The social aspects of illness: Children's and parents' explanations of the relation between social categories and illness in a predominantly white U.S. sample

The COVID-19 pandemic in the United States has had a disproportionate impact on Black, low-income, and elderly individuals. We recruited 175 predominantly white children ages 5-12 and their parents (N = 112) and asked which of two individuals (differing in age, gender, race, social class, or personality) was more likely to get sick with either COVID-19 or the common cold and why. Children and parents reported that older adults were more likely to get sick than younger adults, but reported few differences based on gender, race, social class, or personality. Children predominantly used behavioral explanations, but older children used more biological and structural explanations. Thus, children have some understanding of health disparities, and their understanding increases with age.

Testimony and observation of statistical evidence interact in adults' and children's category-based induction

Hearing generic or other kind-relevant claims can influence the use of information from direct observations in category learning. In the current study, we ask how both adults and children integrate their observations with testimony when learning about the causal property of a novel category. Participants were randomly assigned to hear one of four types of testimony: generic, quantified "all", specific, or only labels. In Study 1, adults (N = 1249) then observed that some proportion of objects (10%-100%) possessed a causal property. In Study 2, children (N = 123, Mage = 5.06 years, SD = 0.61 years, range 4.01-5.99 years) observed a sample where 30% of the objects had the causal property. Generic and quantified "all" claims led both adults and children to generalize the causal property beyond what was observed. Adults and children diverged, however, in their overall trust in testimony that could be verified by observations: adults were more skeptical of inaccurate quantified claims, whereas children were more accepting. Additional memory probes suggest that children's trust in unverified claims may have been due to misremembering what they saw in favor of what they heard. The current findings demonstrate that both child and adult learners integrate information from both sources, offering insights into the mechanisms by which language frames first-hand experience.

Gender Essentialism Predicts Prejudice against Gender Nonconformity in Two Cultural Contexts

Gender-nonconforming children face a substantial amount of prejudice, making it important to investigate potential contributing factors. In a correlational study of 253 U.S. Midwestern and Pacific Northwestern 6- to 10-year-old gender-conforming children (Age M = 7.95, SD = 1.43; 54% girl, 46% boy; 77% White), we examined how gender essentialism (beliefs that gender is biological, discrete, informative, and immutable) and gender identity essentialism (beliefs that gender identity is immutable) relate to prejudice against gender-nonconforming children. We also examined whether these associations varied by the child's cultural context (rural, non-diverse, conservative vs. urban, more diverse, liberal). We found a positive correlation between gender essentialism and prejudice, in both cultural contexts. Additionally, children from the more rural context endorsed more essentialism and expressed more prejudice than did their counterparts from the more urban context. However, we found no differences in children's gender identity essentialism by cultural context and no association with prejudice.

Generically partisan: Polarization in political communication

American political parties continue to grow more polarized, but the extent of ideological polarization among the public is much less than the extent of perceived polarization (what the ideological gap is believed to be). Perceived polarization is concerning because of its link to interparty hostility, but it remains unclear what drives this phenomenon. We propose that a tendency for individuals to form broad generalizations about groups on the basis of inconsistent evidence may be partly responsible. We study this tendency by measuring the interpretation, endorsement, and recall of category-referring statements, also known as generics (e.g., "Democrats favor affirmative action"). In study 1 (n = 417), perceived polarization was substantially greater than actual polarization. Further, participants endorsed generics as long as they were true more often of the target party (e.g., Democrats favor affirmative action) than of the opposing party (e.g., Republicans favor affirmative action), even when they believed such statements to be true for well below 50% of the relevant party. Study 2 (n = 928) found that upon receiving information from political elites, people tended to recall these statements as generic, regardless of whether the original statement was generic or not. Study 3 (n = 422) found that generic statements regarding new political information led to polarized judgments and did so more than nongeneric statements. Altogether, the data indicate a tendency toward holding mental representations of political claims that exaggerate party differences. These findings suggest that the use of generic language, common in everyday speech, enables inferential errors that exacerbate perceived polarization.

Looking beyond the obvious

A hallmark of human cognition is the capacity to think about observable experience in ways that are nonobvious-from scientific concepts (genes, molecules) to everyday understandings (germs, soul). Where does this capacity come from, and how does it develop? I propose that, contrary to what is classically assumed, young children often extend beyond the tangible "here-and-now" to think about hidden, invisible, abstract, or nonpresent entities. I review examples from three lines of research: essentialism, generic language, and object history. These findings suggest that, in some respects, the standard developmental story may be backward: for young humans, going beyond the obvious can be easy, and sticking with the here-and-now can be a challenge. I discuss the implications for how children learn, what is basic in human thought, and how tendencies that make us so smart and sophisticated can also be sources of distortion and bias. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

"It kinda has like a mind": Children's and parents' beliefs concerning viral disease transmission for COVID-19 and the common cold

