Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus in 3 wildlife species, San Diego, California, USA

Detection of antibodies against influenza A viruses in cattle

Unexpected outbreaks caused by the H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) in dairy cows in the United States (US) have raised significant veterinary and public health concerns. When and how the H5N1 HPAIV was introduced into dairy cows and the broader epidemiology of influenza A virus (IAV) infections in cattle in the US remain unclear. Herein, we performed a retrospective study to screen more than 1,700 cattle serum samples collected from different bovine breeds in the US from January 2023 to May 2024 using an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) targeting the nucleoprotein (NP) to detect IAV infections, and the positive samples were further tested by hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay. Results showed that 586 of 1,724 samples (33.99%) from 15 US states were seropositive by the NP ELISA assay, including 78 samples collected in 2024 and 508 samples collected in 2023. Moreover, the HI assay revealed that 45 of these ELISA-positive samples were positive to human seasonal H1N1 and H3N2 and swine H3N2 and H1N2 viruses, and some were positive to two or three tested IAVs. Surprisingly, none of these ELISA-positive samples were HI positive for the circulating bovine H5N1 strain. Our results demonstrate that IAVs other than H5N1 can infect cattle, infections are not limited to dairy cows, and that bovine infections with swine and human IAVs have occurred prior to the H5N1 outbreaks. All results highlight the value in monitoring IAV epidemiology in cattle, as the viruses might adapt to cattle and/or reassort with the currently circulating H5N1 HPAIV, increasing risk to humans.IMPORTANCEInfluenza A virus (IAV) is an important zoonotic pathogen that can infect different species. Although cattle were not historically considered vulnerable to IAV infections, an unexpected outbreak caused by H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus in dairy cows in the United States (US) in early 2024 has raised significant concerns. When and how the virus was introduced into dairy cows and the wider impact of IAV infections in cattle in the US remain unclear. Our retrospective serological screen provided evidence of human and swine H1 and H3 IAV infections in different cattle breeds in addition to dairy cows, although no H5N1 infection was detected. Our results underline the necessity to monitor IAV epidemiology in cattle, as reassortment of IAVs from different species may occur in cattle, generating novel viruses that pose threats to public and animal health.

A systematic review on reverse-zoonosis: Global impact and changes in transmission patterns

Reverse zoonosis or zooanthroponosis is the transfer of pathogens from humans to animals. Although less studied than zoonotic diseases, this phenomenon poses significant risks to both animal and public health. The increasing human-animal interactions driven by urbanization, globalization, and environmental changes have exacerbated the occurrence of reverse zoonosis. This review evaluated the global impact and transmission patterns of reverse zoonosis, highlighting the anthropogenic and intrinsic factors contributing to its emergence. The study performed a systematic review and included 91 scientific articles published from 2000 to 2022, covering viral, bacterial, parasitic, fungal, and protozoal reverse zoonoses. This study indicated that viral infections, particularly respiratory viruses such as severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 and influenza, have the highest incidence of reverse zoonosis, followed by bacterial infections like tuberculosis and methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus. The United States, India, and Hong Kong are among the most reported regions for reverse zoonotic events. Major risk factors identified include environmental degradation, climate change, antimicrobial resistance, and global wildlife trade. The review underscores the need for enhanced surveillance systems, interdisciplinary collaboration, and stringent regulations on wildlife trade and animal husbandry practices to mitigate the risks associated with reverse zoonosis. Understanding the dynamics of human-animal pathogen transmission is crucial for developing not only effective but also sustainable strategies to protect animal populations as well as public health from emerging infectious diseases.

