Inhalational anthrax outbreak among postal workers, Washington, D.C., 2001

Evaluation of Sporicidal Disinfectants for the Disinfection of Personal Protective Equipment During Biological Hazards

A fast, effective, and safe disinfection of personal protective equipment (PPE) is vitally important for emergency forces involved in biological hazards. This study aimed to investigate a broad range of disinfectants to improve the established disinfection procedure. We analyzed the efficacy of chlorine-, peracetic acid–, and oxygen-based disinfectants against Bacillus spores on PPE. Therefore, spores of different Bacillus species were exposed to disinfectants on PPE material by using a standardized procedure covering the dried spores with disinfectants and applying mechanical distribution. Efficacy of disinfectants was quantified by determining the reduction factor (log₁₀ levels) and number of viable spores left afterward. The chlorine-based granulate Hypochlorit CA G (2% chlorine) sufficiently inactivated Bacillus spores of risk groups 1 and 2, even with temperatures ranging from −20 to 35°C. Wofasteril^® SC super (1.75% peracetic acid) achieved a reliable reduction of risk groups 1 and 2 and even fully virulent Bacillus spores by ≥5 log₁₀ levels on PPE. With this, Hypochlorit-CA G and Wofasteril^® SC super proved to be promising alternatives to the previously proven and widely used peracetic acid compound Wofasteril^® (2% peracetic acid) for the disinfection of PPE when bacterial spores are known to be the contaminating agent. These results will help to improve the disinfection of PPE during biological hazards by providing new data on promising alternative compounds.

A fast, effective, and safe disinfection of personal protective equipment (PPE) is vitally important for emergency forces involved in biological hazards. This study aimed to investigate a broad range of disinfectants to improve the established disinfection procedure. The authors analyzed the efficacy of chlorine-, peracetic acid-, and oxygen-based disinfectants against Bacillus spores on PPE.

Review: The risk of contracting anthrax from spore-contaminated soil - A military medical perspective

Anthrax is an infectious disease of relevance for military forces. Although spores of Bacillus anthracis obiquitously occur in soil, reports on soil-borne transmission to humans are scarce. In this narrative review, the potential of soil-borne transmission of anthrax to humans is discussed based on pathogen-specific characteristics and reports on anthrax in the course of several centuries of warfare. In theory, anthrax foci can pose a potential risk of infection to animals and humans if sufficient amounts of virulent spores are present in the soil even after an extended period of time. In praxis, however, transmissions are usually due to contacts with animal products and reported events of soil-based transmissions are scarce. In the history of warfare, even in the trenches of World War I, reported anthrax cases due to soil-contaminated wounds are virtually absent. Both the perspectives and the experience of the Western hemisphere and of former Soviet Republics are presented. Based on the accessible data as provided in the review, the transmission risk of anthrax by infections of wounds due to spore-contaminated soil is considered as very low under the most circumstance. Active historic anthrax foci may, however, still pose a risk to the health of deployed soldiers.

The use of host factors in microbial forensics

Advances have been made in the forensic analysis of microbes and toxins. An underdeveloped and underutilized area in microbial forensics is how the host interacts with microorganisms in a way that provides unique signatures for forensic use. For forensic purposes, an immediate goal is to distinguish a potential victim and innocent person from a perpetrator, and to distinguish between a naturally acquired or intentional infection. Principal methods that are sufficiently developed are characterization of the humoral immune response to microbial antigens including vaccine-induced immunity and detection of antibiotics that may be present in a possible perpetrator. This chapter presents central elements of the host response in a simplified fashion and describes a representative example, which, in the appropriate context, has a high potential of providing evidence that may aid an investigation to distinguish a perpetrator from a victim. This chapter also presents information about the immune system so that the interested reader can have a fuller understanding of the immune response in general.

Zoonoses under our noses

One Health is an effective approach for the management of zoonotic disease in humans, animals and environments. Examples of the management of bacterial zoonoses in Europe and across the globe demonstrate that One Health approaches of international surveillance, information-sharing and appropriate intervention methods are required to successfully prevent and control disease outbreaks in both endemic and non-endemic regions. Additionally, a One Health approach enables effective preparation and response to bioterrorism threats.

Medical Spending for the 2001 Anthrax Letter Attacks

ABSTRACTIntroductionThis paper assesses the total medical costs associated with the US anthrax letter attacks of 2001. This information can be used to inform policies, which may help mitigate the potential economic impacts of similar bioterrorist attacks.

METHODS

Journal publications and news reports were reviewed to establish the number of people who were exposed, were potentially exposed, received prophylactics, and became ill. Where available, cost data from the anthrax letter attacks were used. Where data were unavailable, high, low, and best cost estimates were developed from the broader literature to create a cost model and establish economic impacts.

RESULTS

Medical spending totaled approximately $177 million.

CONCLUSIONS

The largest expenditures stemmed from self-initiated prophylaxis (worried well): people who sought prophylactic treatment without any indication that they had been exposed to anthrax letters. This highlights an area of focus for mitigating the economic impacts of future disasters. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2019;13:539-546).

Dose-Response Modeling for Inhalational Anthrax in Rabbits Following Single or Multiple Exposures

There is a need to advance our ability to characterize the risk of inhalational anthrax following a low-dose exposure. The exposure scenario most often considered is a single exposure that occurs during an attack. However, long-term daily low-dose exposures also represent a realistic exposure scenario, such as what may be encountered by people occupying areas for longer periods. Given this, the objective of the current work was to model two rabbit inhalational anthrax dose-response data sets. One data set was from single exposures to aerosolized Bacillus anthracis Ames spores. The second data set exposed rabbits repeatedly to aerosols of B. anthracis Ames spores. For the multiple exposure data the cumulative dose (i.e., the sum of the individual daily doses) was used for the model. Lethality was the response for both. Modeling was performed using Benchmark Dose Software evaluating six models: logprobit, loglogistic, Weibull, exponential, gamma, and dichotomous-Hill. All models produced acceptable fits to either data set. The exponential model was identified as the best fitting model for both data sets. Statistical tests suggested there was no significant difference between the single exposure exponential model results and the multiple exposure exponential model results, which suggests the risk of disease is similar between the two data sets. The dose expected to cause 10% lethality was 15,600 inhaled spores and 18,200 inhaled spores for the single exposure and multiple exposure exponential dose-response model, respectively, and the 95% lower confidence intervals were 9,800 inhaled spores and 9,200 inhaled spores, respectively.

