Object permanence in orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) and squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus)

Orangutan strategies for solving a visuospatial memory task

The popular game known as Concentration (also commonly referred to as Memory), in which players search for matching pairs among a grid of face-down cards, provides a robust platform for examining visuospatial memory in a simple and nonverbal way. Five orangutans (Pongo ssp.) at the Indianapolis Zoo were given a modified version of the Concentration Game in which three cards were shown face-down on a computer screen, two of which matched each other while the third was a foil. Subjects overturned two cards at a time by touching them, with trials terminating in a food reward if the overturned cards matched, or reverting to their face-down position if they did not. A constraint was experimentally imposed on the game whereby the first two cards touched would never match, resulting in an optimal strategy composed of touching the first two cards, followed by the third, followed by the card among the first two cards that matched the third. We aimed to measure the extent to which orangutans would memorize and utilize visuospatial cues to solve the task in the optimal manner. Findings showed that three of five subjects utilized an optimal strategy more often than would be expected by chance, but also over utilized specific patterns of choices instead of adjusting their strategies to minimize the overall number of card flips. Visuospatial recall played a role in several of the participants' strategies for completing the task, but not to an extent that was necessary to achieve optimal gameplay.

Horses' (Equus caballus) Ability to Solve Visible but Not Invisible Displacement Tasks Is Associated With Frustration Behavior and Heart Rate

Many frameworks have assessed the ultimate and ontogenetic underpinnings in the development of object permanence, but less is known about whether individual characteristics, such as sex or training level, as well as proximate factors, such as arousal or emotional state, affect performance in these tasks. The current study investigated horses’ performance in visible and invisible displacement tasks and assessed whether specific ontogenetic, behavioral, and physiological factors were associated with performance. The study included 39 Icelandic horses aged 2–25 years, of varying training levels. The horses were exposed to three tasks: (a) a choice test (n = 37), (b) a visible displacement task (n = 35), and (c) an invisible displacement task (n = 31). 27 horses in the choice test, and 8 horses in the visible displacement task, performed significantly better than expected by chance, while none did so in the invisible displacement task. This was also reflected in their group performance, where horses performed above chance level in the choice task and the visible displacement task only. In the invisible displacement task, the group performed significantly worse than expected by chance indicating that horses persistently chose the side where they had last seen the target. None of the individual characteristics included in the study had an effect on performance. Unsuccessful horses had higher heart rate levels, and expressed more behavior indicative of frustration, likely because of their inability to solve the task. The increased frustration/arousal could lead to a negative feedback loop, which might hamper performance in subsequent trials. Care should thus be taken in future experimental designs to closely monitor the arousal level of the tested individuals in order to safeguard comparability.

Non-human primates use combined rules when deciding under ambiguity

Decision outcomes in unpredictable environments may not have exact known probabilities. Yet the predictability level of outcomes matters in decisions, and animals, including humans, generally avoid ambiguous options. Managing ambiguity may be more challenging and requires stronger cognitive skills than decision-making under risk, where decisions involve known probabilities. Here we compare decision-making in capuchins, macaques, orangutans, gorillas, chimpanzees and bonobos in risky and ambiguous contexts. Subjects were shown lotteries (a tray of potential rewards, some large, some small) and could gamble a medium-sized food item to obtain one of the displayed rewards. The odds of winning and losing varied and were accessible in the risky context (all rewards were visible) or partially available in the ambiguous context (some rewards were covered). In the latter case, the level of information varied from fully ambiguous (individuals could not guess what was under the covers) to predictable (individuals could guess). None of the species avoided gambling in ambiguous lotteries and gambling rates were high if at least two large rewards were visible. Capuchins and bonobos ignored the covered items and gorillas and macaques took the presence of potential rewards into account, but only chimpanzees and orangutans could consistently build correct expectations about the size of the covered rewards. Chimpanzees and orangutans combined decision rules according to the number of large visible rewards and the level of predictability, a process resembling conditional probabilities assessment in humans. Despite a low sample size, this is the first evidence in non-human primates that a combination of several rules can underlie choices made in an unpredictable environment. Our finding that non-human primates can deal with the uncertainty of an outcome when exchanging one food item for another is a key element to the understanding of the evolutionary origins of economic behaviour. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.

Horses Solve Visible but Not Invisible Displacement Tasks in an Object Permanence Paradigm

A key question in the field of animal cognition is how animals comprehend their physical world. Object permanence is one of the fundamental features of physical cognition. It is the ability to reason about hidden objects and to mentally reconstruct their invisible displacements. This cognitive skill has been studied in a wide range of species but never directly in the horse (Equus caballus). In this study, we therefore assessed the understanding of visible and invisible displacements in adult Welsh mares in two complementary experiments, using different horses. In experiment 1, visible displacement was investigated using two tasks adapted from the Uzgiris and Hunt scale 1. Invisible displacement was assessed using a transposition task, in which food was first hidden in one of two containers and the location of the containers was then switched. In experiment 2, we further investigated horses’ understanding of visible and invisible displacements using an easier procedure designed to avoid potentially confounding factors. In both experiments, horses successfully completed the tasks involving visible displacement with two or three possible hiding places. However, in both experiments, horses failed the transposition tasks, suggesting that they may not be able to track the displacement of an object that is not directly perceived (i.e., invisible displacement). These results bring new insights into object permanence in horses and how they represent their physical world.