How people reason about disease transmission is central to their commonsense theories, scientific literacy, and adherence to public health guidelines. This study provided an in-depth assessment of U.S. children's (ages 5-12, N = 180) and their parents' (N = 125) understanding of viral transmission of COVID-19 and the common cold, during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic. The primary aim was to discover children's causal models of viral transmission, by asking them to predict and explain counter-intuitive outcomes (e.g., asymptomatic disease, symptom delay) and processes that cannot be directly observed (e.g., viral replication, how vaccines work). A secondary aim was to explore parental factors that might contribute to children's understanding. Although even the youngest children understood germs as disease-causing and were highly knowledgeable about certain behaviors that transmit or block viral disease (e.g., sneezing, mask-wearing), they generally failed to appreciate the processes that play out over time within the body. Overall, children appeared to rely on two competing mental models of viruses: one in which viruses operate strictly via mechanical processes (movement through space), and one in which viruses are small living creatures, able to grow in size and to move by themselves. These results suggest that distinct causal frameworks co-exist in children's understanding. A challenge for the future is how to teach children about illness as a biological process without also fostering inappropriate animism or anthropomorphism of viruses.

How essentialist reasoning about language acquisition relates to educational myths and policy endorsements

How people conceptualize learning is related to real-world educational consequences across many domains of education. Despite its centrality to the educational system, we know little about how the public reasons about language acquisition, and the potential consequences for their thinking about real-world issues (e.g., policy endorsements). The current studies examined people's essentialist beliefs about language acquisition (e.g., that language is innate and biologically based), then investigated how individual differences in these beliefs related to the endorsement of educational myths and policies. We probed several dimensions of essentialist beliefs, including that language acquisition is innate, genetically based, and wired in the brain. In two studies, we tested specific hypotheses regarding the extent to which people use essentialist thinking when reasoning about: learning a specific language (e.g., Korean), learning a first language more generally, and learning two or more languages. Across studies, participants were more likely to essentialize the ability to learn multiple languages than one's first language, and more likely to essentialize the learning of multiple languages and one's first language than the learning of a particular language. We also found substantial individual differences in the degree to which participants essentialized language acquisition. In both studies, these individual differences correlated with an endorsement of language-related educational neuromyths (Study 1 and pre-registered Study 2), and rejection of educational policies that promote multilingual education (Study 2). Together, these studies reveal the complexity of how people reason about language acquisition and its corresponding educational consequences.

What makes Voldemort tick? Children's and adults' reasoning about the nature of villains

How do children make sense of antisocial acts committed by evil-doers? We addressed this question in three studies with 434 children (4-12 years) and 277 adults, focused on participants' judgments of both familiar and novel fictional villains and heroes. Study 1 established that children viewed villains' actions and emotions as overwhelmingly negative, suggesting that children's well-documented positivity bias does not prevent their appreciation of extreme forms of villainy. Studies 2 and 3 assessed children's and adults' beliefs regarding heroes' and villains' moral character and true selves, using an array of converging evidence, including: how a character felt inside, whether a character's actions reflected their true self, whether a character's true self could change over time, and how an omniscient machine would judge a character's true self. Across these measures, both children and adults consistently evaluated villains' true selves to be more negative than heroes'. Importantly, at the same time, we also detected an asymmetry in the judgments, wherein villains were more likely than heroes to have a true self that differed from their outward behavior. More specifically, across the ages studied participants more often reported that villains were inwardly good, than that heroes were inwardly bad. Implications, limitations, and directions for future research are discussed in light of our expanding understanding of the development of true self beliefs.

Preliminary evidence for progressions in ownership reasoning over the preschool period

Defining developmental progressions can be an important step in identifying developmental precursors and mechanisms of change, within and across areas of reasoning. In one exploratory study, we examine whether the development of children's thinking about ownership follows a systematic progression wherein some components emerge reliably before others. We examine this issue in a sample of 72 children: 40 older 2-year-olds, M_age = 2.78 (.14); R = 2.50-3.00, and 32 older 4-year-olds, M_age = 4.77 (.16); R = 4.50-5.00, living in Michigan in the United States. We use a battery of four established ownership tasks that tested different aspects of children's ownership thinking. A Guttman test revealed a reliable sequence that explained 81.9% of children's performance. Namely, we discovered that identifying familiar owned objects emerged first, control of permission as a cue to ownership second, understanding ownership transfers third, and the tracking of sets of identical objects last. This ordering suggests two foundational ownership abilities on which more complex reasoning may be built: the ability to include information about familiar owners in children's mental models of objects and recognizing that control is central to ownership. The observed progression is an important first step toward developing a formal ownership scale. This study paves the way for mapping the conceptual and information-processing demands (e.g., executive functioning, memory) that likely underlie change in ownership thinking across childhood. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Testing the effects of congruence in adult multilingual acquisition with implications for creole genesis

