Accounting for future populations in health research

The research we fund today will improve the health of people who will live tomorrow. But future people will not all benefit equally: decisions we make about what research to prioritize will predictably affect when and how much different people benefit from research. Organizations that fund health research should thus fairly account for the health needs of future populations when setting priorities. To this end, some research funders aim to allocate research resources in accordance with disease burden, prioritizing illnesses that cause more morbidity and mortality. In this article, I defend research funders' practice of aligning research funding with disease burden but argue that funders should aim to align research funding with future-rather than present-disease burden. I suggest that research funders should allocate research funding in proportion to aggregated estimates of disease burden over the period when research could plausibly start to yield benefits until indefinitely into the future.

La pobreza extrema es prioridad: Un argumento sobre la distribución equitativa de la vacuna contra el COVID-19 en Perú

La humanidad ya dispone de vacunas eficaces contra el COVID-19. En Perú se administraron 86 millones de dosis para cubrir la demanda de 33 millones de peruanos. Para ello, se ha priorizado la vacunación en grupos clave: personal de salud, sujetos con condiciones de salud preexistentes y mayores de 65 años. Sin embargo, dada la problemática social y la situación de la salud pública en Perú, este trabajo defiende que la prioridad de la vacunación debe centrarse en la población que vive en extrema pobreza. El método utilizado fue una argumentación ética sobre la distribución de la vacuna contra el COVID-19 en Perú. Esta argumentación se basa en el análisis de la población peruana que vive en extrema pobreza, la cual presenta diferentes estratos de vulnerabilidad, y que, ante una eventual infección por SARS-CoV-2, se irían agravando uno tras otro, a través de un efecto en cascada. Este escenario daría lugar a nuevas vulnerabilidades de las ya existentes, causando mayores daños. Los esfuerzos de vacunación en esta población clave les brindaría oportunidad de seguir encontrando formas de llevar alimentos a sus hogares, reduciendo significativamente el riesgo de contagio en su entorno y mitigando el efecto devastador de las enfermedades locales a las que ya está expuesta. Se plantean cuatro objeciones relacionadas con este argumento, con sus correspondientes respuestas. El acceso prioritario a la vacuna reduciría significativamente el daño a las personas que viven en la extrema pobreza, haciendo prevalecer los principios de justicia y equidad.

Ranking the relative importance of COVID-19 vaccination strategies in Canada: a priority-setting exercise

BACKGROUND

When vaccine supplies are anticipated to be limited, necessitating the vaccination of certain groups earlier than others, the assessment of values and preferences of stakeholders is an important component of an ethically sound vaccine prioritization framework. The objective of this study was to conduct a priority-setting exercise to establish an expert stakeholder perspective on the relative importance of COVID-19 vaccination strategies in Canada.

METHODS

The priority-setting exercise included a survey of stakeholders that was conducted from July 22 to Aug. 14, 2020. Stakeholders included clinical and public health expert groups, provincial and territorial committees and national Indigenous groups, patient and community advocacy representatives and experts, health professional associations and federal government departments. Survey results were analyzed to identify trends.

RESULTS

Of 155 stakeholders contacted, 76 surveys were received for a participation rate of 49%. During a period of anticipated initial vaccine scarcity for all pandemic scenarios, stakeholders generally considered the most important vaccination strategy to be protecting those who are most vulnerable to severe illness and death from COVID-19. This was followed in importance by strategies to protect health care capacity, minimize transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and protect critical infrastructure.

INTERPRETATION

This priority-setting exercise established that there is general alignment in the values and preferences across stakeholder groups: the most important vaccination strategy at the time of limited initial vaccine availability is to protect those who are most vulnerable. The findings of this priority-setting exercise provided a timely expert perspective to guide early public health planning for COVID-19 vaccines.

Prioritizing health care workers and first responders for access to the COVID19 vaccine is not unethical, but both fair and effective - an ethical analysis

The Nordic countries have differed in their approach as to how much priority for COVID19 vaccine access should be given to health care workers. Two countries decided not to give health care workers highest priority, raising some controversy. The rationale was that those at highest risk of dying needed to come first. However, when it comes to protecting those at the highest risk of dying from COVID19, their needs and vulnerabilities need to be considered more broadly than just in terms of the individual protection that vaccination will afford them. Likewise, when considering whether to prioritize health care workers for the vaccine, their crucial role in keeping the health care system operational, and right to a safe work environment need to be factored in. Below we review several ethical arguments for why frontline health care workers and first responders should receive priority access to the COVID19 vaccine.

