Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in captive cheetah

A systematic review on reverse-zoonosis: Global impact and changes in transmission patterns

Reverse zoonosis or zooanthroponosis is the transfer of pathogens from humans to animals. Although less studied than zoonotic diseases, this phenomenon poses significant risks to both animal and public health. The increasing human-animal interactions driven by urbanization, globalization, and environmental changes have exacerbated the occurrence of reverse zoonosis. This review evaluated the global impact and transmission patterns of reverse zoonosis, highlighting the anthropogenic and intrinsic factors contributing to its emergence. The study performed a systematic review and included 91 scientific articles published from 2000 to 2022, covering viral, bacterial, parasitic, fungal, and protozoal reverse zoonoses. This study indicated that viral infections, particularly respiratory viruses such as severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 and influenza, have the highest incidence of reverse zoonosis, followed by bacterial infections like tuberculosis and methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus. The United States, India, and Hong Kong are among the most reported regions for reverse zoonotic events. Major risk factors identified include environmental degradation, climate change, antimicrobial resistance, and global wildlife trade. The review underscores the need for enhanced surveillance systems, interdisciplinary collaboration, and stringent regulations on wildlife trade and animal husbandry practices to mitigate the risks associated with reverse zoonosis. Understanding the dynamics of human-animal pathogen transmission is crucial for developing not only effective but also sustainable strategies to protect animal populations as well as public health from emerging infectious diseases.

Reverse Zoonotic Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and Monkeypox Virus: A Comprehensive Review

Reverse zoonosis reveals the process of transmission of a pathogen through the human-animal interface and the spillback of the zoonotic pathogen. In this article, we methodically demonstrate various aspects of reverse zoonosis, with a comprehensive discussion of SARS-CoV-2 and MPXV reverse zoonosis. First, different components of reverse zoonosis, such as humans, different pathogens, and numerous animals (poultry, livestock, pets, wild animals, and zoo animals), have been demonstrated. Second, it explains the present status of reverse zoonosis with different pathogens during previous occurrences of various outbreaks, epidemics, and pandemics. Here, we present 25 examples from literature. Third, using several examples, we comprehensively illustrate the present status of the reverse zoonosis of SARS-CoV-2 and MPXV. Here, we have provided 17 examples of SARS-CoV-2 reverse zoonosis and two examples of MPXV reverse zoonosis. Fourth, we have described two significant aspects of reverse zoonosis: understanding the fundamental aspects of spillback and awareness. These two aspects are required to prevent reverse zoonosis from the current infection with two significant viruses. Finally, the One Health approach was discussed vividly, where we urge scientists from different areas to work collaboratively to solve the issue of reverse zoonosis.

Assessing the risk of human-to-wildlife pathogen transmission for conservation and public health

The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has led to increased concern over transmission of pathogens from humans to animals, and its potential to threaten conservation and public health. To assess this threat, we reviewed published evidence of human-to-wildlife transmission events, with a focus on how such events could threaten animal and human health. We identified 97 verified examples, involving a wide range of pathogens; however, reported hosts were mostly non-human primates or large, long-lived captive animals. Relatively few documented examples resulted in morbidity and mortality, and very few led to maintenance of a human pathogen in a new reservoir or subsequent "secondary spillover" back into humans. We discuss limitations in the literature surrounding these phenomena, including strong evidence of sampling bias towards non-human primates and human-proximate mammals and the possibility of systematic bias against reporting human parasites in wildlife, both of which limit our ability to assess the risk of human-to-wildlife pathogen transmission. We outline how researchers can collect experimental and observational evidence that will expand our capacity for risk assessment for human-to-wildlife pathogen transmission.

Serologic evidence of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection in camel and Eld's deer, Thailand

Background and Aim

The pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza (H1N1pdm09) virus has affected both human and animal populations worldwide. The transmission of the H1N1pdm09 virus from humans to animals is increasingly more evident. Captive animals, particularly zoo animals, are at risk of H1N1pdm09 virus infection through close contact with humans. Evidence of exposure to the H1N1pdm09 virus has been reported in several species of animals in captivity. However, there is limited information on the H1N1pdm09 virus infection and circulation in captive animals. To extend the body of knowledge on exposure to the H1N1pdm09 virus among captive animals in Thailand, our study investigated the presence of antibodies against the H1N1pdm09 virus in two captive animals: Camelids and Eld's deer.

