Leveraging International Influenza Surveillance Systems and Programs during the COVID-19 Pandemic

A network of global respiratory disease surveillance systems and partnerships has been built over decades as a direct response to the persistent threat of seasonal, zoonotic, and pandemic influenza. These efforts have been spearheaded by the World Health Organization, country ministries of health, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, nongovernmental organizations, academic groups, and others. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention worked closely with ministries of health in partner countries and the World Health Organization to leverage influenza surveillance systems and programs to respond to SARS-CoV-2 transmission. Countries used existing surveillance systems for severe acute respiratory infection and influenza-like illness, respiratory virus laboratory resources, pandemic influenza preparedness plans, and ongoing population-based influenza studies to track, study, and respond to SARS-CoV-2 infections. The incorporation of COVID-19 surveillance into existing influenza sentinel surveillance systems can support continued global surveillance for respiratory viruses with pandemic potential.

Prevention and Control of Seasonal Influenza with Vaccines: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices - United States, 2020-21 Influenza Season

This report updates the 2019–20 recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) regarding the use of seasonal influenza vaccines in the United States (MMWR Recomm Rep 2019;68[No. RR-3]). Routine annual influenza vaccination is recommended for all persons aged ≥6 months who do not have contraindications. For each recipient, a licensed and age-appropriate vaccine should be used. Inactivated influenza vaccines (IIVs), recombinant influenza vaccine (RIV4), and live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV4) are expected to be available. Most influenza vaccines available for the 2020–21 season will be quadrivalent, with the exception of MF59-adjuvanted IIV, which is expected to be available in both quadrivalent and trivalent formulations.

Updates to the recommendations described in this report reflect discussions during public meetings of ACIP held on October 23, 2019; February 26, 2020; and June 24, 2020. Primary updates to this report include the following two items. First, the composition of 2020–21 U.S. influenza vaccines includes updates to the influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, influenza A(H3N2), and influenza B/Victoria lineage components. Second, recent licensures of two new influenza vaccines, Fluzone High-Dose Quadrivalent and Fluad Quadrivalent, are discussed. Both new vaccines are licensed for persons aged ≥65 years. Additional changes include updated discussion of contraindications and precautions to influenza vaccination and the accompanying Table, updated discussion concerning use of LAIV4 in the setting of influenza antiviral medication use, and updated recommendations concerning vaccination of persons with egg allergy who receive either cell culture–based IIV4 (ccIIV4) or RIV4.

The 2020–21 influenza season will coincide with the continued or recurrent circulation of SARS-CoV-2 (the novel coronavirus associated with coronavirus disease 2019 [COVID-19]). Influenza vaccination of persons aged ≥6 months to reduce prevalence of illness caused by influenza will reduce symptoms that might be confused with those of COVID-19. Prevention of and reduction in the severity of influenza illness and reduction of outpatient illnesses, hospitalizations, and intensive care unit admissions through influenza vaccination also could alleviate stress on the U.S. health care system. Guidance for vaccine planning during the pandemic is available at https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pandemic-guidance/index.html.

This report focuses on recommendations for the use of vaccines for the prevention and control of seasonal influenza during the 2020–21 season in the United States. A brief summary of the recommendations and a link to the most recent Background Document containing additional information are available at https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/acip-recs/vacc-specific/flu.html. These recommendations apply to U.S.-licensed influenza vaccines used within Food and Drug Administration (FDA)–licensed indications. Updates and other information are available from CDC’s influenza website (https://www.cdc.gov/flu). Vaccination and health care providers should check this site periodically for additional information.

Fifty Years of Influenza A(H3N2) Following the Pandemic of 1968

In 2018, the world commemorated the centennial of the 1918 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic, the deadliest pandemic in recorded history; however, little mention was made of the 50th anniversary of the 1968 A(H3N2) pandemic. Although pandemic morbidity and mortality were much lower in 1968 than in 1918, influenza A(H3N2) virus infections have become the leading cause of seasonal influenza illness and death over the last 50 years, with more than twice the number of hospitalizations from A(H3N2) as from A(H1N1) during the past six seasons. We review the emergence, progression, clinical course, etiology, epidemiology, and treatment of the 1968 pandemic and highlight the short- and long-term impact associated with A(H3N2) viruses. The 1968 H3N2 pandemic and its ongoing sequelae underscore the need for improved seasonal and pandemic influenza prevention, control, preparedness, and response efforts.

Initial public health response and interim clinical guidance for the 2019 novel coronavirus outbreak - United States, December 31, 2019-February 4, 2020

This article summarizes what is currently known about the 2019 novel coronavirus and offers interim guidance.

Update: Public Health Response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Outbreak - United States, February 24, 2020

An outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) caused by the 2019 novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) began in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China in December 2019, and has spread throughout China and to 31 other countries and territories, including the United States (1). As of February 23, 2020, there were 76,936 reported cases in mainland China and 1,875 cases in locations outside mainland China (1). There have been 2,462 associated deaths worldwide; no deaths have been reported in the United States. Fourteen cases have been diagnosed in the United States, and an additional 39 cases have occurred among repatriated persons from high-risk settings, for a current total of 53 cases within the United States. This report summarizes the aggressive measures (2,3) that CDC, state and local health departments, multiple other federal agencies, and other partners are implementing to slow and try to contain transmission of COVID-19 in the United States. These measures require the identification of cases and contacts of persons with COVID-19 in the United States and the recommended assessment, monitoring, and care of travelers arriving from areas with substantial COVID-19 transmission. Although these measures might not prevent widespread transmission of the virus in the United States, they are being implemented to 1) slow the spread of illness; 2) provide time to better prepare state and local health departments, health care systems, businesses, educational organizations, and the general public in the event that widespread transmission occurs; and 3) better characterize COVID-19 to guide public health recommendations and the development and deployment of medical countermeasures, including diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines. U.S. public health authorities are monitoring the situation closely, and CDC is coordinating efforts with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other global partners. Interim guidance is available at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/index.html. As more is learned about this novel virus and this outbreak, CDC will rapidly incorporate new knowledge into guidance for action by CDC, state and local health departments, health care providers, and communities.