Sharing power in global health research: an ethical toolkit for designing priority-setting processes that meaningfully include communities

To promote social justice and equity, global health research should meaningfully engage communities throughout projects: from setting agendas onwards. But communities, especially those that are considered disadvantaged or marginalised, rarely have a say in the priorities of the research projects that aim to help them. So far, there remains limited ethical guidance and resources on how to share power with communities in health research priority-setting. This paper presents an "ethical toolkit" for academic researchers and their community partners to use to design priority-setting processes that meaningfully include the communities impacted by their projects. An empirical reflective equilibrium approach was employed to develop the toolkit. Conceptual work articulated ethical considerations related to sharing power in g0l0o0bal health research priority-setting, developed guidance on how to address them, and created an initial version of the toolkit. Empirical work (51 in-depth interviews, 1 focus group, 2 case studies in India and the Philippines) conducted in 2018 and 2019 then tested those findings against information from global health research practice. The final ethical toolkit is a reflective project planning aid. It consists of 4 worksheets (Worksheet 1- Selecting Partners; Worksheet 2- Deciding to Partner; Worksheet 3- Deciding to Engage with the Wider Community; Worksheet 4- Designing Priority-setting) and a Companion Document detailing how to use them. Reflecting on and discussing the questions in Worksheets 1 to 4 before priority-setting will help deliver priority-setting processes that share power with communities and projects with research topics and questions that more accurately reflect their healthcare and system needs.

Triaging ethical issues in the coronavirus pandemic: how to prioritize bioethics research during public health emergencies

Much of the ethical discourse concerning the coronavirus pandemic has focused on the allocation of scarce resources, be it potentially beneficial new treatments, ventilators, intensive care beds, or oxygen. Somewhat ironically, the more important ethical issues may lie elsewhere, just as the more important medical issues do not concern intensive care or treatment for COVID-19 patients, but rather the diversion towards these modes of care at the expense of non-Covid patients and treatment. In this article I explore how ethicists can and should prioritize which ethical issues to deal with, and develop a method of triage for identification and prioritization of ethical issues both in the next public health emergency and in bioethics more widely.

Queue questions: Ethics of COVID-19 vaccine prioritization

The rapid development of vaccines against COVID-19 represents a huge achievement, and offers hope of ending the global pandemic. At least three COVID-19 vaccines have been approved or are about to be approved for distribution in many countries. However, with very limited initial availability, only a minority of the population will be able to receive vaccines this winter. Urgent decisions will have to be made about who should receive priority for access. Current policy in the UK appears to take the view that those who are most vulnerable to COVID-19 should get the vaccine first. While this is intuitively attractive, we argue that there are other possible values and criteria that need to be considered. These include both intrinsic and instrumental values. The former are numbers of lives saved, years of life saved, quality of the lives saved, quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs), and possibly others including age. Instrumental values include protecting healthcare systems and other broader societal interests, which might require prioritizing key worker status and having dependants. The challenge from an ethical point of view is to strike the right balance among these values. It also depends on effectiveness of different vaccines on different population groups and on modelling around cost-effectiveness of different strategies. It is a mistake to simply assume that prioritizing the most vulnerable is the best strategy. Although that could end up being the best approach, whether it is or not requires careful ethical and empirical analysis.

Contractualist age rationing under outbreak circumstances

Age rationing is a central issue in the health care priority-setting literature, but it has become ever more salient in the light of the Covid-19 outbreak, where health authorities in several countries have given higher priority to younger over older patients. But how is age rationing different under outbreak circumstances than under normal circumstances, and what does this difference imply for ethical theories? This is the topic of this paper. The paper argues that outbreaks such as that of Covid-19 involve special circumstances that change how age should influence our prioritization decisions, and that while this shift in circumstances poses a problem for consequentialist views such as utilitarianism and age-weighted consequentialism, contractualism is better equipped to cope with it. The paper then offers a contractualist prudential account of age rationing under outbreak circumstances.

Reflective disequilibrium: a critical evaluation of the complete lives framework for healthcare rationing

One prominent view in recent literature on resource allocation is Persad, Emanuel and Wertheimer's complete lives framework for the rationing of lifesaving healthcare interventions (CLF). CLF states that we should prioritise the needs of individuals who have had less opportunity to experience the events that characterise a complete life. Persad et al argue that their system is the product of a successful process of reflective equilibrium-a philosophical methodology whereby theories, principles and considered judgements are balanced with each other and revised until we achieve an acceptable coherence between our various beliefs. Yet I argue that many of the principles and intuitions underpinning CLF conflict with each other, and that Persad et al have failed to achieve an acceptable coherence between them. I focus on three tensions in particular: the conflict between the youngest first principle and Persad et al's investment refinement; the conflict between current medical need and a concern for lifetime equality; and the tension between adopting an objective measure of complete lives and accommodating for differences in life narratives.

