The powers and pitfalls of payment for performance

A new look at physicians' responses to financial incentives: Quality of care, practice characteristics, and motivations

There is considerable controversy about what causes (in)effectiveness of physician performance pay in improving the quality of care. Using a behavioral experiment with German primary-care physicians, we study the incentive effect of performance pay on service provision and quality of care. To explore whether variations in quality are based on the incentive scheme and the interplay with physicians' real-world profit orientation and patient-regarding motivations, we link administrative data on practice characteristics and survey data on physicians' attitudes with experimental data. We find that, under performance pay, quality increases by about 7pp compared to baseline capitation. While the effect increases with the severity of illness, the bonus level does not significantly affect the quality of care. Data linkage indicates that primary-care physicians in high-profit practices provide a lower quality of care. Physicians' other-regarding motivations and attitudes are significant drivers of high treatment quality.

Comparison of pay-for-performance (P4P) programs in primary care of selected countries: a comparative study

BACKGROUND

Pay for performance (P4P) schemes provide financial incentives or facilities to health workers based on the achievement of predetermined performance goals. Various P4P programs have been implemented around the world. There is a question of which model is suitable for p4p implementation to achieve better results. The purpose of this study is to compare pay for performance models in different countries.

METHODS

This is a descriptive-comparative study comparing the P4P model in selected countries in 2022. Data for each country are collected from reliable databases and are tabulated to compare their payment models. the standard framework of the P4P model is used for data analysis.

RESULTS

we used the standard P4P model framework to compare pay for performance programs in the primary care sector of selected countries because this framework can demonstrate all the necessary features of payment programs, including performance domains and measures, basis for reward or penalty, nature of the reward or penalty, and data reporting. The results of this study show that although the principles of P4P are almost similar in the selected countries, the biggest difference is in the definition of performance domains and measures.

CONCLUSIONS

Designing an effective P4P program is very complex, and its success depends on a variety of factors, from the socioeconomic and cultural context and the healthcare goals of governments to the personal characteristics of the healthcare provider. considering these factors and the general framework of the features of P4P programs are critical to the success of the p4p design and implementation.

Does performance-based remuneration improve outcomes in the treatment of hip fracture?

Aims

The aim of this study was to determine whether national standards of best practice are associated with improved health-related quality of life (HRQoL) outcomes in hip fracture patients.

Methods

This was a multicentre cohort study conducted in 20 acute UK NHS hospitals treating hip fracture patients. Patients aged ≥ 60 years treated operatively for a hip fracture were eligible for inclusion. Regression models were fitted to each of the “Best Practice Tariff” indicators and overall attainment. The impact of attainment on HRQoL was assessed by quantifying improvement in EuroQol five-dimension five-level questionnaire (EQ-5D-5L) from estimated regression model coefficients.

Results

A total of 6,532 patients provided both baseline and four-month EQ-5D-5L, of whom 1,060 participants had died at follow-up. Best practice was achieved in the care of 57% of participants; there was no difference in age, cognitive ability, and mobility at baseline for the overall attainment and non-attainment groups. Attaining at least ‘joint care by surgeon and orthogeriatrician’, ‘delirium assessment’, and ‘falls assessment’ was associated with a large, clinically relevant increase in four months EQ-5D-5L of 0.094 (bootstrapped 95% confidence interval (CI) 0.046 to 0.146).

Conclusion

National standards with enhanced remuneration in hip fracture care results in improvement in individual patients’ HRQoL.

Cite this article: Bone Joint J 2021;103-B(5):881–887.

What theories underpin performance-based financing? A scoping review

PURPOSE

The study aims to explore the theoretical bases justifying the use of performance-based financing (PBF) in the health sector in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs).

DESIGN/METHODOLOGY/APPROACH

The authors conducted a scoping review of the literature on PBF so as to identify the theories utilized to underpin it and analyzed its theoretical justifications.

