Neural evidence accumulation persists after choice to inform metacognitive judgments

Distinct basal ganglia contributions to learning from implicit and explicit value signals in perceptual decision-making

Metacognitive evaluations of confidence provide an estimate of decision accuracy that could guide learning in the absence of explicit feedback. We examine how humans might learn from this implicit feedback in direct comparison with that of explicit feedback, using simultaneous EEG-fMRI. Participants performed a motion direction discrimination task where stimulus difficulty was increased to maintain performance, with intermixed explicit- and no-feedback trials. We isolate single-trial estimates of post-decision confidence using EEG decoding, and find these neural signatures re-emerge at the time of feedback together with separable signatures of explicit feedback. We identified these signatures of implicit versus explicit feedback along a dorsal-ventral gradient in the striatum, a finding uniquely enabled by an EEG-fMRI fusion. These two signals appear to integrate into an aggregate representation in the external globus pallidus, which could broadcast updates to improve cortical decision processing via the thalamus and insular cortex, irrespective of the source of feedback.

Unconscious Perception of Vernier Offsets

The comparison between conscious and unconscious perception is a cornerstone of consciousness science. However, most studies reporting above-chance discrimination of unseen stimuli do not control for criterion biases when assessing awareness. We tested whether observers can discriminate subjectively invisible offsets of Vernier stimuli when visibility is probed using a bias-free task. To reduce visibility, stimuli were either backward masked or presented for very brief durations (1-3 milliseconds) using a modern-day Tachistoscope. We found some behavioral indicators of perception without awareness, and yet, no conclusive evidence thereof. To seek more decisive proof, we simulated a series of Bayesian observer models, including some that produce visibility judgements alongside type-1 judgements. Our data are best accounted for by observers with slightly suboptimal conscious access to sensory evidence. Overall, the stimuli and visibility manipulations employed here induced mild instances of blindsight-like behavior, making them attractive candidates for future investigation of this phenomenon.

A Neural Decision Signal during Internal Sampling from Working Memory in Humans

How humans transform sensory information into decisions that steer purposeful behavior is a central question in psychology and neuroscience that is traditionally investigated during the sampling of external environmental signals. The decision-making framework of gradual information sampling toward a decision has also been proposed to apply when sampling internal sensory evidence from working memory. However, neural evidence for this proposal remains scarce. Here we show (using scalp EEG in male and female human volunteers) that sampling internal visual representations from working memory elicits a scalp EEG potential associated with gradual evidence accumulation-the central parietal positivity. Consistent with an evolving decision process, we show how this signal (1) scales with the time participants require to reach a decision about the cued memory content and (2) is amplified when having to decide among multiple contents in working memory. These results bring the electrophysiology of decision-making into the domain of working memory and suggest that variability in memory-guided behavior may be driven (at least in part) by variations in the sampling of our inner mental contents.

Distinct neural markers of evidence accumulation index metacognitive processing before and after simple visual decisions

Perceptual decision-making is affected by uncertainty arising from the reliability of incoming sensory evidence (perceptual uncertainty) and the categorization of that evidence relative to a choice boundary (categorical uncertainty). Here, we investigated how these factors impact the temporal dynamics of evidence processing during decision-making and subsequent metacognitive judgments. Participants performed a motion discrimination task while electroencephalography was recorded. We manipulated perceptual uncertainty by varying motion coherence, and categorical uncertainty by varying the angular offset of motion signals relative to a criterion. After each trial, participants rated their desire to change their mind. High uncertainty impaired perceptual and metacognitive judgments and reduced the amplitude of the centro-parietal positivity, a neural marker of evidence accumulation. Coherence and offset affected the centro-parietal positivity at different time points, suggesting that perceptual and categorical uncertainty affect decision-making in sequential stages. Moreover, the centro-parietal positivity predicted participants' metacognitive judgments: larger predecisional centro-parietal positivity amplitude was associated with less desire to change one's mind, whereas larger postdecisional centro-parietal positivity amplitude was associated with greater desire to change one's mind, but only following errors. These findings reveal a dissociation between predecisional and postdecisional evidence processing, suggesting that the CPP tracks potentially distinct cognitive processes before and after a decision.

Awareness of errors is reduced by sleep loss

The ability to detect and subsequently correct errors is important in preventing the detrimental consequences of sleep loss. The Error Related Negativity (ERN), and the error positivity (Pe) are established neural correlates of error processing. Previous work has shown sleep loss reduces ERN and Pe, indicating sleep loss impairs error-monitoring processes. However, no previous work has examined behavioral error awareness, in conjunction with EEG measures, under sleep loss conditions, and studies of sleep restriction are lacking. Using combined behavioral and EEG measures, we report two studies investigating the impact of total sleep deprivation (TSD) and sleep restriction (SR) on error awareness. Fourteen healthy participants completed the Error Awareness Task under conditions of TSD and 27 completed the same task under conditions of SR. It was found that TSD did not influence behavioral error awareness or ERN or Pe amplitude, however, SR reduced behavioral error awareness, increased the time taken to detect errors, and reduced Pe amplitude. Findings indicate individuals who are chronically sleep restricted are at risk for reduced recognition of errors. Reduced error awareness may be one factor contributing to the increased accidents and injuries seen in contexts where sleep loss is prevalent.

Neural correlates of confidence during decision formation in a perceptual judgment task

When we make a decision, we also estimate the probability that our choice is correct or accurate. This probability estimate is termed our degree of decision confidence. Recent work has reported event-related potential (ERP) correlates of confidence both during decision formation (the centro-parietal positivity component; CPP) and after a decision has been made (the error positivity component; Pe). However, there are several measurement confounds that complicate the interpretation of these findings. More recent studies that overcome these issues have so far produced conflicting results. To better characterise the ERP correlates of confidence we presented participants with a comparative brightness judgment task while recording electroencephalography. Participants judged which of two flickering squares (varying in luminance over time) was brighter on average. Participants then gave confidence ratings ranging from "surely incorrect" to "surely correct". To elicit a range of confidence ratings we manipulated both the mean luminance difference between the brighter and darker squares (relative evidence) and the overall luminance of both squares (absolute evidence). We found larger CPP amplitudes in trials with higher confidence ratings. This association was not simply a by-product of differences in relative evidence (which covaries with confidence) across trials. We did not identify postdecisional ERP correlates of confidence, except when they were artificially produced by pre-response ERP baselines. These results provide further evidence for neural correlates of processes that inform confidence judgments during decision formation.

Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis

Determining the psychological, computational, and neural bases of confidence and uncertainty holds promise for understanding foundational aspects of human metacognition. While a neuroscience of confidence has focused on the mechanisms underpinning subpersonal phenomena such as representations of uncertainty in the visual or motor system, metacognition research has been concerned with personal-level beliefs and knowledge about self-performance. I provide a road map for bridging this divide by focusing on a particular class of confidence computation: propositional confidence in one's own (hypothetical) decisions or actions. Propositional confidence is informed by the observer's models of the world and their cognitive system, which may be more or less accurate-thus explaining why metacognitive judgments are inferential and sometimes diverge from task performance. Disparate findings on the neural basis of uncertainty and performance monitoring are integrated into a common framework, and a new understanding of the locus of action of metacognitive interventions is developed.

Multimodal investigations of emotional face processing and social trait judgment of faces

Faces are among the most important visual stimuli that humans perceive in everyday life. While extensive literature has examined emotional processing and social evaluations of faces, most studies have examined either topic using unimodal approaches. In this review, we promote the use of multimodal cognitive neuroscience approaches to study these processes, using two lines of research as examples: ambiguity in facial expressions of emotion and social trait judgment of faces. In the first set of studies, we identified an event-related potential that signals emotion ambiguity using electroencephalography and we found convergent neural responses to emotion ambiguity using functional neuroimaging and single-neuron recordings. In the second set of studies, we discuss how different neuroimaging and personality-dimensional approaches together provide new insights into social trait judgments of faces. In both sets of studies, we provide an in-depth comparison between neurotypicals and people with autism spectrum disorder. We offer a computational account for the behavioral and neural markers of the different facial processing between the two groups. Finally, we suggest new practices for studying the emotional processing and social evaluations of faces. All data discussed in the case studies of this review are publicly available.

Prospective and Retrospective Metacognitive Abilities and Their Association with Impaired Self-awareness in Patients with Traumatic Brain Injury

Metacognitive impairment often occurs in patients with traumatic brain injury (TBI) and is associated with clinical problems. The aim of this study was to clarify the pathology of metacognitive impairment in TBI patients using a behavioral task, clinical assessment of self-awareness, and lesion-symptom mapping. Metacognitive abilities of TBI patients and healthy controls were assessed using a modified perceptual decision-making task. Self-awareness was assessed using the Patient Competency Rating Scale and the Frontal Systems Behavior Scale. The associations between estimated metacognitive abilities, self-awareness, and neuropsychological test results were examined. The correspondence between metacognitive disabilities and brain lesions was explored by ROI-based lesion-symptom mapping using structural magnetic resonance images. Overall, 25 TBI patients and 95 healthy controls were included in the analyses. Compared with that in healthy controls, the prospective metacognitive ability of TBI patients was lower, with metacognitive evaluations revealing a bias toward overestimating their abilities. Retrospective metacognitive ability showed a negative correlation with self-awareness but not with neuropsychological test results. In the lesion-symptom mapping analysis, the left pFC was associated with lower retrospective metacognitive ability. This study contributes to a better understanding of the pathology of metacognitive and self-awareness deficits in TBI patients and may explain the cause of impaired realistic goal setting and adaptive behavior in these patients.

Stimulus expectations do not modulate visual event-related potentials in probabilistic cueing designs

Humans and other animals can learn and exploit repeating patterns that occur within their environments. These learned patterns can be used to form expectations about future sensory events. Several influential predictive coding models have been proposed to explain how learned expectations influence the activity of stimulus-selective neurons in the visual system. These models specify reductions in neural response measures when expectations are fulfilled (termed expectation suppression) and increases following surprising sensory events. However, there is currently scant evidence for expectation suppression in the visual system when confounding factors are taken into account. Effects of surprise have been observed in blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signals, but not when using electrophysiological measures. To provide a strong test for expectation suppression and surprise effects we performed a predictive cueing experiment while recording electroencephalographic (EEG) data. Participants (n=48) learned cue-face associations during a training session and were then exposed to these cue-face pairs in a subsequent experiment. Using univariate analyses of face-evoked event-related potentials (ERPs) we did not observe any differences across expected (90% probability), neutral (50%) and surprising (10%) face conditions. Across these comparisons, Bayes factors consistently favoured the null hypothesis throughout the time-course of the stimulus-evoked response. When using multivariate pattern analysis we did not observe above-chance classification of expected and surprising face-evoked ERPs. By contrast, we found robust within- and across-trial stimulus repetition effects. Our findings do not support predictive coding-based accounts that specify reduced prediction error signalling when perceptual expectations are fulfilled. They instead highlight the utility of other types of predictive processing models that describe expectation-related phenomena in the visual system without recourse to prediction error signalling.

Prior information differentially affects discrimination decisions and subjective confidence reports

According to Bayesian models, both decisions and confidence are based on the same precision-weighted integration of prior expectations ("priors") and incoming information ("likelihoods"). This assumes that priors are integrated optimally and equally in decisions and confidence, which has not been tested. In three experiments, we quantify how priors inform decisions and confidence. With a dual-decision task we create pairs of conditions that are matched in posterior information, but differ on whether the prior or likelihood is more informative. We find that priors are underweighted in discrimination decisions, but are less underweighted in confidence about those decisions, and this is not due to differences in processing time. The same patterns remain with exogenous probabilistic cues as priors. With a Bayesian model we quantify the weighting parameters for the prior at both levels, and find converging evidence that priors are more optimally used in explicit confidence, even when underused in decisions.

