The Probabilistic Price of Life Across Time: Generational and Probabilistic Distance Render a Life Today Worth More Than Ten Tomorrow

Is the certainty of saving a life today worth more than the less-certain possibility of saving 10 lives tomorrow? In six pre-registered studies with U.S. samples from Prolific (N = 5,095), we employed an intergenerational probability discounting task, discovering people discount the value of life as uncertainty and intergenerational distance from the present increase. Specifically, as uncertainty about impacting the future rises, individuals increasingly prioritize saving fewer present lives over more future lives, particularly for more distant future beneficiaries (Studies 1-2b). Experimental evidence (Studies 3a-4) suggests that certainty perceptions drive intergenerational concern, rather than the inverse. Drawing upon seminal research from cognitive science and behavioral economics, these findings address gaps in emerging social psychological inquiry into long-term intergenerational concern, shed light on mechanisms underlying debates on the ethical philosophy of longtermism, and highlight practical implications for decision-makers, stressing the need to increase certainty perceptions surrounding about pro-future actions to enhance intergenerational beneficence.

Imagining the future improves saving in preschoolers

Preschoolers are notoriously poor at delaying gratification and saving limited resources, yet evidence-based methods of improving these behaviors are lacking. Using the marble game saving paradigm, we examined whether young children's saving behavior would increase as a result of engaging in future-oriented imagination using a storyboard. Participants were 115 typically developing 4-year-olds from a midwestern U.S. metropolitan area (Mage = 53.48 months, SD = 4.14, range = 47-60; 54.8% female; 84.5% White; 7.3% Hispanic/Latino ethnicity; median annual household income = $150,000-$174,999). Children were randomly assigned to one of four storyboard conditions prior to the marble game: Positive Future Simulation, Negative Future Simulation, Positive Routine, or Negative Routine. In each condition, children were asked to imagine how they would feel in the future situation using a smiley face rating scale. Results showed that children were significantly more likely to save (and to save more marbles) in the experimental conditions compared with the control conditions (medium effect sizes). Moreover, imagining saving for the future (and how good that would feel) was more effective at increasing saving behaviors than imagining not saving (and how bad that would feel). Emotion ratings were consistent with the assigned condition, but positive emotion alone did not account for these effects. Results held after accounting for game order and verbal IQ. Implications of temporal psychological distancing and emotion anticipation for children's future-oriented decision making are discussed.

Dynamic inconsistency in great apes

When presented with the option of either an immediate benefit or a larger, later reward, we may behave impatiently by choosing instant gratification. Nonetheless, when we can make the same decision ahead of time and plan for the future, we tend to make more patient choices. Here, we explored whether great apes share this core feature of human decision-making, often referred to as dynamic inconsistency. We found that orangutans, bonobos, and gorillas tended to act impatiently and with considerable variability between individuals when choosing between an immediate reward and a larger-later reward, which is a commonly employed testing method in the field. However, with the inclusion of a front-end delay for both alternatives, their decisions became more patient and homogeneous. These results show that great apes are dynamically inconsistent. They also suggest that, when choosing between future outcomes, they are more patient than previously reported. We advocate for the inclusion of diverse time ranges in comparative research, especially considering the intertwinement of intertemporal choices and future-oriented behavior.

Positive autobiographical memory recall does not influence temporal discounting: an internal meta-analysis of experimental studies

People tend to discount the value of future rewards as the delay to receiving them increases. This phenomenon, known as temporal discounting, may underlie many impulsive behaviors, such as drug abuse and overeating. Given the potential role of temporal discounting in maladaptive behaviors, many efforts have been made to find experimental manipulations that reduce temporal discounting. One class of manipulations that has held some promise involves recalling positive autobiographical memories prior to making intertemporal choices. Just as imagining positive future events has been shown to reduce temporal discounting, a few studies have shown that recalling positive past events reduces temporal discounting, especially if memory retrieval evokes positive affective states, such as gratitude and nostalgia. However, we failed to replicate these findings. Here we present an internal meta-analysis combining data from 14 studies (n = 758) that involved within-subjects positive memory recall-based manipulations. In each study, temporal discounting was assessed using a monetary intertemporal choice task. The average effect size was not significantly different from zero. This finding helps elucidate the neurocognitive mechanisms of temporal discounting; whereas engaging the episodic memory system to imagine future events might promote more patience, engaging the episodic memory system to imagine past events does not.

The sign effect in temporal discounting does not require the hippocampus

When considering future outcomes, humans tend to discount gains more than losses. This phenomenon, referred to as the temporal discounting sign effect, is thought to result from the greater anticipated emotional impact of waiting for a negative outcome (dread) compared to waiting for a positive outcome (mixture of savoring and impatience). The impact of such anticipatory emotions has been proposed to rely on episodic future thinking. We evaluated this proposal by examining the presence and magnitude of a sign effect in the intertemporal decisions of individuals with hippocampal amnesia, who are severely impaired in their ability to engage in episodic mental simulation, and by comparing their patterns of choices to those of healthy controls. We also measured loss aversion, the tendency to assign greater value to losses compared to equivalent gains, to verify that any reduction in the sign effect in the hippocampal lesion group could not be explained by a group difference in loss aversion. Results showed that participants with hippocampal amnesia exhibited a sign effect, with less discounting of monetary losses compared to gains, that was similar in magnitude to that of controls. Loss aversion, albeit greater in the hippocampal compared to the control group, did not account for the sign effect. These results indicate that the sign effect does not depend on the integrity of hippocampally mediated episodic processes. They suggest instead that the impact of anticipatory emotions can be factored into decisions via semantic future thinking, drawing on non-contextual knowledge about oneself.

Time matters for mental health: a systematic review of quantitative studies on time perspective in psychiatric populations

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

The ability to perform mental time travels and to develop representations of the past, the present, and the future is one of the distinctive capacities of the human mind. Despite its pronounced consequences for motivation, cognition, affect, and subjective well being, time perspective (TP) has been outside mainstream psychiatry and clinical psychology. We highlight the role of psychological-temporal phenomena in various disorders and summarize the current research on TP and psychopathology.

RECENT FINDINGS

Our review ultimately comprised 21 articles, including 18 unique datasets. It revealed that persons with different psychiatric diagnoses (attention defict hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), alcohol dependence, anxiety disorders, depression, bipolar disorder, personality disorders, posttraumatic stress disorder, schizophrenia) display different temporal profiles than control groups. We also found marked associations between temporal features and psychiatric symptom severity. The effects of specific TPs vary across different psychiatric diagnoses and to some extent between various age groups, with a consistent, widespread, and nonspecific effect of past-negative and less balanced, inflexible TP profile.

