Memory and law: what can cognitive neuroscience contribute?

Artificial intelligence in insanity evaluation. Potential opportunities and current challenges

The formulation of a scientific opinion on whether the individual who committed a crime should be held responsible for his/her actions or should be considered not responsible by reason of insanity is very difficult. Indeed, forensic psychopathological decision on insanity is highly prone to errors and is affected by human cognitive biases, resulting in low inter-rater reliability. In this context, artificial intelligence can be extremely useful to improve the inter-subjectivity of insanity evaluation. In this paper, we discuss the possible applications of artificial intelligence in this field as well as the challenges and pitfalls that hamper the effective implementation of AI in insanity evaluation. In particular, thus far, it is possible to apply only supervised algorithms without knowing which is the ground truth and which data should be used to train and test the algorithms. In addition, it is not known which percentage of accuracy of the algorithms is sufficient to support partial or total insanity, nor which are the boundaries between sanity and partial or total insanity. Finally, ethical aspects have not been sufficiently investigated. We conclude that these pitfalls should be resolved before AI can be safely and reliably applied in criminal trials.

Reconstructing a new hippocampal engram for systems reconsolidation and remote memory updating

Recalling systems-consolidated neocortex-dependent remote memories re-engages the hippocampus in a process called systems reconsolidation. However, underlying mechanisms, particularly for the origin of the reinstated hippocampal memory engram, remain elusive. By developing a triple-event labeling tool and employing two-photon imaging, we trace hippocampal engram ensembles from memory acquisition to systems reconsolidation and find that remote recall recruits a new engram ensemble in the hippocampus for subsequent memory retrieval. Consistently, recruiting new engrams is supported by adult hippocampal neurogenesis-mediated silencing of original engrams. This new engram ensemble receives currently experienced contextual information, incorporates new information into the remote memory, and supports remote memory updating. Such a reconstructed hippocampal memory is then integrated with the valence of remote memory via medial prefrontal cortex projection-mediated activity coordination between the hippocampus and amygdala. Thus, the reconstruction of new memory engrams underlies systems reconsolidation, which explains how remote memories are updated with new information.

Post-retrieval noradrenergic activation impairs subsequent memory depending on cortico-hippocampal reactivation

When retrieved, seemingly stable memories can become sensitive to significant events, such as acute stress. The mechanisms underlying these memory dynamics remain poorly understood. Here, we show that noradrenergic stimulation after memory retrieval impairs subsequent remembering, depending on hippocampal and cortical signals emerging during retrieval. In a three-day study, we measured brain activity using fMRI during initial encoding, 24 hr-delayed memory cueing followed by pharmacological elevations of glucocorticoid or noradrenergic activity, and final recall. While post-retrieval glucocorticoids did not affect subsequent memory, the impairing effect of noradrenergic arousal on final recall depended on hippocampal reactivation and category-level reinstatement in the ventral temporal cortex during memory cueing. These effects did not require a reactivation of the original memory trace and did not interact with offline reinstatement during rest. Our findings demonstrate that, depending on the retrieval-related neural reactivation of memories, noradrenergic arousal after retrieval can alter the future accessibility of consolidated memories.

Research Review: Why do prospective and retrospective measures of maltreatment differ? A narrative review

BACKGROUND

Childhood maltreatment contributes to a large mental health burden worldwide. Different measures of childhood maltreatment are not equivalent and may capture meaningful differences. In particular, prospective and retrospective measures of maltreatment identify different groups of individuals and are differentially associated with psychopathology. However, the reasons behind these discrepancies have not yet been comprehensively mapped.

METHODS

In this review, we draw on multi-disciplinary research and present an integrated framework to explain maltreatment measurement disagreement.

RESULTS

We identified three interrelated domains. First, methodological issues related to measurement and data collection methods. Second, the role of memory in influencing retrospective reports of maltreatment. Finally, the motivations individuals may have to disclose, withhold, or fabricate information about maltreatment.

CONCLUSIONS

A greater understanding of maltreatment measurement disagreement may point to new ways to conceptualise and assess maltreatment. Furthermore, it may help uncover mechanisms underlying maltreatment-related psychopathology and targets for novel interventions.

Drawings reveal changes in object memory, but not spatial memory, across time

Time has an immense influence on our memory. Truncated encoding leads to memory for only the 'gist' of an image, and long delays before recall result in generalized memories with few details. Here, we used crowdsourced scoring of hundreds of drawings made from memory after variable encoding (Experiment 1) and retentions of that memory (Experiment 2) to quantify what features of memory content change across time. We found that whereas some features of memory are highly dependent on time, such as the proportion of objects recalled from a scene and false recall for objects not in the original image, spatial memory was highly accurate and relatively independent of time. We also found that we could predict which objects were recalled across time based on the location, meaning, and saliency of the objects. The differential impact of time on object and spatial memory supports a separation of these memory systems.