FINDINGS

Sixty-four studies met the inclusion criteria. Economic theories were predominant, with the principal-agent theory being the most commonly-used theory, explicitly referred to by two-thirds of included studies. Psychological theories were also common, with a wide array of motivation theories. Other disciplines in the form of management or organizational science, political and social science and systems approaches also contributed. However, some of the theories referred to contradicted each other. Many of the studies included only casually alluded to one or more theories, and very few used these theories to justify or support PBF. No theory emerged as a dominant, consistent and credible justification of PBF, perhaps except for the principal-agent theory, which was often inappropriately applied in the included studies, and when it included additional assumptions reflecting the contexts of the health sector in LMICs, might actually warn against adopting PBF.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

Overall, this review has not been able to identify a comprehensive, credible, consistent, theoretical justification for using PBF rather than alternative approaches to health system reforms and healthcare providers' motivation in LMICs.

ORIGINALITY/VALUE

The theoretical justifications of PBF in the health sector in LMICs are under-documented. This review is the first of this kind and should encourage further debate and theoretical exploration of the justifications of PBF.

Pay for performance for specialised care in England: Strengths and weaknesses

Pay-for-Performance (P4P) schemes have become increasingly common internationally, yet evidence of their effectiveness remains ambiguous. P4P has been widely used in England for over a decade both in primary and secondary care. A prominent P4P programme in secondary care is the Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) framework. The most recent addition to this framework is Prescribed Specialised Services (PSS) CQUIN, introduced into the NHS in England in 2013. This study offers a review and critique of the PSS CQUIN scheme for specialised care. A key feature of PSS CQUIN is that whilst it is centrally developed, performance targets are agreed locally. This means that there is variation across providers in the schemes selected from the national menu, the achievement level needed to earn payment, and the proportion of the overall payment attached to each scheme. Specific schemes vary in terms of what is incentivised - structure, process and/or outcome - and how they are incentivised. Centralised versus decentralised decision making, the nature of the performance measures, the tiered payment structure and the dynamic nature of the schemes have created a sophisticated but complex P4P programme which requires evaluation to understand the effect of such incentives on specialised care.

Pay for performance and hip fracture outcomes: an interrupted time series and difference-in-differences analysis in England and Scotland

Aims

Hip fractures are associated with high morbidity, mortality, and costs. One strategy for improving outcomes is to incentivize hospitals to provide better quality of care. We aimed to determine whether a pay-for-performance initiative affected hip fracture outcomes in England by using Scotland, which did not participate in the scheme, as a control.

Materials and Methods

We undertook an interrupted time series study with data from all patients aged more than 60 years with a hip fracture in England (2000 to 2018) using the Hospital Episode Statistics Admitted Patient Care (HES APC) data set linked to national death registrations. Difference-in-differences (DID) analysis incorporating equivalent data from the Scottish Morbidity Record was used to control for secular trends. The outcomes were 30-day and 365-day mortality, 30-day re-admission, time to operation, and acute length of stay.

Results

There were 1 037 860 patients with a hip fracture in England and 116 594 in Scotland. Both 30-day (DID -1.7%; 95% confidence interval (CI) -2.0 to -1.2) and 365-day (-1.9%; 95% CI -2.5 to -1.3) mortality fell in England post-intervention when compared with outcomes in Scotland. There were 7600 fewer deaths between 2010 and 2016 that could be attributed to interventions driven by pay-for-performance. A pre-existing annual trend towards increased 30-day re-admissions in England was halted post-intervention. Significant reductions were observed in the time to operation and length of stay.

Conclusion

This study provides evidence that a pay-for-performance programme improved the outcomes after a hip fracture in England.

Cite this article: Bone Joint J 2019;101-B:1015–1023.

A reporting framework for describing and a typology for categorizing and analyzing the designs of health care pay for performance schemes

Background

Pay for Performance (P4P) has increasingly being adopted in different countries as a provider payment mechanism to improve health system performance. Evaluations of pay for performance (P4P) schemes across several countries show significant variation in effectiveness, which may be explained by differences in design. There is however no reliable framework to structure the reporting of the design or a typology to help analyse and interpret results of P4P schemes. This paper reports the development of a reporting framework and a typology of P4P schemes.