Linguists from across sub-disciplines have noted that congruence (i.e., form-function mapping) across languages in contact seems to affect acquisition and play a role in language emergence (e.g. Creole genesis). However, because congruence is often confounded with other variables (e.g., frequency, language type, speakers' proficiency levels, perceptual salience, semantic transparency), it remains unclear whether congruence per se benefits learners. In this paper, we provide an experimental test of the effects of congruence on acquisition through an artificial language-learning experiment involving English (L1) and two artificial languages (Flugerdu and Zamperese). English-speakers who identified as "native" (i.e., first-language) speakers (N = 163) were randomly assigned to one of four conditions, varying which of the three languages expressed negation with congruent forms: all three languages; only Flugerdu and Zamperese; only English and Flugerdu; or none. Our findings show that participants better acquired the negation morpheme when the form was congruent with negation in English but not when the two artificial languages alone shared a congruent form. We likewise found unanticipated spillover effects in which participants better acquired the vocabulary and grammar of the artificial languages when all three languages had congruent negation forms. These findings provide insight into the effects of congruence on language acquisition in multilingual environments and Creole language formation.

Learning the rules of the game: The role of generic "you" and "we" in shaping children's interpretations of norms

A critical skill of childhood is learning social norms. We examine whether the generic pronouns "you" and "we," which frame information as applying to people in general rather than to a specific individual, facilitate this process. In one pre-registered experiment conducted online between 2020 and 2021, children 4- to 9-year-old primarily living in the midwestern U.S. (N = 146, 75 girls, 71 boys, M_age  = 7.14, SD = 1.69, 82% White) interpreted actions described with generic pronouns (vs. "I") as normatively correct and selected the speaker who used generic pronouns as the rule-follower, particularly when generic pronouns were presented first. There were no significant effects of age. These results illustrate how generic pronouns influence how children discern unfamiliar norms and form interpersonal judgments.

Genetic essentialist beliefs about criminality predict harshness of recommended punishment

Genetic essentialism is a set of beliefs holding that certain categories have a heritable, intrinsic, and biological basis. The current studies explore people's genetic essentialist beliefs about criminality, how such essentialism relates to beliefs about appropriate punishment, and the kinds of judgments and motivations that underlie these associations. Study 1 validated a novel task, in which respondents estimated how possible it would be for a child to inherit criminal behavior from a sperm donor with whom they had no contact. Studies 2-4 used this task to address how genetic essentialist beliefs related to the harmfulness of a crime and the harshness of recommended punishment. Results indicated a tendency to essentialize both low- and high-harm crimes, though genetic essentialism was higher for more harmful crimes. Moreover, genetic essentialist beliefs predicted recommendations for harsher punishments, with retributive and protective motivations, as well as perceptions of recidivism risk, partially mediating this association. Further, Studies 3 and 4 found that genetic essentialism positively predicted support for harsh punishments such as the death penalty, as well as support for directing financial resources more toward law enforcement and less toward social support. Lay theories about criminality may have profound implications for decisions about appropriate punishment for wrongdoers, as well as broader policy decisions about crime, punishment, and resource allocation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Generic Language for Social and Animal Kinds: An Examination of the Asymmetry Between Acceptance and Inferences

Generics (e.g., "Ravens are black") express generalizations about categories or their members. Previous research found that generics about animals are interpreted as broadly true of members of a kind, yet also accepted based on minimal evidence. This asymmetry is important for suggesting a mechanism by which unfounded generalizations may flourish; yet, little is known whether this finding extends to generics about groups of people (heretofore, "social generics"). Accordingly, in four preregistered studies (n = 665), we tested for an inferential asymmetry for generics regarding novel groups of animals versus people. Participants were randomly assigned to either an Implied Prevalence task (given a generic, asked to estimate the prevalence of a property) or a Truth-Conditions task (given prevalence information, asked whether a generic was true or false). A generic asymmetry was found in both domains, at equivalent levels. The asymmetry also extended to properties varying in valence (dangerous and neutral). Finally, there were differences as a function of property valence in the Implied Prevalence task and a small but consistent interaction between domain and prevalence in the Truth-Conditions task. We discuss the implications of these results for the semantics of generics, theoretical accounts of the asymmetry, and the relation between generics and stereotyping.

The development of digital ownership in children

The current study examined whether, for children and adults, behaviors that are considered violations of property rights in the case of physical property are likewise viewed as violations in the case of digital property. In this preregistered study (N = 156), 5- to 10-year-old children and adults heard a story about a person who downloaded a digital file (e.g., an e-book that she did not own) onto her personal computer (digital) versus a person who put a physical item (e.g., a book that she did not own) into her bag (physical). Participants were asked to evaluate how okay each behavior is. We found that from 5 years of age children evaluated taking a physical object more negatively than downloading a digital file, which was also the pattern observed in adults. Furthermore, by 9 years of age children were equivalent to adults in their evaluation of downloading digital files. The current study has implications for the development of ownership in children.

