The need for a cognitive neuroscience of naturalistic social cognition

How and why affective and reactive virtual agents will bring new insights on social cognitive disorders in schizophrenia? An illustration with a virtual card game paradigm

In recent decades, many studies have shown that schizophrenia is associated with severe social cognitive impairments affecting key components, such as the recognition of emotions, theory of mind, attributional style, and metacognition. Most studies investigated each construct separately, precluding analysis of the interactive and immersive nature of real-life situation. Specialized batteries of tests are under investigation to assess social cognition, which is thought now as a link between neurocognitive disorders and impaired functioning. However, this link accounts for a limited part of the variance of real-life functioning. To fill this gap, advances in virtual reality and affective computing have made it possible to carry out experimental investigations of naturalistic social cognition, in controlled conditions, with good reproducibility. This approach is illustrated with the description of a new paradigm based on an original virtual card game in which subjects interpret emotional displays from a female virtual agent, and decipher her helping intentions. Independent variables concerning emotional expression in terms of valence and intensity were manipulated. We show how several useful dependant variables, ranging from classic experimental psychology data to metacognition or subjective experiences records, may be extracted from a single experiment. Methodological issues about the immersion into a simulated intersubjective situation are considered. The example of this new flexible experimental setting, with regards to the many constructs recognized in social neurosciences, constitutes a rationale for focusing on this potential intermediate link between standardized tests and real-life functioning, and also for using it as an innovative media for cognitive remediation.

Interactive social neuroscience to study autism spectrum disorder

Individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) demonstrate difficulty with social interactions and relationships, but the neural mechanisms underlying these difficulties remain largely unknown. While social difficulties in ASD are most apparent in the context of interactions with other people, most neuroscience research investigating ASD have provided limited insight into the complex dynamics of these interactions. The development of novel, innovative "interactive social neuroscience" methods to study the brain in contexts with two interacting humans is a necessary advance for ASD research. Studies applying an interactive neuroscience approach to study two brains engaging with one another have revealed significant differences in neural processes during interaction compared to observation in brain regions that are implicated in the neuropathology of ASD. Interactive social neuroscience methods are crucial in clarifying the mechanisms underlying the social and communication deficits that characterize ASD.

A common neural code for perceived and inferred emotion

Although the emotions of other people can often be perceived from overt reactions (e.g., facial or vocal expressions), they can also be inferred from situational information in the absence of observable expressions. How does the human brain make use of these diverse forms of evidence to generate a common representation of a target's emotional state? In the present research, we identify neural patterns that correspond to emotions inferred from contextual information and find that these patterns generalize across different cues from which an emotion can be attributed. Specifically, we use functional neuroimaging to measure neural responses to dynamic facial expressions with positive and negative valence and to short animations in which the valence of a character's emotion could be identified only from the situation. Using multivoxel pattern analysis, we test for regions that contain information about the target's emotional state, identifying representations specific to a single stimulus type and representations that generalize across stimulus types. In regions of medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), a classifier trained to discriminate emotional valence for one stimulus (e.g., animated situations) could successfully discriminate valence for the remaining stimulus (e.g., facial expressions), indicating a representation of valence that abstracts away from perceptual features and generalizes across different forms of evidence. Moreover, in a subregion of MPFC, this neural representation generalized to trials involving subjectively experienced emotional events, suggesting partial overlap in neural responses to attributed and experienced emotions. These data provide a step toward understanding how the brain transforms stimulus-bound inputs into abstract representations of emotion.

From naturalistic neuroscience to modeling radical embodiment with narrative enactive systems

Mainstream cognitive neuroscience has begun to accept the idea of embodied mind, which assumes that the human mind is fundamentally constituted by the dynamical interactions of the brain, body, and the environment. In today's paradigm of naturalistic neurosciences, subjects are exposed to rich contexts, such as video sequences or entire films, under relatively controlled conditions, against which researchers can interpret changes in neural responses within a time window. However, from the point of view of radical embodied cognitive neuroscience, the increasing complexity alone will not suffice as the explanatory apparatus for dynamical embodiment and situatedness of the mind. We suggest that narrative enactive systems with dynamically adaptive content as stimuli, may serve better to account for the embodied mind engaged with the surrounding world. Among the ensuing challenges for neuroimaging studies is how to interpret brain data against broad temporal contexts of previous experiences that condition the unfolding experience of nowness. We propose means to tackle this issue, as well as ways to limit the exponentially growing combinatoria of narrative paths to a controllable number.

Empathy: gender effects in brain and behavior

Evidence suggests that there are differences in the capacity for empathy between males and females. However, how deep do these differences go? Stereotypically, females are portrayed as more nurturing and empathetic, while males are portrayed as less emotional and more cognitive. Some authors suggest that observed gender differences might be largely due to cultural expectations about gender roles. However, empathy has both evolutionary and developmental precursors, and can be studied using implicit measures, aspects that can help elucidate the respective roles of culture and biology. This article reviews evidence from ethology, social psychology, economics, and neuroscience to show that there are fundamental differences in implicit measures of empathy, with parallels in development and evolution. Studies in nonhuman animals and younger human populations (infants/children) offer converging evidence that sex differences in empathy have phylogenetic and ontogenetic roots in biology and are not merely cultural byproducts driven by socialization. We review how these differences may have arisen in response to males' and females' different roles throughout evolution. Examinations of the neurobiological underpinnings of empathy reveal important quantitative gender differences in the basic networks involved in affective and cognitive forms of empathy, as well as a qualitative divergence between the sexes in how emotional information is integrated to support decision making processes. Finally, the study of gender differences in empathy can be improved by designing studies with greater statistical power and considering variables implicit in gender (e.g., sexual preference, prenatal hormone exposure). These improvements may also help uncover the nature of neurodevelopmental and psychiatric disorders in which one sex is more vulnerable to compromised social competence associated with impaired empathy.