Confidence is predicted by pre- and post-choice decision signal dynamics

It is well established that one's confidence in a choice can be influenced by new evidence encountered after commitment has been reached, but the processes through which post-choice evidence is sampled remain unclear. To investigate this, we traced the pre- and post-choice dynamics of electrophysiological signatures of evidence accumulation (Centro-parietal Positivity, CPP) and motor preparation (mu/beta band) to determine their sensitivity to participants' confidence in their perceptual discriminations. Pre-choice CPP amplitudes scaled with confidence both when confidence was reported simultaneously with choice, and when reported 1 second after the initial direction decision with no intervening evidence. When additional evidence was presented during the post-choice delay period, the CPP exhibited sustained activation after the initial choice, with a more prolonged build-up on trials with lower certainty in the alternative that was finally endorsed, irrespective of whether this entailed a change-of-mind from the initial choice or not. Further investigation established that this pattern was accompanied by later lateralisation of motor preparation signals toward the ultimately chosen response and slower confidence reports when participants indicated low certainty in this response. These observations are consistent with certainty-dependent stopping theories according to which post-choice evidence accumulation ceases when a criterion level of certainty in a choice alternative has been reached, but continues otherwise. Our findings have implications for current models of choice confidence, and predictions they may make about EEG signatures.

The COMT gene modulates the relationship between bilingual adaptation in executive function and decision-making: an EEG study

Bilingual adaptive control mechanisms appear to be linked to congenital genetic factors such as dopamine (DA) genes. However, it is unclear as to whether acquired cognitive exercise can vanquish innate influences that allow bilingual executive advantages to be shown in other cognitive areas. In the present study, we examine the relationship between gene-dependent executive control and decision-making by targeting the enzyme catecholamine-O-methyltransferase (COMT) and employing electroencephalography (EEG). Chinese-English bilinguals (N = 101) participated in a language switching task and the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). The findings showed that COMT Val158Met polymorphism played a complex role in decision-making and bilingual executive control processing: Bilinguals with Valine (Val) homozygotes had poorer performance in the IGT, while Methionine (Met) carriers had larger switch costs in the language switching task. Second, the cross-task relationships varied among bilinguals with different COMT genotypes: Bilinguals with Met allele genotypes showed larger switch costs and better performance on the IGT. These findings suggest that bilinguals who carry Met allele are equipped with more efficient adaptive mechanisms of executive functions that are generalized to other cognitive domains.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11571-022-09867-2.

Evidence or Confidence: What Is Really Monitored during a Decision?

Assessing our confidence in the choices we make is important to making adaptive decisions, and it is thus no surprise that we excel in this ability. However, standard models of decision-making, such as the drift-diffusion model (DDM), treat confidence assessment as a post hoc or parallel process that does not directly influence the choice, which depends only on accumulated evidence. Here, we pursue the alternative hypothesis that what is monitored during a decision is an evolving sense of confidence (that the to-be-selected option is the best) rather than raw evidence. Monitoring confidence has the appealing consequence that the decision threshold corresponds to a desired level of confidence for the choice, and that confidence improvements can be traded off against the resources required to secure them. We show that most previous findings on perceptual and value-based decisions traditionally interpreted from an evidence-accumulation perspective can be explained more parsimoniously from our novel confidence-driven perspective. Furthermore, we show that our novel confidence-driven DDM (cDDM) naturally generalizes to decisions involving any number of alternative options - which is notoriously not the case with traditional DDM or related models. Finally, we discuss future empirical evidence that could be useful in adjudicating between these alternatives.

Confidence in consciousness research

To study (un)conscious perception and test hypotheses about consciousness, researchers need procedures for determining whether subjects consciously perceive stimuli or not. This article is an introduction to a family of procedures called "confidence-based procedures," which consist in interpreting metacognitive indicators as indicators of consciousness. I assess the validity and accuracy of these procedures, and answer a series of common objections to their use in consciousness research. I conclude that confidence-based procedures are valid for assessing consciousness, and, in most cases, accurate enough for our practical and scientific purposes. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Perception and Psychophysics Philosophy > Consciousness.

Explaining Integration of Evidence Separated by Temporal Gaps with Frontoparietal Circuit Models

Perceptual decisions rely on accumulating sensory evidence over time. However, the accumulation process is complicated in real life when evidence resulted from separated cues over time. Previous studies demonstrate that participants are able to integrate information from two separated cues to improve their performance invariant to an interval between the cues. However, there is no neural model that can account for accuracy and confidence in decisions when there is a time interval in evidence. We used behavioral and EEG datasets from a visual choice task -Random dot motion- with separated evidence to investigate three candid distributed neural networks. We showed that decisions based on evidence accumulation by separated cues over time are best explained by the interplay of recurrent cortical dynamics of centro-parietal and frontal brain areas while an uncertainty-monitoring module included in the model.

Confidence reflects a noisy decision reliability estimate

Decisions vary in difficulty. Humans know this and typically report more confidence in easy than in difficult decisions. However, confidence reports do not perfectly track decision accuracy, but also reflect response biases and difficulty misjudgements. To isolate the quality of confidence reports, we developed a model of the decision-making process underlying choice-confidence data. In this model, confidence reflects a subject's estimate of the reliability of their decision. The quality of this estimate is limited by the subject's uncertainty about the uncertainty of the variable that informs their decision ('meta-uncertainty'). This model provides an accurate account of choice-confidence data across a broad range of perceptual and cognitive tasks, investigated in six previous studies. We find meta-uncertainty varies across subjects, is stable over time, generalizes across some domains and can be manipulated experimentally. The model offers a parsimonious explanation for the computational processes that underlie and constrain the sense of confidence.

Analyzing traditional and accelerated nursing student exam answer changing behaviors: A retrospective study

OBJECTIVE

This study examined differences in exam answer changing behavior among baccalaureate students based on program pace, semester in the program, exam scores, and grade point average.

DESIGN

The study is a retrospective review of quantitative data.

SETTING

The data was collected using standardized testing results taken by students at a private, liberal arts university in the midwestern United States.

PARTICIPANTS

774 normed standardized nursing exams were reviewed retrospectively for number and type of answer changes and analyzed between traditional and accelerated baccalaureate students early, middle, and late in the curriculum.

RESULTS

Most answer changes (50%) were beneficial to grades. Answer changing decreased late in the program. Students scoring higher changed fewer answers. Program pace and grade point average did not influence answer changing.

CONCLUSION

Answer changing should not be generally discouraged. Promoting adequate preparation and test taking skills may benefit nursing students, especially early in programs.