Women Versus Females: Gender Essentialism in Everyday Language

How do different words referring to gender/sex categories reflect and/or shape our understanding of gender/sex concepts? The current study examined this issue by assessing how individuals use gender/sex terms (females, males, women, men). Participants recruited through MTurk (N = 299) completed an online survey, rating the terms on nine dimensions, completing a fill-in-the-blank task, and reporting gender essentialist beliefs. Overall, participants rated the words females/males as more biological and technical, and women/men as higher on all other dimensions (e.g., appropriate, polite, warm). Preference for females/males correlated positively with gender essentialism among women. These findings suggest that use of certain gendered terms is linked to how people conceptualize gender/sex. Future research should further explore the relation between choice of gendered terms, how language choice reflects and shapes attitudes and beliefs about gender/sex, and factors (e.g., race) that may influence this relation.

Formal explanations shape children's representations of animal kinds and social groups

In certain domains, people represent some of an individual's properties (e.g., a tiger's ferocity), but not others (e.g., a tiger's being in the zoo), as stemming from the assumed "essence" of the individual's category. How do children identify which properties of an individual are essentialized and which are not? Here, we examine whether formal explanations-that is, explanations that appeal to category membership (e.g., "That's ferocious because it's a tiger")-help children to identify which properties are essentialized. We investigated this question in two domains: animal kinds (Study 1) and social categories (specifically, gender; Studies 2 and 3). Across studies, we introduced children to novel behaviors and preferences of individuals using either a formal explanation or closely matched wording that did not express a formal explanation. To measure the extent to which children essentialized the novel properties, we assessed their inferences about the stability, innateness, and generalizability of these properties. In Study 1 (N = 104; 61 girls, 43 boys; predominantly White and multiracial children from high-income backgrounds), we found that formal explanations led 5- and 6-year-old children to view novel properties of individual animals as more stable across time. In Studies 2 and 3 (total N = 163; 84 girls, 79 boys; predominantly White, Asian, and multiracial children from high-income backgrounds), we found that formal explanations led 6-year-olds, but not 5-year-olds, to view novel properties of individual girls and boys as more stable across contexts. These studies highlight an important mechanism by which formal explanations guide conceptual development. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Scientific and Folk Theories of Viral Transmission: A Comparison of COVID-19 and the Common Cold

Disease transmission is a fruitful domain in which to examine how scientific and folk theories interrelate, given laypeople’s access to multiple sources of information to explain events of personal significance. The current paper reports an in-depth survey of U.S. adults’ (N = 238) causal reasoning about two viral illnesses: a novel, deadly disease that has massively disrupted everyone’s lives (COVID-19), and a familiar, innocuous disease that has essentially no serious consequences (the common cold). Participants received a series of closed-ended and open-ended questions probing their reasoning about disease transmission, with a focus on causal mechanisms underlying disease contraction, transmission, treatment, and prevention; non-visible (internal) biological processes; and ontological frameworks regarding what kinds of entities viruses are. We also assessed participants’ attitudes, such as their trust in scientific experts and willingness to be vaccinated. Results indicated complexity in people’s reasoning, consistent with the co-existence of multiple explanatory frameworks. An understanding of viral transmission and viral replication existed alongside folk theories, placeholder beliefs, and lack of differentiation between viral and non-viral disease. For example, roughly 40% of participants who explained illness in terms of the transmission of viruses also endorsed a non-viral folk theory, such as exposure to cold weather or special foods as curative. Additionally, participants made use of competing modes of construal (biological, mechanical, and psychological) when explaining how viruses operate, such as framing the immune system response (biological) as cells trying to fight off the virus (psychological). Indeed, participants who displayed greater knowledge about viral transmission were significantly more likely to anthropomorphize bodily processes. Although comparisons of COVID-19 and the common cold revealed relatively few differences, the latter, more familiar disease elicited consistently lower levels of accuracy and greater reliance on folk theories. Moreover, for COVID-19 in particular, accuracy positively correlated with attitudes (trusting medical scientists and taking the disease more seriously), self-protective behaviors (such as social distancing and mask-wearing), and willingness to be vaccinated. For both diseases, self-assessed knowledge about the disease negatively predicted accuracy. The results are discussed in relation to challenges for formal models of explanatory reasoning.

Children expect others to prefer handmade items

Although children frequently engage in creative activities (in which they make foods and objects by hand), the development and scope of children's thinking about handmade items is largely unexplored. In the present studies, we examined whether 4- to 12-year-old children at a local children's museum (54% girls, 46% boys; 51% White, 11% Asian/Asian American, 10% more than 1 group, 4% Latinx, 3% Black/African American, 18% did not report race/ethnicity) would expect other people to prefer handmade over factory-made items, including foods and nonfoods. In Experiments 1 (n = 124) and 2 (n = 122), participants expected a child character to prefer items the character made themselves and items made by the character's parent or a local person. However, this expectation did not persist at all costs: When considering imperfect handmade items in Experiment 3 (n = 122), children demonstrated a handmade preference when considering nonfoods made by a parent but demonstrated a factory-made preference when considering foods made by a parent. Children's explanations were associated with their choices: When children's explanations referred to emotions or relationships, they were more likely to select handmade items. When children referred to item features, they were more likely to select factory-made items. Across studies, we observed persistent age and gender effects: Children's handmade preference increased with child age and girls demonstrated a more robust handmade preference than boys. These findings highlight children's developing and nuanced reasoning about object value. At an early age, children consider who made an object as a contributor to its value. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Social constructionist and essentialist beliefs about gender and race

