation of the incentive scheme for most performance measures, ranging from 18% (albuminuria: OR, 1.18; 95%-CI, 1.05-1.33) to 58% (HDL cholesterol: OR, 1.58; 95%-CI, 1.40-1.78). Full adherence was more likely after implementation of the incentive scheme (OR, 1.37; 95%-CI, 1.20-1.55), whereas level 1 significantly decreased (OR, 0.74; 95%-CI, 0.65 - 0.85). The proportions of the other adherence levels were stable.

CONCLUSION

Incentive schemes including transparency of the achieved performance may be able to improve guideline adherence in patients with diabetes and are promising to increase quality of care in this patient population.

Effects of performance-based capitation payment on the use of public primary health care services in Indonesia

The Indonesian national health insurance agency BPJS Kesehatan, the largest single-payer system in the world, is among the first to combine capitation-based payments with performance-based financing. The Kapitasi Berbasis Komitmen (KBK) scheme for puskesmas (community health centres) was implemented in province capitals between August 2015 and May 2016. Its main goal was to incentivize the substitution of secondary by primary care use. We evaluate its effect on its three incentivized outcomes: the fraction of insured visiting the puskesmas, the fraction of chronically ill with a puskesmas visit and the hospital referral rate for insured with a non-specialistic condition. We use BPJS Kesehatan claims data from 2015 to 2016 from a stratified one percent sample of its members. Comparable control districts were identified using coarsened exact matching. We adopt a Difference-in-Differences (DID) study design and estimate a two-way fixed effects regression model to compare 27 intervention districts to 300 comparable non-capital control districts. We find that KBK payment increased the monthly percentage of enrolees contacting a puskesmas with 0.578 percentage points. This is a sizeable increase of 48 percent compared to the baseline rate of just 1.2% but it still leaves most puskesmas far below the "sufficient" KBK threshold of 15%. For chronically ill patients, a small increase of 1.15 percentage points was estimated, but it leaves the rate even further below the program's "sufficient" threshold of 50%. We find no statistically significant effect on referral rates to hospitals for conditions not requiring specialist care. While we find positive effects of KBK on two out of three outcomes, all estimated effect sizes leave the actual rates far below the program targets. Our findings suggest that the KBK performance-based capitation reform has not been very successful in substituting secondary care use by greater primary care use.

The effectiveness of pay-for-performance contracts with non-governmental organizations in Afghanistan - results of a controlled interrupted time series analysis

BACKGROUND

In many contexts, including fragile settings like Afghanistan, the coverage of basic health services is low. To address these challenges there has been considerable interest in working with NGOs and examining the effect of financial incentives on service providers. The Government of Afghanistan has used contracting with NGOs for more than 15 years and in 2019 introduced pay-for-performance (P4P) into the contracts. This study examines the impact of P4P on health service delivery in Afghanistan.

METHODS

We conducted an interrupted time series (ITS) analysis with a non-randomized comparison group that employed segmented regression models and used independently verified health management information system (HMIS) data from 2015 to 2021. We compared 31 provinces with P4P contracts to 3 provinces where the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) continued to deliver services without P4P. We used data from annual health facility surveys to assess the quality of care.

FINDINGS

Independent verification of the HMIS data found that consistency and accuracy was greater than 90% in the contracted provinces. The introduction of P4P increased the 10 P4P-compensated service delivery outcomes by a median of 22.1 percentage points (range 10.2 to 43.8) for the two-arm analysis and 19.9 percentage points (range: - 8.3 to 56.1) for the one-arm analysis. There was a small decrease in quality of care initially, but it was short-lived. We found few other unintended consequences.

INTERPRETATION

P4P contracts with NGOs led to a substantial improvement in service delivery at lower cost despite a very difficult security situation. The promising results from this large-scale experience warrant more extensive application of P4P contracts in other fragile settings or wherever coverage remains low.

Pay-for-performance for primary health care in Brazil: A comparison with England's Quality Outcomes Framework and lessons for the future

Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been widely applied in OECD countries to improve the quality of both primary and secondary care, and is increasingly being implemented in low- and middle-income countries. In 2011, Brazil introduced one of the largest P4P schemes in the world, the National Programme for Improving Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ). We critically assess the design of PMAQ, drawing on a comparison with England's quality and outcome framework which, like PMAQ, was implemented at scale relatively rapidly within a nationalised health system. A key feature of PMAQ was that payment was based on the performance of primary care teams but rewards were given to municipalities, who had autonomy in how the funds could be used. This meant the incentives felt by family health teams were contingent on municipality decisions on whether to pass the funds on as bonuses and the basis upon which they allocated the funds between and within teams. Compared with England's P4P scheme, performance measurement under PMAQ focused more on structural rather than process quality of care, relied on many more indicators, and was less regular. While PMAQ represented an important new funding stream for primary health care, our review suggests that theoretical incentives generated were unclear and could have been better structured to direct health providers towards improvements in quality of care.

The role of pay-for-performance in reducing healthcare disparities: A narrative literature review

As American healthcare shifts to value-based payment, Pay-for-Performance (P4P) has become an important and controversial topic. One of the main controversies pertains to its potential to narrow or widen existing healthcare disparities depending on how the program is designed and implemented. It is thus imperative to understand which design features are most likely to reduce disparities. We conducted a systematic literature review from 2004 to 2021 of P4P's impact on disparities. Given the interdisciplinary nature of P4P research, multiple search strategies were combined, and many study designs were eligible for analysis. The literature was then qualitatively analyzed, with themes and major findings developed using Grounded Theory. Six major design features emerged as most promising in leveraging P4P to reduce disparities: 1) Risk/Case-Mix Adjustment; 2) Stratified Performance Measures/Stratification; 3) Disparity Reduction Metrics; 4) Exception Reporting; 5) Pay-for-Improvement; and 6) Population-Specific Metrics. Each design feature has its own mechanism, strengths, and weaknesses. We identify and define these features' direct and indirect effects on healthcare disparities. The interaction of each design feature with one another, with P4P as a whole, and within the larger reimbursement system can have considerable effects on disparities. Promising strategies exist to leverage P4P to narrow disparities for clinically and socially complex patients. The six design features discussed in this review help P4P programs address structural disadvantages faced by such patients and their providers. In regard to health equity, these design features can transform P4P from being part of the problem to being part of the solution.

The effect of a pay-for-performance program on health-related quality of life for patients with hepatitis in Taiwan

Purpose

Chronic viral hepatitis is a major global public health problem. The guidelines suggest the long-term performance of regular ongoing liver examinations to monitor liver inflammation and screen for hepatocellular carcinoma. However, the effects of regular liver examinations on health-related quality of life (HRQoL) have not been adequately evaluated. Therefore, this study evaluated the effects of regular ongoing examinations on the quality of life of patients with hepatitis.

