How language shapes the cultural inheritance of categories

The Theory of Constructed Emotion: More Than a Feeling

A recently published article by van Heijst et al. attempted to reconcile two research approaches in the science of emotion-basic emotion theory and the theory of constructed emotion-by suggesting that the former explains emotions as bioregulatory states of the body whereas the latter explains feelings that arise from those state changes. This bifurcation of emotion into objective physical states and subjective feelings involves three misleading simplifications that fundamentally misrepresent the theory of constructed emotion and prevent progress in the science of emotion. In this article we identify these misleading simplifications and the resulting factual errors, empirical oversights, and evolutionary oversimplifications. We then discuss why such errors will continue to arise until scientists realize that the two theories are intrinsically irreconcilable. They rest on incommensurate assumptions and require different methods of evaluation. Only by directly considering these differences will these research silos in the science of emotion finally dissolve, speeding the accumulation of trustworthy scientific knowledge about emotion that is usable in the real world.

Language as a modulator to cognitive and neurological systems

Language is a defining characteristic of humans, playing a crucial role in both species evolution and individual development. While traditional views, such as Chomsky's, emphasize language's dual functions in sensorimotor externalization and conceptual-intentional thought, its broader role as a modulator of cognitive and neurological systems remains underexplored. Here, we propose that language, due to its profound, accessible, and widespread neurological activation, serves as a pivotal modulator of these systems. This perspective provides new insights into the interconnection between language, cognition, and brain function, and points to novel therapeutic pathways that leverage the modulating capabilities of language for cognitive enhancement and neurological rehabilitation.

How generic language shapes the development of social thought

Generic language, that is, language that refers to a category as an abstract whole (e.g., 'Girls like pink') rather than specific individuals (e.g., 'This girl likes pink'), is a common means by which children learn about social kinds. Here, we propose that children interpret generics as signaling that their referenced categories are natural, objective, and have distinctive features, and, thus, in the social domain, that such language affects children's beliefs about the social world in ways that extend far beyond the content they explicitly communicate. On this account, even generics expressing uncontentious content (e.g., 'Girls are great at math') can lead children to think of categories as defining fundamentally distinct kinds of people and contribute to the development of stereotypes and other problematic social phenomena.

The persuasive role of generic-you in online interactions

Persuasion plays a crucial role in human communication. Yet, convincing someone to change their mind is often challenging. Here, we demonstrate that a subtle linguistic device, generic-you (i.e., "you" that refers to people in general, e.g., "You win some, you lose some"), is associated with successfully shifting people's pre-existing views in a naturalistic context. Leveraging Large Language Models, we conducted a preregistered study using a large ([Formula: see text] = 204,120) online debate dataset. Every use of generic-you in an argument was associated with an up to 14% percent increase in the odds of successful persuasion. These findings underscore the need to distinguish between the specific and generic uses of "you" in large-scale linguistic analyses, an aspect that has been overlooked in the literature. The robust association between generic-you and persuasion persisted with the inclusion of various covariates, and above and beyond other pronouns (i.e., specific-you, I or we). However, these findings do not imply causality. In Supplementary Experiment 2, arguments with generic-you (vs. first-person singular pronouns, e.g., I) were rated as more persuasive by open-minded individuals. In Supplementary Experiment 3, generic-you (vs. specific-you) arguments did not differentially predict attitude change. We discuss explanations for these results, including differential mechanisms, boundary conditions, and the possibility that people intuitively draw on generic-you when expressing more persuasive ideas. Together, these findings add to a growing literature on the interpersonal implications of broadening one's perspective via a subtle shift in language, while motivating future research on contextual and individual differences that may moderate these effects.

Pathogen stress heightens sensorimotor dimensions in the human collective semantic space

Infectious diseases have been major causes of death throughout human history and are assumed to broadly affect human psychology. However, whether and how conceptual processing, an internal world model central to various cognitive processes, adapts to such salient stress variables remains largely unknown. To address this, we conducted three studies examining the relationship between pathogen severity and semantic space, probed through the main neurocognitive semantic dimensions revealed by large-scale text analyses: one cross-cultural study (across 43 countries) and two historical studies (over the past 100 years). Across all three studies, we observed that increasing pathogen severity was associated with an enhancement of the sensory-motor dimension in the collective semantic space. These patterns remained robust after controlling for the effects of sociocultural variables, including economic wealth and societal norms of tightness. These results highlight the universal dynamic mechanisms of collective semantics, such that pathogen stress potentially drives sensorially oriented semantic processing.

Giving Generic Language Another Thought

According to an influential research program in cognitive science, philosophy, and linguistics, there is a deep, special connection between generics and pernicious aspects of social cognition, such as stereotyping. Specifically, generics are thought to exacerbate our propensity to essentialize, lead us to overgeneralize based on scarce evidence and to other epistemically dubious patterns of inference. Recently, however, several studies have put empirical and theoretical pressure on some of the main tenets of this research program. The goal of this paper is to bring these results together in a comprehensive narrative and systematically evaluate their impact on the hypothesis that generics have a uniquely problematic effect on our social and cognitive capacities.

How Culture Shapes the Early Development of Essentialist Beliefs

People represent many categories and their features as determined by intrinsic essences. These essentialist beliefs reflect biased views of the world that can hinder scientific reasoning and contribute to social prejudice. To consider the extent to which such essentialist views originate from culturally-situated processes, the present study tested the developmental trajectories of essentialist beliefs among children growing up in the United States and China (N = 531; ages 3-6). Essentialist beliefs emerged across early childhood in both communities, but their instantiation and trajectories varied across cultures. In the sample from the United States (but not from China), essentialist beliefs that categories and their features are fixed-at-birth and inflexible increased across age. On the other hand, in the sample from China, children held stronger beliefs that categories are objective and explanatory and viewed them as more homogenous with age. Children sampled from these two contexts also showed variation in basic explanatory, linguistic, and inferential processes, suggesting that cultural variation in the development of essentialism across childhood might reflect variation in the basic conceptual biases that children rely on to build intuitive theories of the world.