Social constructionist beliefs posit that sociocultural forces shape power-stratified social categories, whereas essentialist beliefs posit that social categories are defined by an immutable, natural essence shared by category members. Across three studies, we developed and validated the Social Constructionist and Essentialist Beliefs Scale (SCEBS) to assess the latent structure of ontological beliefs about two social categories: gender and race. In Study 1 ( N = 598), we found a three-factor structure for SCEBS-Gender and SCEBS-Race, consisting of Social Constructionism, Essentialism, and Realism. In Study 2a ( N = 300), we examined factor structure stability and criterion-related validity. We found incremental validity of SCEBS, and social constructionist beliefs particularly, for predicting modern sexism and symbolic racism beyond extant, essentialism-focused measures. In Study 2b ( N = 218), we established 4-week test–retest reliability of SCEBS. Our research demonstrates the value of assessing both social constructionist and essentialist beliefs in the study of prejudice.

Beyond Black and White: Conceptualizing and essentializing Black-White identity

OBJECTIVE

Psychological research suggests that Black-White individuals are often conceptualized as Black and White, and that essentialist beliefs about race are negatively associated with conceptualizing Black-White individuals as such. The present research examined what people think it means to be Black and White (e.g., a mixture of Black and White vs. completely Black and completely White) and whether essentialism is indeed negatively associated with such concepts.

METHOD

We used multiple methodologies (e.g., surveys, open-ended explanations, experimental manipulations) to examine how Black, White, and Black-White perceivers conceptualized Black-White individuals (Studies 1-3) and the extent to which essentialist beliefs, both dispositional (Studies 2-3) and experimentally induced (Study 4), predicted those concepts.

RESULTS

We find that U.S. Black-White individuals most often conceptualized "Black and White" to mean a mixture of Black and White (Study 1), as did U.S. White individuals and U.S. Black individuals (Studies 2 and 3), and that racial essentialism-both dispositional (Studies 2 and 3) and experimentally manipulated (Study 4)-was positively associated with this conception.

CONCLUSION

Our data shed new light on the complexity of race concepts and essentialism and advance the psychological understanding of Black-White identity. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

To Give or to Receive? The Role of Giver Versus Receiver on Object Tracking and Object Preferences in Children and Adults

For adults, ownership is a concept that rests on principles and connections that apply broadly – whether the owner is the self or someone else, and whether the self is giver or receiver. The present studies tested whether preschool children likewise treat ownership in this abstract fashion. In Experiment 1, 20 children and 24 adults were assigned to be either “givers” or “receivers.” They were then asked to identify which items they and the researcher owned. In Experiment 2, 20 children and 24 adults were asked which items they and the experimenter liked best. In both experiments, participants’ judgments were not influenced by their role (giver vs. receiver), but were more adult-like when reasoning about self-owned than other-owned objects. These data suggest that intuitions about property ownership are initially egocentric – biased toward linking objects to one’s self – and then extend to others over the course of development.

A Slippery Myth: How Learning Style Beliefs Shape Reasoning about Multimodal Instruction and Related Scientific Evidence

The learning style myth is a commonly held myth that matching instruction to a student's "learning style" will result in improved learning, while providing mismatched instruction will result in suboptimal learning. The present study used a short online reasoning exercise about the efficacy of multimodal instruction to investigate the nature of learning styles beliefs. We aimed to: understand how learning style beliefs interact with beliefs about multimodal learning; characterize the potential complexity of learning style beliefs and understand how this short exercise might influence endorsements of learning styles. Many participants who believed in the learning style myth supported the efficacy of multimodal learning, and many were willing to revise their belief in the myth after the exercise. Personal experiences and worldviews were commonly cited as reasons for maintaining beliefs in learning styles. Findings reveal the complexity of learning style beliefs, and how they interact with evidence in previously undocumented ways.

What we would (but shouldn't) do for those we love: Universalism versus partiality in responding to others' moral transgressions

Recent work indicates that people are more likely to protect a close (vs. distant) other who commits a crime. But do people think it is morally right to treat close others differently? On the one hand, universalist moral principles dictate that people should be treated equally. On the other hand, close relationships are the source of special moral obligations, which may lead people to believe they ought to preferentially protect close others. Here we attempt to adjudicate between these competing considerations by examining what people think they would and should do when a close (vs. distant) other behaves immorally. Across four experiments (N = 2002), we show that people believe they morally should protect close others more than distant others. However, we also document a striking discrepancy: participants reported that they would protect close others far more than they should protect them. These findings demonstrate that people believe close relationships influence what they morally ought to do-but also that moral decisions about close others may be a context in which people are particularly likely to fail to do what they think is morally right.