Validation of high throughput screening of human sera for detection of anti-PA IgG by Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA) as an emergency response to an anthrax incident

To improve surge testing capability for a response to a release of Bacillus anthracis, the CDC anti-Protective Antigen (PA) IgG Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA) was re-designed into a high throughput screening format. The following assay performance parameters were evaluated: goodness of fit (measured as the mean reference standard r²), accuracy (measured as percent error), precision (measured as coefficient of variance (CV)), lower limit of detection (LLOD), lower limit of quantification (LLOQ), dilutional linearity, diagnostic sensitivity (DSN) and diagnostic specificity (DSP). The paired sets of data for each sample were evaluated by Concordance Correlation Coefficient (CCC) analysis. The goodness of fit was 0.999; percent error between the expected and observed concentration for each sample ranged from -4.6% to 14.4%. The coefficient of variance ranged from 9.0% to 21.2%. The assay LLOQ was 2.6 μg/mL. The regression analysis results for dilutional linearity data were r² = 0.952, slope = 1.02 and intercept = -0.03. CCC between assays was 0.974 for the median concentration of serum samples. The accuracy and precision components of CCC were 0.997 and 0.977, respectively. This high throughput screening assay is precise, accurate, sensitive and specific. Anti-PA IgG concentrations determined using two different assays proved high levels of agreement. The method will improve surge testing capability 18-fold from 4 to 72 sera per assay plate.

Computational fluid dynamics modeling of Bacillus anthracis spore deposition in rabbit and human respiratory airways

Three-dimensional computational fluid dynamics and Lagrangian particle deposition models were developed to compare the deposition of aerosolized Bacillus anthracis spores in the respiratory airways of a human with that of the rabbit, a species commonly used in the study of anthrax disease. The respiratory airway geometries for each species were derived respectively from computed tomography (CT) and μCT images. Both models encompassed airways that extended from the external nose to the lung with a total of 272 outlets in the human model and 2878 outlets in the rabbit model. All simulations of spore deposition were conducted under transient, inhalation-exhalation breathing conditions using average species-specific minute volumes. Two different exposure scenarios were modeled in the rabbit based upon experimental inhalation studies. For comparison, human simulations were conducted at the highest exposure concentration used during the rabbit experimental exposures. Results demonstrated that regional spore deposition patterns were sensitive to airway geometry and ventilation profiles. Due to the complex airway geometries in the rabbit nose, higher spore deposition efficiency was predicted in the nasal sinus compared to the human at the same air concentration of anthrax spores. In contrast, higher spore deposition was predicted in the lower conducting airways of the human compared to the rabbit lung due to differences in airway branching pattern. This information can be used to refine published and ongoing biokinetic models of inhalation anthrax spore exposures, which currently estimate deposited spore concentrations based solely upon exposure concentrations and inhaled doses that do not factor in species-specific anatomy and physiology for deposition.

Multigeneration Cross-Contamination of Mail with Bacillus anthracis Spores

The release of biological agents, including those which could be used in biowarfare or bioterrorism in large urban areas, has been a concern for governments for nearly three decades. Previous incidents from Sverdlosk and the postal anthrax attack of 2001 have raised questions on the mechanism of spread of Bacillus anthracis spores as an aerosol or contaminant. Prior studies have demonstrated that Bacillus atrophaeus is easily transferred through simulated mail handing, but no reports have demonstrated this ability with Bacillus anthracis spores, which have morphological differences that may affect adhesion properties between spore and formite. In this study, equipment developed to simulate interactions across three generations of envelopes subjected to tumbling and mixing was used to evaluate the potential for cross-contamination of B. anthracis spores in simulated mail handling. In these experiments, we found that the potential for cross-contamination through letter tumbling from one generation to the next varied between generations while the presence of a fluidizer had no statistical impact on the transfer of material. Likewise, the presence or absence of a fluidizer had no statistically significant impact on cross-contamination levels or reaerosolization from letter opening.

Antimicrobial Treatment for Systemic Anthrax: Analysis of Cases from 1945 to 2014 Identified Through a Systematic Literature Review

Systemic anthrax is associated with high mortality. Current national guidelines, developed for the individualized treatment of systemic anthrax, outline the use of combination intravenous antimicrobials for a minimum of 2 weeks, bactericidal and protein synthesis inhibitor antimicrobials for all cases of systemic anthrax, and at least 3 antimicrobials with good blood-brain barrier penetration for anthrax meningitis. However, in an anthrax mass casualty incident, large numbers of anthrax cases may create challenges in meeting antimicrobial needs. To further inform our understanding of the role of antimicrobials in treating systemic anthrax, a systematic review of the English-language literature was conducted to identify cases of systemic anthrax treated with antimicrobials for which a clinical outcome was recorded. A total of 149 cases of systemic anthrax were identified. Among the identified 59 cases of cutaneous anthrax, 33 were complicated by meningitis (76% mortality), while 26 simply had evidence of the systemic inflammatory response syndrome (4% mortality); 21 of 26 (81%) of this latter group received monotherapy. Subsequent analysis regarding combination antimicrobial therapy was restricted to the remaining 123 cases of more severe anthrax (overall 67% mortality). Recipients of combination bactericidal and protein synthesis inhibitor therapy had a 45% survival versus 28% in the absence of combination therapy (p = 0.07). For meningitis cases (n = 77), survival was greater for those receiving 3 or more antimicrobials over the course of treatment (3 of 4; 75%), compared to receipt of 1 or 2 antimicrobials (12 of 73; 16%) (p = 0.02). Median parenteral antimicrobial duration was 14 days. Combination bactericidal and protein synthesis inhibitor therapy may be appropriate in severe anthrax disease, particularly anthrax meningitis, in a mass casualty incident.

Whole genome protein microarrays for serum profiling of immunodominant antigens of Bacillus anthracis

A commercial Bacillus anthracis (Anthrax) whole genome protein microarray has been used to identify immunogenic Anthrax proteins (IAP) using sera from groups of donors with (a) confirmed B. anthracis naturally acquired cutaneous infection, (b) confirmed B. anthracis intravenous drug use-acquired infection, (c) occupational exposure in a wool-sorters factory, (d) humans and rabbits vaccinated with the UK Anthrax protein vaccine and compared to naïve unexposed controls. Anti-IAP responses were observed for both IgG and IgA in the challenged groups; however the anti-IAP IgG response was more evident in the vaccinated group and the anti-IAP IgA response more evident in the B. anthracis-infected groups. Infected individuals appeared somewhat suppressed for their general IgG response, compared with other challenged groups. Immunogenic protein antigens were identified in all groups, some of which were shared between groups whilst others were specific for individual groups. The toxin proteins were immunodominant in all vaccinated, infected or other challenged groups. However, a number of other chromosomally-located and plasmid encoded open reading frame proteins were also recognized by infected or exposed groups in comparison to controls. Some of these antigens e.g., BA4182 are not recognized by vaccinated individuals, suggesting that there are proteins more specifically expressed by live Anthrax spores in vivo that are not currently found in the UK licensed Anthrax Vaccine (AVP). These may perhaps be preferentially expressed during infection and represent expression of alternative pathways in the B. anthracis “infectome.” These may make highly attractive candidates for diagnostic and vaccine biomarker development as they may be more specifically associated with the infectious phase of the pathogen. A number of B. anthracis small hypothetical protein targets have been synthesized, tested in mouse immunogenicity studies and validated in parallel using human sera from the same study.

