Close relationship between mink influenza (H10N4) and concomitantly circulating avian influenza viruses

Zoonotic Animal Influenza Virus and Potential Mixing Vessel Hosts

Influenza viruses belong to the family Orthomyxoviridae with a negative-sense, single-stranded segmented RNA genome. They infect a wide range of animals, including humans. From 1918 to 2009, there were four influenza pandemics, which caused millions of casualties. Frequent spillover of animal influenza viruses to humans with or without intermediate hosts poses a serious zoonotic and pandemic threat. The current SARS-CoV-2 pandemic overshadowed the high risk raised by animal influenza viruses, but highlighted the role of wildlife as a reservoir for pandemic viruses. In this review, we summarize the occurrence of animal influenza virus in humans and describe potential mixing vessel or intermediate hosts for zoonotic influenza viruses. While several animal influenza viruses possess a high zoonotic risk (e.g., avian and swine influenza viruses), others are of low to negligible zoonotic potential (e.g., equine, canine, bat and bovine influenza viruses). Transmission can occur directly from animals, particularly poultry and swine, to humans or through reassortant viruses in "mixing vessel" hosts. To date, there are less than 3000 confirmed human infections with avian-origin viruses and less than 7000 subclinical infections documented. Likewise, only a few hundreds of confirmed human cases caused by swine influenza viruses have been reported. Pigs are the historic mixing vessel host for the generation of zoonotic influenza viruses due to the expression of both avian-type and human-type receptors. Nevertheless, there are a number of hosts which carry both types of receptors and can act as a potential mixing vessel host. High vigilance is warranted to prevent the next pandemic caused by animal influenza viruses.

Mink infection with influenza A viruses: an ignored intermediate host?

Continuously emergence of human infection with avian influenza A virus poses persistent threat to public health, as illustrated in zoonotic H5N1/6 and H7N9 infections. The recent surge of infection to farmed mink by multiple subtypes of avian influenza A viruses in China highlights the role of mink in the ecology of influenza in this region. Serologic studies suggested that farmed mink in China are frequently infected with prevailing human (H3N2 and H1N1/pdm) and avian (H7N9, H5N6, and H9N2) influenza A viruses. Moreover, genetic analysis from the sequences of influenza viruses from mink showed that several strains acquired mammalian adaptive mutations compared to their avian counterparts. The transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from mink to human alerts us that mink may serve as an intermediate host or reservoir of some emerging pathogens. Considering the high susceptibility to different influenza A viruses, it is possible that mink in endemic regions may play a role as an "mixing vessel" for generating novel pandemic strain. Thus, enhanced surveillance of influenza viruses in mink should be urgently implemented for early warning of potential pandemic.

Genetic analysis and biological characterization of H10N3 influenza A viruses isolated in China from 2014 to 2021

The H10 subtypes of avian influenza viruses pose a continual threat to the poultry industry and human health. The sporadic spillover of H10 subtypes viruses from poultry to humans is represented by the H10N8 human cases in 2013 and the recent H10N3 human infection in 2021. However, the genesis and characteristics of the recent reassortment H10N3 viruses have not been systemically investigated. In this study, we characterized 20 H10N3 viruses isolated in live poultry markets during routine nationwide surveillance in China from 2014 to 2021. The viruses in the recent reassortant genotype acquired their hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) genes from the duck H10 viruses and H7N3 viruses, respectively, whereas the internal genes were derived from chicken H9N2 viruses as early as 2019. Receptor-binding analysis indicated that two of the tested H10N3 viruses had a higher affinity for human-type receptors than for avian-type receptors, highlighting the potential risk of avian-to-human transmission. Animal studies showed that only viruses belonging to the recent reassortant genotype were pathogenic in mice; two tested viruses transmitted via direct contact and one virus transmitted by respiratory droplets in guinea pigs, though with limited efficiency. These findings emphasize the need for enhanced surveillance of H10N3 viruses.

