Pandemic potential of a strain of influenza A (H1N1): early findings

Optimizing influenza vaccine distribution

The criteria to assess public health policies are fundamental to policy optimization. Using a model parametrized with survey-based contact data and mortality data from influenza pandemics, we determined optimal vaccine allocation for five outcome measures: deaths, infections, years of life lost, contingent valuation, and economic costs. We find that optimal vaccination is achieved by prioritization of schoolchildren and adults aged 30 to 39 years. Schoolchildren are most responsible for transmission, and their parents serve as bridges to the rest of the population. Our results indicate that consideration of age-specific transmission dynamics is paramount to the optimal allocation of influenza vaccines. We also found that previous and new recommendations from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention both for the novel swine-origin influenza and, particularly, for seasonal influenza, are suboptimal for all outcome measures.

Investment decisions in influenza pandemic contingency planning: cost-effectiveness of stockpiling antiviral drugs

BACKGROUND

The threat of an influenza pandemic has led to stockpiling of antiviral drugs in order to mitigate a plausible outbreak. If the stockpile would be used in relation to the recent pandemic alert, an investment decision about renewing the stock for a possible subsequent pandemic is essential. The decision should include cost-effectiveness considerations.

METHODS

We constructed a cost-effectiveness analysis in the Dutch context, explicitly including risk of an outbreak. Outcomes from a dynamic transmission model, comparing an intervention with a non-intervention scenario, were input in our health economic calculations.

RESULTS

Stockpiling was cost-effective from the health-care perspective if the actual risk is 37% for 30 years. If less than 60% of the population would take the antiviral drugs or the attack rate is about 50%, the investment would not be cost-effective from this perspective.

CONCLUSION

Risk perception, realistic coverage among population and size of a pandemic are crucial parameters and highly decisive for the investment decision.

The early molecular epidemiology of the swine-origin A/H1N1 human influenza pandemic

Swine-origin pandemic human influenza A virus (H1N1pdm) has spread rapidly around the world since its initial documentation in April 2009. Here we have updated initial estimates of the rate of molecular evolution and estimates of the time of origin of this virus in the human population using the large number of viral sequences made available as part of the public health response to this global pandemic. Currently sampled H1N1pdm sequences share a most recent common ancestor in the first 7 weeks of 2009 with the implication that the virus was transmitting cryptically for up to 3 months prior to recognition. A phylogenetic reconstruction of the data shows that the virus has been circling the globe extensively with multiple introductions into most geographical areas.

Adaptive vaccination strategies to mitigate pandemic influenza: Mexico as a case study

In this modeling work, we explore the effectiveness of various age-targeted vaccination strategies to mitigate hospitalization and mortality from pandemic influenza, assuming limited vaccine supplies. We propose a novel adaptive vaccination strategy in which vaccination is initiated during the outbreak and priority groups are identified based on real-time epidemiological data monitoring age-specific risk of hospitalization and death. We apply this strategy to detailed epidemiological and demographic data collected during the recent swine A/H1N1 outbreak in Mexico. We show that the adaptive strategy targeting age groups 6-59 years is the most effective in reducing hospitalizations and deaths, as compared with a more traditional strategy used in the control of seasonal influenza and targeting children under 5 and seniors over 65. Results are robust to a number of assumptions and could provide guidance to many nations facing a recrudescence of A/H1N1v pandemic activity in the fall and likely vaccine shortages.

Potential for a global dynamic of Influenza A (H1N1)

Background

Geographical and temporal diffusion patterns of a human pandemic due to Swine Origin Influenza Virus (S-OIV) remain uncertain. The extent to which national and international pandemic preparedness plans and control strategies can slow or stop the process is not known. However, despite preparedness efforts, it appears that, particularly in the USA, Mexico, Canada and the UK, local chains of virus transmission can sustain autonomous dynamics which may lead to the next pandemic. Forecasts of influenza experts usually rely on information related to new circulating strains.

Methods

We attempted to quantify the possible spread of the pandemic across a network of 52 major cities and to predict the effect of vaccination against the pandemic strain, if available. Predictions are based on simulations from a stochastic SEIR model. Parameters used in the simulations are set to values consistent with recent estimations from the outbreak in Mexico.

