Self-Other Mergence in the Frontal Cortex during Cooperation and Competition

Post-interaction neuroplasticity of inter-brain networks underlies the development of social relationship

Inter-brain coupling has been increasingly recognized for its role in supporting connectedness during social communication. Here we investigate whether inter-brain coupling is plastic and persists beyond the offset of social interaction, facilitating the emergence of social closeness. Dyads were concurrently scanned using functional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) while engaging in a task that involved movement synchronization. To assess post-interaction neuroplasticity, participants performed a baseline condition with no interaction before and after the interaction. The results reveal heightened inter-brain coupling in neural networks comprising the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex in the post-task compared to the pre-task baseline. Critically, the right IFG emerged as a highly connected hub, with post-task inter-brain coupling in this region predicting the levels of motivation to connect socially. We suggest that post-interactions inter-brain coupling may reflect consolidation of socially related cues, underscoring the role of inter-brain plasticity in fundamental aspects of relationship development.

The future of metacognition research: Balancing construct breadth with measurement rigor

Foundational work in the psychology of metacognition identified a distinction between metacognitive knowledge (stable beliefs about one's capacities) and metacognitive experiences (local evaluations of performance). More recently, the field has focused on developing tasks and metrics that seek to identify metacognitive capacities from momentary estimates of confidence in performance, and providing precise computational accounts of metacognitive failure. However, this notable progress in formalising models of metacognitive judgments may come at a cost of ignoring broader elements of the psychology of metacognition - such as how stable meta-knowledge is formed, how social cognition and metacognition interact, and how we evaluate affective states that do not have an obvious ground truth. We propose that construct breadth in metacognition research can be restored while maintaining rigour in measurement, and highlight promising avenues for expanding the scope of metacognition research. Such a research programme is well placed to recapture qualitative features of metacognitive knowledge and experience while maintaining the psychophysical rigor that characterises modern research on confidence and performance monitoring.

Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis

Determining the psychological, computational, and neural bases of confidence and uncertainty holds promise for understanding foundational aspects of human metacognition. While a neuroscience of confidence has focused on the mechanisms underpinning subpersonal phenomena such as representations of uncertainty in the visual or motor system, metacognition research has been concerned with personal-level beliefs and knowledge about self-performance. I provide a road map for bridging this divide by focusing on a particular class of confidence computation: propositional confidence in one's own (hypothetical) decisions or actions. Propositional confidence is informed by the observer's models of the world and their cognitive system, which may be more or less accurate-thus explaining why metacognitive judgments are inferential and sometimes diverge from task performance. Disparate findings on the neural basis of uncertainty and performance monitoring are integrated into a common framework, and a new understanding of the locus of action of metacognitive interventions is developed.

Influence of interpersonal distance on collaborative performance in the joint Simon task-An fNIRS-based hyperscanning study

Collaboration is a critical skill in everyday life. It has been suggested that collaborative performance may be influenced by social factors such as interpersonal distance, which is defined as the perceived psychological distance between individuals. Previous literature has reported that close interpersonal distance may promote the level of self-other integration between interacting members, and in turn, enhance collaborative performance. These studies mainly focused on interdependent collaboration, which requires high levels of shared representations and self-other integration. However, little is known about the effect of interpersonal distance on independent collaboration (e.g., the joint Simon task), in which individuals perform the task independently while the final outcome is determined by the parties. To address this issue, we simultaneously measured the frontal activations of ninety-four pairs of participants using a functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS)-based hyperscanning technique while they performed a joint Simon task. Behavioral results showed that the Joint Simon Effect (JSE), defined as the RT difference between incongruent and congruent conditions indicating the level of self-other integration between collaborators, was larger in the friend group than in the stranger group. Consistently, the inter-brain neural synchronization (INS) across the dorsolateral and medial parts of the prefrontal cortex was also stronger in the friend group. In addition, INS in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex negatively predicted JSE only in the friend group. These results suggest that close interpersonal distance may enhance the shared mental representation among collaborators, which in turn influences their collaborative performance.

The Causal Role of Temporoparietal Junction in Mediating Self-Other Mergence during Mentalizing

Mentalizing is a core faculty of human social behaviors that involves inferring the cognitive states of others. This process necessitates adopting an allocentric perspective and suppressing one's egocentric perspective, referred to as self-other distinction (SOD). Meanwhile, individuals may project their own cognitive states onto others in prosocial behaviors, a process known as self-other mergence (SOM). It remains unclear how the two opposing processes coexist during mentalizing. We here combined functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) techniques with intranasal oxytocin (OTint) as a probe to examine the SOM effect in healthy male human participants, during which they attributed the cognitive states of decision confidence to an anonymous partner. Our results showed that OTint facilitated SOM via the left temporoparietal junction (lTPJ), but did not affect neural representations of internal information about others' confidence in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, which might be dedicated to SOD, although the two brain regions, importantly, have been suggested to be involved in mentalizing. Further, the SOM effect induced by OTint was fully mediated by the lTPJ activities and became weakened when the lTPJ activities were suppressed by rTMS. These findings suggest that the lTPJ might play a vital role in mediating SOM during mentalizing.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Every human mind is unique. It is critical to distinguish the minds of others from the self. On the contrary, we often project the current mental states of the self onto others; that is to say, self-other mergence (SOM). The neural mechanism underlying SOM remains unclear. We here used intranasal oxytocin (OTint) as a probe to leverage SOM, which is typically suppressed during mentalizing. We revealed that OTint specifically modulated the left temporoparietal junction (lTPJ) neural activities to fully mediate the SOM effect, while suppressing the lTPJ neural activities by transcranial magnetic stimulations causally attenuated the SOM effect. Our results demonstrate that the lTPJ might mediate SOM during social interactions.