The Psychology of Framing: How Everyday Language Shapes the Way We Think, Feel, and Act

When we use language to communicate, we must choose what to say, what not to say, and how to say it. That is, we must decide how to frame the message. These linguistic choices matter: Framing a discussion one way or another can influence how people think, feel, and act in many important domains, including politics, health, business, journalism, law, and even conversations with loved ones. The ubiquity of framing effects raises several important questions relevant to the public interest: What makes certain messages so potent and others so ineffectual? Do framing effects pose a threat to our autonomy, or are they a rational response to variation in linguistic content? Can we learn to use language more effectively to promote policy reforms or other causes we believe in, or is this an overly idealistic goal? In this article, we address these questions by providing an integrative review of the psychology of framing. We begin with a brief history of the concept of framing and a survey of common framing effects. We then outline the cognitive, social-pragmatic, and emotional mechanisms underlying such effects. This discussion centers on the view that framing is a natural-and unavoidable-feature of human communication. From this perspective, framing effects reflect a sensible response to messages that communicate different information. In the second half of the article, we provide a taxonomy of linguistic framing techniques, describing various ways that the structure or content of a message can be altered to shape people's mental models of what is being described. Some framing manipulations are subtle, involving a slight shift in grammar or wording. Others are more overt, involving wholesale changes to a message. Finally, we consider factors that moderate the impact of framing, gaps in the current empirical literature, and opportunities for future research. We conclude by offering general recommendations for effective framing and reflecting on the place of framing in society. Linguistic framing is powerful, but its effects are not inevitable-we can always reframe an issue to ourselves or other people.

How language framing shapes the perception of social norms

Language plays a crucial role in the transmission of social norms. The way language is used, referred to as language framing, shapes perceptions of social norms. This review synthesizes recent research from various fields to explore the mechanisms through which language framing influences social norm perception. We highlight five key mechanisms: attention redirection, context-specific pragmatic inference, point-of-reference alteration, trustworthiness and credibility judgment, and emotion elicitation. We underscore the need to understand how these mechanisms interact with each other and the necessity for a comprehensive model that integrates linguistic processes into social norm perceptions. Such a model would enhance our ability to craft effective communication strategies aimed at promoting positive behavior and driving social changes.

The nature of label-induced categories: preverbal infants represent surface features and category symbols

Humans categorize objects not only based on perceptual features (e.g. red, rounded), but also function (e.g. used to transport people). Category membership can be communicated via labelling (e.g. 'apple', 'vehicle'). While it is well established that even preverbal infants rely on labels to learn categories, it remains unclear what is the nature of those categories: whether they simply contain sets of visual features diagnostic of category membership, or whether they additionally contain abstract category markers or symbols (e.g. linguistic in the form of category labels or non-linguistic). To address this question, we first used labelling to teach two novel object categories, each composed of unfamiliar visually unrelated objects, to adults and nine-month-olds. Then, we assessed categorization in an electroencephalography category-oddball task. Both adults and infants displayed stronger neural responses to the infrequent category, which, in the absence of visual features shared by all category members, indicates that the categories they set up contained feature-independent category markers. Well before language production starts, labels help infants to discover categories without relying on perceptual similarities across objects and build category representations with summary elements that may be critical for the development of abstract thought.

Cultural bias and cultural alignment of large language models

Culture fundamentally shapes people's reasoning, behavior, and communication. As people increasingly use generative artificial intelligence (AI) to expedite and automate personal and professional tasks, cultural values embedded in AI models may bias people's authentic expression and contribute to the dominance of certain cultures. We conduct a disaggregated evaluation of cultural bias for five widely used large language models (OpenAI's GPT-4o/4-turbo/4/3.5-turbo/3) by comparing the models' responses to nationally representative survey data. All models exhibit cultural values resembling English-speaking and Protestant European countries. We test cultural prompting as a control strategy to increase cultural alignment for each country/territory. For later models (GPT-4, 4-turbo, 4o), this improves the cultural alignment of the models' output for 71-81% of countries and territories. We suggest using cultural prompting and ongoing evaluation to reduce cultural bias in the output of generative AI.

Tell me your (cognitive) budget, and I'll tell you what you value

Consider the following two (hypothetical) generic causal claims: "Living in a neighborhood with many families with children increases purchases of bicycles" and "living in an affluent neighborhood with many families with children increases purchases of bicycles." These claims not only differ in what they suggest about how bicycle ownership is distributed across different neighborhoods (i.e., "the data"), but also have the potential to communicate something about the speakers' values: namely, the prominence they accord to affluence in representing and making decisions about the social world. Here, we examine the relationship between the level of granularity with which a cause is described in a generic causal claim (e.g., neighborhood vs. affluent neighborhood) and the value of the information contained in the causal model that generates that claim. We argue that listeners who know any two of the following can make reliable inferences about the third: 1) the level of granularity at which a speaker makes a generic causal claim, 2) the speaker's values, and 3) the data available to the speaker. We present results of four experiments (N = 1323) in the domain of social categories that provide evidence in keeping with these predictions.