Mistrust and inconsistency during COVID-19: considerations for resource allocation guidelines that prioritise healthcare workers

As the USA contends with another surge in COVID-19 cases, hospitals may soon need to answer the unresolved question of who lives and dies when ventilator demand exceeds supply. Although most triage policies in the USA have seemingly converged on the use of clinical need and benefit as primary criteria for prioritisation, significant differences exist between institutions in how to assign priority to patients with identical medical prognoses: the so-called 'tie-breaker' situations. In particular, one's status as a frontline healthcare worker (HCW) has been a proposed criterion for prioritisation in the event of a tie. This article outlines two major grounds for reconsidering HCW prioritisation. The first recognises trust as an indispensable element of clinical care and mistrust as a hindrance to any public health strategy against the virus, thus raising concerns about the outward appearance of favouritism. The second considers the ways in which proponents of HCW prioritisation deviate from the very 'ethics frameworks' that often preface triage policies and serve to guide resource allocation-a rhetorical strategy that may undermine the very ethical foundations on which triage policies stand. By appealing to trust and consistency, we re-examine existing arguments in favour of HCW prioritisation and provide a more tenable justification for adjudicating on tie-breaker events during crisis standards of care.

Ethical challenges in nephrology: a call for action

The American Society of Nephrology, the European Renal Association-European Dialysis and Transplant Association and the International Society of Nephrology Joint Working Group on Ethical Issues in Nephrology have identified ten broad areas of ethical concern as priority challenges that require collaborative action. Here, we describe these challenges - equity in access to kidney failure care, avoiding futile dialysis, reducing dialysis costs, shared decision-making in kidney failure care, living donor risk evaluation and decision-making, priority setting in kidney disease prevention and care, the ethical implications of genetic kidney diseases, responsible advocacy for kidney health and management of conflicts of interest - with the aim of highlighting the need for ethical analysis of specific issues, as well as for the development of tools and training to support clinicians who treat patients with kidney disease in practising ethically and contributing to ethical policy-making.

Rethinking patient involvement in healthcare priority setting

With healthcare systems under pressure from scarcity of resources and ever-increasing demand for services, difficult priority setting choices need to be made. At the same time, increased attention to patient involvement in a wide range of settings has given rise to the idea that those who are eventually affected by priority setting decisions should have a say in those decisions. In this paper, we investigate arguments for the inclusion of patient representatives in priority setting bodies at the policy level. We find that the standard justifications for patient representation, such as to achieve patient-relevant decisions, empowerment of patients, securing legitimacy of decisions, and the analogy with democracy, all fall short of supporting patient representation in this context. We conclude by briefly outlining an alternative proposal for patient participation that involves patient consultants.

Co-payment for Unfunded Additional Care in Publicly Funded Healthcare Systems: Ethical Issues

The burdens of resource constraints in publicly funded healthcare systems urge decision makers in countries like Sweden, Norway and the UK to find new financial solutions. One proposal that has been put forward is co-payment-a financial model where some treatment or care is made available to patients who are willing and able to pay the costs that exceed the available alternatives fully covered by public means. Co-payment of this sort has been associated with various ethical concerns. These range from worries that it has a negative impact on patients' wellbeing and on health care institutions, to fears that co-payment is in conflict with core values of publicly funded health care systems. This article provides an overview of the main ethical issues associated with co-payment, and ethical arguments both in support of and against it will be presented and analyzed.

The significance of 'severity'

This essay considers whether permitting the cost-effectiveness of healthcare to govern its allocation is ethically objectionable on the grounds that it fails to give sufficient weight to the severity of people's health states. After documenting the popular sentiment that appears to support this criticism, the essay considers how to implement prioritising severity, focusing on Erik Nord's work. The remainder of the essay scrutinises the ethical arguments supporting policies prioritising severity and challenges those who would prioritise severity to define a notion of severity whose prioritisation they can defend.