Causal role of a neural system for separating and selecting multidimensional social cognitive information

People are multi-faceted, typically good at some things but bad at others, and a critical aspect of social judgement is the ability to focus on those traits relevant for the task at hand. However, it remains unknown how the brain supports such context-dependent social judgement. Here, we examine how people represent multidimensional individuals, and how the brain extracts relevant information and filters out irrelevant information when comparing individuals within a specific dimension. Using human fMRI, we identify distinct neural representations in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and anterior insula (AI) supporting separation and selection of information for context-dependent social judgement. Causal evaluation using non-invasive brain stimulation shows that AI disruption alters the impact of relevant information on social comparison, whereas dmPFC disruption only affects the impact of irrelevant information. This neural circuit is distinct from the one supporting integration across, as opposed to separation of, different features of a multidimensional cognitive space.

Neural Basis of Social Influence of Observing Other's Perception in Dot-Number Estimation

Our perceptions and decisions are often implicitly influenced by observing another's actions. However, it is unclear how observing other people's perceptual decisions without interacting with them can engage the processing of self-other discrepancies and change the observer's decisions. In this study, we employed functional magnetic resonance imaging and a computational model to investigate the neural basis of how unilaterally observing the other's perceptual decisions modulated one's own decisions. The experimental task was to discriminate whether the number of presented dots was higher or lower than a reference number. The participants performed the task solely while unilaterally observing the performance of another "participant," who produced overestimations and underestimations in the same task in separate sessions. Results of the behavioral analysis showed that the participants' decisions were modulated to resemble those of the other. Image analysis based on computational model revealed that the activation in the medial prefrontal cortex was associated with the discrepancy between the inferred participant's and the presented other's decisions. In addition, the number-sensitive region in the superior parietal region showed altered activation patterns after observing the other's overestimations and underestimations. The activity of the superior parietal region was not involved in assessing the observation of other's perceptual decisions, but it was engaged in plain numerosity perception. These results suggest that computational modeling can capture the neuro-behavioral processing of self-other discrepancies in perception followed by the activity modulation in the number-sensitive region in the task of dot-number estimation.

Neuronal mechanisms of dynamic strategic competition

Competitive social interactions, as in chess or poker, often involve multiple moves and countermoves deployed tactically within a broader strategic plan. Such maneuvers are supported by mentalizing or theory-of-mind-reasoning about the beliefs, plans, and goals of an opponent. The neuronal mechanisms underlying strategic competition remain largely unknown. To address this gap, we studied humans and monkeys playing a virtual soccer game featuring continuous competitive interactions. Humans and monkeys deployed similar tactics within broadly identical strategies, which featured unpredictable trajectories and precise timing for kickers, and responsiveness to opponents for goalies. We used Gaussian Process (GP) classification to decompose continuous gameplay into a series of discrete decisions predicated on the evolving states of self and opponent. We extracted relevant model parameters as regressors for neuronal activity in macaque mid-superior temporal sulcus (mSTS), the putative homolog of human temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), an area selectively engaged during strategic social interactions. We discovered two spatially-segregated populations of mSTS neurons that signaled actions of self and opponent, sensitivities to state changes, and previous and current trial outcomes. Inactivating mSTS reduced kicker unpredictability and impaired goalie responsiveness. These findings demonstrate mSTS neurons multiplex information about the current states of self and opponent as well as history of previous interactions to support ongoing strategic competition, consistent with hemodynamic activity found in human TPJ.

A Role for Uncertainty in the Neural Distinction Between Social and Nonsocial Thought

Neuroimaging research has identified a network of brain regions that is consistently more engaged when people think about the minds of other people than when they engage in nonsocial tasks. Activations in this "mentalizing network" are sometimes interpreted as evidence for the domain-specificity of cognitive processes supporting social thought. Here, we examine the alternative possibility that at least some activations in the mentalizing network may be explained by uncertainty. A reconsideration of findings from existing functional MRI studies in light of new data from independent raters suggests that (a) social tasks used in past studies have higher levels of uncertainty than their nonsocial comparison tasks and (b) activation in a key brain region associated with social cognition, the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), may track with the degree of uncertainty surrounding both social and nonsocial inferences. These observations suggest that the preferential DMPFC response observed consistently in social scenarios may reflect the engagement of domain-general processes of uncertainty reduction, which points to avenues for future research into the core cognitive mechanisms supporting typical and atypical social thought.

Neural activity tracking identity and confidence in social information

Humans learn about the environment either directly by interacting with it or indirectly by seeking information about it from social sources such as conspecifics. The degree of confidence in the information obtained through either route should determine the impact that it has on adapting and changing behaviour. We examined whether and how behavioural and neural computations differ during non-social learning as opposed to learning from social sources. Trial-wise confidence judgements about non-social and social information sources offered a window into this learning process. Despite matching exactly the statistical features of social and non-social conditions, confidence judgements were more accurate and less changeable when they were made about social as opposed to non-social information sources. In addition to subjective reports of confidence, differences were also apparent in the Bayesian estimates of participants' subjective beliefs. Univariate activity in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and posterior temporoparietal junction more closely tracked confidence about social as opposed to non-social information sources. In addition, the multivariate patterns of activity in the same areas encoded identities of social information sources compared to non-social information sources.

A shared brain system forming confidence judgment across cognitive domains

Confidence is typically defined as a subjective judgment about whether a decision is right. Decisions are based on sources of information that come from various cognitive domains and are processed in different brain systems. An unsettled question is whether the brain computes confidence in a similar manner whatever the domain or in a manner that would be idiosyncratic to each domain. To address this issue, human participants performed two tasks probing confidence in decisions made about the same material (history and geography statements), but based on different cognitive processes: semantic memory for deciding whether the statement was true or false, and duration perception for deciding whether the statement display was long or short. At the behavioral level, we found that the same factors (difficulty, accuracy, response time, and confidence in the preceding decision) predicted confidence judgments in both tasks. At the neural level, we observed using functional magnetic resonance imaging that confidence judgments in both tasks were associated to activity in the same brain regions: positively in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and negatively in a prefronto-parietal network. Together, these findings suggest the existence of a shared brain system that generates confidence judgments in a similar manner across cognitive domains.