Growth mindset and academic outcomes: a comparison of US and Chinese students

Chinese students are more likely than US students to hold a malleable view of success in school, yet are more likely to hold fixed mindsets about intelligence. We demonstrate that this apparently contradictory pattern of cross-cultural differences holds true across multiple samples and is related to how students conceptualize intelligence and its relationship with academic achievement. Study 1 (N > 15,000) confirmed that US students endorsed more growth mindsets than Chinese students. Importantly, US students' mathematics grades were positively related to growth mindsets with a medium-to-large effect, but for Chinese students, this association was slightly negative. Study 2 conceptually replicated Study 1 findings with US and Chinese college samples, and further discovered that cross-cultural differences in intelligence mindset beliefs corresponded to how students defined intelligence. Together, these studies demonstrated systematic cross-cultural differences in intelligence mindset and suggest that intelligence mindsets are not necessarily associated with academic motivation or success in the same way across cultures.

The Roles of Privacy and Trust in Children's Evaluations and Explanations of Digital Tracking

A "digital revolution" has introduced new privacy violations concerning access to information stored on electronic devices. The present two studies assessed how U.S. children ages 5-17 and adults (N = 416; 55% female; 67% white) evaluated those accessing digital information belonging to someone else, either location data (Study 1) or digital photos (Study 2). The trustworthiness of the tracker (Studies 1 and 2) and the privacy of the information (Study 2) were manipulated. At all ages, evaluations were more negative when the tracker was less trustworthy, and when information was private. However, younger children were substantially more positive overall about digital tracking than older participants. These results, yielding primarily medium-to-large effect sizes, suggest that with age, children increasingly appreciate digital privacy considerations.

Transgender and cisgender children's essentialist beliefs about sex and gender identity

Children essentialize gender from a young age, viewing it as inborn, biologically based, unchanging, and predictive of preferences and behaviors. Children's gender essentialism appears to be so pervasive that it is found within conservative and liberal communities, and among transgender and cisgender children. However, it remains unclear what aspect of gender the children participating in past studies essentialized. Such studies used labels such as "girl" or "boy" without clarifying how children (or researchers) interpreted them. Are they indicators of the target's biological categorization at birth (sex), the target's sense of their own gender (gender identity), or some third possible interpretation? This distinction becomes particularly relevant when transgender children are concerned, as their sex assigned at birth and gender identity are not aligned. In the present two studies, we discovered that 6- to 11-year-old transgender children, their cisgender siblings, and unrelated cisgender children, all essentialized both sex and gender identity. Moreover, transgender and cisgender children did not differ in their essentialism of sex (i.e., whether body parts would remain stable over time). Importantly, however, transgender children were less likely than unrelated cisgender children to essentialize when hearing an ambiguous gender/sex label ("girl" or "boy"). Finally, the two studies showed mixed findings on whether the participant groups differed in reasoning about the stability of a gender-nonconforming target's gender identity. These findings illustrate that a child's identity can relate to their conceptual development, as well as the importance of diversifying samples to enhance our understanding of social cognitive development.

A Dollar Is a Dollar Is a Dollar, or Is It? Insights From Children's Reasoning About "Dirty Money"

Money can take many forms-a coin or a bill, a payment for an automobile or a prize for an award, a piece from the 1989 series or the 2019 series, and so on-but despite this, money is designed to represent an amount and only that. Thus, a dollar is a dollar, in the sense that money is fungible. But when adults ordinarily think about money, they think about it in terms of its source, and in particular, its moral source (e.g., dirty money). Here we investigate the development of the belief that money carries traces of its moral history. We study children ages 5-6 and 8-9, who are sensitive to both object history and morality, and thus possess the component pieces needed to think that a dollar may not be like any other. Across three principal studies (and three additional studies in Appendix S1; N = 327; 219 five- and six-year-olds; 108 eight- and nine-year-olds), we find that children are less likely to want money with negative moral history, a pattern that was stronger and more consistent among 8- and 9-year-olds than 5- and 6-year-olds. These findings highlight pressing directions for future research that could help shed light on the mechanisms that contribute to the belief that money carries traces of its moral history.

Perceptions of the malleability of fluid and crystallized intelligence

There is significant variation in lay people's beliefs about the nature of intelligence: Some believe that intelligence is relatively fixed and innate, whereas others view intelligence as more malleable and affected by experience. However, most studies in this domain do not explicitly define intelligence when probing about beliefs about intelligence and aptitude. Thus, variation in beliefs may reflect variation in how intelligence is defined. To address this issue, we conducted 3 studies examining individuals' beliefs about fluid versus crystallized intelligence. Study 1 used a modified version of Dweck's (1999) mindset questionnaire and found that people have more fixed views about fluid intelligence than either crystallized intelligence or intelligence in general. Study 2 used a switched-at-birth paradigm and found that individuals hold more essentialist beliefs about fluid intelligence than crystallized intelligence. Study 3 added a survey that probed participants' beliefs about mathematics achievement. It found that when reasoning about mathematics achievements, participants' attributions of ability and effort were differentially associated with their crystallized and fluid mindset beliefs. Specifically, mindsets of fluid intelligence were more associated with effort for professional-level mathematics achievements, whereas mindsets of crystallized intelligence were more associated with elementary-level mathematics achievements. Together, the present studies highlight the importance of considering the definition of intelligence when assessing related beliefs about malleability, inheritance, and achievement. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Should Individuals Think Like Their Group? A Descriptive-to-Prescriptive Tendency Toward Group-Based Beliefs