Macphail’s Null Hypothesis of Vertebrate Intelligence: Insights From Avian Cognition

Macphail famously criticized two foundational assumptions that underlie the evolutionary approach to comparative psychology: that there are differences in intelligence across species, and that intelligent behavior in animals is based on more than associative learning. Here, we provide evidence from recent work in avian cognition that supports both these assumptions: intelligence across species varies, and animals can perform intelligent behaviors that are not guided solely by associative learning mechanisms. Finally, we reflect on the limitations of comparative psychology that led to Macphail’s claims and suggest strategies researchers can use to make more advances in the field.

A comparative analysis of the dopaminergic innervation of the executive caudal nidopallium in pigeon, chicken, zebra finch, and carrion crow

Despite the long, separate evolutionary history of birds and mammals, both lineages developed a rich behavioral repertoire of remarkably similar executive control generated by distinctly different brains. The seat for executive functioning in birds is the nidopallium caudolaterale (NCL) and the mammalian equivalent is known as the prefrontal cortex (PFC). Both are densely innervated by dopaminergic fibers, and are an integration center of sensory input and motor output. Whereas the variation of the PFC has been well documented in different mammalian orders, we know very little about the NCL across the avian clade. In order to investigate whether this structure adheres to species-specific variations, this study aimed to describe the trajectory of the NCL in pigeon, chicken, carrion crow and zebra finch. We employed immunohistochemistry to map dopaminergic innervation, and executed a Gallyas stain to visualize the dorsal arcopallial tract that runs between the NCL and the arcopallium. Our analysis showed that whereas the trajectory of the NCL in the chicken is highly comparable to the pigeon, the two Passeriformes show a strikingly different pattern. In both carrion crow and zebra finch, we identified four different subareas of high dopaminergic innervation that span the entire caudal forebrain. Based on their sensory input, motor output, and involvement in dopamine-related cognitive control of the delineated areas here, we propose that at least three morphologically different subareas constitute the NCL in these songbirds. Thus, our study shows that comparable to the PFC in mammals, the NCL in birds varies considerably across species.

Search Behavior in Goat (Capra hircus) Kids From Mothers Kept at Different Animal Densities Throughout Pregnancy

Individual differences in cognitive performance are often reported but factors related to variation within species are rarely addressed. Goats (Capra hircus) have been subjects of many cognitive studies recently but without focus on individual variation. Among others, factors such as prenatal stress and sex of the individual have been proposed as possible explanations for individual variation in cognitive skills. We aimed to study whether prenatal environment, prenatal stress, litter size, sex, and birth weight influences search behavior skills of goat kids. Pregnant Norwegian dairy goats were exposed to different spatial allowance (namely 1.0, 2.0, or 3.0 m2 per animal) within the commercially applied range during pregnancy and their serum cortisol levels were measured six times within this period. Twenty-six of the kids born entered a three-stage searching task with increasing difficulty when they were 6 weeks old. The tasks included finding a bucket of milk: while moving (stage 1), after moving and disappearing behind a curtain (stage 2), and moving behind a displacement device and the device moving behind a curtain while hiding the bucket (stage 3). We found that prenatal animal density had no effect on the search skills of the offspring, while kids with higher prenatal maternal cortisol levels performed better at the highest stage tested: finding an object after single invisible displacement. At this stage, singleton kids and males performed better than twins and females. Birth weight had no effect at this stage. The findings suggest that maternal cortisol in the observed range had a facilitating effect on cognitive development of goat kids.

Where's the cookie? The ability of monkeys to track object transpositions

Object permanence is the ability to represent mentally an object and follow its position even when it has disappeared from view. According to Piaget’s 6-stage scale of the sensorimotor period of development, it seems that object permanence appears in Stage 4 and fully develops in Stage 6. In this study, we investigated the ability of some species of monkeys (i.e. pig-tailed macaque, lion-tailed macaque, Celebes crested macaque, barbary macaque, De Brazza’s monkey, L’Hoest’s monkey, Allen’s swamp monkey, black crested mangabeys, collared mangabeys, Geoffroy’s spider monkey) to track the displacement of an object, which consisted of a reward hidden under one of two cups. Our findings showed that the examined subjects possess Stage 6 of object permanence. We then compared our results with data on apes and dogs participating in Rooijakkers et al. (Anim Cogn 12:789–796, 2009) experiment, where the same method was applied. The monkeys examined by us performed significantly better than the dogs but worse than the apes. In our experiment, the monkeys performed above chance level in all variants, but it should be noted that we observed significant differences in the number of correct choices according to the level of a variant’s complexity.

What do monkeys know about others' knowledge?

