Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N8 in Germany: Outbreak Investigations

Risk Awareness and Attitude of German Farmers towards Biosecurity Measures

The implementation of management activities depends on both the attitude of the people performing the work and their understanding of why the work should be performed. In the context of animal husbandry, the implementation of such practices is crucial for the functionality of biosecurity. Therefore, it is important to know how farmers perceive biosecurity as a whole. An anonymous online survey was conducted among German farmers. In addition to general data about their farm, information about their existing concept of biosecurity, as well as about the assessment of possible introduction routes for animal diseases into the farm with regard to their likelihood, was gathered. Furthermore, information on measures to protect their farm against disease introduction were retrieved. Analysis showed that in general, farmers were aware of the importance of biosecurity and consequently had concepts of biosecurity on their farms. However, awareness about dangerous introduction routes for animal diseases into a farm was associated with a lack of knowledge of how to improve the measures in these areas. The role of the veterinarian in the context of biosecurity was highlighted and further problematic areas were indicated. Overall, the high level of commitment from farmers indicated a good implementation of daily practices.

Development and implementation of a risk assessment tool for broiler farm biosecurity and a health intervention plan in the Netherlands, Greece, and Cyprus

Preventing pathogens from entering and spreading on farms is the first step in reducing health problems. For this study a BiosEcurity Assessment Tool was developed to identify strengths and weaknesses in biosecurity on broiler farms, which was used as a starting point to formulate tailor-made health plans to improve broiler health and reduce antimicrobial use. Farms were divided into 3 separate areas according to associated biosecurity risk; high disease risk external areas (red zone), medium risk service areas (orange zone), and the clean and highly secure access-restricted green zone. In the Netherlands, Cyprus, and Greece, 13, 15, and 7 broiler houses were monitored for 4 production cycles (2 preintervention and 2 postintervention cycles). At the start of the study the BiosEcurity Assessment Tool assessment was performed and a health plan was made in consultation with the veterinarian. After the second cycle a start was made with the implementation of the health plan. Overall, the biosecurity level in the green and orange zones were significantly higher in the Netherlands compared to Greece and Cyprus, but there was no difference for the red zone or the transition zones between the countries. The interventions in the health plans were mostly directed towards those measures that could be implemented in the short term and with low costs in the green zone. In Cyprus a decrease in antimicrobial use was found postintervention. This was not the case in Greece and the Netherlands. In Cyprus and Greece footpad lesion improved after interventions were implemented, although this may have been an effect of season. In Dutch farms no improvement was detected, but both antimicrobial use and footpad lesions were lower at the start of the study compared to Cypriot and Greek farms. In conclusion, the BEAT shows to be a promising tool to assess biosecurity risks on broiler farms. The biosecurity assessment in combination with the farm specific health plans could contribute to antimicrobial reduction on broiler farms.

Genotype Uniformity, Wild Bird-to-Poultry Transmissions, and Farm-to-Farm Carryover during the Spread of the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N8 in the Czech Republic in 2021

In 2020–2021, the second massive dissemination of a highly pathogenic avian influenza of the H5Nx subtype occurred in Europe. During this period, the virus caused numerous outbreaks in poultry, including in the Czech Republic. In the present study, we provide an insight into the genetic variability of the Czech/2021 (CZE/2021) H5N8 viruses to determine the relationships between strains from wild and domestic poultry and to infer transmission routes between the affected flocks of commercial poultry. For this purpose, whole genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis of 70 H5N8 genomes representing 79.7% of the cases were performed. All CZE/2021 H5N8 viruses belonged to the 2.3.4.4b H5 lineage and circulated without reassortment, retaining the A/chicken/Iraq/1/2020 H5N8-like genotype constellation. Phylogenetic analysis suggested the frequent local transmission of H5N8 from wild birds to backyard poultry and extensive spread among commercial poultry farms. In addition, the analysis suggested one cross-border transmission event. Indirect transmission via contaminated materials was considered the most likely source of infection. Improved biosecurity and increased collaboration between field veterinarians and the laboratory are essential to limit the local spread of the virus and to reveal and interrupt critical routes of infection.