Across three pre-registered studies with children (ages 4-9) and adults (N = 303), we examined whether how a group is predicted evaluations of how group members should be (i.e., a descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency), under conditions in which the descriptive group norms entailed beliefs that were fact-based (Study 1), opinion-based (Study 2), and ideology-based (Study 3). Overall, participants tended to disapprove of individuals with beliefs that differed from their group, but the extent of this tendency varied across development and as a function of the belief under consideration (e.g., younger children did not show a descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency in the context of facts and ideologies, suggesting that they prioritized truth over group norms). Implications for normative reasoning and ideological polarization are discussed.

The development of children's identification of foreigner talk

Although children's use of speech registers such as Baby Talk is well documented, little is known about their understanding of Foreigner Talk, a register addressed to non-native speakers. In Study 1, 4- to 8-year-old children and adults (N = 125) heard 4 registers (Foreigner Talk, Baby Talk, Peer Talk, and Teacher Talk) and predicted who would receive each. By 5 years, children selected the target addressee of Foreigner Talk above chance. In Study 2, 5- to 8-year-old children and adults (N = 94) completed a register match task manipulating 3 addressee cues: language, appearance, and origin. Prior to 7-8 years of age, children did not use the language cue alone when identifying the addressee of Foreigner Talk, and at no age did children use one cue more than another. In contrast, adults made use of language and appearance more than the origin cue. These findings suggest that an understanding of Foreigner Talk emerges by school age yet also undergoes developmental change. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Beliefs About the Persistence of History in Objects and Spaces in the United States and India

Scattered evidence in the literature suggests that people may believe that non-visible traces of past events (e.g., origins, emotions, and qualities of the owner) persist over time in objects and spaces, even after the original source has been removed. To date, however, there has been no unified treatment to determine the scope and cultural consistency of this expectation. This study had four primary goals: (a) to assess how broadly participants display persistence-of-history beliefs, (b) to explore individual differences in these beliefs, (c) to examine the explanatory frameworks for these beliefs, and (d) to determine whether these beliefs were endorsed across two cultural settings. Adults in both United States ( N = 195) and India ( N = 173) evaluated a broad range of situations involving possible persistence of history. In both countries, three patterns emerged: (a) A broad range of persistence-of-history scenarios were judged to be possible, falling into two underlying thematic clusters (supernatural vs. non-supernatural); (b) paranormal beliefs predicted endorsement of items in both thematic clusters; and yet (c) most scenarios were explained using natural explanatory frameworks. Together, these results demonstrate broad endorsement of the persistence of history—across cultures, situations, and individuals—as well as substantial individual variation.

Children's implicit food cognition: Developing a food Implicit Association Test

Assessing children's reasoning about food, including their health knowledge and their food preferences, is an important step toward understanding how health messages may influence children's food choices. However, in many studies, assessing children's reasoning relies on parent report or could be susceptible to social pressure from adults. To address these limitations, the present study describes the development of a food version of the Implicit Association Test (IAT). The IAT has been used to examine children's implicit stereotypes about social groups, yet few studies have used the IAT in other domains (such as food cognition). Four- to 12-year-olds (n = 123) completed the food IAT and an explicit card sort task, in which children assessed foods based on their perception of the food's healthfulness (healthy vs. unhealthy) and palatability (yummy vs. yucky). Surprisingly, children demonstrated positive implicit associations towards vegetables. This pattern may reflect children's health knowledge, given that the accuracy of children's healthfulness ratings in the card sort task positively predicted children's food IAT d-scores. Implications for both food cognition and the IAT are discussed.

Children's beliefs about causes of human characteristics: Genes, environment, or choice?

To what extent do our genes make us nice, smart, or athletic? The explanatory frameworks we employ have broad consequences for how we evaluate and interact with others. Yet to date, little is known regarding when and how young children appeal to genetic explanations to understand human difference. The current study examined children's (aged 7-13 years) and adults' explanations for a set of human characteristics, contrasting genetic attributions with environmental and choice-based attributions. Whereas most adults and older children offered an unprompted genetic explanation at least once on an open-ended task, such explanations were not seen from younger children. However, even younger children, once trained on the mechanism of genes, endorsed genetic explanations for a range of characteristics-often in combination with environment and choice. Moreover, only adults favored genetic explanations for intelligence and athleticism; children, in contrast, favored environment and choice explanations for these characteristics. These findings suggest that children can employ genetic explanations in principled ways as early as 7 years of age but also that such explanations are used to account for a wider range of features by adults. Our study provides some of the first evidence regarding the ways in which genetic attributions emerge and change starting in early childhood. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Iconic realism or representational blindness? How young children and adults reason about pictures and objects