SUMMARY

Based on the review, TP biases are crucial factors in symptom development, while adaptive temporal profiles can serve as protective features against mental disorders. Understanding cognitive-temporal processes can enhance comprehension of psychopathological conditions and facilitate the development of temporality-focused clinical interventions.

Goal characteristics predict the occurrence of goal-related events through belief in future occurrence

While previous studies have highlighted the role of episodic future thinking in goal pursuit, the underlying cognitive mechanisms remain unexplored. Episodic future thinking may promote goal pursuit by shaping the feeling that imagined events will (or will not) happen in the future - referred to as belief in future occurrence. We investigated whether goal self-concordance (Experiment 1) and other goal characteristics identified as influential in goal pursuit (Experiment 2) modulate belief in the future occurrence of goal-related events and predict the actual occurrence of these events. Results showed that goal self-concordance, engagement, and expectancy had an indirect effect on the actual occurrence of events, which was (partially) mediated by belief in future occurrence. The mediating role of belief supports the view that belief in future occurrence when imagining events conveys useful information, allowing us to make informed decisions and undertake adaptive actions in the process of goal pursuit.

Three-year-olds' ability to plan for mutually exclusive future possibilities is limited primarily by their representations of possible plans, not possible events

The ability to prepare for mutually exclusive possible events in the future is essential for everyday decision making. Previous studies have suggested that this ability develops between the ages of 3 and 5 years, and in young children is primarily limited by the ability to represent the set of possible outcomes of an event as "possible". We tested an alternative hypothesis that this ability may be limited by the ability to represent the set of possible actions that could be taken to prepare for those possible outcomes. We adapted the inverted y-shaped tube task of Redshaw and Suddendorf (2016), in which children are asked to catch a marble that is dropped into the top of the tube and can emerge from either the left or right branch of the tube. While 4-year-olds typically place their hands under both openings to catch the marble, preparing for both possible outcomes (optimal action), 3-year-olds often cover only one opening, preparing for only one possible outcome (suboptimal action). In three Experiments, we asked whether first showing children the set of possible actions that could be taken on the tube would enable them to recognize the optimal action that should be used to catch the marble (Experiments 1 and 3, total n = 99 US 3- and 4-year-olds) and enable them to use the optimal action themselves (Experiment 2, n = 96 US 3- and 4-year-olds). We found that 3- and 4-year-olds performed similarly when they were given the opportunity to observe the set of possible actions beforehand. These findings suggest that 3-year-olds' competence at representing mutually exclusive possibilities may be masked by their developing ability to represent and deploy plans to act on these possibilities.

The Relationship Between Perceived Uncontrollable Mortality Risk and Health Effort: Replication, Secondary Analysis, and Mini Meta-analysis

BACKGROUND

The Uncontrollable Mortality Risk Hypothesis (UMRH) states that those who are more likely to die due to factors beyond their control should be less motivated to invest in preventative health behaviors. Greater levels of perceived uncontrollable mortality risk (PUMR) have been associated with lower health effort in previous research, but the topic remains understudied.

PURPOSE

To examine the evidence for the UMRH by replicating a previous study investigating the effects of PUMR on social gradients in health effort, and conducting a mini meta-analysis of the overall relationship between PUMR and health effort.

METHODS

We replicated Pepper and Nettle (2014), who reported a negative relationship between PUMR and health effort, and that the positive effect of subjective socioeconomic position on health effort was explained away by PUMR. We also compared the predictive effect of PUMR on health effort with that of dimensions from the Multidimensional Health Locus of Control scale-a well-used measure of a similar construct, which is frequently found to be associated with health behavior. Finally, we conducted a mini meta-analysis of the relationship between PUMR and health effort from the available research.

RESULTS

PUMR was negatively associated with health effort, and mediated 24% of the total effect of subjective socioeconomic position on health effort, though this mediation effect was weaker than in Pepper and Nettle (2014). PUMR was shown to be a substantially stronger predictor of health effort than the relevant dimensions of the MHLC scale. Finally, our mini meta-analysis indicated a medium-sized negative relationship between PUMR and health effort.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings offer support for the role of PUMR in mediating the relationship between subjective socioeconomic position and health effort. The results highlight the importance of measuring and understanding PUMR in studying socioeconomic inequalities in health behaviors. We discuss potential areas for future research, including determining the accuracy of PUMR, investigating influential cues, examining the role of media in shaping risk perceptions, and understanding individuals' awareness of their own perceptions of mortality risk.

Taking stock of the past: A psychometric evaluation of the Autobiographical Interview

Autobiographical memory (AM) involves a rich phenomenological re-experiencing of a spatio-temporal event from the past, which is challenging to objectively quantify. The Autobiographical Interview (AI; Levine et al. Psychology and Aging, 17(4), 677-689, 2002) is a manualized performance-based assessment designed to quantify episodic (internal) and semantic (external) features of recalled and verbally conveyed prior experiences. The AI has been widely adopted, yet has not undergone a comprehensive psychometric validation. We investigated the reliability, validity, association to individual differences measures, and factor structure in healthy younger and older adults (N = 352). Evidence for the AI's reliability was strong: the subjective scoring protocol showed high inter-rater reliability and previously identified age effects were replicated. Internal consistency across timepoints was robust, suggesting stability in recollection. Central to our validation, internal AI scores were positively correlated with standard, performance-based measures of episodic memory, demonstrating convergent validity. The two-factor structure for the AI was not well supported by confirmatory factor analysis. Adjusting internal and external detail scores for the number of words spoken (detail density) improved trait estimation of AM performance. Overall, the AI demonstrated sound psychometric properties for inquiry into the qualities of autobiographical remembering.