The History of Biological Weapons Use: What We Know and What We Don't

This article critically reviews the literature on the history of biological warfare, bioterrorism, and biocrimes. The first serious effort to review this entire history, made in 1969, had numerous limitations. In recent decades, several authors have filled many of the gaps in our understanding of the past use of biological agents (including both pathogens and toxins), making it possible to reconstruct that history with greater fidelity than previously possible. Nevertheless, there are numerous remaining gaps, and closer inspection indicates that some supposed uses of biological weapons never took place or are poorly substantiated. Topics requiring additional research are identified.

Evaluation of the Universal Viral Transport system for long-term storage of virus specimens for microbial forensics

Forensic microbial specimens, including bacteria and viruses, are collected at biocrime and bioterrorism scenes. Although it is preferable that the pathogens in these samples are alive and kept in a steady state, the samples may be stored for prolonged periods before analysis. Therefore, it is important to understand the effects of storage conditions on the pathogens contained within such samples. To evaluate the capacity to preserve viable virus and the viral genome, influenza virus was added to the transport medium of the Universal Viral Transport system and stored for over 3 months at various temperatures, after which virus titrations and quantitative analysis of the influenza hemagglutinin gene were performed. Although viable viruses became undetectable 29 days after the medium was stored at room temperature, viruses in the medium stored at 4°C were viable even after 99 days. A quantitative PCR analysis indicated that the hemagglutinin gene was maintained for 99 days at both 4°C and room temperature. Therefore, long-term storage at 4°C has little effect on viable virus and viral genes, so the Universal Viral Transport system can be useful for microbial forensics. This study provides important information for the handling of forensic virus specimens.

Evaluation of Inhaled Versus Deposited Dose Using the Exponential Dose-Response Model for Inhalational Anthrax in Nonhuman Primate, Rabbit, and Guinea Pig

The application of the exponential model is extended by the inclusion of new nonhuman primate (NHP), rabbit, and guinea pig dose-lethality data for inhalation anthrax. Because deposition is a critical step in the initiation of inhalation anthrax, inhaled doses may not provide the most accurate cross-species comparison. For this reason, species-specific deposition factors were derived to translate inhaled dose to deposited dose. Four NHP, three rabbit, and two guinea pig data sets were utilized. Results from species-specific pooling analysis suggested all four NHP data sets could be pooled into a single NHP data set, which was also true for the rabbit and guinea pig data sets. The three species-specific pooled data sets could not be combined into a single generic mammalian data set. For inhaled dose, NHPs were the most sensitive (relative lowest LD50) species and rabbits the least. Improved inhaled LD50 s proposed for use in risk assessment are 50,600, 102,600, and 70,800 inhaled spores for NHP, rabbit, and guinea pig, respectively. Lung deposition factors were estimated for each species using published deposition data from Bacillus spore exposures, particle deposition studies, and computer modeling. Deposition was estimated at 22%, 9%, and 30% of the inhaled dose for NHP, rabbit, and guinea pig, respectively. When the inhaled dose was adjusted to reflect deposited dose, the rabbit animal model appears the most sensitive with the guinea pig the least sensitive species.

Comparing electronic news media reports of potential bioterrorism-related incidents involving unknown white powder to reports received by the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Federal Bureau of Investigation: U.S.A., 2009-2011

There have been periodic electronic news media reports of potential bioterrorism-related incidents involving unknown substances (often referred to as "white powder") since the 2001 intentional dissemination of Bacillus anthracis through the U.S. Postal System. This study reviewed the number of unknown "white powder" incidents reported online by the electronic news media and compared them with unknown "white powder" incidents reported to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) during a 2-year period from June 1, 2009 and May 31, 2011. Results identified 297 electronic news media reports, 538 CDC reports, and 384 FBI reports of unknown "white powder." This study showed different unknown "white powder" incidents captured by each of the three sources. However, the authors could not determine the public health implications of this discordance.

Assessment of viable bacteria and bacterial DNA in blood and bloodstain specimens stored under various conditions

Microbial forensic specimens that are collected at biocrime and bioterrorism scenes include blood, tissue, cloths containing biological fluids, swabs, water, soil, and aerosols. It is preferable that pathogens in such specimens are alive and kept in a steady state. Specimens may be stored for a prolonged period before analysis; therefore, it is important to understand the effect of the storage conditions on the pathogens contained within the specimens. In this study, we prepared blood and bloodstain specimens containing Gram-negative or -positive bacteria, stored the samples for 482 days under various conditions, and measured viable bacterial counts and total bacterial contents in the samples. Viable bacteria were preserved well in the samples stored at -30 and -80 °C, but were diminished or undetectable in the samples stored at 4 °C and room temperature. The total bacterial content was maintained in the blood samples stored at -30 and -80 °C and in the bloodstain samples stored under all temperature conditions, but decreased in the blood samples stored at 4 °C and room temperature. This study showed that the storage conditions affected viable bacteria and bacterial DNA and that freezing and drying were significant for their long-term storage. We provide important information for the storage of microbial forensic specimens.

Modeling low-dose mortality and disease incubation period of inhalational anthrax in the rabbit

There is a need to advance our ability to conduct credible human risk assessments for inhalational anthrax associated with exposure to a low number of bacteria. Combining animal data with computational models of disease will be central in the low-dose and cross-species extrapolations required in achieving this goal. The objective of the current work was to apply and advance the competing risks (CR) computational model of inhalational anthrax where data was collected from NZW rabbits exposed to aerosols of Ames strain Bacillus anthracis. An initial aim was to parameterize the CR model using high-dose rabbit data and then conduct a low-dose extrapolation. The CR low-dose attack rate was then compared against known low-dose rabbit data as well as the low-dose curve obtained when the entire rabbit dose-response data set was fitted to an exponential dose-response (EDR) model. The CR model predictions demonstrated excellent agreement with actual low-dose rabbit data. We next used a modified CR model (MCR) to examine disease incubation period (the time to reach a fever >40 °C). The MCR model predicted a germination period of 14.5h following exposure to a low spore dose, which was confirmed by monitoring spore germination in the rabbit lung using PCR, and predicted a low-dose disease incubation period in the rabbit between 14.7 and 16.8 days. Overall, the CR and MCR model appeared to describe rabbit inhalational anthrax well. These results are discussed in the context of conducting laboratory studies in other relevant animal models, combining the CR/MCR model with other computation models of inhalational anthrax, and using the resulting information towards extrapolating a low-dose response prediction for man.

