Reversible Silencing of the Frontopolar Cortex Selectively Impairs Metacognitive Judgment on Non-experience in Primates

Memories or decisions? Bridging accounts of frontopolar function

Frontopolar cortex (FPC), for a long time elusive to functional description, is now associated with a wide range of cognitive processes. Prominent accounts of FPC function emerged from studies of memory (e.g., episodic and prospective memory; EM and PM, respectively) and of executive function (e.g., planning, multi-tasking, relational reasoning, cognitive branching, etc). In recent years, FPC function has begun to be described within the context of value-based decision making in terms of monitoring the value of alternatives and optimizing cognitive resources to balance the explore/exploit dilemma in the face of volatile environments. In this perspective, we propose that the broad counterfactual inference and behavioural flexibility account can help re-interpret findings from EM and PM studies and offer an explanatory bridge between the memory and executive function accounts. More specifically, we propose that counterfactual value monitoring in FPC modulates the reallocation of cognitive resources between present and past information and contributes to efficient episodic and prospective retrieval by concurrently assessing the value of competing memories in relation to the decision at hand and proactively evaluating future potential scenarios to anticipate optimal engagement of intentions.

Metacognitive sensitivity: The key to calibrating trust and optimal decision making with AI

Knowing when to trust and incorporate the advice from artificially intelligent (AI) systems is of increasing importance in the modern world. Research indicates that when AI provides high confidence ratings, human users often correspondingly increase their trust in such judgments, but these increases in trust can occur even when AI fails to provide accurate information on a given task. In this piece, we argue that measures of metacognitive sensitivity provided by AI systems will likely play a critical role in (1) helping individuals to calibrate their level of trust in these systems and (2) optimally incorporating advice from AI into human-AI hybrid decision making. We draw upon a seminal finding in the perceptual decision-making literature that demonstrates the importance of metacognitive ratings for optimal joint decisions and outline a framework to test how different types of information provided by AI systems can guide decision making.

Effects of different AI-driven Chatbot feedback on learning outcomes and brain activity

Artificial intelligence (AI) driven chatbots provide instant feedback to support learning. Yet, the impacts of different feedback types on behavior and brain activation remain underexplored. We investigated how metacognitive, affective, and neutral feedback from an educational chatbot affected learning outcomes and brain activity using functional near-infrared spectroscopy. Students receiving metacognitive feedback showed higher transfer scores, greater metacognitive sensitivity, and increased brain activation in the frontopolar area and middle temporal gyrus compared to other feedback types. Such activation correlated with metacognitive sensitivity. Students receiving affective feedback showed better retention scores than those receiving neutral feedback, along with higher activation in the supramarginal gyrus. Students receiving neutral feedback exhibited higher activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex than other feedback types. The machine learning model identified key brain regions that predicted transfer scores. These findings underscore the potential of diverse feedback types in enhancing learning via human-chatbot interaction, and provide neurophysiological signatures.

Neural representation of action symbols in primate frontal cortex

At the core of intelligence is proficiency in solving new problems, including those that differ dramatically from problems seen before. Problem-solving, in turn, depends on goal-directed generation of novel thoughts and behaviors1, which has been proposed to rely on internal representations of discrete units, or symbols, and processes that can recombine them into a large set of possible composite representations1-11. Although this view has been influential in formulating cognitive-level explanations of behavior, definitive evidence for a neuronal substrate of symbols has remained elusive. Here, we identify a neural population encoding action symbols-internal, recombinable representations of discrete units of motor behavior-localized to a specific area of frontal cortex. In macaque monkeys performing a drawing-like task designed to assess recombination of learned action symbols into novel sequences, we found behavioral evidence for three critical features that indicate actions have an underlying symbolic representation: (i) invariance over low-level motor parameters; (ii) categorical structure, reflecting discrete classes of action; and (iii) recombination into novel sequences. In simultaneous neural recordings across motor, premotor, and prefrontal cortex, we found that planning-related population activity in ventral premotor cortex encodes actions in a manner that, like behavior, reflects motor invariance, categorical structure, and recombination, three properties indicating a symbolic representation. Activity in no other recorded area exhibited this combination of properties. These findings reveal a neural representation of action symbols localized to PMv, and therefore identify a putative neural substrate for symbolic cognitive operations.

Metacognition in nonhuman primates: a review of current knowledge

Metacognition, the ability to monitor and control one's own cognitive processes, has long been considered a hallmark of human cognition. However, two decades of research have provided compelling evidence of metacognitive-like abilities in some nonhuman primates. This review synthesizes current knowledge on the subject, highlighting key experimental paradigms and empirical findings, with an emphasis on the latest studies. Thanks to advances in methods and efforts to counter alternative explanations, there is now a consensus that great apes and some macaque species can monitor and control some of their cognitive processes. Despite numerous investigations, however, whether capuchin monkeys are metacognitive remains unclear. Critical gaps persist in our understanding of metacognition across species. We discuss the importance of expanding research to include a wider range of primate species and the potential role of ecological factors in shaping metacognitive capacities. In addition, we consider some promising avenues for future research, including neurophysiological approaches, studies of metacognitive errors, and field experiments.