Emergence, Evolution, and Biological Characteristics of H10N4 and H10N8 Avian Influenza Viruses in Migratory Wild Birds Detected in Eastern China in 2020

H10Nx influenza viruses have caused increasing public concern due to their occasional infection of humans. However, the genesis and biological characteristics of H10 viruses in migratory wild birds are largely unknown. In this study, we conducted active surveillance to monitor circulation of avian influenza viruses in eastern China and isolated five H10N4 and two H10N8 viruses from migratory birds in 2020. Genetic analysis indicated that the hemagglutinin (HA) genes of the seven H10 viruses were clustered into the North American lineage and established as a novel Eurasian branch in wild birds in South Korea, Bangladesh, and China. The neuraminidase (NA) genes of the H10N4 and H10N8 viruses originated from the circulating HxN4 and H5N8 viruses in migratory birds in Eurasia. We further revealed that some of the novel H10N4 and H10N8 viruses acquired the ability to bind human-like receptors. Animal studies indicated that these H10 viruses can replicate in mice, chickens, and ducks. Importantly, we found that the H10N4 and H10N8 viruses can transmit efficiently among chickens and ducks but induce lower HA inhibition (HI) antibody titers in ducks. These findings emphasized that annual surveillance in migratory waterfowl should be strengthened to monitor the introduction of wild-bird H10N4 and H10N8 reassortants into poultry.

IMPORTANCE The emerging avian influenza reassortants and mutants in birds pose an increasing threat to poultry and public health. H10 avian influenza viruses are widely prevalent in wild birds, poultry, seals, and minks and pose an increasing threat to human health. The occasional human infections with H10N8 and H10N3 viruses in China have significantly increased public concern about the potential pandemic risk posed by H10 viruses. In this study, we found that the North American H10 viruses have been successfully introduced to Asia by migratory birds and further reassorted with other subtypes to generate novel H10N4 and H10N8 viruses in eastern China. These emerging H10 reassortants have a high potential to threaten the poultry industry and human health due to their efficient replication and transmission in chickens, ducks, and mice.

Influenza A Viruses and Zoonotic Events-Are We Creating Our Own Reservoirs?

Zoonotic infections of humans with influenza A viruses (IAVs) from animal reservoirs can result in severe disease in individuals and, in rare cases, lead to pandemic outbreaks; this is exemplified by numerous cases of human infection with avian IAVs (AIVs) and the 2009 swine influenza pandemic. In fact, zoonotic transmissions are strongly facilitated by manmade reservoirs that were created through the intensification and industrialization of livestock farming. This can be witnessed by the repeated introduction of IAVs from natural reservoirs of aquatic wild bird metapopulations into swine and poultry, and the accompanied emergence of partially- or fully-adapted human pathogenic viruses. On the other side, human adapted IAV have been (and still are) introduced into livestock by reverse zoonotic transmission. This link to manmade reservoirs was also observed before the 20th century, when horses seemed to have been an important reservoir for IAVs but lost relevance when the populations declined due to increasing industrialization. Therefore, to reduce zoonotic events, it is important to control the spread of IAV within these animal reservoirs, for example with efficient vaccination strategies, but also to critically surveil the different manmade reservoirs to evaluate the emergence of new IAV strains with pandemic potential.

The Emergence and Zoonotic Transmission of H10Nx Avian Influenza Virus Infections

Avian influenza viruses pose a continuous threat to both poultry and human health, with significant economic impact. The ability of viruses to reassort and jump the species barrier into mammalian hosts generates a constant pandemic threat. H10Nx avian viruses have been shown to replicate in mammalian species without prior adaptation and have caused significant human infection and fatalities. They are able to rapidly reassort with circulating poultry strains and go undetected due to their low pathogenicity in chickens. Novel detections of both human reassortant strains and increasing endemicity of H10Nx poultry infections highlight the increasing need for heightened surveillance and greater understanding of the distribution, tropism, and infection capabilities of these viruses. In this minireview, we highlight the gap in the current understanding of this subtype and its prevalence across a vast range of host species and geographical locations.