Inhalational anthrax (Ames aerosol) in naïve and vaccinated New Zealand rabbits: characterizing the spread of bacteria from lung deposition to bacteremia

There is a need to better understand inhalational anthrax in relevant animal models. This understanding could aid risk assessment, help define therapeutic windows, and provide a better understanding of disease. The aim here was to characterize and quantify bacterial deposition and dissemination in rabbits following exposure to single high aerosol dose (> 100 LD₅₀) of Bacillus anthracis (Ames) spores immediately following exposure through 36 h. The primary goal of collecting the data was to support investigators in developing computational models of inhalational anthrax disease. Rabbits were vaccinated prior to exposure with the human vaccine (Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed, AVA) or were sham-vaccinated, and were then exposed in pairs (one sham and one AVA) so disease kinetics could be characterized in equally-dosed hosts where one group is fully protected and is able to clear the infection (AVA-vaccinated), while the other is susceptible to disease, in which case the bacteria are able to escape containment and replicate uncontrolled (sham-vaccinated rabbits). Between 4–5% of the presented aerosol dose was retained in the lung of sham- and AVA-vaccinated rabbits as measured by dilution plate analysis of homogenized lung tissue or bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL) fluid. After 6 and 36 h, >80% and >96%, respectively, of the deposited spores were no longer detected in BAL, with no detectable difference between sham- or AVA-vaccinated rabbits. Thereafter, differences between the two groups became noticeable. In sham-vaccinated rabbits the bacteria were detected in the tracheobronchial lymph nodes (TBLN) 12 h post-exposure and in the circulation at 24 h, a time point which was also associated with dramatic increases in vegetative CFU in the lung tissue of some animals. In all sham-vaccinated rabbits, bacteria increased in both TBLN and blood through 36 h at which point in time some rabbits succumbed to disease. In contrast, AVA-vaccinated rabbits showed small numbers of CFU in TBLN between 24 and 36 h post-exposure with small numbers of bacteria in the circulation only at 24 h post-exposure. These results characterize and quantify disease progression in naïve rabbits following aerosol administration of Ames spores which may be useful in a number of different research applications, including developing quantitative models of infection for use in human inhalational anthrax risk assessment.

Characterizing bioaerosol risk from environmental sampling

In the aftermath of a release of microbiological agents, environmental sampling must be conducted to characterize the release sufficiently so that mathematical models can then be used to predict the subsequent dispersion and human health risks. Because both the dose-response and environmental transport of aerosolized microbiological agents are functions of the effective aerodynamic diameter of the particles, environmental assessments should consider not only the total amount of agents but also the size distributions of the aerosolized particles. However, typical surface sampling cannot readily distinguish among different size particles. This study evaluates different approaches to estimating risk from measurements of microorganisms deposited on surfaces after an aerosol release. For various combinations of sampling surfaces, size fractions, HVAC operating conditions, size distributions of release spores, uncertainties in surface measurements, and the accuracy of model predictions are tested in order to assess how much detail can realistically be identified from surface sampling results. The recommended modeling and sampling scheme is one choosing 3, 5, and 10 μm diameter particles as identification targets and taking samples from untracked floor, wall, and the HVAC filter. This scheme provides reasonably accurate, but somewhat conservative, estimates of risk across a range of different scenarios. Performance of the recommended sampling scheme is tested by using data from a large-scale field test as a case study. Sample sizes of 10-25 in each homogeneously mixed environmental compartment are sufficient to develop order of magnitude estimates of risk. Larger sample sizes have little benefit unless uncertainties in sample recoveries can be reduced.

Comparison of quantitative PCR and culture-based methods for evaluating dispersal of Bacillus thuringiensis endospores at a bioterrorism hoax crime scene

Since the anthrax mail attacks of 2001, law enforcement agencies have processed thousands of suspicious mail incidents globally, many of which are hoax bioterrorism threats. Bio-insecticide preparations containing Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) spores have been involved in several such threats in Australia, leading to the requirement for rapid and sensitive detection techniques for this organism, a close relative of Bacillus anthracis. Here we describe the development of a quantitative PCR (qPCR) method for the detection of Bt crystal toxin gene cry1, and evaluation of the method's effectiveness during a hoax bioterrorism event in 2009. When combined with moist wipe sampling, the cry1 qPCR was a rapid, reliable, and sensitive diagnostic tool for detecting and quantifying Bt contamination, and mapping endospore dispersal within a mail sorting facility. Results from the cry1 qPCR were validated by viable counts of the same samples on Bacillus-selective agar (PEMBA), which revealed a similar pattern of contamination. Extensive and persistent contamination of the facility was detected, both within the affected mailroom, and extending into office areas up to 30m distant from the source event, emphasising the need for improved containment procedures for suspicious mail items, both during and post-event. The cry1 qPCR enables detection of both viable and non-viable Bt spores and cells, which is important for historical crime scenes or scenes subjected to decontamination. This work provides a new rapid method to add to the forensics toolbox for crime scenes suspected to be contaminated with biological agents.

DETECTION OF INVISIBLE BACILLI SPORES ON SURFACES USING A PORTABLE SERS-BASED ANALYZER

Since the distribution of anthrax causing spores through the U.S. Postal System in the autumn of 2001, bioterrorism has become an ever present threat. During and following an attack it is also important to detect spores on surfaces, to assess the extent of an attack, to quantify risk of infection by contact, as well as to evaluate post-attack clean-up. To perform useful measurements, analyzers and/or methods must be capable of detecting as few as 10 spores/cm2, in under 5-minutes, with little or no sample preparation or false-positive responses, using a portable device. In an effort to develop such a device, we have been investigating the ability of surface-enhanced Raman spectroscopy (SERS) to detect dipicolinic acid (DPA) as a chemical signature of bacilli spores. In general, SERS is capable of detecting mg/L concentrations and lower, and providing unequivocal identification of chemicals based on each one's unique spectrum. However, rapid analysis requires extracting the DPA from the spores for SERS detection. Here we describe the use of a room temperature digesting agent in combination with SERS to detect 220 spores on a surface, the entire procedure which was performed in 2.5 minutes.

B. anthracis in a wool-processing factory: seroprevalence and occupational risk

In a Belgian wool-processing factory, living anthrax spores were found in raw goat hair and air dust, but confirmed anthrax cases had never been reported. Anthrax vaccines are not licensed nor recommended in Belgium. We conducted a B. anthracis seroprevalence study to investigate risk factors associated with positive serology and advise on protective measures. Overall 12·1% (8/66) employees were seropositive; 30% of persons processing raw goat hair and 20% of persons sorting raw goat hair were seropositive compared to 3% in less exposed jobs [adjusted prevalence ratio (aPR) 44·4, P=0·001; aPR 14·5, P=0·016, respectively). The number of masks used per day was protective (aPR 0·3, P=0·015). Results suggest a dose-response association for those processing raw goat hair. Host-related factors probably played a role as antibody response varied from person to person within an exposure group. Workers exposed to raw goat hair should be offered higher protection against anthrax and have access to anthrax vaccines.

