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Adlhoch C, Alm E, Enkirch T, Lamb F, Melidou A, Willgert K, Marangon S, Monne I, Stegeman JA, Delacourt R, Baldinelli F, Broglia A. Drivers for a pandemic due to avian influenza and options for One Health mitigation measures. EFSA J 2024; 22:e8735. [PMID: 38576537 PMCID: PMC10988447 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2024.8735] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 04/06/2024] Open
Abstract
Avian influenza viruses (AIV) remain prevalent among wild bird populations in the European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA), leading to significant illness in and death of birds. Transmission between bird and mammal species has been observed, particularly in fur animal farms, where outbreaks have been reported. While transmission from infected birds to humans is rare, there have been instances of exposure to these viruses since 2020 without any symptomatic infections reported in the EU/EEA. However, these viruses continue to evolve globally, and with the migration of wild birds, new strains carrying potential mutations for mammalian adaptation could be selected. If avian A(H5N1) influenza viruses acquire the ability to spread efficiently among humans, large-scale transmission could occur due to the lack of immune defences against H5 viruses in humans. The emergence of AIV capable of infecting mammals, including humans, can be facilitated by various drivers. Some intrinsic drivers are related to virus characteristics or host susceptibility. Other drivers are extrinsic and may increase exposure of mammals and humans to AIV thereby stimulating mutation and adaptation to mammals. Extrinsic drivers include the ecology of host species, such as including wildlife, human activities like farming practices and the use of natural resources, climatic and environmental factors. One Health measures to mitigate the risk of AIV adapting to mammals and humans focus on limiting exposure and preventing spread. Key options for actions include enhancing surveillance targeting humans and animals, ensuring access to rapid diagnostics, promoting collaboration between animal and human sectors, and implementing preventive measures such as vaccination. Effective communication to different involved target audiences should be emphasised, as well as strengthening veterinary infrastructure, enforcing biosecurity measures at farms, and reducing wildlife contact with domestic animals. Careful planning of poultry and fur animal farming, especially in areas with high waterfowl density, is highlighted for effective risk reduction.
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Adlhoch C, Fusaro A, Gonzales JL, Kuiken T, Mirinavičiūtė G, Niqueux É, Ståhl K, Staubach C, Terregino C, Willgert K, Baldinelli F, Chuzhakina K, Delacourt R, Georganas A, Georgiev M, Kohnle L. Avian influenza overview September-December 2023. EFSA J 2023; 21:e8539. [PMID: 38116102 PMCID: PMC10730024 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2023.8539] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/21/2023] Open
Abstract
Between 2 September and 1 December 2023, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) outbreaks were reported in domestic (88) and wild (175) birds across 23 countries in Europe. Compared to previous years, the increase in the number of HPAI virus detections in waterfowl has been delayed, possibly due to a later start of the autumn migration of several wild bird species. Common cranes were the most frequently affected species during this reporting period with mortality events being described in several European countries. Most HPAI outbreaks reported in poultry were primary outbreaks following the introduction of the virus by wild birds, with the exception of Hungary, where two clusters involving secondary spread occurred. HPAI viruses identified in Europe belonged to eleven different genotypes, seven of which were new. With regard to mammals, the serological survey conducted in all fur farms in Finland revealed 29 additional serologically positive farms during this reporting period. Wild mammals continued to be affected mostly in the Americas, from where further spread into wild birds and mammals in the Antarctic region was described for the first time. Since the last report and as of 1 December 2023, three fatal and one severe human A(H5N1) infection with clade 2.3.2.1c viruses have been reported by Cambodia, and one A(H9N2) infection was reported from China. No human infections related to the avian influenza detections in animals in fur farms in Finland have been reported, and human infections with avian influenza remain a rare event. The risk of infection with currently circulating avian H5 influenza viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe remains low for the general population in the EU/EEA. The risk of infection remains low to moderate for occupationally or otherwise exposed people to infected birds or mammals (wild or domesticated); this assessment covers different situations that depend on the level of exposure.
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Adlhoch C, Fusaro A, Gonzales JL, Kuiken T, Mirinavičiūtė G, Niqueux É, Staubach C, Terregino C, Baldinelli F, Rusinà A, Kohnle L. Avian influenza overview June-September 2023. EFSA J 2023; 21:e08328. [PMID: 37809353 PMCID: PMC10552073 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2023.8328] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/10/2023] Open
Abstract
Between 24 June and 1 September 2023, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) outbreaks were reported in domestic (25) and wild (482) birds across 21 countries in Europe. Most of these outbreaks appeared to be clustered along coastlines with only few HPAI virus detections inland. In poultry, all HPAI outbreaks were primary and sporadic with most of them occurring in the United Kingdom. In wild birds, colony-breeding seabirds continued to be most heavily affected, but an increasing number of HPAI virus detections in waterfowl is expected in the coming weeks. The current epidemic in wild birds has already surpassed the one of the previous epidemiological year in terms of total number of HPAI virus detections. As regards mammals, A(H5N1) virus was identified in 26 fur animal farms in Finland. Affected species included American mink, red and Arctic fox, and common raccoon dog. The most likely source of introduction was contact with gulls. Wild mammals continued to be affected worldwide, mostly red foxes and different seal species. Since the last report and as of 28 September 2023, two A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus detections in humans have been reported by the United Kingdom, and three human infections with A(H5N6) and two with A(H9N2) were reported from China, respectively. No human infection related to the avian influenza detections in animals on fur farms in Finland or in cats in Poland have been reported, and human infections with avian influenza remain a rare event. The risk of infection with currently circulating avian H5 influenza viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe remains low for the general population in the EU/EEA. The risk of infection remains low to moderate for occupationally or otherwise exposed people to infected birds or mammals (wild or domesticated); this assessment covers different situations that depend on the level of exposure.
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Adlhoch C, Fusaro A, Gonzales JL, Kuiken T, Melidou A, Mirinavičiūtė G, Niqueux É, Ståhl K, Staubach C, Terregino C, Baldinelli F, Broglia A, Kohnle L. Avian influenza overview April - June 2023. EFSA J 2023; 21:e08191. [PMID: 37485254 PMCID: PMC10358191 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2023.8191] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 10.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 07/25/2023] Open
Abstract
Between 29 April and 23 June 2023, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus (clade 2.3.4.4b) outbreaks were reported in domestic (98) and wild (634) birds across 25 countries in Europe. A cluster of outbreaks in mulard ducks for foie gras production was concentrated in Southwest France, whereas the overall A(H5N1) situation in poultry in Europe and worldwide has eased. In wild birds, black-headed gulls and several new seabird species, mostly gulls and terns (e.g. sandwich terns), were heavily affected, with increased mortality being observed in both adults and juveniles after hatching. Compared to the same period last year, dead seabirds have been increasingly found inland and not only along European coastlines. As regards mammals, A(H5N1) virus was identified in 24 domestic cats and one caracal in Poland between 10 and 30 June 2023. Affected animals showed neurological and respiratory signs, sometimes mortality, and were widely scattered across nine voivodeships in the country. All cases are genetically closely related and identified viruses cluster with viruses detected in poultry (since October 2022, but now only sporadic) and wild birds (December 2022-January 2023) in the past. Uncertainties still exist around their possible source of infection, with no feline-to-feline or feline-to-human transmission reported so far. Since 10 May 2023 and as of 4 July 2023, two A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus detections in humans were reported from the United Kingdom, and two A(H9N2) and one A(H5N6) human infections in China. In addition, one person infected with A(H3N8) in China has died. The risk of infection with currently circulating avian H5 influenza viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe remains low for the general population in the EU/EEA, low to moderate for occupationally or otherwise exposed people to infected birds or mammals (wild or domesticated).
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Adlhoch C, Fusaro A, Gonzales JL, Kuiken T, Mirinaviciute G, Niqueux É, Stahl K, Staubach C, Terregino C, Broglia A, Kohnle L, Baldinelli F. Avian influenza overview March - April 2023. EFSA J 2023; 21:e08039. [PMID: 37293570 PMCID: PMC10245295 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2023.8039] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/10/2023] Open
Abstract
Between 2 March and 28 April 2023, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5Nx) virus, clade 2.3.4.4b, outbreaks were reported in domestic (106) and wild (610) birds across 24 countries in Europe. Poultry outbreaks occurred less frequently compared to the previous reporting period and compared to spring 2022. Most of these outbreaks were classified as primary outbreaks without secondary spread and some of them associated with atypical disease presentation, in particular low mortality. In wild birds, black-headed gulls continued to be heavily affected, while also other threatened wild bird species, such as the peregrine falcon, showed increased mortality. The ongoing epidemic in black-headed gulls, many of which breed inland, may increase the risk for poultry, especially in July-August, when first-year birds disperse from the breeding colonies. HPAI A(H5N1) virus also continued to expand in the Americas, including in mammalian species, and is expected to reach the Antarctic in the near future. HPAI virus infections were detected in six mammal species, particularly in marine mammals and mustelids, for the first time, while the viruses currently circulating in Europe retain a preferential binding for avian-like receptors. Since 13 March 2022 and as of 10 May 2023, two A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus detections in humans were reported from China (1), and Chile (1), as well as three A(H9N2) and one A(H3N8) human infections in China. The risk of infection with currently circulating avian H5 influenza viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe remains low for the general population in the EU/EEA, and low to moderate for occupationally or otherwise exposed people.
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Affiliation(s)
- Cornelia Adlhoch
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
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Adlhoch C, Fusaro A, Gonzales JL, Kuiken T, Marangon S, Mirinaviciute G, Niqueux É, Stahl K, Staubach C, Terregino C, Broglia A, Baldinelli F. Avian influenza overview December 2022 - March 2023. EFSA J 2023; 21:e07917. [PMID: 36949860 PMCID: PMC10025949 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2023.7917] [Citation(s) in RCA: 28] [Impact Index Per Article: 28.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 03/24/2023] Open
Abstract
Between 3 December 2022 and 1 March 2023 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus, clade 2.3.4.4b, was reported in Europe in domestic (522) and wild (1,138) birds over 24 countries. An unexpected number of HPAI virus detections in sea birds were observed, mainly in gull species and particularly in black-headed gulls (large mortality events were observed in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy). The close genetic relationship among viruses collected from black-headed gulls suggests a southward spread of the virus. Moreover, the genetic analyses indicate that the virus persisted in Europe in residential wild birds during and after the summer months. Although the virus retained a preferential binding for avian-like receptors, several mutations associated to increased zoonotic potential were detected. The risk of HPAI virus infection for poultry due to the virus circulating in black-headed gulls and other gull species might increase during the coming months, as breeding bird colonies move inland with possible overlap with poultry production areas. Worldwide, HPAI A(H5N1) virus continued to spread southward in the Americas, from Mexico to southern Chile. The Peruvian pelican was the most frequently reported infected species with thousands of deaths being reported. The reporting of HPAI A(H5N1) in mammals also continued probably linked to feeding on infected wild birds. In Peru, a mass mortality event of sea lions was observed in January and February 2023. Since October 2022, six A(H5N1) detections in humans were reported from Cambodia (a family cluster with 2 people, clade 2.3.2.1c), China (2, clade 2.3.4.4b), Ecuador (1, clade 2.3.4.4b), and Vietnam (1, unspecified clade), as well as two A(H5N6) human infections from China. The risk of infection with currently circulating avian H5 influenza viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe is assessed as low for the general population in the EU/EEA, and low to moderate for occupationally or otherwise exposed people.
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Nielsen SS, Alvarez J, Bicout DJ, Calistri P, Canali E, Drewe JA, Garin‐Bastuji B, Gonzales Rojas JL, Gortázar C, Herskin M, Michel V, Miranda Chueca MÁ, Padalino B, Pasquali P, Roberts HC, Spoolder H, Velarde A, Viltrop A, Winckler C, Adlhoch C, Aznar I, Baldinelli F, Boklund A, Broglia A, Gerhards N, Mur L, Nannapaneni P, Ståhl K. SARS-CoV-2 in animals: susceptibility of animal species, risk for animal and public health, monitoring, prevention and control. EFSA J 2023; 21:e07822. [PMID: 36860662 PMCID: PMC9968901 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2023.7822] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 03/03/2023] Open
Abstract
The epidemiological situation of SARS-CoV-2 in humans and animals is continually evolving. To date, animal species known to transmit SARS-CoV-2 are American mink, raccoon dog, cat, ferret, hamster, house mouse, Egyptian fruit bat, deer mouse and white-tailed deer. Among farmed animals, American mink have the highest likelihood to become infected from humans or animals and further transmit SARS-CoV-2. In the EU, 44 outbreaks were reported in 2021 in mink farms in seven MSs, while only six in 2022 in two MSs, thus representing a decreasing trend. The introduction of SARS-CoV-2 into mink farms is usually via infected humans; this can be controlled by systematically testing people entering farms and adequate biosecurity. The current most appropriate monitoring approach for mink is the outbreak confirmation based on suspicion, testing dead or clinically sick animals in case of increased mortality or positive farm personnel and the genomic surveillance of virus variants. The genomic analysis of SARS-CoV-2 showed mink-specific clusters with a potential to spill back into the human population. Among companion animals, cats, ferrets and hamsters are those at highest risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection, which most likely originates from an infected human, and which has no or very low impact on virus circulation in the human population. Among wild animals (including zoo animals), mostly carnivores, great apes and white-tailed deer have been reported to be naturally infected by SARS-CoV-2. In the EU, no cases of infected wildlife have been reported so far. Proper disposal of human waste is advised to reduce the risks of spill-over of SARS-CoV-2 to wildlife. Furthermore, contact with wildlife, especially if sick or dead, should be minimised. No specific monitoring for wildlife is recommended apart from testing hunter-harvested animals with clinical signs or found-dead. Bats should be monitored as a natural host of many coronaviruses.