Assessing the Likelihood of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Incursion Into the Gamebird Sector in Great Britain via Designated Hatcheries

The outbreaks of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza (HPAI) in the United Kingdom in 2017 and 2021 had a substantial impact on the gamebird industry and highlighted to policymakers the importance of existing knowledge gaps for effective disease control. Despite the size of the industry, the impact of HPAI on the gamebird industry is not well-understood. To improve future disease preparedness, a veterinary risk assessment to explore the risk of HPAI incursion into the gamebird sector in Great Britain via a designated hatchery was commissioned by Scottish Government Animal Health and Welfare Division. Hatchery designation is a legal requirement for hatcheries located within disease control zones or that have business links to premises located in disease control zones to continue operating during an HPAI outbreak. Several risk pathways were identified, which involved various management procedures associated with egg production through to the delivery of day-old chicks. The overall likelihood of the HPAI virus introduction into a designated hatchery through hatching egg movement is considered to be low (high uncertainty). The overall likelihood of onward transmission of the HPAI virus into gamebird rearing sites from a designated hatchery through day-old chick movement is also considered to be low (medium uncertainty). These risk levels are based on the assumption that relevant control measures are observed, as enhanced biosecurity is one of the requirements for hatchery designation. However, high uncertainties and variabilities were identified in the level of compliance with these biosecurity measures. Factors increasing the likelihood level include management practices typical to this sector, such as having multiple egg production sites, raising birds at outdoor sites, catching birds from the wild for egg production, having various scale of satellite farms in various locations, importing eggs and day-old chicks from overseas, as well as the proximity of the game farm to the infected premise or to higher risk areas. This study offers evidence for policymakers to help develop criteria for hatchery designation and proposes important mitigation strategies for future disease outbreaks specific for the gamebird sector.

Avian influenza A virus susceptibility, infection, transmission, and antibody kinetics in European starlings

Avian influenza A viruses (IAVs) pose risks to public, agricultural, and wildlife health. Bridge hosts are spillover hosts that share habitat with both maintenance hosts (e.g., mallards) and target hosts (e.g., poultry). We conducted a comprehensive assessment of European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris), a common visitor to both urban and agricultural environments, to assess whether this species might act as a potential maintenance or bridge host for IAVs. First, we experimentally inoculated starlings with a wild bird IAV to investigate susceptibility and replication kinetics. Next, we evaluated whether IAV might spill over to starlings from sharing resources with a widespread IAV reservoir host. We accomplished this using a specially designed transmission cage to simulate natural environmental transmission by exposing starlings to water shared with IAV-infected mallards (Anas platyrhynchos). We then conducted a contact study to assess intraspecies transmission between starlings. In the initial experimental infection study, all inoculated starlings shed viral RNA and seroconverted. All starlings in the transmission study became infected and shed RNA at similar levels. All but one of these birds seroconverted, but detectable antibodies were relatively transient, falling to negative levels in a majority of birds by 59 days post contact. None of the contact starlings in the intraspecies transmission experiment became infected. In summary, we demonstrated that starlings may have the potential to act as IAV bridge hosts if they share water with IAV-infected waterfowl. However, starlings are unlikely to act as maintenance hosts due to limited, if any, intraspecies transmission. In addition, starlings have a relatively brief antibody response which should be considered when interpreting serology from field samples. Further study is needed to evaluate the potential for transmission from starlings to poultry, a possibility enhanced by starling's behavioral trait of forming very large flocks which can descend on poultry facilities when natural resources are scarce.

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Viruses at the Wild-Domestic Bird Interface in Europe: Future Directions for Research and Surveillance

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks in wild birds and poultry are no longer a rare phenomenon in Europe. In the past 15 years, HPAI outbreaks—in particular those caused by H5 viruses derived from the A/Goose/Guangdong/1/1996 lineage that emerged in southeast Asia in 1996—have been occuring with increasing frequency in Europe. Between 2005 and 2020, at least ten HPAI H5 incursions were identified in Europe resulting in mass mortalities among poultry and wild birds. Until 2009, the HPAI H5 virus outbreaks in Europe were caused by HPAI H5N1 clade 2.2 viruses, while from 2014 onwards HPAI H5 clade 2.3.4.4 viruses dominated outbreaks, with abundant genetic reassortments yielding subtypes H5N1, H5N2, H5N3, H5N4, H5N5, H5N6 and H5N8. The majority of HPAI H5 virus detections in wild and domestic birds within Europe coincide with southwest/westward fall migration and large local waterbird aggregations during wintering. In this review we provide an overview of HPAI H5 virus epidemiology, ecology and evolution at the interface between poultry and wild birds based on 15 years of avian influenza virus surveillance in Europe, and assess future directions for HPAI virus research and surveillance, including the integration of whole genome sequencing, host identification and avian ecology into risk-based surveillance and analyses.