Toddlers do not preferentially transmit generalizable information to others

Children actively and selectively transmit information to others based on the type of information and the context during learning. Four- to 7-year-old children preferentially transmit generalizable information in teaching-like contexts. Although 2-year-old children are able to distinguish between generalizable and non-generalizable information, it is not known whether they likewise transmit generalizable information selectively. We designed a behavioral study to address this question. Two-year-old children were presented with three novel boxes, identical except for their color. In each box, one of two equally salient actions led to a generalizable outcome (e.g., playing a [different] tune in each box), whereas the other led to a non-generalizable outcome (e.g., turning on a light, vibrating the box, or making a noise). In the discovery phase, children had a chance to discover the functions of each box presented one-by-one. Then, in the exploration phase, they were given the opportunity to independently explore all three boxes presented together. Finally, in the transmission phase, an ignorant recipient entered the room and asked the child to show them how these toys work. We measured whether children preferentially transmitted either generalizable or non-generalizable information when they were asked to demonstrate the function of the toys to a naïve adult. We found that children did not display any preference for transmitting generalizable information. These findings are discussed with respect to toddlers' selectivity in transmitting information but also the development of sensitivity to information generalizability. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHT: Young children transmit information to others and do so with some degree of selectivity to a variety of factors. Generalizability is an important factor affecting information transmission, and older children tend to associate generalizable information with teaching-like interactions. We tested whether toddlers selectively transmitted it to others over non-generalizable information. We found that toddlers do not show a preference to transmit generalizable over non-generalizable information.

Should continuous deep sedation until death be legally regulated in Switzerland? An exploratory study with palliative care physicians

Background

In Switzerland, continuous deep sedation until death (CDSUD) is not legally regulated and the current clinical practice guidelines on palliative sedation from 2005 do not refer to it. In contrast, in France, a neighbouring country, CDSUD is regulated by a specific law and professional guidelines. International studies show that in culturally polymorphic countries, there are variations in the end-of-life practices between linguistic regions and that a linguistic region shares many cultural characteristics with the neighbouring country.

Objectives

This study aimed to explore the attitudes of palliative care physicians from the French-speaking part of Switzerland on the question of whether CDSUD should be legally regulated in the country, and to identify their arguments. Our study also aimed to assess whether a hypothetical Swiss law on CDSUD should be similar to the current legal regulation of this practice in France.

Design

We conducted a multicentre exploratory qualitative study based on face-to-face interviews with palliative care physicians in the French-speaking part of Switzerland.

Methods

We analysed the interview transcripts using thematic analysis, combining deductive and inductive coding.

Results

Most of the participants were opposed to having specific legal regulation of CDSUD in Switzerland. Their arguments were diverse: some focused on medical and epistemological aspects of CDSUD, whereas others emphasized the legal inconvenience of having such regulation. None had the opinion that, if CDSUD were legally regulated in Switzerland, the regulation should be similar to that in France.

Conclusion

This study allows to better understand why palliative care physicians in French-speaking Switzerland may be reluctant to have legal regulation of CDSUD. Further studies covering the whole country would be needed to gain a more complete picture of Swiss palliative care physicians on this question.

Generically partisan: Polarization in political communication

American political parties continue to grow more polarized, but the extent of ideological polarization among the public is much less than the extent of perceived polarization (what the ideological gap is believed to be). Perceived polarization is concerning because of its link to interparty hostility, but it remains unclear what drives this phenomenon. We propose that a tendency for individuals to form broad generalizations about groups on the basis of inconsistent evidence may be partly responsible. We study this tendency by measuring the interpretation, endorsement, and recall of category-referring statements, also known as generics (e.g., "Democrats favor affirmative action"). In study 1 (n = 417), perceived polarization was substantially greater than actual polarization. Further, participants endorsed generics as long as they were true more often of the target party (e.g., Democrats favor affirmative action) than of the opposing party (e.g., Republicans favor affirmative action), even when they believed such statements to be true for well below 50% of the relevant party. Study 2 (n = 928) found that upon receiving information from political elites, people tended to recall these statements as generic, regardless of whether the original statement was generic or not. Study 3 (n = 422) found that generic statements regarding new political information led to polarized judgments and did so more than nongeneric statements. Altogether, the data indicate a tendency toward holding mental representations of political claims that exaggerate party differences. These findings suggest that the use of generic language, common in everyday speech, enables inferential errors that exacerbate perceived polarization.

The language network is not engaged in object categorization

The relationship between language and thought is the subject of long-standing debate. One claim states that language facilitates categorization of objects based on a certain feature (e.g. color) through the use of category labels that reduce interference from other, irrelevant features. Therefore, language impairment is expected to affect categorization of items grouped by a single feature (low-dimensional categories, e.g. "Yellow Things") more than categorization of items that share many features (high-dimensional categories, e.g. "Animals"). To test this account, we conducted two behavioral studies with individuals with aphasia and an fMRI experiment with healthy adults. The aphasia studies showed that selective low-dimensional categorization impairment was present in some, but not all, individuals with severe anomia and was not characteristic of aphasia in general. fMRI results revealed little activity in language-responsive brain regions during both low- and high-dimensional categorization; instead, categorization recruited the domain-general multiple-demand network (involved in wide-ranging cognitive tasks). Combined, results demonstrate that the language system is not implicated in object categorization. Instead, selective low-dimensional categorization impairment might be caused by damage to brain regions responsible for cognitive control. Our work adds to the growing evidence of the dissociation between the language system and many cognitive tasks in adults.