Initial Public Health Response and Interim Clinical Guidance for the 2019 Novel Coronavirus Outbreak - United States, December 31, 2019-February 4, 2020

On December 31, 2019, Chinese health officials reported a cluster of cases of acute respiratory illness in persons associated with the Hunan seafood and animal market in the city of Wuhan, Hubei Province, in central China. On January 7, 2020, Chinese health officials confirmed that a novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) was associated with this initial cluster (1). As of February 4, 2020, a total of 20,471 confirmed cases, including 2,788 (13.6%) with severe illness,* and 425 deaths (2.1%) had been reported by the National Health Commission of China (2). Cases have also been reported in 26 locations outside of mainland China, including documentation of some person-to-person transmission and one death (2). As of February 4, 11 cases had been reported in the United States. On January 30, the World Health Organization (WHO) Director-General declared that the 2019-nCoV outbreak constitutes a Public Health Emergency of International Concern.† On January 31, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary declared a U.S. public health emergency to respond to 2019-nCoV.§ Also on January 31, the president of the United States signed a "Proclamation on Suspension of Entry as Immigrants and Nonimmigrants of Persons who Pose a Risk of Transmitting 2019 Novel Coronavirus," which limits entry into the United States of persons who traveled to mainland China to U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents and their families (3). CDC, multiple other federal agencies, state and local health departments, and other partners are implementing aggressive measures to slow transmission of 2019-nCoV in the United States (4,5). These measures require the identification of cases and their contacts in the United States and the appropriate assessment and care of travelers arriving from mainland China to the United States. These measures are being implemented in anticipation of additional 2019-nCoV cases in the United States. Although these measures might not prevent the eventual establishment of ongoing, widespread transmission of the virus in the United States, they are being implemented to 1) slow the spread of illness; 2) provide time to better prepare health care systems and the general public to be ready if widespread transmission with substantial associated illness occurs; and 3) better characterize 2019-nCoV infection to guide public health recommendations and the development of medical countermeasures including diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines. Public health authorities are monitoring the situation closely. As more is learned about this novel virus and this outbreak, CDC will rapidly incorporate new knowledge into guidance for action by CDC and state and local health departments.

Prevention and Control of Seasonal Influenza with Vaccines: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices - United States, 2019-20 Influenza Season

This report updates the 2018–19 recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) regarding the use of seasonal influenza vaccines in the United States (MMWR Recomm Rep 2018;67[No. RR-3]). Routine annual influenza vaccination is recommended for all persons aged ≥6 months who do not have contraindications. A licensed, recommended, and age-appropriate vaccine should be used. Inactivated influenza vaccines (IIVs), recombinant influenza vaccine (RIV), and live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV) are expected to be available for the 2019–20 season. Standard-dose, unadjuvanted, inactivated influenza vaccines will be available in quadrivalent formulations (IIV4s). High-dose (HD-IIV3) and adjuvanted (aIIV3) inactivated influenza vaccines will be available in trivalent formulations. Recombinant (RIV4) and live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV4) will be available in quadrivalent formulations.

Updates to the recommendations described in this report reflect discussions during public meetings of ACIP held on October 25, 2018; February 27, 2019; and June 27, 2019. Primary updates in this report include the following two items. First, 2019–20 U.S. trivalent influenza vaccines will contain hemagglutinin (HA) derived from an A/Brisbane/02/2018 (H1N1)pdm09–like virus, an A/Kansas/14/2017 (H3N2)–like virus, and a B/Colorado/06/2017–like virus (Victoria lineage). Quadrivalent influenza vaccines will contain HA derived from these three viruses, and a B/Phuket/3073/2013–like virus (Yamagata lineage). Second, recent labeling changes for two IIV4s, Afluria Quadrivalent and Fluzone Quadrivalent, are discussed. The age indication for Afluria Quadrivalent has been expanded from ≥5 years to ≥6 months. The dose volume for Afluria Quadrivalent is 0.25 mL for children aged 6 through 35 months and 0.5 mL for all persons aged ≥36 months (≥3 years). The dose volume for Fluzone Quadrivalent for children aged 6 through 35 months, which was previously 0.25 mL, is now either 0.25 mL or 0.5 mL. The dose volume for Fluzone Quadrivalent is 0.5 mL for all persons aged ≥36 months (≥3 years).

This report focuses on the recommendations for use of vaccines for the prevention and control of influenza during the 2019–20 season in the United States. A brief summary of these recommendations and a Background Document containing additional information are available at https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/acip-recs/vacc-specific/flu.html. These recommendations apply to U.S.-licensed influenza vaccines used within Food and Drug Administration–licensed indications. Updates and other information are available from CDC’s influenza website (https://www.cdc.gov/flu). Vaccination and health care providers should check this site periodically for additional information.

Progress in Vaccine-Preventable and Respiratory Infectious Diseases-First 10 Years of the CDC National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, 2006-2015

The need for closer linkages between scientific and programmatic areas focused on addressing vaccine-preventable and acute respiratory infections led to establishment of the National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases (NCIRD) at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. During its first 10 years (2006–2015), NCIRD worked with partners to improve preparedness and response to pandemic influenza and other emergent respiratory infections, provide an evidence base for addition of 7 newly recommended vaccines, and modernize vaccine distribution. Clinical tools were developed for improved conversations with parents, which helped sustain childhood immunization as a social norm. Coverage increased for vaccines to protect adolescents against pertussis, meningococcal meningitis, and human papillomavirus–associated cancers. NCIRD programs supported outbreak response for new respiratory pathogens and oversaw response of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic. Other national public health institutes might also find closer linkages between epidemiology, laboratory, and immunization programs useful.

100 Years of Medical Countermeasures and Pandemic Influenza Preparedness

The 1918 influenza pandemic spread rapidly around the globe, leading to high mortality and social disruption. The countermeasures available to mitigate the pandemic were limited and relied on nonpharmaceutical interventions. Over the past 100 years, improvements in medical care, influenza vaccines, antiviral medications, community mitigation efforts, diagnosis, and communications have improved pandemic response. A number of gaps remain, including vaccines that are more rapidly manufactured, antiviral drugs that are more effective and available, and better respiratory protective devices.