Methods

A cross-sectional study was conducted from October to December 2016 in four hospitals in northern Taiwan. A hepatitis pay-for-performance (P4P) program was launched in 2010 to ensure that hepatitis patients have regular ongoing liver examinations. The study group consisted of patients who joined and stayed in the program for more than one year. The study assessed HRQoL utilizing the five-level version of the EuroQol-5 Dimension (EQ-5D-5L) and the EuroQoL visual analog scale (EQ-VAS). The responses for the EQ-5D-5L in hepatitis patients were transformed into the EQ-5D index according to the Taiwanese population’s value set. Sociodemographic and clinical characteristics were collected by questionnaire, and descriptive statistics were presented. A two-part model and generalized linear model with a Poisson distribution and a log link function, respectively, were used to examine the associations of the EQ-5D index and EQ-VAS score with participation in the hepatitis P4P program. We applied propensity score weighting with inverse probability weighting to control for selection bias.

Results

In all, 508 patients (aged 57.6 ± 11.6 years; 60.8% male) were enrolled in this study. The mean (standard deviation, SD) reported EQ-5D index and EQ-VAS scores were 0.93 (0.12) and 75.1 (13.8), and the median (interquartile range, IQR) values were 1 (0.108) and 80 (15), respectively. The study group had a moderately significantly higher EQ-VAS score (mean ratio = 1.029, P < 0.001). However, the differences in the EQ-5D index scores between the study and control groups were not significant.

Conclusion

Patients with hepatitis partially benefited from receiving hepatitis P4P in Taiwan, which featured regular ongoing liver examinations, in that their EQ-VAS scores were enhanced but not their EQ-5D index scores.

Combined impact of Medicare's hospital pay for performance programs on quality and safety outcomes is mixed

BACKGROUND

Three major hospital pay for performance (P4P) programs were introduced by the Affordable Care Act and intended to improve the quality, safety and efficiency of care provided to Medicare beneficiaries. The financial risk to hospitals associated with Medicare's P4P programs is substantial. Evidence on the positive impact of these programs, however, has been mixed, and no study has assessed their combined impact. In this study, we examined the combined impact of Medicare's P4P programs on clinical areas and populations targeted by the programs, as well as those outside their focus.

METHODS

We used 2007-2016 Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project State Inpatient Databases for 14 states to identify hospital-level inpatient quality indicators (IQIs) and patient safety indicators (PSIs), by quarter and payer (Medicare vs. non-Medicare). IQIs and PSIs are standardized, evidence-based measures that can be used to track hospital quality of care and patient safety over time using hospital administrative data. The study period of 2007-2016 was selected to capture multiple years before and after introduction of program metrics. Interrupted time series was used to analyze the impact of the P4P programs on study outcomes targeted and not targeted by the programs. In sensitivity analyses, we examined the impact of these programs on care for non-Medicare patients.

RESULTS

Medicare P4P programs were not associated with consistent improvements in targeted or non-targeted quality and safety measures. Moreover, mortality rates across targeted and untargeted conditions were generally getting worse after the introduction of Medicare's P4P programs. Trends in PSIs were extremely mixed, with five outcomes trending in an expected (improving) direction, five trending in an unexpected (deteriorating) direction, and three with insignificant changes over time. Sensitivity analyses did not substantially alter these results.

CONCLUSIONS

Consistent with previous studies for individual programs, we detect minimal, if any, effect of Medicare's hospital P4P programs on quality and safety. Given the growing evidence of limited impact, the administrative cost of monitoring and enforcing penalties, and potential increase in mortality, CMS should consider redesigning their P4P programs before continuing to expand them.

Incentivizing appropriate prescribing in primary care: Development and first results of an electronic health record-based pay-for-performance scheme

OBJECTIVE

Part of the funding of Dutch General Practitioners (GPs) care is based on pay-for-performance, including an incentive for appropriate prescribing according to guidelines in national formularies. Aim of this paper is to describe the development of an indicator and an infrastructure based on prescription data from GP Electronic Health Records (EHR), to assess the level of adherence to formularies and the effects of the pay-for-performance scheme, thereby assessing the usefulness of the infrastructure and the indicator.

METHODS

Adherence to formularies was calculated as the percentage of first prescriptions by the GP for medications that were included in one of the national formularies used by the GP, based on prescription data from EHRs. Adherence scores were collected quarterly for 2018 and 2019 and subsequently sent to health insurance companies for the pay-for-performance scheme. Adherence scores were used to monitor the effect of the pay-for-performance scheme.

RESULTS

75% (2018) and 83% (2019) of all GP practicesparticipated. Adherence to formularies was around 85% or 95%, depending on the formulary used. Adherence improved significantly, especially for practices that scored lowest in 2018.

DISCUSSION

We found high levels of adherence to national formularies, with small improvements after one year. The infrastructure will be used to further stimulate formulary-based prescribing by implementing more actionable and relevant indicators on adherence scores for GPs.

Targeting for nonpoint source pollution reduction: A synthesis of lessons learned, remaining challenges, and emerging opportunities

The ability to identify, target, and treat critical pollution source areas on a landscape is an ongoing challenge for water quality programs that seek to address nonpoint source (NPS) pollution. In this article, we develop a conceptual framework for targeting program design, and review recent experience with the implementation of targeting programs that corresponds with a wide range of program characteristics. Through this review, we emphasize that the complex and locally dependent nature of NPS generation and transport makes it impossible to define a narrow set of rules to guide targeting programs everywhere. Instead, we evaluate key features of NPS targeting in several different contexts, highlighting lessons learned from recent experience. This synthesis of targeting program design and implementation points toward several areas of opportunity for improved NPS policy, however more research is needed to systematically document changes in behavior and pollutant loads. The lack of monitoring data at refined scales presents a major obstacle to targeting program success. This paper synthesizes new opportunities and ongoing challenges for the implementation of targeting in NPS water quality programs.

Multidisciplinary care program in pre-end-stage kidney disease from 2010 to 2018 in Taiwan

BACKGROUND

The Taiwanese government launched a universal pay-for-performance (P4P) program in 2006 to promote multidisciplinary care for patients with stage 3b-5 chronic kidney disease (CKD). This study aimed to understand the enrollments, care processes, and outcomes of the P4P program between 2010 and 2018.

METHODS

We conducted a population-based study using the Taiwan National Health Insurance Research Data. We divided the incident dialysis population into joining and not joining P4P groups based on whether patients had joined the pre-ESRD program before dialysis or not. Trends in the medications prescribed, anemia correction, vascular access preparation before dialysis initiation, and cumulative survival rate were compared.

RESULTS

The program included more than 100,000 patients with late-stage CKD. Enrollment increased by almost 100% from 2010 to 2018, with increases seen in those over 75 years old (127.5%), male (96.7%), and earlier CKD stages (≥35% stage 3b in 2018). Females were more likely to stay being enrolled. The joining P4P group was prescribed more appropriate medications, such as erythropoietin-stimulating agents and statins. However, a high number of patients were still prescribed metformin (≥40%) and non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (≥20%). Compared to the not joining P4P group, the patients in the P4P group had better anemia management, dialysis preparation, and post-dialysis survival.