Emergence of a novel reassortant avian influenza virus (H10N3) in Eastern China with high pathogenicity and respiratory droplet transmissibility to mammals

Decades have passed since the first discovery of H10-subtype avian influenza virus (AIV) in chickens in 1949, and it has been detected in many species including mammals such as minks, pigs, seals and humans. Cases of human infections with H10N8 viruses identified in China in 2013 have raised widespread attention. Two novel reassortant H10N3 viruses were isolated from chickens in December 2019 in eastern China during routine surveillance for AIVs. The internal genes of these viruses were derived from genotype S (G57) H9N2 and were consistent with H5N6, H7N9 and H10N8, which cause fatal infections in humans. Their viral pathogenicity and transmissibility were further studied in different animal models. The two H10N3 isolates had low pathogenicity in chickens and were transmitted between chickens via direct contact. These viruses were highly pathogenic in mice and could be transmitted between guinea pigs via direct contact and respiratory droplets. More importantly, these viruses can bind to both human-type SAα-2,6-Gal receptors and avian-type SAα-2,3-Gal receptors. Asymptomatic shedding in chickens and good adaptability to mammals of these H10N3 isolates would make it easier to transmit to humans and pose a threat to public health.

Canine and Feline Influenza

Influenza virus infections of carnivores-primarily in dogs and in large and small cats-have been repeatedly observed to be caused by a number of direct spillovers of avian viruses or in infections by human or swine viruses. In addition, there have also been prolonged epizootics of an H3N8 equine influenza virus in dogs starting around 1999, of an H3N2 avian influenza virus in domestic dog populations in Asia and in the United States that started around 2004, and an outbreak of an avian H7N2 influenza virus among cats in an animal shelter in the United States in 2016. The impact of influenza viruses in domesticated companion animals and their zoonotic or panzootic potential poses significant questions for veterinary and human health.

Influenza A in Bovine Species: A Narrative Literature Review

It is quite intriguing that bovines were largely unaffected by influenza A, even though most of the domesticated and wild animals/birds at the human-animal interface succumbed to infection over the past few decades. Influenza A occurs on a very infrequent basis in bovine species and hence bovines were not considered to be susceptible hosts for influenza until the emergence of influenza D. This review describes a multifaceted chronological review of literature on influenza in cattle which comprises mainly of the natural infections/outbreaks, experimental studies, and pathological and seroepidemiological aspects of influenza A that have occurred in the past. The review also sheds light on the bovine models used in vitro and in vivo for influenza-related studies over recent years. Despite a few natural cases in the mid-twentieth century and seroprevalence of human, swine, and avian influenza viruses in bovines, the evolution and host adaptation of influenza A virus (IAV) in this species suffered a serious hindrance until the novel influenza D virus (IDV) emerged recently in cattle across the world. Supposedly, certain bovine host factors, particularly some serum components and secretory proteins, were reported to have anti-influenza properties, which could be an attributing factor for the resilient nature of bovines to IAV. Further studies are needed to identify the host-specific factors contributing to the differential pathogenetic mechanisms and disease progression of IAV in bovines compared to other susceptible mammalian hosts.

Evaluation of the Biological Properties and Cross-Reactive Antibody Response to H10 Influenza Viruses in Ferrets