Do people with schizophrenia have difficulty anticipating pleasure, engaging in effortful behavior, or both?

Motivation deficits are common in schizophrenia, but little is known about underlying mechanisms, or the specific goals that people with schizophrenia set in daily life. Using neurobiological heuristics of pleasure anticipation and effort assessment, we examined the quality of activities and goals of 47 people with and 41 people without schizophrenia, utilizing ecological momentary assessment. Participants were provided cell phones and called 4 times a day for 7 days, and were asked about their current activities and anticipation of upcoming goals. Activities and goals were later coded by independent raters on pleasure and effort. In line with recent laboratory findings on effort computation deficits in schizophrenia, relative to healthy participants, people with schizophrenia reported engaging in less effortful activities and setting less effortful goals, which were related to patient functioning. In addition, patients showed some inaccuracy in estimating how difficult an effortful goal would be, which in turn was associated with lower neurocognition. In contrast to previous research, people with schizophrenia engaged in activities and set goals that were more pleasure-based, and anticipated goals as being more pleasurable than controls. Thus, this study provided evidence for difficulty with effortful behavior and not anticipation of pleasure. These findings may have psychosocial treatment implications, focusing on effort assessment or effort expenditure. For example, to help people with schizophrenia engage in more meaningful goal pursuits, treatment providers may leverage low-effort pleasurable goals by helping patients to break down larger, more complex goals into smaller, lower-effort steps that are associated with specific pleasurable rewards.

From speech to thought: the neuronal basis of cognitive units in non-experimental, real-life communication investigated using ECoG

Exchange of thoughts by means of expressive speech is fundamental to human communication. However, the neuronal basis of real-life communication in general, and of verbal exchange of ideas in particular, has rarely been studied until now. Here, our aim was to establish an approach for exploring the neuronal processes related to cognitive “idea” units (IUs) in conditions of non-experimental speech production. We investigated whether such units corresponding to single, coherent chunks of speech with syntactically-defined borders, are useful to unravel the neuronal mechanisms underlying real-world human cognition. To this aim, we employed simultaneous electrocorticography (ECoG) and video recordings obtained in pre-neurosurgical diagnostics of epilepsy patients. We transcribed non-experimental, daily hospital conversations, identified IUs in transcriptions of the patients' speech, classified the obtained IUs according to a previously-proposed taxonomy focusing on memory content, and investigated the underlying neuronal activity. In each of our three subjects, we were able to collect a large number of IUs which could be assigned to different functional IU subclasses with a high inter-rater agreement. Robust IU-onset-related changes in spectral magnitude could be observed in high gamma frequencies (70–150 Hz) on the inferior lateral convexity and in the superior temporal cortex regardless of the IU content. A comparison of the topography of these responses with mouth motor and speech areas identified by electrocortical stimulation showed that IUs might be of use for extraoperative mapping of eloquent cortex (average sensitivity: 44.4%, average specificity: 91.1%). High gamma responses specific to memory-related IU subclasses were observed in the inferior parietal and prefrontal regions. IU-based analysis of ECoG recordings during non-experimental communication thus elicits topographically- and functionally-specific effects. We conclude that segmentation of spontaneous real-world speech in linguistically-motivated units is a promising strategy for elucidating the neuronal basis of mental processing during non-experimental communication.

Intentions in the Brain

Is it possible to understand the intentions of others by merely observing their movements? Current debate has been mainly focused on the role that mirror neurons and motor simulation may play in this process, with surprisingly little attention being devoted to how intentions are actually translated into movements. Here, we delineate an alternative approach to the problem of intention-from-movement understanding, which takes “action execution” rather than “action observation” as a starting point. We first consider whether and to what extent, during action execution, intentions shape movement kinematics. We then examine whether observers are sensitive to intention information conveyed by visual kinematics and can use this information to discriminate between different intentions. Finally, we consider the neural mechanisms that may contribute to intention-from-movement understanding. We argue that by reframing the relationship between intention and movement, this evidence opens new perspectives into the neurobiology of how we know other minds and predict others’ behavior.

Neural activation associated with the cognitive emotion regulation of sadness in healthy children

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Children's use of reappraisal was associated with increased prefrontal activation.

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Children showed deactivation in the amygdala while reappraising sad photos.

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Children's PFC activity during reappraisal was consistent with adult findings.

When used effectively, cognitive reappraisal of distressing events is a highly adaptive cognitive emotion regulation (CER) strategy, with impairments in cognitive reappraisal associated with greater risk for psychopathology. Despite extensive literature examining the neural correlates of cognitive reappraisal in healthy and psychiatrically ill adults, there is a dearth of data to inform the neural bases of CER in children, a key gap in the literature necessary to map the developmental trajectory of cognitive reappraisal. In this fMRI study, psychiatrically healthy schoolchildren were instructed to use cognitive reappraisal to modulate their emotional reactions and responses of negative affect after viewing sad photos. Consistent with the adult literature, when actively engaged in reappraisal compared to passively viewing sad photos, children showed increased activation in the vlPFC, dlPFC, and dmPFC as well as in parietal and temporal lobe regions. When children used cognitive reappraisal to minimize their experience of negative affect after viewing sad stimuli they exhibited dampened amygdala responses. Results are discussed in relation to the importance of identifying and characterizing neural processes underlying adaptive CER strategies in typically developing children in order to understand how these systems go awry and relate to the risk and occurrence of affective disorders.