Recently, comparative psychologists have suggested that primates represent others' knowledge states. Evidence for this claim comes from studies demonstrating that primates expect others to maintain representations of objects when those objects are not currently visible. However, little work has explored whether nonhuman primates expect others to share the more sophisticated kinds of object knowledge that they themselves possess. We therefore investigated whether primates attribute to others knowledge that is acquired through the mental transformation of a static object representation. Specifically, we tested whether rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) expected a human demonstrator to solve a difficult rotational displacement task. In Experiment 1, monkeys watched a demonstrator hide a piece of fruit in one of two boxes. The monkey and the demonstrator then watched the boxes rotate 180°. We found that monkeys looked longer when the demonstrator reached into the box that did not contain the fruit, indicating that they expected her to be able to track the fruit to its current location. In Experiment 2, we ruled out the possibility that monkeys simply expected the demonstrator to search for the food in its true location. When the demonstrator did not witness the rotation event, monkeys looked equally long at the two reaching outcomes. These results are consistent with the interpretation that rhesus macaques expect others to dynamically update their representations of unseen objects.

Does size really matter? Investigating cognitive differences in spatial memory ability based on size in domestic dogs

The study of canine cognition can be useful in understanding the selective pressures affecting cognitive abilities. Dogs have undergone intensive artificial selection yielding distinctive breeds, which differ both phenotypically and behaviorally and no other species has a wider range in brain size. As brain size has long been hypothesized to relate to cognitive capacity, this species offers a useful model to further explore this relationship. The influence of physical size on canine cognition has not been thoroughly addressed, despite the fact that large dogs are often perceived to be 'smarter' than small dogs. To date, this preconception has only recently been addressed and supported in one study comparing large and small dogs in a social cognition task, where large dogs outperformed small dogs in a pointing choice task. We assessed large and small dogs using a series of spatial cognition tasks and detected no differences between the two groups. Further research is needed to clarify why our results failed to compliment previous findings. It is possible that differences found in social cognition tasks may not be due to differences in size, rather they may be based on other factors such as methodology, prior training experience, or past experience with humans in general.

Visible and invisible displacement with dynamic visual occlusion in bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops spp)

Anticipating the location of a temporarily obscured target-what Piaget (the construction of reality in the child. Basic Books, New York, 1954) called "object permanence"-is a critical skill, especially in hunters of mobile prey. Previous research with bottlenose dolphins found they could predict the location of a target that had been visibly displaced into an opaque container, but not one that was first placed in an opaque container and then invisibly displaced to another container. We tested whether, by altering the task to involve occlusion rather than containment, these animals could show more advanced object permanence skills. We projected dynamic visual displays at an underwater-viewing window and videotaped the animals' head moves while observing these displays. In Experiment 1, the animals observed a small black disk moving behind occluders that shifted in size, ultimately forming one large occluder. Nine out of ten subjects "tracked" the presumed movement of the disk behind this occluder on their first trial-and in a statistically significant number of subsequent trials-confirming their visible displacement abilities. In Experiment 2, we tested their invisible displacement abilities. The disk first disappeared behind a pair of moving occluders, which then moved behind a stationary occluder. The moving occluders then reappeared and separated, revealing that the disk was no longer behind them. The subjects subsequently looked to the correct stationary occluder on eight of their ten first trials, and in a statistically significant number of subsequent trials. Thus, by altering the stimuli to be more ecologically valid, we were able to show that the dolphins could indeed succeed at an invisible displacement task.

The use of a displacement device negatively affects the performance of dogs (Canis familiaris) in visible object displacement tasks

Visible and invisible displacement tasks have been used widely for comparative studies of animals' understanding of object permanence, with evidence accumulating that some species can solve invisible displacement tasks and, thus, reach Piagetian stage 6 of object permanence. In contrast, dogs appear to rely on associative cues, such as the location of the displacement device, during invisible displacement tasks. It remains unclear, however, whether dogs, and other species that failed in invisible displacement tasks, do so because of their inability to form a mental representation of the target object, or simply because of the involvement of a more salient but potentially misleading associative cue, the displacement device. Here we show that the use of a displacement device impairs the performance of dogs also in visible displacement tasks: their search accuracy was significantly lower when a visible displacement was performed with a displacement device, and only two of initially 42 dogs passed the sham-baiting control conditions. The negative influence of the displacement device in visible displacement tasks may be explained by strong associative cues overriding explicit information about the target object's location, reminiscent of an overshadowing effect, and/or object individuation errors as the target object is placed within the displacement device and moves along a spatiotemporally identical trajectory. Our data suggest that a comprehensive appraisal of a species' performance in object permanence tasks should include visible displacement tasks with the same displacement device used in invisible displacements, which typically has not been done in the past.