CONCLUSION

The patients in the joining P4P program group were delivered more appropriate CKD care and were associated with better survival outcomes. Polices and action plans are needed to extend the coverage of and enrollment in the P4P program.

The Effectiveness of Pay-for-Performance Program of Diabetes Care for Psychiatric Patients: A Regional Psychiatric Hospital Experience

BACKGROUND

The Pay-for-performance (P4P) program of diabetes care has demonstrated successful outcomes in patients with type 2 diabetes. However, the effectiveness of this multidisciplinary care model for psychiatric patients has never been evaluated. The objective of this study is to examine the effectiveness of P4P program of diabetes for psychiatric patients with diabetes.

METHODS

This study utilized a retrospective cohort design to examine the effectiveness of P4P program of diabetes care for psychiatric patients with diabetes. The participants' HbA1c (hemoglobin A1c) data of the fourth quarter in 2018 were used as baseline value, while P4P program was not applied yet. HbA1c data of every quarter in 2019 were collected. Generalized estimating equations (GEE) was used to analyze the change of HbA1c level.

RESULTS

The HbA1c level increased slightly in the first quarter, and then decreased gradually since the second quarter. The HbA1c level was significantly lower in the fourth quarter after P4P program intervention (p < 0.05).

CONCLUSION

P4P program of diabetes care is also effective on psychiatric patients with diabetes, and this multidisciplinary care model could be encouraged and promoted for psychiatric patients with diabetes.

Diverse community leaders' perspectives about quality primary healthcare and healthcare measurement: Qualitative community-based participatory research

Background

Healthcare quality measurements in the United States illustrate disparities by racial/ethnic group, socio-economic class, and geographic location. Redressing healthcare inequities, including measurement of and reimbursement for healthcare quality, requires partnering with communities historically excluded from decision-making. Quality healthcare is measured according to insurers, professional organizations and government agencies, with little input from diverse communities. This community-based participatory research study aimed to amplify the voices of community leaders from seven diverse urban communities in Minneapolis-Saint Paul Minnesota, view quality healthcare and financial reimbursement based on quality metric scores.

Methods

A Community Engagement Team consisting of one community member from each of seven urban communities —Black/African American, Lesbian-Gay-Bisexual-Transgender-Queer-Two Spirit, Hmong, Latino/a/x, Native American, Somali, and White—and two community-based researchers conducted listening sessions with 20 community leaders about quality primary healthcare. Transcripts were inductively analyzed and major themes were identified.

Results

Listening sessions produced three major themes, with recommended actions for primary care clinics.

#1: Quality Clinics Utilize Structures and Processes that Support Healthcare Equity.

#2: Quality Clinics Offer Effective Relationships, Education, and Health Promotion.

#3: Funding Based on Current Quality Measures Perpetuates Health Inequities.

Conclusion

Community leaders identified ideal characteristics of quality primary healthcare, most of which are not currently measured. They expressed concern that linking clinic payment with quality metrics without considering social and structural determinants of health perpetuates social injustice in healthcare.

Potential, challenges and pitfalls of pay-for-performance schemes: a narrative review evaluating the merits for the Australian home care sector

PURPOSE

This qualitative narrative review aims to identify and evaluate the potential, challenges and pitfalls of pay-for-performance (P4P) schemes for the home care of adults with a disability. Due to a limited experimentation with P4P schemes in the context of the home and disability care sectors, the authors conducted a narrative review focusing on related areas of care, primarily nursing home care, to better understand the effectiveness of P4P schemes as a care intervention and evaluate the challenges associated with the introduction of these schemes.

DESIGN/METHODOLOGY/APPROACH

The authors employed a narrative review approach to examine the effectiveness of P4P schemes as a care intervention. The approach included a manual content analysis of the relevant academic and grey literature, focusing on the potential, challenges and pitfalls of P4P for care funders and providers.

FINDINGS

There is some, albeit limited, evidence from other related areas of care to support the effectiveness of P4P to improve the quality of care or the efficiency of its delivery for the home care sector. The results of prior studies are, however, often mixed and inconclusive, due to flaws with the design of schemes, including the nature of the incentives. Limited duration and poor-quality evaluations have further hampered the ability of studies to demonstrate the effectiveness of P4P schemes, which diminishes the credibility of these care interventions. When undertaken systematically, there seems to be some evidence that P4P can work; however, it requires careful design, implementation, measurement and evaluation.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

Based on the challenges associated with the successful implementation of P4P schemes, the authors identified lessons for the design, implementation, measurement and evaluation of P4P schemes for care funders and policymakers.

ORIGINALITY/VALUE

This study critically evaluates the potential of P4P as a care intervention for the home care and disability sectors. By evaluating the potential, challenges and pitfalls associated with P4P in related areas of care, the study provides guidance to home care funders, providers and policymakers in care settings.

Incentives for physician teams: Effectiveness of performance feedback and payment distribution methods

Best practices in team-based incentive design remain underexplored. This study examines under group-based pay-for-performance, how managers incentivize physicians for teamwork through internal feedback and payment distribution methods. In collaboration with Taiwan Association of Family Medicine, authors conducted a national survey of physician groups, with a response rate of 48.3%. Multilevel linear regression was applied to 134 groups, collectively consisting of 1,245 physicians in Taiwan. The outcome variables were two manager-rated scores for group performance on achieving (a) comprehensive, coordinated, continuous care, and (b) patient health improvement. The results indicate that providing each physician feedback on peer performance is superior to not providing it; when providing peer information within a group, concealing identities is superior to revealing them. These findings imply that application of the principle of social comparison can be effective; however, caution should be taken when disclosure of identifiable peer performance may intensify peer competition and undermine care coordination in team-based models. Further, groups that distribute payments equally among physicians perform better than groups that distributed payment proportionally to physicians' patient shares. The findings are germane to small teams, where physicians do not have full control over care processes and outcomes, and need to work cooperatively to maximize group-based payment.

Lessons Learned From Ohio's Statewide Implementation of the Preferences for Everyday Living Inventory as a Pay for Performance Initiative to Enhance Person-Centered Care

Person-centered care (PCC) in nursing homes is an elusive organizational goal that has attracted the attention of pay-for-performance (P4P) programs. P4P programs are used to incentivize providers to improve the quality of care delivered. However, P4P programs have both overarching policy initiatives (big "P") that must incorporate an implementation framework that is adaptable in practice (little "p"). The purpose of this paper is to apply six key factors that are central to P4P design in long-term care settings: financial incentives, measurement, stakeholder involvement and alignment, feasibility, education and awareness, and reporting and transparency as a framework for a case study of a P4P initiative conducted in Ohio between 2015 and 2019. Notably, the case study is focused on PCC and how the Ohio Department of Medicaid selected the Preferences for Everyday Living Inventory (PELI) for nursing home providers to use with all of their residents. Although inclusion of the PELI met some of the key factors, such as measurement, its implementation did not meet other key factors, such as reporting and transparency. Based on lessons learned from the Ohio P4P, recommendations are presented for use of the PELI as both a process and outcome measure in future P4P initiatives.