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Adlhoch C, Delgado-Sanz C, Carnahan A, Larrauri A, Popovici O, Bossuyt N, Thomas I, Kynčl J, Slezak P, Brytting M, Guiomar R, Redlberger-Fritz M, Maistre Melillo J, Melillo T, van Gageldonk-Lafeber AB, Marbus SD, O’Donnell J, Domegan L, Gomes Dias J, Olsen SJ. Effect of neuraminidase inhibitor (oseltamivir) treatment on outcome of hospitalised influenza patients, surveillance data from 11 EU countries, 2010 to 2020. Euro Surveill 2023; 28:2200340. [PMID: 36700868 PMCID: PMC9881178 DOI: 10.2807/1560-7917.es.2023.28.4.2200340] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/27/2023] Open
Abstract
BackgroundTimely treatment with neuraminidase inhibitors (NAI) can reduce severe outcomes in influenza patients.AimWe assessed the impact of antiviral treatment on in-hospital deaths of laboratory-confirmed influenza patients in 11 European Union countries from 2010/11 to 2019/20.MethodsCase-based surveillance data from hospitalised patients with known age, sex, outcome, ward, vaccination status, timing of antiviral treatment, and hospitalisation were obtained. A mixed effect logistic regression model using country as random intercept was applied to estimate the adjusted odds ratio (aOR) for in-hospital death in patients treated with NAIs vs not treated.ResultsOf 19,937 patients, 31% received NAIs within 48 hours of hospital admission. Older age (60-79 years aOR 3.0, 95% CI: 2.4-3.8; 80 years 8.3 (6.6-10.5)) and intensive care unit admission (3.8, 95% CI: 3.4-4.2) increased risk of dying, while early hospital admission after symptom onset decreased risk (aOR 0.91, 95% CI: 0.90-0.93). NAI treatment initiation within 48 hours and up to 7 days reduced risk of dying (0-48 hours aOR 0.51, 95% CI: 0.45-0.59; 3-4 days 0.59 (0.51-0.67); 5-7 days 0.64 (0.56-0.74)), in particular in patients 40 years and older (e.g. treatment within 48 hours: 40-59 years aOR 0.43, 95% CI: 0.28-0.66; 60-79 years 0.50 (0.39-0.63); ≥80 years 0.51 (0.42-0.63)).ConclusionNAI treatment given within 48 hours and possibly up to 7 days after symptom onset reduced risk of in-hospital death. NAI treatment should be considered in older patients to prevent severe outcomes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Cornelia Adlhoch
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | | | | | - Amparo Larrauri
- National Centre of Epidemiology, CIBERESP, Carlos III Health Institute, Madrid, Spain
| | - Odette Popovici
- National Institute of Public Health Romania-National Centre for Communicable Diseases Surveillance and Control, Bucharest, Romania
| | | | | | - Jan Kynčl
- Department of Infectious Diseases Epidemiology, National Institute of Public Health, Prague, Czechia
| | - Pavel Slezak
- Department of Infectious Diseases Epidemiology, National Institute of Public Health, Prague, Czechia
| | - Mia Brytting
- Public Health Agency of Sweden, Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Raquel Guiomar
- National Influenza Reference Laboratory, National Institute of Health Dr. Ricardo Jorge, Lisbon, Portugal
| | | | | | - Tanya Melillo
- Infectious Disease prevention and Control unit, Malta
| | | | - Sierk D. Marbus
- National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Bilthoven, the Netherlands
| | - Joan O’Donnell
- Health Service Executive-Health Protection Surveillance Centre, Dublin, Ireland
| | - Lisa Domegan
- Health Service Executive-Health Protection Surveillance Centre, Dublin, Ireland
| | - Joana Gomes Dias
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
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Adlhoch C, Fusaro A, Gonzales JL, Kuiken T, Marangon S, Niqueux É, Staubach C, Terregino C, Aznar I, Guajardo IM, Baldinelli F. Avian influenza overview September - December 2022. EFSA J 2023; 21:e07786. [PMID: 36698491 PMCID: PMC9851911 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2023.7786] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/21/2023] Open
Abstract
Between October 2021 and September 2022 Europe has suffered the most devastating highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) epidemic with a total of 2,520 outbreaks in poultry, 227 outbreaks in captive birds, and 3,867 HPAI virus detections in wild birds. The unprecedent geographical extent (37 European countries affected) resulted in 50 million birds culled in affected establishments. In the current reporting period, between 10 September and 2 December 2022, 1,163 HPAI virus detections were reported in 27 European countries in poultry (398), captive (151) and wild birds (613). A decrease in HPAI virus detections in colony-breeding seabirds species and an increase in the number of detections in waterfowl has been observed. The continuous circulation of the virus in the wild reservoir has led to the frequent introduction of the virus into poultry populations. It is suspected that waterfowl might be more involved than seabirds in the incursion of HPAI virus into poultry establishments. In the coming months, the increasing infection pressure on poultry establishments might increase the risk of incursions in poultry, with potential further spread, primarily in areas with high poultry densities. The viruses detected since September 2022 (clade 2.3.4.4b) belong to eleven genotypes, three of which have circulated in Europe during the summer months, while eight represent new genotypes. HPAI viruses were also detected in wild and farmed mammal species in Europe and North America, showing genetic markers of adaptation to replication in mammals. Since the last report, two A(H5N1) detections in humans in Spain, one A(H5N1), one A(H5N6) and one A(H9N2) human infection in China as well as one A(H5) infection without NA-type result in Vietnam were reported, respectively. The risk of infection is assessed as low for the general population in the EU/EEA, and low to medium for occupationally exposed people.
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Adlhoch C, Fusaro A, Gonzales JL, Kuiken T, Marangon S, Niqueux É, Staubach C, Terregino C, Guajardo IM, Chuzhakina K, Baldinelli F. Avian influenza overview June - September 2022. EFSA J 2022; 20:e07597. [PMID: 36247870 PMCID: PMC9552036 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2022.7597] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/11/2022] Open
Abstract
The 2021-2022 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) epidemic season is the largest HPAI epidemic so far observed in Europe, with a total of 2,467 outbreaks in poultry, 47.7 million birds culled in the affected establishments, 187 outbreaks in captive birds, and 3,573 HPAI virus detections in wild birds with an unprecedent geographical extent reaching from Svalbard islands to South Portugal and Ukraine, affecting 37 European countries. Between 11 June and 9 September 2022, 788 HPAI virus detections were reported in 16 European countries in poultry (56), captive (22) and wild birds (710). Several colony-breeding seabird species exhibited widespread and massive mortality from HPAI A(H5N1) virus along the northwest coast of Europe. This resulted in an unprecedentedly high level of HPAI virus detections in wild birds between June and August 2022 and represents an ongoing risk of infection for domestic birds. HPAI outbreaks were still observed in poultry from June to September with five-fold more infected premises than observed during the same period in 2021 and mostly distributed along the Atlantic coast. Response options to this new epidemiological situation include the definition and rapid implementation of suitable and sustainable HPAI mitigation strategies such as appropriate biosecurity measures and surveillance strategies for early detection in the different poultry production systems. The viruses currently circulating in Europe belong to clade 2.3.4.4b with seven genotypes, three of which identified for the first time during this time period, being detected during summer. HPAI A(H5) viruses were also detected in wild mammal species in Europe and North America and showed genetic markers of adaptation to replication in mammals. Since the last report, two A(H5N6), two A(H9N2) and one A(H10N3) human infections were reported in China. The risk of infection is assessed as low for the general population in the EU/EEA, and low to medium for occupationally exposed people.
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Adlhoch C, Fusaro A, Gonzales JL, Kuiken T, Marangon S, Niqueux É, Staubach C, Terregino C, Aznar I, Guajardo IM, Baldinelli F. Avian influenza overview March - June 2022. EFSA J 2022; 20:e07415. [PMID: 35949938 PMCID: PMC9356771 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2022.7415] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/11/2022] Open
Abstract
The 2021-2022 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) epidemic season is the largest epidemic so far observed in Europe, with a total of 2,398 outbreaks in poultry, 46 million birds culled in the affected establishments, 168 detections in captive birds, and 2,733 HPAI events in wild birds in 36 European countries. Between 16 March and 10 June 2022, 1,182 HPAI virus detections were reported in 28 EU/EEA countries and United Kingdom in poultry (750), and in wild (410) and captive birds (22). During this reporting period, 86% of the poultry outbreaks were secondary due to between-farm spread of HPAI virus. France accounted for 68% of the overall poultry outbreaks, Hungary for 24% and all other affected countries for less than 2% each. Most detections in wild birds were reported by Germany (158), followed by the Netherlands (98) and the United Kingdom (48). The observed persistence of HPAI (H5) virus in wild birds since the 2020-2021 epidemic wave indicates that it may have become endemic in wild bird populations in Europe, implying that the health risk from HPAI A(H5) for poultry, humans, and wildlife in Europe remains present year-round, with the highest risk in the autumn and winter months. Response options to this new epidemiological situation include the definition and the rapid implementation of suitable and sustainable HPAI mitigation strategies such as appropriate biosecurity measures and surveillance strategies for early detection measures in the different poultry production systems. Medium to long-term strategies for reducing poultry density in high-risk areas should also be considered. The results of the genetic analysis indicate that the viruses currently circulating in Europe belong to clade 2.3.4.4b. HPAI A(H5) viruses were also detected in wild mammal species in Canada, USA and Japan, and showed genetic markers of adaptation to replication in mammals. Since the last report, four A(H5N6), two A(H9N2) and two A(H3N8) human infections were reported in China and one A(H5N1) in USA. The risk of infection is assessed as low for the general population in the EU/EEA, and low to medium for occupationally exposed people.
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Melidou A, Ködmön C, Nahapetyan K, Kraus A, Alm E, Adlhoch C, Mooks P, Dave N, Carvalho C, Meslé MMI, Daniels R, Pebody R. Influenza returns with a season dominated by clade 3C.2a1b.2a.2 A(H3N2) viruses, WHO European Region, 2021/22. Euro Surveill 2022; 27. [PMID: 35426364 PMCID: PMC9012087 DOI: 10.2807/1560-7917.es.2022.27.15.2200255] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Abstract
In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 non-pharmaceutical interventions continued slowing influenza circulation in the 2021/22 season, with reduced characterisation data. A(H3) predominated and, in some countries, co-circulated with A(H1)pdm09 and B/Victoria viruses. No B/Yamagata virus detections were confirmed. Substantial proportions of characterised circulating virus subtypes or lineages differed antigenically from their respective northern hemisphere vaccine components. Appropriate levels of influenza virus characterisations should be maintained until the season end and in future seasons, when surveillance is adapted to integrate SARS-CoV-2.
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Affiliation(s)
- Angeliki Melidou
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Csaba Ködmön
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Karen Nahapetyan
- World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - Annette Kraus
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Erik Alm
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Cornelia Adlhoch
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Piers Mooks
- World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - Nishi Dave
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Carlos Carvalho
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Margaux MI Meslé
- World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - Rodney Daniels
- WHO Collaborating Centre, Francis Crick Institute, London, United Kingdom
| | - Richard Pebody
- World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
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Adlhoch C, Fusaro A, Gonzales JL, Kuiken T, Marangon S, Niqueux É, Staubach C, Terregino C, Aznar I, Muñoz Guajardo I, Baldinelli F. Avian influenza overview December 2021 - March 2022. EFSA J 2022; 20:e07289. [PMID: 35386927 PMCID: PMC8978176 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2022.7289] [Citation(s) in RCA: 26] [Impact Index Per Article: 13.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Abstract
Between 9 December 2021 and 15 March 2022, 2,653 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus detections were reported in 33 EU/EEA countries and the UK in poultry (1,030), in wild (1,489) and in captive birds (133). The outbreaks in poultry were mainly reported by France (609), where two spatiotemporal clusters have been identified since October 2021, followed by Italy (131), Hungary (73) and Poland (53); those reporting countries accounted together for 12.8 of the 17.5 million birds that were culled in the HPAI affected poultry establishments in this reporting period. The majority of the detections in wild birds were reported by Germany (767), the Netherlands (293), the UK (118) and Denmark (74). HPAI A(H5) was detected in a wide range of host species in wild birds, indicating an increasing and changing risk for virus incursion into poultry farms. The observed persistence and continuous circulation of HPAI viruses in migratory and resident wild birds will continue to pose a risk for the poultry industry in Europe for the coming months. This requires the definition and the rapid implementation of suitable and sustainable HPAI mitigation strategies such as appropriate biosecurity measures, surveillance plans and early detection measures in the different poultry production systems. The results of the genetic analysis indicate that the viruses currently circulating in Europe belong to clade 2.3.4.4b. Some of these viruses were also detected in wild mammal species in the Netherlands, Slovenia, Finland and Ireland showing genetic markers of adaptation to replication in mammals. Since the last report, the UK reported one human infection with A(H5N1), China 17 human infections with A(H5N6), and China and Cambodia 15 infections with A(H9N2) virus. The risk of infection for the general population in the EU/EEA is assessed as low, and for occupationally exposed people, low to medium.