Considering Quality of Life while Repudiating Disability Injustice: A Pathways Approach to Setting Priorities

This article proposes a novel strategy, one that draws on insights from antidiscrimination law, for addressing a persistent challenge in medical ethics and the philosophy of disability: whether health systems can consider quality of life without unjustly discriminating against individuals with disabilities. It argues that rather than uniformly considering or ignoring quality of life, health systems should take a more nuanced approach. Under the article's proposal, health systems should treat cases where (1) quality of life suffers because of disability-focused exclusion or injustice differently from cases where (2) lower quality of life results from laws of nature, resource scarcity, or appropriate tradeoffs. Decisionmakers should ignore quality-of-life losses that result from injustice or exclusion when ignoring them would improve the prospects of individuals with disabilities; in contrast, they should consider quality-of-life losses that are unavoidable or stem from resource scarcity or permissible tradeoffs. On this proposal, while health systems should not amplify existing injustice against individuals with disabilities, they are not required to altogether ignore the potential effects of disability on quality of life.

Medium-Range Narratives as a Complementary Tool to Principle-Based Prioritization in Sweden: Test Case "ADHD"

In this paper, for the benefit of reflection processes in clinical and in local, regional, and national priority-setting, we aim to develop an ethical theoretical framework that includes both ethical principles and medium-range narratives. We present our suggestion in the particular case of having to choose between treatment interventions for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and treatment interventions for other conditions or diseases, under circumstances of scarcity. In order to arrive at our model, we compare two distinct ethical approaches: a generalist (principles) approach and a particularist (narratives) approach. Our focus is on Sweden, because in Sweden prioritization in healthcare is uniquely governmentally regulated by the "ethics platform." We will present a (fictional) scenario to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the generalist principled perspective of the ethics platform and the particularist perspective of narrative ethics. We will suggest an alternative (moderately particularist) approach to prioritization, which we dub a "principles plus medium-range narratives" approach. Notwithstanding the undeniably central role of principles in distributive justice, we claim that medium-range narratives concerning individuals or groups who stand to benefit or lose from ADHD prioritization practices should also be read or listened to and taken into account at all levels of priority-setting. These narratives are expected to ethically optimize clinical priority-setting, as well as that undertaken at local, regional, and national levels.

Appeal to the Rule of Rescue in health care: discriminating and not benevolent?

Thirty years of debate have passed since the term "Rule of Rescue" has been introduced into medical ethics. Its main focus was on whether or why medical treatment for acute conditions should have priority over preventive measures irrespective of opportunity costs. Recent contributions, taking account of the widespread reluctance to accept purely efficiency-oriented prioritization approaches, advance another objection: Prioritizing treatment, they hold, discriminates against statistical lives. The reference to opportunity costs has also been renewed in a distinctly ethical fashion: It has been stipulated that favoring help for identifiable lives amounts to a lack of benevolence for one's fellow creatures. The present article argues against both objections. It suggests that the debate's focus on consequences (deaths or severe ill health) should be reoriented by asking which aspects of such states of affairs are actually attributable to a decision maker who judges within a specific situation of choice.

Withholding and withdrawing treatment for cost-effectiveness reasons: Are they ethically on par?

In healthcare priority settings, early access to treatment before reimbursement decisions gives rise to problems of whether negative decisions for cost-effectiveness reasons should result in withdrawing treatment, already accessed by patients. Among professionals there seems to be a strong attitude to distinguish between withdrawing and withholding treatment, viewing the former as ethically worse. In this article the distinction between withdrawing and withholding treatment for reasons of cost effectiveness is explored by analysing the doing/allowing distinction, different theories of justice, consequentialist and virtue perspectives. The authors do not find any strong reasons for an intrinsic difference, but do find some reasons for a consequentialist difference, given present attitudes. However, overall, such a difference does not, all things considered, provide a convincing reason against withdrawal, given the greater consequentialist gain of using cost-effective treatment. As a result, patients should be properly informed when given early access to treatment, that such treatment can be later withdrawn following a negative reimbursement decision.

Patients with multiple needs for healthcare and priority to the worse off

There is a growing body of literature which suggests that decisions about healthcare priority setting should take into account the extent to which patients are worse off. However, such decisions are often based on how badly off patients are with respect to the condition targeted by the treatment whose priority is under consideration (condition-specific severity). In this paper I argue that giving priority to the worse off in terms of condition-specific severity does not reflect the morally relevant sense of being worse off. I conclude that an account of giving priority to the worse off relevant for healthcare priority setting should take into account how badly off patients are when all of their conditions are considered (holistic severity).