Quality Improvement and Public Reporting in STEMI Care

Mortality rates for patients with ST-segment elevation myocardial infarction (STEMI) remain high despite development of novel drugs and interventions over the past several decades. There is significant variability between hospitals in use of evidence-based treatments, and substantial opportunities exist to optimize care pathways and reduce disparities in care delivery. Quality improvement interventions implemented at local, regional, and national levels have improved care processes and patient outcomes. This article reviews evidence for quality improvement interventions along the spectrum of STEMI care, describes existing systems for quality measurement, and examines local and national policy interventions, with special attention to public reporting programs.

Chronic care model in the diabetes pay-for-performance program in Taiwan: Benefits, challenges and future directions

In this review, we discuss the chronic care model (CCM) in relation to the diabetes pay-for-performance (P4P) program in Taiwan. We first introduce the 6 components of the CCM and provide a detailed description of each of the activities in the P4P program implemented in Taiwan, mapping them onto the 6 components of the CCM. For each CCM component, the following three topics are described: the definition of the CCM component, the general activities implemented related to this component, and practical and empirical practices based on hospital or local government cases. We then conclude by describing the possible successful features of this P4P program and its challenges and future directions. We conclude that the successful characteristics of this P4P program in Taiwan include its focus on extrinsic and intrinsic incentives (i.e., shared care network), physician-led P4P and the implementation of activities based on the CCM components. However, due to the low rate of P4P program coverage, approximately 50% of patients with diabetes cannot enjoy the benefits of CCM-related activities or receive necessary examinations. In addition, most of these CCM-related activities are not allotted an adequate amount of incentives, and these activities are mainly implemented in hospitals, which compared with primary care providers, are unable to execute these activities flexibly. All of these issues, as well as insufficient implementation of the e-CCM model, could hinder the advanced improvement of diabetes care in Taiwan.

Radiology Patient Outcome Measures: Impact of a Departmental Pay-for-Performance Initiative on Key Quality and Safety Measures

OBJECTIVE

Assess impact of a multifaceted pay-for-performance (PFP) initiative on radiologists' behavior regarding key quality and safety measures.

METHODS

This institutional review board-approved prospective study was performed at a large, 12-division urban academic radiology department. Radiology patient outcome measures were implemented October 1, 2017, measuring report signature timeliness, critical results communication, and generation of peer-learning communications between radiologists. Subspecialty division-wide and individual radiologist targets were specified, performance was transparently communicated on an intranet dashboard updated daily, and performance was financially incentivized (5% of salary) quarterly. We compared outcomes 12 months pre- versus 12 months post-PFP implementation. Primary outcome was monthly 90th percentile time from scan completion to final report signature (CtoF). Secondary outcomes were percentage timely closed-loop communication of critical results and number of division-wide peer-learning communications. Statistical process control analysis and parallel coordinates charts were used to assess for temporal trends.

RESULTS

In all, 144 radiologists generated 1,255,771 reports (613,273 pre-PFP) during the study period. Monthly 90th percentile CtoF exhibited an absolute decrease of 4.4 hours (from 21.1 to 16.7 hours) and a 20.9% relative decrease post-PFP. Statistical process control analysis demonstrated significant decreases in 90th percentile CtoF post-PFP, sustained throughout the study period (P < .003). Between 95% (119 of 125, July 1, 2018, to September 30, 2018) and 98.4% (126 of 128, October 1, 2017, to December 31, 2017) of radiologists achieved >90% timely closure of critical alerts; all divisions exceeded the target of 90 peer-learning communications each quarter (range: 97-472) after January 1, 2018.

DISCUSSION

Implementation of a multifaceted PFP initiative using well-defined radiology patient outcome measures correlated with measurable improvements in radiologist behavior regarding key quality and safety parameters.

The effect of pay-for-performance program on infection events and mortality rate in diabetic patients: a nationwide population-based cohort study

Background

Diabetes mellitus is a known risk factor for infection. Pay for Performance (P4P) program is designed to enhance the comprehensive patient care. The aim of this study is to evaluate the effect of the P4P program on infection incidence in type 2 diabetic patients.

Methods

This is a retrospective longitudinal cohort study using data from the National Health Insurance Research Database in Taiwan. Diabetic patients between 1 January 2002 and 31 December 2013 were included. Primary outcomes analyzed were patient emergency room (ER) infection events and deaths.

Results

After propensity score matching, there were 337,184 patients in both the P4P and non-P4P cohort. The results showed that patients’ completing one-year P4P program was associated with a decreased risk of any ER infection event (27.2% vs. 29%; subdistribution hazard ratio [HR] 0.87, 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.86–0.88). While the number needed to treat was 58 for the non-P4P group, it dropped to 28 in the P4P group. The risk of infection-related death was significantly lower in the P4P group than in the non-P4P group (4.1% vs. 7.6%; HR 0.46, 95% CI 0.45–0.47). The effect of P4P on ER infection incidence and infection-related death was more apparent in the subgroups of patients who were female, had diabetes duration ≥5 years, chronic kidney disease, higher Charlson’s Comorbidity Index scores and infection-related hospitalization in the previous 3 years.

Conclusions

The P4P program might reduce risk of ER infection events and infection-related deaths in type 2 diabetic patients.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s12913-021-06091-2.

Tools of power: pay-for-performance in French and German health reforms

PURPOSE

Pay-for-performance (P4P) as an innovation for improved health care has been introduced in many health systems worldwide. The aim of this article is to apply and refine a specific theoretical angle for the analysis of these reforms, the theoretical frameworks of public policy instruments and programmatic actors, in order to highlight differences between countries.

DESIGN/METHODOLOGY/APPROACH

This analysis is based on a comparative case study of the introduction of P4P in France and Germany in the ambulatory sector for the period from 2007 until 2017. This included a literature review and semi-structured interviews with 23 actors between 2013 and 2015.

FINDINGS

The introduction of a supposedly clear-cut policy instrument - P4P in health care - is distinctly shaped by the intertwined configuration of institutional architecture and the policy programme of key system actors. This can be understood as a continuation of long-term transformations, most importantly the increasingly direct influence of the state and a weakening of the representation of the medical profession, as well as an internal fragmentation of the latter.

ORIGINALITY/VALUE

This analysis illustrates the applicability of the policy instrument approach to the heath sector. In addition, the authors have applied the dual perspective of policy instruments and programmatic actors. Both proved complementary and appropriate for the study of a highly technical instrument such as P4P.