Brain signatures of error awareness during cognitive tasks for humans in the flight environment

At present, many scientific experiments are carried out in extreme conditions. Pilots need to perform high-intensity tasks for a long time. Human error is an essential factor affecting mission execution. To deeply study the physiological characteristics of different erroneous states of consciousness, we used an improved double-choice Oddball paradigm to collect brain electrophysiological signals of volunteers and pilots in missions and analyze event-related potential (ERP), time-frequency, and brain function spectrum, extracting EEG indicators sensitive to error awareness. The results showed that, in the 300∼500 ms time window, the error awareness type was correlated with Pe amplitude. Meanwhile, the time-frequency and brain functional spectrum analysis showed that the amplitude of the aware errors α-ERS oscillation, the functional spectral density of the α-band, and the uncertain errors were more prominent than unaware errors. The error awareness of the pilots showed the same EEG sensitivity characteristics in flight as in the ground volunteer experiment, and the characteristic sensitivity value was higher than that of the ground participants. We analyzed the EEG indicators sensitive to error awareness and determined the differences in EEG characteristics when pilots have error awareness on the ground and in flight. This study provides theoretical guidance for the follow-up research on the intervention measures against error awareness and determines the target point positioning.

Check or Go? Impact of Doubt on the Hierarchical Organization of the Mediofrontal Area

BACKGROUND

Based on numerous imaging and electrophysiological studies, the presupplementary motor area (pre-SMA) and the rostral cingulate motor area are cortical regions considered to be essential to voluntary movement initiation and behavioral control. However, their respective roles and functional interactions remain a long-standing and still debated question.

METHODS

Here, we trained 2 rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) in a complex cognitive task to compare the neuronal activity of these 2 regions on the medial wall during both perceptual and internally guided decisions.

RESULTS

We confirmed the implication of both areas throughout the decision process. Critically, we demonstrate that instead of a stable invariant role, the pre-SMA and rostral cingulate motor area manifested a versatile hierarchical relationship depending on the mode of movement initiation. Whereas pre-SMA neurons were primarily engaged in decisions based on perceptual information, rostral cingulate motor area neurons preempted the decision process in case of an internally doubt-driven checking behavior, withholding pre-SMA recruitment during the time spent inhibiting the habitual action.

CONCLUSIONS

We identified a versatile hierarchical organization of the mediofrontal area that may substantially affect normal and pathological decision processes because adaptive behaviors, such as doubt-checking and its compulsive counterpart, rely on this subtle equilibrium in controlling action initiation.

Uncovering the effects of bilingual language control on rational decisions: An ERP study

A growing body of research suggests that the language in which bilinguals make decisions affects the rationality of such decisions. Furthermore, bilinguals constantly confront cross-language interference that requires complex language control processes to resolve this competition. However, the relationship between language control and decision-making is unclear. In the current study, we analyze electrophysiological and behavior data elicited from two groups of Chinese-English bilinguals. One group was trained in intensive language switching and then completed the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) and the other group completed the two tasks in the reverse order. We found that bilinguals who first received language switching training significantly scored higher on the IGT, with the score positively correlating with L1 and L2 switch costs. More importantly, training with language switching first led to an N2 component for L1 switching costs that negatively correlated with both loss feedback-related negativity and the P3 component. These effects did not emerge among the group of bilinguals who performed the IGT first. Taken together, the findings suggest that bilinguals are assisted in making rational decisions by language control on feedback evaluation.

Alpha oscillations and stimulus-evoked activity dissociate metacognitive reports of attention, visibility, and confidence in a rapid visual detection task

Variability in the detection and discrimination of weak visual stimuli has been linked to oscillatory neural activity. In particular, the amplitude of activity in the alpha-band (8–12 Hz) has been shown to impact the objective likelihood of stimulus detection, as well as measures of subjective visibility, attention, and decision confidence. Here we investigate how preparatory alpha in a cued pretarget interval influences performance and phenomenology, by recording simultaneous subjective measures of attention and confidence (experiment 1) or attention and visibility (experiment 2) on a trial-by-trial basis in a visual detection task. Across both experiments, alpha amplitude was negatively and linearly correlated with the intensity of subjective attention. In contrast with this linear relationship, we observed a quadratic relationship between the strength of alpha oscillations and subjective ratings of confidence and visibility. We find that this same quadratic relationship links alpha amplitude with the strength of stimulus-evoked responses. Visibility and confidence judgments also corresponded with the strength of evoked responses, but confidence, uniquely, incorporated information about attentional state. As such, our findings reveal distinct psychological and neural correlates of metacognitive judgments of attentional state, stimulus visibility, and decision confidence when these judgments are preceded by a cued target interval.

Effects of Rhythmic Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation in the Alpha-Band on Visual Perception Depend on Deviation From Alpha-Peak Frequency: Faster Relative Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation Alpha-Pace Improves Performance

Alpha-band oscillatory activity over occipito-parietal areas is involved in shaping perceptual and cognitive processes, with a growing body of electroencephalographic (EEG) evidence indicating that pre-stimulus alpha-band amplitude relates to the subjective perceptual experience, but not to objective measures of visual task performance (discrimination accuracy). The primary aim of the present transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) study was to investigate whether causality can be established for this relationship, using rhythmic (alpha-band) TMS entrainment protocols. It was anticipated that pre-stimulus 10 Hz-TMS would induce changes in subjective awareness ratings but not accuracy, in the visual hemifield contralateral to TMS. To test this, we administered 10 Hz-TMS over the right intraparietal sulcus prior to visual stimulus presentation in 17 participants, while measuring their objective performance and subjective awareness in a visual discrimination task. Arrhythmic and 10 Hz sham-TMS served as control conditions (within-participant design). Resting EEG was used to record individual alpha frequency (IAF). A study conducted in parallel to ours with a similar design but reported after we completed data collection informed further, secondary analyses for a causal relationship between pre-stimulus alpha-frequency and discrimination accuracy. This was explored through a regression analysis between rhythmic-TMS alpha-pace relative to IAF and performance measures. Our results revealed that contrary to our primary expectation, pre-stimulus 10 Hz-TMS did not affect subjective measures of performance, nor accuracy, relative to control-TMS. This null result is in accord with a recent finding showing that for influencing subjective measures of performance, alpha-TMS needs to be applied post-stimulus. In addition, our secondary analysis showed that IAF was positively correlated with task accuracy across participants, and that 10 Hz-TMS effects on accuracy—but not awareness ratings—depended on IAF: The slower (or faster) the IAF, relative to the fixed 10 Hz TMS frequency, the stronger the TMS-induced performance improvement (or worsening), indicating that 10 Hz-TMS produced a gain (or a loss) in individual performance, directly depending on TMS-pace relative to IAF. In support of recent reports, this is evidence for alpha-frequency playing a causal role in perceptual sensitivity likely through regulating the speed of sensory sampling.