Impartiality and infectious disease: Prioritizing individuals versus the collective in antibiotic prescription

BACKGROUND

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a global public health disaster driven largely by antibiotic use in human health care. Doctors considering whether to prescribe antibiotics face an ethical conflict between upholding individual patient health and advancing public health aims. Existing literature mainly examines whether patients awaiting consultations desire or expect to receive antibiotic prescriptions, but does not report views of the wider public regarding conditions under which doctors should prescribe antibiotics. It also does not explore the ethical significance of public views or their sensitivity to awareness of AMR risks or the standpoint (self-interested or impartial) taken by participants.

METHODS

An online survey was conducted with a sample of the U.S. public (n = 158). Participants were asked to indicate what relative priority should be given to individual patients and society-at-large from various standpoints and in various contexts, including antibiotic prescription.

RESULTS

Of the participants, 50.3% thought that doctors should generally prioritize individual patients over society, whereas 32.0% prioritized society over individual patients. When asked in the context of AMR, 39.2% prioritized individuals whereas 45.5% prioritized society. Participants were significantly less willing to prioritize society over individuals when they themselves were the patient, both in general (p = .001) and in relation to AMR specifically (p = .006).

CONCLUSIONS

Participants' attitudes were more oriented to society and sensitive to collective responsibility when informed about the social costs of antibiotic use and when considered from a third-person rather than first-person perspective. That is, as participants came closer to taking the perspective of an informed and impartial "ideal observer," their support for prioritizing society increased. Our findings suggest that, insofar as antibiotic policies and practices should be informed by attitudes that are impartial and well-informed, there is significant support for prioritizing society.

The Role of Physicians in the Allocation of Health Care: Is Some Justice Better than None?

Physicians' advocacy obligations are best understood as going beyond advocacy on behalf of individual patients, which I call the "individualistic view," to include advocacy for intelligent research-based allocation schemes that promote good outcomes and cost-effective care for all patients, which I call the "systemic view." This systemic view includes moving beyond self-interest to promote less-wasteful and more cost-conscious allocation decisions and the setting of priorities at all levels to expand health care access. It includes physician involvement in discussions with patients in the context of clinical care, involvement in the formulation and administration of benefit structures and other allocation policies, and, finally, involvement in promoting public dialogue about health care priorities. This involvement is based on a concept of a deliberative process that can result in "just enough" decisions within systems for the preservation and promotion of health care and other societal goods.

The values and ethical commitments of doctors engaging in macroallocation: a qualitative and evaluative analysis

BACKGROUND

In most socialised health systems there are formal processes that manage resource scarcity and determine the allocation of funds to health services in accordance with their priority. In this analysis, part of a larger qualitative study examining the ethical issues entailed in doctors' participation as technical experts in priority setting, we describe the values and ethical commitments of doctors who engage in priority setting and make an empirically derived contribution towards the identification of an ethical framework for doctors' macroallocation work.

METHOD

We conducted semi-structured interviews with 20 doctors, each of whom participated in macroallocation at one or more levels of the Australian health system. Our sampling, data-collection, and analysis strategies were closely modelled on grounded moral analysis, an iterative empirical bioethics methodology that employs contemporaneous interchange between the ethical and empirical to support normative claims grounded in practice.

RESULTS

The values held in common by the doctors in our sample related to the domains of personal ethics ('taking responsibility' and 'persistence, patience, and loyalty to a cause'), justice ('engaging in distributive justice', 'equity', and 'confidence in institutions'), and practices of argumentation ('moderation' and 'data and evidence'). Applying the principles of grounded moral analysis, we identified that our participants' ideas of the good in macroallocation and their normative insights into the practice were strongly aligned with the three levels of Paul Ricoeur's 'little ethics': 'aiming at the "good life" lived with and for others in just institutions'.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings suggest new ways of understanding how doctors' values might have procedural and substantive impacts on macroallocation, and challenge the prevailing assumption that doctors in this milieu are motivated primarily by deontological considerations. Our empirical bioethics approach enabled us to identify an ethical framework for medical work in macroallocation that was grounded in the values and ethical intuitions of doctors engaged in actions of distributive justice. The concordance between Ricoeur's 'little ethics' and macroallocation practitioners' experiences, and its embrace of mutuality, suggest that it has the potential to guide practice, support ethical reflection, and harmonise deliberative practices amongst actors in macroallocation generally.