Antibody responses to a spore carbohydrate antigen as a marker of nonfatal inhalation anthrax in rhesus macaques

The Bacillus anthracis exosporium protein BclA contains an O-linked antigenic tetrasaccharide whose terminal sugar is known as anthrose (J. M. Daubenspeck et al., J. Biol. Chem. 279:30945-30953, 2004). We hypothesized that serologic responses to anthrose may have diagnostic value in confirming exposure to aerosolized B. anthracis. We evaluated the serologic responses to a synthetic anthrose-containing trisaccharide (ATS) in a group of five rhesus macaques that survived inhalation anthrax following exposure to B. anthracis Ames spores. Two of five animals (RM2 and RM3) were treated with ciprofloxacin starting at 48 hours postexposure and two (RM4 and RM5) at 72 h postexposure; one animal (RM1) was untreated. Infection was confirmed by blood culture and detection of anthrax toxin lethal factor (LF) in plasma. Anti-ATS IgG responses were determined at 14, 21, 28, and 35 days postexposure, with preexposure serum as a control. All animals, irrespective of ciprofloxacin treatment, mounted a specific, measurable anti-ATS IgG response. The earliest detectable responses were on days 14 (RM1, RM2, and RM5), 21 (RM4), and 28 (RM3). Specificity of the anti-ATS responses was demonstrated by competitive-inhibition enzyme immunoassay (CIEIA), in which a 2-fold (wt/wt) excess of carbohydrate in a bovine serum albumin (BSA) conjugate of the oligosaccharide (ATS-BSA) effected >94% inhibition, whereas a structural analog lacking the 3-hydroxy-3-methyl-butyryl moiety at the C-4" of the anthrosyl residue had no inhibition activity. These data suggest that anti-ATS antibody responses may be used to identify aerosol exposure to B. anthracis spores. The anti-ATS antibody responses were detectable during administration of ciprofloxacin.

Multigeneration cross contamination of mail with Bacillus species spores by tumbling

In 2001, envelopes loaded with Bacillus anthracis spores were mailed to Senators Daschle and Leahy as well as to the New York Post and NBC News buildings. Additional letters may have been mailed to other news agencies because there was confirmed anthrax infection of employees at these locations. These events heightened the awareness of the lack of understanding of the mechanism(s) by which objects contaminated with a biological agent might spread disease. This understanding is crucial for the estimation of the potential for exposure to ensure the appropriate response in the event of future attacks. In this study, equipment to simulate interactions between envelopes and procedures to analyze the spread of spores from a "payload" envelope (i.e., loaded internally with a powdered spore preparation) onto neighboring envelopes were developed. Another process to determine whether an aerosol could be generated by opening contaminated envelopes was developed. Subsequent generations of contaminated envelopes originating from a single payload envelope showed a consistent two-log decrease in the number of spores transferred from one generation to the next. Opening a tertiary contaminated envelope resulted in an aerosol containing 10(3) B. anthracis spores. We developed a procedure for sampling contaminated letters by a nondestructive method aimed at providing information useful for consequence management while preserving the integrity of objects contaminated during the incident and preserving evidence for law enforcement agencies.

National validation study of a swab protocol for the recovery of Bacillus anthracis spores from surfaces

Twelve Laboratory Response Network (LRN) affiliated laboratories participated in a validation study of a macrofoam swab protocol for the recovery, detection, and quantification of viable B. anthracis (BA) Sterne spores from steel surfaces. CDC personnel inoculated steel coupons (26cm(2)) with 1-4 log(10) BA spores and recovered them by sampling with pre-moistened macrofoam swabs. Phase 1 (P1) of the study evaluated swabs containing BA only, while dust and background organisms were added to swabs in Phase 2 (P2) to mimic environmental conditions. Laboratories processed swabs and enumerated spores by culturing eluted swab suspensions and counting colonies with morphology consistent with BA. Processed swabs were placed in enrichment broth, incubated 24h, and cultured by streaking for isolation. Real-time PCR was performed on selected colonies from P2 samples to confirm the identity of BA. Mean percent recovery (%R) of spores from the surface ranged from 15.8 to 31.0% (P1) and from 27.9 to 55.0% (P2). The highest mean percent recovery was 31.0% (sd 10.9%) for P1 (4 log(10) inoculum) and 55.0% (sd 27.6%) for P2 (1 log(10) inoculum). The overall %R was higher for P2 (44.6%) than P1 (24.1%), but the overall reproducibility (between-lab variability) was lower in P2 than in P1 (25.0 vs 16.5%CV, respectively). The overall precision (within-lab variability) was close to identical for P1 and P2 (44.0 and 44.1, respectively), but varied greatly between inoculum levels. The protocol demonstrated linearity in %R over the three inoculum levels and is able to detect between 26 and 5x10(6)spores/26cm(2). Sensitivity as determined by culture was >98.3% for both phases and all inocula, suggesting that the culture method maintains sensitivity in the presence of contaminants. The enrichment broth method alone was less sensitive for sampled swabs (66.4%) during P2, suggesting that the presence of background organisms inhibited growth or isolation of BA from the broth. The addition of real-time PCR testing to the assay increased specificity from >85.4% to >95.0% in P2. Although the precision was low at the 1 log(10) inoculum level in both phases (59.0 and 50.2%), this swab processing protocol, was sensitive, specific, precise, and reproducible at 2-4 log(10)/26cm(2) spore concentrations.

Bioterrorism and biologic warfare

Biologic agents have been used throughout history to influence battles. Recently, biologic agents have been used as terrorist weapons. A review of the history of biologic weapons and a medical overview of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Category A and B agents is provided, including history, pathogenesis, clinical presentation, microbiology/virology, diagnosis, treatment, and each agent's use or potential use as a weapon. Background information on public health issues surrounding bioterrorism and the role of oral and maxillofacial surgeons in a bioterrorist event also is provided.

Interferon protects mice against inhalation anthrax

Interferons (IFNs) play a role in innate immunity during many viral, bacterial, and protozoal infections. With the increasing threat of bioterrorist attacks with Bacillus anthracis, its high lethality, and the limited effectiveness of antibiotics, alternative treatments are being studied. Antibodies to protective antigen (PA) are promising, as is IFN. During many bacterial infections, production of and protection by IFNs has been reported, including B. anthracis in vitro. In vivo, we find that (1) the type I IFN inducer, Poly-ICLC, strongly and rapidly protects mice; (2) the protection is IFN-mediated since recombinant murine IFN-beta can protect, and protection by Poly-ICLC is abrogated in IFN type I receptor knockout mice. The greatest protection by Poly-ICLC was conferred by intranasal treatment. A delay in death was observed with the intramuscular route alone, but was not significant. Together, the results suggest the IFN defense could protect mice, up to 60%, against lethal inhalational anthrax, and thus have important medical implications for therapy of human anthrax.