Mirror Neuron System and Mentalizing System connect during online social interaction

Two sets of brain areas are repeatedly reported in neuroimaging studies on social cognition: the Mirror Neuron System and the Mentalizing System. The Mirror System is involved in goal understanding and has been associated with several emotional and cognitive functions central to social interaction, ranging from empathy to gestural communication and imitation. The Mentalizing System is recruited in tasks requiring cognitive processes such as self-reference and understanding of other's intentions. Although theoretical accounts for an interaction between the two systems have been proposed, little is known about their synergy during social exchanges. In order to explore this question, we have recorded brain activity by means of functional MRI during live social exchanges based on reciprocal imitation of hand gestures. Here, we investigate, using the method of psychophysiological interaction, the changes in functional connectivity of the Mirror System due to the conditions of interest (being imitated, imitating) compared with passive observation of hand gestures. We report a strong coupling between the Mirror System and the Mentalizing System during the imitative exchanges. Our findings suggest a complementary role of the two networks during social encounters. The Mirror System would engage in the preparation of own actions and the simulation of other's actions, while the Mentalizing System would engage in the anticipation of the other's intention and thus would participate to the co-regulation of reciprocal actions. Beyond a specific effect of imitation, the design used offers the opportunity to tackle the role of role-switching in an interpersonal account of social cognition.

Empathic accuracy and cognition in schizotypal personality disorder

Interpersonal dysfunction contributes to significant disability in the schizophrenia spectrum. Schizotypal Personality Disorder (SPD) is a schizophrenia-related personality demonstrating social cognitive impairment in the absence of frank psychosis. Past research indicates that cognitive dysfunction or schizotypy may account for social cognitive dysfunction in this population. We tested SPD subjects and healthy controls on the Empathic Accuracy (EA) paradigm and the Reading of the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET), assessing the impact of EA on social support. We also explored whether EA differences could be explained by intelligence, working memory, trait empathy, or attachment avoidance. SPD subjects did not differ from controls in RMET, but demonstrated lower EA during negative valence videos, associated with lower social support. Dynamic, multimodal EA paradigms may be more effective at capturing interpersonal dysfunction than static image tasks such as RMET. Schizotypal severity, trait empathy, and cognitive dysfunction did not account for empathic dysfunction in SPD, although attachment avoidance is related to empathic differences. Empathic dysfunction for negative affect contributes to decreased social support in the schizophrenia spectrum. Future research may shed further light on potential links between attachment avoidance, empathic dysfunction, and social support.

Adapting social neuroscience measures for schizophrenia clinical trials, Part 2: trolling the depths of psychometric properties

The psychometric properties of 4 paradigms adapted from the social neuroscience literature were evaluated to determine their suitability for use in clinical trials of schizophrenia. This 2-site study (University of California, Los Angeles and University of North Carolina) included 173 clinically stable schizophrenia outpatients and 88 healthy controls. The social cognition battery was administered twice to the schizophrenia group (baseline, 4-week retest) and once to the control group. The 4 paradigms included 2 that assess perception of nonverbal social and action cues (basic biological motion and emotion in biological motion) and 2 that involve higher level inferences about self and others' mental states (self-referential memory and empathic accuracy). Each paradigm was evaluated on (1) patient vs healthy control group differences, (2) test-retest reliability, (3) utility as a repeated measure, and (4) tolerability. Of the 4 paradigms, empathic accuracy demonstrated the strongest characteristics, including large between-group differences, adequate test-retest reliability (.72), negligible practice effects, and good tolerability ratings. The other paradigms showed weaker psychometric characteristics in their current forms. These findings highlight challenges in adapting social neuroscience paradigms for use in clinical trials.

Adapting social neuroscience measures for schizophrenia clinical trials, Part 1: ferrying paradigms across perilous waters

Social cognitive impairment is prominent in schizophrenia, and it is closely related to functional outcome. Partly for these reasons, it has rapidly become a target for both training and psychopharmacological interventions. However, there is a paucity of reliable and valid social cognitive endpoints that can be used to evaluate treatment response in clinical trials. Also, clinical studies in schizophrenia have benefited rather little from the surge of activity and knowledge in nonclinical social neuroscience. The National Institute of Mental Health-sponsored study, "Social Cognition and Functioning in Schizophrenia" (SCAF), attempted to address this translational challenge by selecting paradigms from social neuroscience that could be adapted for use in schizophrenia. The project also evaluated the psychometric properties and external validity of the tasks to determine their suitability for multisite clinical trials. This first article in the theme section presents the goals, conceptual background, and rationale for the SCAF project.

Effects of emotional context on memory for details: the role of attention

It was repeatedly demonstrated that a negative emotional context enhances memory for central details while impairing memory for peripheral information. This trade-off effect is assumed to result from attentional processes: a negative context seems to narrow attention to central information at the expense of more peripheral details, thus causing the differential effects in memory. However, this explanation has rarely been tested and previous findings were partly inconclusive. For the present experiment 13 negative and 13 neutral naturalistic, thematically driven picture stories were constructed to test the trade-off effect in an ecologically more valid setting as compared to previous studies. During an incidental encoding phase, eye movements were recorded as an index of overt attention. In a subsequent recognition phase, memory for central and peripheral details occurring in the picture stories was tested. Explicit affective ratings and autonomic responses validated the induction of emotion during encoding. Consistent with the emotional trade-off effect on memory, encoding context differentially affected recognition of central and peripheral details. However, contrary to the common assumption, the emotional trade-off effect on memory was not mediated by attentional processes. By contrast, results suggest that the relevance of attentional processing for later recognition memory depends on the centrality of information and the emotional context but not their interaction. Thus, central information was remembered well even when fixated very briefly whereas memory for peripheral information depended more on overt attention at encoding. Moreover, the influence of overt attention on memory for central and peripheral details seems to be much lower for an arousing as compared to a neutral context.