Results

We show that a two-wave pandemic dynamic may be observed in Southern hemisphere because of seasonal constraints for a maximum value of the basic reproductive number (R_{0, max}) within a city equal to 1.5 and a mean generation interval (GI) of 2 days. In this case and in the absence of vaccination, attack rates may reach 46% when considering a completely susceptible population. More severe scenarios characterized by higher values of R_{0, max} (2.2) and GI (3.1) yield an attack rate of 77%. By extrapolation, we find that mass vaccination in all countries (i.e. up to 50% of the population) implemented 6 months after the start of the pandemic may reduce the cumulative number of cases by 91% in the case of the low transmissible strain (R_{0, max} = 1.5). This relative reduction is only 44% for R_{0, max} = 2.2 since most of the cases occur in the first 6 months and so before the vaccination campaign.

Conclusion

Although uncertainties remain about the epidemiological and clinical characteristics of the new influenza strain, this study provides the first analysis of the potential spread of the pandemic and first assessment of the impact of different immunization strategies.

The first influenza pandemic in the new millennium: lessons learned hitherto for current control efforts and overall pandemic preparedness

Influenza viruses pose a permanent threat to human populations due to their ability to constantly adapt to impact immunologically susceptible individuals in the forms of epidemic and pandemics through antigenic drifts and antigenic shifts, respectively. Pandemic influenza preparedness is a critical step in responding to future influenza outbreaks. In this regard, responding to the current pandemic and preparing for future ones requires critical planning for the early phases where there is no availability of pandemic vaccine with rapid deployment of medical supplies for personal protection, antivirals, antibiotics and social distancing measures. In addition, it has become clear that responding to the current pandemic or preparing for future ones, nation states need to develop or strengthen their laboratory capability for influenza diagnosis as well as begin preparing their vaccine/antiviral deployment plans. Vaccine deployment plans are the critical missing link in pandemic preparedness and response. Rapid containment efforts are not effective and instead mitigation efforts should lead pandemic control efforts. We suggest that development of vaccine/antiviral deployment plans is a key preparedness step that allows nations identify logistic gaps in their response capacity.

Evolutionary analysis of the dynamics of viral infectious disease

Many organisms that cause infectious diseases, particularly RNA viruses, mutate so rapidly that their evolutionary and ecological behaviours are inextricably linked. Consequently, aspects of the transmission and epidemiology of these pathogens are imprinted on the genetic diversity of their genomes. Large-scale empirical analyses of the evolutionary dynamics of important pathogens are now feasible owing to the increasing availability of pathogen sequence data and the development of new computational and statistical methods of analysis. In this Review, we outline the questions that can be answered using viral evolutionary analysis across a wide range of biological scales.

Novel swine-origin influenza A virus in humans: another pandemic knocking at the door

Influenza A viruses represent a continuous pandemic threat. In April 2009, a novel influenza A virus, the so-called swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) virus (S-OIV), was identified in Mexico. Although S-OIV originates from triple-reassortant swine influenza A (H1) that has been circulating in North American pig herds since the end of the 1990s, S-OIV is readily transmitted between humans but is not epidemic in pigs. After its discovery, S-OIV rapidly spread throughout the world within few weeks. In this review, we sum up the current situation and put it into the context of the current state of knowledge of influenza and influenza pandemics. Some indications suggest that a pandemic may be mild but even "mild" pandemics can result in millions of deaths. However, no reasonable forecasts how this pandemic may develop can be made at this time. Despite stockpiling by many countries and WHO, antiviral drugs will be limited in case of pandemic and resistances may emerge. Effective vaccines are regarded to be crucial for the control of influenza pandemics. However, production capacities are restricted and development/production of a S-OIV vaccine will interfere with manufacturing of seasonal influenza vaccines. The authors are convinced that S-OIV should be taken seriously as pandemic threat and underestimation of the menace by S-OIV to be by far more dangerous than its overestimation.

2009 Swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) resembles previous influenza isolates

Background

In April 2009, novel swine-origin influenza viruses (S-OIV) were identified in patients from Mexico and the United States. The viruses were genetically characterized as a novel influenza A (H1N1) strain originating in swine, and within a very short time the S-OIV strain spread across the globe via human-to-human contact.

