Drivers for a pandemic due to avian influenza and options for One Health mitigation measures

Avian influenza viruses (AIV) remain prevalent among wild bird populations in the European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA), leading to significant illness in and death of birds. Transmission between bird and mammal species has been observed, particularly in fur animal farms, where outbreaks have been reported. While transmission from infected birds to humans is rare, there have been instances of exposure to these viruses since 2020 without any symptomatic infections reported in the EU/EEA. However, these viruses continue to evolve globally, and with the migration of wild birds, new strains carrying potential mutations for mammalian adaptation could be selected. If avian A(H5N1) influenza viruses acquire the ability to spread efficiently among humans, large-scale transmission could occur due to the lack of immune defences against H5 viruses in humans. The emergence of AIV capable of infecting mammals, including humans, can be facilitated by various drivers. Some intrinsic drivers are related to virus characteristics or host susceptibility. Other drivers are extrinsic and may increase exposure of mammals and humans to AIV thereby stimulating mutation and adaptation to mammals. Extrinsic drivers include the ecology of host species, such as including wildlife, human activities like farming practices and the use of natural resources, climatic and environmental factors. One Health measures to mitigate the risk of AIV adapting to mammals and humans focus on limiting exposure and preventing spread. Key options for actions include enhancing surveillance targeting humans and animals, ensuring access to rapid diagnostics, promoting collaboration between animal and human sectors, and implementing preventive measures such as vaccination. Effective communication to different involved target audiences should be emphasised, as well as strengthening veterinary infrastructure, enforcing biosecurity measures at farms, and reducing wildlife contact with domestic animals. Careful planning of poultry and fur animal farming, especially in areas with high waterfowl density, is highlighted for effective risk reduction.

Vaccination of poultry against highly pathogenic avian influenza - Part 2. Surveillance and mitigation measures

Selecting appropriate diagnostic methods that take account of the type of vaccine used is important when implementing a vaccination programme against highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI). If vaccination is effective, a decreased viral load is expected in the samples used for diagnosis, making molecular methods with high sensitivity the best choice. Although serological methods can be reasonably sensitive, they may produce results that are difficult to interpret. In addition to routine molecular monitoring, it is recommended to conduct viral isolation, genetic sequencing and phenotypic characterisation of any HPAI virus detected in vaccinated flocks to detect escape mutants early. Following emergency vaccination, various surveillance options based on virological testing of dead birds ('bucket sampling') at defined intervals were assessed to be effective for early detection of HPAIV and prove disease freedom in vaccinated populations. For ducks, virological or serological testing of live birds was assessed as an effective strategy. This surveillance could be also applied in the peri-vaccination zone on vaccinated establishments, while maintaining passive surveillance in unvaccinated chicken layers and turkeys, and weekly bucket sampling in unvaccinated ducks. To demonstrate disease freedom with > 99% confidence and to detect HPAI virus sufficiently early following preventive vaccination, monthly virological testing of all dead birds up to 15 per flock, coupled with passive surveillance in both vaccinated and unvaccinated flocks, is recommended. Reducing the sampling intervals increases the sensitivity of early detection up to 100%. To enable the safe movement of vaccinated poultry during emergency vaccination, laboratory examinations in the 72 h prior to the movement can be considered as a risk mitigation measure, in addition to clinical inspection; sampling results from existing surveillance activities carried out in these 72 h could be used. In this Opinion, several schemes are recommended to enable the safe movement of vaccinated poultry following preventive vaccination.

Vaccination of poultry against highly pathogenic avian influenza - part 1. Available vaccines and vaccination strategies

Several vaccines have been developed against highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), mostly inactivated whole-virus vaccines for chickens. In the EU, one vaccine is authorised in chickens but is not fully efficacious to stop transmission, highlighting the need for vaccines tailored to diverse poultry species and production types. Off-label use of vaccines is possible, but effectiveness varies. Vaccines are usually injectable, a time-consuming process. Mass-application vaccines outside hatcheries remain rare. First vaccination varies from in-ovo to 6 weeks of age. Data about immunity onset and duration in the target species are often unavailable, despite being key for effective planning. Minimising antigenic distance between vaccines and field strains is essential, requiring rapid updates of vaccines to match circulating strains. Generating harmonised vaccine efficacy data showing vaccine ability to reduce transmission is crucial and this ability should be also assessed in field trials. Planning vaccination requires selecting the most adequate vaccine type and vaccination scheme. Emergency protective vaccination is limited to vaccines that are not restricted by species, age or pre-existing vector-immunity, while preventive vaccination should prioritise achieving the highest protection, especially for the most susceptible species in high-risk transmission areas. Model simulations in France, Italy and The Netherlands revealed that (i) duck and turkey farms are more infectious than chickens, (ii) depopulating infected farms only showed limitations in controlling disease spread, while 1-km ring-culling performed better than or similar to emergency preventive ring-vaccination scenarios, although with the highest number of depopulated farms, (iii) preventive vaccination of the most susceptible species in high-risk transmission areas was the best option to minimise the outbreaks' number and duration, (iv) during outbreaks in such areas, emergency protective vaccination in a 3-km radius was more effective than 1- and 10-km radius. Vaccine efficacy should be monitored and complement other surveillance and preventive efforts.

Assessment of listing and categorisation of animal diseases within the framework of the Animal Health Law (Regulation (EU)2016/429): Infection with salmonid alphavirus (SAV)

Infection with salmonid alphavirus (SAV) was assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular the criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as laid out in Article 9 and Article 8 for listing animal species related to infection with SAV. The assessment was performed following the ad hoc method on data collection and assessment developed by AHAW Panel and already published. The outcome reported is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with an uncertain outcome. According to the assessment, it was uncertain whether infection with salmonid alphavirus can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (50-80% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that infection with salmonid alphavirus does not meet the criteria in Section 1 (Category A; 5-10% probability of meeting the criteria) and it is uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 (Categories B, C, D and E; 50-90%, probability of meeting the criteria). The animal species to be listed for infection with SAV according to Article 8 criteria are provided.

Assessment of listing and categorisation of animal diseases within the framework of the Animal Health Law (Regulation (EU) 2016/429): Spring Viraemia of Carp (SVC)

Spring Viraemia of Carp (SVC) was assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular the criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as in Article 9 and Article 8 for listing animal species related to SVC. The assessment was performed following the ad hoc method for data collection and assessment previously developed by the AHAW panel and already published. The outcome reported is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with an uncertain outcome. According to the assessment performed here, it is uncertain whether SVC can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (45-90% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that SVC does not meet the criteria in Section 1 (Category A; 5-33% probability of meeting the criteria) and it is uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 (Categories B, C, D and E; 33-66%, 10-66%, 45-90% and 45-90% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively). The animal species to be listed for SVC according to Article 8 criteria are provided.