Text as signal. A tutorial with case studies focusing on social media (Twitter)

Sentiment analysis is the automated coding of emotions expressed in text. Sentiment analysis and other types of analyses focusing on the automatic coding of textual documents are increasingly popular in psychology and computer science. However, the potential of treating automatically coded text collected with regular sampling intervals as a signal is currently overlooked. We use the phrase "text as signal" to refer to the application of signal processing techniques to coded textual documents sampled with regularity. In order to illustrate the potential of treating text as signal, we introduce the reader to a variety of such techniques in a tutorial with two case studies in the realm of social media analysis. First, we apply finite response impulse filtering to emotion-coded tweets posted during the US Election Week of 2020 and discuss the visualization of the resulting variation in the filtered signal. We use changepoint detection to highlight the important changes in the emotional signals. Then we examine data interpolation, analysis of periodicity via the fast Fourier transform (FFT), and FFT filtering to personal value-coded tweets from November 2019 to October 2020 and link the variation in the filtered signal to some of the epoch-defining events occurring during this period. Finally, we use block bootstrapping to estimate the variability/uncertainty in the resulting filtered signals. After working through the tutorial, the readers will understand the basics of signal processing to analyze regularly sampled coded text.

Where does language come from? The development of a naïve biological understanding of language

We examined 3- to 10-year-old U.S. children's naïve biological beliefs about spoken language, probing developing beliefs about where language is located in the body. Experiment 1 (N = 128) introduced children to two aliens, each having eight parts: internal organs (brain and lungs), face parts (mouth and ears), limbs (arms and legs), and accessories (bag and hat). Participants were assigned to the Language condition (in which the aliens spoke two different languages) or the control Sports condition (in which the aliens played two different sports). We assessed children's reasoning about which parts were necessary to speak a language (or play a sport) by asking children to (a) create a new alien with the ability to speak a language (or play a sport) and (b) remove parts of an alien while preserving its ability to speak a language (or play a sport). In the Language condition, with age, children attributed language-speaking abilities to internal organs and face parts. In Experiment 2 (N = 32), a simplified language task revealed that 3- and 4-year-old children demonstrated a weaker, albeit present, biological belief about language. In Experiment 3 (N = 96), children decided at what point an alien would lose its ability to speak the language as the experimenter added or removed parts. Children attributed language-speaking abilities to specific internal organs and face parts (brain and mouth). We demonstrate that children believe that language is contained to specific parts of the body and that this "metabiological" reasoning increases with age.

The Evolution of Inclusive Folk-Biological Labels and the Cultural Maintenance of Meaning

How is word meaning established, and how do individuals acquire it? What ensures the uniform understanding of word meaning in a linguistic community? In this paper I draw from cultural attraction theory and use folk biology as an example domain and address these questions by treating meaning acquisition as an inferential process. I show that significant variation exists in how individuals understand the meaning of inclusive biological labels such as "plant" and "animal" due to variation in their salience in contemporary ethnic minority groups in southwest China, and I present historical textual evidence that the meaning of inclusive terms is often unstable but can be sustained by such cultural institutions as religion and education, which provide situations in which the meaning of linguistic labels can be unambiguously inferred.

Learning the rules of the game: The role of generic "you" and "we" in shaping children's interpretations of norms

A critical skill of childhood is learning social norms. We examine whether the generic pronouns "you" and "we," which frame information as applying to people in general rather than to a specific individual, facilitate this process. In one pre-registered experiment conducted online between 2020 and 2021, children 4- to 9-year-old primarily living in the midwestern U.S. (N = 146, 75 girls, 71 boys, M_age  = 7.14, SD = 1.69, 82% White) interpreted actions described with generic pronouns (vs. "I") as normatively correct and selected the speaker who used generic pronouns as the rule-follower, particularly when generic pronouns were presented first. There were no significant effects of age. These results illustrate how generic pronouns influence how children discern unfamiliar norms and form interpersonal judgments.

Speaking of Kinds: How Correcting Generic Statements can Shape Children's Concepts

Generic language (e.g., "tigers have stripes") leads children to assume that the referenced category (e.g., tigers) is inductively informative and provides a causal explanation for the behavior of individual members. In two preregistered studies with 4- to 7-year-old children (N = 497), we considered the mechanisms underlying these effects by testing how correcting generics might affect the development of these beliefs about novel social and animal kinds (Study 1) and about gender (Study 2). Correcting generics by narrowing their scope to a single individual limited beliefs that the referenced categories could explain what their members would be like while broadening the scope to a superordinate category (Study 2) uniquely limited endorsement of gender norms. Across both studies, correcting generics did not alter beliefs about feature heritability and had mixed effects on inductive inferences, suggesting that additional mechanisms (e.g., causal reasoning about shared features) contribute to the development of full-blown essentialist beliefs. These results help illuminate the mechanisms by which generics lead children to view categories as having rich inductive and causal potential; in particular, they suggest that children interpret generics as signals that speakers in their community view the referenced categories as meaningful kinds that support generalization. The findings also point the way to concrete suggestions for how adults can effectively correct problematic generics (e.g., gender stereotypes) that children may hear in daily life.

The influence of linguistic form and causal explanations on the development of social essentialism

Generic descriptions of social categories (e.g., boys play baseball; girls have long hair) lead children and adults to think of the referenced categories (i.e., boys and girls) in essentialist terms-as natural ways of dividing up the world. Yet, key questions remain unanswered about how, why, and when generic language shapes the development of essentialist beliefs. The present experiment examined the scope of these effects by testing the extent to which generics elicit essentialist beliefs because of their linguistic form or because of the causal information they convey. Generic language led children (N = 199, M_age = 6.07 years, range = 4.5-7.95) to essentialize a novel social category, regardless of the causal information used to describe category-property relations (either biological or cultural). In contrast, both linguistic form and causal information influenced adults' (N = 234) beliefs. These findings reveal a unique role of linguistic form in the development and communication of essentialist beliefs in young children.