Methodology

We conducted a comprehensive computational search of all available sequences of the surface proteins of H1N1 swine influenza isolates and found that a similar strain to S-OIV appeared in Thailand in 2000. The earlier isolates caused infections in pigs but only one sequenced human case, A/Thailand/271/2005 (H1N1).

Significance

Differences between the Thai cases and S-OIV may help shed light on the ability of the current outbreak strain to spread rapidly among humans.

Pathogenesis and transmission of swine-origin 2009 A(H1N1) influenza virus in ferrets

The swine-origin A(H1N1) influenza virus that has emerged in humans in early 2009 has raised concerns about pandemic developments. In a ferret pathogenesis and transmission model, the 2009 A(H1N1) influenza virus was found to be more pathogenic than a seasonal A(H1N1) virus, with more extensive virus replication occurring in the respiratory tract. Replication of seasonal A(H1N1) virus was confined to the nasal cavity of ferrets, but the 2009 A(H1N1) influenza virus also replicated in the trachea, bronchi, and bronchioles. Virus shedding was more abundant from the upper respiratory tract for 2009 A(H1N1) influenza virus as compared with seasonal virus, and transmission via aerosol or respiratory droplets was equally efficient. These data suggest that the 2009 A(H1N1) influenza virus has the ability to persist in the human population, potentially with more severe clinical consequences.

Modelling the impact of an influenza A/H1N1 pandemic on critical care demand from early pathogenicity data: the case for sentinel reporting

Projected critical care demand for pandemic influenza H1N1 in England was estimated in this study. The effect of varying hospital admission rates under statistical uncertainty was examined. Early in a pandemic, uncertainty in epidemiological parameters leads to a wide range of credible scenarios, with projected demand ranging from insignificant to overwhelming. However, even small changes to input assumptions make the major incident scenario increasingly likely. Before any cases are admitted to hospital, 95% confidence limit on admission rates led to a range in predicted peak critical care bed occupancy of between 0% and 37% of total critical care bed capacity, half of these cases requiring ventilatory support. For hospital admission rates above 0.25%, critical care bed availability would be exceeded. Further, only 10% of critical care beds in England are in specialist paediatric units, but best estimates suggest that 30% of patients requiring critical care will be children. Paediatric intensive care facilities are likely to be quickly exhausted and suggest that older children should be managed in adult critical care units to allow resource optimisation. Crucially this study highlights the need for sentinel reporting and real-time modelling to guide rational decision making.

Clinical effectiveness of oseltamivir for influenza A(H1N1) virus with H274Y neuraminidase mutation

OBJECTIVE

To evaluate the clinical effectiveness of oseltamivir therapy started within 48h of the onset for influenza A(H1N1) virus with H274Y neuraminidase (NA) mutation.

METHODS

Virus was isolated before and four to six days after starting oseltamivir treatment from 73 outpatients with influenza A(H1N1) virus in the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 seasons. NA inhibition assays (IC(50)) and sequence analyses were done using influenza viruses isolated from these patients. Body temperature was evaluated before and on the second, third, and fourth days after starting treatment.

RESULTS

H274Y mutation was not shown in the 2007-2008 season (44 patients) and shown in all 29 patients in the 2008-2009 season by NA sequence analyses. The mean IC(50) before oseltamivir treatment was significantly higher in 2008-2009 (319.3+/-185.4 nM) than in 2007-2008 (1.5+/-0.8 nM; p<.001). Patients < or =15 years with oseltamivir-resistant virus infection had a higher ratio of patients persisted virus after oseltamivir treatment than patients >15 years (50% and 11.8%, respectively, p=0.038), and a significant higher body temperature during oseltamivir treatment, compared to patients < or =15 years treated for oseltamivir-sensitive virus infection.

CONCLUSION

The clinical effectiveness of oseltamivir for the A(H1N1) virus was reduced in the 2008-2009 season compared with the previous season, especially in children, probably due to the H274Y mutation. Oseltamivir seems to be not recommended for children and patients with high-risk underlying diseases infected with H274Y mutated A(H1N1) virus.

Public perceptions, anxiety, and behaviour change in relation to the swine flu outbreak: cross sectional telephone survey

OBJECTIVE

To assess whether perceptions of the swine flu outbreak predicted changes in behaviour among members of the public in England, Scotland, and Wales.