Avian influenza overview April - June 2023

Between 29 April and 23 June 2023, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus (clade 2.3.4.4b) outbreaks were reported in domestic (98) and wild (634) birds across 25 countries in Europe. A cluster of outbreaks in mulard ducks for foie gras production was concentrated in Southwest France, whereas the overall A(H5N1) situation in poultry in Europe and worldwide has eased. In wild birds, black-headed gulls and several new seabird species, mostly gulls and terns (e.g. sandwich terns), were heavily affected, with increased mortality being observed in both adults and juveniles after hatching. Compared to the same period last year, dead seabirds have been increasingly found inland and not only along European coastlines. As regards mammals, A(H5N1) virus was identified in 24 domestic cats and one caracal in Poland between 10 and 30 June 2023. Affected animals showed neurological and respiratory signs, sometimes mortality, and were widely scattered across nine voivodeships in the country. All cases are genetically closely related and identified viruses cluster with viruses detected in poultry (since October 2022, but now only sporadic) and wild birds (December 2022-January 2023) in the past. Uncertainties still exist around their possible source of infection, with no feline-to-feline or feline-to-human transmission reported so far. Since 10 May 2023 and as of 4 July 2023, two A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus detections in humans were reported from the United Kingdom, and two A(H9N2) and one A(H5N6) human infections in China. In addition, one person infected with A(H3N8) in China has died. The risk of infection with currently circulating avian H5 influenza viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe remains low for the general population in the EU/EEA, low to moderate for occupationally or otherwise exposed people to infected birds or mammals (wild or domesticated).

Reducing the environmental impact of surgery on a global scale: systematic review and co-prioritization with healthcare workers in 132 countries

BACKGROUND

Healthcare cannot achieve net-zero carbon without addressing operating theatres. The aim of this study was to prioritize feasible interventions to reduce the environmental impact of operating theatres.

METHODS

This study adopted a four-phase Delphi consensus co-prioritization methodology. In phase 1, a systematic review of published interventions and global consultation of perioperative healthcare professionals were used to longlist interventions. In phase 2, iterative thematic analysis consolidated comparable interventions into a shortlist. In phase 3, the shortlist was co-prioritized based on patient and clinician views on acceptability, feasibility, and safety. In phase 4, ranked lists of interventions were presented by their relevance to high-income countries and low-middle-income countries.

RESULTS

In phase 1, 43 interventions were identified, which had low uptake in practice according to 3042 professionals globally. In phase 2, a shortlist of 15 intervention domains was generated. In phase 3, interventions were deemed acceptable for more than 90 per cent of patients except for reducing general anaesthesia (84 per cent) and re-sterilization of 'single-use' consumables (86 per cent). In phase 4, the top three shortlisted interventions for high-income countries were: introducing recycling; reducing use of anaesthetic gases; and appropriate clinical waste processing. In phase 4, the top three shortlisted interventions for low-middle-income countries were: introducing reusable surgical devices; reducing use of consumables; and reducing the use of general anaesthesia.

CONCLUSION

This is a step toward environmentally sustainable operating environments with actionable interventions applicable to both high- and low-middle-income countries.

Avian influenza overview March - April 2023

Between 2 March and 28 April 2023, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5Nx) virus, clade 2.3.4.4b, outbreaks were reported in domestic (106) and wild (610) birds across 24 countries in Europe. Poultry outbreaks occurred less frequently compared to the previous reporting period and compared to spring 2022. Most of these outbreaks were classified as primary outbreaks without secondary spread and some of them associated with atypical disease presentation, in particular low mortality. In wild birds, black-headed gulls continued to be heavily affected, while also other threatened wild bird species, such as the peregrine falcon, showed increased mortality. The ongoing epidemic in black-headed gulls, many of which breed inland, may increase the risk for poultry, especially in July-August, when first-year birds disperse from the breeding colonies. HPAI A(H5N1) virus also continued to expand in the Americas, including in mammalian species, and is expected to reach the Antarctic in the near future. HPAI virus infections were detected in six mammal species, particularly in marine mammals and mustelids, for the first time, while the viruses currently circulating in Europe retain a preferential binding for avian-like receptors. Since 13 March 2022 and as of 10 May 2023, two A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus detections in humans were reported from China (1), and Chile (1), as well as three A(H9N2) and one A(H3N8) human infections in China. The risk of infection with currently circulating avian H5 influenza viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe remains low for the general population in the EU/EEA, and low to moderate for occupationally or otherwise exposed people.

Prioritisation of zoonotic diseases for coordinated surveillance systems under the One Health approach for cross-border pathogens that threaten the Union

In the context of the initiative 'CP-g-22-04.01 Direct grants to Member States' authorities', EFSA was requested to develop and conduct a prioritisation of zoonotic diseases, in collaboration with Member States, to identify priorities for the establishment of a coordinated surveillance system under the One Health approach. The methodology developed by EFSA's Working Group on One Health surveillance was based on a combination of multi-criteria decision analysis and the Delphi method. It comprised the establishment of a list of zoonotic diseases, definition of pathogen- and surveillance-related criteria, weighing of those criteria, scoring of zoonotic diseases by Member States, calculation of summary scores, and ranking of the list of zoonotic diseases according to those scores. Results were presented at EU and country level. A prioritisation workshop was organised with the One Health subgroup of EFSA's Scientific Network for Risk Assessment in Animal Health and Welfare in November 2022 to discuss and agree on a final list of priorities for which specific surveillance strategies would be developed. Those 10 priorities were Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever, echinococcosis (both E. granulosus and E. multilocularis), hepatitis E, influenza (avian), influenza (swine), Lyme borreliosis, Q-fever, Rift Valley fever, tick-borne encephalitis and West Nile fever. 'Disease X' was not assessed in the same way as other zoonotic diseases on the list, but it was added to the final list of priorities due to its relevance and importance in the One Health context.

Coordinated surveillance system under the One Health approach for cross-border pathogens that threaten the Union - options for sustainable surveillance strategies for priority pathogens

This report provides guidance for Member states who plan to submit applications under the work programme 'CP-g-22-04.01 Direct grants to Member States' authorities'. The priority pathogens on which the coordinated surveillance under the grant initiative shall focus have been identified in a prioritisation exercise with Member States and ECDC. These are Crimean Congo haemorrhagic fever, echinococcosis, hepatitis E, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), influenza in swine, Lyme disease, Q-fever, Rift Valley fever, tick-borne encephalitis, West Nile fever and Disease X (Disease Y of animals). Surveillance activities (surveillance cards) have been proposed for these agents in this report. Member States should select one or more diseases from the list of priority diseases and then choose surveillance activities from the surveillance cards and modify them where needed, to reflect their national needs and situation. Member States can also design alternative surveillance activities for the priority infectious agents that may better fit the epidemiological situation in their country. Further, this report provides a section on surveillance perspectives that links infectious agents to different hosts, allowing Member States to consider the testing for multiple infectious agents in samples from a single host population, as well as sections providing guidance on surveillance in vectors and wildlife and for Disease X (Disease Y in animals). Member States are encouraged to develop cross-sectoral collaborations and the report provides guidance on cross-sectoral collaboration to help them. Finally, there is a roadmap providing an overall description of the steps in the process of developing a surveillance system in order to apply for the grant.