Context reconsidered: Complex signal ensembles, relational meaning, and population thinking in psychological science

This article considers the status and study of "context" in psychological science through the lens of research on emotional expressions. The article begins by updating three well-trod methodological debates on the role of context in emotional expressions to reconsider several fundamental assumptions lurking within the field's dominant methodological tradition: namely, that certain expressive movements have biologically prepared, inherent emotional meanings that issue from singular, universal processes which are independent of but interact with contextual influences. The second part of this article considers the scientific opportunities that await if we set aside this traditional understanding of "context" as a moderator of signals with inherent psychological meaning and instead consider the possibility that psychological events emerge in ecosystems of signal ensembles, such that the psychological meaning of any individual signal is entirely relational. Such a fundamental shift has radical implications not only for the science of emotion but for psychological science more generally. It offers opportunities to improve the validity and trustworthiness of psychological science beyond what can be achieved with improvements to methodological rigor alone. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

The influence of language input on 3-year-olds' learning about novel social categories

There is considerable variability in the social categories that children essentialize and the types of expectations children form about these categories, suggesting children's essentialist beliefs are shaped by environmental input. Prior studies have shown that exposure to generic statements about a social category promotes essentialist beliefs in 4.5- to 8-year-old children. However, by this age children form essentialist beliefs quite robustly, and thus it is unclear whether generic statements impact children's expectations about social categories at younger ages when essentialist beliefs first begin to emerge. Moreover, in prior studies the generic statements were delivered by an experimenter and carefully controlled, and thus it is unclear whether these statements would have the same impact if they occurred in a somewhat less constrained setting, such as parents reading a picture book to their child. The current study addressed these open questions by investigating whether generic statements delivered during a picture-book interaction with their parents influenced 3-year-olds' expectations about members of a novel social category. Our results showed that children who heard generic statements during the picture-book interaction used social-group membership to make inferences about the likely behavior of a novel category member, whereas children who were not exposed to generic statements did not. These findings suggest that as early as 3 years of age, children's expectations about social categories are influenced by generic statements that occur during brief parent-child interactions.

A new science of emotion: implications for functional neurological disorder

Functional neurological disorder reflects impairments in brain networks leading to distressing motor, sensory and/or cognitive symptoms that demonstrate positive clinical signs on examination incongruent with other conditions. A central issue in historical and contemporary formulations of functional neurological disorder has been the mechanistic and aetiological role of emotions. However, the debate has mostly omitted fundamental questions about the nature of emotions in the first place. In this perspective article, we first outline a set of relevant working principles of the brain (e.g. allostasis, predictive processing, interoception and affect), followed by a focused review of the theory of constructed emotion to introduce a new understanding of what emotions are. Building on this theoretical framework, we formulate how altered emotion category construction can be an integral component of the pathophysiology of functional neurological disorder and related functional somatic symptoms. In doing so, we address several themes for the functional neurological disorder field including: (i) how energy regulation and the process of emotion category construction relate to symptom generation, including revisiting alexithymia, 'panic attack without panic', dissociation, insecure attachment and the influential role of life experiences; (ii) re-interpret select neurobiological research findings in functional neurological disorder cohorts through the lens of the theory of constructed emotion to illustrate its potential mechanistic relevance; and (iii) discuss therapeutic implications. While we continue to support that functional neurological disorder is mechanistically and aetiologically heterogenous, consideration of how the theory of constructed emotion relates to the generation and maintenance of functional neurological and functional somatic symptoms offers an integrated viewpoint that cuts across neurology, psychiatry, psychology and cognitive-affective neuroscience.

A voice without a mouth no more: The neurobiology of language and consciousness

Most research on the neurobiology of language ignores consciousness and vice versa. Here, language, with an emphasis on inner speech, is hypothesised to generate and sustain self-awareness, i.e., higher-order consciousness. Converging evidence supporting this hypothesis is reviewed. To account for these findings, a 'HOLISTIC' model of neurobiology of language, inner speech, and consciousness is proposed. It involves a 'core' set of inner speech production regions that initiate the experience of feeling and hearing words. These take on affective qualities, deriving from activation of associated sensory, motor, and emotional representations, involving a largely unconscious dynamic 'periphery', distributed throughout the whole brain. Responding to those words forms the basis for sustained network activity, involving 'default mode' activation and prefrontal and thalamic/brainstem selection of contextually relevant responses. Evidence for the model is reviewed, supporting neuroimaging meta-analyses conducted, and comparisons with other theories of consciousness made. The HOLISTIC model constitutes a more parsimonious and complete account of the 'neural correlates of consciousness' that has implications for a mechanistic account of mental health and wellbeing.

Children's thinking about group-based social hierarchies

Wealth, power, and status are distributed unevenly across social groups. A surge of recent research reveals that people being recognizing, representing, and reasoning about group-based patterns of inequity during the first years of life. We first synthesize recent research on what children learn about group-based social hierarchies as well as how this learning occurs. We then discuss how children not only learn about societal structures but become active participants in them. Studying the origins and development of children's thoughts and behavior regarding group-based social hierarchies provides valuable insight into how systems of inequity are perpetuated across generations and how intergroup biases related to wealth, power, and status may be mitigated and reshaped early in development.