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15
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Adlhoch C, Fusaro A, Gonzales JL, Kuiken T, Marangon S, Niqueux É, Staubach C, Terregino C, Aznar I, Muñoz Guajardo I, Baldinelli F. Avian influenza overview May - September 2021. EFSA J 2022; 20:e07122. [PMID: 35079292 PMCID: PMC8777557 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2022.7122] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/11/2022] Open
Abstract
The 2020-2021 avian influenza epidemic with a total of 3,777 reported highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) detections and approximately 22,900,000 affected poultry birds in 31 European Countries appears to be one of the largest HPAI epidemics that has ever occurred in Europe. Between 15 May and 15 September 2021, 162 HPAI virus detections were reported in 17 EU/EEA countries and the UK in poultry (51), in wild (91) and captive birds (20). The detections in poultry were mainly reported by Kosovo (20), Poland (17) and Albania (6). HPAI virus was detected during the summer months in resident wild bird populations mainly in northern Europe. The data presented in this report indicates that HPAI virus is still circulating in domestic and wild bird populations in some European countries and that the epidemic is not over yet. Based on these observations, it appears that the persistence of HPAI A(H5) in Europe continues to pose a risk of further virus incursions in domestic bird populations. Furthermore, during summer, HPAI viruses were detected in poultry and several wild bird species in areas in Russia that are linked to key migration areas of wild waterbirds; this is of concern due to the possible introduction and spread of novel virus strains via wild birds migrating to the EU countries during the autumn from the eastern breeding to the overwintering sites. Nineteen different virus genotypes have been identified so far in Europe and Central Asia since July 2020, confirming a high propensity for this virus to undergo reassortment events. Since the last report, 15 human infections due to A(H5N6) HPAI and five human cases due to A(H9N2) low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) virus have been reported from China. Some of these cases were caused by a virus with an HA gene closely related to the A(H5) viruses circulating in Europe. The viruses characterised to date retain a preference for avian-type receptors; however, the reports of transmission events of A(H5) viruses to mammals and humans in Russia, as well as the recent A(H5N6) human cases in China may indicate a continuous risk of these viruses adapting to mammals. The risk of infection for the general population in the EU/EEA is assessed as very low, and for occupationally exposed people low, with large uncertainty due to the high diversity of circulating viruses in the bird populations.
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Abstract
BACKGROUND Hepatitis E virus (HEV) is a major cause of acute viral hepatitis. Better understanding of HEV subtypes involved in hepatitis E infections is essential. Investigation of sources and routes of transmission and the identification of potential clusters/outbreaks rely upon molecular typing of viral strains. A study was carried out to evaluate the ability of laboratories to undertake molecular typing with genotype and subtype determination. METHODS A blinded panel of 11 different Orthohepevirus A strains was distributed to 28 laboratories performing HEV sequence analysis. Laboratories used their routine HEV sequencing and genotyping methods. RESULTS Results were returned by 25 laboratories. Overall, 93% samples were assigned to the correct genotype and 81% were assigned to the correct subtype. Fragments amplified for typing ranged in size and the sequencing assays targeted both the structural and non-structural protein-coding regions. There was good agreement between the reported sequences where methods targeted overlapping fragments. In some cases, incorrect genotypes/subtypes were reported, including those not contained in the panel, and in one case, a genotype was reported for a blinded control sample containing Zika virus; collectively these data indicate contamination problems. CONCLUSIONS In general, identification of genotypes was good; however, in a small number of cases, there was a failure to generate sequences from some of the samples. There was generally broad agreement between the use of online typing tools such as the one provided by HEVnet and curated lists of published HEV reference sequences; however, going forward harmonization between these resources is essential.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sally A Baylis
- Viral Safety Section, Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Langen, Germany
| | - Cornelia Adlhoch
- Disease Programmes Unit, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Solna, Sweden
| | - Liam Childs
- Host-Pathogen Interactions, Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Langen, Germany
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17
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Adlhoch C, Fusaro A, Gonzales JL, Kuiken T, Marangon S, Niqueux É, Staubach C, Terregino C, Aznar I, Guajardo IM, Lima E, Baldinelli F. Avian influenza overview February - May 2021. EFSA J 2021; 19:e06951. [PMID: 34925560 PMCID: PMC8647004 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2021.6951] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
The 2020-2021 epidemic with a total of 3,555 reported HPAI detections and around 22,400,000 affected poultry birds in 28 European Countries appears to be one of the largest and most devastating HPAI epidemics ever occurred in Europe. Between 24 February and 14 May 2021, 1,672 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus detections were reported in 24 EU/EEA countries and the UK in poultry (n=580), and in wild (n=1,051) and captive birds (n=41). The majority of the detections in poultry were reported by Poland that accounted for 297 outbreaks occurring in a densely populated poultry area over a short period of time, followed by Germany with 168 outbreaks. Germany accounted for 603 detections in wild birds, followed by Denmark and Poland with 167 and 56 detections, respectively. A second peak of HPAI-associated wild bird mortality was observed from February to April 2021 in north-west Europe. The observed longer persistence of HPAI in wild birds compared to previous years may result in a continuation of the risk for juveniles of wild birds and mammals, as well as for virus entry into poultry farms. Therefore, enhanced awareness among farmers to continue applying stringent biosecurity measures and to monitor and report increases in daily mortality and drops in production parameters, are recommended. Sixteen different genotypes were identified to date in Europe and Russia, suggesting a high propensity of these viruses to reassort. The viruses characterized to date retain a preference for avian-type receptors; however, transmission events to mammals and the identification of sporadic mutations of mammal adaptation, indicate ongoing evolution processes and possible increased ability of viruses within this clade to further adapt and transmit to mammals including humans. Since the last report, two human infections due to A(H5N6) HPAI were reported from China and Laos and 10 human cases due to A(H9N2) low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) virus identified in China and Cambodia. The risk of infection for the general population in the EU/EEA is assessed as very low and for occupationally exposed people low. People exposed during avian influenza outbreaks should adhere to protection measures, strictly wear personal protective equipment and get tested immediately when developing respiratory symptoms or conjunctivitis within 10 days after exposure.
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18
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Adlhoch C, Fusaro A, Gonzales JL, Kuiken T, Marangon S, Niqueux É, Staubach C, Terregino C, Aznar I, Muñoz Guajardo I, Baldinelli F. Avian influenza overview September - December 2021. EFSA J 2021; 19:e07108. [PMID: 34987626 PMCID: PMC8698678 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2021.7108] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/02/2022] Open
Abstract
Between 16 September and 8 December 2021, 867 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus detections were reported in 27 EU/EEA countries and the UK in poultry (316), in wild (523) and in captive birds (28). The detections in poultry were mainly reported by Italy (167) followed by Hungary and Poland (35 each). Tha majority of the detections in wild birds were reported by Germany (280), Netherlands (65) and United Kingdom (53). The observed persistence and continuous circulation of HPAI viruses in migratory and resident wild birds will continue to pose a risk for the poultry industry in Europe for the coming months. The frequent occurrence of HPAI A(H5) incursions in commercial farms (including poultry production types considered at low avian influenza risk) raises concern about the capacity of the applied biosecurity measures to prevent virus introduction. Short-term preparedness and medium- and long-term prevention strategies, including revising and reinforcing biosecurity measures, reduction of the density of commercial poultry farms and possible appropriate vaccination strategies, should be implemented. The results of the genetic analysis indicate that the viruses characterised during this reporting period belong to clade 2.3.4.4b. Some of the characterized HPAI A(H5N1) viruses detected in Sweden, Germany, Poland and United Kingdom are related to the viruses which have been circulating in Europe since October 2020; in North, Central, South and East Europe novel reassortant A(H5N1) virus has been introduced starting from October 2021. HPAI A(H5N1) was also detected in wild mammal species in Sweden, Estonia and Finland; some of these strains characterised so far present an adaptive marker that is associated with increased virulence and replication in mammals. Since the last report, 13 human infections due to HPAI A(H5N6) and two human cases due to LPAI A(H9N2) virus have been reported from China. Some of these A(H5N6) cases were caused by a reassortant virus of clade 2.3.4.4b, which possessed an HA gene closely related to the A(H5) viruses circulating in Europe. The risk of infection for the general population in the EU/EEA is assessed as low, and for occupationally exposed people, low to medium, with large uncertainty due to the high diversity of circulating viruses in the bird populations.
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19
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Adlhoch C, Baldinelli F, Fusaro A, Terregino C. Avian influenza, a new threat to public health in Europe? Clin Microbiol Infect 2021; 28:149-151. [PMID: 34763057 DOI: 10.1016/j.cmi.2021.11.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/01/2021] [Revised: 10/30/2021] [Accepted: 11/01/2021] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Cornelia Adlhoch
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Solna, Sweden.
| | | | - Alice Fusaro
- European Union Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza and Newcastle Disease, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale Delle Venezie, Legnaro (PD), Italy
| | - Calogero Terregino
- European Union Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza and Newcastle Disease, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale Delle Venezie, Legnaro (PD), Italy
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20
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Ferland L, Carvalho C, Dias JG, Lamb F, Adlhoch C, Suetens C, Beauté J, Kinross P, Plachouras D, Hannila-Handelberg T, Fabiani M, Riccardo F, van Gageldonk-Lafeber R, Teirlinck AC, Mossong J, Vergison A, Melillo J, Melillo T, Mook P, Pebody R, Coutinho Rehse AP, Monnet DL. Risk of hospitalization and risk of death for health care workers with COVID-19 in nine European countries, January 2020-January 2021. J Hosp Infect 2021; 119:170-174. [PMID: 34752802 PMCID: PMC8665668 DOI: 10.1016/j.jhin.2021.10.015] [Citation(s) in RCA: 27] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/20/2021] [Revised: 10/21/2021] [Accepted: 10/21/2021] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
Abstract
This article presents and compares coronavirus disease 2019 attack rates for infection, hospitalization, intensive care unit (ICU) admission and death in healthcare workers (HCWs) and non-HCWs in nine European countries from 31st January 2020 to 13th January 2021. Adjusted attack rate ratios in HCWs (compared with non-HCWs) were 3.0 [95% confidence interval (CI) 2.2–4.0] for infection, 1.8 (95% CI 1.2–2.7) for hospitalization, 1.9 (95% CI 1.1–3.2) for ICU admission and 0.9 (95% CI 0.4–2.0) for death. Among hospitalized cases, the case-fatality ratio was 1.8% in HCWs and 8.2% in non-HCWs. Differences may be due to better/earlier access to treatment, differential underascertainment and the healthy worker effect.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lisa Ferland
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Solna, Sweden
| | - Carlos Carvalho
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Solna, Sweden.
| | - Joana Gomes Dias
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Solna, Sweden
| | - Favelle Lamb
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Solna, Sweden
| | - Cornelia Adlhoch
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Solna, Sweden
| | - Carl Suetens
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Solna, Sweden
| | - Julien Beauté
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Solna, Sweden
| | - Pete Kinross
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Solna, Sweden
| | | | | | | | | | | | - Anne C Teirlinck
- National Institute for Public Health and the Environment, Bilthoven, The Netherlands
| | | | | | | | | | - Piers Mook
- World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - Richard Pebody
- World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
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21
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Adlhoch C, Sneiderman M, Martinuka O, Melidou A, Bundle N, Fielding J, Olsen SJ, Penttinen P, Pastore L, Pebody R. Spotlight influenza: The 2019/20 influenza season and the impact of COVID-19 on influenza surveillance in the WHO European Region. ACTA ACUST UNITED AC 2021; 26. [PMID: 34622760 PMCID: PMC8511754 DOI: 10.2807/1560-7917.es.2021.26.40.2100077] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/26/2022]
Abstract
BackgroundAnnual seasonal influenza activity in the northern hemisphere causes a high burden of disease during the winter months, peaking in the first weeks of the year.AimWe describe the 2019/20 influenza season and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on sentinel surveillance in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region.MethodsWe analysed weekly epidemiological and virological influenza data from sentinel primary care and hospital sources reported by countries, territories and areas (hereafter countries) in the European Region.ResultsWe observed co-circulation of influenza B/Victoria-lineage, A(H1)pdm09 and A(H3) viruses during the 2019/20 season, with different dominance patterns observed across the Region. A higher proportion of patients with influenza A virus infection than type B were observed. The influenza activity started in week 47/2019, and influenza positivity rate was ≥ 50% for 2 weeks (05-06/2020) rather than 5-8 weeks in the previous five seasons. In many countries a rapid reduction in sentinel reports and the highest influenza activity was observed in weeks 09-13/2020. Reporting was reduced from week 14/2020 across the Region coincident with the onset of widespread circulation of SARS-CoV-2.ConclusionsOverall, influenza type A viruses dominated; however, there were varying patterns across the Region, with dominance of B/Victoria-lineage viruses in a few countries. The COVID-19 pandemic contributed to an earlier end of the influenza season and reduced influenza virus circulation probably owing to restricted healthcare access and public health measures.
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Affiliation(s)
- Cornelia Adlhoch
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Miriam Sneiderman
- World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - Oksana Martinuka
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Angeliki Melidou
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Nick Bundle
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - James Fielding
- World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - Sonja J Olsen
- World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - Pasi Penttinen
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Lucia Pastore
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Richard Pebody
- World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
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- The members of the European Influenza Surveillance Network are listed under Investigators
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22
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Beauté J, Adlhoch C, Bundle N, Melidou A, Spiteri G. Testing indicators to monitor the COVID-19 pandemic. The Lancet Infectious Diseases 2021; 21:1344-1345. [PMID: 34450053 PMCID: PMC8384351 DOI: 10.1016/s1473-3099(21)00461-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/01/2021] [Accepted: 07/26/2021] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Julien Beauté
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Solna 169 73, Sweden.
| | - Cornelia Adlhoch
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Solna 169 73, Sweden
| | - Nick Bundle
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Solna 169 73, Sweden
| | - Angeliki Melidou
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Solna 169 73, Sweden
| | - Gianfranco Spiteri
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Solna 169 73, Sweden
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23
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Funk T, Pharris A, Spiteri G, Bundle N, Melidou A, Carr M, Gonzalez G, Garcia-Leon A, Crispie F, O'Connor L, Murphy N, Mossong J, Vergison A, Wienecke-Baldacchino AK, Abdelrahman T, Riccardo F, Stefanelli P, Di Martino A, Bella A, Lo Presti A, Casaca P, Moreno J, Borges V, Isidro J, Ferreira R, Gomes JP, Dotsenko L, Suija H, Epstein J, Sadikova O, Sepp H, Ikonen N, Savolainen-Kopra C, Blomqvist S, Möttönen T, Helve O, Gomes-Dias J, Adlhoch C. Characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern B.1.1.7, B.1.351 or P.1: data from seven EU/EEA countries, weeks 38/2020 to 10/2021. Euro Surveill 2021; 26:2100348. [PMID: 33890566 PMCID: PMC8063589 DOI: 10.2807/1560-7917.es.2021.26.16.2100348] [Citation(s) in RCA: 173] [Impact Index Per Article: 57.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/23/2021] [Accepted: 04/21/2021] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Abstract
We compared 19,207 cases of SARS-CoV-2 variant B.1.1.7/S gene target failure (SGTF), 436 B.1.351 and 352 P.1 to non-variant cases reported by seven European countries. COVID-19 cases with these variants had significantly higher adjusted odds ratios for hospitalisation (B.1.1.7/SGTF: 1.7, 95% confidence interval (CI): 1.0-2.9; B.1.351: 3.6, 95% CI: 2.1-6.2; P.1: 2.6, 95% CI: 1.4-4.8) and B.1.1.7/SGTF and P.1 cases also for intensive care admission (B.1.1.7/SGTF: 2.3, 95% CI: 1.4-3.5; P.1: 2.2, 95% CI: 1.7-2.8).