When reasoning about a representation (e.g., a toy lion), children often engage in "iconic realism," whereby representations are reported to have properties of their real-life referents. The present studies examined an inverse difficulty that we dub "representational blindness": overlooking (i.e., being 'blind' to) a representation's objective, non-symbolic features. In three experiments (N = 302), children (3-6 years) and adults saw a series of representations (pictures and toys) and were tested on how often they endorsed a property that was true of the real-world referent (e.g., reporting that a toy lion is dangerous; iconic realism) or rejected a property that was true of the representation (e.g., denying that a toy elephant can be lifted with one hand; representational blindness). We found that representational blindness and realism were separable tendencies. Children (and to a lesser extent, adults) displayed both, but at different rates for pictures than for toys. We conclude that children's reasoning about representations includes a bias to overlook the features of the representation itself. Further, although pictures and toys are both representations, they provoke ontologically distinct interpretations. We discuss the implications of these results for a variety of important conceptual tasks, including learning to read, draw, or objectively evaluate scientific evidence.

Eleanor Emmons Maccoby (1917-2018)

This article memorializes Eleanor Emmons Maccoby (1917-2018). Maccoby was a world-renowned scholar of child development, sex differences, and socialization. She tackled the complex question of how children develop with methodological precision and scientific rigor. Her commitment to improving the lives of children underscored not only her research but also her extensive national and international service. Her landmark 1974 book with Carol Jacklin, The Psychology of Sex Differences, revolutionized how we understand "male" and "female." She was a trailblazer for women in academia and an inspiration to those who knew her. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Generic language in scientific communication

Scientific communication poses a challenge: To clearly highlight key conclusions and implications while fully acknowledging the limitations of the evidence. Although these goals are in principle compatible, the goal of conveying complex and variable data may compete with reporting results in a digestible form that fits (increasingly) limited publication formats. As a result, authors' choices may favor clarity over complexity. For example, generic language (e.g., "Introverts and extraverts require different learning environments") may mislead by implying general, timeless conclusions while glossing over exceptions and variability. Using generic language is especially problematic if authors overgeneralize from small or unrepresentative samples (e.g., exclusively Western, middle-class). We present 4 studies examining the use and implications of generic language in psychology research articles. Study 1, a text analysis of 1,149 psychology articles published in 11 journals in 2015 and 2016, examined the use of generics in titles, research highlights, and abstracts. We found that generics were ubiquitously used to convey results (89% of articles included at least 1 generic), despite that most articles made no mention of sample demographics. Generics appeared more frequently in shorter units of the paper (i.e., highlights more than abstracts), and generics were not associated with sample size. Studies 2 to 4 (n = 1,578) found that readers judged results expressed with generic language to be more important and generalizable than findings expressed with nongeneric language. We highlight potential unintended consequences of language choice in scientific communication, as well as what these choices reveal about how scientists think about their data.

Linguistic Shifts: A Relatively Effortless Route to Emotion Regulation?

Prior research indicates that psychological distance facilitates emotion regulation. Here, we propose that the ability to transcend one’s immersed perspective may be hidden in plain sight, within the very structure of language. We review evidence regarding two linguistic mechanisms, distanced self-talk and generic “you,” that promote emotion regulation by allowing speakers to shift from an immersed to a more distanced perspective through the words they use to reflect on the self (e.g., shifting from “I” to their own name or other non-first-person-singular pronouns). We conclude by suggesting that these linguistic shifts occur relatively seamlessly and thus may provide a less effortful route to emotion regulation.

Bilingual effects on lexical selection: A neurodevelopmental perspective

When a listener hears a word, multiple lexical items may come to mind; for instance, /kæn/ may activate concepts with similar phonological onsets such as candy and candle. Acquisition of two lexicons may increase such linguistic competition. Using functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy neuroimaging, we investigate whether bilingualism impacts word processing in the child's brain. Bilingual and monolingual children (N = 52; ages 7-10) completed a lexical selection task in English, where participants adjudicated phonological competitors (e.g., car/cat vs. car/pen). Children were less accurate and responded more slowly during competing than non-competing items. In doing so, children engaged top-down fronto-parietal regions associated with cognitive control. In comparison to bilinguals, monolinguals showed greater activity in left frontal regions, a difference possibly due to bilinguals' adaptation for dual-lexicons. These differences provide insight to theories aiming to explain the role of experience on children's emerging neural networks for lexical selection and language processing.

The Roles of Group Status and Group Membership in the Practice of Hypodescent

Hypodescent emerged in U.S. history to reinforce racial hierarchy. Research suggests that among contemporary U.S. adults, hypodescent continues to shape social perception. Among U.S. children, however, hypodescent is less likely to be endorsed. Here, we tested for hypodescent by introducing U.S. children (ages 4-9) and adults (N = 273) to hierarchically ordered novel groups (one was high status and another was low status) and then to a child who had one parent from each group. In Study 1, we presented the groups in a third-party context. In Study 2, we randomly assigned participants to the high-status or the low-status group. Across both studies, participants did not reliably endorse hypodescent, raising questions as to what elicits this practice.