Methods

P4P design features were identified from literature and then explored using relevant theories from behavioural and economic science. These design features were then combined with the help of multidimensional tables to produce a reporting framework and a typology which was tested using 74 P4P studies. The inter-rater reliability of the typology was assessed using Fleiss’ Kappa.

Results

A Healthcare Incentive Scheme Reporting Framework (HISReF) was developed consisting of nine design features. This was collapsed into a typology consisting of 4 items/design features. There was good inter-rater reliability on all the four items on the typology (kappa > 0.7).

Conclusion

The HISReF provides an important first step towards establishing a common language in which intervention designers can clearly specify the content of P4P designs. Our typology may be used to aid evidence synthesis and interpretation of results of P4P schemes.

Electronic supplementary material

The online version of this article (10.1186/s12913-018-3479-x) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Methods for the economic evaluation of changes to the organisation and delivery of health services: principal challenges and recommendations

There is a requirement for economic evaluation of health technologies seeking public funding across Europe. Changes to the organisation and delivery of health services, including changes to health policy, are not covered by such appraisals. These changes also have consequences for National Health Service (NHS) funds, yet undergo no mandatory cost-effectiveness assessment. The focus on health technologies may have occurred because larger-scale service changes pose more complex challenges to evaluators. This paper discusses the principal challenges faced when performing economic evaluations of changes to the organisation and delivery of health services and provides recommendations for overcoming them. The five principal challenges identified are as follows: undertakingex-anteevaluation; evaluating impacts in terms of quality-adjusted life years; assessing costs and opportunity costs; accounting for spillover effects; and generalisability. Of these challenges, methods for estimating the impact on costs and quality-adjusted life years are those most in need of development. Methods are available forex-anteevaluation, assessing opportunity costs and examining generalisability. However, these are rarely applied in practice. The general principles of assessing the cost-effectiveness of interventions should be applied to all NHS spending, not just that involving health technologies. Advancements in this area have the potential to improve the allocation of scarce NHS resources.

Payment incentives for community-based psychiatric care in Ontario, Canada

BACKGROUND

In September 2011, the government of Ontario implemented payment incentives to encourage the delivery of community-based psychiatric care to patients after discharge from a psychiatric hospital admission and to those with a recent suicide attempt. We evaluated whether these incentives affected supply of psychiatric services and access to care.

METHODS

We used administrative data to capture monthly observations for all psychiatrists who practised in Ontario between September 2009 and August 2014. We conducted interrupted time-series analyses of psychiatrist-level and patient-level data to evaluate whether the incentives affected the quantity of eligible outpatient services delivered and the likelihood of receiving follow-up care.

RESULTS

Among 1921 psychiatrists evaluated, implementation of the incentive payments was not associated with increased provision of follow-up visits after discharge from a psychiatric hospital admission (mean change in visits per month per psychiatrist 0.0099, 95% confidence interval [CI] -0.0989 to 0.1206; change in trend 0.0032, 95% CI -0.0035 to 0.0095) or after a suicide attempt (mean change -0.0910, 95% CI -0.1885 to 0.0026; change in trend 0.0102, 95% CI 0.0045 to 0.0159). There was also no change in the probability that patients received follow-up care after discharge (change in level -0.0079, 95% CI -0.0223 to 0.0061; change in trend 0.0007, 95% CI -0.0003 to 0.0016) or after a suicide attempt (change in level 0.0074, 95% CI -0.0094 to 0.0366; change in trend 0.0006, 95% CI -0.0007 to 0.0022).

INTERPRETATION

Our results suggest that implementation of the incentives did not increase access to follow-up care for patients after discharge from a psychiatric hospital admission or after a suicide attempt, and the incentives had no effect on supply of psychiatric services. Further research to guide design and implementation of more effective incentives is warranted.