Tuning alpha rhythms to shape conscious visual perception

It is commonly held that what we see and what we believe we see are overlapping phenomena. However, dissociations between sensory events and their subjective interpretation occur in the general population and in clinical disorders, raising the question as to whether perceptual accuracy and its subjective interpretation represent mechanistically dissociable events. Here, we uncover the role that alpha oscillations play in shaping these two indices of human conscious experience. We used electroencephalography (EEG) to measure occipital alpha oscillations during a visual detection task, which were then entrained using rhythmic-TMS. We found that controlling prestimulus alpha frequency by rhythmic-TMS modulated perceptual accuracy, but not subjective confidence in it, whereas controlling poststimulus (but not prestimulus) alpha amplitude modulated how well subjective confidence judgments can distinguish between correct and incorrect decision, but not accuracy. These findings provide the first causal evidence of a double dissociation between alpha speed and alpha amplitude, linking alpha frequency to spatiotemporal sampling resources and alpha amplitude to the internal, subjective representation and interpretation of sensory events.

Distinct neurocomputational mechanisms support informational and socially normative conformity

A change of mind in response to social influence could be driven by informational conformity to increase accuracy, or by normative conformity to comply with social norms such as reciprocity. Disentangling the behavioural, cognitive, and neurobiological underpinnings of informational and normative conformity have proven elusive. Here, participants underwent fMRI while performing a perceptual task that involved both advice-taking and advice-giving to human and computer partners. The concurrent inclusion of 2 different social roles and 2 different social partners revealed distinct behavioural and neural markers for informational and normative conformity. Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) BOLD response tracked informational conformity towards both human and computer but tracked normative conformity only when interacting with humans. A network of brain areas (dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and temporoparietal junction (TPJ)) that tracked normative conformity increased their functional coupling with the dACC when interacting with humans. These findings enable differentiating the neural mechanisms by which different types of conformity shape social changes of mind.

Filling the gaps: Cognitive control as a critical lens for understanding mechanisms of value-based decision-making

While often seeming to investigate rather different problems, research into value-based decision making and cognitive control have historically offered parallel insights into how people select thoughts and actions. While the former studies how people weigh costs and benefits to make a decision, the latter studies how they adjust information processing to achieve their goals. Recent work has highlighted ways in which decision-making research can inform our understanding of cognitive control. Here, we provide the complementary perspective: how cognitive control research has informed understanding of decision-making. We highlight three particular areas of research where this critical interchange has occurred: (1) how different types of goals shape the evaluation of choice options, (2) how people use control to adjust the ways they make their decisions, and (3) how people monitor decisions to inform adjustments to control at multiple levels and timescales. We show how adopting this alternate viewpoint offers new insight into the determinants of both decisions and control; provides alternative interpretations for common neuroeconomic findings; and generates fruitful directions for future research.

Metacognitive Awareness of Difficulty in Action Selection: The Role of the Cingulo-opercular Network

The question whether and how we are able to monitor our own cognitive states (metacognition) has been a matter of debate for decades. Do we have direct access to our cognitive processes, or can we only infer them indirectly based on their consequences? In the current study, we wanted to investigate the brain circuits that underlie the metacognitive experience of fluency in action selection. To manipulate action-selection fluency, we used a subliminal response priming paradigm. On each trial, both male and female human participants additionally engaged in the metacognitive process of rating how hard they felt it was to respond to the target stimulus. Despite having no conscious awareness of the prime, results showed that participants rated incompatible trials (during which subliminal primes interfered with the required response) to be more difficult than compatible trials (where primes facilitated the required response), reflecting metacognitive awareness of difficulty. This increased sense of subjective difficulty was mirrored by increased activity in the rostral cingulate zone and the anterior insula, two regions that are functionally closely connected. Importantly, this reflected activations that were unique to subjective difficulty ratings and were not explained by RTs or prime-response compatibility. We interpret these findings in light of a possible grounding of the metacognitive judgment of fluency in action selection in interoceptive signals resulting from increased effort.

Deliberative Decision-Making in Macaques Removes Reward-Driven Response Vigor

Most of our daily decisions are governed by one of two systems: an impulsive system driving instantaneous decisions and a deliberative system driving thoughtful ones. The impulsive system reacts to immediately available concrete rewards. In contrast, the deliberative system reacts to more delayed rewards and/or punishments, which imposes consideration of longer-term choice consequences. Contingency management for addiction treatment is hypothesized to engage deliberative processes. Ultimately, in both decision-making situations, an action is needed to enact the decision. Whether those actions differ in implementation is an open question whose answer could inform as to whether distinct neural systems are engaged. To explore whether there is evidence of separate mechanisms between deliberated and immediate choices, we trained monkeys to perform a decision-making task where they made a choice on a touch screen between two visual cues predicting different amounts of reward. In immediate choice (IC) trials, the cues appeared at the final response locations where subjects could immediately touch the chosen cue. In deliberated choice (DC) trials, compound cues appeared orthogonally to the response locations. After a delay, allowing for decision formation, an identifying cue component was displaced to the randomly assigned response locations, permitting subjects to reach for the chosen cue. Both trial types showed an effect of cue value on cue selection time. However, only IC trials showed an effect of the competing cue on response vigor (measured by movement duration) and a reach trajectory that deviated in the direction of the competing cue, suggesting a decision reexamination process. Reward modulation of response vigor implicates dopaminergic mechanisms. In DC trials, reach trajectories revealed a commitment to the chosen choice target, and reach vigor was not modulated by the value of the competing cue. Our results suggest that choice–action dynamics are shaped by competing offers only during instantaneous, impulsive choice. After a deliberated decision, choice–action dynamics are unaffected by the alternative offer cue, demonstrating a commitment to the choice. The potential relevance to contingency management is discussed.