DESIGN

Cross sectional telephone survey using random digit dialling.

SETTING

Interviews by telephone between 8 and 12 May.

PARTICIPANTS

997 adults aged 18 or more who had heard of swine flu and spoke English.

MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES

Recommended change in behaviour (increases in handwashing and surface cleaning or plans made with a "flu friend") and avoidance behaviours (engaged in one or more of six behaviours such as avoiding large crowds or public transport).

RESULTS

37.8% of participants (n=377) reported performing any recommended behaviour change "over the past four days . . . because of swine flu." 4.9% (n=49) had carried out any avoidance behaviour. Controlling for personal details and anxiety, recommended changes were associated with perceptions that swine flu is severe, that the risk of catching it is high risk, that the outbreak will continue for a long time, that the authorities can be trusted, that good information has been provided, that people can control their risk of catching swine flu, and that specific behaviours are effective in reducing the risk. Being uncertain about the outbreak and believing that the outbreak had been exaggerated were associated with a lower likelihood of change. The strongest predictor of behaviour change was ethnicity, with participants from ethnic minority groups being more likely to make recommended changes (odds ratio 3.2, 95% confidence interval 2.0 to 5.3) and carry out avoidance behaviours (4.1, 2.0 to 8.4).

CONCLUSIONS

The results support efforts to inform the public about specific actions that can reduce the risks from swine flu and to communicate about the government's plans and resources. Tackling the perception that the outbreak has been "over-hyped" may be difficult but worthwhile. Additional research is required into differing reactions to the outbreak among ethnic groups.

Origins and evolutionary genomics of the 2009 swine-origin H1N1 influenza A epidemic

In March and early April 2009, a new swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) virus (S-OIV) emerged in Mexico and the United States. During the first few weeks of surveillance, the virus spread worldwide to 30 countries (as of May 11) by human-to-human transmission, causing the World Health Organization to raise its pandemic alert to level 5 of 6. This virus has the potential to develop into the first influenza pandemic of the twenty-first century. Here we use evolutionary analysis to estimate the timescale of the origins and the early development of the S-OIV epidemic. We show that it was derived from several viruses circulating in swine, and that the initial transmission to humans occurred several months before recognition of the outbreak. A phylogenetic estimate of the gaps in genetic surveillance indicates a long period of unsampled ancestry before the S-OIV outbreak, suggesting that the reassortment of swine lineages may have occurred years before emergence in humans, and that the multiple genetic ancestry of S-OIV is not indicative of an artificial origin. Furthermore, the unsampled history of the epidemic means that the nature and location of the genetically closest swine viruses reveal little about the immediate origin of the epidemic, despite the fact that we included a panel of closely related and previously unpublished swine influenza isolates. Our results highlight the need for systematic surveillance of influenza in swine, and provide evidence that the mixing of new genetic elements in swine can result in the emergence of viruses with pandemic potential in humans.

Transmission and pathogenesis of swine-origin 2009 A(H1N1) influenza viruses in ferrets and mice

Recent reports of mild to severe influenza-like illness in humans caused by a novel swine-origin 2009 A(H1N1) influenza virus underscore the need to better understand the pathogenesis and transmission of these viruses in mammals. In this study, selected 2009 A(H1N1) influenza isolates were assessed for their ability to cause disease in mice and ferrets and compared with a contemporary seasonal H1N1 virus for their ability to transmit to naïve ferrets through respiratory droplets. In contrast to seasonal influenza H1N1 virus, 2009 A(H1N1) influenza viruses caused increased morbidity, replicated to higher titers in lung tissue, and were recovered from the intestinal tract of intranasally inoculated ferrets. The 2009 A(H1N1) influenza viruses exhibited less efficient respiratory droplet transmission in ferrets in comparison with the highly transmissible phenotype of a seasonal H1N1 virus. Transmission of the 2009 A(H1N1) influenza viruses was further corroborated by characterizing the binding specificity of the viral hemagglutinin to the sialylated glycan receptors (in the human host) by use of dose-dependent direct receptor-binding and human lung tissue-binding assays.