Do penalty-based pay-for-performance programs improve surgical care more effectively than other payment strategies? A systematic review

Background

The aim of this systematic review is to assess if penalty-based pay-for-performance (P4P) programs are more effective in improving quality and cost outcomes compared to two other payment strategies (i.e., rewards and a combination of rewards and penalties) for surgical care in the United States. Penalty-based programs have gained in popularity because of their potential to motivate behavioral change more effectively than reward-based programs to improve quality of care. However, little is known about whether penalties are more effective than other strategies.

Materials and methods

A systematic literature review was conducted according to the PRISMA guideline to identify studies that evaluated the effects of P4P programs on quality and cost outcomes for surgical care. Five databases were used to search studies published from 2003 to March 1, 2020. Studies were selected based on the PRISMA guidelines. Methodological quality of individual studies was assessed based on ROBINS-I with GRADE approach.

Results

This review included 22 studies. Fifteen cross-sectional, 1 prospective cohort, 4 retrospective cohort, and 2 case-control studies were found. We identified 11 unique P4P programs: 5 used rewards, 3 used penalties, and 3 used a combination of rewards and penalties as a payment strategy. Five out of 10 studies reported positive effects of penalty-based programs, whereas evidence from studies evaluating P4P programs with a reward design or combination of rewards and penalties was little or null.

Conclusions

This review highlights that P4P programs with a penalty design could be more effective than programs using rewards or a combination of rewards and penalties to improve quality of surgical care.

•

Evidence on the effectiveness of pay-for-performance programs in quality improvement is mixed.

•

Five out of 10 studies reported positive effects of penalty-based programs.

•

Evidence from studies evaluating P4P programs with a reward design or combination of rewards and penalties was little or null.

•

The increasing use of penalty-based pay-for-performance programs has the potential to improve surgical care quality.

•

Penalties may induce stronger provider and hospital behavioral change than other payment strategies.

The evidence gap on gendered impacts of performance-based financing among family physicians for chronic disease care: a systematic review reanalysis in contexts of single-payer universal coverage

BACKGROUND

Although pay-for-performance (P4P) among primary care physicians for enhanced chronic disease management is increasingly common, the evidence base is fragmented in terms of socially equitable impacts in achieving the quadruple aim for healthcare improvement: better population health, reduced healthcare costs, and enhanced patient and provider experiences. This study aimed to assess the literature from a systematic review on how P4P for diabetes services impacts on gender equity in patient outcomes and the physician workforce.

METHODS

A gender-based analysis was performed of studies retrieved through a systematic search of 10 abstract and citation databases plus grey literature sources for P4P impact assessments in multiple languages over the period January 2000 to April 2018, following the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines. The study was restricted to single-payer national health systems to minimize the risk of physicians sorting out of health organizations with a strong performance pay component. Two reviewers scored and synthesized the integration of sex and gender in assessing patient- and provider-oriented outcomes as well as the quality of the evidence.

FINDINGS

Of the 2218 identified records, 39 studies covering eight P4P interventions in seven countries were included for analysis. Most (79%) of the studies reported having considered sex/gender in the design, but only 28% presented sex-disaggregated patient data in the results of the P4P assessment models, and none (0%) assessed the interaction of patients' sex with the policy intervention. Few (15%) of the studies controlled for the provider's sex, and none (0%) discussed impacts of P4P on the work life of providers from a gender perspective (e.g., pay equity).

CONCLUSIONS

There is a dearth of evidence on gender-based outcomes of publicly funded incentivizing physician payment schemes for chronic disease care. As the popularity of P4P to achieve health system goals continues to grow, so does the risk of unintended consequences. There is a critical need for research integrating gender concerns to help inform performance-based health workforce financing policy options in the era of the Sustainable Development Goals.

Effects of pay-for-performance on prescription of hypertension drugs among public and private primary care providers in Sweden

This study exploits policy reforms in Swedish primary care to examine the effect of pay-for-performance (P4P) on compliance with hypertension drug guidelines among public and private health care providers. Using provider-level outcome data for 2005-2013 from the Swedish Prescription Register, providers in regions using P4P were compared to providers in other regions in a difference-in-differences analysis. The results indicate that P4P improved guideline compliance regarding prescription of angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitors and angiotensin receptor blockers. The effect was mainly driven by private providers, suggesting that policy makers should take ownership into account when designing incentives for health care providers.

How are pay-for-performance schemes in healthcare designed in low- and middle-income countries? Typology and systematic literature review

BACKGROUND

Pay for performance (P4P) schemes provide financial incentives to health workers or facilities based on the achievement of pre-specified performance targets and have been widely implemented in health systems across low and middle-income countries (LMICs). The growing evidence base on P4P highlights that (i) there is substantial variation in the effect of P4P schemes on outcomes and (ii) there appears to be heterogeneity in incentive design. Even though scheme design is likely a key determinant of scheme effectiveness, we currently lack systematic evidence on how P4P schemes are designed in LMICs.

METHODS

We develop a typology to classify the design of P4P schemes in LMICs, which highlights different design features that are a priori likely to affect the behaviour of incentivised actors. We then use results from a systematic literature review to classify and describe the design of P4P schemes that have been evaluated in LMICs. To capture academic publications, Medline, Embase, and EconLit databases were searched. To include relevant grey literature, Google Scholar, Emerald Insight, and websites of the World Bank, WHO, Cordaid, Norad, DfID, USAID and PEPFAR were searched.

RESULTS

We identify 41 different P4P schemes implemented in 29 LMICs. We find that there is substantial heterogeneity in the design of P4P schemes in LMICs and pinpoint precisely how scheme design varies across settings. Our results also highlight that incentive design is not adequately being reported on in the literature - with many studies failing to report key design features.

CONCLUSIONS

We encourage authors to make a greater effort to report information on P4P scheme design in the future and suggest using the typology laid out in this paper as a starting point.

Awareness of, attitude toward, and willingness to participate in pay for performance programs among family physicians: a cross-sectional study

Background

The National Health Insurance Administration of Taiwan has introduced several pay-for-performance programs to improve the quality of healthcare. This study aimed to provide government with evidence-based research findings to help primary care physicians to actively engage in pay-for-performance programs.

Methods

We conducted a questionnaire survey among family physicians with age-stratified sampling from September 2016 to December 2017. The structured questionnaire consisted of items including the basic demographics of the surveyee and their awareness of and attitudes toward the strengths and/or weaknesses of the pay-for-performance programs, as well as their subjective norms, and the willingness to participate in the pay-for-performance programs. Univariate analysis and multivariate logistic regression analysis were performed to compare the differences between family physicians who participate in the pay-for-performance programs versus those who did not.

Results

A total of 543 family physicians completed the questionnaire. Among family physicians who participated in the pay-for-performance programs, more had joined the Family Practice Integrated Care Project [Odds ratio (OR): 2.70; 95% Confidence interval (CI): 1.78 ~ 4.09], had a greater awareness of pay-for-performance programs (OR: 2.37; 95% CI: 1.50 ~ 3.83), and a less negative attitude to pay-for-performance programs (OR: 0.50; 95% CI: 0.31 ~ 0.80) after adjusting for age and gender. The major reasons for family physicians who decided to join the pay-for-performance programs included believing the programs help enhance the quality of healthcare (80.8%) and recognizing the benefit of saving health expenditure (63.4%). The causes of unwillingness to join in a pay-for-performance program among non-participants were increased load of administrative works (79.6%) and inadequate understanding of the contents of the pay-for-performance programs (62.9%).