Avian influenza overview December 2022 - March 2023

Between 3 December 2022 and 1 March 2023 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus, clade 2.3.4.4b, was reported in Europe in domestic (522) and wild (1,138) birds over 24 countries. An unexpected number of HPAI virus detections in sea birds were observed, mainly in gull species and particularly in black-headed gulls (large mortality events were observed in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy). The close genetic relationship among viruses collected from black-headed gulls suggests a southward spread of the virus. Moreover, the genetic analyses indicate that the virus persisted in Europe in residential wild birds during and after the summer months. Although the virus retained a preferential binding for avian-like receptors, several mutations associated to increased zoonotic potential were detected. The risk of HPAI virus infection for poultry due to the virus circulating in black-headed gulls and other gull species might increase during the coming months, as breeding bird colonies move inland with possible overlap with poultry production areas. Worldwide, HPAI A(H5N1) virus continued to spread southward in the Americas, from Mexico to southern Chile. The Peruvian pelican was the most frequently reported infected species with thousands of deaths being reported. The reporting of HPAI A(H5N1) in mammals also continued probably linked to feeding on infected wild birds. In Peru, a mass mortality event of sea lions was observed in January and February 2023. Since October 2022, six A(H5N1) detections in humans were reported from Cambodia (a family cluster with 2 people, clade 2.3.2.1c), China (2, clade 2.3.4.4b), Ecuador (1, clade 2.3.4.4b), and Vietnam (1, unspecified clade), as well as two A(H5N6) human infections from China. The risk of infection with currently circulating avian H5 influenza viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe is assessed as low for the general population in the EU/EEA, and low to moderate for occupationally or otherwise exposed people.

SARS-CoV-2 in animals: susceptibility of animal species, risk for animal and public health, monitoring, prevention and control

The epidemiological situation of SARS-CoV-2 in humans and animals is continually evolving. To date, animal species known to transmit SARS-CoV-2 are American mink, raccoon dog, cat, ferret, hamster, house mouse, Egyptian fruit bat, deer mouse and white-tailed deer. Among farmed animals, American mink have the highest likelihood to become infected from humans or animals and further transmit SARS-CoV-2. In the EU, 44 outbreaks were reported in 2021 in mink farms in seven MSs, while only six in 2022 in two MSs, thus representing a decreasing trend. The introduction of SARS-CoV-2 into mink farms is usually via infected humans; this can be controlled by systematically testing people entering farms and adequate biosecurity. The current most appropriate monitoring approach for mink is the outbreak confirmation based on suspicion, testing dead or clinically sick animals in case of increased mortality or positive farm personnel and the genomic surveillance of virus variants. The genomic analysis of SARS-CoV-2 showed mink-specific clusters with a potential to spill back into the human population. Among companion animals, cats, ferrets and hamsters are those at highest risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection, which most likely originates from an infected human, and which has no or very low impact on virus circulation in the human population. Among wild animals (including zoo animals), mostly carnivores, great apes and white-tailed deer have been reported to be naturally infected by SARS-CoV-2. In the EU, no cases of infected wildlife have been reported so far. Proper disposal of human waste is advised to reduce the risks of spill-over of SARS-CoV-2 to wildlife. Furthermore, contact with wildlife, especially if sick or dead, should be minimised. No specific monitoring for wildlife is recommended apart from testing hunter-harvested animals with clinical signs or found-dead. Bats should be monitored as a natural host of many coronaviruses.

Assessment of listing and categorisation of animal diseases within the framework of the Animal Health Law (Regulation (EU) No 2016/429): antimicrobial-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa in dogs and cats

Pseudomonas aeruginosa (P. aeruginosa) was identified among the most relevant antimicrobial‐resistant (AMR) bacteria in the EU for dogs and cats in a previous scientific opinion. Thus, it has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as in Article 9, and Article 8 for listing animal species related to the bacterium. The assessment has been performed following a methodology previously published. The outcome is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with uncertain outcome. According to the assessment here performed, it is uncertain whether AMR P. aeruginosa can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (33–90% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that the bacterium does not meet the criteria in Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 (Categories A, B, C and D; 0–5%, 1–5%, 5–33% and 5–33% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively) and the AHAW Panel was uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Section 5 (Category E, 33–90% probability of meeting the criteria). The animal species to be listed for AMR P. aeruginosa according to Article 8 criteria are mainly dogs and cats.

Epidemiological analyses of African swine fever in the European Union: (September 2020 to August 2021)

This report provides a descriptive analysis of the African swine fever (ASF) Genotype II epidemic in the affected Member States in the EU and two neighbouring countries for the period from 1 September 2020 to 31 August 2021. ASF continued to spread in wild boar in the EU, it entered Germany in September 2020, while Belgium became free from ASF in October 2020. No ASF outbreaks in domestic pigs nor cases in wild boar have been reported in Greece since February 2020. In the Baltic States, overall, there has been a declining trend in proportions of polymerase chain reaction (PCR)-positive samples from wild boar carcasses in the last few years. In the other countries, the proportions of PCR-positive wild boar carcasses remained high, indicating continuing spread of the disease. A systematic literature review revealed that the risk factors most frequently significantly associated with ASF in domestic pigs were pig density, low levels of biosecurity and socio-economic factors. For wild boar, most significant risk factors were related to habitat, socio-economic factors and wild boar management. The effectiveness of different control options in the so-named white zones, areas where wild boar densities have been drastically reduced to avoid further spread of ASF after a new introduction, was assessed with a stochastic model. Important findings were that establishing a white zone is much more challenging when the area of ASF incursion is adjacent to an area where limited control measures are in place. Very stringent wild boar population reduction measures in the white zone are key to success. The white zone needs to be far enough away from the affected core area so that the population can be reduced in time before the disease arrives and the timing of this will depend on the wild boar density and the required population reduction target in the white zone. Finally, establishing a proactive white zone along the demarcation line of an affected area requires higher culling efforts, but has a higher chance of success to stop the spread of the disease than establishing reactive white zones after the disease has already entered in the area.

Assessment of listing and categorisation of animal diseases within the framework of the Animal Health Law (Regulation (EU) No 2016/429): antimicrobial‐resistant Escherichia coli in dogs and cats, horses, swine, poultry, cattle, sheep and goats

Escherichia coli (E. coli) was identified among the most relevant antimicrobial‐resistant (AMR) bacteria in the EU for dogs and cats, horses, swine, poultry, cattle, sheep and goats in previous scientific opinions. Thus, it has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as in Article 9 and Article 8 for listing animal species related to the bacterium. The assessment has been performed following a methodology previously published. The outcome is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with uncertain outcome. According to the assessment here performed, it is uncertain whether AMR E. coli can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (33–66% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that the bacterium does not meet the criteria in Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 (Categories A, B, C and D; 0–5%, 5–10%, 10–33% and 10–33% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively) and the AHAW Panel was uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Section 5 (Category E, 33–66% probability of meeting the criteria). The animal species to be listed for AMR E. coli according to Article 8 criteria include mammals, birds, reptiles and fish.

Assessment of listing and categorisation of animal diseases within the framework of the Animal Health Law (Regulation (EU) No 2016/429): antimicrobial-resistant Staphylococcus aureus in cattle and horses

Staphylococcus aureus (S. aureus) was identified among the most relevant antimicrobial-resistant (AMR) bacteria in the EU for cattle and horses in previous scientific opinions. Thus, it has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as in Article 9, and Article 8 for listing animal species related to the bacterium. The assessment has been performed following a methodology previously published. The outcome is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with uncertain outcome. According to the assessment here performed, it is uncertain whether AMR S. aureus can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (60-90% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that the bacterium does not meet the criteria in Sections 1, 2 and 4 (Categories A, B and D; 1-5%, 5-10% and 10-33% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively) and the AHAW Panel was uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Sections 3 and 5 (Categories C and E, 33-90% and 60-90% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively). The animal species to be listed for AMR S. aureus according to Article 8 criteria include mainly mammals, birds, reptiles and fish.