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Affiliation(s)
- Tjede Funk
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Anastasia Pharris
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Gianfranco Spiteri
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Nick Bundle
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Angeliki Melidou
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Michael Carr
- National Virus Reference Laboratory (NVRL), University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
- International Collaboration Unit, Research Center for Zoonosis Control, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan
| | - Gabriel Gonzalez
- National Virus Reference Laboratory (NVRL), University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
- International Collaboration Unit, Research Center for Zoonosis Control, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan
| | - Alejandro Garcia-Leon
- Centre for Experimental Pathogen Host Research, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland on behalf of the All Ireland Infectious Diseases (AIID) Cohort
| | - Fiona Crispie
- Teagasc Food Research Centre, Moorepark, Fermoy, Ireland on behalf of the Irish Coronavirus Sequencing Consortium (ICSC)
| | - Lois O'Connor
- Health Service Executive - Health Protection Surveillance Centre (HPSC), Dublin, Ireland
| | - Niamh Murphy
- Health Service Executive - Health Protection Surveillance Centre (HPSC), Dublin, Ireland
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Pedro Casaca
- Directorate of Analysis and Information, Directorate-General of Health, Lisbon, Portugal
| | - Joana Moreno
- Directorate of Analysis and Information, Directorate-General of Health, Lisbon, Portugal
| | - Vítor Borges
- Bioinformatics Unit, Infectious Diseases Department, National Institute of Health Dr. Ricardo Jorge, Lisbon, Portugal
| | - Joana Isidro
- Bioinformatics Unit, Infectious Diseases Department, National Institute of Health Dr. Ricardo Jorge, Lisbon, Portugal
| | - Rita Ferreira
- Bioinformatics Unit, Infectious Diseases Department, National Institute of Health Dr. Ricardo Jorge, Lisbon, Portugal
| | - João Paulo Gomes
- Bioinformatics Unit, Infectious Diseases Department, National Institute of Health Dr. Ricardo Jorge, Lisbon, Portugal
| | | | | | | | | | | | - Niina Ikonen
- Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare (THL), Department of Health Security, Helsinki, Finland
| | - Carita Savolainen-Kopra
- Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare (THL), Department of Health Security, Helsinki, Finland
| | - Soile Blomqvist
- Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare (THL), Department of Health Security, Helsinki, Finland
| | - Teemu Möttönen
- Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare (THL), Department of Health Security, Helsinki, Finland
| | - Otto Helve
- Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare (THL), Department of Health Security, Helsinki, Finland
| | - Joana Gomes-Dias
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Cornelia Adlhoch
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
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24
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Adlhoch C, Mook P, Lamb F, Ferland L, Melidou A, Amato-Gauci AJ, Pebody R. Very little influenza in the WHO European Region during the 2020/21 season, weeks 40 2020 to 8 2021. Euro Surveill 2021; 26:2100221. [PMID: 33739256 PMCID: PMC7976381 DOI: 10.2807/1560-7917.es.2021.26.11.2100221] [Citation(s) in RCA: 60] [Impact Index Per Article: 20.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/22/2021] [Accepted: 03/18/2021] [Indexed: 01/22/2023] Open
Abstract
Between weeks 40 2020 and 8 2021, the World Health Organization European Region experienced a 99.8% reduction in sentinel influenza virus positive detections (33/25,606 tested; 0.1%) relative to an average of 14,966/39,407 (38.0%; p < 0.001) over the same time in the previous six seasons. COVID-19 pandemic public health and physical distancing measures may have extinguished the 2020/21 European seasonal influenza epidemic with just a few sporadic detections of all viral subtypes. This might possibly continue during the remainder of the influenza season.
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Affiliation(s)
- Cornelia Adlhoch
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Piers Mook
- World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - Favelle Lamb
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Lisa Ferland
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Angeliki Melidou
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | | | - Richard Pebody
- World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
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25
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Adlhoch C, Fusaro A, Gonzales JL, Kuiken T, Marangon S, Niqueux É, Staubach C, Terregino C, Muñoz Guajardo I, Lima E, Baldinelli F. Avian influenza overview December 2020 - February 2021. EFSA J 2021; 19:e06497. [PMID: 33717356 PMCID: PMC7927793 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2021.6497] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/27/2023] Open
Abstract
Between 8 December 2020 and 23 February 2021, 1,022 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus detectionswere reported in 25 EU/EEA countries and the UK in poultry (n=592), wild (n=421) and captive birds (n=9).The majority of the detections were reported by Francethat accounted for 442 outbreaks in poultry,mostly located inthe Landes regionandaffecting the foie gras production industry,and six wild bird detections; Germany,who reported 207 detections in wild birds and 50 poultry outbreaks; Denmark,with 63 detections in wild birds and one poultry outbreak; and Poland,with 37 poultry outbreaks and 24 wild bird detections. Due to the continued presence of HPAI A(H5) viruses in wild birds and the environment,there is still a risk of avian influenza incursions with the potential further spread between establishments, primarily in areas with high poultry densities. As the currently circulating HPAI A(H5N8) virus cancause high mortality also in affected duck farms, mortality eventscan be seen as a good indicator of virus presence. However,also subclinical virusspread in this type of poultry production system have been reported.To improve early detection of infection in poultry within the surveillance zone, the clinical inspection of duck establishments should be complemented by encouraging farmers to collect dead birds to be pooled and tested weekly (bucket sampling).Six different genotypes were identified to date in Europe and Russia, suggesting a high propensity of these viruses to undergo multiple reassortment events. To date, no evidence of fixation of known mutations previously described as associated to zoonotic potential has been observed in HPAI viruses currently circulanting in Europe based on the available sequences.Seven cases due to A(H5N8) HPAI virus have been reported from Russia, all were poultry workerswith mild or no symptoms. Five human cases due to A(H5N6) HPAI and 10 cases due to A(H9N2) LPAI viruseshave been reported from China. The risk for the general population as well as travel-related imported human cases is assessed as very lowand the risk forpeople occupationally exposedpeople as low.Any human infections with avian influenza viruses are notifiablewithin 24 hoursthrough the Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) and the International Health Regulations (IHR) notification system.
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Boklund A, Gortázar C, Pasquali P, Roberts H, Nielsen SS, Stahl K, Stegeman A, Baldinelli F, Broglia A, Van Der Stede Y, Adlhoch C, Alm E, Melidou A, Mirinaviciute G. Monitoring of SARS-CoV-2 infection in mustelids. EFSA J 2021; 19:e06459. [PMID: 33717355 PMCID: PMC7926496 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2021.6459] [Citation(s) in RCA: 46] [Impact Index Per Article: 15.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/08/2023] Open
Abstract
American mink and ferret are highly susceptible to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), but no information is available for other mustelid species. SARS-CoV-2 spreads very efficiently within mink farms once introduced, by direct and indirect contact, high within-farm animal density increases the chance for transmission. Between-farm spread is likely to occur once SARS-CoV-2 is introduced, short distance between SARS-CoV-2 positive farms is a risk factor. As of 29 January 2021, SARS-CoV-2 virus has been reported in 400 mink farms in eight countries in the European Union. In most cases, the likely introduction of SARS-CoV-2 infection into farms was infected humans. Human health can be at risk by mink-related variant viruses, which can establish circulation in the community, but so far these have not shown to be more transmissible or causing more severe impact compared with other circulating SARS-CoV-2. Concerning animal health risk posed by SARS-CoV-2 infection the animal species that may be included in monitoring plans are American mink, ferrets, cats, raccoon dogs, white-tailed deer and Rhinolophidae bats. All mink farms should be considered at risk of infection; therefore, the monitoring objective should be early detection. This includes passive monitoring (in place in the whole territory of all countries where animals susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 are bred) but also active monitoring by regular testing. First, frequent testing of farm personnel and all people in contact with the animals is recommended. Furthermore randomly selected animals (dead or sick animals should be included) should be tested using reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), ideally at weekly intervals (i.e. design prevalence approximately 5% in each epidemiological unit, to be assessed case by case). Suspected animals (dead or with clinical signs and a minimum five animals) should be tested for confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection. Positive samples from each farm should be sequenced to monitor virus evolution and results publicly shared.
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Nørgaard SK, Vestergaard LS, Nielsen J, Richter L, Schmid D, Bustos N, Braye T, Athanasiadou M, Lytras T, Denissov G, Veideman T, Luomala O, Möttönen T, Fouillet A, Caserio-Schönemann C, An der Heiden M, Uphoff H, Gkolfinopoulou K, Bobvos J, Paldy A, Rotem N, Kornilenko I, Domegan L, O'Donnell J, Donato FD, Scortichini M, Hoffmann P, Velez T, England K, Calleja N, van Asten L, Stoeldraijer L, White RA, Paulsen TH, da Silva SP, Rodrigues AP, Klepac P, Zaletel M, Fafangel M, Larrauri A, León I, Farah A, Galanis I, Junker C, Perisa D, Sinnathamby M, Andrews N, O'Doherty MG, Irwin D, Kennedy S, McMenamin J, Adlhoch C, Bundle N, Penttinen P, Pukkila J, Pebody R, Krause TG, Mølbak K. Real-time monitoring shows substantial excess all-cause mortality during second wave of COVID-19 in Europe, October to December 2020. ACTA ACUST UNITED AC 2021; 26. [PMID: 33446304 PMCID: PMC7809719 DOI: 10.2807/1560-7917.es.2021.26.1.2002023] [Citation(s) in RCA: 41] [Impact Index Per Article: 13.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/14/2023]
Abstract
The European monitoring of excess mortality for public health action (EuroMOMO) network monitors weekly excess all-cause mortality in 27 European countries or subnational areas. During the first wave of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic in Europe in spring 2020, several countries experienced extraordinarily high levels of excess mortality. Europe is currently seeing another upsurge in COVID-19 cases, and EuroMOMO is again witnessing a substantial excess all-cause mortality attributable to COVID-19.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Jens Nielsen
- EuroMOMO hub, Statens Serum Institut, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - Lukas Richter
- Austrian Agency for Health and Food Safety, Vienna, Austria
| | - Daniela Schmid
- Austrian Agency for Health and Food Safety, Vienna, Austria
| | | | | | | | | | - Gleb Denissov
- National Institute for Health Development, Tallinn, Estonia
| | | | - Oskari Luomala
- Finnish National Institute for Health and Welfare, Helsinki, Finland
| | - Teemu Möttönen
- Finnish National Institute for Health and Welfare, Helsinki, Finland
| | - Anne Fouillet
- French Public Health Agency (Santé Publique France), Saint-Maurice, France
| | | | | | - Helmut Uphoff
- Hessisches Landesprüfungs- und Untersuchungsamt im Gesundheitswesen, Dillenburg, Germany
| | | | - Janos Bobvos
- National Public Health Center, Budapest, Hungary
| | - Anna Paldy
- National Public Health Center, Budapest, Hungary
| | - Naama Rotem
- Health & Vital Statistics Sector, Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem, Israel
| | - Irene Kornilenko
- Health & Vital Statistics Sector, Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem, Israel
| | - Lisa Domegan
- Health Service Executive - Health Protection Surveillance Centre, Dublin, Ireland
| | - Joan O'Donnell
- Health Service Executive - Health Protection Surveillance Centre, Dublin, Ireland
| | | | | | - Patrick Hoffmann
- Health Directorate Luxembourg - Division de l'inspection sanitaire, Luxembourg, Luxembourg
| | - Telma Velez
- Health Directorate Luxembourg - Division de l'inspection sanitaire, Luxembourg, Luxembourg
| | | | - Neville Calleja
- Directorate for Health Information and Research, Pieta, Malta
| | - Liselotte van Asten
- National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Bilthoven, the Netherlands
| | | | | | | | | | - Ana P Rodrigues
- Instituto Nacional de Saúde Doutor Ricardo Jorge, Lisboa, Portugal
| | - Petra Klepac
- National Institute of Public Health, Ljubljana, Slovenia
| | - Metka Zaletel
- National Institute of Public Health, Ljubljana, Slovenia
| | - Mario Fafangel
- National Institute of Public Health, Ljubljana, Slovenia
| | - Amparo Larrauri
- National Centre of Epidemiology, CIBER Epidemiología y Salud Pública (CIBERESP), Carlos III Health Institute, Madrid, Spain
| | - Inmaculada León
- National Centre of Epidemiology, CIBER Epidemiología y Salud Pública (CIBERESP), Carlos III Health Institute, Madrid, Spain
| | - Ahmed Farah
- Public Health Agency of Sweden, Stockholm, Sweden
| | | | | | - Damir Perisa
- Federal Office of Public Health, Bern, Switzerland
| | - Mary Sinnathamby
- Public Health England, Colindale, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
| | - Nick Andrews
- Public Health England, Colindale, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
| | - Mark G O'Doherty
- Public Health Agency, Northern Ireland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
| | - David Irwin
- Public Health Agency, Northern Ireland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
| | - Sharon Kennedy
- Public Health Scotland, Glasgow, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
| | - Jim McMenamin
- Public Health Scotland, Glasgow, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
| | - Cornelia Adlhoch
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Solna, Sweden
| | - Nick Bundle
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Solna, Sweden
| | - Pasi Penttinen
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Solna, Sweden
| | - Jukka Pukkila
- World Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - Richard Pebody
- World Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - Tyra G Krause
- EuroMOMO hub, Statens Serum Institut, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - Kåre Mølbak
- Department of Veterinary and Animal Science, Faculty of Health and Medical Science, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark.,EuroMOMO hub, Statens Serum Institut, Copenhagen, Denmark
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Adlhoch C, Fusaro A, Gonzales JL, Kuiken T, Marangon S, Niqueux É, Staubach C, Terregino C, Baldinelli F. Avian influenza overview August - December 2020. EFSA J 2020; 18:e06379. [PMID: 33343738 PMCID: PMC7744019 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2020.6379] [Citation(s) in RCA: 21] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/20/2022] Open
Abstract
Between 15 August and 7 December 2020, 561highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus detections were reported in 15EU/EEA countries and UK in wild birds, poultry andcaptive birds, with Germany (n=370), Denmark (n=65), the Netherlands (n=57) being the most affected countries.The majority of the detections have been reported in wild birds(n=510), primarily in barnacle goose, greylag goose, andEurasian wigeon. Raptors have also been detected infected, particularly common buzzard. The majority of the birds had been found dead or moribund,however, there are also reports ofHPAI virus infection in apparently healthy ducks or geese.A total of 43 HPAI outbreaks were notified in poultry;with signs of avian influenza infection being observed in at least 33 outbreaks;the most likely source of infection was indirect contact with wild birds. Three HPAI virus subtypes, A(H5N8) (n=518), A(H5N5) (n=17) and A(H5N1) (n=6),and four different genotypes were identified, suggesting the occurrence of multiple virus introductions into Europe.The reassortant A(H5N1) virus identified in EU/EEA countries has acquired gene segments from low pathogenic viruses and is not related to A(H5N1) viruses of e.g. clade 2.3.2.1c causing human infections outside of Europe. As the autumn migration of wild waterbirds to their wintering areasin Europe continues, and given the expected local movements of these birds, there is still a high risk of introduction andfurther spread ofHPAI A(H5) viruses within Europe.The risk of virus spread from wild birds to poultry is high and Member States should enforce in 'high risk areas' of their territories the measures provided for in Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1136.Detection of outbreaks in breeder farms in Denmark, the Netherlands and United Kingdom, highlight also the risk of introduction via contaminated materials (bedding/straw) and equipment.Maintaining high and sustainable surveillance and biosecurityparticularly in high-risk areas is of utmost importance. Two human cases due to zoonoticA(H5N1) and A(H9N2) avian influenza virus infection were reportedduring the reporting period. The risk for the general population as well as travel-related imported human cases are assessed as very low.