Prevention and Control of Seasonal Influenza with Vaccines: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices-United States, 2018-19 Influenza Season

This report updates the 2017-18 recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) regarding the use of seasonal influenza vaccines in the United States (MMWR Recomm Rep 2017;66[No. RR-2]). Routine annual influenza vaccination is recommended for all persons aged ≥6 months who do not have contraindications. A licensed, recommended, and age-appropriate vaccine should be used. Inactivated influenza vaccines (IIVs), recombinant influenza vaccine (RIV), and live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV) are expected to be available for the 2018-19 season. Standard-dose, unadjuvanted, inactivated influenza vaccines will be available in quadrivalent (IIV4) and trivalent (IIV3) formulations. Recombinant influenza vaccine (RIV4) and live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV4) will be available in quadrivalent formulations. High-dose inactivated influenza vaccine (HD-IIV3) and adjuvanted inactivated influenza vaccine (aIIV3) will be available in trivalent formulations.Updates to the recommendations described in this report reflect discussions during public meetings of ACIP held on October 25, 2017; February 21, 2018; and June 20, 2018. New and updated information in this report includes the following four items. First, vaccine viruses included in the 2018-19 U.S. trivalent influenza vaccines will be an A/Michigan/45/2015 (H1N1)pdm09-like virus, an A/Singapore/INFIMH-16-0019/2016 (H3N2)-like virus, and a B/Colorado/06/2017-like virus (Victoria lineage). Quadrivalent influenza vaccines will contain these three viruses and an additional influenza B vaccine virus, a B/Phuket/3073/2013-like virus (Yamagata lineage). Second, recommendations for the use of LAIV4 (FluMist Quadrivalent) have been updated. Following two seasons (2016-17 and 2017-18) during which ACIP recommended that LAIV4 not be used, for the 2018-19 season, vaccination providers may choose to administer any licensed, age-appropriate influenza vaccine (IIV, RIV4, or LAIV4). LAIV4 is an option for those for whom it is appropriate. Third, persons with a history of egg allergy of any severity may receive any licensed, recommended, and age-appropriate influenza vaccine (IIV, RIV4, or LAIV4). Additional recommendations concerning vaccination of egg-allergic persons are discussed. Finally, information on recent licensures and labeling changes is discussed, including expansion of the age indication for Afluria Quadrivalent (IIV4) from ≥18 years to ≥5 years and expansion of the age indication for Fluarix Quadrivalent (IIV4), previously licensed for ≥3 years, to ≥6 months.This report focuses on the recommendations for use of vaccines for the prevention and control of influenza during the 2018-19 season in the United States. A Background Document containing further information and a brief summary of these recommendations are available at https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/acip-recs/vacc-specific/flu.html.These recommendations apply to U.S.-licensed influenza vaccines used within Food and Drug Administration-licensed indications. Updates and other information are available at CDC's influenza website (https://www.cdc.gov/flu). Vaccination and health care providers should check CDC's influenza website periodically for additional information.

Update: ACIP Recommendations for the Use of Quadrivalent Live Attenuated Influenza Vaccine (LAIV4) - United States, 2018-19 Influenza Season

Intranasally administered live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV) was initially licensed in the United States in 2003 as a trivalent formulation (LAIV3) (FluMist, MedImmune, LLC). Quadrivalent live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV4) (FluMist Quadrivalent, MedImmune) has been licensed in the United States since 2012 and was first available during the 2013-14 influenza season, replacing LAIV3. During the 2016-17 and 2017-18 influenza seasons, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommended that LAIV4 not be used because of concerns about low effectiveness against influenza A(H1N1)pdm09-like viruses circulating in the United States during the 2013-14 and 2015-16 seasons (1,2). On February 21, 2018, ACIP recommended that LAIV4 be an option for influenza vaccination of persons for whom it is appropriate for the 2018-19 season (3). This document provides an overview of the information discussed in the decision-making process leading to this recommendation. A description of methodology and data reviewed will be included in the background materials that will supplement the 2018-19 ACIP Influenza Recommendations, which will replace the 2017-18 ACIP influenza statement (2), and which will also contain guidance for the use of LAIV4.

Systematic Assessment of Multiple Routine and Near Real-Time Indicators to Classify the Severity of Influenza Seasons and Pandemics in the United States, 2003-2004 Through 2015-2016

Assessments of influenza season severity can guide public health action. We used the moving epidemic method to develop intensity thresholds (ITs) for 3 US surveillance indicators from the 2003-2004 through 2014-2015 influenza seasons (excluding the 2009 pandemic). The indicators were: 1) outpatient visits for influenza-like illness; 2) influenza-related hospitalizations; and 3) influenza- and pneumonia-related deaths. ITs were developed for the population overall and separately for children, adults, and older adults, and they were set at the upper limit of the 50% (IT50), 90% (IT90), and 98% (IT98) 1-sided confidence intervals of the geometric mean of each season's 3 highest values. Severity was classified as low if ≥2 systems peaked below IT50, moderate if ≥2 peaked between IT50 and IT90, high if ≥2 peaked between IT90 and IT98, and very high if ≥2 peaked above IT98. We pilot-tested this method with the 2015-2016 season and the 2009 pandemic. Overall, 4 seasons were classified as low severity, 7 as moderate, 2 as high, and none as very high. Among the age groups, older adults had the most seasons (n = 3) classified as high, and children were the only group to have seasons (n = 2) classified as very high. We will apply this method to classify the severity of future seasons and inform pandemic response.

The Global Threat of Animal Influenza Viruses of Zoonotic Concern: Then and Now

Animal influenza viruses can reassort or mutate to infect and spread sustainably among people and cause a devastating worldwide pandemic. Since the first evidence of human infection with an animal influenza virus, in 1958, 16 different novel, zoonotic influenza A virus subtype groups in 29 countries, Taiwan, and Hong Kong have caused human infections, with differing severity and frequency. The frequency of novel influenza virus detection is increasing, and human infections with influenza A(H5N1) and A(H7N9) viruses are now annual seasonal occurrences in Asia. The study of the epidemiology and virology of animal influenza viruses is key to understanding pandemic risk and informing preparedness. This supplement brings together select recent articles that look at the risk of emergence and transmission of and approaches to prevent novel influenza virus infections.