Bacillus spores in the mail: "ironing" out the anthrax problem

INTRODUCTION

Following a terrorist release of Bacillus anthracis spores through the U.S. Postal Service, it was suggested that decontamination of spores in mail envelopes could be accomplished at home by utilizing the steam heat from a household iron. This study investigated the use of a standard household iron, in a dry heat mode, for sterilizing mail envelopes laced with bacterial spores.

METHODS

The Bacillus subtilis var. niger spore, a more heat resistant spore, was used as a surrogate for B. Anthracis spores. Standard mail envelopes containing 2.1 x 10(6) spores were sealed and subjected to various levels of dry heat from a standard household iron for periods of 5, 10, and 15 minutes. Envelope contents were then cultured in soy broth for seven days to detect any bacterial growth, and in addition envelopes and contents were visually inspected for evidence of damage and readability of words.

RESULTS

At a temperature range of 160.01 degrees C - 204.5 degrees C for a period of 5 minutes, B. subtilis var. niger spores were effectively sterilized and, at 7 days, no bacterial growth was observed. No gross evidence of envelope damage was observed and the legibility of words was not compromised.

CONCLUSIONS

Dry heat from a common household iron is capable of destroying Bacillus spores in mailing envelopes without grossly altering the envelope or affecting the legibility of words.

Performance indicators for response to selected infectious disease outbreaks: a review of the published record

The purpose of this study was to determine whether published reports of infectious disease outbreaks could serve as a source of evidence for public health practice, particularly in responding to bioterrorism. Such performance indicators are measures of practice and process that lead to optimal health outcomes. We collected data from 116 individual articles that described 59 outbreaks of eight different pathogens with potential for bioterrorist use. Analysis of these reports determined whether they addressed 12 process indicators and four outcome indicators--each generally recognized as a component of effective outbreak response. The results showed that outbreak reports typically included information about these process and outcome indicators, thus validating their practical importance. However, few reports had been written with specificity to document the chronology of outbreak response, or the dissemination of information to protect healthcare workers, or the communication with law enforcement and emergency operations that are important in response to bioterrorism. We conclude that the published record of infectious disease outbreaks can, in the future, be used as a source for practice-based evidence if agreed-upon measures for effective performance become standard components of outbreak reports.

Virulent spores of Bacillus anthracis and other Bacillus species deposited on solid surfaces have similar sensitivity to chemical decontaminants

AIMS

To compare the relative sensitivity of Bacillus anthracis and spores of other Bacillus spp. deposited on different solid surfaces to inactivation by liquid chemical disinfecting agents.

METHODS AND RESULTS

We prepared under similar conditions spores from five different virulent and three attenuated strains of B. anthracis, as well as spores of Bacillus subtilis, Bacillus atrophaeus (previously known as Bacillus globigii), Bacillus cereus, Bacillus thuringiensis and Bacillus megaterium. As spore-surface interactions may bias inactivation experiments, we evaluated the relative binding of different spores to carrier materials. The survival of spores deposited on glass, metallic or polymeric surfaces were quantitatively measured by ASTM standard method E-2414-05 which recovers spores from surfaces by increasing stringency. The number of spores inactivated by each decontaminant was similar and generally within 1 log among the 12 different Bacillus strains tested. This similarity among Bacillus strains and species was observed through a range of sporicidal efficacy on spores deposited on painted metal, polymeric rubber or glass.

CONCLUSIONS

The data obtained indicate that the sensitivity of common simulants (B. atrophaeus and B. subtilis), as well as spores of B. cereus, B. thuringiensis, and B. megaterium, to inactivation by products that contain either: peroxide, chlorine or oxidants is similar to that shown by spores from all eight B. anthracis strains studied.

SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPACT OF THE STUDY

The comparative results of the present study suggest that decontamination and sterilization data obtained with simulants can be safely extrapolated to virulent spores of B. anthracis. Thus, valid conclusions on sporicidal efficacy could be drawn from safer and less costly experiments employing non-pathogenic spore simulants.

In vitro and in vivo characterization of anthrax anti-protective antigen and anti-lethal factor monoclonal antibodies after passive transfer in a mouse lethal toxin challenge model to define correlates of immunity

Passive transfer of antibody may be useful for preexposure prophylaxis against biological agents used as weapons of terror, such as Bacillus anthracis. Studies were performed to evaluate the ability of anthrax antiprotective antigen (anti-PA) and antilethal factor (anti-LF) neutralizing monoclonal antibodies (mAbs) to protect against an anthrax lethal toxin (LeTx) challenge in a mouse model and to identify correlates of immunity to LeTx challenge. Despite having similar affinities for their respective antigens, anti-PA (3F11) and anti-LF (9A11), passive transfer of up to 1.5 mg of anti-PA 3F11 mAb did not provide significant protection when transferred to mice 24 h before LeTx challenge, while passive transfer of as low as 0.375 mg of anti-LF 9A11 did provide significant protection. Serum collected 24 h after passive transfer had LeTx-neutralizing activity when tested using a standard LeTx neutralization assay, but neutralization titers measured using this assay did not correlate with protection against LeTx challenge. However, measurement of LeTx-neutralizing serum responses with an LeTx neutralization assay in vitro employing the addition of LeTx to J774A.1 cells 15 min before the addition of the serum did result in neutralization titers that correlated with protection against LeTx challenge. Our results demonstrate that only the LeTx neutralization titers measured utilizing the addition of LeTx to J774A.1 cells 15 min before the addition of sample correlated with protection in vivo. Thus, this LeTx neutralization assay may be a more biologically relevant neutralization assay to predict the in vivo protective capacity of LeTx-neutralizing antibodies.

Facilitation of risk communication during the anthrax attacks of 2001: the organizational backstory

The anthrax attacks of 2001 created risk communication problems that cannot be fully understood without appreciating the dynamics among organizations. Case studies of communication in New Jersey, consisting of interviews with a range of participants, found that existing organizational and professional networks facilitated trust among decisionmakers. This interpersonal trust improved communication among agencies and thereby risk communication with the public. For example, "white powder scares" were a problem even in places without contamination. Professionals' trust in each other was vital for responding productively. Conversely, organizational challenges, including conflict among agencies, hindered communication with key audiences. Although centralization and increased control are often seen as the remedy for communicative confusion, they also can quash the improvisational responses needed during crises.

Discernment between deliberate and natural infectious disease outbreaks

Public health authorities should be vigilant to the potential for outbreaks deliberately caused by biological agents (bioterrorism). Such events require a rapid response and incorporation of non-traditional partners for disease investigation and outbreak control. The astute application of infectious disease epidemiological principles can promote an enhanced index of suspicion for such events. We discuss epidemiological indicators that should be considered during outbreak investigations, and also examine their application during bioterrorism incidents, an accidental release of an agent, outbreaks of infections that were alleged to have been deliberately initiated, and a model scenario. The Grunow & Finke epidemiological assessment tool is used to examine these historical events and the model scenario. The results received from this analysis, coupled with an understanding of epidemiological clues to unnatural events, and knowledge of how to manage such events, can aid in the improved response and resolution of epidemics.