Double invisible displacement understanding in orangutans: testing in non-locomotor and locomotor space

The nonadjacent double invisible displacement task has been used to test for the ability of different species to mentally represent the unperceived trajectory of an object. The task typically requires three occluders/boxes in a linear array and involves hiding an object in one of two nonadjacent boxes visited in succession. Previous research indicates that 19-, 26-, and 30-month-old children and various nonhuman species cannot solve these displacements. It has been hypothesized that this is because individuals are unable to inhibit searching in the unbaited center box that was never visited by the experimenter. It has been suggested that presenting the task in a large-scale locomotor space might allow individuals to overcome this inhibition problem. In the present study, we tested orangutans on adjacent and nonadjacent double invisible displacements with the traditional setup (experiment 1) and in locomotor space with boxes placed 1.22 m apart (experiment 2). In both experiments, subjects were able to solve adjacent, but not nonadjacent, trials. The failure on nonadjacent trials appeared to be because of an inability to inhibit sequential search on the second choice as well as because of a large number of first-choice errors (directly choosing an incorrect box). The current results support previous findings that orangutans exhibit some constraints when representing the invisible trajectory of objects.

Inferential reasoning and egg rejection in a cooperatively breeding cuckoo

Inferential reasoning-associating a visible consequence with an imagined event-has been demonstrated in several bird species in captivity, but few studies have tested wild birds in ecologically relevant contexts. Here, we investigate inferential reasoning by the greater ani, a cooperatively breeding cuckoo in which several females lay eggs in one nest. Prior to laying her first egg, each female removes any eggs that have already been laid by other females in the shared nest. After laying her first egg, however, each female stops removing eggs, presumably in order to avoid accidentally rejecting her own. But are anis using inferential reasoning to track the fate of their eggs in the communal nest, or is egg ejection governed by non-cognitive determinants? We experimentally removed eggs from two-female nests after both females had laid at least one egg and used video recording to verify that both females viewed the empty nest. We waited until one female (A) laid an egg in the nest, and video recorded the behavior of the female that had not yet re-laid (B). We predicted that if capable of inferential reasoning, female B should infer that the new egg could not be her own and she should remove it. Five out of five females tested failed to make this inference, suggesting that egg removal is either determined by the female's reproductive status or by the amount of time elapsed between egg removal and re-laying. This apparent cognitive constraint may have implications for the evolutionary stability of the anis' unusual breeding system.

Comparative Developmental Psychology: How is Human Cognitive Development Unique?

The fields of developmental and comparative psychology both seek to illuminate the roots of adult cognitive systems. Developmental studies target the emergence of adult cognitive systems over ontogenetic time, whereas comparative studies investigate the origins of human cognition in our evolutionary history. Despite the long tradition of research in both of these areas, little work has examined the intersection of the two: the study of cognitive development in a comparative perspective. In the current article, we review recent work using this comparative developmental approach to study non-human primate cognition. We argue that comparative data on the pace and pattern of cognitive development across species can address major theoretical questions in both psychology and biology. In particular, such integrative research will allow stronger biological inferences about the function of developmental change, and will be critical in addressing how humans come to acquire species-unique cognitive abilities.

Socio-spatial cognition in vervet monkeys

Safety in numbers is thought to be the principal advantage of living in groups for many species. The group can only provide protection against predators, however, when group cohesion is maintained. Vocalisations are used to monitor inter-individual distances, especially under conditions of poor visibility, but should be avoided in the presence of predators. Mentally tracking the movements of silent and invisible group members would allow animals foraging in dense vegetation to stay close to their group members while reducing the use of vocal contact. We tested the socio-spatial cognitive abilities of wild vervet monkeys (Chlorocebus pygerythrus) by comparing their reactions to plausible and implausible displacements of group members simulated by sound playbacks. Our methods are comparable to those used in studies of 'object permanence' and 'invisible displacements' of inanimate objects. Our results show that vervets can track the whereabouts of invisibly and silently moving group members, at least over short periods of time.

Understanding of and reasoning about object-object relationships in long-tailed macaques?

Diagnostic reasoning, defined as the ability to infer unobserved causes based on the observation of their effects, is a central cognitive competency of humans. Yet, little is known about diagnostic reasoning in non-human primates, and what we know is largely restricted to the Great Apes. To track the evolutionary history of these skills within primates, we investigated long-tailed macaques’ understanding of the significance of inclinations of covers of hidden food as diagnostic indicators for the presence of an object located underneath. Subjects were confronted with choices between different objects that might cover food items. Based on their physical characteristics, the shape and orientation of the covers did or did not reveal the location of a hidden reward. For instance, hiding the reward under a solid board led to its inclination, whereas a hollow cup remained unaltered. Thus, the type of cover and the occurrence or absence of a change in their appearance could potentially be used to reason diagnostically about the location of the reward. In several experiments, the macaques were confronted with a varying number of covers and their performance was dependent on the level of complexity and on the type of change of the covers’ orientation. The macaques could use a board’s inclination to detect the reward, but failed to do so if the lack of inclination was indicative of an alternative hiding place. We suggest that the monkeys’ performance is based on a rudimentary understanding of causality, but find no good evidence for sophisticated diagnostic reasoning in this particular domain.

Can black-and-white ruffed lemurs (Varecia variegata) solve object permanence tasks?