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Melidou A, Pereyaslov D, Hungnes O, Prosenc K, Alm E, Adlhoch C, Fielding J, Sneiderman M, Martinuka O, Celentano LP, Pebody R. Virological surveillance of influenza viruses in the WHO European Region in 2019/20 - impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Euro Surveill 2020; 25:2001822. [PMID: 33213683 PMCID: PMC7678039 DOI: 10.2807/1560-7917.es.2020.25.46.2001822] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/29/2022] Open
Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic negatively impacted the 2019/20 WHO European Region influenza surveillance. Compared with previous 4-year averages, antigenic and genetic characterisations decreased by 17% (3,140 vs 2,601) and 24% (4,474 vs 3,403). Of subtyped influenza A viruses, 56% (26,477/47,357) were A(H1)pdm09, 44% (20,880/47,357) A(H3). Of characterised B viruses, 98% (4,585/4,679) were B/Victoria. Considerable numbers of viruses antigenically differed from northern hemisphere vaccine components. In 2020/21, maintaining influenza virological surveillance, while supporting SARS-CoV-2 surveillance is crucial.
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Affiliation(s)
- Angeliki Melidou
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Dmitriy Pereyaslov
- World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - Olav Hungnes
- Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Oslo, Norway
| | - Katarina Prosenc
- Laboratory for Public Health Virology, National Influenza Centre Slovenia, National Laboratory for Health, Environment and Food, Ljubljana, Slovenia
| | - Erik Alm
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Cornelia Adlhoch
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - James Fielding
- World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - Miriam Sneiderman
- World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - Oksana Martinuka
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | | | - Richard Pebody
- World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
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Adlhoch C, Fusaro A, Gonzales JL, Kuiken T, Marangon S, Niqueux É, Staubach C, Smietanka K, Terregino C, Van der Stede Y, Aznar I, Baldinelli F. Avian influenza overview - update on 19 November 2020, EU/EEA and the UK. EFSA J 2020; 18:e06341. [PMID: 33281979 PMCID: PMC7684971 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2020.6341] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
Since 16 October 2020, outbreaks ofhighly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruseshavebeen reported inseveral EU/EEAcountries -Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Swedenas well asin the United Kingdom.As of 19 November,12pm, 302 HPAI A(H5) detections have been reported, with the majority of the detections referring to wild birds (n=281), and a few related to outbreaks in poultry (n=18) and captive birds (n=3). Most of the detections in wild birds were in wild waterbirds,being barnacle goose the most affected species (n=110), followed by greylag goose (n=47), Eurasian wigeon (n=32),mallard (n=14), and common buzzard (n=13).ThreeHPAI virus subtypes were identified, A(H5N8), A(H5N5) and A(H5N1), with A(H5N8) being the most reported subtype (n=284). Phylogenetic analysis indicated that the viruses evolved from a single progenitor virus thatwent through multiple reassortment events. Based on the ongoing autumn migration of wild waterbirds to their wintering areas in Europe, there is a continued risk of further introduction of HPAI A(H5) viruses into Europe. Furthermore, given the expected movements of both migratory, and resident wild birds in Europe during winter, there is a high risk of further spread of HPAI A(H5) viruses within Europe. No genetic markers indicating adaptation to mammals have been identified in the viruses analysed so far,andno human infection due to avian influenza viruses detected in the recent outbreakshas been reported. For that reason,the risk to the general population remains very low.However,following the precautionary principle, people should avoid touching sick or dead birds unprotected to minimise any potential risk.
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Adlhoch C, Pebody R. What to expect for the influenza season 2020/21 with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic in the World Health Organization European Region. Euro Surveill 2020; 25:2001816. [PMID: 33094719 PMCID: PMC7651872 DOI: 10.2807/1560-7917.es.2020.25.42.2001816] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/20/2020] [Accepted: 10/22/2020] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Cornelia Adlhoch
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Richard Pebody
- World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
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32
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Ong CWM, Migliori GB, Raviglione M, MacGregor-Skinner G, Sotgiu G, Alffenaar JW, Tiberi S, Adlhoch C, Alonzi T, Archuleta S, Brusin S, Cambau E, Capobianchi MR, Castilletti C, Centis R, Cirillo DM, D'Ambrosio L, Delogu G, Esposito SMR, Figueroa J, Friedland JS, Ho BCH, Ippolito G, Jankovic M, Kim HY, Rosales Klintz S, Ködmön C, Lalle E, Leo YS, Leung CC, Märtson AG, Melazzini MG, Najafi Fard S, Penttinen P, Petrone L, Petruccioli E, Pontali E, Saderi L, Santin M, Spanevello A, van Crevel R, van der Werf MJ, Visca D, Viveiros M, Zellweger JP, Zumla A, Goletti D. Epidemic and pandemic viral infections: impact on tuberculosis and the lung: A consensus by the World Association for Infectious Diseases and Immunological Disorders (WAidid), Global Tuberculosis Network (GTN), and members of the European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases Study Group for Mycobacterial Infections (ESGMYC). Eur Respir J 2020; 56:2001727. [PMID: 32586885 PMCID: PMC7527651 DOI: 10.1183/13993003.01727-2020] [Citation(s) in RCA: 73] [Impact Index Per Article: 18.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/11/2020] [Accepted: 06/12/2020] [Indexed: 01/08/2023]
Abstract
Major epidemics, including some that qualify as pandemics, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), HIV, influenza A (H1N1)pdm/09 and most recently COVID-19, affect the lung. Tuberculosis (TB) remains the top infectious disease killer, but apart from syndemic TB/HIV little is known regarding the interaction of viral epidemics and pandemics with TB. The aim of this consensus-based document is to describe the effects of viral infections resulting in epidemics and pandemics that affect the lung (MERS, SARS, HIV, influenza A (H1N1)pdm/09 and COVID-19) and their interactions with TB. A search of the scientific literature was performed. A writing committee of international experts including the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control Public Health Emergency (ECDC PHE) team, the World Association for Infectious Diseases and Immunological Disorders (WAidid), the Global Tuberculosis Network (GTN), and members of the European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases (ESCMID) Study Group for Mycobacterial Infections (ESGMYC) was established. Consensus was achieved after multiple rounds of revisions between the writing committee and a larger expert group. A Delphi process involving the core group of authors (excluding the ECDC PHE team) identified the areas requiring review/consensus, followed by a second round to refine the definitive consensus elements. The epidemiology and immunology of these viral infections and their interactions with TB are discussed with implications for diagnosis, treatment and prevention of airborne infections (infection control, viral containment and workplace safety). This consensus document represents a rapid and comprehensive summary on what is known on the topic.
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Affiliation(s)
- Catherine Wei Min Ong
- Dept of Medicine, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore
- Institute for Health Innovation and Technology (iHealthtech), National University of Singapore, Singapore
- These authors contributed equally
- Members of ESGMYC
| | - Giovanni Battista Migliori
- Servizio di Epidemiologia Clinica delle Malattie Respiratorie, Istituti Clinici Scientifici Maugeri IRCCS, Tradate, Italy
- These authors contributed equally
| | - Mario Raviglione
- Centre for Multidisciplinary Research in Health Science, University of Milan, Milan, Italy
- Global Studies Institute, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
| | | | - Giovanni Sotgiu
- Clinical Epidemiology and Medical Statistics Unit, Dept of Medical, Surgical and Experimental Sciences, University of Sassari, Sassari, Italy
| | - Jan-Willem Alffenaar
- Sydney Pharmacy School, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia
- Westmead Hospital, Sydney, Australia
- Marie Bashir Institute of Infectious Diseases and Biosecurity, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia
- Members of ESGMYC
| | - Simon Tiberi
- Blizard Institute, Barts and The London School of Medicine and Dentistry, Queen Mary University of London, London, UK
- Division of Infection, Royal London Hospital, Barts Health NHS Trust, London, UK
- Members of ESGMYC
| | - Cornelia Adlhoch
- Public Health Emergency Team, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Stockholm, Sweden
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control Public Health Emergency team co-authors
| | - Tonino Alonzi
- Translational Research Unit, Epidemiology and Preclinical Research Dept, "L. Spallanzani" National Institute for Infectious Diseases (INMI), IRCCS, Rome, Italy
| | - Sophia Archuleta
- Dept of Medicine, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore
| | - Sergio Brusin
- Public Health Emergency Team, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Stockholm, Sweden
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control Public Health Emergency team co-authors
| | - Emmanuelle Cambau
- AP-HP-Lariboisiere, Bacteriologie, Laboratory Associated to the National Reference Centre for Mycobacteria, IAME UMR1137, INSERM, University of Paris, Paris, France
- Members of ESGMYC
| | - Maria Rosaria Capobianchi
- Laboratory of Virology, Epidemiology and Preclinical Research Dept, "L. Spallanzani" National Institute for Infectious Diseases (INMI), IRCCS, Rome, Italy
| | - Concetta Castilletti
- Laboratory of Virology, Epidemiology and Preclinical Research Dept, "L. Spallanzani" National Institute for Infectious Diseases (INMI), IRCCS, Rome, Italy
| | - Rosella Centis
- Servizio di Epidemiologia Clinica delle Malattie Respiratorie, Istituti Clinici Scientifici Maugeri IRCCS, Tradate, Italy
| | - Daniela M Cirillo
- Emerging Bacterial Pathogens Unit, IRCCS San Raffaele Scientific Institute, Milan, Italy
- Members of ESGMYC
| | | | - Giovanni Delogu
- Università Cattolica Sacro Cuore, Roma, Italy
- Mater Olbia Hospital, Olbia, Italy
- Members of ESGMYC
| | - Susanna M R Esposito
- Pediatric Clinic, Pietro Barilla Children's Hospital, University of Parma, Parma, Italy
| | | | - Jon S Friedland
- St George's, University of London, London, UK
- Members of ESGMYC
| | - Benjamin Choon Heng Ho
- Tuberculosis Control Unit, Dept of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine, Tan Tock Seng Hospital, Singapore
| | - Giuseppe Ippolito
- Scientific Direction, "L. Spallanzani" National Institute for Infectious Diseases (INMI), IRCCS, Rome, Italy
| | - Mateja Jankovic
- School of Medicine, University of Zagreb and Clinic for Respiratory Diseases, University Hospital Center Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia
- Members of ESGMYC
| | - Hannah Yejin Kim
- Sydney Pharmacy School, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia
- Westmead Hospital, Sydney, Australia
- Marie Bashir Institute of Infectious Diseases and Biosecurity, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia
| | - Senia Rosales Klintz
- Public Health Emergency Team, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Stockholm, Sweden
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control Public Health Emergency team co-authors
| | - Csaba Ködmön
- Public Health Emergency Team, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Stockholm, Sweden
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control Public Health Emergency team co-authors
| | - Eleonora Lalle
- Laboratory of Virology, Epidemiology and Preclinical Research Dept, "L. Spallanzani" National Institute for Infectious Diseases (INMI), IRCCS, Rome, Italy
| | - Yee Sin Leo
- National Centre for Infectious Diseases, Singapore
| | - Chi-Chiu Leung
- Hong Kong Tuberculosis, Chest and Heart Diseases Association, Wanchai, Hong Kong, China
| | - Anne-Grete Märtson
- Dept of Clinical Pharmacy and Pharmacology, University Medical Center Groningen, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
| | | | - Saeid Najafi Fard
- Translational Research Unit, Epidemiology and Preclinical Research Dept, "L. Spallanzani" National Institute for Infectious Diseases (INMI), IRCCS, Rome, Italy
| | - Pasi Penttinen
- Public Health Emergency Team, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Stockholm, Sweden
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control Public Health Emergency team co-authors
| | - Linda Petrone
- Translational Research Unit, Epidemiology and Preclinical Research Dept, "L. Spallanzani" National Institute for Infectious Diseases (INMI), IRCCS, Rome, Italy
| | - Elisa Petruccioli
- Translational Research Unit, Epidemiology and Preclinical Research Dept, "L. Spallanzani" National Institute for Infectious Diseases (INMI), IRCCS, Rome, Italy
| | | | - Laura Saderi
- Clinical Epidemiology and Medical Statistics Unit, Dept of Medical, Surgical and Experimental Sciences, University of Sassari, Sassari, Italy
| | - Miguel Santin
- Dept of Infectious Diseases, Bellvitge University Hospital-Bellvitge Biomedical Research Institute (IDIBELL), L'Hospitalet de Llobregat, Barcelona, Spain
- Dept of Clinical Science, University of Barcelona, L'Hospitalet de Llobregat, Barcelona, Spain
- Members of ESGMYC
| | - Antonio Spanevello
- Division of Pulmonary Rehabilitation, Istituti Clinici Scientifici Maugeri, IRCCS, Tradate, Italy
- Dept of Medicine and Surgery, Respiratory Diseases, University of Insubria, Varese-Como, Italy
| | - Reinout van Crevel
- Radboudumc Center for Infectious Diseases, Radboud Institute for Health Sciences, Radboudumc, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
- Centre for Tropical Medicine and Global Health, Nuffield Dept of Medicine, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
- Members of ESGMYC
| | - Marieke J van der Werf
- Public Health Emergency Team, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Stockholm, Sweden