Behavioral and neuro-cognitive bases for emergence of norms and socially shared realities via dynamic interaction

In the digital era, new socially shared realities and norms emerge rapidly, whether they are beneficial or harmful to our societies. Although these are emerging properties from dynamic interaction, most research has centered on static situations where isolated individuals face extant norms. We investigated how perceptual norms emerge endogenously as shared realities through interaction, using behavioral and fMRI experiments coupled with computational modeling. Social interactions fostered convergence of perceptual responses among people, not only overtly but also at the covert psychophysical level that generates overt responses. Reciprocity played a critical role in increasing the stability (reliability) of the psychophysical function within each individual, modulated by neural activity in the mentalizing network during interaction. These results imply that bilateral influence promotes mutual cognitive anchoring of individual views, producing shared generative models at the collective level that enable endogenous agreement on totally new targets-one of the key functions of social norms.

Neurocomputational mechanisms of confidence in self and others

Computing confidence in one’s own and others’ decisions is critical for social success. While there has been substantial progress in our understanding of confidence estimates about oneself, little is known about how people form confidence estimates about others. Here, we address this question by asking participants undergoing fMRI to place bets on perceptual decisions made by themselves or one of three other players of varying ability. We show that participants compute confidence in another player’s decisions by combining distinct estimates of player ability and decision difficulty – allowing them to predict that a good player may get a difficult decision wrong and that a bad player may get an easy decision right. We find that this computation is associated with an interaction between brain systems implicated in decision-making (LIP) and theory of mind (TPJ and dmPFC). These results reveal an interplay between self- and other-related processes during a social confidence computation.

A functional neuroimaging study of self-other processing alterations in atypical developmental trajectories of psychotic-like experiences

Self-disturbances constitute a hallmark of psychosis, but it remains unclear whether these alterations are present in at-risk populations, and therefore their role in the development of psychosis has yet to be confirmed. The present study addressed this question by measuring neural correlates of self-other processing in youth belonging to three developmental trajectories of psychotic experiences. Eighty-six youths were recruited from a longitudinal cohort of over 3800 adolescents based on their trajectories of Psychotic-Like Experiences from 12 to 16 years of age. Participants underwent neuroimaging at 17 years of age (mean). A functional neuroimaging task evaluating self- and other-related trait judgments was used to measure whole-brain activation and connectivity. Youth who showed an increasing trajectory displayed hypoactivation of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and hypoconnectivity with the cerebellum. By contrast, youth who showed a decreasing trajectory displayed decreased activation of the superior temporal gyrus, the inferior frontal gyrus, and the middle occipital gyrus. These findings suggest that the increasing trajectory is associated with alterations that might erode distinctions between self and other, influencing the emergence of symptoms such as hallucinations. The decreasing trajectory, in comparison, was associated with hypoactivations in areas influencing attention and basic information processing more generally. These alterations might affect the trajectories’ susceptibilities to positive vs. negative symptoms, respectively.

A corticostriatal pathway mediating self-efficacy enhancement

Forming positive beliefs about one's ability to perform challenging tasks, often termed self-efficacy, is fundamental to motivation and emotional well-being. Self-efficacy crucially depends on positive social feedback, yet people differ in the degree to which they integrate such feedback into self-beliefs (i.e., positive bias). While diminished positive bias of this sort is linked to mood and anxiety, the neural processes by which positive feedback on public performance enhances self-efficacy remain unclear. To address this, we conducted a behavioral and fMRI study wherein participants delivered a public speech and received fictitious positive and neutral feedback on their performance in the MRI scanner. Before and after receiving feedback, participants evaluated their actual and expected performance. We found that reduced positive bias in updating self-efficacy based on positive social feedback associated with a psychopathological dimension reflecting symptoms of anxiety, depression, and low self-esteem. Analysis of brain encoding of social feedback showed that a positive self-efficacy update bias associated with a stronger reward-related response in the ventral striatum (VS) and stronger coupling of the VS with a temporoparietal region involved in self-processing. Together, our findings demarcate a corticostriatal circuit that promotes positive bias in self-efficacy updating based on social feedback, and highlight the centrality of such bias to emotional well-being.

A neuroscientific perspective on the computational theory of social groups

We welcome a computational theory on social groups, yet we argue it would benefit from a broader scope. A neuroscientific perspective offers the possibility to disentangle which computations employed in a group context are genuinely social in nature. Concurrently, we emphasize that a unifying theory of social groups needs to additionally consider higher-level processes like motivations and emotions.

Medial and orbital frontal cortex in decision-making and flexible behavior

The medial frontal cortex and adjacent orbitofrontal cortex have been the focus of investigations of decision-making, behavioral flexibility, and social behavior. We review studies conducted in humans, macaques, and rodents and argue that several regions with different functional roles can be identified in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, perigenual anterior cingulate cortex, anterior medial frontal cortex, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and medial and lateral parts of the orbitofrontal cortex. There is increasing evidence that the manner in which these areas represent the value of the environment and specific choices is different from subcortical brain regions and more complex than previously thought. Although activity in some regions reflects distributions of reward and opportunities across the environment, in other cases, activity reflects the structural relationships between features of the environment that animals can use to infer what decision to take even if they have not encountered identical opportunities in the past.

Distinctive roles of mPFC subregions in forming impressions and guiding social interaction based on others' social behaviour

People can quickly form impressions of others from their social behaviour, which can guide their future social interactions. This study investigated how the type and timing of others' social decisions affect the impression formation and social interactions. In each trial, participants watched a responder's decision in an ultimatum game, decided whether to choose the responder as their next partner for proposer or responder and reported the perceived warmth, competence and likability of the responder. Participants preferred responders who accepted (i.e. accepters) unfair offers for the responder and those who rejected (i.e. rejecters) unfair offers for the proposer in their next ultimatum game, and the rostral medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) activity encoded such a strategic context-dependent valuation when choosing partners. Slow rejecters were perceived as warmer than fast rejecters, which was mirrored by the anterior mid-cingulate cortex activity when watching others' decisions, possibly detecting and resolving conflicting impressions. Finally, those who perceived accepters vs rejecters as warmer showed higher ventral mPFC responses to accepters vs rejecters when choosing a partner, regardless of the context. The present study suggests that distinctive subregions of the mPFC may be differentially involved in forming impressions and guiding social interactions with others based on their social behaviours.