Constructing citizen engagement in health research priority-setting to attend to dynamics of power and difference

Engaging citizens is vital to achieving people-centred health research. This paper aims to put attention to dynamics of power and dynamics of difference back at the centre of citizen engagement in health research priority-setting. Without attention to power and difference, engagement can lead to presence without voice and voice without influence, particularly for disadvantaged and marginalised groups. By analysing six key bodies of literature, the paper first identifies the different components of engagement-who initiates, for what purpose, who participates, and how they participate-and the dynamics of power and dynamics of difference relevant to them. For each component of engagement, the ethical considerations relating to those dimensions of power and dimensions of difference are characterised for the research priority-setting context and preliminary guidance on how they might be addressed is provided. An initial framework comprised of a series of questions reflecting these ethical considerations has been developed for use by researchers and citizens when designing engagement processes for research projects. Where researchers and citizens attend to the framework's questions and then revise their priority-setting processes' design to better represent diversity and mitigate power disparities, more inclusive citizen engagement is promoted. Disadvantaged and marginalised groups are more likely to be present and heard, which, in turn, will help generate research projects with topics and questions that encompass and more accurately reflect their health needs.

[The ethical problems in limiting the role for cost-effectiveness]

In relation to the Swedish ethical platform for priority setting in health-care it is debated what role cost-effectiveness should play. In the article an ethical analysis is presented showing that a limited role risks leading to unequal priorities between similar needs in conflict with the human dignity and need-solidarity principles of the platform. It is also argued that resulting problems with effect comparability over different conditions and resulting equality problems with the current praxis can be mitigated through strategies like explicitly considering outcome measure and by adjusting the cost-effectiveness threshold under specific conditions.

Can Judges Ration with Compassion? A Priority-Setting Rights Matrix

How should courts supervise health service resource allocation? Although practice varies widely, four broad approaches can be represented on a matrix comparing, on two axes, (a) individual-community rights and (b) substantive-procedural remedies. Examples from each compartment of the matrix are discussed and, although the community-procedural approach is recommended as a general rule, a range of other responses within the matrix may also be desirable.

Against proportional shortfall as a priority-setting principle

As the demand for healthcare rises, so does the need for priority setting in healthcare. In this paper, I consider a prominent priority-setting principle: proportional shortfall. My purpose is to argue that proportional shortfall, as a principle, should not be adopted. My key criticism is that proportional shortfall fails to consider past health.Proportional shortfall is justified as it supposedly balances concern for prospective health while still accounting for lifetime health, even though past health is deemed irrelevant. Accounting for this lifetime perspective means that the principle may indirectly consider past health by accounting for how far an individual is from achieving a complete, healthy life. I argue that proportional shortfall does not account for this lifetime perspective as it fails to incorporate the fair innings argument as originally claimed, undermining its purported justification.I go on to demonstrate that the case for ignoring past health is weak, and argue that past health is at least sometimes relevant for priority-setting decisions. Specifically, when an individual's past health has a direct impact on current or future health, and when one individual has enjoyed significantly more healthy life years than another.Finally, I demonstrate that by ignoring past illnesses, even those entirely unrelated to their current illness, proportional shortfall can lead to instances of double jeopardy, a highly problematic implication. These arguments give us reason to reject proportional shortfall.

Against lifetime QALY prioritarianism

Lifetime quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) prioritarianism has recently been defended as a reasonable specification of the prioritarian view that benefits to the worse off should be given priority in health-related priority setting. This paper argues against this view with reference to how it relies on implausible assumptions. By referring to lifetime QALY as the basis for judgments about who is worse off lifetime QALY prioritarianism relies on assumptions of strict additivity, atomism and intertemporal separability of sublifetime attributes. These assumptions entail that a health state at some period in time contributes with the same amount to how well off someone is regardless of intrapersonal and interpersonal distributions of health states. The paper argues that this is implausible and that prioritarians should take both intrapersonal and interpersonal distributions of goods into account when they establish who is worse off. They should therefore not accept that lifetime QALY is a reasonable ground for ascribing priority and reject lifetime QALY prioritarianism.

When clinical trials compete: prioritising study recruitment

It is not uncommon for multiple clinical trials at the same institution to recruit concurrently from the same patient population. When the relevant pool of patients is limited, as it often is, trials essentially compete for participants. There is evidence that such a competition is a predictor of low study accrual, with increased competition tied to increased recruitment shortfalls. But there is no consensus on what steps, if any, institutions should take to approach this issue. In this article, we argue that an institutional policy that prioritises some trials for recruitment ahead of others is ethically permissible and indeed prima facie preferable to alternative means of addressing recruitment competition. We motivate this view by appeal to the ethical importance of minimising the number of studies that begin but do not complete, thereby exposing their participants to unnecessary risks and burdens in the process. We then argue that a policy of prioritisation can be fair to relevant stakeholders, including participants, investigators and funders. Finally, by way of encouraging and helping to frame future debate, we propose some questions that would need to be addressed when identifying substantive ethical criteria for prioritising between studies.