Prevention and Control of Seasonal Influenza with Vaccines: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices - United States, 2017-18 Influenza Season

This report updates the 2016–17 recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) regarding the use of seasonal influenza vaccines (MMWR Recomm Rep 2016;65[No. RR-5]). Routine annual influenza vaccination is recommended for all persons aged ≥6 months who do not have contraindications. A licensed, recommended, and age-appropriate vaccine should be used.

For the 2017–18 season, quadrivalent and trivalent influenza vaccines will be available. Inactivated influenza vaccines (IIVs) will be available in trivalent (IIV3) and quadrivalent (IIV4) formulations. Recombinant influenza vaccine (RIV) will be available in trivalent (RIV3) and quadrivalent (RIV4) formulations. Live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV4) is not recommended for use during the 2017–18 season due to concerns about its effectiveness against (H1N1)pdm09 viruses during the 2013–14 and 2015–16 seasons. Recommendations for different vaccine types and specific populations are discussed. No preferential recommendation is made for one influenza vaccine product over another for persons for whom more than one licensed, recommended product is available.

Updates to the recommendations described in this report reflect discussions during public meetings of ACIP held on October 20, 2016; February 22, 2017; and June 21, 2017. New and updated information in this report includes the following:

•Vaccine viruses included in the 2017–18 U.S. trivalent influenza vaccines will be an A/Michigan/45/2015 (H1N1)pdm09–like virus, an A/Hong Kong/4801/2014 (H3N2)-like virus, and a B/Brisbane/60/2008–like virus (Victoria lineage). Quadrivalent influenza vaccines will contain these three viruses and an additional influenza B vaccine virus, a B/Phuket/3073/2013–like virus (Yamagata lineage).

• Information on recent licensures and labelling changes is discussed, including licensure of Afluria Quadrivalent (IIV4; Seqirus, Parkville, Victoria, Australia); Flublok Quadrivalent (RIV4; Protein Sciences, Meriden, Connecticut); and expansion of the age indication for FluLaval Quadrivalent (IIV4; ID Biomedical Corporation of Quebec, Quebec City, Quebec, Canada), previously licensed for ≥3 years, to ≥6 months.

• Pregnant women may receive any licensed, recommended, age-appropriate influenza vaccine.

• Afluria (IIV3; Seqirus, Parkville, Victoria, Australia) may be used for persons aged ≥5 years, consistent with Food and Drug Administration–approved labeling.

• FluMist Quadrivalent (LAIV4; MedImmune, Gaithersburg, Maryland) should not be used during the 2017–18 season due to concerns about its effectiveness against influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses in the United States during the 2013–14 and 2015–16 influenza seasons.

This report focuses on the recommendations for use of vaccines for the prevention and control of influenza during the 2017–18 season in the United States. A Background Document containing further information and a summary of these recommendations are available at https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/acip-recs/vacc-specific/flu.html. These recommendations apply to licensed influenza vaccines used within Food and Drug Administration–licensed indications, including those licensed after the publication date of this report. Updates and other information are available at CDC’s influenza website (https://www.cdc.gov/flu). Vaccination and health care providers should check CDC’s influenza website periodically for additional information.

Stockpiled pre-pandemic H5N1 influenza virus vaccines with AS03 adjuvant provide cross-protection from H5N2 clade 2.3.4.4 virus challenge in ferrets

Avian influenza viruses, notably H5 subtype viruses, pose a continuous threat to public health due to their pandemic potential. In recent years, influenza virus H5 subtype split vaccines with novel oil-in-water emulsion based adjuvants (e.g. AS03, MF59) have been shown to be safe, immunogenic, and able to induce broad immune responses in clinical trials, providing strong scientific support for vaccine stockpiling. However, whether such vaccines can provide protection from infection with emerging, antigenically distinct clades of H5 viruses has not been adequately addressed. Here, we selected two AS03-adjuvanted H5N1 vaccines from the US national pre-pandemic influenza vaccine stockpile and assessed whether the 2004-05 vaccines could provide protection against a 2014 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N2 virus (A/northern pintail/Washington/40964/2014), a clade 2.3.4.4 virus responsible for mass culling of poultry in North America. Ferrets received two doses of adjuvanted vaccine containing 7.5µg of hemagglutinin (HA) from A/Vietnam/1203/2004 (clade 1) or A/Anhui/1/2005 (clade 2.3.4) virus either in a homologous or heterologous prime-boost vaccination regime. We found that both vaccination regimens elicited robust antibody responses against the 2004-05 vaccine viruses and could reduce virus-induced morbidity and viral replication in the lower respiratory tract upon heterologous challenge despite the low level of cross-reactive antibody titers to the challenge H5N2 virus. This study supports the value of existing stockpiled 2004-05 influenza H5N1 vaccines, combined with AS03-adjuvant for early use in the event of an emerging pandemic with H5N2-like clade 2.3.4.4 viruses.

Evaluation of multiplex assay platforms for detection of influenza hemagglutinin subtype specific antibody responses

Influenza hemagglutination inhibition (HI) and virus microneutralization assays (MN) are widely used for seroprevalence studies. However, these assays have limited field portability and are difficult to fully automate for high throughput laboratory testing. To address these issues, three multiplex influenza subtype-specific antibody detection assays were developed using recombinant hemagglutinin antigens in combination with Chembio, Luminex^®, and ForteBio^® platforms. Assay sensitivity, specificity, and subtype cross-reactivity were evaluated using a panel of well characterized human sera. Compared to the traditional HI, assay sensitivity ranged from 87% to 92% and assay specificity in sera collected from unexposed persons ranged from 65% to 100% across the platforms. High assay specificity (86-100%) for A(H5N1) rHA was achieved for sera from exposed or unexposed to hetorosubtype influenza HAs. In contrast, assay specificity for A(H1N1)pdm09 rHA using sera collected from A/Vietnam/1204/2004 (H5N1) vaccinees in 2008 was low (22-30%) in all platforms. Although cross-reactivity against rHA subtype proteins was observed in each assay platform, the correct subtype specific responses were identified 78%-94% of the time when paired samples were available for analysis. These results show that high throughput and portable multiplex assays that incorporate rHA can be used to identify influenza subtype specific infections.