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control Public Health Emergency team co-authors
| | - Dina Visca
- Division of Pulmonary Rehabilitation, Istituti Clinici Scientifici Maugeri, IRCCS, Tradate, Italy
- Dept of Medicine and Surgery, Respiratory Diseases, University of Insubria, Varese-Como, Italy
| | - Miguel Viveiros
- Global Health and Tropical Medicine, Institute of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, NOVA University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal
- Members of ESGMYC
| | | | - Alimuddin Zumla
- Dept of Infection, Division of Infection and Immunity, University College London and NIHR Biomedical Research Centre, UCL Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, London, UK
| | - Delia Goletti
- Translational Research Unit, Epidemiology and Preclinical Research Dept, "L. Spallanzani" National Institute for Infectious Diseases (INMI), IRCCS, Rome, Italy
- Saint Camillus International University of Health and Medical Sciences, Rome, Italy
- Members of ESGMYC
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Adlhoch C, Fusaro A, Kuiken T, Niqueux É, Staubach C, Terregino C, Muñoz Guajardo I, Baldinelli F. Avian influenza overview May - August 2020. EFSA J 2020; 18:e06270. [PMID: 33281980 PMCID: PMC7525800 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2020.6270] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/11/2022] Open
Abstract
Between 16 May and 15 August 2020, seven highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N8) virus outbreaks were reported in Europe in poultry, with one outbreak reported in Bulgaria(n=1) andsix in Hungary (n=6) and one low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) A(H5N3) virus outbreak was reported in poultry in Italy. All six outbreaks detected in Hungary were secondary outbreaks and seem to be the tail end of the HPAI A(H5N8) epidemic that wasobserved in poultry over the winter and spring in central Europe from December 2019 (n=334).Genetic analysis of the HPAI A(H5N8) viruses isolated during this reporting period from Bulgaria and Hungary did not identify any major changes compared tothe viruses collected in the respective countries during the first months of 2020. This suggests a persistence of the virus in the two countries rather than new introductions via infectedwild birds. HPAI A(H5N8) virus has been detected in poultry and wild birds in western Russia within the reporting period, and as of the middle of September also in Kazakhstan. The presence of HPAI virus in western Russiaand in north Kazakhstan,spatially associated with autumnmigration routes of wild waterbirds, is of concern due to the possible spread of the virus via wild birds migrating to the EU.It is highly recommended thatMember States take appropriate measures to promptly detect suspected cases of HPAI, including increasing biosecurity measures. According to past experiences (2005-2006 and 2016-2017 epidemic waves), the northern and eastern European areas might be at higher risk of virus introduction in the coming autumn-winter seasonand should be the key regions where prompt response measures to early detect the virusshould be set up. One human case due to A(H9N2) avian influenza virus infection was reported during the reporting period.
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Melidou A, Hungnes O, Pereyaslov D, Adlhoch C, Segaloff H, Robesyn E, Penttinen P, Olsen SJ. Predominance of influenza virus A(H3N2) 3C.2a1b and A(H1N1)pdm09 6B.1A5A genetic subclades in the WHO European Region, 2018-2019. Vaccine 2020; 38:5707-5717. [PMID: 32624252 DOI: 10.1016/j.vaccine.2020.06.031] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/04/2019] [Revised: 06/05/2020] [Accepted: 06/09/2020] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
Abstract
BACKGROUND The 2018/2019 influenza season in the WHO European Region was dominated by influenza A (H1N1)pdm09 and (H3N2) viruses, with very few influenza B viruses detected. METHODS Countries in the European Region reported virus characterization data to The European Surveillance System for weeks 40/2018 to 20/2019. These virus antigenic and genetic characterization and haemagglutinin (HA) sequence data were analysed to describe and assess circulating viruses relative to the 2018/2019 vaccine virus components for the northern hemisphere. RESULTS Thirty countries reported 4776 viruses characterized genetically and 3311 viruses antigenically. All genetically characterized A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses fell in subclade 6B.1A, of which 90% carried the amino acid substitution S183P in the HA gene. Antigenic data indicated that circulating A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses were similar to the 2018/2019 vaccine virus. Genetic data showed that A(H3N2) viruses mostly fell in clade 3C.2a (75%) and 90% of which were subclade 3C.2a1b. A lower proportion fell in clade 3C.3a (23%) and were antigenically distinct from the vaccine virus. All B/Victoria viruses belonged to clade 1A; 30% carried a double amino acid deletion in HA and were genetically and antigenically similar to the vaccine virus component, while 55% carried a triple amino acid deletion or no deletion in HA; these were antigenically distinct from each other and from the vaccine component. All B/Yamagata viruses belonged to clade 3 and were antigenically similar to the virus component in the quadrivalent vaccine for 2018/2019. CONCLUSIONS A simultaneous circulation of genetically and antigenically diverse A(H3N2) and B/Victoria viruses was observed and represented a challenge to vaccine strain selection.
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Affiliation(s)
- Angeliki Melidou
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden.
| | - Olav Hungnes
- Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Oslo, Norway
| | | | - Cornelia Adlhoch
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | | | - Emmanuel Robesyn
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Pasi Penttinen
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
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Abstract
Between 16 August and 15 November 2019, one low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) A(H5) outbreak in poultry in France was reported in Europe. Genetic characterisation reveals that the virusclusterswith Eurasian LPAI viruses. No highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks in birds were notified in Europe in the relevant period for this report. HPAI A(H5N6) viruswas identified in chickens in Nigeria, this isthe first report of HPAI A(H5N6) from the African continent.FewerHPAI outbreaks in Asia and Africa were reported during the time period for this report compared with the previous reporting period. Apart from the long‐term epidemic of HPAI A(H5N2)in Taiwan, only six HPAI outbreakswere reported in domestic birds from Nepal, South Africa and Taiwan. Furthermore, no HPAI detections fromwild birds were reported worldwide in the relevant time period forthis report.Even if the risk of incursion of HPAI from wild birds into poultryestablishments in Europe is currently assessed as low, it is important to maintain passive surveillance activities. The focus should be on wild bird species that are in the revised list of target species in order to detect any incursion of HPAI virus early and initiate a warning.Despite the decrease in the number of avian influenza outbreaks over recent months, it is important to maintain a high alert level andhigh standard of biosecurity onpoultry establishments.In Europe, no human infections due toHPAI viruses detected in wild bird or poultry outbreaks, have been reported. The risk of zoonotic transmission to the general public in Europe is considered to be very low.
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Adlhoch C, Fusaro A, Kuiken T, Niqueux E, Staubach C, Terregino C, Guajardo IM, Baldinelli F. Avian influenza overview February - May 2020. EFSA J 2020; 18:e06194. [PMID: 32874346 PMCID: PMC7448026 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2020.6194] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/10/2023] Open
Abstract
Between 16 February and 15 May 2020, 290highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) virus outbreakswere reported in Europe in poultry (n=287), captive birds (n=2) and wild birds (n=1)in Bulgaria, Czechia,Germany,Hungary andPolandand two low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) A(H7N1) virus outbreaks were reported in poultry in Italy. 258 of 287 poultry outbreaks detected in Europe were secondary outbreaks, suggesting that in the large majoryty of cases the spread of the virus was not due to wild birds.Allthe HPAI outbreaks were A(H5N8) apart from three,which were reported as A(H5N2) from Bulgaria. Genetic analysis of the HPAI A(H5N8) viruses isolated from the eastern and central European countries indicates that this is a reassortant between HPAI A(H5N8) viruses from Africa and LPAI viruses from Eurasia. Two distict subtypes were identified in Bulgaria, a novel reassortant A(H5N2) and A(H5N8) that is persisting in the country since 2016. There could be several reasons why only very few HPAI cases were detected in wild birds in this 2019-2020 epidemic season and a better knowledge of wild bird movements and virus-host interaction (e.g. susceptibility of the hosts to this virus) could help to understand the reasons for poor detection of HPAI infected wild birds. In comparison with the last reporting period, a decreasing number of HPAI A(H5)-affected countries and outbreaks were reported from outside Europe. However, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the current epidemiological situation in many countries out of Europe. Four human cases due to A(H9N2) virus infection were reported during the reporting period from China.
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Adlhoch C, Fusaro A, Kuiken T, Niqueux E, Staubach C, Terregino C, Guajardo IM, Baldinelli F. Avian influenza overview November 2019- February2020. EFSA J 2020; 18:e06096. [PMID: 32874270 PMCID: PMC7448010 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2020.6096] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/11/2022] Open
Abstract
Between 16 November 2019 and 15 February 2020, 36 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N8) virus outbreakswere reported in Europe in poultry (n=34), captive birds (n=1) and wild birds (n=2), in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Germany, Czechiaand Ukraine,one HPAI outbreakcaused by a simultaneous infection with A(H5N2) and A(H5N8) was reported in poultry in Bulgaria, andtwo low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) A(H5) virus outbreaks were reported in poultryin the United Kingdom and in Denmark. Genomic characterisation of the HPAI A(H5N8) viruses suggests that they are reassortants of HPAI A(H5N8) viruses from Africa and LPAI viruses from Eurasia. It is likely that this reassortment occurred in wild migratory birds in Asia during the summer and then spread to eastern Europe with the autumnmigration. This is the first time that wild bird migration from Africa to Eurasia has been implicated in the long-distance spread of HPAI viruses to the EU. Given the late incursion of HPAI A(H5N8) virus into the EU in this winter season (first outbreak reported on 30 December 2019), its overall restriction to eastern Europe, and the approaching spring migration, the risk of the virus spreadingfurther in the west via wild birds is decreasing for the coming months. Genetic analysis of the HPAI A(H5N2) and A(H5N8) viruses detected in the Bulgarian outbreak reveals that these virusesare both related to the 2018-19 Bulgarian HPAI A(H5N8) viruses and not to the HPAI A(H5N8) viruses currently circulating in Europe.An increasing number of HPAI A(H5N1), A(H5N2), A(H5N5) and A(H5N6) virus outbreaks in poultry in Asia were reported during the time period for this report compared with the previous reporting period. Single outbreaks of HPAI A(H5N8) virus were notified by Saudi Arabia and South Africa. Furthermore, in contrast to the last report, HPAI virus-positive wild birds were reported from Israel and one of the key migration areas in northern China.Two human cases due to A(H9N2) virus infection were reported during the reporting period.
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Mook P, Meerhoff T, Olsen SJ, Snacken R, Adlhoch C, Pereyaslov D, Broberg EK, Melidou A, Brown C, Penttinen P. Alternating patterns of seasonal influenza activity in the WHO European Region following the 2009 pandemic, 2010-2018. Influenza Other Respir Viruses 2020; 14:150-161. [PMID: 31944604 PMCID: PMC7040975 DOI: 10.1111/irv.12703] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/05/2019] [Revised: 10/12/2019] [Accepted: 10/15/2019] [Indexed: 11/28/2022] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND Influenza virus infections are common and lead to substantial morbidity and mortality worldwide. We characterized the first eight influenza epidemics since the 2009 influenza pandemic by describing the distribution of viruses and epidemics temporally and geographically across the WHO European Region. METHODS We retrospectively analyzed laboratory-confirmed influenza detections in ambulatory patients from sentinel sites. Data were aggregated by reporting entity and season (weeks 40-20) for 2010-2011 to 2017-2018. We explored geographical spread using correlation coefficients. RESULTS There was variation in the regional influenza epidemics during the study period. Influenza A virus subtypes alternated in dominance, except for 2013-2014 during which both cocirculated, and only one season (2017-2018) was B virus dominant. The median start week for epidemics in the Region was week 50, the time to the peak ranged between four and 13 weeks, and the duration of the epidemic ranged between 19 and 25 weeks. There was evidence of a west-to-east spread across the Region during epidemics in 2010-2011 (r = .365; P = .019), 2012-2013 (r = .484; P = .001), 2014-2015 (r = .423; P = .006), and 2017-2018 (r = .566; P < .001) seasons. Variation in virus distribution and timing existed within reporting entities across seasons and across reporting entities for a given season. CONCLUSIONS Aggregated influenza detection data from sentinel surveillance sites by season between 2010 and 2018 have been presented for the European Region for the first time. Substantial diversity exists between influenza epidemics. These data can inform prevention and control efforts at national, sub-national, and international levels. Aggregated, regional surveillance data from early affected reporting entities may provide an early warning function and be helpful for early season forecasting efforts.