Separable neural signatures of confidence during perceptual decisions

Perceptual confidence is an evaluation of the validity of perceptual decisions. While there is behavioural evidence that confidence evaluation differs from perceptual decision-making, disentangling these two processes remains a challenge at the neural level. Here, we examined the electrical brain activity of human participants in a protracted perceptual decision-making task where observers tend to commit to perceptual decisions early whilst continuing to monitor sensory evidence for evaluating confidence. Premature decision commitments were revealed by patterns of spectral power overlying motor cortex, followed by an attenuation of the neural representation of perceptual decision evidence. A distinct neural representation was associated with the computation of confidence, with sources localised in the superior parietal and orbitofrontal cortices. In agreement with a dissociation between perception and confidence, these neural resources were recruited even after observers committed to their perceptual decisions, and thus delineate an integral neural circuit for evaluating perceptual decision confidence.

Understanding neural signals of post-decisional performance monitoring: An integrative review

Performance monitoring is a key cognitive function, allowing to detect mistakes and adapt future behavior. Post-decisional neural signals have been identified that are sensitive to decision accuracy, decision confidence and subsequent adaptation. Here, we review recent work that supports an understanding of late error/confidence signals in terms of the computational process of post-decisional evidence accumulation. We argue that the error positivity, a positive-going centro-parietal potential measured through scalp electrophysiology, reflects the post-decisional evidence accumulation process itself, which follows a boundary crossing event corresponding to initial decision commitment. This proposal provides a powerful explanation for both the morphological characteristics of the signal and its relation to various expressions of performance monitoring. Moreover, it suggests that the error positivity -a signal with thus far unique properties in cognitive neuroscience - can be leveraged to furnish key new insights into the inputs to, adaptation, and consequences of the post-decisional accumulation process.

Neural correlates of metacognition across the adult lifespan

Metacognitive accuracy describes the degree of overlap between the subjective perception of one's decision accuracy (i.e. confidence) and objectively observed performance. With older age, the need for accurate metacognitive evaluation increases; however, error detection rates typically decrease. We investigated the effect of ageing on metacognitive accuracy using event-related potentials (ERPs) reflecting error detection and confidence: the error/correct negativity (N_e/c) and the error/correct positivity (P_e/c). Sixty-five healthy adults (20 to 76 years) completed a complex Flanker task and provided confidence ratings. We found that metacognitive accuracy declined with age beyond the expected decline in task performance, while the adaptive adjustment of behaviour was well preserved. P_e amplitudes following errors varied by confidence rating, but they did not mirror the reduction in metacognitive accuracy. N_e amplitudes decreased with age for low confidence errors. The results suggest that age-related difficulties in metacognitive evaluation could be related to an impaired integration of decision accuracy and confidence information processing. Ultimately, training the metacognitive evaluation of fundamental decisions in older adults might constitute a promising endeavour.

Global motion evoked potentials in autistic and dyslexic children: A cross-syndrome approach

Atypicalities in psychophysical thresholds for global motion processing have been reported in many neurodevelopmental conditions, including autism and dyslexia. Cross-syndrome comparisons of neural dynamics may help determine whether altered motion processing is a general marker of atypical development or condition-specific. Here, we assessed group differences in N2 peak amplitude (previously proposed as a marker of motion-specific processing) in typically developing (n = 57), autistic (n = 29) and dyslexic children (n = 44) aged 6-14 years, in two global motion tasks. High-density EEG data were collected while children judged the direction of global motion stimuli as quickly and accurately as possible, following a period of random motion. Using a data-driven component decomposition technique, we identified a reliable component that was maximal over occipital electrodes and had an N2-like peak at ~160 msec. We found no group differences in N2 peak amplitude, in either task. However, for both autistic and dyslexic children, there was evidence of atypicalities in later stages of processing that require follow up in future research. Our results suggest that early sensory encoding of motion information is unimpaired in dyslexic and autistic children. Group differences in later processing stages could reflect sustained global motion responses, decision-making, metacognitive processes and/or response generation, which may also distinguish between autistic and dyslexic individuals.

Tracking dynamic adjustments to decision making and performance monitoring processes in conflict tasks

How we exert control over our decision-making has been investigated using conflict tasks, which involve stimuli containing elements that are either congruent or incongruent. In these tasks, participants adapt their decision-making strategies following exposure to incongruent stimuli. According to conflict monitoring accounts, conflicting stimulus features are detected in medial frontal cortex, and the extent of experienced conflict scales with response time (RT) and frontal theta-band activity in the Electroencephalogram (EEG). However, the consequent adjustments to decision processes following response conflict are not well-specified. To characterise these adjustments and their neural implementation we recorded EEG during a modified Flanker task. We traced the time-courses of performance monitoring processes (frontal theta) and multiple processes related to perceptual decision-making. In each trial participants judged which of two overlaid gratings forming a plaid stimulus (termed the S1 target) was of higher contrast. The stimulus was divided into two sections, which each contained higher contrast gratings in either congruent or incongruent directions. Shortly after responding to the S1 target, an additional S2 target was presented, which was always congruent. Our EEG results suggest enhanced sensory evidence representations in visual cortex and reduced evidence accumulation rates for S2 targets following incongruent S1 stimuli. Results of a follow-up behavioural experiment indicated that the accumulation of sensory evidence from the incongruent (i.e. distracting) stimulus element was adjusted following response conflict. Frontal theta amplitudes positively correlated with RT following S1 targets (in line with conflict monitoring accounts). Following S2 targets there was no such correlation, and theta amplitude profiles instead resembled decision evidence accumulation trajectories. Our findings provide novel insights into how cognitive control is implemented following exposure to conflicting information, which is critical for extending conflict monitoring accounts.