CDC Grand Rounds: Modeling and Public Health Decision-Making

Mathematical models incorporate various data sources and advanced computational techniques to portray real-world disease transmission and translate the basic science of infectious diseases into decision-support tools for public health. Unlike standard epidemiologic methods that rely on complete data, modeling is needed when there are gaps in data. By combining diverse data sources, models can fill gaps when critical decisions must be made using incomplete or limited information. They can be used to assess the effect and feasibility of different scenarios and provide insight into the emergence, spread, and control of disease. During the past decade, models have been used to predict the likelihood and magnitude of infectious disease outbreaks, inform emergency response activities in real time (1), and develop plans and preparedness strategies for future events, the latter of which proved invaluable during outbreaks such as severe acute respiratory syndrome and pandemic influenza (2-6). Ideally, modeling is a multistep process that involves communication between modelers and decision-makers, allowing them to gain a mutual understanding of the problem to be addressed, the type of estimates that can be reliably generated, and the limitations of the data. As models become more detailed and relevant to real-time threats, the importance of modeling in public health decision-making continues to grow.

Prevention and Control of Seasonal Influenza with Vaccines

This report updates the 2015-16 recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) regarding the use of seasonal influenza vaccines (Grohskopf LA, Sokolow LZ, Olsen SJ, Bresee JS, Broder KR, Karron RA. Prevention and control of influenza with vaccines: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, United States, 2015-16 influenza season. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2015;64:818-25). Routine annual influenza vaccination is recommended for all persons aged ≥6 months who do not have contraindications. For the 2016-17 influenza season, inactivated influenza vaccines (IIVs) will be available in both trivalent (IIV3) and quadrivalent (IIV4) formulations. Recombinant influenza vaccine (RIV) will be available in a trivalent formulation (RIV3). In light of concerns regarding low effectiveness against influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 in the United States during the 2013-14 and 2015-16 seasons, for the 2016-17 season, ACIP makes the interim recommendation that live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV4) should not be used. Vaccine virus strains included in the 2016-17 U.S. trivalent influenza vaccines will be an A/California/7/2009 (H1N1)-like virus, an A/Hong Kong/4801/2014 (H3N2)-like virus, and a B/Brisbane/60/2008-like virus (Victoria lineage). Quadrivalent vaccines will include an additional influenza B virus strain, a B/Phuket/3073/2013-like virus (Yamagata lineage).Recommendations for use of different vaccine types and specific populations are discussed. A licensed, age-appropriate vaccine should be used. No preferential recommendation is made for one influenza vaccine product over another for persons for whom more than one licensed, recommended product is otherwise appropriate. This information is intended for vaccination providers, immunization program personnel, and public health personnel. Information in this report reflects discussions during public meetings of ACIP held on October 21, 2015; February 24, 2016; and June 22, 2016. These recommendations apply to all licensed influenza vaccines used within Food and Drug Administration-licensed indications, including those licensed after the publication date of this report. Updates and other information are available at CDC's influenza website (http://www.cdc.gov/flu). Vaccination and health care providers should check CDC's influenza website periodically for additional information.

H7N9: preparing for the unexpected in influenza

In the years prior to 2013, avian influenza A H7 viruses were a cause of significant poultry mortality; however, human illness was generally mild. In March 2013, a novel influenza A(H7N9) virus emerged in China as an unexpected cause of severe human illness with 36% mortality. Chinese and other public health officials responded quickly, characterizing the virus and identifying more than 400 cases through use of new technologies and surveillance tools made possible by past preparedness and response efforts. Genetic sequencing, glycan-array receptor-binding assays, and ferret studies reveal the H7N9 virus to have increased binding to mammalian respiratory cells and to have mutations associated with higher virus replication rates and illness severity. New risk-assessment tools indicate H7N9 has the potential for further mammalian adaptation with possible human-to-human transmission. Vigilant virologic and epidemiologic surveillance is needed to monitor H7N9 and detect other unexpected novel influenza viruses that may emerge.

Updated preparedness and response framework for influenza pandemics

The complexities of planning for and responding to the emergence of novel influenza viruses emphasize the need for systematic frameworks to describe the progression of the event; weigh the risk of emergence and potential public health impact; evaluate transmissibility, antiviral resistance, and severity; and make decisions about interventions. On the basis of experience from recent influenza responses, CDC has updated its framework to describe influenza pandemic progression using six intervals (two prepandemic and four pandemic intervals) and eight domains. This updated framework can be used for influenza pandemic planning and serves as recommendations for risk assessment, decision-making, and action in the United States. The updated framework replaces the U.S. federal government stages from the 2006 implementation plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (US Homeland Security Council. National strategy for pandemic influenza: implementation plan. Washington, DC: US Homeland Security Council; 2006. Available at http://www.flu.gov/planning-preparedness/federal/pandemic-influenza-implementation.pdf). The six intervals of the updated framework are as follows: 1) investigation of cases of novel influenza, 2) recognition of increased potential for ongoing transmission, 3) initiation of a pandemic wave, 4) acceleration of a pandemic wave, 5) deceleration of a pandemic wave, and 6) preparation for future pandemic waves. The following eight domains are used to organize response efforts within each interval: incident management, surveillance and epidemiology, laboratory, community mitigation, medical care and countermeasures, vaccine, risk communications, and state/local coordination. Compared with the previous U.S. government stages, this updated framework provides greater detail and clarity regarding the potential timing of key decisions and actions aimed at slowing the spread and mitigating the impact of an emerging pandemic. Use of this updated framework is anticipated to improve pandemic preparedness and response in the United States. Activities and decisions during a response are event-specific. These intervals serve as a reference for public health decision-making by federal, state, and local health authorities in the United States during an influenza pandemic and are not meant to be prescriptive or comprehensive. This framework incorporates information from newly developed tools for pandemic planning and response, including the Influenza Risk Assessment Tool and the Pandemic Severity Assessment Framework, and has been aligned with the pandemic phases restructured in 2013 by the World Health Organization.