Cortical Layer-Dependent Signaling in Cognition: Three Computational Modes of the Canonical Circuit

The cerebral cortex performs computations via numerous six-layer modules. The operational dynamics of these modules were studied primarily in early sensory cortices using bottom-up computation for response selectivity as a model, which has been recently revolutionized by genetic approaches in mice. However, cognitive processes such as recall and imagery require top-down generative computation. The question of whether the layered module operates similarly in top-down generative processing as in bottom-up sensory processing has become testable by advances in the layer identification of recorded neurons in behaving monkeys. This review examines recent advances in laminar signaling in these two computations, using predictive coding computation as a common reference, and shows that each of these computations recruits distinct laminar circuits, particularly in layer 5, depending on the cognitive demands. These findings highlight many open questions, including how different interareal feedback pathways, originating from and terminating at different layers, convey distinct functional signals.

Frontal pole-precuneus connectivity is associated with a discrepancy between self-rated and observer-rated depression severity in mood disorders: a resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging study

Discrepancies in self-rated and observer-rated depression severity may underlie the basis for biological heterogeneity in depressive disorders and be an important predictor of outcomes and indicators to optimize intervention strategies. However, the neural mechanisms underlying this discrepancy have been understudied. This study aimed to examine the brain networks that represent the neural basis of the discrepancy between self-rated and observer-rated depression severity using resting-state functional MRI. To examine the discrepancy between self-rated and observer-rated depression severity, self- and observer-ratings discrepancy (SOD) was defined, and the higher and lower SOD groups were selected from depressed patients as participants showing extreme deviation. Resting-state functional MRI analysis was performed to examine regions with significant differences in functional connectivity in the two groups. The results showed that, in the higher SOD group compared to the lower SOD group, there was increased functional connectivity between the frontal pole and precuneus, both of which are subregions of the default mode network that have been reported to be associated with ruminative and self-referential thinking. These results provide insight into the association of brain circuitry with discrepancies between self- and observer-rated depression severity and may lead to more treatment-oriented diagnostic reclassification in the future.

The neural mechanism of communication between graduate students and advisers in different adviser-advisee relationships

Communication is crucial in constructing the relationship between students and advisers, ultimately bridging interpersonal interactions. Only a few studies however explore the communication between postgraduate students and advisers. To fill the gaps in the empirical researches, this study uses functional near-infrared spectroscopy (FNIRS) techniques to explore the neurophysiology differences in brain activation of postgraduates with different adviser-advise relationships during simulated communication with their advisers. Results showed significant differences in the activation of the prefrontal cortex between high-quality and the low-quality students during simulating and when communicating with advisers, specifically in the Broca's areas, the frontal pole, and the orbitofrontal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices. This further elucidated the complex cognitive process of communication between graduate students and advisers.

Neural correlates of metacognition: Disentangling the brain circuits underlying prospective and retrospective second-order judgments through noninvasive brain stimulation

Metacognition encompasses the capability to monitor and control one's cognitive processes, with metamemory and metadecision configuring among the most studied higher order functions. Although imaging experiments evaluated the role of disparate brain regions, neural substrates of metacognitive judgments remain undetermined. The aim of this systematic review is to summarize and discuss the available evidence concerning the neural bases of metacognition which has been collected by assessing the effects of noninvasive brain stimulation (NIBS) on human subjects' metacognitive capacities. Based on such literature analysis, our goal is, at first, to verify whether prospective and retrospective second-order judgments are localized within separate brain circuits and, subsequently, to provide compelling clues useful for identifying new targets for future NIBS studies. The search was conducted following the preferred reporting items for systematic reviews and meta-analyses guidelines among PubMed, PsycINFO, PsycARTICLES, PSYNDEX, MEDLINE, and ERIC databases. Overall, 25 studies met the eligibility criteria, yielding a total of 36 experiments employing transcranial magnetic stimulation and 16 ones making use of transcranial electrical stimulation techniques, including transcranial direct current stimulation and transcranial alternating current stimulation. Importantly, we found that both perspective and retrospective judgments about both memory and perceptual decision-making performances depend on the activation of the anterior and lateral portions of the prefrontal cortex, as well as on the activity of more caudal regions such as the premotor cortex and the precuneus. Combining this evidence with results from previous imaging and lesion studies, we advance ventromedial prefrontal cortex as a promising target for future NIBS studies.

Neural circuits for retrospective and prospective introspection for the past, present and future in macaque monkeys and humans

For animals, including humans, to have self-awareness, the ability to reflect on one's own perceptions and cognitions, which is known as metacognition, and an understanding of consistency of the self from the past to the present and into the future based on metacognition is essential. Through the mediation of self-consciousness, animals are thought to be able to proactively act to change their environment rather than passively responding to changes in their environment. However, it has not been known whether animals have self-awareness, and, if so, how it is implemented neurobiologically. In this review article, I introduce our studies examining the neural basis of metacognitive abilities for past, present, and future actions in macaque monkeys and humans, and explore the evolutionary origins of self-awareness.