Clinical impact, diagnosis and control of Equine Herpesvirus-1 infection in Europe

Equine herpesvirus-1 (EHV-1) can affect the entire equine sector in EU, and the large outbreak reported in 2021 in Spain drew attention to the needs of the European Commission for scientific advice for the assessment of EHV-1 infection within the framework of Animal Health Law. EHV-1 is considered endemic in the EU; its main risk is linked to the characteristic of producing latent life-long infections. These can reactivate producing clinical disease, which can include respiratory, abortive and possibly fatal neurological forms. From the epidemiological and genomic viewpoint, there are no specific neuropathogenic EHV-1 strains; the respiratory, reproductive and neurological signs are not found to be strain-specific. This was also the case of the virus that caused the outbreak in Valencia (Spain) in 2021, which was genetically closely related to other viruses circulating before in Europe, and did not present the so-called neuropathogenic genotype. The outbreak reported in Valencia was followed by wide geographic spread of the virus possibly due to a delay in diagnosis and late application of biosecurity measures. The recommended and most sensitive diagnostic test for detecting EHV-1 is PCR performed on swabs collected according to the type of clinical signs. Serological assays on paired blood samples can help to detect a recent infection, while no diagnostic methods are available to detect EHV-1 latent infections. Safe movements of horses can be ensured at premovement phase by testing and issuing health certificates, and by isolating animals upon arrival at new premises with regular health monitoring. In case of suspicion, movements should be forbidden and EHV-1 infection early detected/confirmed by validated diagnostic tools. During outbreaks, no movements should be allowed until 21 days after the detection of the last case. In general, vaccination against EHV-1 should be promoted, although this offers limited protection against the neurological form of the disease.

Assessment of listing and categorisation of animal diseases within the framework of the Animal Health Law (Regulation (EU) No 2016/429): antimicrobial-resistant Brachyspira hyodysenteriae in swine

Brachyspira hyodysenteriae (B. hyodysenteriae) was identified among the most relevant antimicrobial-resistant (AMR) bacteria in the EU for swine in a previous scientific opinion. Thus, it has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as in Article 9, and Article 8 for listing animal species related to the bacterium. The assessment has been performed following a methodology previously published. The outcome is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with uncertain outcome. According to the assessment here performed, it is uncertain whether AMR B. hyodysenteriae can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (33-66% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that the bacterium does not meet the criteria in Sections 1, 2 and 3 (Categories A, B and C; 1-10%, 10-33% and 10-33% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively) and the AHAW Panel was uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Sections 4 and 5 (Categories D and E, 50-90% and 33-66% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively). The main animal species to be listed for AMR B. hyodysenteriae according to Article 8 criteria are pigs and some species of birds, such as chickens and ducks.

Assessment of listing and categorisation of animal diseases within the framework of the Animal Health Law (Regulation (EU) No 2016/429): antimicrobial-resistant Rhodococcus equi in horses

Rhodococcus equi (R. equi) was identified among the most relevant antimicrobial-resistant (AMR) bacteria in the EU for horses in a previous scientific opinion. Thus, it has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as in Article 9 and Article 8 for listing animal species related to the bacterium. The assessment has been performed following a methodology previously published. The outcome is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with uncertain outcome. According to the assessment here performed, it is uncertain whether AMR R. equi can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (10-66% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that the bacterium does not meet the criteria in Sections 1 and 2 (Categories A and B; 5-10% and 10-33% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively), and the AHAW Panel is uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Sections 3, 4 and 5 (Categories C, D and E; 10-66% probability of meeting the criteria in all three categories). The animal species to be listed for AMR R. equi according to Article 8 criteria are mainly horses and other species belonging to the Perissodactyla and Artiodactyla orders.

Assessment of listing and categorisation of animal diseases within the framework of the Animal Health Law (Regulation (EU) No 2016/429): antimicrobial-resistant Enterococcus faecalis in poultry

Enterococcus faecalis (E. faecalis) was identified among the most relevant antimicrobial-resistant (AMR) bacteria in the EU for poultry in a previous scientific opinion. Thus, it has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as in Article 9 and Article 8 for listing animal species related to the bacterium. The assessment has been performed following a methodology previously published. The outcome is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with uncertain outcome. According to the assessment here performed, it is uncertain whether AMR E. faecalis can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (33-66% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that the bacterium does not meet the criteria in Sections 1, 2 and 4 (Categories A, B and D; 0-5%, 5-10% and 1-10% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively) and the AHAW Panel is uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Sections 3 and 5 (Categories C and E, 33-66% and 33-66% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively). The animal species to be listed for AMR E. faecalis according to Article 8 criteria are mostly birds of the orders Galliformes and Anseriformes, but also mammals and reptiles can serve as reservoirs.

Assessment of listing and categorisation of animal diseases within the framework of the Animal Health Law (Regulation (EU) No 2016/429): antimicrobial-resistant Enterococcus cecorum in poultry

Enterococcus cecorum (E. cecorum) was identified among the most relevant antimicrobial-resistant (AMR) bacteria in the EU for poultry in a previous scientific opinion. Thus, it has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as in Article 9, and Article 8 for listing animal species related to the bacterium. The assessment has been performed following a methodology previously published. The outcome is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with uncertain outcome. According to the assessment here performed, it is uncertain whether AMR E. cecorum can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (33-75% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that the bacterium does not meet the criteria in Sections 1, 2 and 4 (Categories A, B and D; 0-5%, 5-10% and 10-33% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively) and the AHAW Panel is uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Sections 3 and 5 (Categories C and E, 33-66% and 33-75% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively). The animal species to be listed for AMR E. cecorum according to Article 8 criteria are mostly birds belonging to the families of Anatidae, Columbidae and Phasianidae.

Assessment of listing and categorisation of animal diseases within the framework of the Animal Health Law (Regulation (EU) No 2016/429): antimicrobial-resistant Staphylococcus pseudintermedius in dogs and cats

Staphylococcus pseudintermedius (S. pseudintermedius) was identified among the most relevant antimicrobial-resistant (AMR) bacteria in the EU for dogs and cats in a previous scientific opinion. Thus, it has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as in Article 9, and Article 8 for listing animal species related to the bacterium. The assessment has been performed following a methodology previously published. The outcome is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with uncertain outcome. According to the assessment here performed, it is uncertain whether AMR S. pseudintermedius can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (30-90% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that the bacterium does not meet the criteria in Sections 1, 2 and 4 (Categories A, B and D; 0-1%, 1-10% and 10-33% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively) and the AHAW Panel is uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Sections 3 and 5 (Categories C and E, 5-66% and 30-90% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively). The animal species to be listed for AMR S. pseudintermedius according to Article 8 criteria are mostly species belonging to the families of Canidae and Felidae, such as dogs and cats.