Perceptual reality monitoring: Neural mechanisms dissociating imagination from reality

There is increasing evidence that imagination relies on similar neural mechanisms as externally triggered perception. This overlap presents a challenge for perceptual reality monitoring: deciding what is real and what is imagined. Here, we explore how perceptual reality monitoring might be implemented in the brain. We first describe sensory and cognitive factors that could dissociate imagery and perception and conclude that no single factor unambiguously signals whether an experience is internally or externally generated. We suggest that reality monitoring is implemented by higher-level cortical circuits that evaluate first-order sensory and cognitive factors to determine the source of sensory signals. According to this interpretation, perceptual reality monitoring shares core computations with metacognition. This multi-level architecture might explain several types of source confusion as well as dissociations between simply knowing whether something is real and actually experiencing it as real. We discuss avenues for future research to further our understanding of perceptual reality monitoring, an endeavour that has important implications for our understanding of clinical symptoms as well as general cognitive function.

The prefrontal cortex and (uniquely) human cooperation: a comparative perspective

Humans have an exceptional ability to cooperate relative to many other species. We review the neural mechanisms supporting human cooperation, focusing on the prefrontal cortex. One key feature of human social life is the prevalence of cooperative norms that guide social behavior and prescribe punishment for noncompliance. Taking a comparative approach, we consider shared and unique aspects of cooperative behaviors in humans relative to nonhuman primates, as well as divergences in brain structure that might support uniquely human aspects of cooperation. We highlight a medial prefrontal network common to nonhuman primates and humans supporting a foundational process in cooperative decision-making: valuing outcomes for oneself and others. This medial prefrontal network interacts with lateral prefrontal areas that are thought to represent cooperative norms and modulate value representations to guide behavior appropriate to the local social context. Finally, we propose that more recently evolved anterior regions of prefrontal cortex play a role in arbitrating between cooperative norms across social contexts, and suggest how future research might fruitfully examine the neural basis of norm arbitration.

Neural substrates of shared visual experiences: a hyperscanning fMRI study

Sharing experience is a fundamental human social cognition. Since visual experience is a mental state directed toward the world, we hypothesized that sharing visual experience is mediated by joint attention (JA) for sharing directedness and mentalizing for mental state inferences. We conducted a hyperscanning functional magnetic resonance imaging with 44 healthy adult volunteers to test this hypothesis. We employed spoken-language-cued spatial and feature-based JA tasks. The initiator attracts the partner's attention by a verbal command to a spatial location or an object feature to which the responder directs their attention. Pair-specific inter-individual neural synchronization of task-specific activities was found in the right anterior insular cortex (AIC)-inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) complex, the core node of JA and salience network, and the right posterior superior temporal sulcus, which represents the shared categories of the target. The right AIC-IFG also showed inter-individual synchronization of the residual time-series data, along with the right temporoparietal junction and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex-the core components for mentalization and the default mode network (DMN). This background synchronization represents sharing the belief of sharing the situation. Thus, shared visual experiences are represented by coherent coordination between the DMN and salience network linked through the right AIC-IFG.

Neural Correlates of Academic Self-concept and the Association with Academic Achievement in Older Children

Academic self-concept, which can be defined as one's beliefs about their academic ability, plays an important role in students' future academic achievement. Here, we examined the neuroanatomical substrates underlying academic self-concept in 92 school-aged children (9.90 ± 0.85 years, 41 girls) using voxel-based morphometry of images obtained by structural magnetic resonance imaging. Our results revealed a significant positive correlation between academic self-concept and achievement 1 year after assessment. Whole-brain regression analyses found that gray matter volume in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) was negatively associated with academic self-concept. Region of interest analyses further showed that regional gray matter volume in the right DLPFC could significantly predict achievement 1 year after assessment. Notably, mediation analyses suggested that regional gray matter volume in the right DLPFC mediated the effect of academic self-concept on students' future academic achievement.

The mutuality of social emotions: How the victim's reactive attitude influences the transgressor's emotional responses

Would a transgressor be guiltier or less after receiving the victim's forgiving or blaming attitude? Everyday intuitions and empirical evidence are mixed in this regard, leaving how interpersonal attitudes shape the transgressor's reactive social emotions an open question. We combined a social interactive game with multivariate pattern analysis of fMRI data to address this question. Participants played an interactive game in an fMRI scanner where their incorrect responses could cause either high or low pain stimulation to an anonymous co-player. Following incorrect responses, participants were presented with the co-player's (i.e., the victim's) attitude towards the harm (Blame, Forgive, or Neutral). Behaviorally, the victim's attitude and the severity of harm interactively modulated the transgressor's social emotions, with expectation violation serving as a mediator. While unexpected forgiveness following severe harm amplified the participants' guilt, unexpected blame following minor harm reduced the participants' guilt and increased their anger. This role of expectation violation was supported by multivariate pattern analysis of fMRI, revealing a shared neural representation in ventral striatum in the processing of victim's attitude-induced guilt and anger. Moreover, we identified a neural re-appraisal process of guilt in the transgressor, with the involvement of area related to self-conscious processing (i.e., perigenual anterior cingulate cortex) before knowing the victim's attitude transiting to the involvement of other-regarding related area (i.e., temporoparietal junction) after knowing the victim's attitude. These findings uncover the neurocognitive bases underlying the transgressor's social emotional responses, and highlight the importance of the mutuality of social emotions.