Pathologic Evaluation of Influenza A H5N8 Infection Outbreaks in Mule Ducks in Bulgaria

This article outlines pathomorphologic findings of a study involving commercial mule ducks with confirmed influenza A H5N8 infections after a series of outbreaks in Bulgaria. Examinations were carried out after performing necropsy on dead birds from three different age groups (up to 15, 20 to 30, and 40+ days of age) fattened on different farms. Among birds of all ages, gross lesions were present as lesions affecting the heart. Histologically, the myocardium exhibited severe intermyofibrillar edema, moderate to massive hemorrhages, and degenerative changes. All lesions resulted in single or multiple and small to massive myocardial infarctions. Other affected organs included the brain, lungs, liver, spleen, and pancreas. Nonpurulent lymphocytic encephalitis was found postmortem in ducks that had shown prior clinical nervous signs. Among ducks of all ages, a viral antigen in the cardiomyocytes and the epithelium of air capillaries was found through immunohistochemical detection methods. The results of the present study allowed us to conclude that the highly pathogenic avian influenza A H5N8 viral infection may manifest itself as a systemic illness in commercial mule ducks with septicemic lesions, resulting in high morbidity and mortality rates of up to 100%. Pathomorphologic lesions were somewhat different from those previously reported in wild waterfowl.

The genetics of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses of subtype H5 in Germany, 2006-2020

The H5 A/Goose/Guangdong/1/1996 (gs/GD) lineage emerged in China in 1996. Rooted in the respective gs/GD lineage, the hemagglutinin (HA) gene of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIV) has genetically diversified into a plethora of clades and subclades and evolved into an assortment of sub- and genotypes. Some caused substantial losses in the poultry industry and had a major impact on wild bird populations alongside public health implications due to a zoonotic potential of certain clades. After the primary introduction of the HPAI H5N1 gs/GD lineage into Europe in autumn 2005 and winter 2005/2006, Germany has seen recurring incursions of four varying H5Nx subtypes (H5N1, H5N8, H5N5, H5N6) carrying multiple distinct reassortants, all descendants of the gs/GD virus. The first HPAIV H5 epidemic in Germany during 2006/2007 was caused by a clade 2.2 subtype H5N1 virus. Phylogenetic analysis confirmed three distinct clusters belonging to clades 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2, concurring with geographic and temporal structures. From 2014 onwards, HPAIV clade 2.3.4.4 has dominated the epidemiological situation in Germany. The initial clade 2.3.4.4a HPAIV H5N8, reaching Germany in November 2014, caused a limited epidemic affecting five poultry holdings, one zoo in Northern Germany and few wild birds. After November 2016, HPAIV of clade 2.3.4.4b have dominated the situation to date. The most extensive HPAIV H5 epidemic on record reached Germany in winter 2016/2017, encompassing multiple incursion events with two subtypes (H5N8, H5N5) and entailing five reassortants. A novel H5N6 clade 2.3.4.4b strain affected Germany from December 2017 onwards, instigating low-level infection in smallholdings and wild birds. Recently, in spring 2020, a novel incursion of a genetically distinct HPAI clade 2.3.4.4b H5N8 virus caused another epidemic in Europe, which affected a small number of poultry holdings, one zoo and two wild birds throughout Germany.

Genesis and spread of multiple reassortants during the 2016/2017 H5 avian influenza epidemic in Eurasia