Estimates of the number of human infections with influenza A(H3N2) variant virus, United States, August 2011-April 2012

BACKGROUND

Thirteen human infections with an influenza A(H3N2) variant (H3N2v) virus containing a combination of gene segments not previously associated with human illness were identified in the United States from August 2011 to April 2012. Because laboratory confirmation of influenza virus infection is only performed for a minority of ill persons and routine clinical tests may not identify H3N2v virus, the count of laboratory-confirmed H3N2v virus infections underestimates the true burden of illness.

METHODS

To account for this underascertainment, we adapted a multiplier model created at the beginning of the influenza A(H1N1) 2009 pandemic to estimate the true burden of H3N2v illness. Data to inform each of these parameters came from the literature and from special projects conducted during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic and the 2010-2011 influenza season. The multipliers were calculated as the simple inverses of the proportions at each step, and we accounted for variability and uncertainty in model parameters by using a probabilistic or Monte Carlo approach.

RESULTS

We estimate that the median multiplier for children was 200 (90% range, 115-369) and for adults was 255 (90% range, 152-479) and that 2055 (90% range, 1187-3800) illnesses from H3N2v virus infections may have occurred from August 2011 to April 2012, suggesting that the new virus was more widespread than previously thought.

CONCLUSIONS

Illness from this variant influenza virus was more frequent than previously thought. Continued surveillance is needed to ensure timely detection and response to H3N2v virus infections.

Human infections with influenza A(H3N2) variant virus in the United States, 2011-2012

BACKGROUND. During August 2011-April 2012, 13 human infections with influenza A(H3N2) variant (H3N2v) virus were identified in the United States; 8 occurred in the prior 2 years. This virus differs from previous variant influenza viruses in that it contains the matrix (M) gene from the Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic influenza virus. METHODS. A case was defined as a person with laboratory-confirmed H3N2v virus infection. Cases and contacts were interviewed to determine exposure to swine and other animals and to assess potential person-to-person transmission. RESULTS. Median age of cases was 4 years, and 12 of 13 (92%) were children. Pig exposure was identified in 7 (54%) cases. Six of 7 cases with swine exposure (86%) touched pigs, and 1 (14%) was close to pigs without known direct contact. Six cases had no swine exposure, including 2 clusters of suspected person-to-person transmission. All cases had fever; 12 (92%) had respiratory symptoms, and 3 (23%) were hospitalized for influenza. All 13 cases recovered. CONCLUSIONS. H3N2v virus infections were identified at a high rate from August 2011 to April 2012, and cases without swine exposure were identified in influenza-like illness outbreaks, indicating that limited person-to-person transmission likely occurred. Variant influenza viruses rarely result in sustained person-to-person transmission; however, the potential for this H3N2v virus to transmit efficiently is of concern. With minimal preexisting immunity in children and the limited cross-protective effect from seasonal influenza vaccine, the majority of children are susceptible to infection with this novel influenza virus.

Progress in global surveillance and response capacity 10 years after severe acute respiratory syndrome

Ten years have elapsed since the World Health Organization issued its first global alert for an unexplained illness named severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). The anniversary provides an opportunity to reflect on the international response to this new global microbial threat. While global surveillance and response capacity for public health threats have been strengthened, critical gaps remain. Of 194 World Health Organization member states that signed on to the International Health Regulations (2005), <20% had achieved compliance with the core capacities required by the deadline in June 2012. Lessons learned from the global SARS outbreak highlight the need to avoid complacency, strengthen efforts to improve global capacity to address the next pandemic using all available 21st century tools, and support research to develop new treatment options, countermeasures, and insights while striving to address the global inequities that are the root cause of many of these challenges.

Novel framework for assessing epidemiologic effects of influenza epidemics and pandemics

Organizing and prioritizing data collection may lead to informed assessment and guide decision making.

The effects of influenza on a population are attributable to the clinical severity of illness and the number of persons infected, which can vary greatly between seasons or pandemics. To create a systematic framework for assessing the public health effects of an emerging pandemic, we reviewed data from past influenza seasons and pandemics to characterize severity and transmissibility (based on ranges of these measures in the United States) and outlined a formal assessment of the potential effects of a novel virus. The assessment was divided into 2 periods. Because early in a pandemic, measurement of severity and transmissibility is uncertain, we used a broad dichotomous scale in the initial assessment to divide the range of historic values. In the refined assessment, as more data became available, we categorized those values more precisely. By organizing and prioritizing data collection, this approach may inform an evidence-based assessment of pandemic effects and guide decision making.

Detecting 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus infection: availability of diagnostic testing led to rapid pandemic response

Diagnostic tests for detecting emerging influenza virus strains with pandemic potential are critical for directing global influenza prevention and control activities. In 2008, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention received US Food and Drug Administration approval for a highly sensitive influenza polymerase chain reaction (PCR) assay. Devices were deployed to public health laboratories in the United States and globally. Within 2 weeks of the first recognition of 2009 pandemic influenza H1N1, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention developed and began distributing a new approved pandemic influenza H1N1 PCR assay, which used the previously deployed device platform to meet a >8-fold increase in specimen submissions. Rapid antigen tests were widely used by clinicians at the point of care; however, test sensitivity was low (40%-69%). Many clinical laboratories developed their own pandemic influenza H1N1 PCR assays to meet clinician demand. Future planning efforts should identify ways to improve availability of reliable testing to manage patient care and approaches for optimal use of molecular testing for detecting and controlling emerging influenza virus strains.

Prevention of community-associated methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus infection among Asian/Pacific Islanders: a qualitative assessment

BACKGROUND

Community-associated methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (CA-MRSA) has been increasingly reported over the past decade, including in Asian/Pacific Islanders (A/PIs).

METHODS

We conducted ethnographic interviews in O'ahu and Kaua'i, Hawai'i, with 10 Asian/Pacific Islanders identified as having a history of CA-MRSA infections.

RESULTS

Most (7/10) thought skin infections were not a new problem in Hawai'i. Most (8/9) attempted to self-treat the infection prior to seeking medical care with a range of home remedies and store- bought solutions. Most respondents did not initially comprehend the severity of their infection and only sought medical treatment after concern from family, unbearable pain, and/or other symptoms of illness.