Open science practices in the false memory literature

In response to the replication crisis in psychology, the scientific community has advocated open science practices to promote transparency and reproducibility. Although existing reviews indicate inconsistent and generally low adoption of open science in psychology, a current-day, detailed analysis is lacking. Recognising the significant impact of false memory research in legal contexts, we conducted a preregistered systematic review to assess the integration of open science practices within this field, analysing 388 publications from 2015 to 2023 (including 15 replications and 3 meta-analyses). Our findings indicated a significant yet varied adoption of open science practices. Most studies (86.86%) adhered to at least one measure, with publication accessibility being the most consistently adopted practice at 73.97%. While data sharing demonstrated the most substantial growth, reaching about 75% by 2023, preregistration and analysis script sharing lagged, with 20-25% adoption in 2023. This review highlights a promising trend towards enhanced research quality, transparency, and reproducibility in false memory research. However, the inconsistent implementation of open science practices may still challenge the verification, replication, and interpretation of research findings. Our study underscores the need for a comprehensive adoption of open science to improve research reliability and validity substantially, fostering trust and credibility in psychology.

Post-retrieval stress impairs subsequent memory depending on hippocampal memory trace reinstatement during reactivation

Upon retrieval, memories can become susceptible to meaningful events, such as stress. Post-retrieval memory changes may be attributed to an alteration of the original memory trace during reactivation-dependent reconsolidation or, alternatively, to the modification of retrieval-related memory traces that impact future remembering. Hence, how post-retrieval memory changes emerge in the human brain is unknown. In a 3-day functional magnetic resonance imaging study, we show that post-retrieval stress impairs subsequent memory depending on the strength of neural reinstatement of the original memory trace during reactivation, driven by the hippocampus and its cross-talk with neocortical representation areas. Comparison of neural patterns during immediate and final memory testing further revealed that successful retrieval was linked to pattern-dissimilarity in controls, suggesting the use of a different trace, whereas stressed participants relied on the original memory representation. These representation changes were again dependent on neocortical reinstatement during reactivation. Our findings show disruptive stress effects on the consolidation of retrieval-related memory traces that support future remembering.

Have you been there before? Decoding recognition of spatial scenes from fMRI signals in precuneus

One potential application of forensic "brain reading" is to test whether a suspect has previously experienced a crime scene. Here, we investigated whether it is possible to decode real life autobiographic exposure to spatial locations using fMRI. In the first session, participants visited four out of eight possible rooms on a university campus. During a subsequent scanning session, subjects passively viewed pictures and videos from these eight possible rooms (four old, four novel) without giving any responses. A multivariate searchlight analysis was employed that trained a classifier to distinguish between "seen" versus "unseen" stimuli from a subset of six rooms. We found that bilateral precuneus encoded information that can be used to distinguish between previously seen and unseen rooms and that also generalized to the two stimuli left out from training. We conclude that activity in bilateral precuneus is associated with the memory of previously visited rooms, irrespective of the identity of the room, thus supporting a parietal contribution to episodic memory for spatial locations. Importantly, we could decode whether a room was visited in real life without the need of explicit judgments about the rooms. This suggests that recognition is an automatic response that can be decoded from fMRI data, thus potentially supporting forensic applications of concealed information tests for crime scene recognition.

Drawings reveal changes in object memory, but not spatial memory, across time

Time has an immense influence on our memory. Truncated encoding leads to memory for only the 'gist' of an image, and long delays before recall result in generalized memories with few details. Here, we used crowdsourced scoring of hundreds of drawings made from memory after variable encoding (Experiment 1) and retentions of that memory (Experiment 2) to quantify what features of memory content change across time. We found that whereas some features of memory are highly dependent on time, such as the proportion of objects recalled from a scene and false recall for objects not in the original image, spatial memory was highly accurate and relatively independent of time. We also found that we could predict which objects were recalled across time based on the location, meaning, and saliency of the objects. The differential impact of time on object and spatial memory supports a separation of these memory systems.

Semantic and episodic processes differently predict false memories in the DRM task

There is a fervent debate about the processes underpinning false memories formation. Seminal theories have suggested that semantic memory would be involved in false memories production, while episodic memory would counter their formation. Yet, direct evidence corroborating such view is still lacking. Here, we tested this possibility by asking participants to perform the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) task, a typical false memory paradigm, in which they had to study lists of words and subsequently to recognize and distinguish them from new words (i.e., the false memory items). The same participants were also required to perform a semantic task and an episodic-source memory task. Our results showed that a higher number of false memories in the DRM task occurred for those participants with better semantic memory abilities, while a lower number of false memories occurred for participants with better episodic abilities. These findings support a key role of semantic processes in false memory formation and, more generally, help clarify the specific contribution of different memory systems to false recognitions.