Ethical Hurdles in the Prioritization of Oncology Care

With finite resources, healthcare payers must make difficult choices regarding spending and the ethical distribution of funds. Here, we describe some of the ethical issues surrounding inequity in healthcare in nine major European countries, using cancer care as an example. To identify relevant studies, we conducted a systematic literature search. The results of the literature review suggest that although prevention, access to early diagnosis, and radiotherapy are key factors associated with good outcomes in oncology, public and political attention often focusses on the availability of pharmacological treatments. In some countries this focus may divert funding towards cancer drugs, for example through specific cancer drugs funds, leading to reduced expenditure on other areas of cancer care, including prevention, and potentially on other diseases. In addition, as highly effective, expensive agents are developed, the use of value-based approaches may lead to unacceptable impacts on health budgets, leading to a potential need to re-evaluate current cost-effectiveness thresholds. We anticipate that the question of how to fund new therapies equitably will become even more challenging in the future, with the advent of expensive, innovative, breakthrough treatments in other therapeutic areas.

Public Reasoning and Health-Care Priority Setting: The Case of NICE

Health systems that aim to secure universal patient access through a scheme of prepayments-whether through taxes, social insurance, or a combination of the two-need to make decisions on the scope of coverage that they guarantee: such tasks often falling to a priority-setting agency. This article analyzes the decision-making processes at one such agency in particular-the UK's National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE)-and appraises their ethical justifiability. In particular, we consider the extent to which NICE's model can be justified on the basis of Rawls's conception of "reasonableness." This test shares certain features with the well-known Accountability for Reasonableness (AfR) model but also offers an alternative to it, being concerned with how far the values used by priority-setting agencies such as NICE meet substantive conditions of reasonableness irrespective of their procedural virtues. We find that while there are areas in which NICE's processes may be improved, NICE's overall approach to evaluating health technologies and setting priorities for health-care coverage is a reasonable one, making it an exemplar for other health-care systems facing similar coverage dilemmas. In so doing we offer both a framework for analysing the ethical justifiability of NICE's processes and one that might be used to evaluate others.

Should Children Be Given Priority in Kidney Allocation?

Kidneys for transplantation are scarce, and many countries give priority to children in allocating them. This paper explains and criticizes the paediatric priority. We set out the relevant ethical principles of allocation, such as utility and severity, and the relevant facts to do with such matters as sensitization and child development. We argue that the facts and principles do not support and sometimes conflict with the priority given to children. We next consider various views on how age or the status of children should affect allocation. Again, these views do not support priority to children in its current form. Since distinctions based on age ought to be positively justified, the failure of all these attempts at justification implies that the priority to children is ethically mistaken. Finally, the paper points to evidence that the paediatric priority reduces the overall supply of kidneys, at least in the United States. Paediatric priority is a real-world policy that seems discriminatory, in some places probably reduces the supply of organs, has no robust official defence, and is unsupported by mainstream ethical principles. Consequently, it should be ended.

[The willingness to pay for new drugs is based on ethical principles]

The County Council's board for new therapies (the NT Council) provides recommendations on the use of new drugs based on the ethical platform of priorities, founded by the Swedish parliament. The Council has formulated a policy that interprets the parliamentary ethical platform and operationalize its need and solidarity principle and cost effectiveness principle in four dimensions. The NT Council weighs the health economic evaluation of the drug and the four dimensions: the severity of the condition, the rarity of the condition, the effect size and the data reliability to determine the willingness to pay level and whether the platform allows a recommendation for using of the drug. The severity of the condition has a greater impact than the other dimensions. In the assessment of severity there is also a trade-off between prevention and treatment of manifest diseases and in prevention, the size of the risk of falling ill is of importance. A slightly higher willingness to pay level is reasonable for treatment of very rare conditions, but it is important that identified patients are not given priority over anonymous patient groups with equally strong needs.

Older People's Reasoning About Age-Related Prioritization in Health Care

The aim of this study was to describe the reasoning of people aged 60 years and over about prioritization in health care with regard to age and willingness to pay. Healthy people (n = 300) and people receiving continuous care and services (n = 146) who were between 60 and 101 years old were interviewed about their views on prioritization in health care. The transcribed interviews were analysed using manifest and latent qualitative content analysis. The participants' reasoning on prioritization embraced eight categories: feeling secure and confident in the health care system; being old means low priority; prioritization causes worries; using underhand means in order to be prioritized; prioritization as a necessity; being averse to anyone having precedence over others; having doubts about the distribution of resources; and buying treatment requires wealth.