Travelling models and the challenge of pragmatic contexts and practical norms: the case of maternal health

As in other areas of international development, we are witnessing the proliferation of ‘traveling models’ developed by international experts and introduced in an almost identical format across numerous countries to improve some aspect of maternal health systems in low- and middle-income countries. These policies and protocols are based on ‘miracle mechanisms’ that have been taken out of their original context but are believed to be intrinsically effective in light of their operational devices.

In reality, standardised interventions are, in Africa and elsewhere, confronted with pragmatic implementation contexts that are always varied and specific, and which lead to drifts, distortions, dismemberments and bypasses. The partogram, focused antenatal care, the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV or performance-based payment all illustrate these implementation gaps, often caused by the routine behaviour of health personnel who follow practical norms (and a professional culture) that are often distinct from official norms – as is the case with midwives.

Experiences in maternal and child health in Africa suggest that an alternative approach would be to start with the daily reality of social and practical norms instead of relying on models, and to promote innovations that emerge from within local health systems.

In Tanzania, the many costs of pay-for-performance leave open to debate whether the strategy is cost-effective

Pay-for-performance programs in health care are widespread in low- and middle-income countries. However, there are no studies of these programs' costs or cost-effectiveness. We conducted a cost-effectiveness analysis of a pay-for-performance pilot program in Tanzania and modeled costs of its national expansion. We reviewed project accounts and reports, interviewed key stakeholders, and derived outcomes from a controlled before-and-after study. In 2012 US dollars, the financial cost of the pay-for-performance pilot was $1.2 million, and the economic cost was $2.3 million. The incremental cost per additional facility-based birth ranged from $540 to $907 in the pilot and from $94 to $261 for a national program. In a low-income setting, the costs of managing the program and generating and verifying performance data were substantial. Pay-for-performance programs can stimulate the generation and use of health information by health workers and managers for strategic planning purposes, but the time involved could divert attention from service delivery. Pay-for-performance programs may become more cost-effective when integrated into routine systems over time.

Who to pay for performance? The choice of organisational level for hospital performance incentives

Financial incentives for quality improvement in hospital care [known as pay for performance (P4P)] can be directed to either the hospital level or redistributed to the department level. Theoretically, performance payments distributed to lower organisational levels are more effective in increasing performance than payments directed to the hospital level, but the empirical evidence for this expectation is scarce. This paper compares the performance of hospital departments at hospitals that do and do not redistribute performance payments to the department level. We study a Danish P4P scheme to provide patients with case managers. Applying difference in differences analysis, we estimate a 5 percentage points higher performance at hospital departments that are subject to a direct financial incentive. Our results suggest that payers can improve the effectiveness of P4P payments by distributing payments to the department level rather than the hospital level.

Measuring Healthcare Providers' Performances Within Managed Competition Using Multidimensional Quality and Cost Indicators

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

The Dutch healthcare system is in transition towards managed competition. In theory, a system of managed competition involves incentives for quality and efficiency of provided care. This is mainly because health insurers contract on behalf of their clients with healthcare providers on, potentially, quality and costs. The paper develops a strategy to comprehensively analyse available multidimensional data on quality and costs to assess and report on the relative performance of healthcare providers within managed competition.

DATA AND METHODS

We had access to individual information on 2409 clients of 19 Dutch diabetes care groups on a broad range of (outcome and process related) quality and cost indicators. We carried out a cost-consequences analysis and corrected for differences in case mix to reduce incentives for risk selection by healthcare providers.

RESULTS AND CONCLUSION

There is substantial heterogeneity between diabetes care groups' performances as measured using multidimensional indicators on quality and costs. Better quality diabetes care can be achieved with lower or higher costs. Routine monitoring using multidimensional data on quality and costs merged at the individual level would allow a systematic and comprehensive analysis of healthcare providers' performances within managed competition.