Language and the cultural markers of COVID-19

Despite its universal nature, the impact of COVID-19 has not been geographically homogeneous. While certain countries and regions have been severely affected, registering record infection rates and excess deaths, others experienced only milder outbreaks. We investigate to what extent human factors, in particular cultural origins reflected in different attitudes and behavioural norms, can explain different degrees of exposure to the virus. Motivated by the linguistic relativity hypothesis, we take language as a proxy for cultural origins and exploit the exogenous variation in the language spoken around the border that divides the French- and German-speaking parts of Switzerland to estimate the impact of culture on exposure to COVID-19. The results obtained using a spatial regression discontinuity design reveal, that within 50- and 25- kilometres bandwidth from the language border, the average COVID-19 exposure levels for individuals in French speaking municipalities was higher. In particular, we find that German speaking municipalities were associated with a reduction of around 40% - 50% in the odds of COVID-19 exposure compared to the French speaking municipalities.

How Spanish speakers express norms using generic person markers

Language is one powerful vehicle for transmitting norms-a universal feature of society. In English, people use "you" generically (e.g., "You win some you lose some") to express and interpret norms. Here, we examine how norms are conveyed and interpreted in Spanish, a language that-unlike English-has two forms of you (i.e., formal, informal), distinct generic person markers, and pro-drop, allowing for an examination of underlying conceptual tendencies in how the structure of language facilitates the transmission of norms. In Study 1a-b (N = 838) Spanish speakers used informal generic-you and the generic person marker "se" (but not formal-you) to express norms (vs. preferences). In Study 2 (N = 300), formal you, informal you, and impersonal "se" had persuasive force over personal endorsements (e.g., "I"), informing Spanish speaker's interpretation of unfamiliar norms. Our findings add to a growing literature on how subtle linguistic shifts reflect and influence cognitive processes.

North and South: Naming practices and the hidden dimension of global disparities in knowledge production

Contemporary social sciences aim to be diverse and inclusive, but traces of the historical dominance of Western European and North American academic institutions persist in scientific practices. One such practice is the phrasing of article titles. Our analysis shows that articles studying the global North are systematically less likely to mention the name of the country they study in their title compared to articles on the global South. This constitutes, potentially, an unwarranted claim on universality and may lead to lesser recognition of global South studies. Social and behavioral scientists must reflect on the phrasing of their article titles to avoid reproducing harmful relations of intellectual domination which limit inclusivity and constitute a barrier to the generalizability of scientific knowledge.

The legacy of Eurocentrism continues to affect knowledge production in the social sciences. Evidence produced in and about the global North is assumed to be more “universal,” whereas evidence from or produced in the global South is considered valid only for specific contexts (i.e., “localized”). We argue that these dynamics are evident in the phrasing of articles’ titles based on the examination of more than half a million social science research articles indexed by Scopus (1996 to 2020). We find that empirical articles written by authors affiliated to institutions of the global North, using data from these countries, are less likely to include a concrete geographical reference in their titles. When authors are affiliated to global South institutions, and use evidence from global South countries, the names of these countries are more likely to be part of the article’s title. We confirm this overarching pattern by looking at 1) differences between world regions, 2) differences within world regions, and 3) patterns in 23 social science subfields. These gaps are large and consistent, yet article naming conventions are merely the “tip of the iceberg” of the imbalances in knowledge production between the global North and South.

Use of troponins in the classification of myocardial infarction from electronic health records. The Atherosclerosis Risk in Communities (ARIC) Study

OBJECTIVE

Electronic health record (EHR) data are underutilized for abstracting classification criteria for heart disease. We compared extraction of EHR data on troponin I and T levels with human abstraction.

METHODS

Using EHR for hospitalizations identified through the Atherosclerosis Risk in Communities (ARIC) Study in four US hospitals, we compared blood levels of troponins I and T extracted from EHR structured data elements with levels obtained through data abstraction by human abstractors to 3 decimal places. Observations were divided randomly 50/50 into training and validation sets. Bayesian multilevel logistic regression models were used to estimate agreement by hospital in first and maximum troponin levels, troponin assessment date, troponin upper limit of normal (ULN), and classification of troponin levels as normal (< ULN), equivocal (1-2× ULN), abnormal (>2× ULN), or missing.

RESULTS

Estimated overall agreement in first measured troponin level in the validation data was 88.2% (95% credible interval: 65.0%-97.5%) and 95.5% (91.2-98.2%) for the maximum troponin level observed during hospitalization. The largest variation in probability of agreement was for first troponin measured, which ranged from 66.4% to 95.8% among hospitals.

CONCLUSION

Extraction of maximum troponin values during a hospitalization from EHR structured data is feasible and accurate.

Expertise in emotion: A scoping review and unifying framework for individual differences in the mental representation of emotional experience

Expertise refers to outstanding skill or ability in a particular domain. In the domain of emotion, expertise refers to the observation that some people are better at a range of competencies related to understanding and experiencing emotions, and these competencies may help them lead healthier lives. These individual differences are represented by multiple constructs including emotional awareness, emotional clarity, emotional complexity, emotional granularity, and emotional intelligence. These constructs derive from different theoretical perspectives, highlight different competencies, and are operationalized and measured in different ways. The full set of relationships between these constructs has not yet been considered, hindering scientific progress and the translation of findings to aid mental and physical well-being. In this article, we use a scoping review procedure to integrate these constructs within a shared conceptual space. Scoping reviews provide a principled means of synthesizing large and diverse literature in a transparent fashion, enabling the identification of similarities as well as gaps and inconsistencies across constructs. Using domain-general accounts of expertise as a guide, we build a unifying framework for expertise in emotion and apply this to constructs that describe how people understand and experience their own emotions. Our approach offers opportunities to identify potential mechanisms of expertise in emotion, encouraging future research on those mechanisms and on educational or clinical interventions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Shared understanding of color among sighted and blind adults

Empiricist philosophers such as Locke famously argued that people born blind might learn arbitrary color facts (e.g., marigolds are yellow) but would lack color understanding. Contrary to this intuition, we find that blind and sighted adults share causal understanding of color, despite not always agreeing about arbitrary color facts. Relative to sighted people, blind individuals are less likely to generate "yellow" for banana and "red" for stop sign but make similar generative inferences about real and novel objects' colors, and provide similar causal explanations. For example, people infer that two natural kinds (e.g., bananas) and two artifacts with functional colors (e.g., stop signs) are more likely to have the same color than two artifacts with nonfunctional colors (e.g., cars). People develop intuitive and inferentially rich "theories" of color regardless of visual experience. Linguistic communication is more effective at aligning intuitive theories than knowledge of arbitrary facts.

