An investigation into human pandemic influenza virus (H1N1) 2009 on an Alberta swine farm

On May 2, 2009 the Canadian Food Inspection Agency notified the World Organization for Animal Health that an emerging novel influenza A virus (pandemic H1N1 2009) had been confirmed on a swine farm in Alberta. Over a 4-week period pigs in this farrow-to-finish operation were clinically affected by respiratory disease consistent with an influenza A virus infection and the presence of active viral infection was confirmed in all production areas by real-time polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR). Despite clinical recovery of animals, there was reluctance by purchasers to receive animals from this operation due to concerns about the effect on both domestic and international markets. The owner decided to depopulate the entire herd due to impending welfare issues associated with overcrowding and economic concerns resulting from the inability to market these animals. Carcasses were rendered or composted and did not enter the human food or animal feed chain. The source of virus in this herd was determined to be an infected human. Zoonotic transmission to 2 individuals responding to the outbreak was suspected and recommendations to prevent occupational exposure are discussed.

Swine-origin influenza virus (SOIV) in Louisiana, 2009

Since the new flu strain--named A(H1N1) or Swine Origin Influenza Virus (SOIV) to differentiate it from the seasonal H1N1--first emerged in Mexico and the United States in April, it has spread to 74 countries around the globe. The objectives of this article are to describe the initial stages of the epidemic in Louisiana and to draw some epidemiologic lessons for the future, which could be particularly useful if the pandemic continues during the winter season 2009-2010. Between April 22, 2009 (date when the first specimen was collected) to May 31, 2009, a six week period, there were 133 cases of SOIV infection detected in Louisiana. Cases were diagnosed in late April in several regions of the state, showing that when the first cases had been identified in Mexico and California, the infection was already widespread in Louisiana. The most affected age group was between the ages of five and 25.

[Pattern on the spread of novel influenza A (H1N1) and quantitative assessment of containment in mainland China]

OBJECTIVE

To study the epidemic tendency of emerging influenza A (H1N1) in mainland China, and to explore the different patterns of spread on the disease under the following contexts: (1) To stop the temperature screening program at the border areas of the country; (2) To stop measures of prevention and control on those identified cases and their close contacts; (3) To strengthen programs for the foreign immigrants on 'home quarantine'.

METHODS

Under relevant parameters and information on the transmission link from different reference data, the patterns of influenza spread were simulated by Monte Carlo method.

RESULTS

The temperature screening on border could inhibit the transmission of influenza A (H1N1) to some extent, so that after 3 months the cumulative number of cases will be reduced by 21.5% (1718 cases) and transmission speed of influenza A (H1N1) in mainland China will be delayed by about 4 days. Furthermore, taking positive measures of prevention and control could efficiently slow down the epidemic, so that after 3 months the cumulative number of cases will be reduced by 93.4% (about 90 thousand cases) and it would be delayed by about 15 days if influenza A (H1N1) spreads to the whole country. In addition, if the immigrants were able to practise quarantine measures consciously by themselves at home the effect of prevention and control against influenza A (H1N1) would be more significant. If 30%, 60% and 90% of immigrants would take quarantine measures home consciously, after 3 months the cumulative number of cases will be reduced by about 15% (about 940 cases), 34% (about 2230 cases) and 64% (about 4180 cases), respectively. Also, influenza A (H1N1) spreads to the whole country will be delayed by about 4 days, 10 days and 25 days, respectively. It is difficult to curb fully the development of the epidemic by taking existing control measures, and influenza A (H1N1) may spread to almost all provinces after about 3 months.

CONCLUSION

The effects of existing prevention and control measures were objectively assessed and the results showed the necessity and effectiveness of these measures against the transmission of influenza A (H1N1), in the mainland of China.

BirdFlu2009: Avian Influenza and Human Health. 9-10 September 2009, Oxford, UK

The BirdFlu2009 meeting entitled Avian Influenza and Human Health, held in Oxford, included topics covering new developments in the control of seasonal, avian and swine influenza virus infection, with a focus on the human-animal interface. This conference report highlights selected presentations on sialidase therapy for influenza infection, the use of IVIgs to study antibody diversity and reactivity, detecting oseltamivir carboxylate in waste water, H5N1 infection in Egyptian children, preparedness for an influenza pandemic and an indirect sandwich ELISA to detect H5 avian influenza virus. Investigational drugs discussed include NEX-DAS-181 (NexBio Inc) and MVA-NP-M1 (The Edward Jenner Institute for Vaccine Research).