Risk adjustment in measurements of predicted mortality after myocardial infarction

BACKGROUND

In 2014, the government introduced elements of quality-based funding (pay-for-performance) for the hospital sector. Survival is included as a quality indicator. If such quality indicators are to be used for funding purposes, it must be established that the observed variations are caused by conditions that the hospital trusts are able to influence, and not by any underlying variables. The objective of this study was to investigate how the predicted mortality after myocardial infarction was influenced by various forms of risk adjustment.

MATERIAL AND METHOD

Data from the Norwegian Patient Register on 10,717 patients who had been discharged with the diagnosis of myocardial infarction in 2009 were linked to data on socioeconomic status, comorbidity, travel distances and mortality. The predicted 30-day mortality after myocardial infarction was analysed at the hospital-trust level, using three different models for risk adjustment.

RESULTS

Unadjusted 30-day mortality was highest in the catchment area of Førde Hospital Trust (12.5%) and lowest in Asker og Bærum (5.2%). Risk adjustment changed the estimates of mortality for many of the hospital trusts. In the model involving the most comprehensive risk adjustment, mortality was highest in the catchment area of Akershus University Hospital (10.9%) and lowest in the catchment areas of Sunnmøre Hospital Trust (5.2%) and Nordmøre og Romsdal Hospital Trust (5.2%).

INTERPRETATION

The variation in treatment quality between the hospital trusts, as measured by predicted mortality after myocardial infarction, is influenced by the methods used for risk adjustment. If the quality-based funding scheme is to continue, well-documented models for risk adjustment of the quality indicators need to be established.

Patients' views on pay for performance in France: a qualitative study in primary care

BACKGROUND

Pay for performance was implemented in 2009 in France. The system was optional at first and then became widespread. Since 2012, it has been standard for most GPs. Several studies have attempted to investigate its efficiency and the GP's opinion of the system, but few studies have yet to examine the patient's view.

AIM

To gain an understanding of the views of French family practice patients about pay for performance.

DESIGN AND SETTING

Forty patients were interviewed between March and July 2013 in the Île-de-France region, of France.

METHOD

A qualitative study using semi-structured individual interviews, in primary care.

RESULTS

Most of the patients did not know what pay for performance was and stated that they had not noticed any change in care since the system began. Some patients noted the possible benefits in the quality of care, such as an improvement in follow-up and prevention, better information provided by the GP, and a decrease in the volume of prescriptions and therefore health costs. Other patients were concerned about potential downsides, such as an overprescription of unnecessary medical treatments, an increase in health costs, patient selection, and standardised consultations that do not necessarily take into account the patient's individual concerns.

CONCLUSION

Since implementation of pay for performance, patients had not noticed any modification in their medical care. They could understand the need for change in the remuneration policy and expressed their agreement about performance-based remuneration if, and only if, it is not the cause of depersonalised health care.

A Critique of Grossman's Canonical Model of Health Capital

In the health economics literature, the demand for health and market health inputs is dominated by adaptations of Grossman's health capital model. The model has been widely used to explore a wide range of issues related to health, socioeconomic inequalities in health, demand for medical care, health preventions, occupational choice, and retirement decisions. The commodity of health is viewed as a durable capital stock that yields a flow of healthy time or illness-free time, that depreciates with age, and that can be augmented with the help of market health inputs and own time. The purpose of this article is to provide a comprehensive critical review of the model. Underlying Grossman's model are a faulty conceptual framework and assumptions that tend to exaggerate the degree of control consumers/patients may have over their state of health and survival. The assumption of full information about one's state of health and the efficacy of various health inputs abstracts away from the problems posed by the agency relationship under uncertainty and informational asymmetry. Grossman's individualistic and mechanistic view of health strips health capital and its production of much of their biological/physiological content and their interactions with the individual's social and physical environment.

A qualitative and quantitative evaluation of the Advancing Quality pay-for-performance programme in the NHS North West

Background

Advancing Quality (AQ) is a voluntary programme providing financial incentives for improvement in the quality of care provided to NHS patients in the north-west of England.

Objectives

(1) To identify the impact of AQ on key stakeholders and clinical practice; (2) to assess its cost-effectiveness; (3) to identify key factors that assist or impede its successful implementation; and (4) to provide lessons for the wider implementation of pay-for-performance schemes across the NHS.