CONCLUSION

Clinicians should be aware of the reportedly frequent use of home remedies by this population, as it may potentially contribute to interactions when treatments are combined. If clinicians and public health professionals do not address perceptions and misperceptions of how MRSA is acquired, it will be very difficult to prevent infection, and may also delay individuals from seeking treatment.

Antigenic and genetic characteristics of swine-origin 2009 A(H1N1) influenza viruses circulating in humans

Since its identification in April 2009, an A(H1N1) virus containing a unique combination of gene segments from both North American and Eurasian swine lineages has continued to circulate in humans. The lack of similarity between the 2009 A(H1N1) virus and its nearest relatives indicates that its gene segments have been circulating undetected for an extended period. Its low genetic diversity suggests that the introduction into humans was a single event or multiple events of similar viruses. Molecular markers predictive of adaptation to humans are not currently present in 2009 A(H1N1) viruses, suggesting that previously unrecognized molecular determinants could be responsible for the transmission among humans. Antigenically the viruses are homogeneous and similar to North American swine A(H1N1) viruses but distinct from seasonal human A(H1N1).

Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus infections among healthy full-term newborns

OBJECTIVE

Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) strains have emerged in the community, causing disease among healthy people lacking traditional risk factors for MRSA infection. This article describes an outbreak of MRSA among healthy full-term newborns.

DESIGN

Cases were identified and corresponding medical information collected. Telephone interviews were conducted with mothers of cases and surveillance cultures from mothers and newborns were performed. MRSA isolates were genotyped.

SETTING

Hospital in Chicago, Illinois, USA.

PARTICIPANTS

Newborns, their mothers and hospital healthcare workers.

INTERVENTION

Nursery infection control practices were enhanced. The MRSA-colonised healthcare workers received intranasal mupirocin.

MAIN OUTCOME

Within 4-23 days of birth, 11 newborns were identified with pustules, vesicles or blisters located on the head, groin, perineum, ears, legs, chin and trunk. All received antimicrobials and recovered without incident.

RESULTS

None of 432 peripartum women, one of 399 newborns, and two of 135 healthcare workers were nasal MRSA carriers. Available isolates from six patients, two healthcare workers, and one from an MRSA-colonised newborn were similar by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. Other than contact with the hospital, no common exposures of MRSA transmission were identified.

CONCLUSIONS

MRSA strains that initially emerged in the community are now causing disease in healthcare settings. Providers should be aware that MRSA can cause skin infections among healthy newborns. Adherence to standard infection control practices is important to prevent transmission of MRSA in nurseries.

Chronic disease and disasters medication demands of Hurricane Katrina evacuees

BACKGROUND

Preparing for natural disasters has historically focused on treatment for acute injuries, environmental exposures, and infectious diseases. Many disaster survivors also have existing chronic illness, which may be worsened by post-disaster conditions. The relationship between actual medication demands and medical relief pharmaceutical supplies was assessed in a population of 18,000 evacuees relocated to San Antonio TX after Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast in August 2005.

METHODS

Healthcare encounters from day 4 to day 31 after landfall were monitored using a syndromic surveillance system based on patient chief complaint. Medication-dispensing records were collected from federal disaster relief teams and local retail pharmacies serving evacuees. Medications dispensed to evacuees during this period were quantified into defined daily doses and classified as acute or chronic, based on their primary indications.

RESULTS

Of 4,229 categorized healthcare encounters, 634 (15%) were for care of chronic medical conditions. Sixty-eight percent of all medications dispensed to evacuees were for treatment of chronic diseases. Cardiovascular medications (39%) were most commonly dispensed to evacuees. Thirty-eight percent of medication doses dispensed by federal relief teams were for chronic care, compared to 73% of doses dispensed by retail pharmacies. Federal disaster relief teams supplied 9% of all chronic care medicines dispensed.

CONCLUSIONS

A substantial demand for drugs used to treat chronic medical conditions was identified among San Antonio evacuees, as was a reliance on retail pharmacy supplies to meet this demand. Medical relief pharmacy supplies did not consistently reflect the actual demands of evacuees.

A multistate outbreak of Serratia marcescens bloodstream infection associated with contaminated intravenous magnesium sulfate from a compounding pharmacy

BACKGROUND

In contrast to pharmaceutical manufacturers, compounding pharmacies adhere to different quality-control standards, which may increase the likelihood of undetected outbreaks. In 2005, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention received reports of cases of Serratia marcescens bloodstream infection occurring in patients who underwent cardiac surgical procedures in Los Angeles, California, and in New Jersey. An investigation was initiated to determine whether there was a common underlying cause.

METHODS

A matched case-control study was conducted in Los Angeles. Case record review and environmental testing were conducted in New Jersey. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention performed a multistate case-finding investigation; isolates were compared using pulsed-field gel electrophoresis analysis.

RESULTS

Nationally distributed magnesium sulfate solution (MgSO(4)) from compounding pharmacy X was the only significant risk factor for S. marcescens bloodstream infection (odds ratio, 6.4; 95% confidence interval, 1.1-38.3) among 6 Los Angeles case patients and 18 control subjects. Five New Jersey case patients received MgSO(4) from a single lot produced by compounding pharmacy X; culture of samples from open and unopened 50-mL bags in this lot yielded S. marcescens. Seven additional case patients from 3 different states were identified. Isolates from all 18 case patients and from samples of MgSO(4) demonstrated indistinguishable pulsed-field gel electrophoresis patterns. Compounding pharmacy X voluntarily recalled the product. Neither the pharmacy nor the US Food and Drug Administration could identify a source of contamination in their investigations of compounding pharmacy X.

CONCLUSIONS

A multistate outbreak of S. marcescens bloodstream infection was linked to contaminated MgSO(4) distributed nationally by a compounding pharmacy. Health care personnel should take into account the different quality standards and regulation of compounded parenteral medications distributed in large quantities during investigations of outbreaks of bloodstream infection.