When the mind's eye prevails: The Internal Dominance over External Attention (IDEA) hypothesis

Throughout the 20th century, the psychological literature has considered attention as being primarily directed at the outside world. More recent theories conceive attention as also operating on internal information, and mounting evidence suggests a single, shared attentional focus between external and internal information. Such sharing implies a cognitive architecture where attention needs to be continuously shifted between prioritizing either external or internal information, but the fundamental principles underlying this attentional balancing act are currently unknown. Here, we propose and evaluate one such principle in the shape of the Internal Dominance over External Attention (IDEA) hypothesis: Contrary to the traditional view of attention as being primarily externally oriented, IDEA asserts that attention is inherently biased toward internal information. We provide a theoretical account for why such an internal attention bias may have evolved and examine findings from a wide range of literatures speaking to the balancing of external versus internal attention, including research on working memory, attention switching, visual search, mind wandering, sustained attention, and meditation. We argue that major findings in these disparate research lines can be coherently understood under IDEA. Finally, we consider tentative neurocognitive mechanisms contributing to IDEA and examine the practical implications of more deliberate control over this bias in the context of psychopathology. It is hoped that this novel hypothesis motivates cross-talk between the reviewed research lines and future empirical studies directly examining the mechanisms that steer attention either inward or outward on a moment-by-moment basis.

Repeated simulation increases belief in the future occurrence of uncertain events

The feeling that an imagined event will or will not occur in the future - referred to as belief in future occurrence - plays a key role in guiding our decisions and actions. Recent research suggests that this belief may increase with repeated simulation of future events, but the boundary conditions for this effect remain unclear. Considering the key role of autobiographical knowledge in shaping belief in occurrence, we suggest that the effect of repeated simulation only occurs when prior autobiographical knowledge does not clearly support or contradict the occurrence of the imagined event. To test this hypothesis, we investigated the repetition effect for events that were either plausible or implausible due to their coherence or incoherence with autobiographical knowledge (Experiment 1), and for events that initially appeared uncertain because they were not clearly supported or contradicted by autobiographical knowledge (Experiment 2). We found that all types of events became more detailed and took less time to construct after repeated simulation, but belief in their future occurrence increased only for uncertain events; repetition did not influence belief for events already believed or considered implausible. These findings show that the effect of repeated simulation on belief in future occurrence depends on the consistency of imagined events with autobiographical knowledge.

The past and future of uncertainty in advanced illness: a systematic scoping review of underlying cognitive processes

BACKGROUND

To explain what cognitive capacity shapes uncertainty in advanced illness by identifying the types of evidence, mapping underlying cognitive processes to uncertainty, and outlining future directions for research and interventions.

DESIGN

A systematic scoping review of mixed study designs was carried out following the methodological framework of Arksey and O'Malley (2005) and using qualitative content analysis.

METHODS

PubMed, CINAHL, Embase, and PsycINFO were searched for original studies published in full and in English through December 2021 that reported on uncertainty in illness and related cognitions, cognitive science, or cognitive functions.

RESULTS

After screening 978, 18 articles met the inclusion criteria for review. We found the cognitive capacity of mental time travel - to relive the past or foresee life in the future - interacted with episodic memory retrieval to inform decision-making, and prospection to imagine, predict or prepare for future outcomes to determine lesser or greater uncertainty in advanced illness.

CONCLUSIONS

Mental time travel is a fundamental cognitive function when the future is limited by an advanced illness, to review life as a meaningful narrative. The role of mental time travel to construct or make sense of uncertain futures inherent in advanced illness can inform theory and targets for intervention.

Jurors use mental state information to assess breach in negligence cases

To prove guilt, jurors in many countries must find that the criminal defendant acted with a particular mental state. However, this amateur form of mindreading is not supposed to occur in civil negligence trials. Instead, jurors should decide whether the defendant was negligent by looking only at his actions, and whether they were objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Even so, across four pre-registered studies (N = 782), we showed that mock jurors do not focus on actions alone. US mock jurors spontaneously rely on mental state information when evaluating negligence cases. In Study 1, jurors were given three negligence cases to judge, and were asked to evaluate whether a reasonably careful person would have foreseen the risk (foreseeability) and whether the defendant acted unreasonably (negligence). Across conditions, we also varied the extent and content of additional information about defendant's subjective mental state: jurors were provided with evidence that the defendant either thought the risk of a harm was high or was low, or were not provided with such information. Foreseeability and negligence scores increased when mock jurors were told the defendant thought there was a high risk, and negligence scores decreased when the defendant thought there was a low risk, compared to when no background mental state information was provided. In Study 2, we replicated these findings by using mild (as opposed to severe) harm cases. In Study 3, we tested an intervention aimed at reducing jurors' reliance on mental states, which consisted in raising jurors' awareness of potential hindsight bias in their evaluations. The intervention reduced mock juror reliance on mental states when assessing foreseeability when the defendant was described as knowing of a high risk, an effect replicated in Study 4. This research demonstrates that jurors rely on mental states to assess breach, regardless of what the legal doctrine says.

A systematic review of the impact of future-oriented thinking on academic outcomes

Future-oriented thought is a broad construct that characterize the ability to generate mental representations of the future and project oneself into a variety of hypothetical states. It is well established that the degree to which one is focused more on the past, present, or future has a variety of implications on psychological functioning. This study focuses on the relationship between future-oriented thought and academic performance of students. To bridge this gap, we conducted the first systematic review investigating the benefit of future-oriented thought on promoting positive outcomes in academic settings. Our systematic review comprised 21 studies (k = 21). Results identified a clear relationship between future-oriented thought and positive outcomes in academic settings. Furthermore, our systematic review reveals important relationships between future-oriented thought and academic engagement, as well as future-oriented thought and academic performance. Our findings suggest that those who are more future-oriented demonstrate higher levels of academic engagement compared to those who were less future-oriented. Our findings suggest that probing and guiding students toward a future goal may increase their academic engagement and performance.

Evidence for Spinozan "Unbelieving" in the Right Inferior Prefrontal Cortex

Humans can think about possible states of the world without believing in them, an important capacity for high-level cognition. Here, we use fMRI and a novel "shell game" task to test two competing theories about the nature of belief and its neural basis. According to the Cartesian theory, information is first understood, then assessed for veracity, and ultimately encoded as either believed or not believed. According to the Spinozan theory, comprehension entails belief by default, such that understanding without believing requires an additional process of "unbelieving." Participants (n = 70) were experimentally induced to have beliefs, desires, or mere thoughts about hidden states of the shell game (e.g., believing that the dog is hidden in the upper right corner). That is, participants were induced to have specific "propositional attitudes" toward specific "propositions" in a controlled way. Consistent with the Spinozan theory, we found that thinking about a proposition without believing it is associated with increased activation of the right inferior frontal gyrus. This was true whether the hidden state was desired by the participant (because of reward) or merely thought about. These findings are consistent with a version of the Spinozan theory whereby unbelieving is an inhibitory control process. We consider potential implications of these results for the phenomena of delusional belief and wishful thinking.