The recent outbreak of avian origin H10N7 influenza among seals in northern Europe and two fatal human infections with an avian H10N8 virus in China have demonstrated that H10 viruses can spread between mammals and cause severe disease in humans. To gain insight into the potential for H10 viruses to cross the species barrier and to identify a candidate vaccine strain, we evaluated the in vitro and in vivo properties and antibody response in ferrets to 20 diverse H10 viruses. H10 virus infection of ferrets caused variable weight loss, and all 20 viruses replicated throughout the respiratory tract; however, replication in the lungs was highly variable. In glycan-binding assays, the H10 viruses preferentially bound "avian-like" α2,3-linked sialic acids. Importantly, several isolates also displayed strong binding to long-chain "human-like" α2,6-linked sialic acids and exhibited comparable or elevated neuraminidase activity relative to human H1N1, H2N2, and H3N2 viruses. In hemagglutination inhibition assays, 12 antisera cross-reacted with ≥14 of 20 H10 viruses, and 7 viruses induced neutralizing activity against ≥15 of the 20 viruses. By combining data on weight loss, viral replication, and the cross-reactive antibody response, we identified A/mallard/Portugal/79906/2009 (H10N7) as a suitable virus for vaccine development. Collectively, our findings suggest that H10 viruses may continue to sporadically infect humans and other mammals, underscoring the importance of developing an H10 vaccine for pandemic preparedness.IMPORTANCE Avian origin H10 influenza viruses sporadically infect humans and other mammals; however, little is known about viruses of this subtype. Thus, we characterized the biological properties of 20 H10 viruses in vitro and in ferrets. Infection caused mild to moderate weight loss (5 to 15%), with robust viral replication in the nasal tissues and variable replication in the lung. H10 viruses preferentially bind "avian-like" sialic acids, although several isolates also displayed binding to "human-like" sialic acid receptors. This is consistent with the ability of H10 viruses to cross the species barrier and warrants selection of an H10 vaccine strain. By evaluating the cross-reactive antibody response to the H10 viruses and combining this analysis with viral replication and weight loss findings, we identified A/mallard/Portugal/79906/2009 (H10N7) as a suitable H10 vaccine strain.

Enhanced pathogenicity and neurotropism of mouse-adapted H10N7 influenza virus are mediated by novel PB2 and NA mutations

The H10 subtype of avian influenza viruses (AIVs) circulates globally in wild birds and poultry, and this subtype has been shown to be increasingly prevalent in China. Among the various H10 viruses, H10N7 AIVs have caused repeated mammal and human infections. To investigate their genetic adaptation in mammals, we generated a mouse-adapted avian H10N7 variant (A/mallard/Beijing/27/2011-MA; BJ27-MA) which exhibited increased virulence in mice compared to wild-type virus and acquired neurotropism. Sequencing showed the absence of the widely recognized mammalian adaptation markers of E627K and D701N in PB2 in the mouse-adapted strain; instead, five amino acid mutations were identified: E158G and M631L in PB2; G218E in haemagglutinin (H3 numbering); and K110E and S453I in neuraminidase (NA). The neurovirulence of the BJ27-MA virus necessitated the combined presence of the PB2 and NA mutations. Mutations M631L and E158G of PB2 and K110E of NA were required to mediate increased virus replication and severity of infection in mice and mammalian cells. PB2-M631L was functionally the most dominant mutation in that it strongly upregulated viral polymerase activity and played a critical role in the enhancement of virus replication and disease severity in mice. K110E mutation in NA, on the other hand, significantly promoted NA enzymatic activity. These results indicate that the novel mutations in PB2 and NA genes are critical for the adaptation of H10N7 AIV in mice, and they could serve as molecular signatures of virus transmission to mammalian hosts, including humans.

Influenza A Virus Surveillance in the Invasive American Mink (Neovison vison) from Freshwater Ecosystems, Northern Spain

Influenza A viruses (IAVs) are negative-sense, single-stranded and segmented RNA viruses of the Orthomyxoviridae family that may cause acute respiratory disease in a wide range of birds and mammals. Susceptibility of several species within the family Mustelidae to IAVs has been reported as a result of natural or experimental infections. The objectives of this study were to assess whether free-ranging American mink populations from Northern Spain were infected with IAV and try to define the role of this species in the epidemiology of IAV. Sera from 689 American mink from Northern Spain captured between 2011 and 2014 were tested for the presence of antibodies against IAVs using a commercial competition cELISA. Positive sera were further analysed with haemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay. Fifteen of the 689 (2.2%, 1.3-3.6 CI_95% ) of the American minks analysed were ELISA positive. No significant differences were observed between years of capture, provinces, river basins, sexes or ages of the animals. All seropositive sera resulted negative to the panel strains used in the HI assay, showing that the most relevant strains circulating in swine, the most relevant avian subtypes (H5 and H7) and the H10N4 subtype isolated in minks have not been circulating in this free-ranging exotic carnivore from Spain. In the light of these results, the free-range American mink from Northern Spain do not seem to have an important role in the epidemiology of IAVs.