Evidence accumulation relates to perceptual consciousness and monitoring

A fundamental scientific question concerns the neural basis of perceptual consciousness and perceptual monitoring resulting from the processing of sensory events. Although recent studies identified neurons reflecting stimulus visibility, their functional role remains unknown. Here, we show that perceptual consciousness and monitoring involve evidence accumulation. We recorded single-neuron activity in a participant with a microelectrode in the posterior parietal cortex, while they detected vibrotactile stimuli around detection threshold and provided confidence estimates. We find that detected stimuli elicited neuronal responses resembling evidence accumulation during decision-making, irrespective of motor confounds or task demands. We generalize these findings in healthy volunteers using electroencephalography. Behavioral and neural responses are reproduced with a computational model considering a stimulus as detected if accumulated evidence reaches a bound, and confidence as the distance between maximal evidence and that bound. We conclude that gradual changes in neuronal dynamics during evidence accumulation relates to perceptual consciousness and perceptual monitoring in humans.

Neurophysiology of Human Perceptual Decision-Making

The discovery of neural signals that reflect the dynamics of perceptual decision formation has had a considerable impact. Not only do such signals enable detailed investigations of the neural implementation of the decision-making process but they also can expose key elements of the brain's decision algorithms. For a long time, such signals were only accessible through direct animal brain recordings, and progress in human neuroscience was hampered by the limitations of noninvasive recording techniques. However, recent methodological advances are increasingly enabling the study of human brain signals that finely trace the dynamics of the unfolding decision process. In this review, we highlight how human neurophysiological data are now being leveraged to furnish new insights into the multiple processing levels involved in forming decisions, to inform the construction and evaluation of mathematical models that can explain intra- and interindividual differences, and to examine how key ancillary processes interact with core decision circuits.

Response-based outcome predictions and confidence regulate feedback processing and learning

Influential theories emphasize the importance of predictions in learning: we learn from feedback to the extent that it is surprising, and thus conveys new information. Here, we explore the hypothesis that surprise depends not only on comparing current events to past experience, but also on online evaluation of performance via internal monitoring. Specifically, we propose that people leverage insights from response-based performance monitoring - outcome predictions and confidence - to control learning from feedback. In line with predictions from a Bayesian inference model, we find that people who are better at calibrating their confidence to the precision of their outcome predictions learn more quickly. Further in line with our proposal, EEG signatures of feedback processing are sensitive to the accuracy of, and confidence in, post-response outcome predictions. Taken together, our results suggest that online predictions and confidence serve to calibrate neural error signals to improve the efficiency of learning.

Adaptive rescheduling of error monitoring in multitasking

The concurrent execution of temporally overlapping tasks leads to considerable interference between the subtasks. This also impairs control processes associated with the detection of performance errors. In the present study, we investigated how the human brain adapts to this interference between task representations in such multitasking scenarios. In Experiment 1, participants worked on a dual-tasking paradigm with partially overlapping execution of two tasks (T1 and T2), while we recorded error-related scalp potentials. The error positivity (Pe), a correlate of higher-level error evaluation, was reduced after T1 errors but occurred after a correct T2-response instead. MVPA-based and regression-based single-trial analysis revealed that the immediate Pe and deferred Pe are negatively correlated, suggesting a trial-wise trade-off between immediate and postponed error processing. Experiment 2 confirmed this finding and additionally showed that this result is not due to credit-assignment errors in which a T1 error is falsely attributed to T2. For the first time reporting a Pe that is temporally detached from its eliciting error event by a considerable amount of time, this study illustrates how reliable error detection in dual-tasking is maintained by a mechanism that adaptively schedules error processing, thus demonstrating a remarkable flexibility of the human brain when adapting to multitasking situations.

Confirmation bias is adaptive when coupled with efficient metacognition

Biases in the consideration of evidence can reduce the chances of consensus between people with different viewpoints. While such altered information processing typically leads to detrimental performance in laboratory tasks, the ubiquitous nature of confirmation bias makes it unlikely that selective information processing is universally harmful. Here, we suggest that confirmation bias is adaptive to the extent that agents have good metacognition, allowing them to downweight contradictory information when correct but still able to seek new information when they realize they are wrong. Using simulation-based modelling, we explore how the adaptiveness of holding a confirmation bias depends on such metacognitive insight. We find that the behavioural consequences of selective information processing are systematically affected by agents' introspective abilities. Strikingly, we find that selective information processing can even improve decision-making when compared with unbiased evidence accumulation, as long as it is accompanied by good metacognition. These results further suggest that interventions which boost people's metacognition might be efficient in alleviating the negative effects of selective information processing on issues such as political polarization.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘The political brain: neurocognitive and computational mechanisms’.

Effects of ketamine on brain function during metacognition of episodic memory

Only little research has been conducted on the pharmacological underpinnings of metacognition. Here, we tested the modulatory effects of a single intravenous dose (100 ng/ml) of the N-methyl-D-aspartate-glutamate-receptor antagonist ketamine, a compound known to induce altered states of consciousness, on metacognition and its neural correlates. Fifty-three young, healthy adults completed two study phases of an episodic memory task involving both encoding and retrieval in a double-blind, placebo-controlled fMRI study. Trial-by-trial confidence ratings were collected during retrieval. Effects on the subjective state of consciousness were assessed using the 5D-ASC questionnaire. Confirming that the drug elicited a psychedelic state, there were effects of ketamine on all 5D-ASC scales. Acute ketamine administration during retrieval had deleterious effects on metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d') and led to larger metacognitive bias, with retrieval performance (d') and reaction times remaining unaffected. However, there was no ketamine effect on metacognitive efficiency (meta-d'/d'). Measures of the BOLD signal revealed that ketamine compared to placebo elicited higher activation of posterior cortical brain areas, including superior and inferior parietal lobe, calcarine gyrus, and lingual gyrus, albeit not specific to metacognitive confidence ratings. Ketamine administered during encoding did not significantly affect performance or brain activation. Overall, our findings suggest that ketamine impacts metacognition, leading to significantly larger metacognitive bias and deterioration of metacognitive sensitivity as well as unspecific activation increases in posterior hot zone areas of the neural correlates of consciousness.

The Role of Subjective Experiences in Conflict Tasks: A Review

Cognitive control research is concerned with the question how we install adaptive behaviour in the case of (cognitive) conflict. In this review we focus on the role that awareness of this conflict plays in our ability to exert cognitive control. We will argue that visual conflict is not the only building block of metacognitive experiences of conflict and discuss how they are related to cognitive control. So, a first aim of the current review is to understand how these different metacognitive judgements are created. To do so, we draw some remarkable parallels with research on metacognition in decision making and memory research. Next, we elaborate on the relationship between metacognition and adaptive behaviour, with a specific focus on the role of subjective experiences in the Gratton effect. The grey areas that persist in the current literature are highlighted. In addition to deciphering the mechanisms of metacognitive judgements in cognitive control, this overview also aims to further enlarge our understanding of metacognitive abilities at a more general level.