Assessment of the control measures of the category A diseases of Animal Health Law: Rift Valley Fever

EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases ('Animal Health Law'). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures were assessed for several diseases, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for Rift Valley Fever (RVF). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period and (iii) the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zone and the minimum length of time the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere; nonetheless, the transmission kernels used for the assessment of the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zones are shown. Several scenarios for which these control measures had to be assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. Different risk-based sampling procedures based on clinical visits and laboratory testing are assessed in case of outbreak suspicion, granting animal movements and for repopulation purposes. The length of monitoring period and minimum duration of measures to be implemented in the restricted zones as defined in the Delegated Regulation (30 days) are considered effective for the investigation and control of suspected and confirmed RVF outbreaks, as well as the size of protection and surveillance zone of 20 and 50 km, respectively, which are assessed as sufficient to contain disease transmission with at least 95% probability.

Assessment of the control measures of the category A diseases of Animal Health Law: Burkholderia mallei (Glanders)

EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases ('Animal Health Law'). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for glanders. In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period and (iii) the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zone, and the minimum length of time the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere. Considering the epidemiology and distribution of glanders, it was foreseen that three different situations could lead to a suspicion of the disease. Sampling procedures were defined for each of the three different suspicion types, which can also be applied in most of the other scenarios assessed. The monitoring period (6 months) was assessed as effective in all scenarios. The AHAW Panel of experts considered the minimum radius and duration of the existing protection and surveillance zone, set at the establishment level, effective. Recommendations provided for each of the scenarios assessed aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad hoc requests in relation to glanders.

Assessment of the control measures for category A diseases of Animal Health Law: Lumpy Skin Disease

EFSA received a mandate from the EC to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases ('Animal Health Law'). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures are assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for Lumpy Skin Disease (LSD). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, ii) monitoring period and iii) the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zones, and the minimum length of time that measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere; nonetheless, the transmission kernels used for the assessment of the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zones are shown. Several scenarios for which these control measures had to be assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. The monitoring period was assessed as effective, and based on the transmission kernels available, it was concluded that the protection zone of 20 km radius and the surveillance zone of 50 km radius would comprise > 99% of the transmission from an affected establishment if transmission occurred. Recommendations provided for each of the assessed scenarios aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad hoc requests in relation to LSD.

Assessment of listing and categorisation of animal diseases within the framework of the Animal Health Law (Regulation (EU) No 2016/429): infection with Equine Herpesvirus-1

Equine Herpesvirus-1 infection has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular criteria of: Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on the eligibility of the disease to be listed, Article 9 for the categorisation of the disease according to disease prevention and control measures as in Annex IV and Article 8 on the list of animal species related to Equine Herpesvirus-1 infection. The assessment has been performed following a methodology composed of information collection and compilation, and expert judgement on each criterion at individual and collective level. The outcome is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether the criterion is fulfilled (66-100%) or not (0-33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment (33-66%). For the questions where no consensus was reached, the different supporting views are reported. According to the assessment performed, Equine Herpesvirus-1 infection can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the Animal Health Law with 33-90% certainty. According to the criteria as in Annex IV of the AHL related to Article 9 of the AHL for the categorisation of diseases according to the level of prevention and control, it was assessed with less than 1% certainty that EHV-1 fulfils the criteria as in Section 1 (category A), 1-5% for the criteria as in Section 2 (category B), 10-66% for the criteria as in Section 3 (category C), 66-90% for the criteria as in Section 4 (category D) and 33-90% for the criteria as in Section 5 (category E). The animal species to be listed for EHV-1 infection according to Article 8(3) criteria are the species belonging to the families of Equidae, Bovidae, Camelidae, Caviidae, Cervidae, Cricetidae, Felidae, Giraffidae, Leporidae, Muridae, Rhinocerontidae, Tapiridae and Ursidae.

Assessment of the control measures of the category A diseases of Animal Health Law: sheep and goat pox

EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases (‘Animal Health Law’). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for sheep and goat pox. In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period and (iii) the minimum radii of the protection and surveillance zones, and the minimum length of time the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere; nonetheless, the transmission kernels used for the assessment of the minimum radii of the protection and surveillance zones are shown. Several scenarios for which these control measures had to be assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. Different risk‐based sampling procedures based on clinical visits and laboratory testing are assessed in case of outbreak suspicion, granting animal movements and for repopulation purposes. The monitoring period of 21 days was assessed as effective. The estimated probability of transmission beyond the protection zone of 3 km radius from an infectious establishment is 9.6% (95% CI: 3.1–25.8%) and 2.3% (95% CI: 1–5.5%) for the surveillance zone of 10 km radius. This may be considered sufficient to contain the disease spread (95% probability of containing transmission corresponds to 5.3 Km). To contain 99% of the spread, the radius should be increased to 19.4 km (95% CI: 9.8–26.8). This may increase the number of farms in the surveillance zone, since the area would increase fourfold.

Assessment of the control measures of the category A diseases of Animal Health Law: Newcastle disease

EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases ('Animal Health Law'). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for Newcastle disease (ND). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period and (iii) the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zone, and the minimum length of time the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere. Several scenarios for which these control measures had to be assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. The monitoring period (21 days) was assessed as effective in non-vaccinated chicken and turkey flocks, although large uncertainty remains surrounding the effectiveness of this period in vaccinated galliform flocks and flocks of other bird species. It was also concluded that the protection (3 km radius) and the surveillance (10 km radius) zones contain 99% of the infections from an infectious establishment. Recommendations provided for each of the scenarios assessed aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad hoc requests in relation to ND.

Maximum levels of cross-contamination for 24 antimicrobial active substances in non-target feed. Part 12: Tetracyclines: tetracycline, chlortetracycline, oxytetracycline, and doxycycline

The specific concentrations of tetracycline, chlortetracycline, oxytetracycline and doxycycline in non-target feed for food-producing animals, below which there would not be an effect on the emergence of, and/or selection for, resistance in bacteria relevant for human and animal health, as well as the specific antimicrobial concentrations in feed which have an effect in terms of growth promotion/increased yield were assessed by EFSA in collaboration with EMA. Details of the methodology used for this assessment, associated data gaps and uncertainties are presented in a separate document. To address antimicrobial resistance, the Feed Antimicrobial Resistance Selection Concentration (FARSC) model developed specifically for the assessment was applied. The FARSC for these four tetracyclines was estimated. To address growth promotion, data from scientific publications obtained from an extensive literature review were used. Levels in feed that showed to have an effect on growth promotion/increased yield were reported for tetracycline, chlortetracycline, oxytetracycline, whilst for doxycycline no suitable data for the assessment were available. Uncertainties and data gaps associated with the levels reported were addressed. It was recommended to perform further studies to supply more diverse and complete data related to the requirements for calculation of the FARSC for these antimicrobials.

Maximum levels of cross-contamination for 24 antimicrobial active substances in non-target feed. Part 9: Polymyxins: colistin

The specific concentrations of colistin in non-target feed for food-producing animals, below which there would not be an effect on the emergence of, and/or selection for, resistance in bacteria relevant for human and animal health, as well as the specific antimicrobial concentrations in feed which have an effect in terms of growth promotion/increased yield were assessed by EFSA in collaboration with EMA. Details of the methodology used for this assessment, associated data gaps and uncertainties, are presented in a separate document. To address antimicrobial resistance, the Feed Antimicrobial Resistance Selection Concentration (FARSC) model developed specifically for the assessment was applied. However, due to the lack of data on the parameters required to calculate the FARSC, it was not possible to conclude the assessment until further experimental data become available. To address growth promotion, data from scientific publications obtained from an extensive literature review were used. Levels of colistin in feed that showed to have an effect on growth promotion/increased yield were reported. It was recommended to carry out studies to generate the data that are required to fill the gaps which prevented the calculation of the FARSC for these antimicrobials.