H1N1 swine origin influenza infection in the United States and Europe in 2009 may be similar to H1N1 seasonal influenza infection in two Australian states in 2007 and 2008

BACKGROUND

The population-based impact of infection with swine origin influenza A (H1N1) virus infection was not clear in the early days of the epidemic towards the end of May 2009. Australia had seven confirmed cases by 22 May 2009. We aimed to compare available data on swine origin influenza A (H1N1) virus infection overseas with seasonal influenza A (H1N1) virus infection in Australia to assist with forward planning.

METHODS

Data on infection with seasonal influenza A (H1N1) virus in patients recruited through sentinel general practices in Victoria and Western Australia in 2007 and 2008 were compared with early publications on infection with swine origin influenza A (H1N1) virus in the United States and Europe.

RESULTS

Influenza A (H1N1) virus infection was predominantly a disease of younger people, regardless of whether the virus was of swine or human origin. The median age of infection with swine origin virus was 20 years in the United States and 22 years in Spain, while the median age of infection with human origin virus was 18 years in Western Australia and 23 years in Victoria.

CONCLUSIONS

The median age of infection with influenza A (H1N1) virus was around 20 +/- 3 years, independent of the origin of the H1N1 virus but a higher proportion of swine origin influenza infections occurred in people aged 10-18 years. This is at least partially explained by biased sampling among surveillance patients, although it may also reflect a different infection pattern.

Development of a real-time RT-PCR for the detection of swine-lineage influenza A (H1N1) virus infections

BACKGROUND

A novel influenza A virus, subtype H1N1 of swine-lineage (H1N1 swl) has transmitted rapidly to many regions of the world with evidence of sustained transmission within some countries. Rapid detection and differentiation from seasonal influenza is essential to instigate appropriate patient and public health management and for disease surveillance.

OBJECTIVES

To develop a rapid and sensitive real-time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (rtRT-PCR) for confirmation of H1N1 swl.

STUDY DESIGN

A one-step rtRT-PCR approach was employed to target the matrix gene of the novel influenza A/H1N1 swl and validated against a panel of seasonal influenza A (H1N1 and H3N2), swine influenza A/H1N1 and avian influenza A/H5N1 viruses. The assay following validation was then used prospectively to detect H1N1 swl positive specimens from the recent outbreaks in the UK and the Republic of Ireland.

RESULTS

The one-step H1N1 swl matrix rtRT-PCR successfully detected H1N1 swl clinical specimens and did not cross-react with seasonal influenza A, subtypes H1N1 and H3N2 viruses and swine influenza A (H1N1). The H1N1 swl matrix assay did cross react with H5N1. The H1N1 swl matrix assay was then compared to two other assays using a dilution series and a panel of untyped influenza A positive clinical samples. These experiments found the assay to have a comparable sensitivity to the established universal influenza A rtRT-PCR and was more sensitive than the H1N1 swl specific assay that targeted the H1 region.

CONCLUSIONS

The results demonstrate that the rtRT-PCR is sensitive and should be used alongside existing universal influenza A assays to rapidly detect the novel H1N1 swl virus.

Mitigation approaches to combat the flu pandemic

Management of flu pandemic is a perpetual challenge for the medical fraternity since time immemorial. Animal to human transmission has been observed thrice in the last century within an average range of 11-39 years of antigenic recycling. The recent outbreak of influenza A (H1N1, also termed as swine flu), first reported in Mexico on April 26, 2009, occurred in the forty first year since last reported flu pandemic (July 1968). Within less than 50 days, it has assumed pandemic proportions (phase VI) affecting over 76 countries with 163 deaths/35,928 cases (as on 15(th) June 2009). It indicated the re-emergence of genetically reassorted virus having strains endemic to humans, swine and avian (H5N1). The World Health Organisation (WHO) member states have already pulled up their socks and geared up to combat such criticalities. Earlier outbreaks of avian flu (H5N1) in different countries led WHO to develop pandemic preparedness strategies with national/regional plans on pandemic preparedness. Numerous factors related to climatic conditions, socio-economic strata, governance and sharing of information/logistics at all levels have been considered critical indicators in monitoring the dynamics of escalation towards a pandemic situation.The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), Government of India, with the active cooperation of UN agencies and other stakeholders/experts has formulated a concept paper on role of nonhealth service providers during pandemics in April 2008 and released national guidelines - management of biological disasters in July 2008. These guidelines enumerate that the success of medical management endeavors like pharmaceutical (anti-viral Oseltamivir and Zanamivir therapies), nonpharmaceutical interventions and vaccination development etc., largely depends on level of resistance offered by mutagenic viral strain and rationale use of pharmaco therapeutic interventions. This article describes the mitigation approach to combat flu pandemic with its effective implementation at national, state and local levels.