Design

We tested whether or not the financial incentives of AQ had an impact on mortality using two methods: a between-region difference-in-differences analysis comparing the North West region and the rest of England for the incentivised and non-incentivised conditions and a triple-difference analysis comparing performance on the incentivised conditions, as well as the non-incentivised conditions, in the North West region and the rest of England. A cost-effectiveness analysis of AQ based on the first 18 months of the programme was also undertaken. We used interviews and observation to explore how and why changes occurred.

Results

Risk-adjusted mortality rates for all three of the conditions we studied (pneumonia, heart failure and myocardial infarction) decreased in both the North West region and the rest of England during the first 18 months of the scheme. The reduction in mortality for incentivised conditions was greater in the North West region than in the rest of England. Compared with non-incentivised conditions within the North West region, there was a significant reduction in overall mortality for incentivised conditions, comprising a statistically significant reduction in pneumonia and non-significant reductions in the other two conditions. Comparing mortality for the incentivised conditions with mortality for these conditions in other regions, there was a significant reduction in overall mortality in the North West region, again made up of individually significant reductions in pneumonia and non-significant reductions in the other two conditions. The reduction in mortality over the 18-month period studied for non-incentivised conditions was not significantly different between the North West region and the rest of England. The between-region difference-in-differences analysis after 42 months showed that risk-adjusted mortality for the incentivised conditions fell in the rest of England and the North West region. This reduction in the rest of England was significantly larger than in the North West region and was concentrated in pneumonia. However, the reductions in mortality were larger for the non-incentivised conditions in the North West region than in the rest of England between these periods. For incentivised conditions, the triple-difference analysis shows a larger reduction in mortality for the rest of England than in the North West region between the short- and long-term periods.

Conclusions

Based on the first 18 months, the AQ programme was a relatively effective and cost-effective intervention. However, findings at 42 months are open to interpretation. One interpretation is that the short-term improvements were not sustained and that the observed improvements in mortality in the non-incentivised conditions within hospitals participating in AQ were unrelated to the programme. An alternative interpretation is that these improvements are related to the positive spillover effect of AQ. Further research should be undertaken to determine the explanation for the findings.

Funding

The National Institute for Health Research Health Services and Delivery Research programme.

Effect of pay-for-outcomes and encouraging new providers on national health service smoking cessation services in England: a cluster controlled study

Background

Payment incentives are known to influence healthcare but little is known about the impact of paying directly for achieved outcomes. In England, novel purchasing (commissioning) of National Health Service (NHS) stop smoking services, which paid providers for quits achieved whilst encouraging new market entrants, was implemented in eight localities (primary care trusts (PCTs)) in April 2010. This study examines the impact of the novel commissioning on these services.

Methods

Accredited providers were paid standard tariffs for each smoker who was supported to quit for four and 12 weeks. A cluster-controlled study design was used with the eight intervention PCTs (representing 2,138,947 adult population) matched with a control group of all other (n=64) PCTs with similar demographics which did not implement the novel commissioning arrangements. The primary outcome measure was changes in quits at four weeks between April 2009 and March 2013. A secondary outcome measure was the number of new market entrants within the group of the largest two providers at PCT-level.

Results

The number of four-week quits per 1,000 adult population increased per year on average by 9.6% in the intervention PCTs compared to a decrease of 1.1% in the control PCTs (incident rate ratio 1∙108, p<0∙001, 95% CI 1∙059 to 1∙160). Eighty-five providers held ‘any qualified provider’ contracts for stop smoking services across the eight intervention PCTs in 2011/12, and 84% of the four-week quits were accounted for by the largest two providers at PCT-level. Three of these 10 providers were new market entrants. To the extent that the intervention incentivized providers to overstate quits in order to increase income, caution is appropriate when considering the findings.

Conclusions

Novel commissioning to incentivize achievement of specific clinical outcomes and attract new service providers can increase the effectiveness and supply of NHS stop smoking services.