In 2016/2017, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus of the subtype H5 spilled over into wild birds and caused the largest known HPAI epidemic in Europe, affecting poultry and wild birds. During its spread, the virus frequently exchanged genetic material (reassortment) with cocirculating low-pathogenic avian influenza viruses. To determine where and when these reassortments occurred, we analyzed Eurasian avian influenza viruses and identified a large set of H5 HPAI reassortants. We found that new genetic material likely came from wild birds across their migratory range and from domestic ducks not only in China, but also in central Europe. This knowledge is important to understand how the virus could adapt to wild birds and become established in wild bird populations.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of the H5 A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage can cause severe disease in poultry and wild birds, and occasionally in humans. In recent years, H5 HPAI viruses of this lineage infecting poultry in Asia have spilled over into wild birds and spread via bird migration to countries in Europe, Africa, and North America. In 2016/2017, this spillover resulted in the largest HPAI epidemic on record in Europe and was associated with an unusually high frequency of reassortments between H5 HPAI viruses and cocirculating low-pathogenic avian influenza viruses. Here, we show that the seven main H5 reassortant viruses had various combinations of gene segments 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6. Using detailed time-resolved phylogenetic analysis, most of these gene segments likely originated from wild birds and at dates and locations that corresponded to their hosts’ migratory cycles. However, some gene segments in two reassortant viruses likely originated from domestic anseriforms, either in spring 2016 in east China or in autumn 2016 in central Europe. Our results demonstrate that, in addition to domestic anseriforms in Asia, both migratory wild birds and domestic anseriforms in Europe are relevant sources of gene segments for recent reassortant H5 HPAI viruses. The ease with which these H5 HPAI viruses reassort, in combination with repeated spillovers of H5 HPAI viruses into wild birds, increases the risk of emergence of a reassortant virus that persists in wild bird populations yet remains highly pathogenic for poultry.

Highly Pathogenic and Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5 Subtype Viruses in Wild Birds in Ukraine

There have been three waves of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks in commercial, backyard poultry, and wild birds in Ukraine. The first (2005-2006) and second (2008) waves were caused by H5N1 HPAI virus, with 45 outbreaks among commercial poultry (chickens) and backyard fowl (chickens, ducks, and geese) in four regions of Ukraine (AR Crimea, Kherson, Odesa, and Sumy Oblast). H5N1 HPAI viruses were isolated from dead wild birds: cormorants (Phalacrocorax carbo) and great crested grebes (Podiceps cristatus) in 2006 and 2008. The third HPAI wave consisted of nine outbreaks of H5N8 HPAI in wild and domestic birds, beginning in November 2016 in the central and south regions (Kherson, Odesa, Chernivtsi, Ternopil, and Mykolaiv Oblast). H5N8 HPAI virus was detected in dead mute swans (Cygnus olor), peacocks (Pavo cristatus) (in zoo), ruddy shelducks (Tadorna ferruginea), white-fronted geese (Anser albifrons), and from environmental samples in 2016 and 2017. Wide wild bird surveillance for avian influenza (AI) virus was conducted from 2006 to 2016 in Ukraine regions suspected of being intercontinental (north-south and east-west) flyways. A total of 21 511 samples were collected from 105 species of wild birds representing 27 families and 11 orders. Ninety-five avian influenza (AI) viruses were isolated (including one H5N2 LPAI virus in 2010) from wild birds with a total of 26 antigenic hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) combinations. Fifteen of 16 known avian HA subtypes were isolated. Two H5N8 HPAI viruses (2016-2017) and two H5N2 LPAI viruses (2016) were isolated from wild birds and environmental samples (fresh bird feces) during surveillance before the outbreak in poultry in 2016-2017. The Ukrainian H5N1, H5N8 HPAI, and H5N2 LPAI viruses belong to different H5 phylogenetic groups. Our results demonstrate the great diversity of AI viruses in wild birds in Ukraine, as well as the importance of this region for studying the ecology of avian influenza.

Efficacy of Clade 2.3.2 H5-Recombinant Baculovirus Vaccine in Protecting Muscovy and Pekin Ducks from Clade 2.3.4.4 H5N8 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Infection