Conclusions

To better motivate family physicians into P4P participation, hosting effective training programs, developing a more transparent formula for assessing financial risk, providing sufficient budget for healthcare quality improvement, and designing a reasonable profit-sharing plan to promote collaboration between different levels of medical institutions are all imperative.

Effect of a national primary care reform on avoidable hospital admissions (2000-2015): A difference-in-difference analysis

In 2006 a major primary care reform was initiated in Portugal. The most significant aspect of this reform was the creation of a new organizational model of primary care provision: Family Health Units (FHUs), consisting of small voluntarily constituted multidisciplinary teams that have functional autonomy and are partly financed through capitation and pay-for-performance. The creation of FHUs sought to increase access to care and to chronic disease management by improving the long-term relationship between health professionals and patients. The objectives of this study are to evaluate the impact of the FHUs implementation on population health outcomes, measured by the rate of hospitalizations for ambulatory care sensitive conditions (ACSC), i.e. avoidable hospital inpatient admissions, and to explore the effectiveness of the pay-for-performance in primary care by analysing the subset of disease specific hospitalizations for ACSC related to the financial incentives. Using data from 276 Portuguese municipalities from 2000 to 2015 (n = 4416) and exploiting the gradual introduction of the FHUs over time, we used a difference-in-differences approach contrasting the evolution of the hospitalization rate for ACSC in municipalities that implemented or not the FHUs. We then explored heterogeneous effects by incentivized (diabetes and hypertension) and non-incentivized disease-specific rates of hospitalizations for ACSC. During the period under analysis, 448 FHUs were created in 126 municipalities. No significant impact of the FHUs implementation on the reduction of the hospitalization rate for ACSC was found. This result also held for the incentivized hospitalizations for ACSC. We only found a statistically significant effect of the FHUs implementation in the reduction of one non-incentivized area (the rate of urinary tract infection ACSC). Our results question the capacity of this payment mechanism to achieve better health outcomes, and invites a more careful and evidence-based action toward its wider diffusion.

Is it feasible to pay specialty substance use disorder treatment programs based on patient outcomes?

BACKGROUND

Some US payers are starting to vary payment to providers depending on patient outcomes, but this approach is rarely used in substance use disorder (SUD) treatment.

PURPOSE

We examine the feasibility of applying a pay-for-outcomes approach to SUD treatment.

METHODS

We reviewed several relevant literatures: (1) economic theory papers that describe the conditions under which pay-for-outcomes is feasible in principle; (2) description of the key outcomes expected from SUD treatment, and the measures of these outcomes that are available in administrative data systems; and (3) reports on actual experiences of paying SUD treatment providers based on patient outcomes.

RESULTS

The economics literature notes that when patient outcomes are strongly influenced by factors beyond provider control and when risk adjustment performs poorly, pay-for-outcomes will increase provider financial risk. This is relevant to SUD treatment. The literature on SUD outcome measurement shows disagreement on whether to include broader outcomes beyond abstinence from substance use. Good measures are available for some of these broader constructs, but the need for risk adjustment still brings many challenges. Results from two past payment experiments in SUD treatment reinforce some of the concerns raised in the more conceptual literature.

CONCLUSION

There are special challenges in applying pay-for-outcomes to SUD treatment, not all of which could be overcome by developing better measures. For SUD treatment it may be necessary to define outcomes more broadly than for general medical care, and to continue conditioning a sizeable portion of payment on process measures.

Effects of pay-for-performance for primary care physicians on diabetes outcomes in single-payer health systems: a systematic review

BACKGROUND

Although pay-for-performance (P4P) for diabetes care is increasingly common, evidence of its effectiveness in improving population health and health system sustainability is deficient. This information gap is attributable in part to the heterogeneity of healthcare financing, covered medical conditions, care settings, and provider remuneration arrangements within and across countries. We systematically reviewed the literature concentrating on whether P4P for physicians in primary and community care leads to better diabetes outcomes in single-payer national health insurance systems.

METHODS

Studies were identified by searching ten databases (01/2000-04/2018) and scanning the reference lists of review articles and other global health literature. We included primary studies evaluating the effects of introducing P4P for diabetes care among primary care physicians in countries of universal health coverage. Outcomes of interest included patient morbidity, avoidable hospitalization, premature death, and healthcare costs.

RESULTS

We identified 2218 reports; after exclusions, 10 articles covering 8 P4P interventions in 7 countries were eligible for analysis. Five studies, capturing records from 717,166 patients with diabetes, were graded as high-quality evaluations of P4P on health outcomes. Based on three quality studies, P4P can result in reduced risk of mortality over the longer term-when linked to performance metrics. However, studies from other jurisdictions, where P4P was not linked to specific patient-oriented objectives, yielded little or mixed evidence of positive health impacts.

CONCLUSION

Evidence of the effectiveness of P4P depends on whether physicians' incentive payments are explicitly tied to performance metrics. However, the most appropriate indicators for performance monitoring remain in question. More research with rigorous evaluation in different settings is needed.

Pre-approval incentives to promote adoption of personalized medicine: a theoretical approach

BACKGROUND

Currently, personalised medicine is becoming more frequently used and many drug companies are including this strategy to gain market access for very specialized therapies. In this article, in order to understand the relationships between the health authority and the drug company when deciding upon the implementation of personalized medicines, we take a theoretical perspective to model it when the price and reimbursement policy follows a pay-for-performance scheme. During the development of a new drug, the firm must decide whether to generate additional knowledge by investing in additional resources to stratify the target population based on a biomarker or directly apply for marketing authorization for the new treatment without information on the characteristics of patients who could respond to it. In this context, we assume that the pricing policy is set by the health authority, and then we characterize the pricing and investment decisions contingent on the rate of response to the treatment.

RESULTS

We find that the price when the firm carries out R&D leading to the personalized treatments is not necessarily higher than the price if the firm does not carry out the R&D investment. When the rate of response to the treatment is too low, then the new drug is not marketed. If the rate of response is too high, personalized medicine is not implemented. For intermediate values of the rate of response, the adoption of personalized medicine may occur if the investment costs are sufficiently low; otherwise, the treatment is given to all patients without additional information on their characteristics. The higher the quality of the genetic test (in terms of its sensitivity and specificity), the wider the interval for the values of the proportional responders for which personalized medicine may be implemented.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings show that pre-approval incentives (prices) to promote the personalized treatments depend on the specific characteristics of the disease and the efficacy of the treatment. The model gives an intuitive idea about what to expect in terms of price incentives when the possibility of personalizing treatments becomes a strategic decision for the stakeholders.