Avian influenza virus H9N2 infections in farmed minks

BACKGROUND

The prevalence of avian H9N2 viruses throughout Asia, along with their demonstrated ability to infect mammals, puts them high on the list of influenza viruses with pandemic potential for humans. In this study, we investigated whether H9N2 viruses could infect farmed minks.

METHODS

First, we conducted a serological survey for avian influenza virus antibodies on a random sample of the field-trial population of farmed minks. Then we inoculated farmed minks with A/Chicken/Hebei/4/2008 H9N2 viruses and observed the potential pathogenicity of H9N2 virus and virus shedding in infected minks.

RESULTS

H9 influenza antibodies could be detected in most farmed minks with a higher seropositivity, which indicated that farmed minks had the high prevalence of exposure to H9 viruses. After infection, the minks displayed the slight clinical signs including lethargy and initial weight loss. The infected lungs showed the mild diffuse pneumonia with thickened alveolar walls and inflammatory cellular infiltration. Influenza virus detection showed that viruses were detected in the allantoic fluids inoculated supernatant of lung tissues at 3 and 7 days post-infection (dpi), and found in the nasal swabs of H9N2-infected minks at 3-11 dpi, suggesting that H9N2 viruses replicated in the respiratory organ, were then shed outwards. HI antibody test showed that antibody levels began to rise at 7 dpi.

CONCLUSIONS

Our data provided the serological and experimental evidences that strongly suggested farmed minks under the natural state were susceptible to H9N2 viral infection and might be the H9N2 virus carriers. It is imperative to strengthen the H9N2 viral monitoring in farmed minks and pay urgent attention to prevent and control new influenza viruses pandemic prevalence.

Genetics, Receptor Binding, and Virulence in Mice of H10N8 Influenza Viruses Isolated from Ducks and Chickens in Live Poultry Markets in China

We analyzed eight H10N8 viruses isolated from ducks and chickens in live poultry markets from 2009 to 2013 in China. These viruses showed distinct genetic diversity and formed five genotypes: the four duck isolates formed four different genotypes, whereas the four chicken viruses belong to a single genotype. The viruses bound to both human- and avian-type receptors, and four of the viruses caused 12.7% to 22.5% body weight loss in mice.

Low-pathogenic avian influenza viruses in wild house mice

BACKGROUND

Avian influenza viruses are known to productively infect a number of mammal species, several of which are commonly found on or near poultry and gamebird farms. While control of rodent species is often used to limit avian influenza virus transmission within and among outbreak sites, few studies have investigated the potential role of these species in outbreak dynamics.

METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

We trapped and sampled synanthropic mammals on a gamebird farm in Idaho, USA that had recently experienced a low pathogenic avian influenza outbreak. Six of six house mice (Mus musculus) caught on the outbreak farm were presumptively positive for antibodies to type A influenza. Consequently, we experimentally infected groups of naïve wild-caught house mice with five different low pathogenic avian influenza viruses that included three viruses derived from wild birds and two viruses derived from chickens. Virus replication was efficient in house mice inoculated with viruses derived from wild birds and more moderate for chicken-derived viruses. Mean titers (EID(50) equivalents/mL) across all lung samples from seven days of sampling (three mice/day) ranged from 10(3.89) (H3N6) to 10(5.06) (H4N6) for the wild bird viruses and 10(2.08) (H6N2) to 10(2.85) (H4N8) for the chicken-derived viruses. Interestingly, multiple regression models indicated differential replication between sexes, with significantly (p<0.05) higher concentrations of avian influenza RNA found in females compared with males.

CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE

Avian influenza viruses replicated efficiently in wild-caught house mice without adaptation, indicating mice may be a risk pathway for movement of avian influenza viruses on poultry and gamebird farms. Differential virus replication between males and females warrants further investigation to determine the generality of this result in avian influenza disease dynamics.

Alleles A and B of non-structural protein 1 of avian influenza A viruses differentially inhibit beta interferon production in human and mink lung cells

Non-structural protein 1 (NS1) counteracts the production of host type I interferons (IFN-α/β) for the efficient replication and pathogenicity of influenza A viruses. Here, we reveal another dimension of the NS1 protein of avian influenza A viruses in suppressing IFN-β production in cultured cell lines. We found that allele A NS1 proteins of H6N8 and H4N6 have a strong capacity to inhibit the activation of IFN-β production, compared with allele B from corresponding subtypes, as measured by IFN stimulatory response element (ISRE) promoter activation, IFN-β mRNA transcription and IFN-β protein expression. Furthermore, the ability to suppress IFN-β promoter activation was mapped to the C-terminal effector domain (ED), while the RNA-binding domain (RBD) alone was unable to suppress IFN-β promoter activation. Chimeric studies indicated that when the RBD of allele A was fused to the ED of allele B, it was a strong inhibitor of IFN-β promoter activity. This shows that well-matched ED and RBD are crucial for the function of the NS1 protein and that the RBD could be one possible cause for this differential IFN-β inhibition. Notably, mutagenesis studies indicated that the F103Y and Y103F substitutions in alleles A and B, respectively, do not influence the ISRE promoter activation. Apart from dsRNA signalling, differences were observed in the expression pattern of NS1 in transfected human and mink lung cells. This study therefore expands the versatile nature of the NS1 protein in inhibiting IFN responses at multiple levels, by demonstrating for the first time that it occurs in a manner dependent on allele type.

Differences in the ability to suppress interferon β production between allele A and allele B NS1 proteins from H10 influenza A viruses

Background

In our previous study concerning the genetic relationship among H10 avian influenza viruses with different pathogenicity in mink (Mustela vison), we found that these differences were related to amino acid variations in the NS1 protein. In this study, we extend our previous work to further investigate the effect of the NS1 from different gene pools on type I IFN promoter activity, the production of IFN-β, as well as the expression of the IFN-β mRNA in response to poly I:C.

Results

Using a model system, we first demonstrated that NS1 from A/mink/Sweden/84 (H10N4) (allele A) could suppress an interferon-stimulated response element (ISRE) reporter system to about 85%. The other NS1 (allele B), from A/chicken/Germany/N/49 (H10N7), was also able to suppress the reporter system, but only to about 20%. The differences in the abilities of the two NS1s from different alleles to suppress the ISRE reporter system were clearly reflected by the protein and mRNA expressions of IFN-β as shown by ELISA and RT-PCR assays.

Conclusions

These studies reveal that different non-structural protein 1 (NS1) of influenza viruses, one from allele A and another from allele B, show different abilities to suppress the type I interferon β expression. It has been hypothesised that some of the differences in the different abilities of the alleles to suppress ISRE were because of the interactions and inhibitions at later stages from the IFN receptor, such as the JAK/STAT pathway. This might reflect the additional effects of the immune evasion potential of different NS1s.

Full genome comparison and characterization of avian H10 viruses with different pathogenicity in Mink (Mustela vison) reveals genetic and functional differences in the non-structural gene

Background

The unique property of some avian H10 viruses, particularly the ability to cause severe disease in mink without prior adaptation, enabled our study. Coupled with previous experimental data and genetic characterization here we tried to investigate the possible influence of different genes on the virulence of these H10 avian influenza viruses in mink.

Results

Phylogenetic analysis revealed a close relationship between the viruses studied. Our study also showed that there are no genetic differences in receptor specificity or the cleavability of the haemagglutinin proteins of these viruses regardless of whether they are of low or high pathogenicity in mink.