Should English healthcare providers be penalised for failing to collect patient-reported outcome measures? A retrospective analysis

OBJECTIVE

The best practice tariff for hip and knee replacement in the English National Health Service (NHS) rewards providers based on improvements in patient-reported outcome measures (PROMs) collected before and after surgery. Providers only receive a bonus if at least 50% of their patients complete the preoperative questionnaire. We determined how many providers failed to meet this threshold prior to the policy introduction and assessed longitudinal stability of participation rates.

DESIGN

Retrospective observational study using data from Hospital Episode Statistics and the national PROM programme from April 2009 to March 2012. We calculated participation rates based on either (a) all PROM records or (b) only those that could be linked to inpatient records; constructed confidence intervals around rates to account for sampling variation; applied precision weighting to allow for volume; and applied risk adjustment.

SETTING

NHS hospitals and private providers in England.

PARTICIPANTS

NHS patients undergoing elective unilateral hip and knee replacement surgery.

MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES

Number of providers with participation rates statistically significantly below 50%.

RESULTS

Crude rates identified many providers that failed to achieve the 50% threshold but there were substantially fewer after adjusting for uncertainty and precision. While important, risk adjustment required restricting the analysis to linked data. Year-on-year correlation between provider participation rates was moderate.

CONCLUSIONS

Participation rates have improved over time and only a small number of providers now fall below the threshold, but administering preoperative questionnaires remains problematic in some providers. We recommend that participation rates are based on linked data and take into account sampling variation.

Impact of a pay for performance programme on French GPs' consultation length

BACKGROUND

In 2009, a voluntary-based pay for performance scheme targeting general practitioners (GPs) was introduced in France through the 'Contract for Improving Individual Practices' (CAPI).

OBJECTIVE

To study the impact of the CAPI on French GPs' consultation length.

METHODS

Univariate analysis, and multilevel regression analyses were performed to disentangle the different sources of the consultation length variability (intra and inter physician). The dependant variable was the logarithm of the consultation length. Independent variables included patient's sociodemographics as well as the characteristics of GPs and their medical activity.

RESULTS

Between November 2011 and April 2012, 128 physicians were recruited throughout France and generated 20,779 consultations timed by residents. The average consultation length in the sample was 16.8 min. After adjusting for patients' characteristics only, the consultation length of CAPI signatories was 14.1% lower than that observed for non signatories (p<0.001). After adjusting for GPs' characteristics and the case mix, the CAPI was no longer a significant predictor of the consultation length. The results did not change significantly from one type of consultation to another.

CONCLUSION

Although the CAPI was extended to all GPs in 2012, our results provide a cautionary message to regulators about its ability to generate higher quality of care.

The cost-effectiveness of using financial incentives to improve provider quality: a framework and application

Despite growing adoption of pay-for-performance (P4P) programmes in health care, there is remarkably little evidence on the cost-effectiveness of such schemes. We review the limited number of previous studies and critique the frameworks adopted and the narrow range of costs and outcomes considered, before proposing a new more comprehensive framework, which we apply to the first P4P scheme introduced for hospitals in England. We emphasise that evaluations of cost-effectiveness need to consider who the residual claimant is on any cost savings, the possibility of positive and negative spillovers, and whether performance improvement is a transitory or investment activity. Our application to the Advancing Quality initiative demonstrates that the incentive payments represented less than half of the £ 13 m total programme costs. By generating approximately 5200 quality-adjusted life years and £ 4.4 m of savings in reduced length of stay, we find that the programme was a cost-effective use of resources in its first 18 months.