Neurons in the monkey frontopolar cortex encode learning stage and goal during a fast learning task

The frontopolar cortex (FPC) is, to date, one of the least understood regions of the prefrontal cortex. The current understanding of its function suggests that it plays a role in the control of exploratory behaviors by coordinating the activities of other prefrontal cortex areas involved in decision-making and exploiting actions based on their outcomes. Based on this hypothesis, FPC would drive fast-learning processes through a valuation of the different alternatives. In our study, we used a modified version of a well-known paradigm, the object-in-place (OIP) task, to test this hypothesis in electrophysiology. This paradigm is designed to maximize learning, enabling monkeys to learn in one trial, which is an ability specifically impaired after a lesion of the FPC. We showed that FPC neurons presented an extremely specific pattern of activity by representing the learning stage, exploration versus exploitation, and the goal of the action. However, our results do not support the hypothesis that neurons in the frontal pole compute an evaluation of different alternatives. Indeed, the position of the chosen target was strongly encoded at its acquisition, but the position of the unchosen target was not. Once learned, this representation was also found at the problem presentation, suggesting a monitoring activity of the synthetic goal preceding its acquisition. Our results highlight important features of FPC neurons in fast-learning processes without confirming their role in the disengagement of cognitive control from the current goals.

Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis

Determining the psychological, computational, and neural bases of confidence and uncertainty holds promise for understanding foundational aspects of human metacognition. While a neuroscience of confidence has focused on the mechanisms underpinning subpersonal phenomena such as representations of uncertainty in the visual or motor system, metacognition research has been concerned with personal-level beliefs and knowledge about self-performance. I provide a road map for bridging this divide by focusing on a particular class of confidence computation: propositional confidence in one's own (hypothetical) decisions or actions. Propositional confidence is informed by the observer's models of the world and their cognitive system, which may be more or less accurate-thus explaining why metacognitive judgments are inferential and sometimes diverge from task performance. Disparate findings on the neural basis of uncertainty and performance monitoring are integrated into a common framework, and a new understanding of the locus of action of metacognitive interventions is developed.

Imagining the future self through thought experiments

The ability of the mind to conceptualize what is not present is essential. It allows us to reason counterfactually about what might have happened had events unfolded differently or had another course of action been taken. It allows us to think about what might happen - to perform 'Gedankenexperimente' (thought experiments) - before we act. However, the cognitive and neural mechanisms mediating this ability are poorly understood. We suggest that the frontopolar cortex (FPC) keeps track of and evaluates alternative choices (what we might have done), whereas the anterior lateral prefrontal cortex (alPFC) compares simulations of possible future scenarios (what we might do) and evaluates their reward values. Together, these brain regions support the construction of suppositional scenarios.

Time-sensitive prefrontal involvement in associating confidence with task performance illustrates metacognitive introspection in monkeys

Metacognition refers to the ability to be aware of one's own cognition. Ample evidence indicates that metacognition in the human primate is highly dissociable from cognition, specialized across domains, and subserved by distinct neural substrates. However, these aspects remain relatively understudied in macaque monkeys. In the present study, we investigated the functionality of macaque metacognition by combining a confidence proxy, hierarchical Bayesian meta-d' computational modelling, and a single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation technique. We found that Brodmann area 46d (BA46d) played a critical role in supporting metacognition independent of task performance; we also found that the critical role of this region in meta-calculation was time-sensitive. Additionally, we report that macaque metacognition is highly domain-specific with respect to memory and perception decisions. These findings carry implications for our understanding of metacognitive introspection within the primate lineage.

Partially Overlapping Neural Correlates of Metacognitive Monitoring and Metacognitive Control

Metacognition describes the process of monitoring one's own mental states, often for the purpose of cognitive control. Previous research has investigated how metacognitive signals are generated (metacognitive monitoring), for example, when people (both female/male) judge their confidence in their decisions and memories. Research has also investigated how metacognitive signals are used to influence behavior (metacognitive control), for example, setting a reminder (i.e., cognitive offloading) for something you are not confident you will remember. However, the mapping between metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive control needs further study on a neural level. We used fMRI to investigate a delayed-intentions task with a reminder element, allowing human participants to use their metacognitive insight to engage metacognitive control. Using multivariate pattern analysis, we found that we could separately decode both monitoring and control, and, to a lesser extent, cross-classify between them. Therefore, brain patterns associated with monitoring and control are partially, but not fully, overlapping.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Models of metacognition commonly distinguish between monitoring (how metacognition is formed) and control (how metacognition is used for behavioral regulation). Research into these facets of metacognition has often happened in isolation. Here, we provide a study which directly investigates the mapping between metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive control at a neural level. We applied multivariate pattern analysis to fMRI data from a novel task in which participants separately rated their confidence (metacognitive monitoring) and how much they would like to use a reminder (metacognitive control). We find support for the notion that the two aspects of metacognition overlap partially but not fully. We argue that future research should focus on how different metacognitive signals are selected for control.