Pay-for-performance for shared care of diabetes in Taiwan

BACKGROUND/PURPOSE

Comprehensive and continuous care is crucial for patients with diabetes. The diabetes pay-for-performance (P4P) program launched by the National Health Insurance (NHI) administration in Taiwan provides a financial incentive to facilitate this goal. In this study, we explored the characteristics of patients in the P4P program between 2005 and 2014.

METHODS

Data of patients with diabetes enrolled in the NHI program between 2005 and 2014 were extracted from the NHI research database. Patients were classed as having diabetes if they had three or more outpatient visits within 365 calendar days with an International Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision, Clinical Modification diagnostic code of 250 or hospitalization one or more times with such a diagnosis. The trends of participating in the P4P program were analyzed.

RESULTS

Participation rate of the P4P program increased from 12.1% to 19% between 2005 and 2014. Participants were younger and more likely to be female than those not participating in the program. Lower risks of cancer-related mortality, annual mortality and heart failure were seen in patients participating in the P4P program than in those not participating.

CONCLUSION

Older, male patients with a high disease severity may be less likely to enroll in the P4P program. Although participation rate is increasing, a broad enrollment is expected.

Pay for performance and hip fracture outcomes: an interrupted time series and difference-in-differences analysis in England and Scotland

Aims

Hip fractures are associated with high morbidity, mortality, and costs. One strategy for improving outcomes is to incentivize hospitals to provide better quality of care. We aimed to determine whether a pay-for-performance initiative affected hip fracture outcomes in England by using Scotland, which did not participate in the scheme, as a control.

Materials and Methods

We undertook an interrupted time series study with data from all patients aged more than 60 years with a hip fracture in England (2000 to 2018) using the Hospital Episode Statistics Admitted Patient Care (HES APC) data set linked to national death registrations. Difference-in-differences (DID) analysis incorporating equivalent data from the Scottish Morbidity Record was used to control for secular trends. The outcomes were 30-day and 365-day mortality, 30-day re-admission, time to operation, and acute length of stay.

Results

There were 1 037 860 patients with a hip fracture in England and 116 594 in Scotland. Both 30-day (DID -1.7%; 95% confidence interval (CI) -2.0 to -1.2) and 365-day (-1.9%; 95% CI -2.5 to -1.3) mortality fell in England post-intervention when compared with outcomes in Scotland. There were 7600 fewer deaths between 2010 and 2016 that could be attributed to interventions driven by pay-for-performance. A pre-existing annual trend towards increased 30-day re-admissions in England was halted post-intervention. Significant reductions were observed in the time to operation and length of stay.

Conclusion

This study provides evidence that a pay-for-performance programme improved the outcomes after a hip fracture in England.

Cite this article: Bone Joint J 2019;101-B:1015–1023.

Initiating Aha moments when implementing person-centered care in nursing homes: a multi-arm, pre-post intervention

Background

Comprehensive adoption of culture change via person-centered care (PCC) practices in nursing homes has been slow. Change such as this, requires transformation of organizational culture, frequently generating resistance and slow moving change. This study examined how nursing homes perceive their adoption of PCC practices across seven domains and how these perceptions change in response to an educational intervention embedded in a statewide program, Promoting Excellent Alternatives in Kansas nursing homes (PEAK 2.0). Given perception is an important feature of the change process, it was hypothesized that pre-adopters engaging in PEAK 2.0’s initial Foundation year (level 0) would have lower perceived PCC adoption following a year of education and exposure to PCC, whereas adopters (PEAK 2.0 level 1–5 homes) would have higher perceived PCC adoption following a year of participation in their respective level in the program.

Methods

A multi-arm, pre/post intervention study was conducted during the 2014 and 2015 years of the PEAK 2.0 program comparing pre-PCC adopters to adopters. Outcomes were self-ratings of perceived PCC implementation across seven domains of PCC at the beginning and end of the 2014–15 program year, after pre-adopters had received PCC education and adopters had implemented a year of PCC. Paired t-tests and mixed repeated-measures linear models, controlling for potential confounders, were employed to test the study hypotheses.

Results

Across all seven domains of PCC, pre-adopters rated their PCC implementation as significantly higher on pre-test (2014) than on post-test (2015). In contrast, adopters rated their PCC achievement as higher on post-test (2015) than on pre-test (2014).

Conclusions

Pre-adopters’ lower score following a year of education and exposure to PCC may reflect a shift in perceptions of PCC as a concept or a deeper conceptualization of PCC. Since perceptions or assumptions can serve as a source of resistance to change, redefinition or “unlearning” to make way for more accurate definitions of PCC could aid in reducing organizational resistance to implementation of PCC and thus improve the rate of adoption.

Electronic supplementary material

The online version of this article (10.1186/s12877-019-1121-3) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Primary care clinicians' perspectives about quality measurements in safety-net clinics and non-safety-net clinics

BACKGROUND

Quality metrics, pay for performance (P4P), and value-based payments are prominent aspects of the current and future American healthcare system. However, linking clinic payment to clinic quality measures may financially disadvantage safety-net clinics and their patient population because safety-net clinics often have worse quality metric scores than non-safety net clinics. The Minnesota Safety Net Coalition's Quality Measurement Enhancement Project sought to collect data from primary care providers' (PCPs) experiences, which could assist Minnesota policymakers and state agencies as they create a new P4P system. Our research study aims are to identify PCPs' perspectives about 1) quality metrics at safety net clinics and non-safety net clinics, 2) how clinic quality measures affect patients and patient care, and 3) how payment for quality measures may influence healthcare.

METHODS

Qualitative interviews with 14 PCPs (4 individual interviews and 3 focus groups) who had worked at both safety net and non-safety net primary care clinics in Minneapolis-St Paul Minnesota USA metropolitan area. Qualitative analyses identified major themes.

RESULTS

Three themes with sub-themes emerged. Theme #1: Minnesota's current clinic quality scores are influenced more by patients and clinic systems than by clinicians. Theme #2: Collecting data for a set of specific quality measures is not the same as measuring quality healthcare. Subtheme #2.1: Current quality measures are not aligned with how patients and clinicians define quality healthcare. Theme #3: Current quality measures are a product of and embedded in social and structural inequities in the American health care system. Subtheme #3.1: The current inequitable healthcare system should not be reinforced with financial payments. Subtheme #3.2: Health equity requires new metrics and a new healthcare system. Overall, PCPs felt that the current inequitable quality metrics should be replaced by different metrics along with major changes to the healthcare system that could produce greater health equity.

CONCLUSION

Aligning payment with the current quality metrics could perpetuate and exacerbate social inequities and health disparities. Policymakers should consider PCPs' perspectives and create a quality-payment framework that does not disadvantage patients who are affected by social and structural inequities as well as the clinics and providers who serve them.