In late 2016, a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus subtype H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 was reported in Egypt in migratory birds; subsequently, the virus spread to backyard and commercial poultry in several Egyptian governorates, causing severe economic losses to the poultry industry. Here, a recombinant subunit commercial H5 vaccine prepared from the clade 2.3.2 H5 segment on baculovirus was evaluated in Pekin ducks (Anasplatyrhynchos domesticus) and Muscovy ducks (Cairina moschata) in Biosafety Level 3 isolators by using two vaccination regimes: either a single dose on day 10 and a challenge on day 31 or a double dose on days 10 and 28 and a challenge on day 49. The protection parameters were evaluated after experimental infection with the Egyptian HPAI H5N8 isolate clade 2.3.4.4b (A/common-coot/Egypt/CA285/2016) based on mortality rate, clinical signs, gross lesions, seroconversion, virus shedding, and histopathologic changes. In the single-dose vaccination regime, the mortality rate in Muscovy and Pekin ducks was 10% and 0% vs. 40% and 0% in nonvaccinated challenged ducks, respectively. In the double-dose vaccination regime, the mortality rates in Muscovy and Pekin ducks were 0% and 0% vs. 60% and 40% in nonvaccinated challenged ducks, respectively. Muscovy ducks developed more severe clinical signs and gross lesions than Pekin ducks. In addition, tracheal viral shedding in challenged Muscovy ducks, in the single-dose vaccination regime, was 50%, 22%, and 0% at 3, 5, and 7 days postchallenge (DPC), respectively, and was 0% in all Pekin ducks vs. 100% in all challenged nonvaccinated Muscovy and Pekin ducks at 3, 5, and 7 DPC. The viral shedding in challenged Muscovy and Pekin ducks, in the double-dose vaccination regime, was 0% at 3, 5, and 7 DPC vs. 100% in nonvaccinated challenged Muscovy and Pekin ducks, respectively. The results of this study indicate that the H5 baculovirus-based vaccine can be used in ducks with better vaccination regime based on double-dose vaccination at 10 and 28 days of age. In addition, they highlight the need to evaluate the efficacy of currently used commercial vaccines against challenge with the newly emerged HPAI H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 in the field in Egypt to ensure proper control strategy in ducks.

EVALUATION OF A COMMERCIAL COMPETITIVE ENZYME-LINKED IMMUNOSORBENT ASSAY FOR DETECTION OF AVIAN INFLUENZA VIRUS SUBTYPE H5 ANTIBODIES IN ZOO BIRDS

The hemagglutination inhibition (HI) test is the current gold standard for detecting antibodies to avian influenza virus (AIV). Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays (ELISAs) have been explored for use in poultry and certain wild bird species because of high efficiency and lower cost. This study compared a commercial ELISA for detection of AIV subtype H5 antibodies with HI test of 572 serum samples from zoo birds. There was no significant difference between the results of the two tests when statistically compared by a McNemar χ² test (P = 0.86) and assessment of κ (κ = 0.87). With a specificity of 94.2% (95% confidence interval [CI], 0.92-0.97), a sensitivity of 93.9% (95% CI, 0.91-0.97), and an excellent correlation between the two tests, this ELISA can be recommended as an alternative to the HI test for preliminary screening of zoo bird sera for antibodies to AIV subtype H5.

Recovery of influenza A viruses from lake water and sediments by experimental inoculation

Influenza A viruses (IAV) are zoonotic pathogens relevant to human, domestic animal and wildlife health. Many avian IAVs are transmitted among waterfowl via a faecal-oral-route. Therefore, environmental water where waterfowl congregate may play an important role in the ecology and epidemiology of avian IAV. Water and sediment may sustain and transmit virus among individuals or species. It is unclear at what concentrations waterborne viruses are infectious or remain detectable. To address this, we performed lake water and sediment dilution experiments with varying concentrations or infectious doses of four IAV strains from seal, turkey, duck and gull. To test for infectivity of the IAV strains in a concentration dependent manner, we applied cultivation to specific pathogen free (SPF) embryonated chicken eggs and Madin-Darby Canine Kidney (MDCK) cells. IAV recovery was more effective from embryonated chicken eggs than MDCK cells for freshwater lake dilutions, whereas, MDCK cells were more effective for viral recovery from sediment samples. Low infectious dose (1 PFU/200 μL) was sufficient in most cases to detect and recover IAV from lake water dilutions. Sediment required higher initial infectious doses (≥ 100 PFU/200 μL).

Sequential DNA immunization of chickens with bivalent heterologous vaccines induce highly reactive and cross-specific antibodies against influenza hemagglutinin

Vaccines against avian influenza are mostly based on hemagglutinin (HA), which is the main antigen of this virus and a target for neutralizing antibodies. Traditional vaccines are known to be poorly efficient against newly emerging strains, which is an increasing worldwide problem for human health and for the poultry industry. As demonstrated by research and clinical data, sequential exposure to divergent influenza HAs can boost induction of universal antibodies which recognize conserved epitopes. In this work, we have performed sequential immunization of laying hens using monovalent or bivalent compositions of DNA vaccines encoding HAs from distant groups 1 and 2 (H5, H1, and H3 subtypes, respectively). This strategy gave promising results, as it led to induction of polyclonal antibodies against HAs from both groups. These polyclonal antibodies showed cross-reactivity between different HA strains in ELISA, especially when bivalent formulations were used for immunization of birds. However, cross-reactivity of antibodies induced against H3 and H5 HA subtypes was rather limited against each other after homologous immunization. Using a cocktail of HA sequences and/or sequential DNA vaccination with different strains presents a good strategy to overcome the limited effectiveness of vaccines and induce broader immunity against avian influenza. Such a strategy could be adapted for vaccinating laying hens or parental flocks of different groups of poultry.