Metakognitive und sozial-kognitive Defizite bei Schizophrenien. Funktionelle Bedeutung und Behandlungsstrategien

Die Gruppe der Schizophrenien umfasst heterogene psychopathologische Syndrome, die oft mit neurokognitiven Störungen und niedrigem psychosozialen Funktionsniveau assoziiert sind. Empirische Studien legen nahe, dass viele mit Schizophrenie assoziierte Symptome auf Störungen der sozialen Kognition bzw. metakognitive Störungen zurückgeführt werden können. Diese Konzepte beziehen sich auf die Fähigkeit, soziale Signale wahrnehmen und interpretieren, eigene und psychische Zustände Anderer reflektieren und dieses Wissen flexibel in sozialen Interaktionen und zur Problemlösung einsetzen zu können. Der vorliegende Artikel gibt eine Übersicht über sozial-kognitive und metakognitive Defizite bei Schizophrenien und wie über das Training dieser Kernkompetenzen das psychosoziale Funktionsniveau von Patienten mit Schizophrenie verbessert werden kann. Bei Schizophrenien sind soziale Kognition und Metakognition eng mit dem psychosozialen Funktionsniveau verbunden, zum Teil jedoch auch abhängig von neurokognitiven Fähigkeiten. Sozial-kognitives bzw. metakognitives Training kann zur Verbesserung des psychosozialen Funktionsniveaus beitragen, möglicherweise aber in Abhängigkeit vom Lernpotential und der Motivation der Patienten. Zukünftige Studien sollten untersuchen, welche Subtypen innerhalb des Schizophrenie-Spektrums am ehesten von sozial-kognitivem und metakognitivem Training profitieren können und welche Gruppen ggf. zusätzlich neurokognitives Training benötigen, um das psychosoziale Funktionsniveau zu verbessern.

Toward a second-person neuroscience

In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie social encounters are only beginning to be studied and could – paradoxically – be seen as representing the “dark matter” of social neuroscience. Recent conceptual and empirical developments consistently indicate the need for investigations that allow the study of real-time social encounters in a truly interactive manner. This suggestion is based on the premise that social cognition is fundamentally different when we are in interaction with others rather than merely observing them. In this article, we outline the theoretical conception of a second-person approach to other minds and review evidence from neuroimaging, psychophysiological studies, and related fields to argue for the development of a second-person neuroscience, which will help neuroscience to really “go social”; this may also be relevant for our understanding of psychiatric disorders construed as disorders of social cognition.

Outcome dependency alters the neural substrates of impression formation

How do people maintain consistent impressions of other people when other people are often inconsistent? The present research addresses this question by combining recent neuroscientific insights with ecologically meaningful behavioral methods. Participants formed impressions of real people whom they met in a personally involving situation. fMRI and supporting behavioral data revealed that outcome dependency (i.e., depending on another person for a desired outcome) alters previously identified neural dynamics of impression formation. Consistent with past research, a functional localizer identified a region of dorsomedial PFC previously linked to social impression formation. In the main task, this ROI revealed the predicted patterns of activity across outcome dependency conditions: greater BOLD response when information confirmed (vs. violated) social expectations if participants were outcome-independent, and the reverse pattern if participants were outcome-dependent. We suggest that, although social perceivers often discount expectancy-disconfirming information as noise, being dependent on another person for a desired outcome focuses impression-formation processing on the most diagnostic information, rather than on the most tractable information.

Face puzzle-two new video-based tasks for measuring explicit and implicit aspects of facial emotion recognition

Recognizing others' emotional states is crucial for effective social interaction. While most facial emotion recognition tasks use explicit prompts that trigger consciously controlled processing, emotional faces are almost exclusively processed implicitly in real life. Recent attempts in social cognition suggest a dual process perspective, whereby explicit and implicit processes largely operate independently. However, due to differences in methodology the direct comparison of implicit and explicit social cognition has remained a challenge. Here, we introduce a new tool to comparably measure implicit and explicit processing aspects comprising basic and complex emotions in facial expressions. We developed two video-based tasks with similar answer formats to assess performance in respective facial emotion recognition processes: Face Puzzle, implicit and explicit. To assess the tasks' sensitivity to atypical social cognition and to infer interrelationship patterns between explicit and implicit processes in typical and atypical development, we included healthy adults (NT, n = 24) and adults with autism spectrum disorder (ASD, n = 24). Item analyses yielded good reliability of the new tasks. Group-specific results indicated sensitivity to subtle social impairments in high-functioning ASD. Correlation analyses with established implicit and explicit socio-cognitive measures were further in favor of the tasks' external validity. Between group comparisons provide first hints of differential relations between implicit and explicit aspects of facial emotion recognition processes in healthy compared to ASD participants. In addition, an increased magnitude of between group differences in the implicit task was found for a speed-accuracy composite measure. The new Face Puzzle tool thus provides two new tasks to separately assess explicit and implicit social functioning, for instance, to measure subtle impairments as well as potential improvements due to social cognitive interventions.