A comparative review on neuroethical issues in neuroscientific and neuroethical journals

This study is a pilot literature review that compares the interest of neuroethicists and neuroscientists. It aims to determine whether there is a significant gap between the neuroethical issues addressed in philosophical neuroethics journals and neuroscience journals. We retrieved 614 articles from two specialist neuroethics journals (Neuroethics and AJOB Neuroscience) and 82 neuroethics-focused articles from three specialist neuroscience journals (Neuron, Nature Neuroscience, and Nature Reviews Neuroscience). We classified these articles in light of the neuroethical issue in question before we compared the neuroethical issues addressed in philosophical neuroethics with those addressed by neuroscientists. A notable result is a parallelism between them as a general tendency. Neuroscientific articles cover most neuroethical issues discussed by philosophical ethicists and vice versa. Subsequently, there are notable discrepancies between the two bodies of neuroethics literature. For instance, theoretical questions, such as the ethics of moral enhancement and the philosophical implications of neuroscientific findings on our conception of personhood, are more intensely discussed in philosophical-neuroethical articles. Conversely, neuroscientific articles tend to emphasize practical questions, such as how to successfully integrate ethical perspectives into scientific research projects and justifiable practices of animal-involving neuroscientific research. These observations will help us settle the common starting point of the attempt at "ethics integration" in emerging neuroscience, contributing to better governance design and neuroethical practice.

Individual differences in theory of mind correlate with the occurrence of false memory: A study with the DRM task

Although long-term memory and Theory of Mind (ToM) are closely related across the whole lifespan, little is known about the relationship between ToM and semantic memory. Clinical studies have documented the co-occurrence of ToM impairments and semantic memory abnormalities in individuals with autism or semantic dementia. However, to date, no study has directly investigated the existence of a relationship between ToM and semantic memory in the typical population. We addressed this gap on a sample of 103 healthy adults (M age = 22.96 years; age range = 19-35 years). Participants completed a classical false memory task tapping on semantic processes, the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) task, and two ToM tasks, the Triangles and the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task. They also completed the vocabulary scale from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. Results showed that participants' semantic performance in the DRM task was significantly related to that in the Triangles task. Specifically, the higher participants' ToM in the Triangles task, the higher participants' reliance on semantic memory while making false memories in the DRM task. Our findings are consistent with the Fuzzy Trace Theory and the Weak Central Coherence account and suggest that a (partially) common cognitive process responsible for global versus detailed-focus information processing could underlie these two abilities.

Cross-stage neural pattern similarity in the hippocampus predicts false memory derived from post-event inaccurate information

The misinformation effect occurs when people's memory of an event is altered by subsequent inaccurate information. No study has systematically tested theories about the dynamics of human hippocampal representations during the three stages of misinformation-induced false memory. This study replicates behavioral results of the misinformation effect, and investigates the cross-stage pattern similarity in the hippocampus and cortex using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Results show item-specific hippocampal pattern similarity between original-event and post-event stages. During the memory-test stage, hippocampal representations of original information are weakened for true memory, whereas hippocampal representations of misinformation compete with original information to create false memory. When false memory occurs, this conflict is resolved by the lateral prefrontal cortex. Individuals' memory traces of post-event information in the hippocampus predict false memory, whereas original information in the lateral parietal cortex predicts true memory. These findings support the multiple-trace model, and emphasize the reconstructive nature of human memory.

Psychopathic personality traits are linked to reduced false memories for negative events

Individuals scoring high on psychopathic personality traits process emotional material to a different extent than individuals with few psychopathic traits. Evidence exists that these individuals have impaired emotional memory. The question arises whether this emotional memory impairment has ramifications for the production of emotional false memories. In the present study, we investigated the production of false and true memories for emotional events in a community sample (N = 120) of individuals varying in psychopathic traits (evaluated with the Psychopathic Personality Inventory-Revised [PPI-R] questionnaire). The fearless dominance (FD) component of psychopathy interacted with the emotional impact of to-be-remembered events in the production of false memories, showing fewer negative false memories with increasing levels of FD. At the subjective level, negative false memories were not perceived as vivid memory experiences in high FD individuals. Concerning true memories, higher scores in cold-heartedness were related to fewer true memories for neutral and negative (but not positive) events. These results show that individuals with high psychopathy traits - in particular, FD - do not have a general emotional memory impairment but they process negative material in a different way than individuals with low psychopathic traits and thus are less susceptible to producing false memories for negative events.

The evidence for and against reactivation-induced memory updating in humans and nonhuman animals

Systematic investigation of reactivation-induced memory updating began in the 1960s, and a wave of research in this area followed the seminal articulation of "reconsolidation" theory in the early 2000s. Myriad studies indicate that memory reactivation can cause previously consolidated memories to become labile and sensitive to weakening, strengthening, or other forms of modification. However, from its nascent period to the present, the field has been beset by inconsistencies in researchers' abilities to replicate seemingly established effects. Here we review these many studies, synthesizing the human and nonhuman animal literature, and suggest that these failures-to-replicate reflect a highly complex and delicately balanced memory modification system, the substrates of which must be finely tuned to enable adaptive memory updating while limiting maladaptive, inaccurate modifications. A systematic approach to the entire body of evidence, integrating positive and null findings, will yield a comprehensive understanding of the complex and dynamic nature of long-term memory storage and the potential for harnessing modification processes to treat mental disorders driven by pervasive maladaptive memories.