We examined object permanence in black-and-white-ruffed lemurs (Varecia variegata) at Zoo Atlanta. A series of visible and invisible displacement tasks with suitable controls were presented to five adult subjects. Subjects performed significantly above chance on all regular tasks, except for the double invisible displacements. Subjects failed visible and invisible controls. Failure on the control trials did not appear to be because subjects used the "last box touched" strategy (subjects did not choose the last box touched significantly more than expected by chance). However, a substantial percentage of choices was made to the last box touched by the experimenter. There was no significant difference between this percentage, and the percentage of choices made to the baited box (on both visible and invisible controls), which indicates that subjects were drawn to both boxes which the experimenter visited/touched, and thus failed the controls. Based on the results from the present study, we believe that there is no evidence that black-and-white ruffed lemurs understand visible and invisible tasks in the traditional object permanence battery.

Rotational displacement skills in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta)

Rotational displacement tasks, in which participants must track an object at a hiding location within an array while the array rotates, exhibit a puzzling developmental pattern in humans. Human children take an unusually long time to master this task and tend to solve rotational problems through the use of nongeometric features or landmarks as opposed to other kinds of spatial cues. We investigated whether these developmental characteristics are unique to humans by testing rotational displacement skills in a monkey species, the rhesus macaque (Macaca mulatta), using a looking-time method. Monkeys first saw food hidden in two differently colored boxes within an array. The array was then rotated 180° and the boxes reopened to reveal the food in an expected or unexpected location. Our first two experiments explored the developmental time-course of performance on this rotational displacement task. We found that adult macaques looked longer at the unexpected event, but such performance was not mirrored in younger-aged macaques. In a third study, we systematically varied featural information and visible access to the array to investigate which strategies adult macaques used in solving rotational displacements. Our results show that adult macaques need both sets of information to solve the task. Taken together, these results suggest both similarities and differences in mechanisms by which human and nonhuman primates develop this spatial skill.

Object permanence in adult common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus): not everything is an "A-not-B" error that seems to be one

In this paper, we describe a behaviour pattern similar to the "A-not-B" error found in human infants and young apes in a monkey species, the common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus). In contrast to the classical explanation, recently it has been suggested that the "A-not-B" error committed by human infants is at least partially due to misinterpretation of the hider's ostensively communicated object hiding actions as potential 'teaching' demonstrations during the A trials. We tested whether this so-called Natural Pedagogy hypothesis would account for the A-not-B error that marmosets commit in a standard object permanence task, but found no support for the hypothesis in this species. Alternatively, we present evidence that lower level mechanisms, such as attention and motivation, play an important role in committing the "A-not-B" error in marmosets. We argue that these simple mechanisms might contribute to the effect of undeveloped object representational skills in other species including young non-human primates that commit the A-not-B error.

Great apes use landmark cues over spatial relations to find hidden food

We investigated whether chimpanzees, bonobos, and orangutans encoded the location of a reward hidden underneath one of three identical cups in relation to (1) the other cups in the array-i.e., the relative position of the baited cup within the array; or (2) the landmarks surrounding the cups-e.g., the edge of the table. Apes witnessed the hiding of a food reward under one of three cups forming a straight line on a platform. After 30 s, they were allowed to search for the reward. In three different experiments, we varied the distance of the cups to the edge of the platform and the distance between the cups. Results showed that both manipulated variables affected apes' retrieval accuracy. Subjects' retrieval accuracy was higher for the outer cups compared with the Middle cup, especially if the outer cups were located next to the platform's edge. Additionally, the larger the distance between the cups, the better performance became.

Great apes' strategies to map spatial relations

We investigated reasoning about spatial relational similarity in three great ape species: chimpanzees, bonobos, and orangutans. Apes were presented with three spatial mapping tasks in which they were required to find a reward in an array of three cups, after observing a reward being hidden in a different array of three cups. To obtain a food reward, apes needed to choose the cup that was in the same relative position (i.e., on the left) as the baited cup in the other array. The three tasks differed in the constellation of the two arrays. In Experiment 1, the arrays were placed next to each other, forming a line. In Experiment 2, the positioning of the two arrays varied each trial, being placed either one behind the other in two rows, or next to each other, forming a line. Finally, in Experiment 3, the two arrays were always positioned one behind the other in two rows, but misaligned. Results suggested that apes compared the two arrays and recognized that they were similar in some way. However, we believe that instead of mapping the left-left, middle-middle, and right-right cups from each array, they mapped the cups that shared the most similar relations to nearby landmarks (table's visual boundaries).

Great apes track hidden objects after changes in the objects' position and in subject's orientation

Eight chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), five bonobos (Pan paniscus), five gorillas (Gorilla gorilla), and seven orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) were presented with two invisible object displacement tasks. In full view of the subject, a food item was hidden under one of three opaque cups resting on a platform and, after an experimental manipulation, the subject was allowed to select one of the cups. In the rotation task, the platform was rotated 180 degrees while the subject remained stationary. In the translocation task, the platform remained stationary while the subject walked to the opposite side from where she saw the reward being hidden. The final position of the food relative to the subject was equivalent in both tasks. Single displacement trials consisted of only one manipulation, either a rotation or a translocation, whereas double displacement trials consisted of both a rotation and a translocation. We also included no displacement trials in which no displacements took place. No displacement trials were easier than single displacements which, in turn, were easier than double displacements. Unlike earlier studies with children, there was no difference in performance between rotation and translocation displacements. Overall, apes performed above chance in all conditions, but chimpanzees outperformed the other species. This study reinforces the notion that the great apes use an allocentric spatial coding.