The transmissibility and control of pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus

Pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 (pandemic H1N1) is spreading throughout the planet. It has become the dominant strain in the Southern Hemisphere, where the influenza season has now ended. Here, on the basis of reported case clusters in the United States, we estimated the household secondary attack rate for pandemic H1N1 to be 27.3% [95% confidence interval (CI) from 12.2% to 50.5%]. From a school outbreak, we estimated that a typical schoolchild infects 2.4 (95% CI from 1.8 to 3.2) other children within the school. We estimated the basic reproductive number, R0, to range from 1.3 to 1.7 and the generation interval to range from 2.6 to 3.2 days. We used a simulation model to evaluate the effectiveness of vaccination strategies in the United States for fall 2009. If a vaccine were available soon enough, vaccination of children, followed by adults, reaching 70% overall coverage, in addition to high-risk and essential workforce groups, could mitigate a severe epidemic.

The application of genomics to emerging zoonotic viral diseases

Interspecies transmission of pathogens may result in the emergence of new infectious diseases in humans as well as in domestic and wild animals. Genomics tools such as high-throughput sequencing, mRNA expression profiling, and microarray-based analysis of single nucleotide polymorphisms are providing unprecedented ways to analyze the diversity of the genomes of emerging pathogens as well as the molecular basis of the host response to them. By comparing and contrasting the outcomes of an emerging infection with those of closely related pathogens in different but related host species, we can further delineate the various host pathways determining the outcome of zoonotic transmission and adaptation to the newly invaded species. The ultimate challenge is to link pathogen and host genomics data with biological outcomes of zoonotic transmission and to translate the integrated data into novel intervention strategies that eventually will allow the effective control of newly emerging infectious diseases.

Introduction and transmission of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) Virus--Kenya, June-July 2009

In April 2009, in the United States, the first cases of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus infection were reported. On June 11, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared an influenza pandemic because of widespread transmission worldwide. As of September 13, all six WHO regions had reported approximately 296,471 cases of pandemic H1N1, including 3,486 deaths. On June 29, the first case of pandemic H1N1 was confirmed in Kenya. At that time, only four other countries in sub-Saharan Africa had reported cases, and secondary transmission had not been documented in the region. Surveillance activities in Kenya detected four separate introductions of the virus into the country. The introductions provided an opportunity to study transmission of the virus (including calculation of secondary household attack rates) in a virus-naive population that had not yet initiated the use of antiviral drugs. This report describes the four introductions and the accompanying analysis. The overall rate of secondary household transmission of laboratory-confirmed pandemic H1N1 was 26% (range: 7%-33%), which is comparable to secondary household attack rates reported for laboratory-confirmed seasonal influenza virus infection. However, additional and more rigorous studies are needed to better understand the secondary attack rates associated with the current pandemic.

Airborne influenza virus detection with four aerosol samplers using molecular and infectivity assays: considerations for a new infectious virus aerosol sampler

As a first step in conducting studies of airborne influenza transmission, we compared the collection performance of an SKC Biosampler, a compact cascade impactor (CCI), Teflon filters, and gelatin filters by collecting aerosolized influenza virus in a one-pass aerosol chamber. Influenza virus infectivity was determined using a fluorescent focus assay and influenza virus nucleic acid (originating from viable and non-viable viruses) was measured using quantitative PCR. The results showed that the SKC Biosampler recovered and preserved influenza virus infectivity much better than the other samplers - the CCI, Teflon, and gelatin filters recovered only 7-22% of infectious viruses compared with the Biosampler. Total virus collection was not significantly different among the SKC Biosampler, the gelatin, and Teflon filters, but was significantly lower in the CCI. Results from this study show that a new sampler is needed for virus aerosol sampling, as commercially available samplers do not efficiently collect and conserve virus infectivity. Applications for a new sampler include studies of airborne disease transmission and bioterrorism monitoring. Design parameters for a new sampler include high collection efficiency for fine particles and liquid sampling media to preserve infectivity. Practical Implications New air samplers are needed to study infectious airborne viruses and learn about airborne disease transmission. As a first step in designing a new air sampler to collect influenza virus we evaluated four commercial samplers and determined necessary design parameters for a new collector.