Metacognition as a Consequence of Competing Evolutionary Time Scales

Evolution is full of coevolving systems characterized by complex spatio-temporal interactions that lead to intertwined processes of adaptation. Yet, how adaptation across multiple levels of temporal scales and biological complexity is achieved remains unclear. Here, we formalize how evolutionary multi-scale processing underlying adaptation constitutes a form of metacognition flowing from definitions of metaprocessing in machine learning. We show (1) how the evolution of metacognitive systems can be expected when fitness landscapes vary on multiple time scales, and (2) how multiple time scales emerge during coevolutionary processes of sufficiently complex interactions. After defining a metaprocessor as a regulator with local memory, we prove that metacognition is more energetically efficient than purely object-level cognition when selection operates at multiple timescales in evolution. Furthermore, we show that existing modeling approaches to coadaptation and coevolution-here active inference networks, predator-prey interactions, coupled genetic algorithms, and generative adversarial networks-lead to multiple emergent timescales underlying forms of metacognition. Lastly, we show how coarse-grained structures emerge naturally in any resource-limited system, providing sufficient evidence for metacognitive systems to be a prevalent and vital component of (co-)evolution. Therefore, multi-scale processing is a necessary requirement for many evolutionary scenarios, leading to de facto metacognitive evolutionary outcomes.

An evolutionary gap in primate default mode network organization

The human default mode network (DMN) is engaged at rest and in cognitive states such as self-directed thoughts. Interconnected homologous cortical areas in primates constitute a network considered as the equivalent. Here, based on a cross-species comparison of the DMN between humans and non-hominoid primates (macaques, marmosets, and mouse lemurs), we report major dissimilarities in connectivity profiles. Most importantly, the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) of non-hominoid primates is poorly engaged with the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), though strong correlated activity between the human PCC and the mPFC is a key feature of the human DMN. Instead, a fronto-temporal resting-state network involving the mPFC was detected consistently across non-hominoid primate species. These common functional features shared between non-hominoid primates but not with humans suggest a substantial gap in the organization of the primate’s DMN and its associated cognitive functions.

By comparing resting-state networks in humans, macaques, marmosets, and mouse lemurs, Garin et al. identify two networks in non-hominoid primates that include homolog areas of the human default mode network. The mPFC and PCC are tightly connected in the human DMN but poorly connected to each other across non-hominoid primates.

Conversion of concept-specific decision confidence into integrative introspection in primates

Introspection based on the integration of uncertain evidence is critical for acting upon abstract thinking and imagining future scenarios. However, it is unknown how confidence read-outs from multiple sources of different concepts are integrated, especially considering the relationships among the concepts. In this study, monkeys performed wagering based on an estimation of their performance in a preceding mnemonic decision. We found that the longer the response times for post-decision wagering, the more relieved the impairments having been caused by frontal disruption. This suggests the existence of a time-consuming compensatory metacognitive process. We found posterior inferior parietal lobe (pIPL) as its candidate, which was not coding the wagering per se (i.e., just high bet or low bet), but became more active when monkeys successfully chose the optimal bet option based on mnemonic decision performance. Thereafter, the pIPL prompts dorsal anterior cingulate cortex to carry the chosen wagering option. Our findings suggest a role for the pIPL in metacognitive concept integration.

Computational validity: using computation to translate behaviours across species

We propose a new conceptual framework (computational validity) for translation across species and populations based on the computational similarity between the information processing underlying parallel tasks. Translating between species depends not on the superficial similarity of the tasks presented, but rather on the computational similarity of the strategies and mechanisms that underlie those behaviours. Computational validity goes beyond construct validity by directly addressing questions of information processing. Computational validity interacts with circuit validity as computation depends on circuits, but similar computations could be accomplished by different circuits. Because different individuals may use different computations to accomplish a given task, computational validity suggests that behaviour should be understood through the subject's point of view; thus, behaviour should be characterized on an individual level rather than a task level. Tasks can constrain the computational algorithms available to a subject and the observed subtleties of that behaviour can provide information about the computations used by each individual. Computational validity has especially high relevance for the study of psychiatric disorders, given the new views of psychiatry as identifying and mediating information processing dysfunctions that may show high inter-individual variability, as well as for animal models investigating aspects of human psychiatric disorders. This article is part of the theme issue 'Systems neuroscience through the lens of evolutionary theory'.