Materials and Methods

We investigated H1N1pdm09 virus infection among four domestic camelid species and wild Eld's deer that were kept in different zoos in Thailand. In total, 72 archival serum samples from camelid species and Eld's deer collected between 2013 and 2014 in seven provinces in Thailand were analyzed for influenza antibodies using hemagglutination inhibition (HI), microneutralization, and western blotting (WB) assays.

Results

The presence of antibodies against the H1N1pdm09 virus was detected in 2.4% (1/42) of dromedary camel serum samples and 15.4% (2/13) of Eld's deer serum samples. No antibodies were detected in the rest of the serum samples derived from other investigated camelids, including Bactrian camels (0/3), alpacas (0/5), and llamas (0/9). The three positive serum samples showed HI antibody titers of 80, whereas the neutralization titers were in the range of 320-640. Antibodies specific to HA and NP proteins in the H1N1pdm09 virus were detected in positive camel serum samples using WB. Conversely, the presence of the specific antibodies in the positive Eld's deer serum samples could not be determined using WB due to the lack of commercially labeled secondary antibodies.

Conclusion

The present study provided evidence of H1N1pdm09 virus infection in the captive dromedary camel and Eld's deer in Thailand. Our findings highlight the need for continuous surveillance for influenza A virus in the population of dromedary camels and Eld's deer. The susceptible animal populations in close contact with humans should be closely monitored. Further study is warranted to determine whether Eld's deer are indeed a competent reservoir for human influenza virus.

Influenza A and D Viruses in Non-Human Mammalian Hosts in Africa: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis

We conducted a systematic review and meta-analysis to investigate the prevalence and current knowledge of influenza A virus (IAV) and influenza D virus (IDV) in non-human mammalian hosts in Africa. PubMed, Google Scholar, Wiley Online Library and World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE-WAHIS) were searched for studies on IAV and IDV from 2000 to 2020. Pooled prevalence and seroprevalences were estimated using the quality effects meta-analysis model. The estimated pooled prevalence and seroprevalence of IAV in pigs in Africa was 1.6% (95% CI: 0-5%) and 14.9% (95% CI: 5-28%), respectively. The seroprevalence of IDV was 87.2% (95% CI: 24-100%) in camels, 9.3% (95% CI: 0-24%) in cattle, 2.2% (95% CI: 0-4%) in small ruminants and 0.0% (95% CI: 0-2%) in pigs. In pigs, H1N1 and H1N1pdm09 IAVs were commonly detected. Notably, the highly pathogenic H5N1 virus was also detected in pigs. Other subtypes detected serologically and/or virologically included H3N8 and H7N7 in equids, H1N1, and H3N8 and H5N1 in dogs and cats. Furthermore, various wildlife animals were exposed to different IAV subtypes. For prudent mitigation of influenza epizootics and possible human infections, influenza surveillance efforts in Africa should not neglect non-human mammalian hosts. The impact of IAV and IDV in non-human mammalian hosts in Africa deserves further investigation.

A cluster epidemic of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus infection in four captive cheetahs (Acinonyx jubatus)

In January 2019, four cheetahs (Acinonyx jubatus) kept at a Japanese zoo intermittently showed respiratory signs following the incidence of seasonal influenza in animal caregivers. Respiratory materials (saliva, sputum and food tray swabs) were non-invasively collected from the four cheetahs. Although we were unable to isolate the virus, the NP gene of influenza A virus was detected in three of the cheetahs but not in the fourth cheetah that had nearly recovered. From a food tray swab which tested weakly positive by a commercial influenza detection kit, we were able to obtain the whole-genome sequence of the influenza A virus. Analysis of the genome, A/cheetah/Kanagawa/2/2019(H1N1), revealed that the virus was closely related to influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses isolated from humans in Japan in the 2018-2019 winter. Production of haemagglutinin inhibition (HI) antibodies (64-128 HI) against an A(H1N1)pdm09 virus in plasma samples confirmed infection of all four cheetahs. The animals continued to produce antibodies for at least 314 days after disease onset. These findings strongly suggest that reverse zoonotic transmission of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus occurred from human to cheetah and subsequently from cheetah to cheetah in the zoo. We also show that specimens can be safely and non-invasively collected from non-domesticated animals and used to investigate respiratory infectious diseases.