Maximum levels of cross-contamination for 24 antimicrobial active substances in non-target feed. Part 13: Diaminopyrimidines: trimethoprim

The specific concentrations of trimethoprim in non-target feed for food-producing animals below which there would not be an effect on the emergence of, and/or selection for, resistance in bacteria relevant for human and animal health, as well as the specific antimicrobial concentrations in feed which have an effect in terms of growth promotion/increased yield were assessed by EFSA in collaboration with EMA. Details of the methodology used for this assessment, associated data gaps and uncertainties, are presented in a separate document. To address antimicrobial resistance, the Feed Antimicrobial Resistance Selection Concentration (FARSC) model developed specifically for the assessment was applied. The FARSC for trimethoprim was estimated. Uncertainties and data gaps associated to the levels reported were addressed. To address growth promotion, data from scientific publications obtained from an extensive literature review were used. No suitable data for the assessment were available. It was recommended to perform further studies to supply more diverse and complete data related to the requirements for calculation of the FARSC for trimethoprim.

Maximum levels of cross-contamination for 24 antimicrobial active substances in non-target feed. Part 3: Amprolium

The specific concentrations of amprolium in non-target feed for food-producing animals, below which there would not be an effect on the emergence of, and/or selection for, resistance in bacteria relevant for human and animal health, as well as the specific antimicrobial concentrations in feed which have an effect in terms of growth promotion/increased yield were assessed by EFSA in collaboration with EMA. Details of the methodology used for this assessment, associated data gaps and uncertainties, are presented in a separate document. To address antimicrobial resistance, the Feed Antimicrobial Resistance Selection Concentration (FARSC) model developed specifically for the assessment was applied. However, due to the lack of data on the parameters required to calculate the FARSC for amprolium, it was not possible to conclude the assessment. To address growth promotion, data from scientific publications obtained from an extensive literature review were used. Levels of amprolium in feed that showed to have an effect on growth promotion/increased yield were reported. The lack of antibacterial activity at clinically relevant concentrations for amprolium suggests that further studies relating to bacterial resistance are not a priority.

Maximum levels of cross-contamination for 24 antimicrobial active substances in non-target feed. Part 10: Quinolones: flumequine and oxolinic acid

The specific concentrations of flumequine and oxolinic acid in non-target feed for food-producing animals, below which there would not be an effect on the emergence of, and/or selection for, resistance in bacteria relevant for human and animal health, as well as the specific antimicrobial concentrations in feed which have an effect in terms of growth promotion/increased yield were assessed by EFSA in collaboration with EMA. Details of the methodology used for this assessment, associated data gaps and uncertainties, are presented in a separate document. To address antimicrobial resistance, the Feed Antimicrobial Resistance Selection Concentration (FARSC) model developed specifically for the assessment was applied. However, due to the lack of data on the parameters required to calculate the FARSC, it was not possible to conclude the assessment until further experimental data are available. To address growth promotion, data from scientific publications obtained from an extensive literature review were used. No suitable data for the assessment were available. It was recommended to carry out studies to generate the data that are required to fill the gaps which prevented the calculation of the FARSC for these antimicrobials.

Maximum levels of cross-contamination for 24 antimicrobial active substances in non-target feed. Part 4: β-Lactams: amoxicillin and penicillin V

The specific concentrations of amoxicillin and penicillin V in non-target feed for food-producing animals, below which there would not be an effect on the emergence of, and/or selection for, resistance in bacteria relevant for human and animal health, as well as the specific antimicrobial concentrations in feed which have an effect in terms of growth promotion/increased yield were assessed by EFSA in collaboration with EMA. Details of the methodology used for this assessment, associated data gaps and uncertainties, are presented in a separate document. To address antimicrobial resistance, the Feed Antimicrobial Resistance Selection Concentration (FARSC) model developed specifically for the assessment was applied. However, due to the lack of data on the parameters required to calculate the FARSC, it was not possible to conclude the assessment until further experimental data become available. To address growth promotion, data from scientific publications obtained from an extensive literature review were used. Levels in feed that showed to have an effect on growth promotion/increased yield were reported for amoxicillin, whilst for penicillin V no suitable data for the assessment were available. It was recommended to carry out studies to generate the data that are required to fill the gaps which prevented the calculation of the FARSC for these two antimicrobials.

Maximum levels of cross-contamination for 24 antimicrobial active substances in non-target feed. Part 1: Methodology, general data gaps and uncertainties

The European Commission requested EFSA to assess, in collaboration with EMA, the specific concentrations of antimicrobials resulting from cross-contamination in non-target feed for food-producing animals below which there would not be an effect on the emergence of, and/or selection for, resistance in microbial agents relevant for human and animal health, as well as the levels of the antimicrobials which could have a growth promotion/increase yield effect. The assessment was performed for 24 antimicrobial active substances, as specified in the mandate. This scientific opinion describes the methodology used, and the main associated data gaps and uncertainties. To estimate the antimicrobial levels in the non-target feed that would not result in emergence of, and/or selection for, resistance, a model was developed. This 'Feed Antimicrobial Resistance Selection Concentration' (FARSC) model is based on the minimal selective concentration (MSC), or the predicted MSC (PMSC) if MSC for the most susceptible bacterial species is unavailable, the fraction of antimicrobial dose available for exposure to microorganisms in the large intestine or rumen (considering pharmacokinetic parameters), the daily faecal output or rumen volume and the daily feed intake. Currently, lack of data prevents the establishment of PMSC and/or FARSC for several antimicrobials and animal species. To address growth promotion, data from an extensive literature search were used. Specific assessments of the different substances grouped by antimicrobial classes are addressed in separate scientific opinions. General conclusions and recommendations were made.

Maximum levels of cross-contamination for 24 antimicrobial active substances in non-target feed. Part 5: Lincosamides: lincomycin

The specific concentrations of lincomycin in non-target feed for food-producing animals, below which there would not be an effect on the emergence of, and/or selection for, resistance in bacteria relevant for human and animal health, as well as the specific antimicrobial concentrations in feed which have an effect in terms of growth promotion/increased yield were assessed by EFSA in collaboration with EMA. Details of the methodology used for this assessment, associated data gaps and uncertainties, are presented in a separate document. To address antimicrobial resistance, the Feed Antimicrobial Resistance Selection Concentration (FARSC) model developed specifically for the assessment was applied. However, due to the lack of data on the parameters required to calculate the FARSC, it was not possible to conclude the assessment until further experimental data become available. To address growth promotion, data from scientific publications obtained from an extensive literature review were used. Levels of lincomycin in feed that showed to have an effect on growth promotion/increased yield were reported. It was recommended to carry out studies to generate the data that are required to fill the gaps which prevented the calculation of the FARSC for lincomycin.