The neural signatures of social hierarchy-related learning and interaction: A coordinate- and connectivity-based meta-analysis

Numerous neuroimaging studies have investigated the neural mechanisms of two mutually independent yet closely related cognitive processes aiding humans to navigate complex societies: social hierarchy-related learning (SH-RL) and social hierarchy-related interaction (SH-RI). To integrate these heterogeneous results into a more fine-grained and reliable characterization of the neural basis of social hierarchy, we combined coordinate-based meta-analyses with connectivity and functional decoding analyses to understand the underlying neuropsychological mechanism of SH-RL and SH-RI. We identified the anterior insula and temporoparietal junction (dominance detection), medial prefrontal cortex (information updating and computation), and intraparietal sulcus region, amygdala, and hippocampus (social hierarchy representation) as consistent activated brain regions for SH-RL, but the striatum, amygdala, and hippocampus associated with reward processing for SH-RI. Our results provide an overview of the neural architecture of the neuropsychological processes underlying how we understand, and interact within, social hierarchy.

Childhood urbanicity interacts with polygenic risk for depression to affect stress-related medial prefrontal function

Urbanization is increasing globally, and is associated with stress and increased mental health risks, including for depression. However, it remains unclear, especially at the level of brain function, how urbanicity, social threat stressors, and psychiatric risk may be linked. Here, we aim to define the structural and functional MRI neural correlates of social stress, childhood urbanicity, and their putative mechanistic relevance to depressive illness risk, in terms of behavioral traits and genetics. We studied a sample of healthy adults with divergent urban and rural childhoods. We examined childhood urbanicity effects on brain structure as suggested by MRI, and its functional relevance to depression risk, through interactions between urbanicity and trait anxiety-depression, as well as between urbanicity and polygenic risk for depression, during stress-related medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) engagement. Subjects with divergent rural and urban childhoods were similar in adult socioeconomic status and were genetically homogeneous. Urban childhood was associated with relatively reduced mPFC gray matter volumes as suggested by MRI. MPFC engagement under social status threat correlated with the higher trait anxiety-depression in subjects with urban childhoods, but not in their rural counterparts, implicating an exaggerated physiological response to the threat context with urbanicity, in association with behavioral risk for depression. Stress-associated mPFC engagement also interacted with polygenic risk for depression, significantly predicting a differential mPFC response in individuals with urban but not rural childhoods. Developmental urbanicity, therefore, appears to interact with genetic and behavioral risk for depression on the mPFC neural response to a threat context.

How Local and Global Metacognition Shape Mental Health

Metacognition is the ability to reflect on our own cognition and mental states. It is a critical aspect of human subjective experience and operates across many hierarchical levels of abstraction-encompassing local confidence in isolated decisions and global self-beliefs about our abilities and skills. Alterations in metacognition are considered foundational to neurologic and psychiatric disorders, but research has mostly focused on local metacognitive computations, missing out on the role of global aspects of metacognition. Here, we first review current behavioral and neural metrics of local metacognition that lay the foundation for this research. We then address the neurocognitive underpinnings of global metacognition uncovered by recent studies. Finally, we outline a theoretical framework in which higher hierarchical levels of metacognition may help identify the role of maladaptive metacognitive evaluation in mental health conditions, particularly when combined with transdiagnostic methods.

Social prediction modulates activity of macaque superior temporal cortex

The ability to attribute thoughts to others, also called theory of mind (TOM), has been extensively studied in humans; however, its evolutionary origins have been challenged. Computationally, the basis of TOM has been interpreted within the predictive coding framework and associated with activity in the temporoparietal junction (TPJ). Here, we revealed, using a nonlinguistic task and functional magnetic resonance imaging, that activity in a region of the macaque middle superior temporal cortex was specifically modulated by the predictability of social situations. As in human TPJ, this region could be distinguished from other temporal regions involved in face processing. Our result suggests the existence of a precursor for the TOM ability in the last common ancestor of human and Old World monkeys.

Neural mechanisms of predicting individual preferences based on group membership

Successful social interaction requires humans to predict others’ behavior. To do so, internal models of others are generated based on previous observations. When predicting others’ preferences for objects, for example, observations are made at an individual level (5-year-old Rosie often chooses a pencil) or at a group level (kids often choose pencils). But previous research has focused either on already established group knowledge, i.e. stereotypes, or on the neural correlates of predicting traits and preferences of individuals. We identified the neural mechanisms underlying predicting individual behavior based on learned group knowledge using fMRI. We show that applying learned group knowledge hinges on both a network of regions commonly referred to as the mentalizing network, and a network of regions implicated in representing social knowledge. Additionally, we provide evidence for the presence of a gradient in the posterior temporal cortex and the medial frontal cortex, catering to different functions while applying learned group knowledge. This process is characterized by an increased connectivity between medial prefrontal cortex and other mentalizing network regions and increased connectivity between anterior temporal lobe and other social knowledge regions. Our study provides insights into the neural mechanisms underlying the application of learned group knowledge.

Effects of non-invasive brain stimulation on visual perspective taking: A meta-analytic study

Visual perspective taking (VPT) is a critical ability required by complex social interaction. Non-invasive brain stimulation (NIBS) has been increasingly used to examine the causal relationship between brain activity and VPT, yet with heterogeneous results. In the current study, we conducted two meta-analyses to examine the effects of NIBS of the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) or dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) on VPT, respectively. We performed a comprehensive literature search to identify qualified studies and computed the standardized effect size (ES) for each combination of VPT level (Level-1: visibility judgment; Level-2: mental rotation) and perspective (self and other). Thirteen studies (rTPJ: 12 studies, 23 ESs; dmPFC: 4 studies, 14 ESs) were included in the meta-analyses. Random-effects models were used to generate the overall effects. Subgroup analyses for distinct VPT conditions were also performed. We found that rTPJ stimulation significantly improved participants' visibility judgment from the allocentric perspective, whereas its effects on other VPT conditions are negligible. Stimulation of dmPFC appeared to influence Level-1 performance from the egocentric perspective, although this finding was only based on a small number of studies. Notably, contrary to some theoretical models, we did not find strong evidence that these regions are involved in Level-2 VPT with a higher requirement of mental rotation. These findings not only advance our understanding of the causal roles of the rTPJ and dmPFC in VPT, but also reveal that the efficacy of NIBS on VPT is relatively small. Additionally, researchers should also be cautious about the potential publication bias and selective reporting.