White-Tailed Sea Eagle (Haliaeetus albicilla) Die-Off Due to Infection with Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus, Subtype H5N8, in Germany

In contrast to previous incursions of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAIV) H5 viruses, H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4b viruses caused numerous cases of lethal infections in white-tailed sea eagles (Haliaeetus albicilla) affecting mainly young eagles (younger than five years of age) in Germany during winter 2016/2017. Until April 2017, 17 HPAIV H5N8-positive white-tailed sea eagles had been detected (three found alive and 14 carcasses) by real-time RT-PCR and partial nucleotide sequence analyses. Severe neurological clinical signs were noticed which were corroborated by immunohistopathology revealing mild to moderate, oligo- to multifocal necrotizing virus-induced polioencephalitis. Lethal lead (Pb) concentrations, a main factor of mortality in sea eagles in previous years, could be ruled out by atomic absorption spectrometry. HPAIV H5 clade 2.3.4.4b reportedly is the first highly pathogenic influenza virus known to induce fatal disease in European white-tailed see eagles. This virus strain may become a new health threat to a highly protected species across its distribution range in Eurasia. Positive cloacal swabs suggest that eagles can spread the virus with their faeces.

Subpopulation Primers Essential for Exhaustive Detection of Diverse Hemagglutinin Genes of H5 Subtype Avian Influenza Viruses by Loop-Mediated Isothermal Amplification Method

Loop-mediated isothermal amplification (LAMP) is a potential screening test for avian influenza (AI), but its narrow detection spectrum limits its applications. To improve this narrow detection spectrum, 3 types of primers were compared for detection of diverse H5 subtype hemagglutinin (HA) genes. Four and 6 genes, of 10 genetically different H5 HA genes tested, were detected with S primers specific for A/duck/Tsukuba/9/2005 (H5N2) and with M primers (which contained mixed bases), respectively. In contrast, all 10 HA genes became positive with population primers (P primers) (a mixture of primers designed for each subpopulation of 2,202 HA genes). Our study indicated that the P primers for the forward inner primer (FIP) and backward inner primer (BIP) sites were essential for exhaustive detection, whereas those for the F3, forward loop (FL), backward loop (BL), and B3 sites were exchangeable with M primers. A base mismatch experiment demonstrated that HA genes with ≤2 base mismatches per primer site and ≤10 base mismatches per HA gene were amplifiable. Reverse transcription-LAMP was broadly reactive, specific for H5 subtype HA genes, and applicable to field samples, with the sensitivity of real-time PCR. The in silico analysis suggested that most H5 HA genes (2,586 positive genes/2,588 genes tested) registered in the GenBank database might be amplifiable. These results indicate that the use of subpopulation primers in LAMP allows exhaustive detection of diverse HA genes and H5 LAMP can be used as a reliable AI screening test in general diagnostic laboratories.

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N8 Clade 2.3.4.4b in Germany in 2016/2017

Here, we report on the occurrence of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5Nx clade 2.3.4.4b in Germany. Between November 8, 2016, and September 30, 2017, more than 1,150 cases of HPAI H5Nx clade 2.3.4.4b in wild birds and 107 outbreaks in birds kept in captivity (92 poultry holdings and 15 zoos/animal parks) were reported in Germany. This HPAI epidemic is the most severe recorded in Germany so far. The viruses were apparently introduced by migratory birds, sparking an epidemic among wild birds across Germany with occasional incursions into poultry holdings, zoos and animal parks, which were usually rapidly detected and controlled by stamping out. HPAI viruses (mainly subtype H5N8, in a few cases also H5N5) were found in dead wild birds of at least 53 species. The affected wild birds were water birds (including gulls, storks, herons, and cormorants) and scavenging birds (birds of prey, owls, and crows). In a number of cases, substantial gaps in farm biosecurity may have eased virus entry into the holdings. In a second wave of the epidemic starting from February 2017, there was epidemiological and molecular evidence for virus transmission of the infections between commercial turkey holdings in an area of high poultry density, which caused approximately 25% of the total number of outbreaks in poultry. Biosecurity measures in poultry holdings should be adapted. This includes, inter alia, wearing of stable-specific protective clothing and footwear, cleaning, and disinfection of equipment that has been in contact with birds and prevention of contacts between poultry and wild water birds.