In poly I:C stimulated mink lung cells the NS1 protein of influenza A virus showing high pathogenicity in mink down regulated the type I interferon promoter activity to a greater extent than the NS1 protein of the virus showing low pathogenicity in mink.

Conclusions

Differences in pathogenicity and virulence in mink between these strains could be related to clear amino acid differences in the non structural 1 (NS1) protein. The NS gene of mink/84 appears to have contributed to the virulence of the virus in mink by helping the virus evade the innate immune responses.

Monitoring exposure to avian influenza viruses in wild mammals

1

Avian influenza (AI) viruses primarily circulate in wild waterfowl populations and are occasionally transmitted to domestic poultry flocks. However, the possible roles of other wildlife species, such as wild mammals, in AI virus ecology have not been adequately addressed.

2

Due to their habitat and behaviour, many wild mammals may be capable of transmitting pathogens among wild and domestic populations. Exposure to AI viruses has been reported in an array of wild and domestic animals. The presence of wild mammals on farms has been identified as a risk factor for at least one poultry AI outbreak in North America. These reports suggest the need for seroprevalence studies examining the exposure of wild mammals to AI viruses.

3

Serological tests are routinely used to assess domestic poultry, domestic swine and human exposure to influenza A viruses, but these tests have not been validated for use in wild mammals. As such, some of these protocols may require adjustments or may be inappropriate for use in serology testing of wild mammals. Herein, we review these serological techniques and evaluate their potential usefulness in AI surveillance of wild mammals. We call for care to be taken when applying serological tests outside their original area of validation, and for continued assay verification for multiple species and virus strains.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (H5N1) infection in red foxes fed infected bird carcasses

Foxes experimentally fed infected bird carcasses excrete virus for >5 days without exhibiting severe disease and may thus disperse the virus.

Eating infected wild birds may put wild carnivores at high risk for infection with highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus (H5N1). To determine whether red foxes (Vulpes vulpes) are susceptible to infection with HPAI virus (H5N1), we infected 3 foxes intratracheally. They excreted virus pharyngeally for 3–7 days at peak titers of 10^3.5–10^5.2 median tissue culture infective dose (TCID₅₀) per mL and had severe pneumonia, myocarditis, and encephalitis. To determine whether foxes can become infected by the presumed natural route, we fed infected bird carcasses to 3 other red foxes. These foxes excreted virus pharyngeally for 3–5 days at peak titers of 10^4.2–10^4.5 TCID₅₀/mL, but only mild or no pneumonia developed. This study demonstrates that red foxes fed bird carcasses infected with HPAI virus (H5N1) can excrete virus while remaining free of severe disease, thereby potentially playing a role in virus dispersal.

Ecology, epidemiology and human health implications of avian influenza viruses: why do we need to share genetic data?

Avian influenza (AI) is a listed disease of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) that has become a disease of great importance both for animal and human health. Until recent times, AI was considered a disease of birds with zoonotic implications of limited significance. The emergence and spread of the Asian lineage highly pathogenic AI H5N1 virus has dramatically changed this perspective; not only has it been responsible of the death or culling of millions of birds, but this virus has also been able to infect a variety of non-avian hosts including human beings. The implications of such a panzootic reflect themselves in animal health issues, notably in the reduction of a protein source for developing countries and in the management of the pandemic potential. Retrospective studies have shown that avian progenitors play an important role in the generation of pandemic viruses for humans, and therefore these infections in the avian reservoir should be subjected to control measures aiming at eradication of the Asian H5N1 virus from all sectors rather than just eliminating or reducing the impact of the disease in poultry. Collection and analysis of information in a transparent environment and close collaboration between the medical and veterinary scientific community are crucial to support the global AI crisis.