EXPRESS: "Be careful what you recall": Retrieval induced forgetting of genuine real-life autobiographical memories

Which episodes from our lives will be remembered and which will be forgotten, and why? This question has still not been answered satisfactorily by research into autobiographical memory. Previous work has shown that retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF) might be a factor responsible for forgetting parts of the autobiographical memory content. However, none of the previous studies assessed RIF in memories for recent, controlled, personal events. We report here the results of an experiment in which autobiographical memories of real-life events were induced in a controlled, but fully naturalistic, manner, under the disguise of team-building exercises, while an adapted RIF paradigm was applied to these memories. Results clearly showed the influence of RIF on auto-biographical memory retrieval. These findings demonstrate conclusively that RIF occurs in everyday life when remembering personal events.

Evacuation behaviors and emergency communications: An analysis of real-world incident videos

Emergencies such as fires and terrorist attacks pose risks of injuries and fatalities, which can be exacerbated by delayed, ill-informed, or unmanaged responses. Effective emergency communication strategies could be used to better inform people and reduce these risks. This research analyzes videos of real-world emergencies to: (a) identify people's observed behaviors that increase risk during evacuations, and (b) examine which emergency communication strategies might reduce risk behaviors. We analyzed 126 publicly available videos of emergency evacuations in different emergencies (e.g., fire, terror attack, evacuation alarm, perceived threat). We found evidence of three types of risk behaviors (delayed response, filming, running) and four emergency communication strategies (evacuation alarm, staff guiding people to exits, general prerecorded message, live announcement). Our analyses suggest that having staff guide people to exits is the most effective strategy for promoting faster and more effective responses. However, neither live announcements nor pre-recorded messages were associated with delayed responses, while evacuation alarms were associated with more delayed responses than other communication strategies. Although people filming the incident was unrelated to staff interactions, it occurred more with alarms sounding and prerecorded messages, suggesting that these emergency communications might not prevent filming. Compared to no communications, all emergency communication strategies reduced running during evacuations. We discuss the implications of this research for identifying effective emergency communication strategies and reducing risk-increasing evacuation behaviors.

Neural correlates of the Dunning-Kruger effect

The Dunning-Kruger effect (DKE) is a metacognitive phenomenon of illusory superiority in which individuals who perform poorly on a task believe they performed better than others, yet individuals who performed very well believe they under-performed compared to others. This phenomenon has yet to be directly explored in episodic memory, nor explored for physiological correlates or reaction times. We designed a novel method to elicit the DKE via a test of item recognition while electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded. Throughout the task, participants were asked to estimate the percentile in which they performed compared to others. Results revealed participants in the bottom 25th percentile over-estimated their percentile, while participants in the top 75th percentile under-estimated their percentile, exhibiting the classic DKE. Reaction time measures revealed a condition-by-group interaction whereby over-estimators responded faster than under-estimators when estimating being in the top percentile and responded slower when estimating being in the bottom percentile. Between-group EEG differences were evident between over-estimators and under-estimators during Dunning-Kruger responses, which revealed FN400-like effects of familiarity supporting differences for over-estimators, whereas "old-new" memory event-related potential effects revealed a late parietal component associated with recollection-based processing for under-estimators that was not evident for over-estimators. Findings suggest over- and under-estimators use differing cognitive processes when assessing their performance, such that under-estimators may rely on recollection during memory while over-estimators may draw upon excess familiarity when over-estimating their performance. Episodic memory thus appears to play a contributory role in metacognitive judgements of illusory superiority.

Memory engrams: Recalling the past and imagining the future

In 1904, Richard Semon introduced the term "engram" to describe the neural substrate for storing memories. An experience, Semon proposed, activates a subset of cells that undergo off-line, persistent chemical and/or physical changes to become an engram. Subsequent reactivation of this engram induces memory retrieval. Although Semon's contributions were largely ignored in his lifetime, new technologies that allow researchers to image and manipulate the brain at the level of individual neurons has reinvigorated engram research. We review recent progress in studying engrams, including an evaluation of evidence for the existence of engrams, the importance of intrinsic excitability and synaptic plasticity in engrams, and the lifetime of an engram. Together, these findings are beginning to define an engram as the basic unit of memory.

Imagery retrieval may explain why recall of negative scenes contains more accurate detail

We investigated whether the presence of imagery at retrieval was associated with the finding that negative pictures and scenes are recalled with greater perceptual detail. Participants were presented with 30 scenes taken from the International Affective Picture System that were rated either high or low on valence, but similarly on arousal. Recall was prompted with matched visual or verbal cues. During recall, participants reported any images that came to mind and rated them for vividness, whereas accuracy was rated independently. Imagery was described at test in response to over 60% of the stimuli. Whereas vividness was predicted by negative valence, images occurred more often in response to visual cues. The association of negative valence and visual cueing with better recall was observed only in the presence of reported imagery. These findings have important implications for models and experiments focusing on the recall and recognition of visual stimuli.