Perceptual reality monitoring: Neural mechanisms dissociating imagination from reality

There is increasing evidence that imagination relies on similar neural mechanisms as externally triggered perception. This overlap presents a challenge for perceptual reality monitoring: deciding what is real and what is imagined. Here, we explore how perceptual reality monitoring might be implemented in the brain. We first describe sensory and cognitive factors that could dissociate imagery and perception and conclude that no single factor unambiguously signals whether an experience is internally or externally generated. We suggest that reality monitoring is implemented by higher-level cortical circuits that evaluate first-order sensory and cognitive factors to determine the source of sensory signals. According to this interpretation, perceptual reality monitoring shares core computations with metacognition. This multi-level architecture might explain several types of source confusion as well as dissociations between simply knowing whether something is real and actually experiencing it as real. We discuss avenues for future research to further our understanding of perceptual reality monitoring, an endeavour that has important implications for our understanding of clinical symptoms as well as general cognitive function.

The prefrontal cortex and (uniquely) human cooperation: a comparative perspective

Humans have an exceptional ability to cooperate relative to many other species. We review the neural mechanisms supporting human cooperation, focusing on the prefrontal cortex. One key feature of human social life is the prevalence of cooperative norms that guide social behavior and prescribe punishment for noncompliance. Taking a comparative approach, we consider shared and unique aspects of cooperative behaviors in humans relative to nonhuman primates, as well as divergences in brain structure that might support uniquely human aspects of cooperation. We highlight a medial prefrontal network common to nonhuman primates and humans supporting a foundational process in cooperative decision-making: valuing outcomes for oneself and others. This medial prefrontal network interacts with lateral prefrontal areas that are thought to represent cooperative norms and modulate value representations to guide behavior appropriate to the local social context. Finally, we propose that more recently evolved anterior regions of prefrontal cortex play a role in arbitrating between cooperative norms across social contexts, and suggest how future research might fruitfully examine the neural basis of norm arbitration.

Rats use memory confidence to guide decisions

Memory enables access to past experiences to guide future behavior. Humans can determine which memories to trust (high confidence) and which to doubt (low confidence). How memory retrieval, memory confidence, and memory-guided decisions are related, however, is not understood. In particular, how confidence in memories is used in decision making is unknown. We developed a spatial memory task in which rats were incentivized to gamble their time: betting more following a correct choice yielded greater reward. Rat behavior reflected memory confidence, with higher temporal bets following correct choices. We applied machine learning to identify a memory decision variable and built a generative model of memories evolving over time that accurately predicted both choices and confidence reports. Our results reveal in rats an ability thought to exist exclusively in primates and introduce a unified model of memory dynamics, retrieval, choice, and confidence.

Combining brain perturbation and neuroimaging in non-human primates

Brain perturbation studies allow detailed causal inferences of behavioral and neural processes. Because the combination of brain perturbation methods and neural measurement techniques is inherently challenging, research in humans has predominantly focused on non-invasive, indirect brain perturbations, or neurological lesion studies. Non-human primates have been indispensable as a neurobiological system that is highly similar to humans while simultaneously being more experimentally tractable, allowing visualization of the functional and structural impact of systematic brain perturbation. This review considers the state of the art in non-human primate brain perturbation with a focus on approaches that can be combined with neuroimaging. We consider both non-reversible (lesions) and reversible or temporary perturbations such as electrical, pharmacological, optical, optogenetic, chemogenetic, pathway-selective, and ultrasound based interference methods. Method-specific considerations from the research and development community are offered to facilitate research in this field and support further innovations. We conclude by identifying novel avenues for further research and innovation and by highlighting the clinical translational potential of the methods.

Identification and disruption of a neural mechanism for accumulating prospective metacognitive information prior to decision-making

More than one type of probability must be considered when making decisions. It is as necessary to know one's chance of performing choices correctly as it is to know the chances that desired outcomes will follow choices. We refer to these two choice contingencies as internal and external probability. Neural activity across many frontal and parietal areas reflected internal and external probabilities in a similar manner during decision-making. However, neural recording and manipulation approaches suggest that one area, the anterior lateral prefrontal cortex (alPFC), is highly specialized for making prospective, metacognitive judgments on the basis of internal probability; it is essential for knowing which decisions to tackle, given its assessment of how well they will be performed. Its activity predicted prospective metacognitive judgments, and individual variation in activity predicted individual variation in metacognitive judgments. Its disruption altered metacognitive judgments, leading participants to tackle perceptual decisions they were likely to fail.

Socially relative reward valuation in the primate brain

Reward valuation in social contexts is by nature relative rather than absolute; it is made in reference to others. This socially relative reward valuation is based on our propensity to conduct comparisons and competitions between self and other. Exploring its neural substrate has been an active area of research in human neuroimaging. More recently, electrophysiological investigation of the macaque brain has enabled us to understand neural mechanisms underlying this valuation process at single-neuron and network levels. Here I show that shared neural networks centered at the medial prefrontal cortex and dopamine-related subcortical regions are involved in this process in humans and nonhuman primates. Thus, socially relative reward valuation is mediated by cortico-subcortically coordinated activity linking social and reward brain networks.