Modeling influenza epidemics and pandemics: insights into the future of swine flu (H1N1)

Here we present a review of the literature of influenza modeling studies, and discuss how these models can provide insights into the future of the currently circulating novel strain of influenza A (H1N1), formerly known as swine flu. We discuss how the feasibility of controlling an epidemic critically depends on the value of the Basic Reproduction Number (R0). The R0 for novel influenza A (H1N1) has recently been estimated to be between 1.4 and 1.6. This value is below values of R0 estimated for the 1918-1919 pandemic strain (mean R0 approximately 2: range 1.4 to 2.8) and is comparable to R0 values estimated for seasonal strains of influenza (mean R0 1.3: range 0.9 to 2.1). By reviewing results from previous modeling studies we conclude it is theoretically possible that a pandemic of H1N1 could be contained. However it may not be feasible, even in resource-rich countries, to achieve the necessary levels of vaccination and treatment for control. As a recent modeling study has shown, a global cooperative strategy will be essential in order to control a pandemic. This strategy will require resource-rich countries to share their vaccines and antivirals with resource-constrained and resource-poor countries. We conclude our review by discussing the necessity of developing new biologically complex models. We suggest that these models should simultaneously track the transmission dynamics of multiple strains of influenza in bird, pig and human populations. Such models could be critical for identifying effective new interventions, and informing pandemic preparedness planning. Finally, we show that by modeling cross-species transmission it may be possible to predict the emergence of pandemic strains of influenza.

Emergence and pandemic potential of swine-origin H1N1 influenza virus

Influenza viruses cause annual epidemics and occasional pandemics that have claimed the lives of millions. The emergence of new strains will continue to pose challenges to public health and the scientific communities. A prime example is the recent emergence of swine-origin H1N1 viruses that have transmitted to and spread among humans, resulting in outbreaks internationally. Efforts to control these outbreaks and real-time monitoring of the evolution of this virus should provide us with invaluable information to direct infectious disease control programmes and to improve understanding of the factors that determine viral pathogenicity and/or transmissibility.

Widespread public misconception in the early phase of the H1N1 influenza epidemic

OBJECTIVES

To investigate the community responses and preparedness for a possible epidemic of H1N1 influenza in Hong Kong shortly after an imported case was confirmed.

METHODS

A random sample of 550 Chinese adults in the Hong Kong general population was interviewed during May 7-9, 2009.

RESULTS

The public did not perceive a high likelihood of having a local H1N1 outbreak, nor did they regard H1N1 as a threatening disease. Frequent hand-washing (73.6%) and use of face-masks in case of flu symptoms (47.9%) were prevalent. The public approved of governmental policies including the quarantining of hotel guests, was not panicking and perceived a high self-efficacy of self-protection. However, misconceptions were prevalent and the public avoided visiting crowded places (9.3%), which many people wrongly believed was a government recommendation.

CONCLUSION

Although the public response demonstrated vigilance and preparedness there were signs of complacency. Clear communication, updated scientific information and transparency on government decision making are warranted. Data of the study provide a baseline for an ongoing surveillance program to help shape policy and provide information to the international community.

Emergence of a novel swine-origin influenza A virus (S-OIV) H1N1 virus in humans

A recently emerged novel influenza A H1N1 virus continues to spread globally. The virus contains a novel constellation of gene segments, the nearest known precursors being viruses found in swine and it likely arose through reassortment of two or more viruses of swine origin. H1N1, H1N2 and H3N2 subtype swine influenza viruses have occasionally infected humans before but such zoonotic transmission events did not lead to sustained human-to-human transmission in the manner this swine-origin influenza virus (S-OIV) has done. Its transmission among humans appears to be higher than that observed with seasonal influenza. Children and young adults appear to those most affected and also those who appear to maintain transmission. Clinical disease generally appears mild but complications leading to hospitalization can occur, especially in those with underlying lung or cardiac disease, diabetes or those on immunosuppresive therapies. There are concerns that the virus may reassort with existing human influenza virus giving rise to more transmissible or more pathogenic viruses. The virus appears to retain the potential to transmit back to swine and thus continued reassortment with swine viruses is a cause for concern.