Multidrug-resistant Acinetobacter infection mortality rate and length of hospitalization

Acinetobacter infections have increased and gained attention because of the organism’s prolonged environmental survival and propensity to develop antimicrobial drug resistance. The effect of multidrug-resistant (MDR) Acinetobacter infection on clinical outcomes has not been reported. A retrospective, matched cohort investigation was performed at 2 Baltimore hospitals to examine outcomes of patients with MDR Acinetobacter infection compared with patients with susceptible Acinetobacter infections and patients without Acinetobacter infections. Multivariable analysis controlling for severity of illness and underlying disease identified an independent association between patients with MDR Acinetobacter infection (n = 96) and increased hospital and intensive care unit length of stay compared with 91 patients with susceptible Acinetobacter infection (odds ratio [OR] 2.5, 95% confidence interval [CI] 1.2–5.2 and OR 2.1, 95% CI 1.0–4.3] respectively) and 89 uninfected patients (OR 2.5, 95% CI 1.2–5.4 and OR 4.2, 95% CI 1.5–11.6] respectively). Increased hospitalization associated with MDR Acinetobacter infection emphasizes the need for infection control strategies to prevent cross-transmission in healthcare settings.

Staphylococcus aureus-associated skin and soft tissue infections in ambulatory care

To describe the number and treatment of skin and soft tissue infections likely caused by Staphylococcus aureus in the United States, we analyzed data from the 1992-1994 and 2001-2003 National Ambulatory Medical Care Surveys and National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Surveys. Each year, data were reported by an average of 1,400 physicians, 230 outpatient departments, and 390 emergency departments for 30,000, 33,000, and 34,000 visits, respectively. During 2001-2003, the number of annual ambulatory care visits for skin and soft tissue infections was 11.6 million; the visit rate was 410.7 per 10,000 persons. During the study period, rates of overall and physician office visits did not differ; however, rates of visits to outpatient and emergency departments increased by 59% and 31%, respectively. This increase may reflect the emergence of community-acquired methicillin-resistant S. aureus infections.

Community-associated methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus skin infections in a religious community

In September 2004, an outbreak of community-associated methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) skin and soft tissue infections (SSTI) was reported among members of a religious community. We conducted a retrospective cohort study on all 175 community members; performed a nasal carriage survey, and environmental swab testing. We identified 24 MRSA cases (attack rate 14%). In multivariate analysis, sauna use [odds ratio (OR) 19.1, 95% confidence interval (CI) 2.7-206.1] and antimicrobial use within 12 months before infection (OR 11.7, 95% CI 2.9-47.6) were risk factors for infection. MRSA nasal carriage rate was 0.6% (1/174). Nine of 10 clinical isolates and an isolate from an administrative office within the community had the pulsed-field gel electrophoresis type USA300. Targeted hygiene improvement, wound care, and environmental cleaning were implemented. We describe the first reported outbreak of MRSA SSTI in a religious community. Adherence to appropriate personal and environmental hygiene might be critical factors in controlling transmission.

Severe community-acquired pneumonia due to Staphylococcus aureus, 2003-04 influenza season

During the 2003-04 influenza season, 17 cases of Staphylococcus aureus community-acquired pneumonia (CAP) were reported from 9 states; 15 (88%) were associated with methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA). The median age of patients was 21 years; 5 (29%) had underlying diseases, and 4 (24%) had risk factors for MRSA. Twelve (71%) had laboratory evidence of influenza virus infection. All but 1 patient, who died on arrival, were hospitalized. Death occurred in 5 (4 with MRSA). S. aureus isolates were available from 13 (76%) patients (11 MRSA). Toxin genes were detected in all isolates; 11 (85%) had only genes for Panton-Valentine leukocidin. All isolates had community-associated pulsed-field gel electrophoresis patterns; all MRSA isolates had the staphylococcal cassette chromosome mec type IVa. In communities with a high prevalence of MRSA, empiric therapy of severe CAP during periods of high influenza activity should include consideration for MRSA.

Clostridium difficile infection in patients discharged from US short-stay hospitals, 1996-2003

Clinicians should be aware of the increasing risk of C. difficile–associated disease and make efforts to control its transmission.

US hospital discharges for which Clostridium difficile–associated disease (CDAD) was listed as any diagnosis doubled from 82,000 (95% confidence interval [CI] 71,000–94,000) or 31/100,000 population in 1996 to 178,000 (95% CI 151,000–205,000) or 61/100,000 in 2003; this increase was significant between 2000 and 2003 (slope of linear trend 9.48; 95% CI 6.16–12.80, p = 0.01). The overall rate during this period was severalfold higher in persons >65 years of age (228/100,000) than in the age group with the next highest rate, 45–64 years (40/100,000; p<0.001). CDAD appears to be increasing rapidly in the United States and is disproportionately affecting older persons. Clinicians should be aware of the increasing risk for CDAD and make efforts to control transmission of C. difficile and prevent disease.

Clostridium difficile infection in patients discharged from US short-stay hospitals, 1996-2003

US hospital discharges for which Clostridium difficile-associated disease (CDAD) was listed as any diagnosis doubled from 82,000 (95% confidence interval [CI] 71,000-94,000) or 31/100,000 population in 1996 to 178,000 (95% CI 151,000-205,000) or 61/100,000 in 2003; this increase was significant between 2000 and 2003 (slope of linear trend 9.48; 95% CI 6.16-12.80, p = 0.01). The overall rate during this period was severalfold higher in persons >65 years of age (228/100,000) than in the age group with the next highest rate, 45-64 years (40/100,000; p < or = 0.001). CDAD appears to be increasing rapidly in the United States and is disproportionately affecting older persons. Clinicians should be aware of the increasing risk for CDAD and make efforts to control transmission of C. difficile and prevent disease.

Emerging infectious disease outbreaks: old lessons and new challenges for obstetrician-gynecologists

OBJECTIVE

The purpose of this study was to summarize 3 recent high-profile infectious disease threats that have affected the United States: severe acute respiratory syndrome, West Nile virus, and anthrax.

STUDY DESIGN

A systematic review was conducted with the use of Medline searches, searches of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention website, and review by experts at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

RESULTS

The 3 emerging infectious diseases pose very different threats: Severe acute respiratory syndrome is a newly identified pathogen that caused an international pandemic; the West Nile virus investigation involved an old pathogen that was identified in a new location; and the anthrax attacks involved the intentional introduction of a pathogen.

CONCLUSION

All 3 outbreaks highlight the importance of obstetrician-gynecologists keeping current with new information as it emerges. In this global environment, it is likely that novel disease threats will continue to emerge in the United States.