Network structure underlying resolution of conflicting non-verbal and verbal social information

Social judgments often require resolution of incongruity in communication contents. Although previous studies revealed that such conflict resolution recruits brain regions including the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and posterior inferior frontal gyrus (pIFG), functional relationships and networks among these regions remain unclear. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging study, we investigated the functional dissociation and networks by measuring human brain activity during resolving incongruity between verbal and non-verbal emotional contents. First, we found that the conflict resolutions biased by the non-verbal contents activated the posterior dorsal mPFC (post-dmPFC), bilateral anterior insula (AI) and right dorsal pIFG, whereas the resolutions biased by the verbal contents activated the bilateral ventral pIFG. In contrast, the anterior dmPFC (ant-dmPFC), bilateral superior temporal sulcus and fusiform gyrus were commonly involved in both of the resolutions. Second, we found that the post-dmPFC and right ventral pIFG were hub regions in networks underlying the non-verbal- and verbal-content-biased resolutions, respectively. Finally, we revealed that these resolution-type-specific networks were bridged by the ant-dmPFC, which was recruited for the conflict resolutions earlier than the two hub regions. These findings suggest that, in social conflict resolutions, the ant-dmPFC selectively recruits one of the resolution-type-specific networks through its interaction with resolution-type-specific hub regions.

Oscillatory brain activity correlates with risk perception and predicts social decisions

In social interactions, the perception of how risky our decisions are depends on how we anticipate other people's behaviors. We used electroencephalography to study the neurobiology of perception of social risk, in subjects playing the role of proposers in an iterated ultimatum game in pairs. Based on statistical modeling, we used the previous behaviors of both players to separate high-risk [HR] offers from low-risk [LR] offers. The HR offers present higher rejection probability and higher entropy (variability of possible outcome) than the LR offers. Rejections of LR offers elicited both a stronger mediofrontal negativity and a higher prefrontal theta activity than rejections of HR offers. Moreover, prior to feedback, HR offers generated a drop in alpha activity in an extended network. Interestingly, trial-by-trial variation in alpha activity in the medial prefrontal, posterior temporal, and inferior pariental cortex was specifically modulated by risk and, together with theta activity in the prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortex, predicted the proposer's subsequent behavior. Our results provide evidence that alpha and theta oscillations are sensitive to social risk and underlie a fine-tuning regulation of social decisions.

Task-dependent neural bases of perceiving emotionally expressive targets

SOCIAL COGNITION IS FUNDAMENTALLY INTERPERSONAL: individuals' behavior and dispositions critically affect their interaction partners' information processing. However, cognitive neuroscience studies, partially because of methodological constraints, have remained largely "perceiver-centric": focusing on the abilities, motivations, and goals of social perceivers while largely ignoring interpersonal effects. Here, we address this knowledge gap by examining the neural bases of perceiving emotionally expressive and inexpressive social "targets." Sixteen perceivers were scanned using fMRI while they watched targets discussing emotional autobiographical events. Perceivers continuously rated each target's emotional state or eye-gaze direction. The effects of targets' emotional expressivity on perceiver's brain activity depended on task set: when perceivers explicitly attended to targets' emotions, expressivity predicted activity in neural structures-including medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortex-associated with drawing inferences about mental states. When perceivers instead attended to targets' eye-gaze, target expressivity predicted activity in regions-including somatosensory cortex, fusiform gyrus, and motor cortex-associated with monitoring sensorimotor states and biological motion. These findings suggest that expressive targets affect information processing in manner that depends on perceivers' goals. More broadly, these data provide an early step toward understanding the neural bases of interpersonal social cognition.

Oscillatory Brain Correlates of Live Joint Attention: A Dual-EEG Study

Joint attention consists in following another's gaze onto an environmental object, which leads to the alignment of both subjects' attention onto this object. It is a fundamental mechanism of non-verbal communication, and it is essential for dynamic, online, interindividual synchronization during interactions. Here we aimed at investigating the oscillatory brain correlates of joint attention in a face-to-face paradigm where dyads of participants dynamically oriented their attention toward the same or different objects during joint and no-joint attention periods respectively. We also manipulated task instruction: in socially driven instructions, the participants had to follow explicitly their partner's gaze, while in color-driven instructions, the objects to be looked at were designated at by their color so that no explicit gaze following was required. We focused on oscillatory activities in the 10 Hz frequency range, where parieto-occipital alpha and the centro-parietal mu rhythms have been described, as these rhythms have been associated with attention and social coordination processes respectively. We tested the hypothesis of a modulation of these oscillatory activities by joint attention. We used dual-EEG to record simultaneously the brain activities of the participant dyads during our live, face-to-face joint attention paradigm. We showed that joint attention periods - as compared to the no-joint attention periods - were associated with a decrease of signal power between 11 and 13 Hz over a large set of left centro-parieto-occipital electrodes, encompassing the scalp regions where alpha and mu rhythms have been described. This 11-13 Hz signal power decrease was observed independently of the task instruction: it was similar when joint versus no-joint attention situations were socially driven and when they were color-driven. These results are interpreted in terms of the processes of attention mirroring, social coordination, and mutual attentiveness associated with joint attention state.