Doing it Wrong: A Systematic Review on Electrocortical and Behavioral Correlates of Error Monitoring in Patients with Neurological Disorders

Detecting errors in one's own and other's actions is a crucial ability for learning and adapting behavior to everchanging, highly volatile environments. Studies in healthy people demonstrate that monitoring errors in one's own and others' actions are underpinned by specific neural systems that are dysfunctional in a variety of neurological disorders. In this review, we first briefly discuss the main findings concerning error detection and error awareness in healthy subjects, the current theoretical models, and the tasks usually applied to investigate these processes. Then, we report a systematic search for evidence of dysfunctional error monitoring among neurological populations (basal ganglia, neurodegenerative, white-matter diseases and acquired brain injury). In particular, we examine electrophysiological and behavioral evidence for specific alterations of error processing in neurological disorders. Error-related negativity (ERN) amplitude were reduced in most (although not all) neurological patient groups, whereas Positivity Error (Pe) amplitude appeared not to be affected in most patient groups. Also theta activity was reduced in some neurological groups, but consistent evidence on the oscillatory activity has not been provided thus far. Behaviorally, we did not observe relevant patterns of pronounced dysfunctional (post-) error processing. Finally, we discuss limitations of the existing literature, conclusive points, open questions and new possible methodological approaches for clinical studies.

Neurocomputational mechanisms of prior-informed perceptual decision-making in humans

To interact successfully with diverse sensory environments, we must adapt our decision processes to account for time constraints and prior probabilities. The full set of decision-process parameters that undergo such flexible adaptation has proven to be difficult to establish using simplified models that are based on behaviour alone. Here, we utilize well-characterized human neurophysiological signatures of decision formation to construct and constrain a build-to-threshold decision model with multiple build-up (evidence accumulation and urgency) and delay components (pre- and post-decisional). The model indicates that all of these components were adapted in distinct ways and, in several instances, fundamentally differ from the conclusions of conventional diffusion modelling. The neurally informed model outcomes were corroborated by independent neural decision signal observations that were not used in the model's construction. These findings highlight the breadth of decision-process parameters that are amenable to strategic adjustment and the value in leveraging neurophysiological measurements to quantify these adjustments.

Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation-Induced Motor Cortex Activity Influences Visual Awareness Judgments

The influence of non-visual information on visual awareness judgments has recently gained substantial interest. Using single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), we investigate the potential contribution of evidence from the motor system to judgment of visual awareness. We hypothesized that TMS-induced activity in the primary motor cortex (M1) would increase reported visual awareness as compared to the control condition. Additionally, we investigated whether TMS-induced motor-evoked potential (MEP) could measure accumulated evidence for stimulus perception. Following stimulus presentation and TMS, participants first rated their visual awareness verbally using the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS), after which they responded manually to a Gabor orientation identification task. Delivering TMS to M1 resulted in higher average awareness ratings as compared to the control condition, in both correct and incorrect identification task response trials, when the hand with which participants responded was contralateral to the stimulated hemisphere (TMS-response-congruent trials). This effect was accompanied by longer PAS response times (RTs), irrespective of the congruence between TMS and identification response. Moreover, longer identification RTs were observed in TMS-response-congruent trials in the M1 condition as compared to the control condition. Additionally, the amplitudes of MEPs were related to the awareness ratings when response congruence was taken into account. We argue that MEP can serve as an indirect measure of evidence accumulated for stimulus perception and that longer PAS RTs and higher amplitudes of MEPs in the M1 condition reflect integration of additional evidence with visual awareness judgment. In conclusion, we advocate that motor activity influences perceptual awareness judgments.

Neural and behavioral traces of error awareness

Monitoring for errors and behavioral adjustments after errors are essential for daily life. A question that has not been addressed systematically yet, is whether consciously perceived errors lead to different behavioral adjustments compared to unperceived errors. Our goal was to develop a task that would enable us to study different commonly observed neural correlates of error processing and post-error adjustments in their relation to error awareness and accuracy confidence in a single experiment. We assessed performance in a new number judgement error awareness task in 70 participants. We used multiple, robust, single-trial EEG regressions to investigate the link between neural correlates of error processing (e.g., error-related negativity (ERN) and error positivity (Pe)) and error awareness. We found that only aware errors had a slowing effect on reaction times in consecutive trials, but this slowing was not accompanied by post-error increases in accuracy. On a neural level, error awareness and confidence had a modulating effect on both the ERN and Pe, whereby the Pe was most predictive of participants' error awareness. Additionally, we found partial support for a mediating role of error awareness on the coupling between the ERN and behavioral adjustments in the following trial. Our results corroborate previous findings that show both an ERN/Pe and a post-error behavioral adaptation modulation by error awareness. This suggests that conscious error perception can support meta-control processes balancing the recruitment of proactive and reactive control. Furthermore, this study strengthens the role of the Pe as a robust neural index of error awareness.

The neural basis of feedback-guided behavioral adjustment

Given feedback on the outcomes of our choices, humans can then make adjustments to future decisions. This is how we learn. However, how knowing the outcome of one's decisions influences behavioral changes, and especially the neural basis of those behavioral changes, still remains unclear. To investigate these questions, we employed a simple gambling task, in which participants chose between two alternative cards and received trial-by-trial feedback of their choices. In different sessions, we emphasized either utility (win or loss) or performance (whether the choice was correct [better than the alternative] or incorrect), making one of the two aspects more salient to participants. We found that trial-by-trial feedback and the saliency of the feedback modulated behavioral adjustments and subjective evaluations of the outcomes. With simultaneous electroencephalogram (EEG) recording, we found that the feedback-related negativity (FRN), P300, and late positive potential (LPP) served as the neural substrates for behavioral decision switching. Together, our findings reveal the neural basis of behavioral adjustment based on outcome evaluation and highlight the key role of feedback evaluation in future action selection and flexible adaptation.