The effect of episodic foresight on intertemporal decision-making: the role of future self-continuity and perceived control

To investigate the mechanism of episodic foresight of different valences on intertemporal decision-making, this study examined the mediating role of future self-continuity in the influence of episodic foresight on intertemporal decision-making and the moderating role of perceived control in two experiments. The results found that (1) future self-continuity mediated the effect of episodic foresight on individuals' intertemporal decision-making; and (2) perceived control moderated the indirect effect of episodic foresight on intertemporal decision-making through future self-continuity. Under low perceived control, individuals with positive episodic foresight had stronger future self-continuity and preferred future options, while individuals with negative episodic foresight had lower future self-continuity. In contrast, under high perceived control, individuals with different episodic foresight potencies did not show significant differences in their future self-continuity levels, but all showed higher levels and tended to choose the delayed option when faced with an intertemporal choice. From the perspective of the self-cognition, this study provided new insights into the relationship between episodic foresight and intertemporal decision-making and the psychological mechanisms of intertemporal decision-making.

Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny

Humans possess the remarkable capacity to imagine possible worlds and to demarcate possibilities and impossibilities in reasoning. We can think about what might happen in the future and consider what the present would look like had the past turned out differently. We reason about cause and effect, weigh up alternative courses of action and regret our mistakes. In this theme issue, leading experts from across the life sciences provide ground-breaking insights into the proximate questions of how thinking about possibilities works and develops, and the ultimate questions of its adaptive functions and evolutionary history. Together, the contributions delineate neurophysiological, cognitive and social mechanisms involved in mentally simulating possible states of reality; and point to conceptual changes in the understanding of singular and multiple possibilities during human development. The contributions also demonstrate how thinking about possibilities can augment learning, decision-making and judgement, and highlight aspects of the capacity that appear to be shared with non-human animals and aspects that may be uniquely human. Throughout the issue, it becomes clear that many developmental milestones achieved during childhood, and many of the most significant evolutionary and cultural triumphs of the human species, can only be understood with reference to increasingly complex reasoning about possibilities. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.

Intertemporal choice reflects value comparison rather than self-control: insights from confidence judgements

Intertemporal decision-making has long been assumed to measure self-control, with prominent theories treating choices of smaller, sooner rewards as failed attempts to override immediate temptation. If this view is correct, people should be more confident in their intertemporal decisions when they 'successfully' delay gratification than when they do not. In two pre-registered experiments with built-in replication, adult participants (n = 117) made monetary intertemporal choices and rated their confidence in having made the right decisions. Contrary to assumptions of the self-control account, confidence was not higher when participants chose delayed rewards. Rather, participants were more confident in their decisions when possible rewards were further apart in time-discounted subjective value, closer to the present, and larger in magnitude. Demonstrating metacognitive insight, participants were more confident in decisions that better aligned with their separate valuation of possible rewards. Decisions made with less confidence were more prone to changes-of-mind and more susceptible to a patience-enhancing manipulation. Together, our results establish that confidence in intertemporal choice tracks uncertainty in estimating and comparing the value of possible rewards-just as it does in decisions unrelated to self-control. Our findings challenge self-control views and instead cast intertemporal choice as a form of value-based decision-making about future possibilities. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.

Imagining emotional events benefits future-oriented decisions

How does imagining future events-whether positive or negative-influence our choices in the present? Prior work has shown the simulation of hypothetical future events, dubbed episodic future thinking, can alter the propensity to engage in delay discounting (the tendency to devalue future rewards) and does so in a valence-specific manner. Some research shows that positive episodic future thinking reduces delay discounting, whereas negative future thinking augments it. However, more recent research indicates that both positive and negative episodic future thinking reduce delay discounting, suggesting an effect of episodic future thinking that is independent of valence. In this study, we sought to replicate and extend these latter findings. Here, participants (N = 604; N = 572 after exclusions) completed an online study. In the baseline task, participants completed a delay discounting task. In the experimental task, they engaged in episodic future thinking before completing a second delay discounting task. Participants were randomly assigned to engage in either positive, neutral, or negative episodic future thinking. In accordance with Bulley et al., we found that episodic future thinking, regardless of valence, reduced delay discounting. Although episodic future thinking shifted decision-making in all conditions, the effect was stronger when participants engaged in positive episodic future thinking, even after accounting for personal relevance and vividness of imagined events. These findings suggest that episodic future thinking may promote future-oriented choices by contextualising the future, and this effect is further strengthened when the future is tied to positive emotion.

Future thinking and managers’ innovative behavior: an experimental study

Purpose

Does future thinking enhance managers’ innovative behavior? This study aims to posit that the ability to project events while considering current/future variables and their development (i.e. future thinking) – inextricably linked with the knowledge creation process – may enhance the manager’s accuracy and the number of potentially successful innovative ideas for organizations.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors use a between-group experiment to examine the innovation choices of 47 subjects with experience in evaluating the market potential of new products when asked to support or otherwise reject real-life innovation-related ideas. The authors test the accuracy of decisions made by participants primed to apply future thinking, practically implemented through abductive reasoning, in their decision-making.

Findings

The authors found a significant change in managers’ innovative choices, with participants primed for future thinking making significantly more accurate decisions than the control group. Those participants both correctly chose innovation-related ideas with significant future potential and rejected ideas with limited potential that ultimately failed.

Originality/value

This study explores how future thinking enhances managers’ innovative behavior in organizations. It provides empirical evidence on how future thinking, practiced through abductive reasoning, can work to foster innovative behavior, which is an antecedent of knowledge creation. Organizations that foster future thinking concurrently create knowledge, increasing their competitive advantage in the long run.

How Imagination and Memory Shape the Moral Mind

Interdisciplinary research has proposed a multifaceted view of human cognition and morality, establishing that inputs from multiple cognitive and affective processes guide moral decisions. However, extant work on moral cognition has largely overlooked the contributions of episodic representation. The ability to remember or imagine a specific moment in time plays a broadly influential role in cognition and behavior. Yet, existing research has only begun exploring the influence of episodic representation on moral cognition. Here, we evaluate the theoretical connections between episodic representation and moral cognition, review emerging empirical work revealing how episodic representation affects moral decision-making, and conclude by highlighting gaps in the literature and open questions. We argue that a comprehensive model of moral cognition will require including the episodic memory system, further delineating its direct influence on moral thought, and better understanding its interactions with other mental processes to fundamentally shape our sense of right and wrong.