Avian influenza

Previous introductions of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) to the EU were most likely via migratory wild birds. A mathematical model has been developed which indicated that virus amplification and spread may take place when wild bird populations of sufficient size within EU become infected. Low pathogenic avian influenza virus (LPAIV) may reach similar maximum prevalence levels in wild bird populations to HPAIV but the risk of LPAIV infection of a poultry holding was estimated to be lower than that of HPAIV. Only few non-wild bird pathways were identified having a non-negligible risk of AI introduction. The transmission rate between animals within a flock is assessed to be higher for HPAIV than LPAIV. In very few cases, it could be proven that HPAI outbreaks were caused by intrinsic mutation of LPAIV to HPAIV but current knowledge does not allow a prediction as to if, and when this could occur. In gallinaceous poultry, passive surveillance through notification of suspicious clinical signs/mortality was identified as the most effective method for early detection of HPAI outbreaks. For effective surveillance in anseriform poultry, passive surveillance through notification of suspicious clinical signs/mortality needs to be accompanied by serological surveillance and/or a virological surveillance programme of birds found dead (bucket sampling). Serosurveillance is unfit for early warning of LPAI outbreaks at the individual holding level but could be effective in tracing clusters of LPAIV-infected holdings. In wild birds, passive surveillance is an appropriate method for HPAIV surveillance if the HPAIV infections are associated with mortality whereas active wild bird surveillance has a very low efficiency for detecting HPAIV. Experts estimated and emphasised the effect of implementing specific biosecurity measures on reducing the probability of AIV entering into a poultry holding. Human diligence is pivotal to select, implement and maintain specific, effective biosecurity measures.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N8) outbreaks: protection and management of exposed people in Europe, 2014/15 and 2016

Introduction of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus A(H5N8) into Europe prompted animal and human health experts to implement protective measures to prevent transmission to humans. We describe the situation in 2016 and list public health measures and recommendations in place. We summarise critical interfaces identified during the A(H5N1) and A(H5N8) outbreaks in 2014/15. Rapid exchange of information between the animal and human health sectors is critical for a timely, effective and efficient response.

Role for migratory wild birds in the global spread of avian influenza H5N8

Avian influenza viruses affect both poultry production and public health. A subtype H5N8 (clade 2.3.4.4) virus, following an outbreak in poultry in South Korea in January 2014, rapidly spread worldwide in 2014-2015. Our analysis of H5N8 viral sequences, epidemiological investigations, waterfowl migration, and poultry trade showed that long-distance migratory birds can play a major role in the global spread of avian influenza viruses. Further, we found that the hemagglutinin of clade 2.3.4.4 virus was remarkably promiscuous, creating reassortants with multiple neuraminidase subtypes. Improving our understanding of the circumpolar circulation of avian influenza viruses in migratory waterfowl will help to provide early warning of threats from avian influenza to poultry, and potentially human, health.

Vaccination against H5 avian influenza virus induces long-term humoral immune responses in flamingoes (Phoenicopterus spp.)

Avian influenza (AI) can represent a threat to endangered wild birds, as demonstrated with the H5N1 highly pathogenic AI (HPAI) outbreaks. Vaccination against AI using inactivated H5-vaccines has been shown to induce humoral immune response in zoo bird species. In this study, the long-term efficacy of H5-vaccination was evaluated in flamingoes from Barcelona Zoo. Specific H5-antibody titres were maintained at high levels (geometric mean titres ≥32) for over 7 years after vaccination, both against the H5N9 and H5N3 vaccine strains, as well as H5N3 and H5N1 reference strains. In addition the breadth of the immune response was also studied by testing antibody production against H1-, H3-, H4-, H7-, and H10-subtypes. It was observed that most flamingoes presented specific antibodies against H1 virus subtypes, but titres to the other HA-subtypes were rarely detected. We show that AI-vaccines can induce immunity lasting seven years in flamingoes, which suggests that vaccination can provide long term protection from HPAI outbreaks in zoo birds.