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Affiliation(s)
- Piers Mook
- Division of Health Emergencies and Communicable DiseasesHigh Threat PathogensWHO Regional Office for EuropeCopenhagenDenmark
| | - Tamara Meerhoff
- Radboud University Medical CenterRadboud Institute for Health SciencesDepartment of Primary and Community CareNijmegenThe Netherlands
| | - Sonja J. Olsen
- Division of Health Emergencies and Communicable DiseasesHigh Threat PathogensWHO Regional Office for EuropeCopenhagenDenmark
| | - René Snacken
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)StockholmSweden
| | - Cornelia Adlhoch
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)StockholmSweden
| | - Dmitriy Pereyaslov
- Division of Health Emergencies and Communicable DiseasesHigh Threat PathogensWHO Regional Office for EuropeCopenhagenDenmark
| | - Eeva K. Broberg
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)StockholmSweden
| | - Angeliki Melidou
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)StockholmSweden
| | - Caroline Brown
- Division of Health Emergencies and Communicable DiseasesHigh Threat PathogensWHO Regional Office for EuropeCopenhagenDenmark
| | - Pasi Penttinen
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)StockholmSweden
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Spiteri G, Fielding J, Diercke M, Campese C, Enouf V, Gaymard A, Bella A, Sognamiglio P, Sierra Moros MJ, Riutort AN, Demina YV, Mahieu R, Broas M, Bengnér M, Buda S, Schilling J, Filleul L, Lepoutre A, Saura C, Mailles A, Levy-Bruhl D, Coignard B, Bernard-Stoecklin S, Behillil S, van der Werf S, Valette M, Lina B, Riccardo F, Nicastri E, Casas I, Larrauri A, Salom Castell M, Pozo F, Maksyutov RA, Martin C, Van Ranst M, Bossuyt N, Siira L, Sane J, Tegmark-Wisell K, Palmérus M, Broberg EK, Beauté J, Jorgensen P, Bundle N, Pereyaslov D, Adlhoch C, Pukkila J, Pebody R, Olsen S, Ciancio BC. First cases of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in the WHO European Region, 24 January to 21 February 2020. Euro Surveill 2020; 25:2000178. [PMID: 32156327 PMCID: PMC7068164 DOI: 10.2807/1560-7917.es.2020.25.9.2000178] [Citation(s) in RCA: 354] [Impact Index Per Article: 88.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/24/2020] [Accepted: 03/05/2020] [Indexed: 12/14/2022] Open
Abstract
In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - James Fielding
- World Health Organisation Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | | | - Christine Campese
- Santé Publique France - Direction des maladies infectieuses, Saint-Maurice, France
| | - Vincent Enouf
- Centre national de référence Virus des infections respiratoires, dont la grippe, Institut Pasteur, Paris, France
| | - Alexandre Gaymard
- Centre national de référence Virus des infections respiratoires, dont la grippe, Hospices civils de Lyon, Lyon, France
| | | | - Paola Sognamiglio
- Istituto Nazionale Malattie Infettive Lazzaro Spallanzani, Rome, Italy
| | - Maria José Sierra Moros
- Coordination Centre for Health Alerts and Emergencies. Spanish Ministry of Health, Madrid, Spain
| | | | - Yulia V Demina
- Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Well-being (Rospotrebnadzor), Moscow, Russia
| | - Romain Mahieu
- Department of Infectious Disease Prevention and Control, Common Community Commission, Brussels-Capital Region, Brussels, Belgium
| | - Markku Broas
- Chief Physician, Infection control unit, Lapland Hospital District, Rovaniemi, Finland
| | - Malin Bengnér
- County Medical Officer, Jönköping Region, Jönköping, Sweden
| | | | | | - Laurent Filleul
- Santé publique France - Direction des régions, Cellule régionale Nouvelle Aquitaine, Bordeaux, France
| | - Agnès Lepoutre
- Santé publique France - Direction des régions, Cellule régionale Ile-de-France, Paris, France
| | - Christine Saura
- Santé publique France - Direction des régions, Cellule régionale Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes, Lyon, France
| | - Alexandra Mailles
- Santé Publique France - Direction des maladies infectieuses, Saint-Maurice, France
| | - Daniel Levy-Bruhl
- Santé Publique France - Direction des maladies infectieuses, Saint-Maurice, France
| | - Bruno Coignard
- Santé Publique France - Direction des maladies infectieuses, Saint-Maurice, France
| | | | - Sylvie Behillil
- Centre national de référence Virus des infections respiratoires, dont la grippe, Institut Pasteur, Paris, France
| | - Sylvie van der Werf
- Centre national de référence Virus des infections respiratoires, dont la grippe, Institut Pasteur, Paris, France
| | - Martine Valette
- Centre national de référence Virus des infections respiratoires, dont la grippe, Hospices civils de Lyon, Lyon, France
| | - Bruno Lina
- Centre national de référence Virus des infections respiratoires, dont la grippe, Hospices civils de Lyon, Lyon, France
| | | | - Emanuele Nicastri
- Istituto Nazionale Malattie Infettive Lazzaro Spallanzani, Rome, Italy
| | - Inmaculada Casas
- National Centre for Microbiology, WHO-National Influenza Centre, Institute of Health Carlos III. Madrid, Spain
| | - Amparo Larrauri
- National Centre of Epidemiology, CIBERESP, Institute of Health Carlos III. Madrid, Spain
| | | | - Francisco Pozo
- National Centre for Microbiology, WHO-National Influenza Centre, Institute of Health Carlos III. Madrid, Spain
| | - Rinat A Maksyutov
- State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology "Vector", Rospotrebnadzor, Moscow, Russia
| | | | - Marc Van Ranst
- Laboratory of Clinical Virology, Department of Microbiology and Immunology, Rega Institute, KU Leuven - University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
| | - Nathalie Bossuyt
- Epidemiology of infectious diseases, Sciensano, Brussels, Belgium
| | - Lotta Siira
- Expert Microbiology Unit, Department of Health Security, Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare (THL), Helsinki, Finland
| | - Jussi Sane
- Infectious Disease Control and Vaccinations Unit, Department of Health Security, Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare (THL), Helsinki, Finland
| | | | | | - Eeva K Broberg
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Julien Beauté
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Pernille Jorgensen
- World Health Organisation Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - Nick Bundle
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Dmitriy Pereyaslov
- World Health Organisation Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - Cornelia Adlhoch
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Jukka Pukkila
- World Health Organisation Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - Richard Pebody
- World Health Organisation Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - Sonja Olsen
- World Health Organisation Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
- These authors have contributed equally to the manuscript
| | - Bruno Christian Ciancio
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Stockholm, Sweden
- These authors have contributed equally to the manuscript
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Adlhoch C, Manďáková Z, Ethelberg S, Epštein J, Rimhanen-Finne R, Figoni J, Baylis SA, Faber M, Mellou K, Murphy N, O'Gorman J, Tosti ME, Ciccaglione AR, Hofhuis A, Zaaijer H, Lange H, de Sousa R, Avellón A, Sundqvist L, Said B, Ijaz S. Standardising surveillance of hepatitis E virus infection in the EU/EEA: A review of national practices and suggestions for the way forward. J Clin Virol 2019; 120:63-67. [PMID: 31590112 PMCID: PMC6899520 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcv.2019.09.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/03/2019] [Revised: 09/05/2019] [Accepted: 09/11/2019] [Indexed: 01/18/2023]
Abstract
BACKGROUND Hepatitis E virus (HEV) infection is not notifiable at EU/EEA level, therefore surveillance relies on national policies only. Between 2005 and 2015, more than 20,000 cases were reported in EU/EEA countries. HEV testing is established in 26 countries and 19 countries sequence HEV viruses. OBJECTIVE AND STUDY DESIGN WHO's European Action plan for viral hepatitis recommends harmonised surveillance objectives and case definitions. ECDC's HEV expert group developed minimal and optimal criteria for national hepatitis E surveillance to support EU/EEA countries in enhancing their capacity and to harmonise methods. RESULTS The experts agreed that the primary objectives of national surveillance for HEV infections should focus on the basic epidemiology of the disease: to monitor the incidence of acute cases and chronic infections. The secondary objectives should be to describe viral phylotypes or subtypes and to identify potential clusters/outbreaks and possible routes of transmission. Seventeen of 20 countries with existing surveillance systems collect the minimal data set required to describe the epidemiology of acute cases. Eleven countries test for chronic infections. Twelve countries collect data to identify potential clusters/outbreaks and information on possible routes of transmission. DISCUSSION Overall, the majority of EU/EEA countries collect the suggested data and meet the outlined requirements to confirm an acute case.
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Affiliation(s)
- Cornelia Adlhoch
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Gustav III:s boulevard 40, 169 73, Solna, Sweden.
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Niamh Murphy
- Health Service Executive, Health Protection Surveillance Centre, Dublin, Ireland.
| | - Joanne O'Gorman
- Health Service Executive, Health Protection Surveillance Centre, Dublin, Ireland.
| | | | | | - Agnetha Hofhuis
- National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Bilthoven, the Netherlands.
| | - Hans Zaaijer
- Sanquin Blood Supply Foundation, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
| | - Heidi Lange
- Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Oslo, Norway.
| | - Rita de Sousa
- Instituto Nacional de Saúde Doutor Ricardo Jorge, Lisbon, Portugal.
| | - Ana Avellón
- Viral Hepatitis Reference and Research Laboratory National Center of Microbiology Carlos III Health Institute, Madrid, Spain.
| | - Lena Sundqvist
- The Public Health Agency of Sweden (Folkhälsomyndigheten), Stockholm, Sweden.
| | - Bengü Said
- Public Health England, London, United Kingdom.