Post-learning stress reduces the misinformation effect: effects of psychosocial stress on memory updating

Episodic memories can be modified when exposed to new and related information. This phenomenon, known as memory updating, is generally thought to be adaptive but can also lead to incorporating false information into a memory trace. Given the well-known effects of stress on episodic memory, we used a false information paradigm to investigate if acute stress during memory updating (i.e., post-learning stage) affected false memory formation. In a between-subject design, young healthy participants completed the initial phases of the misinformation experiment - they studied an event via a slideshow and then were exposed a related narrative that contained misleading information about that event. After, half of the participants were exposed to acute psychosocial stress and the other half completed a control task. Once stress levels returned to baseline, all of the participants completed the final phase of the experiment, which was a memory test for slideshow that included items containing true facts and misinformation. Participants in the stress condition showed a reduced misinformation effect and were better able to discriminate true from false information compared to control participants. This pattern of results held even when participants were tested on the same memory test after a multiple day delay, illustrating the long-lasting effects of stress on false memory formation specifically, and memory updating generally. We discuss how our results add to the understanding of the time-dependent factors that moderate stress effects on memory, and speculate how stress effects on memory updating can be positive, by limiting intrusions into encoded events, but also negative, by limiting the ability to integrate information with other concepts, harming memory generalization.

Multiple interactive memory representations underlie the induction of false memory

Theoretical and computational models such as transfer-appropriate processing (TAP) and global matching models have emphasized the encoding-retrieval interaction of memory representations in generating false memories, but relevant neural mechanisms are still poorly understood. By manipulating the sensory modalities (visual and auditory) at different processing stages (learning and test) in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott task, we found that the auditory-learning visual-test (AV) group produced more false memories (59%) than the other three groups (42∼44%) [i.e., visual learning visual test (VV), auditory learning auditory test (AA), and visual learning auditory test (VA)]. Functional imaging results showed that the AV group's proneness to false memories was associated with (i) reduced representational match between the tested item and all studied items in the visual cortex, (ii) weakened prefrontal monitoring process due to the reliance on frontal memory signal for both targets and lures, and (iii) enhanced neural similarity for semantically related words in the temporal pole as a result of auditory learning. These results are consistent with the predictions based on the TAP and global matching models and highlight the complex interactions of representations during encoding and retrieval in distributed brain regions that contribute to false memories.

The Failure to Measure Dietary Intake Engendered a Fictional Discourse on Diet-Disease Relations

Controversies regarding the putative health effects of dietary sugar, salt, fat, and cholesterol are not driven by legitimate differences in scientific inference from valid evidence, but by a fictional discourse on diet-disease relations driven by decades of deeply flawed and demonstrably misleading epidemiologic research. Over the past 60 years, epidemiologists published tens of thousands of reports asserting that dietary intake was a major contributing factor to chronic non-communicable diseases despite the fact that epidemiologic methods do not measure dietary intake. In lieu of measuring actual dietary intake, epidemiologists collected millions of unverified verbal and textual reports of memories of perceptions of dietary intake. Given that actual dietary intake and reported memories of perceptions of intake are not in the same ontological category, epidemiologists committed the logical fallacy of "Misplaced Concreteness." This error was exacerbated when the anecdotal (self-reported) data were impermissibly transformed (i.e., pseudo-quantified) into proxy-estimates of nutrient and caloric consumption via the assignment of "reference" values from databases of questionable validity and comprehensiveness. These errors were further compounded when statistical analyses of diet-disease relations were performed using the pseudo-quantified anecdotal data. These fatal measurement, analytic, and inferential flaws were obscured when epidemiologists failed to cite decades of research demonstrating that the proxy-estimates they created were often physiologically implausible (i.e., meaningless) and had no verifiable quantitative relation to the actual nutrient or caloric consumption of participants. In this critical analysis, we present substantial evidence to support our contention that current controversies and public confusion regarding diet-disease relations were generated by tens of thousands of deeply flawed, demonstrably misleading, and pseudoscientific epidemiologic reports. We challenge the field of nutrition to regain lost credibility by acknowledging the empirical and theoretical refutations of their memory-based methods and ensure that rigorous (objective) scientific methods are used to study the role of diet in chronic disease.

Controversy and debate: Memory-Based Methods Paper 1: the fatal flaws of food frequency questionnaires and other memory-based dietary assessment methods

There is an escalating debate over the value and validity of self-reported dietary intake as estimated by Food Frequency Questionnaires and other forms of memory-based dietary assessment methods. Proponents argue that despite limitations, memory-based methods provide valid and valuable information about consumed foods and beverages and therefore can be used to assess diet-disease relations. In fact, over the past 60 years, thousands of memory-based dietary research reports were used to inform public policy and establish the Dietary Guidelines for Americans. Yet, despite this impressive history, our position is that memory-based dietary assessment methods are invalid and inadmissible for scientific research and therefore cannot be used in evidence-based policy making. Herein, we present the empirical evidence and theoretic and philosophic perspectives that render data derived from memory-based methods both fatally flawed and pseudoscientific. First, the use of memory-based methods is founded upon two inter-related logical fallacies: a category error and reification. Second, human memory and recall are not valid instruments for scientific data collection. Third, in standard epidemiologic contexts, the measurement errors associated with self-reported data are nonfalsifiable because there is no way to ascertain if the reported foods and beverages match the respondent's actual consumption. Fourth, the assignment of nutrient and energy values to self-reported intake (i.e., the pseudoquantification of anecdotal data) is impermissible and violates the foundational tenets of measurement theory. Fifth, the proxy estimates created via pseudoquantification are often physiologically implausible and have little relation to actual nutrient and energy consumption. Finally, investigators engendered a fictional discourse on the health effects of dietary sugar, salt, fat and cholesterol when they failed to cite contrary evidence or address decades of research demonstrating the fatal measurement, analytic, and inferential flaws of memory-based dietary assessment methods.