A Predictive Processing Model of Episodic Memory and Time Perception

Human perception and experience of time are strongly influenced by ongoing stimulation, memory of past experiences, and required task context. When paying attention to time, time experience seems to expand; when distracted, it seems to contract. When considering time based on memory, the experience may be different than what is in the moment, exemplified by sayings like "time flies when you're having fun." Experience of time also depends on the content of perceptual experience-rapidly changing or complex perceptual scenes seem longer in duration than less dynamic ones. The complexity of interactions among attention, memory, and perceptual stimulation is a likely reason that an overarching theory of time perception has been difficult to achieve. Here, we introduce a model of perceptual processing and episodic memory that makes use of hierarchical predictive coding, short-term plasticity, spatiotemporal attention, and episodic memory formation and recall, and apply this model to the problem of human time perception. In an experiment with approximately 13,000 human participants, we investigated the effects of memory, cognitive load, and stimulus content on duration reports of dynamic natural scenes up to about 1 minute long. Using our model to generate duration estimates, we compared human and model performance. Model-based estimates replicated key qualitative biases, including differences by cognitive load (attention), scene type (stimulation), and whether the judgment was made based on current or remembered experience (memory). Our work provides a comprehensive model of human time perception and a foundation for exploring the computational basis of episodic memory within a hierarchical predictive coding framework.

Simulating the best and worst of times: the powers and perils of emotional simulation

We are remarkably capable of simulating events that we have never experienced. These simulated events often paint an emotional picture to behold, such as the best and worst possible outcomes that we might face. This review synthesises dispersed literature exploring the role of emotion in simulation. Drawing from work that suggests that simulations can influence our preferences, decision-making, and prosociality, we argue for a critical role of emotion in informing the consequences of simulation. We further unpack burgeoning evidence suggesting that the effects of emotional simulation transcend the laboratory. We propose avenues by which emotional simulation may be harnessed for both personal and collective good in applied contexts. We conclude by offering important future directions.

Integrating Reward Information for Prospective Behavior

Value-based decision-making is often studied in a static context, where participants decide which option to select from those currently available. However, everyday life often involves an additional dimension: deciding when to select to maximize reward. Recent evidence suggests that agents track the latent reward of an option, updating changes in their latent reward estimate, to achieve appropriate selection timing (latent reward tracking). However, this strategy can be difficult to distinguish from one in which the optimal selection time is estimated in advance, allowing an agent to wait a predetermined amount of time before selecting, without needing to monitor an option's latent reward (distance-to-goal tracking). Here, we show that these strategies can in principle be dissociated. Human brain activity was recorded using electroencephalography (EEG), while female and male participants performed a novel decision task. Participants were shown an option and decided when to select it, as its latent reward changed from trial-to-trial. While the latent reward was uncued, it could be estimated using cued information about the option's starting value and value growth rate. We then used representational similarity analysis (RSA) to assess whether EEG signals more closely resembled latent reward tracking or distance-to-goal tracking. This approach successfully dissociated the strategies in this task. Starting value and growth rate were translated into a distance-to-goal signal, far in advance of selecting the option. Latent reward could not be independently decoded. These results demonstrate the feasibility of using high temporal resolution neural recordings to identify internally computed decision variables in the human brain.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Reward-seeking behavior involves acting at the right time. However, the external world does not always tell us when an action is most rewarding, necessitating internal representations that guide action timing. Specifying this internal neural representation is challenging because it might stem from a variety of strategies, many of which make similar predictions about brain activity. This study used a novel approach to test whether alternative strategies could be dissociated in principle. Using representational similarity analysis (RSA), we were able to distinguish between candidate internal representations for selection timing. This shows how pattern analysis methods can be used to measure latent decision information in noninvasive neural data.

On the evolution of a functional approach to memory

In an analysis of memory systems, Sherry and Schacter (Psychological Review, 94, 439-454, 1987) emphasized the importance of functional and evolutionary considerations for characterizing mechanisms of memory. The present article considers four different yet closely related topics from more recent research in which similar considerations have played a prominent role in shaping both experiment and theory: the seven sins of memory, mechanisms underlying memory misattribution errors, the role of memory in imagining future experiences, and the relation between associative inference and memory errors. These lines of research illustrate the usefulness of attempting to integrate functional and mechanistic considerations, in line with the general approach articulated by Sherry and Schacter.

Implicit motives as the missing link between visionary leadership, approach and avoidance motivation, and vision pursuit

An unresolved question in visionary leadership research is, why must visions be high in imagery to cause affective reactions and be motivationally effective? Research in motivation psychology has shown that pictorial cues arouse implicit motives. Thus, pictorial cues from vision-induced imagery should arouse a follower’s implicit motives just like a real image. Hence, our fundamental proposition is that follower implicit motives and follower approach motivation serially mediate the relationship between leader vision and followers’ vision pursuit. We also examine the case of negative leader visions, with the central propositions that a negative leader vision arouses a follower’s implicit fear motives and that the follower’s implicit fear motives and follower avoidance motivation serially mediate the relationship between negative leader vision and the follower’s fear-related behaviors. Lastly, we assert that multiple implicit follower motives aroused by a multithematic leader vision exert additive as well as interaction effects on the follower’s vision pursuit. Plain Language Summary An unresolved question in leader vision research concerns why visions need to be high in imagery in order to elicit affective reactions in followers and be motivationally effective? Research in motivation psychology has shown that pictorial cues can arouse a person's implicit motives. It would thus be reasonable to expect that pictorial cues from leader vision-induced imagery arouse a follower's implicit motives just like a real image. Based on this reasoning, our key proposition is that follower implicit motives and follower approach motivation serially mediate the relationship between leader vision and followers' vision pursuit. We also integrate the special case of negative leader visions into our theorizing, with the central propositions that a negative leader vision arouses a follower's implicit fear motives, and that the follower's implicit fear motives and follower avoidance motivation serially mediate the relationship between negative leader vision and the follower's fear-related behaviors. Lastly, based on the distinction between mono- and multithematic visions, the latter of which with the potential to arouse more than one implicit motive simultaneously, we assert that multiple implicit follower motives aroused by a multithematic leader vision exert additive as well as interaction effects on the follower's vision pursuit.