Reverse Zoonosis of COVID-19: Lessons From the 2009 Influenza Pandemic

Over the past decade, pandemics caused by pandemic H1N1 (pH1N1) influenza virus in 2009 and severe acute respiratory syndrome virus type 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in 2019 have emerged. Both are high-impact respiratory pathogens originating from animals. Their wide distribution in the human population subsequently results in an increased risk of human-to-animal transmission: reverse zoonosis. Although there have only been rare reports of reverse zoonosis events associated with the ongoing coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic from SARS-CoV-2 so far, comparison with the pH1N1 influenza pandemic can provide a better understanding of the possible consequences of such events for public and animal health. The results of our review suggest that similar factors contribute to successful crossing of the host species barriers in both pandemics. Specific risk factors include sufficient interaction between infected humans and recipient animals, suitability of the animal host factors for productive virus infection, and suitability of the animal host population for viral persistence. Of particular concern is virus spread to susceptible animal species, in which group housing and contact network structure could potentially result in an alternative virus reservoir, from which reintroduction into humans can take place. Virus exposure in high-density populations could allow sustained transmission in susceptible animal species. Identification of the risk factors and serological surveillance in SARS-CoV-2-susceptible animal species that are group-housed should help reduce the threat from reverse zoonosis of COVID-19.

Diet May Drive Influenza A Virus Exposure in African Mammals

BACKGROUND

Influenza A viruses (IAVs) represent repeatedly emerging pathogens with near worldwide distribution and an unclear nonavian-host spectrum. While the natural hosts for IAV are among waterfowl species, certain mammals can be productively infected. Southern Africa is home to diverse avian and mammalian fauna for which almost no information exists on IAV dynamics.

METHODS

We evaluated 111 serum samples from 14 mammalian species from Namibia for the presence of IAV-specific antibodies and tested whether host phylogeny, sociality, or diet influence viral prevalence and diversity.

RESULTS

Free-ranging African mammals are exposed to diverse IAV subtypes. Herbivores developed antibodies against 3 different hemagglutinin (HA) subtypes, at low prevalence, while carnivores showed a higher prevalence and diversity of HA-specific antibody responses against 11 different subtypes. Host phylogeny and sociality were not significantly associated with HA antibody prevalence or subtype diversity. Both seroprevalence and HA diversity were significantly increased in carnivores regularly feeding on birds.

CONCLUSIONS

The risk of infection and transmission may be driven by diet and ecological factors that increase contact with migratory and resident waterfowl. Consequently, wild mammals, particularly those that specialize on hunting and scavenging birds, could play an important but overlooked role in influenza epizootics.

Serological evidence of influenza virus infection in captive wild felids, Thailand

Influenza virus is known to affect wild felids. To explore the prevalence of influenza viruses in these animal species, 196 archival sera from 5 felid species including Panthera tigris (N=147), Prionailurus viverrinus (N=35), Panthera leo (N=5), Pardofelis temminckii (N=8) and Neofelis nebulosa (N=1) collected between 2011 and 2015 in 10 provinces of Thailand were determined for the presence of antibody to avian and human influenza viruses. Blocking enzyme-linked immunosorbent (ELISA) assay and hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay were employed as the screening tests, which the serum samples with HI antibody titers ≥20 were further confirmed by cytopathic effect/hemagglutination based-microneutralization (CPE/HA-based microNT) test. Based on HI and microNT assays, the seropositive rates of low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) H5 virus, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5 virus and human H1 virus were 1.53% (3/196), 2.04% (4/196) and 6.63% (13/196), respectively. In addition, we also found antibody against both LPAI H5 virus and HPAI H5 virus in 2 out of 196 tested sera (1.02%). Evidences of influenza virus infection were found in captive P. tigris in Kanchanaburi, Nakhon Sawan and Ratchaburi provinces of Thailand. The findings of our study highlights the need of a continuous active surveillance program of influenza viruses in wild felid species.

Serosurveillance for pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 virus infection in domestic elephants, Thailand

The present study conducted serosurveillance for the presence of antibody to pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 virus (H1N1pdm virus) in archival serum samples collected between 2009 and 2013 from 317 domestic elephants living in 19 provinces situated in various parts of Thailand.

To obtain the most accurate data, hemagglutination-inhibition (HI) assay was employed as the screening test; and sera with HI antibody titers ≥20 were further confirmed by other methods, including cytopathic effect/hemagglutination based-microneutralization (microNT) and Western blot (WB) assays using H1N1pdm matrix 1 (M1) or hemagglutinin (HA) recombinant protein as the test antigen. Conclusively, the appropriate assays using HI in conjunction with WB assays for HA antibody revealed an overall seropositive rate of 8.5% (27 of 317). The prevalence of antibody to H1N1pdm virus was 2% (4/172) in 2009, 32% (17/53) in 2010, 9% (2/22) in 2011, 12% (1/8) in 2012, and 5% (3/62) in 2013. Notably, these positive serum samples were collected from elephants living in 7 tourist provinces of Thailand. The highest seropositive rate was obtained from elephants in Phuket, a popular tourist beach city. Young elephants had higher seropositive rate than older elephants.