Fine-Grained Topography and Modularity of the Macaque Frontal Pole Cortex Revealed by Anatomical Connectivity Profiles

The frontal pole cortex (FPC) plays key roles in various higher-order functions and is highly developed in non-human primates. An essential missing piece of information is the detailed anatomical connections for finer parcellation of the macaque FPC than provided by the previous tracer results. This is important for understanding the functional architecture of the cerebral cortex. Here, combining cross-validation and principal component analysis, we formed a tractography-based parcellation scheme that applied a machine learning algorithm to divide the macaque FPC (2 males and 6 females) into eight subareas using high-resolution diffusion magnetic resonance imaging with the 9.4T Bruker system, and then revealed their subregional connections. Furthermore, we applied improved hierarchical clustering to the obtained parcels to probe the modular structure of the subregions, and found that the dorsolateral FPC, which contains an extension to the medial FPC, was mainly connected to regions of the default-mode network. The ventral FPC was mainly involved in the social-interaction network and the dorsal FPC in the metacognitive network. These results enhance our understanding of the anatomy and circuitry of the macaque brain, and contribute to FPC-related clinical research.

Off-Peak 594-nm Light Surpasses On-Peak 532-nm Light in Silencing Distant ArchT-Expressing Neurons In Vivo

For large brain volume manipulations using optogenetics, both effective opsin excitation and efficient light delivery with minimal light absorption are required to minimize the illuminating light intensity and concomitant off-target effects. ArchT, a widely used potent inhibitory opsin, is commonly activated by 532-nm light, which lies on its in vitro excitation peak. However, 532-nm light also lies on a peak range of the hemoglobin absorption spectrum. Therefore, we predicted that 594-nm light is superior in suppressing distant ArchT-expressing neurons, which is slightly off the ArchT-excitation-plateau and largely off the peak of the hemoglobin absorption spectrum. We quantitatively tested this prediction by the electrophysiological recording of the rat cortex in vivo. At illumination distances greater than 500 μm, 594-nm light was more effective than 532-nm light. Its superiority increased with distance. These results validate our prediction and highlight the significance of excitation-absorption trade-off in selecting illumination wavelength for optogenetics in vivo.

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Wavelength-dependency of optogenetic neuronal control was directly measured in vivo

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Off-peak light silence 1-mm-distant ArchT-neuron twice more than on-peak light in vivo

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Superiority of off-peak light at distance arose from its less absorption of light

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Simulation of light propagation supported unexpectedly large effect of hemoglobin

Behavior- and Modality-General Representation of Confidence in Orbitofrontal Cortex

Every decision we make is accompanied by a sense of confidence about its likely outcome. This sense informs subsequent behavior, such as investing more-whether time, effort, or money-when reward is more certain. A neural representation of confidence should originate from a statistical computation and predict confidence-guided behavior. An additional requirement for confidence representations to support metacognition is abstraction: they should emerge irrespective of the source of information and inform multiple confidence-guided behaviors. It is unknown whether neural confidence signals meet these criteria. Here, we show that single orbitofrontal cortex neurons in rats encode statistical decision confidence irrespective of the sensory modality, olfactory or auditory, used to make a choice. The activity of these neurons also predicts two confidence-guided behaviors: trial-by-trial time investment and cross-trial choice strategy updating. Orbitofrontal cortex thus represents decision confidence consistent with a metacognitive process that is useful for mediating confidence-guided economic decisions.

Knowing Ourselves Together: The Cultural Origins of Metacognition

Metacognition - the ability to represent, monitor and control ongoing cognitive processes - helps us perform many tasks, both when acting alone and when working with others. While metacognition is adaptive, and found in other animals, we should not assume that all human forms of metacognition are gene-based adaptations. Instead, some forms may have a social origin, including the discrimination, interpretation, and broadcasting of metacognitive representations. There is evidence that each of these abilities depends on cultural learning and therefore that cultural selection might shape human metacognition. The cultural origins hypothesis is a plausible and testable alternative that directs us towards a substantial new programme of research.

Explicit memory and cognition in monkeys

Taxonomies of human memory, influenced heavily by Endel Tulving, make a fundamental distinction between explicit and implicit memory. Humans are aware of explicit memories, whereas implicit memories control behavior even though we are not aware of them. Efforts to understand the evolution of memory, and to use nonhuman animals to model human memory, will be facilitated by better understanding the extent to which this critical distinction exists in nonhuman animals. Work with metacognition paradigms in the past 20 years has produced a strong case for the existence of explicit memory in nonhuman primates and possibly other nonhuman animals. Clear dissociations of explicit and implicit memory by metacognition have yet to be demonstrated in nonhumans, although dissociations between memory systems by other behavioral techniques, and by brain manipulations, suggest that the explicit-implicit distinction applies to nonhumans. Neurobehavioral studies of metamemory are beginning to identify neural substrates for memory monitoring in the frontal cortex of monkeys. We have strong evidence that at least some memory systems are explicit in rhesus monkeys, but we need to learn more about the distribution of explicit processes across cognitive systems within monkeys, and across species.