Zoonosis and zooanthroponosis of emerging respiratory viruses

Lung infections in Influenza-Like Illness (ILI) are triggered by a variety of respiratory viruses. All human pandemics have been caused by the members of two major virus families, namely Orthomyxoviridae (influenza A viruses (IAVs); subtypes H1N1, H2N2, and H3N2) and Coronaviridae (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2, SARS-CoV-2). These viruses acquired some adaptive changes in a known intermediate host including domestic birds (IAVs) or unknown intermediate host (SARS-CoV-2) following transmission from their natural reservoirs (e.g. migratory birds or bats, respectively). Verily, these acquired adaptive substitutions facilitated crossing species barriers by these viruses to infect humans in a phenomenon that is known as zoonosis. Besides, these adaptive substitutions aided the variant strain to transmit horizontally to other contact non-human animal species including pets and wild animals (zooanthroponosis). Herein we discuss the main zoonotic and reverse-zoonosis events that occurred during the last two pandemics of influenza A/H1N1 and SARS-CoV-2. We also highlight the impact of interspecies transmission of these pandemic viruses on virus evolution and possible prophylactic and therapeutic interventions. Based on information available and presented in this review article, it is important to close monitoring viral zoonosis and viral reverse zoonosis of pandemic strains within a One-Health and One-World approach to mitigate their unforeseen risks, such as virus evolution and resistance to limited prophylactic and therapeutic interventions.

Striking lineage diversity of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 from non-human sources

Due to the necessity to control human-to-human spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), the overwhelming majority of the generated data on this virus was solely related to the genomic characteristics of strains infecting humans; conversely, this work aimed to recover and analyze the diversity of viral genomes from non-human sources. From a set of 3595 publicly available SARS-CoV-2 genome sequences, 128 lineages were identified in non-human hosts, the majority represented by the variants of concern Delta (n = 1105, 30.7%) and Alpha (n = 466, 12.9%), followed by B.1.1.298 lineage (n = 458, 12.7%). Environment, Neovison vison, Odocoileus virginianus and Felis catus were the non-human sources with the highest number of lineages (14, 12 and 10, respectively). Phylogenomic analyses showed viral clusters from environmental sources, N. vison, O. virginianus, Panthera tigris, and Panthera leo. These clusters were collectively related to human viruses as well as all other non-human sources that were heterogeneously distributed in the phylogenetic tree. Further, the genetic details of viral genomes from bats and pangolins were independently investigated owing to their high divergence, revealing five distinct clusters. Cluster 4 exclusively included bat-sourced genomes and the SARS-CoV-2 reference strain Wuhan-01. In summary, this study identified new genetic landmarks of SARS-CoV-2 evolution. We propose potential interspecies transmission routes of SARS-CoV-2 between animals and humans, which should be considered in order to establish better pathogen surveillance and containment strategies.

Serologic evidence of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection in camel and Eld's deer, Thailand

Background and Aim

The pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza (H1N1pdm09) virus has affected both human and animal populations worldwide. The transmission of the H1N1pdm09 virus from humans to animals is increasingly more evident. Captive animals, particularly zoo animals, are at risk of H1N1pdm09 virus infection through close contact with humans. Evidence of exposure to the H1N1pdm09 virus has been reported in several species of animals in captivity. However, there is limited information on the H1N1pdm09 virus infection and circulation in captive animals. To extend the body of knowledge on exposure to the H1N1pdm09 virus among captive animals in Thailand, our study investigated the presence of antibodies against the H1N1pdm09 virus in two captive animals: Camelids and Eld's deer.

Materials and Methods

We investigated H1N1pdm09 virus infection among four domestic camelid species and wild Eld's deer that were kept in different zoos in Thailand. In total, 72 archival serum samples from camelid species and Eld's deer collected between 2013 and 2014 in seven provinces in Thailand were analyzed for influenza antibodies using hemagglutination inhibition (HI), microneutralization, and western blotting (WB) assays.

Results

The presence of antibodies against the H1N1pdm09 virus was detected in 2.4% (1/42) of dromedary camel serum samples and 15.4% (2/13) of Eld's deer serum samples. No antibodies were detected in the rest of the serum samples derived from other investigated camelids, including Bactrian camels (0/3), alpacas (0/5), and llamas (0/9). The three positive serum samples showed HI antibody titers of 80, whereas the neutralization titers were in the range of 320-640. Antibodies specific to HA and NP proteins in the H1N1pdm09 virus were detected in positive camel serum samples using WB. Conversely, the presence of the specific antibodies in the positive Eld's deer serum samples could not be determined using WB due to the lack of commercially labeled secondary antibodies.