Maximum levels of cross-contamination for 24 antimicrobial active substances in non-target feed. Part 6: Macrolides: tilmicosin, tylosin and tylvalosin

The specific concentrations of tilmicosin, tylosin and tylvalosin in non-target feed for food-producing animals, below which there would not be an effect on the emergence of, and/or selection for, resistance in bacteria relevant for human and animal health, as well as the specific antimicrobial concentrations in feed which have an effect in terms of growth promotion/increased yield, were assessed by EFSA in collaboration with EMA. Details of the methodology used for this assessment, associated data gaps and uncertainties, are presented in a separate document. To address antimicrobial resistance, the Feed Antimicrobial Resistance Selection Concentration (FARSC) model developed specifically for the assessment was applied. However, due to the lack of data on the parameters required to calculate the FARSC, it was not possible to conclude the assessment until further experimental data become available. To address growth promotion, data from scientific publications obtained from an extensive literature review were used. Levels in feed that showed to have an effect on growth promotion/increased yield were reported for tilmicosin and tylosin, whilst for tylvalosin no suitable data for the assessment were available. It was recommended to carry out studies to generate the data that are required to fill the gaps which prevented the calculation of the FARSC for these three antimicrobials.

Maximum levels of cross-contamination for 24 antimicrobial active substances in non-target feed. Part 11: Sulfonamides

The specific concentrations of sulfonamides in non-target feed for food-producing animals, below which there would not be an effect on the emergence of, and/or selection for, resistance in bacteria relevant for human and animal health, as well as the specific antimicrobial concentrations in feed which have an effect in terms of growth promotion/increased yield were assessed by EFSA in collaboration with EMA. Details of the methodology used for this assessment, associated data gaps and uncertainties, are presented in a separate document. To address antimicrobial resistance, the Feed Antimicrobial Resistance Selection Concentration (FARSC) model developed specifically for the assessment was applied. However, due to the lack of data on the parameters required to calculate the FARSC, it was not possible to conclude the assessment until further experimental data are available. To address growth promotion, data from scientific publications obtained from an extensive literature review were used. Levels in feed that showed to have an effect on growth promotion/increased yield were identified for three sulfonamides: sulfamethazine, sulfathiazole and sulfamerazine. It was recommended to carry out studies to generate the data that are required to fill the gaps which prevented the calculation of the FARSC for these antimicrobials.

Maximum levels of cross-contamination for 24 antimicrobial active substances in non-target feed. Part 2: Aminoglycosides/aminocyclitols: apramycin, paromomycin, neomycin and spectinomycin

The specific concentrations of apramycin, paromomycin, neomycin and spectinomycin in non-target feed for food-producing animals, below which there would not be an effect on the emergence of, and/or selection for, resistance in bacteria relevant for human and animal health, as well as the specific antimicrobial concentrations in feed which have an effect in terms of growth promotion/increased yield, were assessed by EFSA in collaboration with EMA. Details of the methodology used for this assessment, associated data gaps and uncertainties, are presented in a separate document. To address antimicrobial resistance, the Feed Antimicrobial Resistance Selection Concentration (FARSC) model developed specifically for the assessment was applied. However, due to the lack of data on the parameters required to calculate the FARSC for these antimicrobials, it was not possible to conclude the assessment until further experimental data become available. To address growth promotion, data from scientific publications obtained from an extensive literature review were used. Levels in feed that showed to have an effect on growth promotion/increased yield were reported for apramycin and neomycin, whilst for paromomycin and spectinomycin, no suitable data for the assessment were available. It was recommended to carry out studies to generate the data that are required to fill the gaps which prevented the calculation of the FARSC for these four antimicrobials.

Maximum levels of cross-contamination for 24 antimicrobial active substances in non-target feed. Part 8: Pleuromutilins: tiamulin and valnemulin

The specific concentrations of tiamulin and valnemulin in non-target feed for food-producing animals, below which there would not be an effect on the emergence of, and/or selection for, resistance in bacteria relevant for human and animal health, as well as the specific antimicrobial concentrations in feed which have an effect in terms of growth promotion/increased yield were assessed by EFSA in collaboration with EMA. Details of the methodology used for this assessment, associated data gaps and uncertainties, are presented in a separate document. To address antimicrobial resistance, the Feed Antimicrobial Resistance Selection Concentration (FARSC) model developed specifically for the assessment was applied. However, due to the lack of data on the parameters required to calculate the FARSC, it was not possible to conclude the assessment until further experimental data become available. To address growth promotion, data from scientific publications obtained from an extensive literature review were used. Levels in feed that showed to have an effect on growth promotion/increased yield were reported for tiamulin, while for valnemulin no suitable data for the assessment were available. It was recommended to carry out studies to generate the data that are required to fill the gaps which prevented the calculation of the FARSC for these two antimicrobials.

Maximum levels of cross-contamination for 24 antimicrobial active substances in non-target feed. Part 7: Amphenicols: florfenicol and thiamphenicol

The specific concentrations of florfenicol and thiamphenicol in non-target feed for food-producing animals, below which there would not be an effect on the emergence of, and/or selection for, resistance in bacteria relevant for human and animal health, as well as the specific antimicrobial concentrations in feed which have an effect in terms of growth promotion/increased yield, were assessed by EFSA in collaboration with EMA. Details of the methodology used for this assessment, associated data gaps and uncertainties, are presented in a separate document. To address antimicrobial resistance, the Feed Antimicrobial Resistance Selection Concentration (FARSC) model developed specifically for the assessment was applied. The FARSC for florfenicol was estimated. However, due to the lack of data, the calculation of the FARSC for thiamphenicol was not possible until further experimental data become available. To address growth promotion, data from scientific publications obtained from an extensive literature review were used. Levels in feed that showed to have an effect on growth promotion/increased yield were reported for florfenicol, whilst for thiamphenicol no suitable data for the assessment were available. Uncertainties and data gaps associated to the levels reported were addressed. For florfenicol, it was recommended to perform further studies to supply more diverse and complete data related to the requirements for calculation of the FARSC, whereas for thiamphenicol, the recommendation was to generate the data required to fill the gaps which prevented the FARSC calculation.

Assessment of the control measures of the category A diseases of Animal Health Law: peste des petits ruminants

EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases ('Animal Health Law'). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for peste des petits ruminants (PPR). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period and (iii) the minimum radii of the protection and surveillance zones, and the minimum length of time the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere; nonetheless, the transmission kernels used for the assessment of the minimum radii of the protection and surveillance zones are shown. Several scenarios for which these control measures had to be assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. The monitoring period of 21 days was assessed as effective, except for the first affected establishments detected, where 33 days is recommended. It was concluded that beyond the protection (3 km) and the surveillance zones (10 km) only 9.6% (95% CI: 3.1-25.8%) and 2.3% (95% CI: 1-5.5%) of the infections from an affected establishment may occur, respectively. This may be considered sufficient to contain the disease spread (95% probability of containing transmission corresponds to 5.3 km). Recommendations provided for each of the scenarios assessed aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad-hoc requests in relation to PPR.