Categories convey prescriptive information across domains and development

Young children display a pervasive bias to assume that what they observe in the world reflects how things are supposed to be. The current studies examined the nature of this bias by testing whether it reflects a particular form of reasoning about human social behaviors or a more general feature of category representations. Children aged 4 to 9 years and adults (N = 747) evaluated instances of nonconformity among members of novel biological and human social kinds. Children held prescriptive expectations for both animal and human categories; in both cases, they said it was wrong for a category member to engage in category-atypical behavior. These prescriptive judgments about categories depended on the extent to which people saw the pictured individual examples as representative of coherent categories. Thus, early prescriptive judgments appear to rely on the interplay between general conceptual biases and domain-specific beliefs about category structure.

Social sampling: Children track social choices to reason about status hierarchies

We tested whether preschool-aged children (N = 280) track an agents' choices of individuals from novel social groups (i.e., social choices) to infer an agent's social preferences and the social status of the groups. Across experiments, children saw a box containing 2 groups (red and blue toy cats). In Experiment 1, children were randomly assigned to Social Selection in which items were described as "friends," or to Object Selection in which items were described as "toys." Within each selection type, the agent selected 5 items from either a numerically common group (82% of box; selections appearing random) or a numerically rare group (18% of box; selections violating random sampling). After watching these selections, children were asked who the agent would play with among 3 individuals: 1 from the selected group, 1 from the unselected group, or 1 from a novel group. Only participants who viewed Social Selection of a numerically rare group predicted that the agent would select an individual from that group in the future. These participants also said an individual from the selected group was the "leader." Subsequent experiments further probed the Social Selection findings. Children's reasoning depended on the agent actively selecting the friends (Experiment 2), and children thought a member of the rare selected group was the leader, but not the "helper" (Experiment 3). These results illustrate that children track an agent's positive social choices to reason about that agent's social preferences and to infer the status (likelihood of being a leader) of novel social groups. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

How does hemispheric specialization contribute to human-defining cognition?

Uniquely human cognitive faculties arise from flexible interplay between specific local neural modules, with hemispheric asymmetries in functional specialization. Here, we discuss how these computational design principles provide a scaffold that enables some of the most advanced cognitive operations, such as semantic understanding of world structure, logical reasoning, and communication via language. We draw parallels to dual-processing theories of cognition by placing a focus on Kahneman's System 1 and System 2. We propose integration of these ideas with the global workspace theory to explain dynamic relay of information products between both systems. Deepening the current understanding of how neurocognitive asymmetry makes humans special can ignite the next wave of neuroscience-inspired artificial intelligence.

Intuitive sociology

How do humans intuitively understand the structure of their society? How should psychologists study people's commonsense understanding of societal structure? The present chapter seeks to address both of these questions by describing the domain of "intuitive sociology." Drawing primarily from empirical research focused on how young children represent and reason about social groups, we propose that intuitive sociology consists of three core phenomena: social types (the identification of relevant groups and their attributes); social value (the worth of different groups); and social norms (shared expectations for how groups ought to be). After articulating each component of intuitive sociology, we end the chapter by considering both the emergence of intuitive sociology in infancy as well as transitions from intuitive to reflective representations of sociology later in life.

Exposure to Literary Fiction Is Associated With Lower Psychological Essentialism

We investigated the impact of exposure to literary and popular fiction on psychological essentialism. Exposure to fiction was measured by using the Author Recognition Test, which allows us to separate exposure to authors of literary and popular fiction. Psychological essentialism was assessed by the discreteness subscale of the psychological essentialism scale in Study 1, and by the three subscales of the same scale (such as discreteness, informativeness, and biological basis) in Study 2 that was pre-registered. Results showed that exposure to literary fiction negatively predicts the three subscales. The results emerged controlling for political ideology, a variable that is commonly associated with psychological essentialism, and level of education.

A qualitative study on continuous deep sedation until death as an alternative to assisted suicide in Switzerland

BACKGROUND

According to the European Association for Palliative Care, decisions regarding palliative sedation should not be made in response to requests for assisted dying, such as euthanasia or assisted suicide. However, several studies show that continuous deep sedation until death (CDSUD) - a particular form of sedation - has been considered as an alternative to these practices in some countries. In Switzerland, where assisted suicide is decriminalized and CDSUD is not legally regulated, no studies have comprehensively investigated their relation. Our study aimed to identify and describe the experience among palliative care physicians of CDSUD as a potential alternative to assisted suicide in the French-speaking part of Switzerland.

METHODS

We performed an exploratory multicentre qualitative study based on interviews with palliative care physicians in the French-speaking part of Switzerland and conducted linguistic and thematic analysis of all interview transcripts. The study is described in accordance with COREQ guidelines.

RESULTS

We included 10 interviews conducted in four palliative care units. Our linguistic analysis shows four main types of sedation, which we called 'rapid CDSUD', 'gradual CDSUD', 'temporary sedation' and 'intermittent sedation'. CDSUD (rapid or gradual) was not considered an alternative to assisted suicide, even if a single situation has been reported. In contrast, 'temporary' or 'intermittent sedation', although not medically indicated, was sometimes introduced in response to a request for assisted suicide. This was the fact when there were barriers to an assisted suicide at home (e.g., when transfer home was impossible or the patient wished not to burden the family).