Discriminating Inhalational Anthrax From Community-Acquired Pneumonia Using Chest Radiograph Findings and a Clinical Algorithm

BACKGROUND

Limiting the effects of a large-scale bioterrorist anthrax attack will require rapid and accurate detection of the earliest victims. We undertook this study to improve physicians' ability to rapidly detect inhalational anthrax victims.

METHODS

We conducted a case-control study to compare chest radiograph findings from 47 patients from historical inhalational anthrax cases and 188 community-acquired pneumonia control subjects. We then used classification tree analyses to derive an algorithm of chest radiograph findings and clinical characteristics that accurately and explicitly discriminated between inhalational anthrax and community-acquired pneumonia.

RESULTS

Twenty-two of the 47 patients from historical inhalational anthrax cases (46.8%) had reported chest radiograph findings. All 22 case patients (100%) had mediastinal widening, pleural effusion, or both. However, 16 case patients (72.7%) also had infiltrates. In comparison, all 188 community-acquired control subjects had reported chest radiographs. Of these, 127 control subjects (67.6%) had infiltrates, 43 control subjects (22.9%) had pleural effusions, and 15 control subjects (8.0%) had mediastinal widening. A derived algorithm with three predictor variables (chest radiograph finding of mediastinal widening, altered mental status, and elevated hematocrit) is 100% sensitive (95% confidence interval [CI], 73.5 to 100) and 98.3% specific (95% CI, 95.1 to 99.6). The derivation process used 12 patients with inhalational anthrax and 177 control subjects with community-acquired pneumonia who had information available for all three variables.

CONCLUSIONS

There are significant chest radiograph differences between inhalational anthrax and community-acquired pneumonia, but none of the chest radiograph findings are both highly sensitive and highly specific. The derived clinical algorithm can improve physicians' ability to discriminate inhalational anthrax from community-acquired pneumonia, but its utility is limited to previously healthy individuals and its accuracy may be limited by missing values.

Evaluation of the rapid analyte measurement platform (RAMP) for the detection of Bacillus anthracis at a crime scene

The aim of this study was to evaluate the accuracy and reliability of the rapid analyte measurement platform (RAMP) for presumptive identification of Bacillus anthracis spores. Test samples consisted of serial dilutions of spore preparations of several Bacillus species, including B. anthracis, which were tested, using the RAMP Anthrax test cartridge, according to the manufacturer's instructions. The fluorescence labelled antibody-antigen complexes were detected in the portable reader after 15 min following sample addition. Dilutions of common environmental and household powders were also tested to identify possible false positive results. B. anthracis spores were identified reliably in test samples containing more than 6000 spores. The test kits were highly specific, showing no cross reactivity with other Bacillus species or any environmental powders tested. The RAMP system for detection of B. anthracis spores, from environmental samples, showed consistent results under a variety of analytical conditions, enabling the trained user to provide a rapid, accurate preliminary risk assessment of a suspected bioterrorism incident.

Evaluation of a macrofoam swab protocol for the recovery of Bacillus anthracis spores from a steel surface

A protocol to recover Bacillus anthracis spores from a steel surface using macrofoam swabs was evaluated for its accuracy, precision, reproducibility, and limit of detection. Macrofoam swabs recovered 31.7 to 49.1% of spores from 10-cm2 steel surfaces with a < or =32.7% coefficient of variation in sampling precision and reproducibility for inocula of > or =38 spores.

Global transport networks and infectious disease spread

Air, sea and land transport networks continue to expand in reach, speed of travel and volume of passengers and goods carried. Pathogens and their vectors can now move further, faster and in greater numbers than ever before. Three important consequences of global transport network expansion are infectious disease pandemics, vector invasion events and vector-borne pathogen importation. This review briefly examines some of the important historical examples of these disease and vector movements, such as the global influenza pandemics, the devastating Anopheles gambiae invasion of Brazil and the recent increases in imported Plasmodium falciparum malaria cases. We then outline potential approaches for future studies of disease movement, focussing on vector invasion and vector-borne disease importation. Such approaches allow us to explore the potential implications of international air travel, shipping routes and other methods of transport on global pathogen and vector traffic.

Comparison of clarithromycin and ciprofloxacin therapy for Bacillus anthracis Sterne infection in mice with or without 60Co gamma-photon irradiation

Biological agents and ionizing radiation lead to more severe clinical outcomes than either insult alone. This study investigated the survival of non-irradiated and (60)Co-gamma-irradiated mice given therapy for inhalation anthrax with ciprofloxacin (CIP) or a clinically relevant mixture of clarithromycin (CLR) and its major human microbiologically important metabolite 14-hydroxy clarithromycin (14-OH CLR). All B6D2F1/J 10-week-old female mice were inoculated intratracheally with 3 x 10(8) c.f.u. of Bacillus anthracis Sterne spores 4 days after the non-lethal 7 Gy dose of (60)Co gamma radiation. Twenty-one days of treatment with CLR/14-OH CLR, 150 mg kg(-1) twice daily, or CIP, 16.5 mg kg(-1) twice daily, began 24 h after inoculation. Pharmacokinetics indicate that the area under the curve (AUC) for 14-OH CLR on the concentration-versus-time graph was slightly higher in gamma-irradiated than non-irradiated animals. Neither drug was able to increase survival in gamma-irradiated animals. CIP and CLR/14-OH CLR therapies in non-irradiated animals increased survival from 49 % (17/35 mice) in buffer-treated animals to 94 % (33/35) and 100 %, respectively (P < 0.001). B. anthracis Sterne only was isolated from 25-50 % of treated mice with or without irradiation. Mixed infections with B. anthracis Sterne were present in 50-71 % of gamma-irradiated mice but only in 5-10 % of mice without irradiation.

Clindamycin and quinolone therapy for Bacillus anthracis Sterne infection in 60Co-gamma-photon-irradiated and sham-irradiated mice

OBJECTIVES

Sublethal ionizing doses of radiation increase the susceptibility of mice to Bacillus anthracis Sterne infection. In this study, we investigated the efficacy of clindamycin in 60Co-gamma-photon-irradiated and sham-irradiated mice after intratracheal challenge with B. anthracis Sterne spores. Clindamycin has in vitro activity against B. anthracis and inhibits the production of toxin from other species, although no direct evidence exists that production of B. anthracis toxin is inhibited.

METHODS

Ten-week-old B6D2F1/J female mice were either sham-irradiated or given a sublethal 7 Gy dose of 60Co-gamma-photon radiation 4 days prior to an intratracheal challenge with toxigenic B. anthracis Sterne spores. Mice were treated twice daily with 200 mg/kg clindamycin (subcutaneous or oral), 100 mg/kg moxifloxacin (oral), 50 mg/kg ciprofloxacin (subcutaneous) or a combination therapy (clindamycin + ciprofloxacin). Bacteria were isolated and identified from lung, liver and heart blood at five timed intervals after irradiation. Survival was recorded twice daily following intratracheal challenge.