Computational modelling of social cognition and behaviour-a reinforcement learning primer

Social neuroscience aims to describe the neural systems that underpin social cognition and behaviour. Over the past decade, researchers have begun to combine computational models with neuroimaging to link social computations to the brain. Inspired by approaches from reinforcement learning theory, which describes how decisions are driven by the unexpectedness of outcomes, accounts of the neural basis of prosocial learning, observational learning, mentalizing and impression formation have been developed. Here we provide an introduction for researchers who wish to use these models in their studies. We consider both theoretical and practical issues related to their implementation, with a focus on specific examples from the field.

Human dorsomedial prefrontal cortex delineates the self and other against the tendency to form interdependent social representations

In this issue of Neuron, using non-invasive brain stimulation, Wittmann et al. (2021) highlight a causal role of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex in keeping separate estimations for the self and others, protecting against a default human tendency to form interdependent social representations.

Viewing Ambiguous Social Interactions Increases Functional Connectivity between Frontal and Temporal Nodes of the Social Brain

Social behavior is coordinated by a network of brain regions, including those involved in the perception of social stimuli and those involved in complex functions, such as inferring perceptual and mental states and controlling social interactions. The properties and function of many of these regions in isolation are relatively well understood, but less is known about how these regions interact while processing dynamic social interactions. To investigate whether the functional connectivity between brain regions is modulated by social context, we collected fMRI data from male monkeys (Macaca mulatta) viewing videos of social interactions labeled as "affiliative," "aggressive," or "ambiguous." We show activation related to the perception of social interactions along both banks of the superior temporal sulcus, parietal cortex, medial and lateral frontal cortex, and the caudate nucleus. Within this network, we show that fronto-temporal functional connectivity is significantly modulated by social context. Crucially, we link the observation of specific behaviors to changes in functional connectivity within our network. Viewing aggressive behavior was associated with a limited increase in temporo-temporal and a weak increase in cingulate-temporal connectivity. By contrast, viewing interactions where the outcome was uncertain was associated with a pronounced increase in temporo-temporal, and cingulate-temporal functional connectivity. We hypothesize that this widespread network synchronization occurs when cingulate and temporal areas coordinate their activity when more difficult social inferences are being made.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Processing social information from our environment requires the activation of several brain regions, which are concentrated within the frontal and temporal lobes. However, little is known about how these areas interact to facilitate the processing of different social interactions. Here we show that functional connectivity within and between the frontal and temporal lobes is modulated by social context. Specifically, we demonstrate that viewing social interactions where the outcome was unclear is associated with increased synchrony within and between the cingulate cortex and temporal cortices. These findings suggest that the coordination between the cingulate and temporal cortices is enhanced when more difficult social inferences are being made.

Causal manipulation of self-other mergence in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex

To navigate social environments, people must simultaneously hold representations about their own and others’ abilities. During self-other mergence, people estimate others’ abilities not only on the basis of the others’ past performance, but the estimates are also influenced by their own performance. For example, if we perform well, we overestimate the abilities of those with whom we are co-operating and underestimate competitors. Self-other mergence is associated with specific activity patterns in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC). Using a combination of non-invasive brain stimulation, functional magnetic resonance imaging, and computational modeling, we show that dmPFC neurostimulation silences these neural signatures of self-other mergence in relation to estimation of others’ abilities. In consequence, self-other mergence behavior increases, and our assessments of our own performance are projected increasingly onto other people. This suggests an inherent tendency to form interdependent social representations and a causal role of the dmPFC in separating self and other representations.

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During self-other mergence (SOM), people confuse one’s own with another’s performance

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Brain stimulation over dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) alters neural SOM

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Brain stimulation over dmPFC simultaneously alters behavioral SOM

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This suggests a causal role of dmPFC in separating self and other representations

A Feature-Based Network Analysis and fMRI Meta-Analysis Reveal Three Distinct Types of Prosocial Decisions

Tasks that measure correlates of prosocial decision-making share one common feature: agents can make choices that increase the welfare of a beneficiary. However, prosocial decisions vary widely as a function of other task features. The diverse ways that prosociality is defined and the heterogeneity of prosocial decisions have created challenges for interpreting findings across studies and identifying their neural correlates. To overcome these challenges, we aimed to organize the prosocial decision-making task space of neuroimaging studies. We conducted a systematic search for studies in which participants made decisions to increase the welfare of others during functional magnetic resonance imaging. We identified shared and distinct features of these tasks and employed an unsupervised graph-based approach to assess how various forms of prosocial decision-making are related in terms of their low-level components (e.g. task features like potential cost to the agent or potential for reciprocity). Analyses uncovered three clusters of prosocial decisions, which we labeled as cooperation, equity and altruism. This feature-based representation of the task structure was supported by results of a neuroimaging meta-analysis that each type of prosocial decisions recruited diverging neural systems. Results clarify some of the existing heterogeneity in how prosociality is conceptualized and generate insight for future research and task paradigm development.

Identification and disruption of a neural mechanism for accumulating prospective metacognitive information prior to decision-making

More than one type of probability must be considered when making decisions. It is as necessary to know one's chance of performing choices correctly as it is to know the chances that desired outcomes will follow choices. We refer to these two choice contingencies as internal and external probability. Neural activity across many frontal and parietal areas reflected internal and external probabilities in a similar manner during decision-making. However, neural recording and manipulation approaches suggest that one area, the anterior lateral prefrontal cortex (alPFC), is highly specialized for making prospective, metacognitive judgments on the basis of internal probability; it is essential for knowing which decisions to tackle, given its assessment of how well they will be performed. Its activity predicted prospective metacognitive judgments, and individual variation in activity predicted individual variation in metacognitive judgments. Its disruption altered metacognitive judgments, leading participants to tackle perceptual decisions they were likely to fail.