Subjective Time in Dementia: A Critical Review

The capacity for subjective time in humans encompasses the perception of time's unfolding from moment to moment, as well as the ability to traverse larger temporal expanses of past- and future-oriented thought via mental time travel. Disruption in time perception can result in maladaptive outcomes-from the innocuous lapse in timing that leads to a burnt piece of toast, to the grievous miscalculation that produces a traffic accident-while disruption to mental time travel can impact core functions from planning appointments to making long-term decisions. Mounting evidence suggests that disturbances to both time perception and mental time travel are prominent in dementia syndromes. Given that such disruptions can have severe consequences for independent functioning in everyday life, here we aim to provide a comprehensive exposition of subjective timing dysfunction in dementia, with a view to informing the management of such disturbances. We consider the neurocognitive mechanisms underpinning changes to both time perception and mental time travel across different dementia disorders. Moreover, we explicate the functional implications of altered subjective timing by reference to two key and representative adaptive capacities: prospective memory and intertemporal decision-making. Overall, our review sheds light on the transdiagnostic implications of subjective timing disturbances in dementia and highlights the high variability in performance across clinical syndromes and functional domains.

The effects of cueing episodic future thinking on delay discounting in children, adolescents, and adults

Discounting the value of delayed rewards such that even a relatively small, immediately available reward is preferred to a larger delayed reward is a commonly observed human trait. Children are particularly steep discounters of delayed rewards as evidenced by delay of gratification studies. In recent years, however, a growing literature indicates that cueing individuals to imagine personal future events attenuates their discounting of delayed rewards. The present studies extend this literature by examining whether cueing future thinking promotes patient choices in children and adolescents. In Experiment 1 we found that cueing future thinking had no effect on 8-11-year-olds' (n = 177) delay discounting of either real or hypothetical rewards. In Experiment 2 we found that cueing adolescents (12-14-year-olds, n = 126) and adults (n = 122) to think about personal future events decreased their discounting of delayed rewards relative to three other conditions: a no cue control, an episodic memory condition and a novel 'future other' condition in which individuals imagine future events that might happen to a significant other person in their life. Cueing adults and adolescents to think about personal future events did not however affect how connected they felt to their future selves or their subjective sense of how close future time points felt to them - two constructs that have previously been shown to be related to delay discounting.

A long time ago in a galaxy far, far away: How temporal are episodic contents?

A prominent feature of mental event (i.e. 'episodic') simulations is their temporal orientation: human adults can generate episodic representations directed towards the past or the future. Here, we investigated how the temporal orientation of imagined events relates to the contents of these events. Is there something intrinsically temporal about episodic contents? Or does their temporality rely on a distinct set of representations? In three experiments (N = 360), we asked participants to generate and later recall a series of imagined events differing in (1) location, (2) time of day, (3) temporal orientation, and (4) weekday. We then tested to what extent successful recall of episodic content (i.e. (1) and (2)) would predict recall of temporality and/or weekday information. Results showed that recall of temporal orientation was only weakly predicted by recall of episodic contents. Nonetheless, temporal orientation was more strongly predicted by content recall than weekday recall. This finding suggests that episodic simulations are unlikely to be intrinsically temporal in nature. Instead, similar to other forms of temporal information, temporal orientation might be determined from such contents by reconstructive post-retrieval processes. These results have implications for how the human ability to 'mentally travel' in time is cognitively implemented.

Pairing facts with imagined consequences improves pandemic-related risk perception

The COVID-19 pandemic reached staggering new peaks during a global resurgence more than a year after the crisis began. Although public health guidelines initially helped to slow the spread of disease, widespread pandemic fatigue and prolonged harm to financial stability and mental well-being contributed to this resurgence. In the late stage of the pandemic, it became clear that new interventions were needed to support long-term behavior change. Here, we examined subjective perceived risk about COVID-19 and the relationship between perceived risk and engagement in risky behaviors. In study 1 (n = 303), we found that subjective perceived risk was likely inaccurate but predicted compliance with public health guidelines. In study 2 (n = 735), we developed a multifaceted intervention designed to realign perceived risk with actual risk. Participants completed an episodic simulation task; we expected that imagining a COVID-related scenario would increase the salience of risk information and enhance behavior change. Immediately following the episodic simulation, participants completed a risk estimation task with individualized feedback about local viral prevalence. We found that information prediction error, a measure of surprise, drove beneficial change in perceived risk and willingness to engage in risky activities. Imagining a COVID-related scenario beforehand enhanced the effect of prediction error on learning. Importantly, our intervention produced lasting effects that persisted after a 1- to 3-wk delay. Overall, we describe a fast and feasible online intervention that effectively changed beliefs and intentions about risky behaviors.

A story to tell: the role of narratives in reducing delay discounting for people who strongly discount the future

Delay Discounting (DD) or devaluing a future, larger reward in favour of a smaller, more immediate reward, has been linked to negative health behaviours. One intervention that reduces DD is Episodic Future Thinking (EFT). EFT has participants generate cues representing positive future events that correspond to temporal windows during the DD task. The current study examined if incorporating EFT cues into narratives would strengthen effects on DD. One hundred and sixty adults were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and were randomised to traditional or narrative EFT. Results showed that participants in narrative EFT discounted the future less (p = 0.034) than participants who engaged in traditional EFT. This novel approach to EFT is well grounded in research and theory on the power of narratives to influence behaviour and can open a new window into ways to reduce DD to strengthen engagement in positive choices.

From many to (n)one: Meditation and the plasticity of the predictive mind

How profoundly can humans change their own minds? In this paper we offer a unifying account of deconstructive meditation under the predictive processing view. We start from simple axioms. First, the brain makes predictions based on past experience, both phylogenetic and ontogenetic. Second, deconstructive meditation brings one closer to the here and now by disengaging anticipatory processes. We propose that practicing meditation therefore gradually reduces counterfactual temporally deep cognition, until all conceptual processing falls away, unveiling a state of pure awareness. Our account also places three main styles of meditation (focused attention, open monitoring, and non-dual) on a single continuum, where each technique relinquishes increasingly engrained habits of prediction, including the predicted self. This deconstruction can also permit certain insights by making the above processes available to introspection. Our framework is consistent with the state of empirical and (neuro)phenomenological evidence and illuminates the top-down plasticity of the predictive mind. Experimental rigor, neurophenomenology, and no-report paradigms are needed to further understanding of how meditation affects predictive processing and the self.