RESULTS

The use of clindamycin increased survival in gamma-irradiated and sham-irradiated animals challenged with B. anthracis Sterne in comparison with control mice (P < 0.001). Ciprofloxacin-treated animals had higher survival compared with clindamycin-treated animals in two experiments, and less survival in a third experiment, although differences were not statistically significant. Moxifloxacin was just as effective as clindamycin. Combination therapy did not improve survival of sham-irradiated animals and significantly decreased survival among gamma-irradiated animals (P = 0.01) in comparison with clindamycin-treated animals. B. anthracis Sterne was isolated from lung, liver and heart blood, irrespective of the antimicrobial treatment.

CONCLUSIONS

Treatment with clindamycin, ciprofloxacin or moxifloxacin increased survival in sham-irradiated and gamma-irradiated animals challenged intratracheally with B. anthracis Sterne spores. However, the combination of clindamycin and ciprofloxacin increased mortality associated with B. anthracis Sterne infection, particularly in gamma-irradiated animals.

No Evidence of a Mild Form of Inhalational Bacillus anthracis Infection During a Bioterrorism-Related Inhalational Anthrax Outbreak in Washington, D.C., in 2001

BACKGROUND

The mail-related dispersal of Bacillus anthracis spores in the Washington, D.C., area during October 2001 resulted in 5 confirmed cases of inhalational anthrax. We identified an additional 144 ill persons who were potentially exposed to aerosolized spores and whose symptoms were compatible with early inhalational anthrax but whose clinical course and nonserologic laboratory evaluation revealed no evidence for B. anthracis infection. We hypothesized that early antibiotic use could have decreased the sensitivity of diagnostic tests or that bioterrorism-related inhalational anthrax may include mild disease.

METHODS

Eligible patients included those with illness compatible with early inhalational anthrax who had potential exposure to B. anthracis. Patient serum samples were tested for immunoglobulin G (IgG) antibody against B. anthracis protective antigen (PA) using a sensitive enzyme-linked immunosorbant assay (sensitivity, 97.6%).

RESULTS

Of the 144 eligible patients, 66 (46%) had convalescent-phase serum samples available for testing; 29 (44%) worked in an area considered to pose a high risk of exposure to B. anthracis spores. Of the 37 patients who worked in areas that did not meet the definition of high-risk exposure, 23 (62%) worked in United States postal or other government facilities in which exposure was plausible but not documented. None of the 66 patients with convalescent-phase serum samples showed evidence of an anti-PA IgG serologic response to B. anthracis.

CONCLUSIONS

These data suggest that a mild form of inhalational anthrax did not occur and that surveillance for moderate or severe illness was adequate to identify all inhalational anthrax cases resulting from the Washington, D.C., bioterrorism-related anthrax exposures.

Mass value assignment of total and subclass immunoglobulin G in a human standard anthrax reference serum

An anti-Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed (anti-AVA) standard human reference serum pool, AVR414, has been prepared, and the total and protective antigen (PA)-specific immunoglobulin G (IgG) were quantified. AVR414 was prepared by plasmapheresis of healthy adults who had received a minimum of four subcutaneous injections of AVA. Mass values (in milligrams per milliliter) for total IgG and IgG subclasses 1 to 4 were determined by radial immunodiffusion. Anti-PA-specific IgG assignment (in micrograms per milliliter) was done by consensus of two complementary approaches: homologous enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) with affinity-purified anti-PA IgG as a calibrator and summation of mean PA-specific IgG subclass concentrations determined by IgG subclass-specific ELISA using the United States National Reference Preparation for Human Serum Proteins as a standard. The total IgG concentration assigned to AVR414 reference serum was 8.33 mg/ml. IgG subclass concentrations were the following: for IgG1, 4.48 mg/ml; for IgG2, 3.35 mg/ml; for IgG3, 0.37 mg/ml; and for IgG4, 0.30 mg/ml. The assigned mass value for total anti-PA-specific IgG was 141.2 microg/ml. Anti-PA-specific IgG subclass concentrations were the following: for IgG1, 79.6 microg/ml; for IgG2, 35.3 microg/ml; for IgG3, 3.2 microg/ml; and for IgG4, 25.3 microg/ml. Human reference serum pool AVR414 will have direct application in the standardization of anthrax serological assays, in reagent qualification, and as a standard for quantification of PA-specific IgG in humans who have been vaccinated with or otherwise exposed to Bacillus anthracis PA.

In their own words: lessons learned from those exposed to anthrax

OBJECTIVES

We evaluated perceptions of workers at the US Postal Service Brentwood Processing and Distribution Center and US Senate employees regarding public health responses to the anthrax mailings of October 2001. We generated recommendations for improving responses to bioterrorism on the basis of the perceptions we recorded.

METHODS

Transcripts from focus groups conducted with Brentwood and US Senate employees were examined, and qualitative analysis identified common domains.

RESULTS

Brentwood focus groups consisted of 36 participants (97% African American and 19% hearing impaired). US Senate focus groups consisted of 7 participants (71% White and 0% hearing impaired). The focus groups revealed that participants' trust in public health agencies had eroded and that this erosion could threaten the effectiveness of communication during future public health emergencies. Among Brentwood participants, lack of trust involved the perception that unfair treatment on the basis of race/ethnicity and socioeconomic status had occurred; among US Senate participants, it derived from perceptions of inconsistent and disorganized messages.

CONCLUSIONS

Effective communication during a public health emergency depends on the provision of clear messages and close involvement of the affected community. Diverse populations may require individualized approaches to ensure that messages are delivered appropriately. Special attention should be given to those who face barriers to traditional modes of communication.

Microbial Forensics Host Factors

This chapter presents the elements of the host response in a simplified fashion. Microbial forensics aims at identifying: the biological agent, its source, and the individuals responsible for a biothreat event. Analytic approaches differ when the suspected biothreat agent is encountered in a container or the environment, as opposed to a human or an animal. However, once the microbe or its toxin is in the living host, all the preceding items except the microbial nucleic acid cannot be analyzed. Nevertheless, the host response to the biological agent is available for analysis. The host response to a foreign substance is often a well orchestrated series of events designed to protect the individual from any harm. Modern techniques help to elucidate the pathways and components of the host response. Similar to a live microbe, vaccines can also provoke an antibody response. A vaccine can compose of: a live or attenuated microbe, a whole nonproliferating microbe, or an antigenic part of the microbe. Regardless, the intent of the vaccine is to produce protection, often by protective antibodies. It is likely that the future understanding of the immune system and evolving technologies; such as microarrays will enhance analytic power.