Planning and Managing Health Systems

Health systems are complex organizations. They are often the largest single employer in a country, with expenditures of public and private money of 4–17 percent of gross domestic product. Overall and individual facility management requires mission statements, objectives, targets, budgets, activities planning, human interaction, services delivery, and quality assurance. Health organization involves a vast complex of stakeholders and participants, suppliers and purchasers, regulators and direct providers, and individual patients, and their decision-making. These include pyramidal and network organizations and ethical decision-making based on public interest, resource allocations, priority selection, and assurance of certain codes of law and ethical conduct. This chapter discusses how complex organizations work, with potential for application in health, and the motivations of workers and of the population being served. Organization theory helps in devising methods to integrate relevant factors to become more effective in defining and achieving goals and missions.

Association between value-based purchasing score and hospital characteristics

BACKGROUND

Medicare hospital Value-based purchasing (VBP) program that links Medicare payments to quality of care will become effective from 2013. It is unclear whether specific hospital characteristics are associated with a hospital's VBP score, and consequently incentive payments.The objective of the study was to assess the association of hospital characteristics with (i) the mean VBP score, and (ii) specific percentiles of the VBP score distribution. The secondary objective was to quantify the associations of hospital characteristics with the VBP score components: clinical process of care (CPC) score and patient satisfaction score.

METHODS

Observational analysis that used data from three sources: Medicare Hospital Compare Database, American Hospital Association 2010 Annual Survey and Medicare Impact File. The final study sample included 2,491 U.S. acute care hospitals eligible for the VBP program. The association of hospital characteristics with the mean VBP score and specific VBP score percentiles were assessed by ordinary least square (OLS) regression and quantile regression (QR), respectively.

RESULTS

VBP score had substantial variations, with mean score of 30 and 60 in the first and fourth quartiles of the VBP score distribution. For-profit status (vs. non-profit), smaller bed size (vs. 100-199 beds), East South Central region (vs. New England region) and the report of specific CPC measures (discharge instructions, timely provision of antibiotics and beta blockers, and serum glucose controls in cardiac surgery patients) were positively associated with mean VBP scores (p<0.01 in all). Total number of CPC measures reported, bed size of 400-499 (vs. 100-199 beds), a few geographic regions (Mid-Atlantic, West North Central, Mountain and Pacific) compared to the New England region were negatively associated with mean VBP score (p<0.01 in all). Disproportionate share index, proportion of Medicare and Medicaid days to total inpatient days had significant (p<0.01) but small effects. QR results indicate evidence of differential effects of some of the hospital characteristics across low-, medium- and high-quality providers.

CONCLUSIONS

Although hospitals serving the poor and the elderly are more likely to score lower under the VBP program, the correlation appears small. Profit status, geographic regions, number and type of CPC measures reported explain the most variation among scores.

Variation in use of dual-chamber implantable cardioverter-defibrillators: results from the national cardiovascular data registry

BACKGROUND

Among patients without an indication for a pacemaker, current evidence is inconclusive whether a dual-chamber implantable cardioverter-defibrillator (ICD) is superior to a single-chamber ICD. The current use of dual-chamber ICDs is not well characterized.

METHODS

We conducted a cross-sectional study exploring hospital-level variation in the use of dual-chamber ICDs across the United States. Patients receiving a primary prevention ICD from 2006 through 2009 without a documented indication for a pacemaker were included. Multivariate hierarchical logistic regression was used to explore patient, health care provider, and physician factors related to the use of a dual-chamber device.

RESULTS

Dual-chamber devices were implanted in 58% of the 87,115 patients without a pacing indication among 1293 hospitals, with hospital rates ranging from 0% in 33 centers to 100% in 109 centers. In multivariate analysis, geographic region was a strong independent predictor of dual-chamber device use, ranging from 36.4% in New England (reference region) to 66.4% in the Pacific region (odds ratio [OR], 5.25; 95% CI, 3.35-8.21). Hospital clustering was assessed using a median OR which was 3.96, meaning that 2 identical patients at different hospitals would have nearly a 4-fold difference in their chance of receiving a dual-chamber ICD.

CONCLUSIONS

Use of dual-chamber ICDs for the primary prevention of sudden cardiac death among patients without an indication for permanent pacing varies markedly at the hospital level in the United States. This is a clear example of how practice can vary independent of patient factors.