The Role of the Medial Prefrontal Cortex in Moderating Neural Representations of Self and Other in Primates

As a frontal node in the primate social brain, the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) plays a critical role in coordinating one's own behavior with respect to that of others. Current literature demonstrates that single neurons in the MPFC encode behavior-related variables such as intentions, actions, and rewards, specifically for self and other, and that the MPFC comes into play when reflecting upon oneself and others. The social moderator account of MPFC function can explain maladaptive social cognition in people with autism spectrum disorder, which tips the balance in favor of self-centered perspectives rather than taking into consideration the perspective of others. Several strands of evidence suggest a hypothesis that the MPFC represents different other mental models, depending on the context at hand, to better predict others' emotions and behaviors. This hypothesis also accounts for aberrant MPFC activity in autistic individuals while they are mentalizing others.

Groups as organisms: Implications for therapy and training

The intellectual tradition of individualism treats the individual person as the fundamental unit of analysis and reduces all things social to the motives and actions of individuals. Most methods in clinical psychology are influenced by individualism and therefore treat the individual as the primary object of therapy/training, even when recognizing the importance of nurturing social relationships for individual wellbeing. Multilevel selection theory offers an alternative to individualism in which individuals become part of something larger than themselves that qualifies as an organism in its own right. Seeing individuals as parts of social organisms provides a new perspective with numerous implications for improving wellbeing at all scales, from individuals to the planet.

Subcortical encoding of agent-relevant associative signals for adaptive social behavior in the macaque

Primates are group-living creatures that constantly face the challenges posed by complex social demands. To date, the cortical mechanisms underlying social information processing have been the major focus of attention. However, emerging evidence suggests that subcortical regions also mediate the collection and processing of information from other agents. Here, we review the literature supporting the hypothesis that behavioral variables important for decision-making, i.e., stimulus, action, and outcome, are associated with agent information (self and other) in subcortical regions, such as the amygdala, striatum, lateral hypothalamus, and dopaminergic midbrain nuclei. Such self-relevant and other-relevant associative signals are then integrated into a social utility signal, presumably at the level of midbrain dopamine neurons. This social utility signal allows decision makers to organize their optimal behavior in accordance with social demands. Determining how self-relevant and other-relevant signals might be altered in psychiatric and neurodevelopmental disorders will be fundamental to better understand how social behaviors are dysregulated in disease conditions.

Impact of internal and external factors on prosocial choices in rhesus macaques

While traditional economic models assume that agents are self-interested, humans and most non-human primates are social species. Therefore, many of decisions they make require the integration of information about other social agents. This study asks to what extent information about social status and the social context in which decisions are taken impact on reward-guided decisions in rhesus macaques. We tested 12 monkeys of varying dominance status in several experimental versions of a two-choice task in which reward could be delivered to self only, only another monkey, both the self and another monkey, or neither. Results showed dominant animals were more prone to make prosocial choices than subordinates, but only when the decision was between a reward for self only and a reward for both self and other. If the choice was between a reward for self only and a reward for other only, no animal expressed altruistic behaviour. Finally, prosocial choices were true social decisions as they were strikingly reduced when the social partner was replaced by a non-social object. These results showed that as in humans, rhesus macaques' social decisions are adaptive and modulated by social status and the cost associated with being prosocial. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.

The effect of feedback valence and source on perception and metacognition: An fMRI investigation

Receiving feedback from our environment that informs us about the outcomes of our actions helps us assess our abilities (e.g., metacognition) and to flexibly adapt our behavior, consequently increasing our chances of success. However, a detailed examination of the effect of feedback on the brain activation during perceptual and confidence judgments as well as the interrelations between perceptual accuracy, prospective and retrospective confidence remains unclear. Here we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine the neural response to feedback valence and source in visual contrast discrimination together with prospective confidence judgments at the beginning of each block and retrospective confidence judgments after every decision. Positive feedback was associated with higher activation (or lower deactivation depending on the area) in areas previously involved in attention, performance monitoring and visual regions during the perceptual judgment than during the confidence judgment. Changes in prospective confidence were positively related to changes in perceptual accuracy as well as to the corresponding retrospective confidence. Thus, feedback information impacted multiple, qualitatively different brain processing states, and we also revealed the dynamic interplay between prospective, perceptual accuracy and retrospective self-assessment.

Socially relative reward valuation in the primate brain

Reward valuation in social contexts is by nature relative rather than absolute; it is made in reference to others. This socially relative reward valuation is based on our propensity to conduct comparisons and competitions between self and other. Exploring its neural substrate has been an active area of research in human neuroimaging. More recently, electrophysiological investigation of the macaque brain has enabled us to understand neural mechanisms underlying this valuation process at single-neuron and network levels. Here I show that shared neural networks centered at the medial prefrontal cortex and dopamine-related subcortical regions are involved in this process in humans and nonhuman primates. Thus, socially relative reward valuation is mediated by cortico-subcortically coordinated activity linking social and reward brain networks.

Late Frontal Negativity Discriminates Outcomes and Intentions in Trust-Repayment Behavior

Altruism (a costly action that benefits others) and reciprocity (the repayment of acts in kind) differ in that the former expresses preferences about the outcome of a social interaction, whereas the latter requires, in addition, ascribing intentions to others. Interestingly, an individual's behavior and neurophysiological activity under outcome- versus intention-based interactions has not been compared directly using different endowments in the same subject and during the same session. Here, we used a mixed version of the Dictator and the Investment games, together with electroencephalography, to uncover a subject's behavior and brain activity when challenged with endowments of different sizes in contexts that call for an altruistic (outcome-based) versus a reciprocal (intention-based) response. We found that subjects displayed positive or negative reciprocity (reciprocal responses greater or smaller than that for altruism, respectively) depending on the amount of trust they received. Furthermore, a subject's late frontal negativity differed between conditions, predicting responses to trust in intentions-based trials. Finally, brain regions related with mentalizing and cognitive control were the cortical sources of this activity. Thus, our work disentangles the behavioral components present in the repayment of trust, and sheds light on the neural activity underlying the integration of outcomes and perceived intentions in human economic interactions.