Preparing the outbreak assistance laboratory network in the Netherlands for the detection of the influenza virus A(H1N1) variant

BACKGROUND

Late April 2009, human infection with variant influenza virus A(H1N1)v emerged in the Northern Americas posing a threat that this virus may become the next pandemic influenza virus.

OBJECTIVES

To prepare laboratories for surge capacity for molecular diagnosis of patients suspected for A(H1N1)v infection in the Netherlands.

STUDY DESIGN

A panel of 10 blinded specimens containing seasonal A(H1N1) or A(H3N2), or A/Netherlands/602/2009(H1N1)v influenza virus, or negative control was distributed to the outbreak assistance laboratories (OAL) together with influenza virus A (M-gene), swine influenza virus A (NP-gene) and influenza virus A(H1N1)v (H1v-gene) specific primers and probes and protocol (CDC Atlanta, USA). Laboratories were asked to implement and test this protocol.

RESULTS

All OAL were able to detect A(H1N1)v using the CDC M-gene reagents, the majority with similar sensitivity as the in-house M-gene based assays. RT-PCRs used in routine diagnostic setting in the OAL specifically designed to detect H1, H3, or NS1 from seasonal influenza A viruses, did not or at very low level cross-react with A(H1N1)v. The CDC swine NP-gene and H1v-gene RT-PCRs showed somewhat reduced sensitivity compared to the CDC and in-house M-gene RT-PCRs. In contrast, in-house developed A(H1N1)v specific H1v-gene and N1v-gene RT-PCRs showed equal sensitivity to CDC and in-house M-gene RT-PCRs.

CONCLUSIONS

The Dutch OAL are prepared for detection and specific identification of A(H1N1)v, although some level of cross-reactivity was observed with seasonal influenza viruses. Additionally, M-gene based generic influenza A virus detection is recommended to be able to detect emerging influenza A viruses in routine settings.

The 2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak in its historical context

Of the 16 known serotypes of influenza A haemagglutinin, 6 have been isolated from humans at the molecular level (H1, H2, H3, H5, H7, H9). 3 of these have been involved in past pandemics (H1, H2, H3). Traditional pandemic surveillance has focussed on monitoring antigenic shift, meaning the re-assortment of novel haemagglutinins into seasonal human influenza A viruses during rare events of double infection with seasonal and zoonotic strains. H5, from avian H5N1 influenza, has been the major cause for concern in recent years. However, the 2009 H1N1 zoonotic event demonstrates that even serotypes already encountered in past human pandemics may constitute new pandemic threats. The protein sequence divergence of the 2009 zoonotic H1 from human seasonal influenza H1 is around 20-24%. A similar level of divergence is found between the 2009 H1 and European swine flu. By contrast, its divergence from North American swine flu strains is around 1-9%. Given that the divergence between H1 and its nearest serotype neighbour H2 is around 40-46%, the 2009 H1 may be broadly considered as halfway towards a new serotype. The current situation is one of antigenic pseudo-shift.

Analytical sensitivity of rapid influenza antigen detection tests for swine-origin influenza virus (H1N1)

BACKGROUND

A novel swine origin influenza virus (S-OIV) (H1N1) is spreading worldwide and threatens to become pandemic.

OBJECTIVES

Determine analytical sensitivity of selected commercially available rapid influenza antigen detection tests in detecting S-OIV H1N1.

STUDY DESIGN

Serial dilutions of two S-OIV isolates, one seasonal influenza A (H1N1) isolate and a nasopharyngeal aspirate from a patient with S-OIV disease were tested in five commercially available influenza antigen detection tests and by virus isolation in cell culture. Viral M gene copy number was determined by quantitative PCR methods.

RESULTS

The analytical sensitivity of the five influenza antigen detection tests for S-OIV (tissue culture infectious dose 50 (TCID(50)) log(10)3.3-4.7 was comparable with that of seasonal influenza (TCID(50) log(10)4.0-4.5).

CONCLUSION

The analytical sensitivity of the selected influenza A antigen detection tests for detection of S-IOV was comparable with that of seasonal influenza H1N1.