Explaining socioeconomic disparities in health behaviours: A review of biopsychological pathways involving stress and inflammation

The purpose of this article was to explore how individuals' position in a socioeconomic hierarchy is related to health behaviours that are related to socioeconomic disparities in health. We identified research which shows that: (a) low socioeconomic status (SES) is associated with living in harsh environments, (b) harsh environments are related to increased levels of stress and inflammation, (c) stress and inflammation impact neural systems involved in self-control by sensitising the impulsive system and desensitising the reflective system, (d) the effects are inflated valuations of small immediate rewards and deflated valuations of larger delayed rewards, (e) these effects are observed as increased delay discounting, and (f) delay discounting is positively associated with practicing more unhealthy behaviours. The results are discussed within an adaptive evolutionary framework which lays out how the stress response system, and its interaction with the immune system and brain systems for decision-making and behaviours, provides the biopsychological mechanisms and regulatory shifts that make widespread conditional adaptability possible. Consequences for policy work, interventions, and future research are discussed.

Future-Orientation (as Trait and State) Promotes Reputation-Protective Choice in Moral Dilemmas

By neglecting the lifelong importance of having a good reputation, humans can profit in the short run from immoral behavior. Thus, reputation-protection is an intertemporal choice. In three preregistered studies ( N = 1,492 Americans), we tested the hypothesis that future-orientation would increase people’s willingness to protect their reputation from harm. In hypothetical scenarios, people had to choose whether they would pay an immediate cost to prevent a devastating rumor from spreading. Study 1 found a positive correlation between future-orientation and reputation-protection. Study 2 manipulated time perspective experimentally and found that future focus (vs. present focus) had a positive and causal effect on reputation-protection. Study 3 was a high-powered replication, showing that the effect of future focus on reputation-protective choice was robust and mediated by reputational concern. In line with common advice around the world of protecting one’s reputation from harm, one way people may achieve that goal is to think about the future before acting.

Willpower with and without effort

Most authors who discuss willpower assume that everyone knows what it is, but our assumptions differ to such an extent that we talk past each other. We agree that willpower is the psychological function that resists temptations - variously known as impulses, addictions, or bad habits; that it operates simultaneously with temptations, without prior commitment; and that use of it is limited by its cost, commonly called effort, as well as by the person's skill at executive functioning. However, accounts are usually not clear about how motivation functions during the application of willpower, or how motivation is related to effort. Some accounts depict willpower as the perceiving or formation of motivational contingencies that outweigh the temptation, and some depict it as a continuous use of mechanisms that interfere with re-weighing the temptation. Some others now suggest that impulse control can bypass motivation altogether, although they refer to this route as habit rather than willpower.It is argued here that willpower should be recognized as either or both of two distinct functions, which can be called resolve and suppression. Resolve is based on interpretation of a current choice as a test case for a broader set of future choices, which puts at stake more than the outcome of the current choice. Suppression is inhibiting valuation of (modulating) and/or keeping attention from (filtering) immediate alternatives to a current intention. Perception of current choices as test cases for broader outcomes may result in reliable preference for these outcomes, which is experienced as an effortless habit - a successful result of resolve, not an alternative method of self-control. Some possible brain imaging correlates are reviewed.

Future preferences and prospection of future of outcomes: Independent yet specific associations with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder

INTRODUCTION

Symptoms of attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and conduct problems have been associated with heightened temporal discounting of reward value resulting in a preference for immediate over delayed outcomes. We examined the cross-sectional relationship between future preference (including intertemporal choice) and prospection (the ability to bring to mind and imagine the experience of future personally-relevant events and outcomes) in adolescents with a range of ADHD symptoms and aggressive behaviour.

METHODS

A combination of behavioural tasks and self-reports measured intertemporal decision making, individual differences in preference for future outcomes and experience of prospection in a convenience sample of English adolescents aged 11-17 (n = 64, 43.8% males). Parents rated symptoms of ADHD and aggression.

RESULTS

& Conclusions: Factor analysis identified two factors: "Future Preference" and "Prospection". Significant negative bivariate correlations were found between ADHD and the scores of both factors and between aggression and Future Preference. A path model confirmed the independent significant association of ADHD with both factors but not with aggression. There was no evidence that Prospection was associated with Future Preference or that it reduced the associations between ADHD symptoms and Future Preference. These results provide further evidence that ADHD is associated with a tendency to prefer immediate over future outcomes. The same association with aggression seemed to be driven by the overlap with ADHD symptoms. We provide some of the first evidence that individuals with high ADHD symptoms have difficulty in prospecting about future episodes. However, this is unrelated to their preference for future outcomes.

Neural and behavioral correlates of episodic memory are associated with temporal discounting in older adults

When facing decisions involving trade-offs between smaller, sooner and larger, delayed rewards, people tend to discount the value of future rewards. There are substantial individual differences in this tendency toward temporal discounting, however. One neurocognitive system that may underlie these individual differences is episodic memory, given the overlap in the neural circuitry involved in imagining the future and remembering the past. Here we tested this hypothesis in older adults, including both those that were cognitively normal and those with amnestic mild cognitive impairment (MCI). We found that performance on neuropsychological measures of episodic memory retrieval was associated with temporal discounting, such that people with better memory discounted delayed rewards less. This relationship was specific to episodic memory and temporal discounting, since executive function (another cognitive ability) was unrelated to temporal discounting, and episodic memory was unrelated to risk tolerance (another decision-making preference). We also examined cortical thickness and volume in medial temporal lobe regions critical for episodic memory. Entorhinal cortical thickness was associated with reduced temporal discounting, with episodic memory performance partially mediating this association. The inclusion of MCI participants was critical to revealing these associations between episodic memory and entorhinal cortical thickness and temporal discounting. These effects were larger in the MCI group, reduced after controlling for MCI status, and statistically significant only when including MCI participants in analyses. Overall, these findings suggest that individual differences in temporal discounting are driven by episodic memory function, and that a decline in medial temporal lobe structural integrity may impact temporal discounting.