Social attention with real versus reel stimuli: toward an empirical approach to concerns about ecological validity

Cognitive neuroscientists often study social cognition by using simple but socially relevant stimuli, such as schematic faces or images of other people. Whilst this research is valuable, important aspects of genuine social encounters are absent from these studies, a fact that has recently drawn criticism. In the present review we argue for an empirical approach to the determination of the equivalence of different social stimuli. This approach involves the systematic comparison of different types of social stimuli ranging in their approximation to a real social interaction. In garnering support for this cognitive ethological approach, we focus on recent research in social attention that has involved stimuli ranging from simple schematic faces to real social interactions. We highlight both meaningful similarities and differences in various social attentional phenomena across these different types of social stimuli thus validating the utility of the research initiative. Furthermore, we argue that exploring these similarities and differences will provide new insights into social cognition and social neuroscience.

Early binding of gaze, gesture, and emotion: neural time course and correlates

Communicative intentions are transmitted by many perceptual cues, including gaze direction, body gesture, and facial expressions. However, little is known about how these visual social cues are integrated over time in the brain and, notably, whether this binding occurs in the emotional or the motor system. By coupling magnetic resonance and electroencephalography imaging in humans, we were able to show that, 200 ms after stimulus onset, the premotor cortex integrated gaze, gesture, and emotion displayed by a congener. At earlier stages, emotional content was processed independently in the amygdala (170 ms), whereas directional cues (gaze direction with pointing gesture) were combined at ∼190 ms in the parietal and supplementary motor cortices. These results demonstrate that the early binding of visual social signals displayed by an agent engaged the dorsal pathway and the premotor cortex, possibly to facilitate the preparation of an adaptive response to another person's immediate intention.

The representation of self and person knowledge in the medial prefrontal cortex

Nearly 40 years ago, social psychologists began applying the information processing framework of cognitive psychology to the question of how humans understand and represent knowledge about themselves and others. This approach gave rise to the immensely successful field of social cognition and fundamentally changed the way in which social psychological phenomena are studied. More recently, social scientists of many stripes have turned to the methods of cognitive neuroscience to understand the neural basis of social cognition. A pervasive finding from this research is that social knowledge, be it about one's self or of others, is represented in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC). This review focuses on the social cognitive neuroscience of self and person knowledge in the MPFC. We begin with a brief historical overview of social cognition, followed by a review of recent and influential research on the brain basis of self and person knowledge. In the latter half of this review, we discuss the role of familiarity and similarity in person perception and of spontaneous processes in self and other-referential cognition. Throughout, we discuss the myriad ways in which the social cognitive neuroscience approach has provided new insights into the nature and structure of self and person knowledge. WIREs Cogn Sci 2012, 3:451-470. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1183 This article is categorized under: Neuroscience > Cognition.

Dissociating modality-specific and supramodal neural systems for action understanding

The neural basis of action understanding in humans remains disputed, with some research implicating the putative mirror neuron system (MNS) and some a mentalizing system (MZS) for inferring mental states. The basis for this dispute may be that action understanding is a heterogeneous construct: actions can be understood from sensory information about body movements or from language about action, and with the goal of understanding the implementation ("how") or motive ("why") of an action. Although extant research implicates the MNS in understanding implementation and the MZS in understanding motive, it remains unknown to what extent these systems subserve modality-specific or supramodal functions in action understanding. While undergoing fMRI, 21 volunteers considered the implementation ("How is she doing it?") and motive ("Why is she doing it?") for actions presented in video or text. Bilateral parietal and right frontal areas of the MNS showed a modality-specific association with perceiving actions in videos, while left-hemisphere MNS showed a supramodal association with understanding implementation. Largely left-hemisphere MZS showed a supramodal association with understanding motive; however, connectivity among the MZS and MNS during the inference of motive was modality specific, being significantly stronger when motive was understood from actions in videos compared to text. These results support a tripartite model of MNS and MZS contributions to action understanding, where distinct areas of the MNS contribute to action perception ("perceiving what") and the representation of action implementation ("knowing how"), while the MZS supports an abstract, modality-independent representation of the mental states that explain action performance ("knowing why").

Atypical brain activation patterns during a face-to-face joint attention game in adults with autism spectrum disorder

Joint attention behaviors include initiating one's own and responding to another's bid for joint attention to an object, person, or topic. Joint attention abilities in autism are pervasively atypical, correlate with development of language and social abilities, and discriminate children with autism from other developmental disorders. Despite the importance of these behaviors, the neural correlates of joint attention in individuals with autism remain unclear. This paucity of data is likely due to the inherent challenge of acquiring data during a real-time social interaction. We used a novel experimental set-up in which participants engaged with an experimenter in an interactive face-to-face joint attention game during fMRI data acquisition. Both initiating and responding to joint attention behaviors were examined as well as a solo attention (SA) control condition. Participants included adults with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) (n = 13), a mean age- and sex-matched neurotypical group (n = 14), and a separate group of neurotypical adults (n = 22). Significant differences were found between groups within social-cognitive brain regions, including dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) and right posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), during the RJA as compared to SA conditions. Region-of-interest analyses revealed a lack of signal differentiation between joint attention and control conditions within left pSTS and dMPFC in individuals with ASD. Within the pSTS, this lack of differentiation was characterized by reduced activation during joint attention and relative hyper-activation during SA. These findings suggest a possible failure of developmental neural specialization within the STS and dMPFC to joint attention in ASD.

The neuroscience of empathy: progress, pitfalls and promise

The last decade has witnessed enormous growth in the neuroscience of empathy. Here, we survey research in this domain with an eye toward evaluating its strengths and weaknesses. First, we take stock of the notable progress made by early research in characterizing the neural systems supporting two empathic sub-processes: sharing others' internal states and explicitly considering those states. Second, we describe methodological and conceptual pitfalls into which this work has sometimes fallen, which can limit its validity. These include the use of relatively artificial stimuli that differ qualitatively from the social cues people typically encounter and a lack of focus on the relationship between brain activity and social behavior. Finally, we describe current research trends that are overcoming these pitfalls through simple but important adjustments in focus, and the future promise of empathy research if these trends continue and expand.