Confident false memories for spatial location are mediated by V1

Prior functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) results suggest that true memories, but not false memories, activate early sensory cortex. It is thought that false memories, which reflect conscious processing, do not activate early sensory cortex because these regions are associated with nonconscious processing. We posited that false memories may activate the earliest visual cortical processing region (i.e., V1) when task conditions are manipulated to evoke conscious processing in this region. In an fMRI experiment, abstract shapes were presented to the left or right of fixation during encoding. During retrieval, old shapes were presented at fixation and participants characterized each shape as previously on the "left" or "right" followed by an "unsure"-"sure"-"very sure" confidence rating. False memories for spatial location (i.e., "right"/left or "left"/right trials with "sure" or "very sure" confidence ratings) were associated with activity in bilateral early visual regions, including V1. In a follow-up fMRI-guided transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) experiment that employed the same paradigm, we assessed whether V1 activity was necessary for false memory construction. Between the encoding phase and the retrieval phase of each run, TMS (1 Hz, 8 min) was used to target the location of false memory activity (identified in the fMRI experiment) in left V1, right V1, or the vertex (control site). Confident false memories for spatial location were significantly reduced following TMS to V1, as compared to vertex. The results of the present experiments provide convergent evidence that early sensory cortex can contribute to false memory construction under particular task conditions.

Neuroanatomical substrates involved in unrelated false facial recognition

Identifying faces is a process central for social interaction and a relevant factor in eyewitness theory. False recognition is a critical mistake during an eyewitness's identification scenario because it can lead to a wrongful conviction. Previous studies have described neural areas related to false facial recognition using the standard Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, triggering related false recognition. Nonetheless, misidentification of faces without trying to elicit false memories (unrelated false recognition) in a police lineup could involve different cognitive processes, and distinct neural areas. To delve into the neural circuitry of unrelated false recognition, we evaluated the memory and response confidence of participants while watching faces photographs in an fMRI task. Functional activations of unrelated false recognition were identified by contrasting the activation on this condition vs. the activations related to recognition (hits) and correct rejections. The results identified the right precentral and cingulate gyri as areas with distinctive activations during false recognition events suggesting a conflict resulting in a dysfunction during memory retrieval. High confidence suggested that about 50% of misidentifications may be related to an unconscious process. These findings add to our understanding of the construction of facial memories and its biological basis, and the fallibility of the eyewitness testimony.

To Veil or Not to Veil: Detecting Lies in The Courtroom. A Comment on Leach et al. (2016)

For the past 40 years, lie detection has predominantly been studied in the context of police-suspect and investigative interviews. In their paper, Leach et al. (2016) examined whether niqabs or hijabs interfere with the trial judges' ability to detect deception and concluded that veiling enhanced trial judges' ability to make accurate veracity judgments. In this comment, we argue that the conclusions made by Leach et al. are based upon an inaccurate experimental court paradigm and suffer from methodological and analytical issues. It is our opinion that the applicability of their research findings to real-life court proceedings alongside potential changes to court practices and policies based on Leach et al. should be regarded as naïve and misinformed.

Misrepresentations and Flawed Logic About the Prevalence of False Memories

Brewin and Andrews (2016) propose that just 15% of people, or even fewer, are susceptible to false childhood memories. If this figure were true, then false memories would still be a serious problem. But the figure is higher than 15%. False memories occur even after a few short and low-pressure interviews, and with each successive interview, they become richer, more compelling, and more likely to occur. It is therefore dangerously misleading to claim that the scientific data provide an "upper bound" on susceptibility to memory errors. We also raise concerns about the peer review process.

Can Implicit Associations Distinguish True and False Eyewitness Memory? Development and Preliminary Testing of the IATe

Eyewitness identification has been shown to be fallible and prone to false memory. In this study we develop and test a new method to probe the mechanisms involved in the formation of false memories in this area, and determine whether a particular memory is likely to be true or false. We created a seven-step procedure based on the Implicit Association Test to gauge implicit biases in eyewitness identification (the IATe). We show that identification errors may result from unconscious bias caused by implicit associations evoked by a given face. We also show that implicit associations between negative attributions such as guilt and eyewitnesses' final pick from a line-up can help to distinguish between true and false memory (especially where the witness has been subject to the suggestive nature of a prior blank line-up). Specifically, the more a witness implicitly associates an individual face with a particular crime, the more likely it is that a memory they have for that person committing the crime is false. These findings are consistent with existing findings in the memory and neuroscience literature showing that false memories can be caused by implicit associations that are outside conscious awareness. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Cognitive neuroscience of honesty and deception: A signaling framework