Formation of global self-beliefs in the human brain

Momentary feelings of confidence accompany many of our actions and decisions. In addition to such “local” feelings of confidence, we also construct “global” confidence estimates about our skills and abilities (global self-performance estimates or SPEs). Distorted SPEs may have a pervasive impact on motivation and self-evaluation, for instance affecting estimates of our competitiveness at work or in a sports team. Here, we found that components of a brain network previously implicated in the tracking of local confidence was additionally modulated by SPE level, whereas ventral striatum tracked SPEs irrespective of confidence. Our findings of a neurocognitive basis for global SPEs lay the groundwork for understanding how distorted SPEs arise in educational and clinical settings.

Humans create metacognitive beliefs about their performance across many levels of abstraction—from local confidence in individual decisions to global estimates of our skills and abilities. Despite a rich literature on the neural basis of local confidence judgements, how global self-performance estimates (SPEs) are constructed remains unknown. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we scanned human subjects while they performed several short blocks of tasks and reported on which task they think they performed best, providing a behavioral proxy for global SPEs. In a frontoparietal network sensitive to fluctuations in local confidence, we found that activity within ventromedial prefrontal cortex and precuneus was additionally modulated by global SPEs. In contrast, activity in ventral striatum was associated with subjects’ global SPEs irrespective of fluctuations in local confidence, and predicted the extent to which global SPEs tracked objective task difficulty across individuals. Our findings reveal neural representations of global SPEs that go beyond the tracking of local confidence, and lay the groundwork for understanding how a formation of global self-beliefs may go awry in conditions characterized by distorted self-evaluation.

Experimental Games and Social Decision Making

Experimental games model situations in which the future outcomes of individuals and groups depend on their own choices and on those of other (groups of) individuals. Games are a powerful tool to identify the neural and psychological mechanisms underlying interpersonal and group cooperation and coordination. Here we discuss recent developments in how experimental games are used and adapted, with an increased focus on repeated interactions, partner control through sanctioning, and partner (de)selection for future interactions. Important advances have been made in uncovering the neurobiological underpinnings of key factors involved in cooperation and coordination, including social preferences, cooperative beliefs, (emotion) signaling, and, in particular, reputations and (in)direct reciprocity. Emerging trends at the cross-sections of psychology, economics, and the neurosciences include an increased focus on group heterogeneities, intergroup polarization and conflict, cross-cultural differences in cooperation and norm enforcement, and neurocomputational modeling of the formation and updating of social preferences and beliefs.

Me first: Neural representations of fairness during three-party interactions

One hallmark of human morality is a deep sense of fairness. People are motivated by both self-interest and a concern for the welfare of others. However, it remains unclear whether these motivations rely on similar neural computations, and the extent to which such computations influence social decision-making when self-fairness and other-fairness motivations compete. In this study, two groups of participants engaged in the role of responder in a three-party Ultimatum Game while being scanned with functional MRI (N = 32) or while undergoing high-density electroencephalography (N = 40). In both studies, participants accepted more OtherFair offers when they themselves received fair offers. Though SelfFairness was reliably decoded from scalp voltages by 170 ms, and from hemodynamic responses in right insula and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, there was no overlap between neural representations of fairness for self and for other. Distinct neural computations and mechanisms seem to be involved when making decisions about fairness in three-party contexts, which are anchored in an egocentric, self-serving bias.

Brain-to-Brain Coupling in the Gamma-Band as a Marker of Shared Intentionality

Cooperation and competition are two ways of social interaction keys to life in society. Recent EEG-based hyperscanning studies reveal that cooperative and competitive interactions induce an increase in interbrain coupling. However, whether this interbrain coupling effect is just a reflection of inter-subject motor coordination or can also signal the type of social interaction is unknown. Here, we show that behavioral coordination and social interaction type can be distinguished according to the frequency of oscillation in which the brains are coupled. We use EEG to simultaneously measure the brain activity of pairs of subjects, while they were performing a visual cue-target task in a cooperative and competitive manner. Behavioral responses were quasi-simultaneous between subject pairs for both competitive and cooperative conditions, with faster average response times for the competitive condition. Concerning brain activity, we found increased interbrain coupling in theta band (3–7 Hz) during cooperation and competition, with stronger coupling during competitive interactions. This increase of interbrain theta coupling correlated with a decrease in reaction times of the dyads. Interestingly, we also found an increase in brain-to-brain coupling in gamma band (38–42 Hz) only during cooperative interactions. Unlike the theta coupling effect, the gamma interbrain coupling did not correlate with dyads’ reaction times. Taken together, these results suggest that theta interbrain coupling could be linked to motor coordination processes common to cooperative and competitive interactions, while gamma brain-to-brain coupling emerges as an electrophysiological marker of shared intentionality during cooperative interactions.

Is There a 'Social' Brain? Implementations and Algorithms

A fundamental question in psychology and neuroscience is the extent to which cognitive and neural processes are specialised for social behaviour, or are shared with other 'non-social' cognitive, perceptual, and motor faculties. Here we apply the influential framework of Marr (1982) across research in humans, monkeys, and rodents to propose that information processing can be understood as 'social' or 'non-social' at different levels. We argue that processes can be socially specialised at the implementational and/or the algorithmic level, and that changing the goal of social behaviour can also change social specificity. This framework could provide important new insights into the nature of social behaviour across species, facilitate greater integration, and inspire novel theoretical and empirical approaches.