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Adlhoch C, Miteva A, Zdravkova A, Miškić T, Kneževic D, Perdikaris S, Śmietanka K, Świętoń E, Kopriva V, Chudý M, Romero González LJ, Moreno Gil I, Wallén Norell A, Verdonck F. Estimation of the number of exposed people during highly pathogenic avian influenza virus outbreaks in EU/EEA countries, October 2016-September 2018. Zoonoses Public Health 2019; 66:874-878. [PMID: 31493311 PMCID: PMC6852165 DOI: 10.1111/zph.12629] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/08/2019] [Revised: 04/26/2019] [Accepted: 06/11/2019] [Indexed: 12/04/2022]
Abstract
We estimated that more than 11,000 people were exposed to highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses in EU/EEA countries over the outbreak period October 2016-September 2018 by cross-linking data submitted by Member States to European Food Safety Authority and EMPRES-i. A stronger framework for collecting human exposure data is required.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | | | - Tihana Miškić
- Ministry of AgricultureVeterinary and Food Safety DirectorateZagrebCroatia
| | | | - Sokratis Perdikaris
- Ministry of Rural Development and Food, General Directorate of Veterinary ServicesDirectorate of Animal HealthAthensGreece
| | | | | | - Vilem Kopriva
- State Veterinary and Food Administration of the Slovak RepublicBratislavaSlovakia
| | - Martin Chudý
- State Veterinary and Food Administration of the Slovak RepublicBratislavaSlovakia
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Adlhoch C, Gomes Dias J, Bonmarin I, Hubert B, Larrauri A, Oliva Domínguez JA, Delgado-Sanz C, Brytting M, Carnahan A, Popovici O, Lupulescu E, O'Donnell J, Domegan L, Van Gageldonk-Lafeber AB, Meijer A, Kynčl J, Slezák P, Guiomar R, Orta Gomes CM, Popow-Kraupp T, Mikas J, Staroňová E, Melillo JM, Melillo T, Ikonen N, Lyytikäinen O, Snacken R, Penttinen P. Determinants of Fatal Outcome in Patients Admitted to Intensive Care Units With Influenza, European Union 2009-2017. Open Forum Infect Dis 2019; 6:ofz462. [PMID: 32258201 PMCID: PMC7105050 DOI: 10.1093/ofid/ofz462] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/04/2018] [Accepted: 10/23/2019] [Indexed: 01/13/2023] Open
Abstract
Background Morbidity, severity, and mortality associated with annual influenza epidemics are of public health concern. We analyzed surveillance data on hospitalized laboratory-confirmed influenza cases admitted to intensive care units to identify common determinants for fatal outcome and inform and target public health prevention strategies, including risk communication. Methods We performed a descriptive analysis and used Poisson regression models with robust variance to estimate the association of age, sex, virus (sub)type, and underlying medical condition with fatal outcome using European Union data from 2009 to 2017. Results Of 13 368 cases included in the basic dataset, 2806 (21%) were fatal. Age ≥40 years and infection with influenza A virus were associated with fatal outcome. Of 5886 cases with known underlying medical conditions and virus A subtype included in a more detailed analysis, 1349 (23%) were fatal. Influenza virus A(H1N1)pdm09 or A(H3N2) infection, age ≥60 years, cancer, human immunodeficiency virus infection and/or other immune deficiency, and heart, kidney, and liver disease were associated with fatal outcome; the risk of death was lower for patients with chronic lung disease and for pregnant women. Conclusions This study re-emphasises the importance of preventing influenza in the elderly and tailoring strategies to risk groups with underlying medical conditions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Cornelia Adlhoch
- Surveillance and Response Support, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Solna, Sweden
| | - Joana Gomes Dias
- Surveillance and Response Support, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Solna, Sweden
| | | | - Bruno Hubert
- Bruno Hubert, Santé Public France, Saint-Maurice Cedex, France
| | - Amparo Larrauri
- National Centre of Epidemiology, CIBER Epidemiología y Salud Pública, Institute of Health Carlos III (ISCIII), Madrid, Spain
| | - Jesús A Oliva Domínguez
- National Centre of Epidemiology, CIBER Epidemiología y Salud Pública, Institute of Health Carlos III (ISCIII), Madrid, Spain
| | - Concepción Delgado-Sanz
- National Centre of Epidemiology, CIBER Epidemiología y Salud Pública, Institute of Health Carlos III (ISCIII), Madrid, Spain
| | - Mia Brytting
- The Public Health Agency of Sweden, Solna, Sweden
| | | | - Odette Popovici
- National Institute of Public Health, Romania National Centre for Communicable Diseases Surveillance and Control, Bucuresti, Romania
| | - Emilia Lupulescu
- National Institute of Public Health, Romania National Centre for Communicable Diseases Surveillance and Control, Bucuresti, Romania
| | - Joan O'Donnell
- Health Service Executive-Health Protection Surveillance Centre, Dublin, Ireland
| | - Lisa Domegan
- Health Service Executive-Health Protection Surveillance Centre, Dublin, Ireland
| | | | - Adam Meijer
- National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Bilthoven, The Netherlands
| | - Jan Kynčl
- Department of Infectious Diseases Epidemiology, National Institute of Public Health, Prague, Czech Republic
| | - Pavel Slezák
- Department of Infectious Diseases Epidemiology, National Institute of Public Health, Prague, Czech Republic
| | - Raquel Guiomar
- Instituto Nacional de Saúde Doutor Ricardo Jorge (National Institute of Health Dr. Ricardo Jorge), Lisboa, Portugal
| | - Carlos M Orta Gomes
- Department of Public Health of Regional Health Administration of Lisbon and Tagus Valley, Lisboa, Portugal
| | | | - Ján Mikas
- Public Health Authority of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava, Slovakia
| | - Edita Staroňová
- Public Health Authority of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava, Slovakia
| | - Jackie M Melillo
- Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Unit, Health Regulation, Malta
| | - Tanya Melillo
- Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Unit, Health Regulation, Malta
| | - Niina Ikonen
- Department of Health Security, National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL), Helsinki, Finland
| | - Outi Lyytikäinen
- Department of Health Security, National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL), Helsinki, Finland
| | - René Snacken
- Surveillance and Response Support, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Solna, Sweden
| | - Pasi Penttinen
- Office of the Chief Scientist, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Solna, Sweden
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Adlhoch C, Fusaro A, Kuiken T, Monne I, Smietanka K, Staubach C, Muñoz Guajardo I, Baldinelli F. Avian influenza overview February- August 2019. EFSA J 2019; 17:e05843. [PMID: 32626437 PMCID: PMC7009306 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2019.5843] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/09/2023] Open
Abstract
Between 16 February and 15 August 2019, five HPAI A(H5N8) outbreaks at poultry establishments in Bulgaria, two low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) A(H5N1) outbreaks in poultry in Denmark and one in captive birds in Germany, one LPAI A(H7N3) outbreak in poultry in Italy and one LPAI A(H7N7) outbreak in poultry in Denmark were reported in Europe. Genetic characterisation reveals that viruses from Denmark cluster with viruses previously identified in wild birds and poultry in Europe; while the Italian isolate clusters with LPAI viruses circulating in wild birds in Central Asia. No avian influenza outbreaks in wild birds were notified in Europe in the relevant period for this report. A decreased number of outbreaks in poultry and wild birds in Asia, Africa and the Middle East was reported during the time period for this report, particularly during the last three months. Furthermore, only six affected wild birds were reported in the relevant time period of this report. Currently there is no evidence of a new HPAI virus incursion from Asia into Europe. However, passive surveillance systems may not be sensitive for early detection if the prevalence or case fatality in wild birds is very low. Therefore, it is important to encourage and maintain passive surveillance in Europe encouraging a search for carcasses of wild bird species that are in the revised list of target species in order to detect any incursion of HPAI virus early and initiate warning. No human infections due to HPAI viruses - detected in wild birds and poultry outbreaks in Europe - have been reported during the last years and the risk of zoonotic transmission to the general public in Europe is considered very low.
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Adlhoch C, Snacken R, Melidou A, Ionescu S, Penttinen P. Dominant influenza A(H3N2) and B/Yamagata virus circulation in EU/EEA, 2016/17 and 2017/18 seasons, respectively. ACTA ACUST UNITED AC 2019; 23. [PMID: 29616611 PMCID: PMC5883452 DOI: 10.2807/1560-7917.es.2018.23.13.18-00146] [Citation(s) in RCA: 47] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
We use surveillance data to describe influenza A and B virus circulation over two consecutive seasons with excess all-cause mortality in Europe, especially in people aged 60 years and older. Influenza A(H3N2) virus dominated in 2016/17 and B/Yamagata in 2017/18. The latter season was prolonged with positivity rates above 50% among sentinel detections for at least 12 weeks. With a current west–east geographical spread, high influenza activity might still be expected in eastern Europe.
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Affiliation(s)
- Cornelia Adlhoch
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - René Snacken
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Angeliki Melidou
- Microbiology Department, School of Medicine, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece
| | - Silviu Ionescu
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Pasi Penttinen
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
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- The members of the European Influenza Surveillance Network are listed at the end of article
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Adlhoch C, Kuiken T, Monne I, Mulatti P, Smietanka K, Staubach C, Guajardo IM, Baldinelli F. Avian influenza overview November 2018 - February 2019. EFSA J 2019; 17:e05664. [PMID: 32626274 PMCID: PMC7009136 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2019.5664] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/07/2023] Open
Abstract
No human infections due to highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N8) or A(H5N6) viruses ‐ detected in wild birds and poultry outbreaks in Europe ‐ have been reported so far and the risk of zoonotic transmission to the general public in Europe is considered very low. Between 16 November 2018 and 15 February 2019, two HPAI A(H5N8) outbreaks in poultry establishments in Bulgaria, two HPAI A(H5N6) outbreaks in wild birds in Denmark and one low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) A(H5N3) in captive birds in the Netherlands were reported in the European Union (EU). Genetic characterisation of the HPAI A(H5N6) viruses reveals that they cluster with the A(H5N6) viruses that have been circulating in Europe since December 2017. The wild bird species involved were birds of prey and were likely infected due to hunting or scavenging infected wild waterfowl. However, HPAI virus was not detected in other wild birds during this period. Outside the EU, two HPAI outbreaks were reported in poultry during the reporting period from western Russia. Sequence information on an HPAI A(H5N6) virus found in a common gull in western Russia in October 2018 suggests that the virus clusters within clade 2.3.4.4c and is closely related to viruses that transmitted zoonotically in China. An increasing number of outbreaks in poultry and wild birds in Asia, Africa and the Middle East was observed during the time period for this report. Currently there is no evidence of a new HPAI virus incursion from Asia into Europe. However, passive surveillance systems may not be sensitive enough if the prevalence or case fatality in wild birds is very low. Nevertheless, it is important to encourage and maintain a certain level of passive surveillance in Europe testing single sick or dead wild birds and birds of prey as they may be sensitive sentinel species for the presence of HPAI virus in the environment. A well‐targeted active surveillance might complement passive surveillance to collect information on HPAI infectious status of apparently healthy wild bird populations.
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Mulder AC, Kroneman A, Franz E, Vennema H, Tulen AD, Takkinen J, Hofhuis A, Adlhoch C. HEVnet: a One Health, collaborative, interdisciplinary network and sequence data repository for enhanced hepatitis E virus molecular typing, characterisation and epidemiological investigations. Euro Surveill 2019; 24:1800407. [PMID: 30862334 PMCID: PMC6415499 DOI: 10.2807/1560-7917.es.2019.24.10.1800407] [Citation(s) in RCA: 47] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/24/2018] [Accepted: 02/08/2019] [Indexed: 12/27/2022] Open
Abstract
Hepatitis E virus (HEV) is a common cause of acute hepatitis worldwide. In Europe, HEV is a zoonosis transmitted via contaminated pork meat or other pork food products. Genotype 3 is the most prevalent HEV type in the animal reservoir, as well as in humans. Despite an increased incidence of hepatitis E across Europe, much remains unknown about its spread, sources and transmission routes. A One Health approach is crucial to better understand the (molecular) epidemiology of HEV. HEVnet was established in April 2017 as a network and database for sharing sequences and accompanying metadata collected from human, animal, food and environmental sources. HEVnet members working in the public health, veterinary health, food, environmental and blood safety sectors have submitted 1,615 HEV sequences from nine countries as at January 2019. Most are from humans (89%), and sequences of animal (5%), food (6%) or environmental (0.3%) origin are rare. Metadata for human sequences capture mostly sex (93%), year of birth (92%) and sampling (100%); data on region of sampling (37%) and clinical information (hospitalisation 27%, symptoms 20% or mortality 8%) are limited. HEVnet aims to expand into a global network capable of performing cross-sectoral and supranational studies, with a joint repository of molecular and epidemiological data on HEV.
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Affiliation(s)
- Annemieke Christine Mulder
- Centre for Infectious Disease Control, National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Bilthoven, the Netherlands
| | - Annelies Kroneman
- Centre for Infectious Disease Control, National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Bilthoven, the Netherlands
| | - Eelco Franz
- Centre for Infectious Disease Control, National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Bilthoven, the Netherlands
| | - Harry Vennema
- Centre for Infectious Disease Control, National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Bilthoven, the Netherlands
| | - Anna D Tulen
- Centre for Infectious Disease Control, National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Bilthoven, the Netherlands
| | - Johanna Takkinen
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Agnetha Hofhuis
- Centre for Infectious Disease Control, National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Bilthoven, the Netherlands
- These authors contributed equally to this article and share last authorship
| | - Cornelia Adlhoch
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
- These authors contributed equally to this article and share last authorship
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Segaloff H, Melidou A, Adlhoch C, Pereyaslov D, Robesyn E, Penttinen P, Olsen SJ. Co-circulation of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and influenza A(H3N2) viruses, World Health Organization (WHO) European Region, October 2018 to February 2019. Euro Surveill 2019; 24:1900125. [PMID: 30862331 PMCID: PMC6402174 DOI: 10.2807/1560-7917.es.2019.24.9.1900125] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/22/2023] Open
Abstract
In the World Health Organization European Region, the 2018/19 influenza season started in week 49 2018, crossing 10% virus-positivity in sentinel surveillance specimens. At week 5 2019, activity remained elevated with positivity rates at 55%. Both A(H1N1)pdm09 and A(H3N2) viruses circulated widely and detection levels in primary care and hospital settings were similar to past seasons. Hospitalisation data may suggest an increased susceptibility to A(H1N1)pdm09 virus in older age groups.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hannah Segaloff
- World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - Angeliki Melidou
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Cornelia Adlhoch
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Dmitriy Pereyaslov
- World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - Emmanuel Robesyn
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Pasi Penttinen
- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Sonja J Olsen
- World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark
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Adlhoch C, Brouwer A, Kuiken T, Miteva A, Mulatti P, Smietanka K, Staubach C, Gogin A, Muñoz Guajardo I, Baldinelli F. Avian influenza overview August - November 2018. EFSA J 2018; 16:e05573. [PMID: 32625795 PMCID: PMC7009621 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2018.5573] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/27/2023] Open
Abstract
Between 16 August and 15 November 2018, 14 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N8) outbreaks in poultry establishments in Bulgaria and seven HPAI A(H5N6) outbreaks, one in captive birds in Germany and six in wild birds in Denmark and the Netherlands were reported in the European Union (EU). No human infection due to HPAI A(H5N8) and A(H5N6) viruses have been reported in Europe so far. Seroconversion of people exposed during outbreaks in Russia has been reported in one study. Although the risk of zoonotic transmission to the general public in Europe is considered to be very low, appropriate personal protection measures of people exposed will reduce any potential risk. Genetic clustering of the viruses isolated from poultry in Bulgaria suggests three separate introductions in 2016 and a continuing circulation and transmission of these viruses within domestic ducks. Recent data from Bulgaria provides further indication that the sensitivity of passive surveillance of HPAI A(H5N8) in domestic ducks may be significantly compromised. Increased vigilance is needed especially during the periods of cold spells in winter when aggregations of wild birds and their movements towards areas with more favourable weather conditions may be encouraged. Two HPAI outbreaks in poultry were reported during this period from western Russia. Low numbers of HPAI outbreaks were observed in Africa and Asia, no HPAI cases were detected in wild birds in the time period relevant for this report. Although a few HPAI outbreaks were reported in Africa and Asia during the reporting period, the probability of HPAI virus introductions from non‐EU countries via wild birds particularly via the north‐eastern route from Russia is increasing, as the fall migration of wild birds from breeding and moulting sites to the wintering sites continues. Furthermore, the lower temperatures and ultraviolet radiation in winter can facilitate the environmental survival of any potential AI viruses introduced to Europe.
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Adlhoch C, Dabrera G, Penttinen P, Pebody R. Protective Measures for Humans against Avian Influenza A(H5N8) Outbreaks in 22 European Union/European Economic Area Countries and Israel, 2016-17. Emerg Infect Dis 2018; 24:1-8. [PMID: 29989531 PMCID: PMC6154149 DOI: 10.3201/eid2410.180269] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/04/2023] Open
Abstract
We sought to better understand national approaches for managing potential human health risks during outbreaks of infection with avian influenza A(H5N8) virus during 2016–17. Twenty-three countries in the Union/European Economic Area and Israel participated in this study. Risk to the general public was assessed as low in 18 countries and medium in 1 country. Of 524 exposed persons identified, 274 were passively monitored and 250 were actively monitored. Of 29 persons tested, all were negative for H5N8 virus. Vaccination and antiviral drug recommendations varied across countries. A high level of personal protection was recommended although a low risk was assessed. No transmission of this virus to humans was identified.
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