Animal and Human Health Implications of Avian Influenza Infections

Avian influenza (AI) is a listed disease of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) that has become a disease of great importance both for animal and human health. Until recent times, AI was considered a disease of birds with zoonotic implications of limited significance. The emergence and spread of the Asian lineage highly pathogenic AI (HPAI) H5N1 virus has dramatically changed this perspective; not only has it been responsible of the death or culling of millions of birds, but this virus has also been able to infect a variety of non-avian hosts including human beings. The implications of such a panzootic reflect themselves in animal health issues, notably in the reduction of a protein source for developing countries and in the management of the pandemic potential. Retrospective studies have shown that avian progenitors play an important role in the generation of pandemic viruses for humans, and therefore these infections in the avian reservoir should be subjected to control measures aiming at eradication of the Asian H5N1 virus from all sectors rather than just eliminating or reducing the impact of the disease in poultry.

Recent developments in avian influenza research: epidemiology and immunoprophylaxis

Influenza A viruses have been isolated from humans, from several other mammalian species and a wide variety of avian species, among which, wild aquatic birds represent the natural hosts of influenza viruses. The majority of the possible combinations of the 15 haemagglutinin (HA) and nine neuraminidase (NA) subtypes recognized have been identified in isolates from domestic and wild birds. Infection of birds can cause a wide range of clinical signs, which may vary according to the host, the virus strain, the host's immune status, the presence of any secondary exacerbating microorganisms and environmental factors. Most infections are inapparent, especially in waterfowl and other wild birds. In contrast, infections caused by viruses of H5 and H7 subtypes can be responsible for devastating epidemics in poultry. Despite the warnings to the poultry industry about these viruses, in 1997 an avian H5N1 influenza virus was directly transmitted from birds to humans in Hong Kong and resulted in 18 confirmed infections, thus strengthening the pandemic threat posed by avian influenza (AI). Indeed, reassortant viruses, harbouring a combination of avian and human viral genomes, have been responsible for major pandemics of human influenza. These considerations warrant the need to continue and broaden efforts in the surveillance of AI. Control programmes have varied from no intervention, as in the case of the occurrence of low pathogenic (LP) AI (LPAI) viruses, to extreme, expensive total quarantine-slaughter programmes carried out to eradicate highly pathogenic (HP) AI (HPAI) viruses. The adoption of a vaccination policy, targeted either to control or to prevent infection in poultry, is generally banned or discouraged. Nevertheless, the need to boost eradication efforts in order to limit further spread of infection and avoid heavy economic losses, and advances in modern vaccine technologies, have prompted a re-evaluation of the potential use of vaccination in poultry as an additional tool in comprehensive disease control strategies. This review presents a synthesis of the most recent research on AI that has contributed to a better understanding of the ecology of the virus and to the development of safe and efficacious vaccines for poultry.

Studies on influenza viruses H10N4 and H10N7 of avian origin in mink

An influenza A virus, A/mink/Sweden/84 (H10N4), was isolated from farmed mink during an outbreak of respiratory disease, histopathologically characterised by severe interstitial pneumonia. The virus was shown to be of recent avian origin and closely related to concomitantly circulating avian influenza virus. Serological investigations were used to link the isolated virus to the herds involved in the disease outbreak. Experimental infection of adult mink with the virus isolate from the disease outbreak reproduced the disease signs and pathological lesions observed in the field cases. The mink influenza virus also induced an antibody response and spread between mink by contact. The same pathogenesis in mink was observed for two avian influenza viruses of the H10N4 subtype, circulating in the avian population. When mink were infected with the prototype avian H10 influenza virus, A/chicken/Germany/N/49, H10N7, the animals responded with antibody production and mild pulmonary lesions but neither disease signs nor contact infections were observed. Detailed studies, including demonstration of viral antigen in situ by immunohistochemistry, of the sequential development of pathological lesions in the mink airways after aerosol exposure to H10N4 or H10N7 revealed that the infections progress very similarly during the first 24h, but are distinctly different at later stages. The conclusion drawn is that A/mink/Sweden/84, but not A/chicken/Germany/N/49, produces a multiple-cycle replication in mink airways. Since the viral distribution and pathological lesions are very similar during the initial stages of infection we suggest that the two viruses differ in their abilities to replicate and spread within the mink tissues, but that their capacities for viral adherence and entry into mink epithelial cells are comparable.