Incentives in a public addiction treatment system: Effects on waiting time and selection

Program-level financial incentives are used by some payers as a tool to improve quality of substance use treatment. However, evidence of effectiveness is mixed and performance contracts may have unintended consequences such as creating barriers for more challenging clients who are less likely to meet benchmarks. This study investigates the impact of a performance contract on waiting time for substance use treatment and client selection. Admission and discharge data from publicly funded Maine outpatient (OP) and intensive outpatient (IOP) substance use treatment programs (N = 38,932 clients) were used. In a quasi-experimental pre-post design, pre-period (FY 2005-2007) admission data from incentivized (IC) and non-incentivized (non-IC) programs were compared to post-period (FY 2008-2012) using propensity score matching and multivariate difference-in-difference regression. Dependent variables were waiting time (incentivized) and client selection (severity: history of mental disorders and substance use severity, not incentivized). Despite financial incentives designed to reduce waiting time for substance use treatment among state-funded outpatient programs, average waiting time for treatment increased in the post period for both IC and non-IC groups, as did client severity. There were no significant differences in waiting time between IC and non-IC groups over time. Increases in client severity over time, with no group differences, indicate that programs did not restrict access for more challenging clients. Adequate funding and other approaches to improve quality may be beneficial.

Improvement of the quality payment program by improving data reporting process: an action research

BACKGROUND

Successful implementation of pay-for-quality (P4Q) programs mostly depends upon a valid, timely, and reliable data about quality measures generated by providers, and interpreted by payers. The aim of this study was to establish a data reporting method for P4Q program through an action research.

METHODS

Qualitative method was used to align theory with action through a three-cycle action research. The study was conducted in September 15, 2015 to March 15, 2017, in East-Azerbaijan, Iran. The purposeful sampling was used to select participants. The participants included healthcare providers, staff in district health centers (DHC), experts, and managers in the provincial primary health center (PPHC). Data was collected by interviews, focus group discussions, and expert panels. Content analysis was used to synthesize the data. In each step, decisions about data reporting methods were made through a consensus of expert panel members.

RESULTS

The most important dimensions of data reporting method were data entry and accuracy, data reporting, data analysis and interpretations, the flexibility of method, and training. By establishment of an online data reporting system for the P4Q program, a major improvement was observed in the documentation of performance data, the satisfaction of health care providers and staff (e.g. either in DHCs or PPHC), improvement of the P4Q program and acceptance of the P4Q program by providers. Following the present study, the online system was expanded in Iran's public health system for data collection and estimating the amount of incentive payments in P4Q program. Moreover, more improvements were achieved by linking the system to EMRs and also, providing automated feedback to providers about their own performance.

CONCLUSIONS

A web-based computerized system with the capability of linking medical record and also its ability to provide feedback to healthcare providers was identified as an appropriate method of data reporting in the P4Q program from the viewpoints of participants in this study.

Moneyball in Medicare

US policymakers place high priority on tying Medicare payments to the value of care delivered. A critical part of this effort is the Hospital Value-based Purchasing Program (HVBP), which rewards or penalizes hospitals based on their quality and episode-based costs of care and incentivizes integration between hospitals and post-acute care providers. Within HVBP, each patient affects hospital performance on a variety of quality and spending measures, and performance translates directly to changes in program points and ultimately dollars. In short, hospital revenue from a patient consists not only of the DRG payment, but also of that patient's marginal future reimbursement. We estimate the magnitude of the marginal future reimbursement for individual patients across each type of quality and performance measure. We describe how those incentives differ across hospitals, including integrated and safety-net hospitals. We find evidence that hospitals improved their performance over time in the areas where they have the highest marginal incentives to improve care, and that integrated hospitals responded more than non-integrated hospitals.

Pay for performance program reduces treatment needed diabetic retinopathy - a nationwide matched cohort study in Taiwan

BACKGROUND

Pay-for-Performance programs have shown improvement in indicators monitoring adequacy and target achievement in diabetic care. However, less is known regarding the impact of this program on the occurrence and long-term effects of diabetic retinopathy. The objective of this study was to determine the effect of pay-for-performance program on the development of treatment needed for diabetic retinopathy in type 2 diabetes patients.

METHODS

We conducted a nationwide retrospective cohort study with a matching design using the Taiwan National Health Insurance Research Database from 2000 to 2012. The outcome was defined as the treatment needed diabetic retinopathy. We matched Pay-for-Performance and non-Pay-for-Performance groups for age, gender, year diabetes was diagnosed and study enrollment, and duration of follow-up.

RESULTS

A total of 9311 patients entered the study cohort, of whom 2157 were registered in the Pay-for-Performance group and 7154 matched in the non-Pay-for-Performance group. The incidence of treatment needed diabetic retinopathy was not significantly different in two groups. However, the incidence of treatment needed diabetic retinopathy was significantly different if restricted the non-Pay-for-Performance group who had at least 1 eye examination or optical coherence tomography within 1 year (adjusted hazard ratio, 0.78; 95% confidence interval, 0.64-0.94).

CONCLUSIONS

Pay-for-Performance is valuable in preventing the development of treatment needed diabetic retinopathy, which could be attributed to the routine eye examination required in the Pay-for-Performance program. We could improve our diabetic care by promoting eye health education and patient awareness on the importance of regular examinations.

Understanding readmissions in children undergoing surgery: A pediatric NSQIP analysis

BACKGROUND

Readmission is increasingly being utilized as an important clinical outcome and measure of hospital quality. Our aim was to delineate rates, risk factors, and reasons for unplanned readmission in pediatric surgery.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Retrospective review of pediatric patients (n=130,274) undergoing surgery (2013-2014) at hospitals enrolled in the Pediatric National Surgical Quality Improvement Program (NSQIP-P) was performed. Logistic regression was used to model factors associated with unplanned 30-day readmission. Reasons for readmission were reviewed to determine the most common causes of readmission.

RESULTS

There were 6059 (n=4.7%) readmitted children within 30days of the index operation. Of these, 5041 (n=3.9%) were unplanned, with readmission rates ranging from 1.3% in plastic surgery to 5.2% in general pediatric surgery, and 10.8% in neurosurgery. Unplanned readmissions were associated with emergent status, comorbidities, and the occurrence of pre- or postdischarge postoperative complications. Overall, the most common causes for readmission were surgical site infections (23.9%), ileus/obstruction/gastrointestinal (16.8%), respiratory (8.6%), graft/implant/device-related (8.1%), neurologic (7.0%), or pain (5.8%). Median time from discharge to readmission was 8days (IQR: 3-14days). Reasons for readmission, time until readmission, and need for reoperative procedure (overall 28%, n=1414) varied between surgical specialties.

CONCLUSION

The reasons for readmission in children undergoing surgery are complex, varied, and influenced by patient characteristics and postoperative complications. These data inform risk-stratification for readmission in pediatric surgical populations, and help to identify potential areas for targeted interventions to improve quality. They also highlight the importance of accounting for case-mix in the interpretation of hospital readmission rates.

LEVEL OF EVIDENCE

3.