Cognitive consequences of cooperative breeding in primates?

Several hypotheses propose that cooperative breeding leads to increased cognitive performance, in both nonhuman and human primates, but systematic evidence for such a relationship is missing. A causal link might exist because motivational and cognitive processes necessary for the execution and coordination of helping behaviors could also favor cognitive performance in contexts not directly related to caregiving. In callitrichids, which among primates rely most strongly on cooperative breeding, these motivational and cognitive processes include attentional biases toward monitoring others, the ability to coordinate actions spatially and temporally, increased social tolerance, increased responsiveness to others' signals, and spontaneous prosociality. These processes are likely to enhance performance particularly in socio-cognitive contexts. Therefore, cooperatively breeding primates are expected to outperform their independently breeding sister taxa in socio-cognitive tasks. We evaluate this prediction by reviewing the literature and comparing cognitive performance in callitrichids with that of their sister taxa, i.e. squirrel monkeys, which are independent breeders, and capuchin monkeys, which show an intermediate breeding system. Consistent with our prediction, this review reveals that callitrichids systematically and significantly outperform their sister taxa in the socio-cognitive, but not in the non-social domain. This comparison is complemented with more qualitative evaluations of prosociality and cognitive performance in non-primate cooperative breeders, which suggest that among mammals, cooperative breeding generally produces conditions conducive to socio-cognitive performance. In the hominid lineage, however, the adoption of extensive allomaternal care presumably resulted in more pervasive cognitive consequences, because the motivational consequences of cooperative breeding was added to an ape-level cognitive system already capable of understanding simple mental states, which enabled the emergence of shared intentionality.

Comparing dogs and great apes in their ability to visually track object transpositions

Knowing that objects continue to exist after disappearing from sight and tracking invisible object displacements are two basic elements of spatial cognition. The current study compares dogs and apes in an invisible transposition task. Food was hidden under one of two cups in full view of the subject. After that both cups were displaced, systematically varying two main factors, whether cups were crossed during displacement and whether the cups were substituted by the other cup or instead cups were moved to new locations. While the apes were successful in all conditions, the dogs had a strong preference to approach the location where they last saw the reward, especially if this location remained filled. In addition, dogs seem to have especial difficulties to track the reward when both containers crossed their path during displacement. These results confirm the substantial difference that exists between great apes and dogs with regard to mental representation abilities required to track the invisible displacements of objects.

Gravity bias in young and adult chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes): tests with a modified opaque-tubes task

Young human children at around 2 years of age fail to predict the correct location of an object when it is dropped from the top of an S-shape opaque tube. They search in the location just below the releasing point (Hood, 1995). This type of error, called a 'gravity bias', has recently been reported in dogs and monkeys. In the present study, we investigated whether young and adult chimpanzees also show such a gravity bias in a modified version of the original opaque-tube task. The original task by Hood and colleagues required the subject to search in a location after the object had fallen, while in the task reported here, subjects were required to predict the location before the object was dropped. Thus the present procedure does not involve explicit invisible displacement operations, one of the important components of the original procedure. In Experiment 1 both young (1.5-2.5-year-old) and adult chimpanzees predicted the location of falling food items below the releasing point even when crossed tubes were used. These gravity errors remained after the extensive experience of using the tubes themselves. Experiment 2 further tested adult and 4-year-old chimpanzees under the set-up in which the straight and crossed tubes were simultaneously presented. The results were the same as those in the previous test, suggesting that developmental changes and learning effect do not affect the gravity bias in chimpanzees.

When pigeons in motion lose sight of their food: behaviour on visible displacement tasks revisited

In traditional visible displacement tasks, animals view an object as it is moved out of their sight, but either the object moves behind an occluder or an occluder moves in front of it. Here we present a more ecologically realistic visible displacement task for pigeons ( Columba livia (Gmelin, 1789)) in which it was the animal that occluded the object, a food dish in this case, by virtue of its own motion. In a branched maze, pigeons had visual access to food, which they would lose from view as they moved through the maze. A within-subject design was used whereby the task was presented first in descending order of difficulty (i.e., decreasing memory load owing to the opening of (i) gaps and (ii) windows in the walls of the maze), and followed 10 months later by an ascending order. When the food was visible at all times through windows and gaps, pigeons would make turns in the maze that would bring them closer to the food (i.e., they chose the shortest route above chance levels). In general, they failed to do so when the food was lost from view, but there was one exception at the end of the study (the second time that there were gaps but no windows): there was a significant tendency for the last two turns that brought the bird out of the maze to be the shortest route to the food. The pigeons may have learned to take advantage of opportunities to lighten their memory load.

Do orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) know when they do not remember?