The source of H1N1pdm viral infection in these elephants was not explored, but most likely came from close contact with the infected mahouts or from the infected tourists who engaged in activities such as elephant riding and feeding. Nevertheless, it could not be excluded that elephant-to-elephant transmission did occur.

A Novel A(H7N2) Influenza Virus Isolated from a Veterinarian Caring for Cats in a New York City Animal Shelter Causes Mild Disease and Transmits Poorly in the Ferret Model

In December 2016, a low-pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) A(H7N2) virus was identified to be the causative source of an outbreak in a cat shelter in New York City, which subsequently spread to multiple shelters in the states of New York and Pennsylvania. One person with occupational exposure to infected cats became infected with the virus, representing the first LPAI H7N2 virus infection in a human in North America since 2003. Considering the close contact that frequently occurs between companion animals and humans, it was critical to assess the relative risk of this novel virus to public health. The virus isolated from the human case, A/New York/108/2016 (NY/108), caused mild and transient illness in ferrets and mice but did not transmit to naive cohoused ferrets following traditional or aerosol-based inoculation methods. The environmental persistence of NY/108 virus was generally comparable to that of other LPAI H7N2 viruses. However, NY/108 virus replicated in human bronchial epithelial cells with an increased efficiency compared with that of previously isolated H7N2 viruses. Furthermore, the novel H7N2 virus was found to utilize a relatively lower pH for hemagglutinin activation, similar to human influenza viruses. Our data suggest that the LPAI H7N2 virus requires further adaptation before representing a substantial threat to public health. However, the reemergence of an LPAI H7N2 virus in the northeastern United States underscores the need for continuous surveillance of emerging zoonotic influenza viruses inclusive of mammalian species, such as domestic felines, that are not commonly considered intermediate hosts for avian influenza viruses.IMPORTANCE Avian influenza viruses are capable of crossing the species barrier to infect mammals, an event of public health concern due to the potential acquisition of a pandemic phenotype. In December 2016, an H7N2 virus caused an outbreak in cats in multiple animal shelters in New York State. This was the first detection of this virus in the northeastern United States in over a decade and the first documented infection of a felid with an H7N2 virus. A veterinarian became infected following occupational exposure to H7N2 virus-infected cats, necessitating the evaluation of this virus for its capacity to cause disease in mammals. While the H7N2 virus was associated with mild illness in mice and ferrets and did not spread well between ferrets, it nonetheless possessed several markers of virulence for mammals. These data highlight the promiscuity of influenza viruses and the need for diligent surveillance across multiple species to quickly identify an emerging strain with pandemic potential.

Reverse zoonotic disease transmission (zooanthroponosis): a systematic review of seldom-documented human biological threats to animals

Background

Research regarding zoonotic diseases often focuses on infectious diseases animals have given to humans. However, an increasing number of reports indicate that humans are transmitting pathogens to animals. Recent examples include methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, influenza A virus, Cryptosporidium parvum, and Ascaris lumbricoides. The aim of this review was to provide an overview of published literature regarding reverse zoonoses and highlight the need for future work in this area.

Methods

An initial broad literature review yielded 4763 titles, of which 4704 were excluded as not meeting inclusion criteria. After careful screening, 56 articles (from 56 countries over three decades) with documented human-to-animal disease transmission were included in this report.

Findings

In these publications, 21 (38%) pathogens studied were bacterial, 16 (29%) were viral, 12 (21%) were parasitic, and 7 (13%) were fungal, other, or involved multiple pathogens. Effected animals included wildlife (n = 28, 50%), livestock (n = 24, 43%), companion animals (n = 13, 23%), and various other animals or animals not explicitly mentioned (n = 2, 4%). Published reports of reverse zoonoses transmission occurred in every continent except Antarctica therefore indicating a worldwide disease threat.

Interpretation

As we see a global increase in industrial animal production, the rapid movement of humans and animals, and the habitats of humans and wild animals intertwining with great complexity, the future promises more opportunities for humans to cause reverse zoonoses. Scientific research must be conducted in this area to provide a richer understanding of emerging and reemerging disease threats. As a result, multidisciplinary approaches such as One Health will be needed to mitigate these problems.