Contributions of anterior cingulate cortex and basolateral amygdala to decision confidence and learning under uncertainty

The subjective sense of certainty, or confidence, in ambiguous sensory cues can alter the interpretation of reward feedback and facilitate learning. We trained rats to report the orientation of ambiguous visual stimuli according to a spatial stimulus-response rule that must be learned. Following choice, rats could wait a self-timed delay for reward or initiate a new trial. Waiting times increase with discrimination accuracy, demonstrating that this measure can be used as a proxy for confidence. Chemogenetic silencing of BLA shortens waiting times overall whereas ACC inhibition renders waiting times insensitive to confidence-modulating attributes of visual stimuli, suggesting contribution of ACC but not BLA to confidence computations. Subsequent reversal learning is enhanced by confidence. Both ACC and BLA inhibition block this enhancement but via differential adjustments in learning strategies and consistent use of learned rules. Altogether, we demonstrate dissociable roles for ACC and BLA in transmitting confidence and learning under uncertainty.

Perirhinal circuits for memory processing

The perirhinal cortex (PRC) serves as the gateway to the hippocampus for episodic memory formation and plays a part in retrieval through its backward connectivity to various neocortical areas. First, I present the evidence suggesting that PRC neurons encode both experientially acquired object features and their associative relations. Recent studies have revealed circuit mechanisms in the PRC for the retrieval of cue-associated information, and have demonstrated that, in monkeys, PRC neuron-encoded information can be behaviourally read out. These studies, among others, support the theory that the PRC converts visual representations of an object into those of its associated features and initiates backward-propagating, interareal signalling for retrieval of nested associations of object features that, combined, extensionally represent the object meaning. I propose that the PRC works as the ventromedial hub of a 'two-hub model' at an apex of the hierarchy of a distributed memory network and integrates signals encoded in other downstream cortical areas that support diverse aspects of knowledge about an object.

The Neurobiology of Confidence: From Beliefs to Neurons

How confident are you? As humans, aware of our subjective sense of confidence, we can readily answer. Knowing your level of confidence helps to optimize both routine decisions such as whether to go back and check if the front door was locked and momentous ones like finding a partner for life. Yet the inherently subjective nature of confidence has limited investigations by neurobiologists. Here, we provide an overview of recent advances in this field and lay out a conceptual framework that lets us translate psychological questions about subjective confidence into the language of neuroscience. We show how statistical notions of confidence provide a bridge between our subjective sense of confidence and confidence-guided behaviors in nonhuman animals, thus enabling the study of the underlying neurobiology. We discuss confidence as a core cognitive process that enables organisms to optimize behavior such as learning or resource allocation and that serves as the basis of metacognitive reasoning. These approaches place confidence on a solid footing and pave the way for a mechanistic understanding of how the brain implements confidence-based algorithms to guide behavior.

Individual susceptibility to TMS affirms the precuneal role in meta-memory upon recollection

A recent virtual-lesion study using inhibitory repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) confirmed the causal behavioral relevance of the precuneus in the evaluation of one's own memory performance (aka mnemonic metacognition). This study's goal is to elucidate how these TMS-induced neuromodulatory effects might relate to the neural correlates and be modulated by individual anatomical profiles in relation to meta-memory. In a within-subjects design, we assessed the impact of 20-min rTMS over the precuneus, compared to the vertex, across three magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) neuro-profiles on 18 healthy subjects during a memory versus a perceptual task. Task-based functional MRI revealed that BOLD signal magnitude in the precuneus is associated with variation in individual meta-memory efficiency. Moreover, individuals with higher resting-state functional connectivity (rs-fcMRI) between the precuneus and the hippocampus, or smaller gray matter volume in the stimulated precuneal region exhibit considerably higher vulnerability to the TMS effect. These effects were not observed in the perceptual domain. Thus, we provide compelling evidence in outlining a possible circuit encompassing the precuneus and its mnemonic midbrain neighbor the hippocampus at the service of realizing our meta-awareness during memory recollection of episodic details.

Mnemonic Introspection in Macaques Is Dependent on Superior Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex But Not Orbitofrontal Cortex

The human PFC has been associated more with meta-perceptual as opposed to meta-memory decisions from correlational neuroimaging investigations. Recently, metacognitive abilities have also been shown to be causally dependent upon anterior and dorsal PFC in nonhuman primate lesion studies. Two studies, using postdecision wagering paradigms and reversible inactivation, challenged this meta-perceptual versus meta-memory notion and showed that dorsal and anterior prefrontal areas are associated with metamemory for experienced objects and awareness of ignorance, respectively. Causal investigations are important but scarce; nothing is known, for example, about the causal contributions of prefrontal subregions to spatial metamemory. Here, we investigated the effects of dorsal versus ventral PFC lesions on two-alternative forced-choice spatial discrimination tasks in male macaque monkeys. Importantly, we were rigorous in approach and applied three independent but complementary indices used to quantify individual animals' metacognitive ability (“Type II sensitivity”) by two variants of meta-d′/d′ and phi coefficient (φ). Our results were consistent across indices: while neither lesions to superior dorsolateral PFC nor orbitofrontal cortex impaired spatial recognition performance, only monkeys with superior dorsolateral PFC lesions were impaired in meta-accuracy. Together with the observation that the same orbitofrontal cortex lesioned monkeys were impaired in updating rule value in a Wisconsin Card Sorting Test analog, we therefore document a functional double-dissociation between these two PFC regions. Our study presents important causal evidence that other dimensions, namely, domain-specific processing (e.g., spatial vs nonspatial metamemory), also need considerations in understanding the functional specialization in the neural underpinnings of introspection.

SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT This study demonstrates macaque monkeys' metacognitive capability of introspecting its own memory success is causally dependent on intact superior dorsolateral prefrontal cortices but not the orbitofrontal cortices. Combining neurosurgical techniques on monkeys and state-of-the-art measures of metacognition, we affirm a critical role of the PFC in supporting spatial meta-recognition memory and delineate functional specificity within PFC for distinct elements of metacognition.

Neural Correlations Underlying Self-Generated Decision in the Frontal Pole Cortex during a Cued Strategy Task

We have previously shown how the Frontal Pole cortex (FPC) neurons play a unique role in both the monitoring and evaluating of self-generated decisions during feedback in a visually cued strategy task. For each trial of this task, a cue instructed one of two strategies: to either stay with the previous goal or shift to the alternative goal. Each cue was followed by a delay period, then each choice was followed by a feedback. FPC neurons show goal-selective activity exclusively during the feedback period. Here, we studied how neural correlation dynamically changes, along with a trial in FPC. We classified the cells as goal-selective and not goal-selective (NS) and analyzed the time-course of the cross-correlations in 76 pairs of neurons from each group. We compared a control epoch with the feedback epoch and we found higher correlations in the latter one between goal-selective neurons than between NS neurons, in which the correlated activity dropped during feedback. This supports the involvement of goal-selective cells in the evaluation of self-generated decisions at the feedback time. We also observed a dynamic change of the correlations in time, indicating that the connections among cell-assemblies were transient, changing between internal states at the feedback time. These results indicate that the changing of the pattern of neural correlations can underlie the flexibility of the prefrontal computations.

Thinking about thinking: A coordinate-based meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies of metacognitive judgements

Metacognition supports reflection upon and control of other cognitive processes. Despite metacognition occupying a central role in human psychology, its neural substrates remain underdetermined, partly due to study-specific differences in task domain and type of metacognitive judgement under study. It is also unclear how metacognition relates to other apparently similar abilities that depend on recursive thought such as theory of mind or mentalising. Now that neuroimaging studies of metacognition are more prevalent, we have an opportunity to characterise consistencies in neural substrates identified across different analysis types and domains. Here we used quantitative activation likelihood estimation methods to synthesise findings from 47 neuroimaging studies on metacognition, divided into categories based on the target of metacognitive evaluation (memory and decision-making), analysis type (judgement-related activation, confidence-related activation, and predictors of metacognitive sensitivity), and, for metamemory judgements, temporal focus (prospective and retrospective). A domain-general network, including medial and lateral prefrontal cortex, precuneus, and insula was associated with the level of confidence in self-performance in both decision-making and memory tasks. We found preferential engagement of right anterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in metadecision experiments and bilateral parahippocampal cortex in metamemory experiments. Results on metacognitive sensitivity were inconclusive, likely due to fewer studies reporting this contrast. Finally, by comparing our results to meta-analyses of mentalising, we obtain evidence for common engagement of the ventromedial and anterior dorsomedial prefrontal cortex in both metacognition and mentalising, suggesting that these regions may support second-order representations for thinking about the thoughts of oneself and others.

Derivation of induced pluripotent stem cells in Japanese macaque (Macaca fuscata)

Non-human primates are our closest relatives and are of special interest for ecological, evolutionary and biomedical research. The Japanese macaque (Macaca fuscata) has contributed to the progress of primatology and neurosciences over 60 years. Despite this importance, the molecular and cellular basis of the Japanese macaque remains unexplored since useful cellular tools are lacking. Here we generated induced pluripotent stem cells (iPSCs) from skin fibroblasts of the Japanese macaque with Sendai virus or plasmid vectors. The Japanese macaque iPSCs (jm-iPSCs) were established under feeder-free culture conditions, but feeder cells turned out to be essential for their maintenance. The jm-iPSCs formed human iPSC-like flat colonies which were positive for pluripotent antigens including alkaline phosphatase, SSEA4, and TRA-1-81. They also expressed endogenous OCT3/4, SOX2, L-MYC, and KLF4 and other pluripotent marker genes. The potential to differentiate into all three germ layers and neural stem cells was confirmed by embryoid body and neurosphere formation, respectively. The jm-iPSCs will provide a robust in vitro tool for investigating the underlying mechanisms of development and physiology studies with the Japanese macaque.