Assessment of the control measures of the category A diseases of Animal Health Law: Classical Swine Fever

EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases ('Animal Health Law'). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for Classical swine fever (CSF). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period and (iii) the minimum radii of the protection and surveillance zones, and the minimum length of time the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere; nonetheless, details of the model used for answering these questions are presented in this opinion as well as the transmission kernels used for the assessment of the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zones. Several scenarios for which these control measures had to be assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. Here, several recommendations are given on how to increase the effectiveness of some of the sampling procedures. Based on the average length of the period between virus introduction and the reporting of a CSF suspicion, the monitoring period was assessed as non-effective. In a similar way, it was recommended that the length of the measures in the protection and surveillance zones were increased from 15 to 25 days in the protection zone and from 30 to 40 days in the surveillance zone. Finally, the analysis of existing Kernels for CSF suggested that the radius of the protection and the surveillance zones comprise 99% of the infections from an affected establishment if transmission occurred. Recommendations provided for each of the scenarios assessed aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad hoc requests in relation to CSF.

Scientific Opinion on the assessment of the control measures for category A diseases of Animal Health Law: Foot and Mouth Disease

EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases ('Animal Health Law'). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for foot and mouth disease (FMD). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, ii) monitoring period and iii) the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zones, and the minimum length of time the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere; nonetheless, the transmission kernels used for the assessment of the minimum radius of the protection zone of 3 km and of the surveillance zone of 10 km are shown. Several scenarios for which these control measures had to be assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. The monitoring period of 21 days was assessed as effective, and it was concluded that the protection and the surveillance zones comprise > 99% of the infections from an affected establishment if transmission occurred. Recommendations, provided for each of the scenarios assessed, aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad hoc requests in relation to FMD.

Epidemiological analysis of African swine fever in the European Union (September 2019 to August 2020)

An update on the African swine fever (ASF) situation in the 10 affected Member States (MS) in the EU and in two neighbouring countries from the 1 September 2019 until the 31 August 2020 is provided. The dynamics of the proportions of PCR- and ELISA-positive samples since the first ASF detection in the country were provided and seasonal patterns were investigated. The impact of the ASF epidemic on the annual numbers of hunted wild boar in each affected MS was investigated. To evaluate differences in the extent of spread of ASF in the wild boar populations, the number of notifications that could be classified as secondary cases to a single source was calculated for each affected MS and compared for the earliest and latest year of the epidemic in the country. To evaluate possible risk factors for the occurrence of ASFV in wild boar or domestic pigs, a literature review was performed. Risk factors for the occurrence of ASF in wild boar in Romanian hunting grounds in 2019 were identified with a generalised linear model. The probability to find at least one PCR-confirmed ASF case in wild boar in a hunting ground in Romania was driven by environmental factors, wild boar abundance and the density of backyard pigs in the hunting ground area, while hunting-related variables were not retained in the final model. Finally, measures implemented in white zones (ASF-free zones that are geographically adjacent to an area where ASF is present in wild boar) to prevent further spread of ASF were analysed with a spatially, explicit stochastic individual-based model. To be effective, the wild boar population in the white zone would need to be drastically reduced before ASF arrives at the zone and it must be wide enough. To achieve the necessary pre-emptive culling targets of wild boar in the white zone, at the start of the establishment, the white zone should be placed sufficiently far from the affected area, considering the speed of the natural spread of the disease. This spread is faster in denser wild boar populations. After a focal ASF introduction, the white zone is always close to the infection hence pre-emptive culling measures in the white zone must be completed in short term, i.e. in a few months.

Monitoring of SARS-CoV-2 infection in mustelids

American mink and ferret are highly susceptible to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), but no information is available for other mustelid species. SARS-CoV-2 spreads very efficiently within mink farms once introduced, by direct and indirect contact, high within-farm animal density increases the chance for transmission. Between-farm spread is likely to occur once SARS-CoV-2 is introduced, short distance between SARS-CoV-2 positive farms is a risk factor. As of 29 January 2021, SARS-CoV-2 virus has been reported in 400 mink farms in eight countries in the European Union. In most cases, the likely introduction of SARS-CoV-2 infection into farms was infected humans. Human health can be at risk by mink-related variant viruses, which can establish circulation in the community, but so far these have not shown to be more transmissible or causing more severe impact compared with other circulating SARS-CoV-2. Concerning animal health risk posed by SARS-CoV-2 infection the animal species that may be included in monitoring plans are American mink, ferrets, cats, raccoon dogs, white-tailed deer and Rhinolophidae bats. All mink farms should be considered at risk of infection; therefore, the monitoring objective should be early detection. This includes passive monitoring (in place in the whole territory of all countries where animals susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 are bred) but also active monitoring by regular testing. First, frequent testing of farm personnel and all people in contact with the animals is recommended. Furthermore randomly selected animals (dead or sick animals should be included) should be tested using reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), ideally at weekly intervals (i.e. design prevalence approximately 5% in each epidemiological unit, to be assessed case by case). Suspected animals (dead or with clinical signs and a minimum five animals) should be tested for confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection. Positive samples from each farm should be sequenced to monitor virus evolution and results publicly shared.

Scientific Opinion on the assessment of the control measures of the category A diseases of Animal Health Law: African Horse Sickness

EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases (‘Animal Health Law’). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for African Horse Sickness (AHS). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period and (iii) the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zone, and the minimum duration of measures in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere; nonetheless, specific details of the transmission kernels used for the assessment of the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zones are shown. Several scenarios for which these control measures were assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. In summary, sampling procedures described in the diagnostic manual for AHS were considered efficient for all Equidae considering the high case fatality rate expected. The monitoring period (14 days) was assessed as effective in every scenario, except for those relating to the epidemiological enquiry where the risk manager should consider increasing the monitoring period, based on the awareness of keepers, environmental conditions and the vector abundance in the region. The current protection zone (100 km) comprises more than 95% of the infections from an affected establishment. Both the radius and duration of the zones could be reduced, based on local environmental conditions and the time of year of the first index case. Recommendations provided for each of the scenarios assessed aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation relating to AHS.

Scientific Opinion on the assessment of the control measures of the category A diseases of Animal Health Law: African Swine Fever

EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases (‘Animal Health Law’). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for African Swine Fever (ASF). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts reviewed the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period and (iii) the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zone, and the minimum length of time the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere; nonetheless, specific details of the model used for the assessment of the laboratory sampling procedures for ASF are presented here. Here, also, the transmission kernels used for the assessment of the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zones are shown. Several scenarios for which these control measures had to be assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. In summary, several sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual for ASF were considered ineffective and a suggestion to exclude, or to substitute with more effective procedures was made. The monitoring period was assessed as non‐effective for several scenarios and a longer monitoring period was suggested to ensure detection of potentially infected herds. It was demonstrated that the surveillance zone comprises 95% of the infections from an affected establishment, and therefore is considered effective. Recommendations provided for each of the scenarios assessed aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad hoc requests in relation to ASF.

Scientific Opinion on the assessment of the control measures of the category A diseases of Animal Health Law: Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza

EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases ('Animal Health Law'). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period and (iii) the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zone, and the minimum length of time the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere; nonetheless, specific details of the model used for the assessment of the laboratory sampling procedures for HPAI are presented here. Here, also, the transmission kernels used for the assessment of the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zones are shown. Several scenarios for which these control measures had to be assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. In summary, sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual for HPAI were considered efficient for gallinaceous poultry, whereas additional sampling is advised for Anseriformes. The monitoring period was assessed as effective, and it was demonstrated that the surveillance zone comprises 95% of the infections from an affected establishment. Recommendations provided for each of the scenarios assessed aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad hoc requests in relation to HPAI.