Is it time? Episodic imagining and the discounting of delayed and probabilistic rewards in young and older adults

Remembering and imagining specific, personal experiences can help shape our decisions. For example, cues to imagine future events can reduce delay discounting (i.e., increase the subjective value of future rewards). It is not known, however, whether such cues can also modulate other forms of reward discounting, such as probability discounting (i.e., the decrease in the subjective value of a possible reward as the odds against its occurrence increase). In addition, it is unclear whether there are age-related differences in the effects of cueing on either delay or probability discounting. Accordingly, young and older adult participants were administered delay and probability discounting tasks both with and without cues to imagine specific, personally meaningful events. As expected, cued episodic imagining decreased the discounting of delayed rewards. Notably, however, this effect was significantly less pronounced in older adults. In contrast to the effects of cueing on delay discounting, personally relevant event cues had little or no effect on the discounting of probabilistic rewards in either young or older adults; Bayesian analysis revealed compelling support for the null hypothesis that event cues do not modulate the subjective value of probabilistic rewards. In sum, imagining future events appears only to affect decisions involving delayed rewards. Although the cueing effect is smaller in older adults, nevertheless, it likely contributes to how adults of all ages evaluate delayed rewards and thus, it is, in fact, about time.

Functions of spontaneous and voluntary future thinking: evidence from subjective ratings

Future thinking is defined as the ability to withdraw from reality and mentally project oneself into the future. The primary aim of the present study was to examine whether functions of future thoughts differed depending on their mode of elicitation (spontaneous or voluntary) and an attribute of goal-relatedness (selected-goal-related or selected-goal-unrelated). After producing spontaneous and voluntary future thoughts in a laboratory paradigm, participants provided ratings on four proposed functions of future thinking (self, directive, social, and emotional regulation). Findings showed that spontaneous and voluntary future thoughts were rated similarly on all functions except the directive function, which was particularly relevant to spontaneous future thoughts. Future thoughts classed as goal-related (selected-goal-related) were rated higher across all functions, and there was largely no interaction between mode of elicitation and goal-relatedness. A higher proportion of spontaneous future thoughts were selected-goal-related compared with voluntary future thoughts. In general, these results indicate that future thinking has significant roles across affective, behavioural, self and social functions, and supports theoretical views that implicate spontaneous future thought in goal-directed cognition and behaviour.

Links between autobiographical memory richness and temporal discounting in older adults

When making choices between smaller, sooner rewards and larger, later ones, people tend to discount future outcomes. Individual differences in temporal discounting in older adults have been associated with episodic memory abilities and entorhinal cortical thickness. The cause of this association between better memory and more future-oriented choice remains unclear, however. One possibility is that people with perceptually richer recollections are more patient because they also imagine the future more vividly. Alternatively, perhaps people whose memories focus more on the meaning of events (i.e., are more "gist-based") show reduced temporal discounting, since imagining the future depends on interactions between semantic and episodic memory. We examined which categories of episodic details - perception-based or gist-based - are associated with temporal discounting in older adults. Older adults whose autobiographical memories were richer in perception-based details showed reduced temporal discounting. Furthermore, in an exploratory neuroanatomical analysis, both discount rates and perception-based details correlated with entorhinal cortical thickness. Retrieving autobiographical memories before choice did not affect temporal discounting, however, suggesting that activating episodic memory circuitry at the time of choice is insufficient to alter discounting in older adults. These findings elucidate the role of episodic memory in decision making, which will inform interventions to nudge intertemporal choices.

Facilitating Episodic Simulation in Anxiety: Role of Sensory Scaffolding and Scenario Modality

Cognitive bias modification of interpretation style (CBM-I) is a family of cognitive training programs that seek to reduce anxious thinking by training people to assign relatively more positive meanings to ambiguous situations. CBM-I’s effects may be enhanced by encouraging more vivid imagery-based episodic simulation of events and by increasing engagement with the training materials. This study investigated the role of sensory scaffolding (whether pictures, or pictures + sound were added) and verbal scenario modality (whether scenarios were delivered visually or aurally) on episodic simulation (Vivid; Plausible; Changing Perspective ratings) and user engagement (Relatable, Comprehensible, Enjoyable ratings). Amazon Mechanical Turk workers (N = 187) with varied anxiety symptom severity read or listened to brief scenarios that varied by sensory scaffolding and verbal scenario modality. Results were somewhat mixed. Generally, picture scaffolding tended to facilitate both episodic simulation and user engagement (relative to no scaffolding), irrespective of scenario modality and anxiety level.

Children's future-oriented cognition

Children's future-oriented cognition has become a well-established area of research over the last decade. Future-oriented cognition encompasses a range of processes, including those involved in conceiving the future, imagining and preparing for future events, and making decisions that will affect how the future unfolds. We consider recent empirical advances in the study of such processes by outlining key findings that have yielded a clearer picture of how future thinking emerges and changes over childhood. Our interest in future thinking stems from a broader interest in temporal cognition, and we argue that a consideration of developmental changes in how children understand and represent time itself provides a valuable framework in which to study future-oriented cognition.

Zooming In and Out on One's Life: Autobiographical Representations at Multiple Time Scales

The ability to decouple from the present environment and explore other times is a central feature of the human mind. Research in cognitive psychology and neuroscience has shown that the personal past and future is represented at multiple timescales and levels of resolution, from broad lifetime periods that span years to short-time slices of experience that span seconds. Here, I review this evidence and propose a theoretical framework for understanding mental time travel as the capacity to flexibly navigate hierarchical layers of autobiographical representations. On this view, past and future thoughts rely on two main systems-event simulation and autobiographical knowledge-that allow us to represent experiential contents that are decoupled from sensory input and to place these on a personal timeline scaffolded from conceptual knowledge of the content and structure of our life. The neural basis of this cognitive architecture is discussed, emphasizing the possible role of the medial pFC in integrating layers of autobiographical representations in the service of mental time travel.

Deliberating trade-offs with the future

Many fundamental choices in life are intertemporal: they involve trade-offs between sooner and later outcomes. In recent years there has been a surge of interest into how people make intertemporal decisions, given that such decisions are ubiquitous in everyday life and central in domains from substance use to climate change action. While it is clear that people make decisions according to rules, intuitions and habits, they also commonly deliberate over their options, thinking through potential outcomes and reflecting on their own preferences. In this Perspective, we bring to bear recent research into the higher-order capacities that underpin deliberation-particularly those that enable people to think about the future (prospection) and their own thinking (metacognition)-to shed light on intertemporal decision-making. We show how a greater appreciation for these mechanisms of deliberation promises to advance our understanding of intertemporal decision-making and unify a wide range of otherwise disparate choice phenomena.