CONCLUSION

These preliminary results can guide clinical, ethical, linguistic and legal reflection in this field and be used to explore this question more deeply at the national and international levels in a comparative, interdisciplinary and multiprofessional approach. They can also be useful to update Swiss clinical guidelines on palliative sedation in order to include specific frameworks on various sedation protocols and sedation as an alternative to assisted suicide. Potential negative impacts of considering palliative sedation as an alternative to assisted suicide should be nuanced by open and honest societal debate.

The correct way to test the hypothesis that racial categorization is a byproduct of an evolved alliance-tracking capacity

The project of identifying the cognitive mechanisms or information-processing functions that cause people to categorize others by their race is one of the longest-standing and socially-impactful scientific issues in all of the behavioral sciences. This paper addresses a critical issue with one of the few hypotheses in this area that has thus far been successful-the alliance hypothesis of race-which had predicted a set of experimental circumstances that appeared to selectively target and modify people's implicit categorization of others by their race. Here, we will show why the evidence put forward in favor of this hypothesis was not in fact evidence in support of the hypothesis, contrary to common understanding. We will then provide the necessary and crucial tests of the hypothesis in the context of conflictual alliances, determining if the predictions of the alliance hypothesis of racial categorization in fact hold up to experimental scrutiny. When adequately tested, we find that indeed categorization by race is selectively reduced when crossed with membership in antagonistic alliances-the very pattern predicted by the alliance hypothesis. This finding provides direct experimental evidence that the human mind treats race as proxy for alliance membership, implying that racial categorization does not reflect attention to physical features per se, but rather to social relationships.

Does It Matter How We Speak About Social Kinds? A Large, Preregistered, Online Experimental Study of How Language Shapes the Development of Essentialist Beliefs

A problematic way to think about social categories is to essentialize them-to treat particular differences between people as marking fundamentally distinct social kinds. From where do these beliefs arise? Language that expresses generic claims about categories elicits some aspects of essentialism, but the scope of these effects remains unclear. This study (N = 204, ages 4.5-8 years, 73% White; recruited predominantly from the United States and the United Kingdom to participate online in 2019) found that generic language increases two critical aspects of essentialist thought: Beliefs that (a) category-related properties arise from intrinsic causal mechanisms and (b) category boundaries are inflexible. These findings have implications for understanding the spread of essentialist beliefs across communities and the development of intergroup behavior.

Developing an Understanding of Science

Young children are adept at several types of scientific reasoning, yet older children and adults have difficulty mastering formal scientific ideas and practices. Why do “little scientists” often become scientifically illiterate adults? We address this question by examining the role of intuition in learning science, both as a body of knowledge and as a method of inquiry. Intuition supports children's understanding of everyday phenomena but conflicts with their ability to learn physical and biological concepts that defy firsthand observation, such as molecules, forces, genes, and germs. Likewise, intuition supports children's causal learning but provides little guidance on how to navigate higher-order constraints on scientific induction, such as the control of variables or the coordination of theory and data. We characterize the foundations of children's intuitive understanding of the natural world, as well as the conceptual scaffolds needed to bridge these intuitions with formal science.

"You" speaks to me: Effects of generic-you in creating resonance between people and ideas

Creating resonance between people and ideas is a central goal of communication. Historically, attempts to understand the factors that promote resonance have focused on altering the content of a message. Here we identify an additional route to evoking resonance that is embedded in the structure of language: the generic use of the word "you" (e.g., "You can't understand someone until you've walked a mile in their shoes"). Using crowd-sourced data from the Amazon Kindle application, we demonstrate that passages that people highlighted-collectively, over a quarter of a million times-were substantially more likely to contain generic-you compared to yoked passages that they did not highlight. We also demonstrate in four experiments (n = 1,900) that ideas expressed with generic-you increased resonance. These findings illustrate how a subtle shift in language establishes a powerful sense of connection between people and ideas.

Should Individuals Think Like Their Group? A Descriptive-to-Prescriptive Tendency Toward Group-Based Beliefs

Across three pre-registered studies with children (ages 4-9) and adults (N = 303), we examined whether how a group is predicted evaluations of how group members should be (i.e., a descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency), under conditions in which the descriptive group norms entailed beliefs that were fact-based (Study 1), opinion-based (Study 2), and ideology-based (Study 3). Overall, participants tended to disapprove of individuals with beliefs that differed from their group, but the extent of this tendency varied across development and as a function of the belief under consideration (e.g., younger children did not show a descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency in the context of facts and ideologies, suggesting that they prioritized truth over group norms). Implications for normative reasoning and ideological polarization are discussed.

"Grumpy" or "furious"? arousal of emotion labels influences judgments of facial expressions

Whether language information influences recognition of emotion from facial expressions remains the subject of debate. The current studies investigate how variations in emotion labels that are paired with expressions influences participants' judgments of the emotion displayed. Static (Study 1) and dynamic (Study 2) facial expressions depicting eight emotion categories were paired with emotion labels that systematically varied in arousal (low and high). Participants rated the arousal, valence, and dominance of expressions paired with labels. Isolated faces and isolated labels were also rated. As predicted, the label presented influenced participants' judgments of the expressions. Across both studies, higher arousal labels were associated with: 1) higher ratings of arousal for sad, angry, and scared expressions, and 2) higher ratings of dominance for angry, proud, and disgust expressions. These results indicate that emotion labels influence judgments of facial expressions.