The genetic conception of health: is it as radical as claimed?

The so-called new genetics is widely predicted to radically transform medicine and public health and deliver considerable benefits in the future. This article argues that, although it is doubtful that many of the promised benefits of genetic research will be delivered, an increasingly pervasive genetic worldview and expectations about future genetic innovations are profoundly shaping conceptions of health and illness and priorities in healthcare. Further, it suggests that debates about the normative and justice implications of new genetic technologies thus far have been constrained by bioethics discourse, which has tended to frame questions narrowly in terms of how best to ensure the protection and promotion of the rights and freedoms of the individual. Sociologists and other social scientists can help broaden debate in this field by exposing the assumptions underlying the genetic conception of health and exploring the implications of associated developments.

Who Shall Not Be Treated: Public Attitudes on Setting Health Care Priorities by Person-Based Criteria in 28 Nations

The principle of distributing health care according to medical need is being challenged by increasing costs. As a result, many countries have initiated a debate on the introduction of explicit priority regulations based on medical, economic and person-based criteria, or have already established such regulations. Previous research on individual attitudes towards setting health care priorities based on medical and economic criteria has revealed consistent results, whereas studies on the use of person-based criteria have generated controversial findings. This paper examines citizens’ attitudes towards three person-based priority criteria, patients’ smoking habits, age and being the parent of a young child. Using data from the ISSP Health Module (2011) in 28 countries, logistic regression analysis demonstrates that self-interest as well as socio-demographic predictors significantly influence respondents’ attitudes towards the use of person-based criteria for health care prioritization. This study contributes to resolving the controversial findings on person-based criteria by using a larger country sample and by controlling for country-level differences with fixed effects models.

Disease prioritarianism: a flawed principle

Disease prioritarianism is a principle that is often implicitly or explicitly employed in the realm of healthcare prioritization. This principle states that the healthcare system ought to prioritize the treatment of disease before any other problem. This article argues that disease prioritarianism ought to be rejected. Instead, we should adopt 'the problem-oriented heuristic' when making prioritizations in the healthcare system. According to this idea, we ought to focus on specific problems and whether or not it is possible and efficient to address them with medical means. This has radical implications for the extension of the healthcare system. First, getting rid of the binary disease/no-disease dichotomy implicit in disease prioritarianism would improve the ability of the healthcare system to address chronic conditions and disabilities that often defy easy classification. Second, the problem-oriented heuristic could empower medical practitioners to address social problems without the need to pathologize these conditions. Third, the problem-oriented heuristic clearly states that what we choose to treat is a normative consideration. Under this assumption, we can engage in a discussion on de-medicalization without distorting preconceptions. Fourth, this pragmatic and de-compartmentalizing approach should allow us to reconsider the term 'efficiency'.

Prioritization of high-cost new drugs for HCV: making sustainability ethical

Hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection is a major health problem worldwide. Chronic HCV infection may in the long run cause cirrhosis, hepatic decompensation and hepatocellular carcinoma, with an ultimate disease burden of at least 350,000 deaths per year worldwide. The new generation of highly effective direct acting antivirals (DAA) to treat HCV infection brings major promises to infected patients in terms of exceedingly high rates of sustained virological response (SVR) but also of tolerability, allowing even the sickest patients to be treated. Even in the face of the excellent safety and efficacy and wide theoretical applicability of these regimens, their introduction is currently facing cost and access issues denying their use to many patients in need. Health systems in all countries are facing a huge problem of distributive justice, since while they should guarantee individual rights, among which the right to health in its broader sense, therefore not limited to healing, but extended to quality of life, they must also grant equal access to the healthcare resources and keep the distribution system sustainable. In the face of a disease with a relatively unpredictable course, where many but not of all chronically infected will eventually die of liver disease, selective allocation of this costly resource is debatable. In most countries the favorite solution has been a stratification of patients for prioritization of treatment, which means allowing Interferon-free DAA treatment only in patients with advanced fibrosis or cirrhosis, while keeping on hold persons with lesser stages of liver disease. In this report, we will perform an ethical assessment addressing the issues linked to access to new therapies, prioritization and eligibility criteria, analyzing the meaning of the term "distributive justice" and the different approaches that can guide us (individualistic libertarianism, social utilitarianism and egalitarianism) on this specific matter. Even if over time the price of new DAA will be reduced through competition and eventual patent expiration, the phenomenon of high drug costs will go on in the next decades and we need adequate tools to face the problems of distributive justice that come with it.