Understanding the neural basis of human honesty and deception has enormous potential scientific and practical value. However, past approaches, largely developed out of studies with forensic applications in mind, are increasingly recognized as having serious methodological and conceptual shortcomings. Here we propose to address these challenges by drawing on so-called signaling games widely used in game theory and ethology to study behavioral and evolutionary consequences of information transmission and distortion. In particular, by separating and capturing distinct adaptive problems facing signal senders and receivers, signaling games provide a framework to organize the complex set of cognitive processes associated with honest and deceptive behavior. Furthermore, this framework provides novel insights into feasibility and practical challenges of neuroimaging-based lie detection.

False memories with age: Neural and cognitive underpinnings

As we age we become increasingly susceptible to memory distortions and inaccuracies. Over the past decade numerous neuroimaging studies have attempted to illuminate the neural underpinnings of aging and false memory. Here we review these studies, and link their findings with those concerning the cognitive properties of age-related changes in memory accuracy. Collectively this evidence points towards a prominent role for age-related declines in medial temporal and prefrontal brain areas, and corresponding impairments in associative binding and strategic monitoring. A resulting cascade of cognitive changes contributes to the heightened vulnerability to false memories with age, including reduced recollective ability, a reliance on gist information and familiarity-based monitoring mechanisms, as well as a reduced ability to inhibit irrelevant information and erroneous binding of features between memory traces. We consider both theoretical and applied implications of research on aging and false memories, as well as questions remaining to be addressed in future research.

Learning and memory under stress: implications for the classroom

Exams, tight deadlines and interpersonal conflicts are just a few examples of the many events that may result in high levels of stress in both students and teachers. Research over the past two decades identified stress and the hormones and neurotransmitters released during and after a stressful event as major modulators of human learning and memory processes, with critical implications for educational contexts. While stress around the time of learning is thought to enhance memory formation, thus leading to robust memories, stress markedly impairs memory retrieval, bearing, for instance, the risk of underachieving at exams. Recent evidence further indicates that stress may hamper the updating of memories in the light of new information and induce a shift from a flexible, 'cognitive' form of learning towards rather rigid, 'habit'-like behaviour. Together, these stress-induced changes may explain some of the difficulties of learning and remembering under stress in the classroom. Taking these insights from psychology and neuroscience into account could bear the potential to facilitate processes of education for both students and teachers.

Creating Memories for False Autobiographical Events in Childhood: A Systematic Review

Using a framework that distinguishes autobiographical belief, recollective experience, and confidence in memory, we review three major paradigms used to suggest false childhood events to adults: imagination inflation, false feedback and memory implantation. Imagination inflation and false feedback studies increase the belief that a suggested event occurred by a small amount such that events are still thought unlikely to have happened. In memory implantation studies, some recollective experience for the suggested events is induced on average in 47% of participants, but only in 15% are these experiences likely to be rated as full memories. We conclude that susceptibility to false memories of childhood events appears more limited than has been suggested. The data emphasise the complex judgements involved in distinguishing real from imaginary recollections and caution against accepting investigator‐based ratings as necessarily corresponding to participants' self‐reports. Recommendations are made for presenting the results of these studies in courtroom settings. © 2016 The Authors Applied Cognitive Psychology Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Decoding fMRI Signatures of Real-world Autobiographical Memory Retrieval

Extant neuroimaging data implicate frontoparietal and medial-temporal lobe regions in episodic retrieval, and the specific pattern of activity within and across these regions is diagnostic of an individual's subjective mnemonic experience. For example, in laboratory-based paradigms, memories for recently encoded faces can be accurately decoded from single-trial fMRI patterns [Uncapher, M. R., Boyd-Meredith, J. T., Chow, T. E., Rissman, J., & Wagner, A. D. Goal-directed modulation of neural memory patterns: Implications for fMRI-based memory detection. Journal of Neuroscience, 35, 8531–8545, 2015; Rissman, J., Greely, H. T., & Wagner, A. D. Detecting individual memories through the neural decoding of memory states and past experience. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, U.S.A., 107, 9849–9854, 2010]. Here, we investigated the neural patterns underlying memory for real-world autobiographical events, probed at 1- to 3-week retention intervals as well as whether distinct patterns are associated with different subjective memory states. For 3 weeks, participants (n = 16) wore digital cameras that captured photographs of their daily activities. One week later, they were scanned while making memory judgments about sequences of photos depicting events from their own lives or events captured by the cameras of others. Whole-brain multivoxel pattern analysis achieved near-perfect accuracy at distinguishing correctly recognized events from correctly rejected novel events, and decoding performance did not significantly vary with retention interval. Multivoxel pattern classifiers also differentiated recollection from familiarity and reliably decoded the subjective strength of recollection, of familiarity, or of novelty. Classification-based brain maps revealed dissociable neural signatures of these mnemonic states, with activity patterns in hippocampus, medial PFC, and ventral parietal cortex being particularly diagnostic of recollection. Finally, a classifier trained on previously acquired laboratory-based memory data achieved reliable decoding of autobiographical memory states. We discuss the implications for neuroscientific accounts of episodic retrieval and comment on the potential forensic use of fMRI for probing experiential knowledge.