The significant but understudied impact of pathogen transmission from humans to animals

Zooanthroponotic pathogens, which are transmitted from humans to nonhuman animals, are an understudied aspect of global health, despite their potential to cause significant disease burden in wild and domestic animal populations and affect global economies. Some key human-borne pathogens that have been shown to infect animals and cause morbidity and mortality include measles virus (paramyxoviruses), influenza A virus (orthomyxoviruses), herpes simplex 1 virus (herpesviruses), protozoal and helminthic parasites, and bacteria such as methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus and Mycobacterium tuberculosis. However, zooanthroponotic pathogens are most commonly reported in captive animals or domestic livestock with close human contact; there, the potential for economic loss and human reinfection is most apparent. There is also the potential for infection in wild animal populations, which may threaten endangered species and decrease biodiversity. The emergence and reemergence of human-borne pathogens in wildlife may also have negative consequences for human health if these pathogens cycle back into humans. Many of the anthropogenic drivers of zoonotic disease emergence also facilitate zooanthroponotic transmission. Increasing research to better understand the occurrence of and the potential for bidirectional pathogen transmission between humans and animals is essential for improving global health. Mt Sinai J Med 76:448-455, 2009. (c) 2009 Mount Sinai School of Medicine.

Viral kinetics and exhaled droplet size affect indoor transmission dynamics of influenza infection

The purpose of this paper was to investigate the effects of viral kinetics and exhaled droplet size on indoor transmission dynamics of influenza infection. The target cell-limited model with delayed virus production was adopted to strengthen the inner mechanisms of virus infection on human epithelial cell. The particle number and volume involved in the viral kinetics were linked with Wells-Riley mathematical equation to quantify the infection risk. We investigated population dynamics in a specific elementary school by using the seasonal susceptible - exposed - infected - recovery (SEIR) model. We found that exhaled pulmonary bioaerosol of sneeze (particle diameter <10 microm) have 10(2)-fold estimate higher than that of cough. Sneeze and cough caused risk probabilities range from 0.075 to 0.30 and 0.076, respectively; whereas basic reproduction numbers (R(0)) estimates range from 4 to 17 for sneeze and nearly 4 for cough, indicating sneeze-posed higher infection risk. The viral kinetics and exhaled droplet size for sneeze affect indoor transmission dynamics of influenza infection since date post-infection 1-7. This study provides direct mechanistic support that indoor influenza virus transmission can be characterized by viral kinetics in human upper respiratory tracts that are modulated by exhaled droplet size. Practical Implications This paper provides a predictive model that can integrate the influenza viral kinetics (target cell-limited model), indoor aerosol transmission potential (Wells-Riley mathematical equation), and population dynamic model [susceptible - exposed - infected - recovery (SEIR) model] in a proposed susceptible population. Viral kinetics expresses the competed results of human immunity ability with influenza virus generation. By linking the viral kinetics and different exposure parameters and environmental factors in a proposed school setting with five age groups, the influenza infection risk can be estimated. On the other hand, we implicated a new simple means of inhaling to mitigate exhaled bioaerosols through an inhaled non-toxic aerosol. The proposed predictive model may serve as a tool for further investigation of specific control measure such as the personal protection masks to alter the particle size and number concentration characteristics and minimize the exhaled bioaerosol droplet to decrease the infection risk in indoor environment settings.

[Convalescence and sick leave after influenza]

Seasonal influenza has a significant impact on individuals and society alike. In otherwise healthy adults, a typical case of seasonal influenza is associated with six to eight days of clinical symptoms, and about four to five days of sick leave. Transmission mainly takes place during the initial four days of the illness. Convalescence from disease should be expected to comprise seven days from symptom onset. In mild cases with symptoms lasting only few days, convalescence could be limited to four days unless prevention of transmission is given very high priority. Shorter duration of convalescence and workplace absence is not recommended due to risk of transmission.