Metacognition refers to the ability to monitor and control one's own cognitive activities such as memory. Although recent studies have raised an interesting possibility that some species of nonhuman animals might possess such skills, subjects often required a numerous number of training trials to acquire the effective use of metacognitive responses. Here, five orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) were tested whether they were able to escape spatial memory tests when they did not remember the location of preferred reward in a relatively small number of trials. The apes were presented with two identical cups, under one of which the experimenter hid a preferred reward (e.g., two grapes). The subjects were then presented with a third container, "escape response", with which they could receive a less preferred but secure reward (e.g., one grape). The orangutans as a group significantly more likely selected the escape response when the baiting of the preferred reward was invisible (as compared to when it was visible) and when the hiding locations of the preferred reward were switched (as compared to when they remained unchanged). Even when the escape response was presented before the final presentation of the memory test, one orangutan successfully avoided the test in which she would likely err. These findings indicate that some orangutans appear to tell when they do not remember correct answers in memory tests.

Piagetian object permanence and its development in Eurasian jays (Garrulus glandarius)

Object permanence in Eurasian jays (Garrulus glandarius) was investigated using a complete version of the Uzgiris and Hunt scale 1. Nine hand-raised jays were studied, divided into two groups according to their different developmental stages (experiment 1, older jays: 2-3 months old, n = 4; experiment 2, younger jays: 15 days old, n = 5). In the first experiment, we investigated whether older jays could achieve piagetian stage 6 of object permanence. Tasks were administered in a fixed sequence (1-15) according to the protocols used in other avian species. The aim of the second experiment was to check whether testing very young jays before their development of "neophobia" could influence the achievement times of piagetian stages. Furthermore, in this experiment tasks were administered randomly to investigate whether the jays' achievement of stage 6 follows a fixed sequence related to the development of specific cognitive abilities. All jays tested in experiments 1 and 2 fully achieved piagetian stage 6 and no "A not B" errors were observed. Performance on visible displacement tasks was better than performance on invisible ones. The results of experiment 2 show that "neophobia" affected the response of jays in terms of achievement times; the older jays in experiment 1 took longer to pass all the tasks when compared with the younger, less neophobic, jays in experiment 2. With regard to the achieving order, jays followed a fixed sequence of acquisition in experiment 2, even if tasks were administered randomly, with the exception of one subject. The results of these experiments support the idea that piagetian stages of cognitive development exist in avian species and that they progress through relatively fixed sequences.

Invisible displacement understanding in domestic dogs (Canis familiaris): the role of visual cues in search behavior

Recently, (Collier-Baker E, Davis JM, Suddendorf T (2004) J Comp Psychol 118:421-433) suggested that domestic dogs do not understand invisible displacements. In the present study, we further investigated the hypothesis that the search behavior of domestic dogs in invisible displacements is guided by various visual cues inherent to the task rather than by mental representation of an object's past trajectory. Specifically, we examined the role of the experimenter as a function of the final position of the displacement device in the search behavior of domestic dogs. Visible and invisible displacement problems were administered to dogs (N = 11) under two conditions. In the Visible-experimenter condition, the experimenter was visible whereas in the Concealed-experimenter condition, the experimenter was visibly occluded behind a large rigid barrier. Our data supported the conclusion that dogs do not understand invisible displacements but primarily search as a function of the final position of the displacement device and, to a lesser extent, the position of the experimenter.

Tracking the displacement of objects: a series of tasks with great apes (Pan troglodytes, Pan paniscus, Gorilla gorilla, and Pongo pygmaeus) and young children (Homo sapiens)

The authors administered a series of object displacement tasks to 24 great apes and 24 30-month-old children (Homo sapiens). Objects were placed under 1 or 2 of 3 cups by visible or invisible displacements. The series included 6 tasks: delayed response, inhibition test, A not B, rotations, transpositions, and object permanence. Apes and children solved most tasks performing at comparable levels except in the transposition task, in which apes performed better than children. Ape species performed at comparable levels in all tasks except in single transpositions, in which chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan paniscus) performed better than gorillas (Gorilla gorilla) and orangutans (Pongo pygmeaus). All species found nonadjacent trials and rotations especially difficult. The number of elements that changed locations, the type of displacement, and having to inhibit predominant reaching responses were factors that negatively affected the subjects' performance.

Apes know that hidden objects can affect the orientation of other objects

Four bonobos, seven gorillas, and six orangutans were presented with two small rectangular boards on a platform. One of the boards had a piece of food under it so that it acquired an inclined orientation whereas the other remained flat on the platform. Subjects preferentially selected the inclined board. In another experiment, subjects were initially presented with two inclined boards and a transformation took place in which one of the boards fell flat to the platform while the other remained inclined. Subjects also preferred the board that remained inclined. Two additional experiments highlighted some of the possible limitations of their reasoning in this task. Presented with two inclined boards, one of which was visibly supported by a piece of wood, they failed to systematically select the unsupported one whose only reason for being inclined was the presence of the reward. Another experiment presented two rewards in each trial (instead of the customary one) in one of the following two combinations: large banana vs. small carrot or small banana vs. large carrot. Prior to the test, E presented both rewards to the subject and then hid each of them under one of the boards so that both boards were differentially inclined due to the different sizes of the rewards involved. Although subjects selected the board that showed a greater inclination (thus securing the larger reward), they disregarded the type of food that was involved. This often meant that they chose the large carrot over the small banana even though they reversed such a choice when the rewards were not occluded by the boards. Providing subjects with a 'reminder' of the type of reward hidden under the boards did not alter the original results. There was no evidence of learning throughout the various experiments and control tests ruled out the possibility of inadvertent cuing by the experimenter, poor performance due to a lack of motivation, or good performance due to a predisposition to select objects with sloped surfaces. It is concluded that subjects made some inferences about the reason for the inclined orientation of the boards, and not simply associated an inclined orientation with the presence of the reward.