Effects of post-encoding stress on performance in the DRM false memory paradigm

Numerous studies have investigated how stress impacts veridical memory, but how stress influences false memory formation remains poorly understood. In order to target memory consolidation specifically, a psychosocial stress (TSST) or control manipulation was administered following encoding of 15 neutral, semantically related word lists (DRM false memory task) and memory was tested 24 h later. Stress decreased recognition of studied words, while increasing false recognition of semantically related lure words. Moreover, while control subjects remembered true and false words equivalently, stressed subjects remembered more false than true words. These results suggest that stress supports gist memory formation in the DRM task, perhaps by hindering detail-specific processing in the hippocampus.

The Novel New Jersey Eyewitness Instruction Induces Skepticism but Not Sensitivity

In recent decades, social scientists have shown that the reliability of eyewitness identifications is much worse than laypersons tend to believe. Although courts have only recently begun to react to this evidence, the New Jersey judiciary has reformed its jury instructions to notify jurors about the frailties of human memory, the potential for lineup administrators to nudge witnesses towards suspects that they police have already identified, and the advantages of alternative lineup procedures, including blinding of the administrator. This experiment tested the efficacy of New Jersey’s jury instruction. In a 2×2 between-subjects design, mock jurors (N = 335) watched a 35-minute murder trial, wherein identification quality was either “weak” or “strong” and either the New Jersey or a “standard” instruction was delivered. Jurors were more than twice as likely to convict when the standard instruction was used (OR = 2.55; 95% CI = 1.37–4.89, p < 0.001). The New Jersey instruction, however, did not improve juror's ability to discern quality; rather, jurors receiving those instructions indiscriminatingly discounted “weak” and “strong” testimony in equal measure.

Priming analogical reasoning with false memories

Like true memories, false memories are capable of priming answers to insight-based problems. Recent research has attempted to extend this paradigm to more advanced problem-solving tasks, including those involving verbal analogical reasoning. However, these experiments are constrained inasmuch as problem solutions could be generated via spreading activation mechanisms (much like false memories themselves) rather than using complex reasoning processes. In three experiments we examined false memory priming of complex analogical reasoning tasks in the absence of simple semantic associations. In Experiment 1, we demonstrated the robustness of false memory priming in analogical reasoning when backward associative strength among the problem terms was eliminated. In Experiments 2a and 2b, we extended these findings by demonstrating priming on newly created homonym analogies that can only be solved by inhibiting semantic associations within the analogy. Overall, the findings of the present experiments provide evidence that the efficacy of false memory priming extends to complex analogical reasoning problems.

The Inadmissibility of What We Eat in America and NHANES Dietary Data in Nutrition and Obesity Research and the Scientific Formulation of National Dietary Guidelines

The Scientific Report of the 2015 Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee was primarily informed by memory-based dietary assessment methods (M-BMs) (eg, interviews and surveys). The reliance on M-BMs to inform dietary policy continues despite decades of unequivocal evidence that M-BM data bear little relation to actual energy and nutrient consumption. Data from M-BMs are defended as valid and valuable despite no empirical support and no examination of the foundational assumptions regarding the validity of human memory and retrospective recall in dietary assessment. We assert that uncritical faith in the validity and value of M-BMs has wasted substantial resources and constitutes the greatest impediment to scientific progress in obesity and nutrition research. Herein, we present evidence that M-BMs are fundamentally and fatally flawed owing to well-established scientific facts and analytic truths. First, the assumption that human memory can provide accurate or precise reproductions of past ingestive behavior is indisputably false. Second, M-BMs require participants to submit to protocols that mimic procedures known to induce false recall. Third, the subjective (ie, not publicly accessible) mental phenomena (ie, memories) from which M-BM data are derived cannot be independently observed, quantified, or falsified; as such, these data are pseudoscientific and inadmissible in scientific research. Fourth, the failure to objectively measure physical activity in analyses renders inferences regarding diet-health relationships equivocal. Given the overwhelming evidence in support of our position, we conclude that M-BM data cannot be used to inform national dietary guidelines and that the continued funding of M-BMs constitutes an unscientific and major misuse of research resources.

Brain substrates of recovery from misleading influence

Humans are strongly influenced by their environment, a dependence that can lead to errors in judgment. Although a rich literature describes how people are influenced by others, little is known regarding the factors that predict subsequent rectification of misleading influence. Using a mediation model in combination with brain imaging, we propose a model for the correction of misinformation. Specifically, our data suggest that amygdala modulation of hippocampal mnemonic representations, during the time of misleading social influence, is associated with reduced subsequent anterior-lateral prefrontal cortex activity that reflects correction. These findings illuminate the process by which erroneous beliefs are, or fail to be, rectified and highlight how past influence constrains subsequent correction.