Potential therapeutic avenues to tackle social cognition problems in schizophrenia

Therapeutic strategies for improving social cognition in patients with schizophrenia have shown much promise in improving social functioning, as well as remediating core psychotic symptoms. However, the efficacy of previous interventions has often been limited by the ambiguity and inconsistency of the categorized subdomains of social cognition, including theory of mind, emotion processing, social perception and attributional bias. Recent research in social and cognitive neuroscience has revealed many new issues that could contribute to the development of more integrated approaches for improving social functioning. The application of such neuroscientific work to a therapeutic and diagnostic context is likely to encourage more effective transference of learned skills to real-world social functioning. This article seeks to provide a comprehensive review of previous social cognitive interventions for schizophrenia, highlight some crucial limitations of these and present the relevance of recent advances in neuroscientific research in possible future treatment strategies. It is emphasized that a more integrated and naturalistic approach for improving social functioning with greater sensitivity for neuroscientific findings related to the psychopathology of schizophrenia is warranted.

Future trends in Neuroimaging: Neural processes as expressed within real-life contexts

Human neuroscience research has changed dramatically with the proliferation and refinement of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) technologies. The early years of the technique were largely devoted to methods development and validation, and to the coarse-grained mapping of functional topographies. This paper will cover three emerging trends that we believe will be central to fMRI research in the coming decade. In the first section of this paper, we argue in favor of a shift from fine-grained functional labeling toward the characterization of underlying neural processes. In the second section, we examine three methodological developments that have improved our ability to characterize these neural processes using fMRI. In the last section, we highlight the trend towards more ecologically valid fMRI experiments, which engage neural circuits in real life conditions. We note that many of our cognitive faculties emerge from interpersonal interactions, and that a complete understanding of the cognitive processes within a single individual's brain cannot be achieved without understanding the interactions among individuals. Looking forward to the future of human fMRI, we conclude that the major constraint on new discoveries will not be related to the spatiotemporal resolution of the BOLD signal, which is constantly improving, but rather to the precision of our hypotheses and the creativity of our methods for testing them.

Schizophrenia patients are impaired in empathic accuracy

BACKGROUND

Empathy is crucial for successful social relationships. Despite its importance for social interactions, little is known about empathy in schizophrenia. This study investigated the degree to which schizophrenia patients can accurately infer the affective state of another person (i.e. empathic accuracy).

METHOD

A group of 30 schizophrenia patients and 22 healthy controls performed an empathic accuracy task on which they continuously rated the affective state of another person shown in a video (referred to as the 'target'). These ratings were compared with the target's own continuous self-rating of affective state; empathic accuracy was defined as the correlation between participants' ratings and the targets' self-ratings. A separate line-tracking task was administered to measure motoric/attentional factors that could account for group differences in performance. Participants' self-rated empathy was measured using the Interpersonal Reactivity Index, and targets' self-rated emotional expressivity was measured using the Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire.

RESULTS

Compared with controls, schizophrenia patients showed lower empathic accuracy although they performed the motoric tracking task at high accuracy. There was a significant group×target expressivity interaction such that patients showed a smaller increase in empathic accuracy with higher levels of emotional expressivity by the target, compared with controls. Patients' empathic accuracy was uncorrelated with self-reported empathy or clinical symptoms.

CONCLUSIONS

Schizophrenia patients showed lower empathic accuracy than controls, and their empathic accuracy was less influenced by the emotional expressivity of the target. These findings suggest that schizophrenia patients benefit less from social cues of another person when making an empathic judgement.

Impaired integration of emotional faces and affective body context in a rare case of developmental visual agnosia

In the current study we examined the recognition of facial expressions embedded in emotionally expressive bodies in case LG, an individual with a rare form of developmental visual agnosia (DVA) who suffers from severe prosopagnosia. Neuropsychological testing demonstrated that LG's agnosia is characterized by profoundly impaired visual integration. Unlike individuals with typical developmental prosopagnosia who display specific difficulties with face identity (but typically not expression) recognition, LG was also impaired at recognizing isolated facial expressions. By contrast, he successfully recognized the expressions portrayed by faceless emotional bodies handling affective paraphernalia. When presented with contextualized faces in emotional bodies his ability to detect the emotion expressed by a face did not improve even if it was embedded in an emotionally-congruent body context. Furthermore, in contrast to controls, LG displayed an abnormal pattern of contextual influence from emotionally-incongruent bodies. The results are interpreted in the context of a general integration deficit in DVA, suggesting that impaired integration may extend from the level of the face to the level of the full person.

Cues to intention: the role of movement information

Body movement provides a rich source of cues about other people's goals and intentions. In the present research, we investigate how well people can distinguish between different social intentions on the basis of movement information. Participants observed a model reaching toward and grasping a wooden block with the intent to cooperate with a partner, compete against an opponent, or perform an individual action. In Experiment 1, a temporal occlusion procedure was used as to determine whether advance information gained during the viewing of the initial phase of an action allowed the observers to discriminate across movements performed with different intentions. In Experiment 2, we examined what kind of cues observers relied upon for the discrimination of intentions by masking selected spatial areas of the model (i.e., the arm or the face) maintaining the same temporal occlusion as for Experiment 1. Results revealed that observers could readily judge whether the object was grasped with the intent to cooperate, compete, or perform an individual action. Seeing the arm was better than seeing the face for discriminating individual movements performed at different speeds (natural-speed vs. fast-speed individual movements). By contrast, seeing the face was better than seeing the arm for discriminating social from individual movements performed at a comparable speed (cooperative vs. natural-speed individual movements, competitive vs. fast-speed individual movements). These results demonstrate that observers are attuned to advance movement information from different cues and that they can use such kind of information to anticipate the future course of an action.