Searching beneath the shelf in macaque monkeys: Evidence for a gravity bias or a foraging bias?

The reasons underpinning search biases in 2 species of macaque monkeys (Macaca mulatta and Macaca arctoides) were explored over the course of 3 experiments requiring monkeys to search for a hidden food reward. The results reveal that monkeys are adept at exploiting perceptual cues to locate a food reward but are unable to use physical constraints such as solidity as cues to the reward's location. Monkeys prefer to search for a food reward beneath a solid shelf, not because they have an expectation that the reward should be there, but rather because, in the absence of usable cues, this bias emerges as a default search option. It is hypothesized that this bias may have its roots in a history of competition for food resources.

Do Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and 2-Year-Old Children (Homo sapiens) Understand Double Invisible Displacement?

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and young children (Homo sapiens) have difficulty with double invisible displacements in which an object is hidden in two nonadjacent boxes in a linear array. Experiment 1 eliminated the possibility that chimpanzees' previous poor performance was due to the hiding direction of the displacement device. As in Call (2001), subjects failed double nonadjacent displacements, showing a tendency to select adjacent boxes. In Experiments 2 and 3, chimpanzees and 24-month-old children were tested on a new adaptation of the task in which four hiding boxes were presented in a diamond-shaped array on a vertical plane. Both species performed above chance on double invisible displacements using this format, suggesting that previous poor performance was due to a response bias or inhibition problem rather than a fundamental limitation in representational capacity.

Duration of cats' (Felis catus) working memory for disappearing objects

This study explored the duration of cats' working memory for hidden objects. Twenty-four cats were equally divided into four groups, which differed according to the type of visual cues displayed on and/or around the hiding boxes. During eight sessions, the four groups of cats were trained to locate a desirable object hidden behind one of the four boxes placed in front of them. Then, the cats were tested with retention intervals of 0, 10, 30 and 60 s. Results revealed no significant differences between the groups during training or testing. In testing, the cats' accuracy to locate the hidden object rapidly declined between 0 and 30 s but remained higher than chance with delays of up to 60 s. The analysis of errors also indicated that the cats searched as a function of the proximity of the target box and were not subjected to intertrial proactive interference. This experiment reveals that the duration of cats' working memory for disappearing objects is limited and the visual cues displayed on and/or around the boxes do not help the cats to memorize a hiding position. In discussion, we explore why the duration of cats' working memory for disappearing objects rapidly declined and compare these finding with those from domestic dogs. The irrelevance of visual cues displayed on and around the hiding boxes on cats' retention capacity is also discussed.

Do chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) understand single invisible displacement?

Previous research suggests that chimpanzees understand single invisible displacement. However, this Piagetian task may be solvable through the use of simple search strategies rather than through mentally representing the past trajectory of an object. Four control conditions were thus administered to two chimpanzees in order to separate associative search strategies from performance based on mental representation. Strategies involving experimenter cue-use, search at the last or first box visited by the displacement device, and search at boxes adjacent to the displacement device were systematically controlled for. Chimpanzees showed no indications of utilizing these simple strategies, suggesting that their capacity to mentally represent single invisible displacements is comparable to that of 18-24-month-old children.

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) use markers to monitor the movement of a hidden item

Four chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) monitored the movement of hidden items in arrays of opaque cups. A chocolate candy was hidden in an array of four cups and temporarily presented paper markers indicated the location of the candy (which otherwise was not visible). These markers were either non-symbolic or symbolic (lexigram) stimuli that in other contexts acted as a label for the hidden candy, and the array was either rotated 180 degrees after the marker was removed or the array remained in the same location. For three of four chimpanzees, performance was better than chance in all conditions and there was no effect of the type of marker. These experiments indicate that chimpanzees can track the movement of a hidden item in an array of identical cups even when they never see the item itself, but only see a temporarily presented marker for the location of that item. However, there was no benefit to the use of symbolic as opposed to non-symbolic stimuli in this performance.

Do dogs (Canis familiaris) understand invisible displacement?

Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) perform above chance on invisible displacement tasks despite showing few other signs of possessing the necessary representational abilities. Four experiments investigated how dogs find an object that has been hidden in 1 of 3 opaque boxes. Dogs passed the task under a variety of control conditions, but only if the device used to displace the object ended up adjacent to the target box after the displacement. These results suggest that the search behavior of dogs was guided by simple associative rules rather than mental representation of the object's past trajectory. In contrast, Experiment 5 found that on the same task, 18- and 24-month-old children showed no disparity between trials in which the displacement device was adjacent or nonadjacent to the target box.