How does your own knowledge influence the perception of another person's action in the human brain?

When you see someone reach into a cookie jar, their goal remains obvious even if you know that the last cookie has already been eaten. Thus, it is possible to infer the goal of an action even if you know that the goal cannot be achieved. Previous research has identified distinct brain networks for processing information about object locations, actions and mental-state inferences. However, the relationship between brain networks for action understanding in social contexts remains unclear. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, this study assesses the role of these networks in understanding another person searching for hidden objects. Participants watched movie clips depicting a toy animal hiding and an actor, who was ignorant of the hiding place, searching in the filled or empty location. When the toy animal hid in the same location repeatedly, the blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) response was suppressed in occipital, posterior temporal and posterior parietal brain regions, consistent with processing object properties and spatial attention. When the actor searched in the same location repeatedly, the BOLD signal was suppressed in the inferior frontal gyrus, consistent with the observation of hand actions. In contrast, searches towards the filled location compared to the empty location were associated with a greater response in the medial prefrontal cortex and right temporal pole, which are both associated with mental state inference. These findings show that when observing another person search for a hidden object, brain networks for processing information about object properties, actions and mental state inferences work together in a complementary fashion. This supports the hypothesis that brain regions within and beyond the putative human mirror neuron system are involved in action comprehension within social contexts.

Social cognitive conflict resolution: contributions of domain-general and domain-specific neural systems

Cognitive control mechanisms allow individuals to behave adaptively in the face of complex and sometimes conflicting information. Although the neural bases of these control mechanisms have been examined in many contexts, almost no attention has been paid to their role in resolving conflicts between competing social cues, which is surprising given that cognitive conflicts are part of many social interactions. Evidence about the neural processing of social information suggests that two systems--the mirror neuron system (MNS) and mental state attribution system (MSAS)--are specialized for processing nonverbal and contextual social cues, respectively. This could support a model of social cognitive conflict resolution in which competition between social cues would recruit domain-general cognitive control mechanisms, which in turn would bias processing toward the MNS or MSAS. Such biasing could also alter social behaviors, such as inferences made about the internal states of others. We tested this model by scanning participants using functional magnetic resonance imaging while they drew inferences about the social targets' emotional states based on congruent or incongruent nonverbal and contextual social cues. Conflicts between social cues recruited the anterior cingulate and lateral prefrontal cortex, brain areas associated with domain-general control processes. This activation was accompanied by biasing of neural activity toward areas in the MNS or MSAS, which tracked, respectively, with perceivers' behavioral reliance on nonverbal or contextual cues when drawing inferences about targets' emotions. Together, these data provide evidence about both domain-general and domain-specific mechanisms involved in resolving social cognitive conflicts.

How clinicians make (or avoid) moral judgments of patients: implications of the evidence for relationships and research

Physicians, nurses, and other clinicians readily acknowledge being troubled by encounters with patients who trigger moral judgments. For decades social scientists have noted that moral judgment of patients is pervasive, occurring not only in egregious and criminal cases but also in everyday situations in which appraisals of patients' social worth and culpability are routine. There is scant literature, however, on the actual prevalence and dynamics of moral judgment in healthcare. The indirect evidence available suggests that moral appraisals function via a complex calculus that reflects variation in patient characteristics, clinician characteristics, task, and organizational factors. The full impact of moral judgment on healthcare relationships, patient outcomes, and clinicians' own well-being is yet unknown. The paucity of attention to moral judgment, despite its significance for patient-centered care, communication, empathy, professionalism, healthcare education, stereotyping, and outcome disparities, represents a blind spot that merits explanation and repair. New methodologies in social psychology and neuroscience have yielded models for how moral judgment operates in healthcare and how research in this area should proceed. Clinicians, educators, and researchers would do well to recognize both the legitimate and illegitimate moral appraisals that are apt to occur in healthcare settings.

Live face-to-face interaction during fMRI: a new tool for social cognitive neuroscience

Cooperative social interaction is critical for human social development and learning. Despite the importance of social interaction, previous neuroimaging studies lack two fundamental components of everyday face-to-face interactions: contingent responding and joint attention. In the current studies, functional MRI data were collected while participants interacted with a human experimenter face-to-face via live video feed as they engaged in simple cooperative games. In Experiment 1, participants engaged in a live interaction with the experimenter ("Live") or watched a video of the same interaction ("Recorded"). During the "Live" interaction, as compared to the Recorded conditions, greater activation was seen in brain regions involved in social cognition and reward, including the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), right superior temporal sulcus (rSTS), ventral striatum, and amygdala. Experiment 2 isolated joint attention, a critical component of social interaction. Participants either followed the gaze of the live experimenter to a shared target of attention ("Joint Attention") or found the target of attention alone while the experimenter was visible but not sharing attention ("Solo Attention"). The right temporoparietal junction and right posterior STS were differentially recruited during Joint, as compared to Solo, attention. These findings suggest the rpSTS and rTPJ are key regions for both social interaction and joint attention. This method of allowing online, contingent social interactions in the scanner could open up new avenues of research in social cognitive neuroscience, both in typical and atypical populations.