Conclusion

The present study provided evidence of H1N1pdm09 virus infection in the captive dromedary camel and Eld's deer in Thailand. Our findings highlight the need for continuous surveillance for influenza A virus in the population of dromedary camels and Eld's deer. The susceptible animal populations in close contact with humans should be closely monitored. Further study is warranted to determine whether Eld's deer are indeed a competent reservoir for human influenza virus.

Eurasian Avian-like M1 Plays More Important Role than M2 in Pathogenicity of 2009 Pandemic H1N1 Influenza Virus in Mice

Reassortant variant viruses generated between 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza virus [A(H1N1)pdm09] and endemic swine influenza viruses posed a potential risk to humans. Surprisingly, genetic analysis showed that almost all of these variant viruses contained the M segment from A(H1N1)pdm09, which originated from Eurasian avian-like swine influenza viruses. Studies have shown that the A(H1N1)pdm09 M gene is critical for the transmissibility and pathogenicity of the variant viruses. However, the M gene encodes two proteins, M1 and M2, and which of those plays a more important role in virus pathogenicity remains unknown. In this study, the M1 and M2 genes of A(H1N1)pdm09 were replaced with those of endemic H3N2 swine influenza virus, respectively. The chimeric viruses were rescued and evaluated in vitro and in mice. Both M1 and M2 of H3N2 affected the virus replication in vitro. In mice, the introduction of H3N2 M1 attenuated the chimeric virus, where all the mice survived from the infection, compared with the wild type virus that caused 100 % mortality. However, the chimeric virus containing H3N2 M2 was still virulent to mice, and caused 16.6% mortality, as well as similar body weight loss to the wild type virus infected group. Compared with the wild type virus, the chimeric virus containing H3N2 M1 induced lower levels of inflammatory cytokines and higher levels of anti-inflammatory cytokines, whereas the chimeric virus containing H3N2 M2 induced substantial pro-inflammatory responses, but higher levels of anti-inflammatory cytokines. The study demonstrated that Eurasian avian-like M1 played a more important role than M2 in the pathogenicity of A(H1N1)pdm09 in mice.

Pandemic lineage 2009 H1N1 influenza A virus infection in farmed mink in Utah

Mink are susceptible to infection with influenza A virus (IAV) of swine and human origin. In 2019, a Utah mink farm had an outbreak of respiratory disease in kits caused by infection with the pandemic influenza A(H1N1)2009 virus [A(H1N1)pdm09]. In 3 wk, ~325, 1-2-wk-old kits died (10% mortality in kits). All deaths occurred in a single barn that housed 640 breeding females. No clinical signs or deaths occurred among adult mink. Five dead kits and 3 euthanized female mink were autopsied. All kits had moderate-to-severe neutrophilic and lymphohistiocytic interstitial pneumonia; adult mink had minimal-to-moderate lymphohistiocytic bronchointerstitial pneumonia. Immunohistochemistry and real-time PCR targeting the matrix gene detected IAV in lung of kits and adults. Virus isolation and genetic analysis identified the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus. The source of the virus was not determined but is thought to be the result of reverse zoonosis. Our case emphasizes the need for close monitoring on mink farms for interspecies transmission of IAV and for safe work practices on farms and in diagnostic laboratories. Additionally, a pandemic virus may continue to circulate at low levels long after the global event is declared over.

Distribution and evolution of H1N1 influenza A viruses with adamantanes-resistant mutations worldwide from 1918 to 2019

H1N1 influenza is a kind of acute respiratory infectious disease that has a high socioeconomic and medical burden each year around the world. In the past decades, H1N1 influenza viruses have exhibited high resistance to adamantanes, which has become a serious issue. To understand the up-to-date distribution and evolution of H1N1 influenza viruses with adamantanes-resistant mutations, we conducted a deep analysis of 15875 M2 protein and 8351 MP nucleotides sequences. Results of the distribution analyses showed that 77.32% of H1N1 influenza viruses harbored-resistance mutations of which 73.52% were S31N, And the mutant variants mainly appeared in North America and Europe and H1N1 influenza viruses with S31N mutation became the circulating strains since 2009 all over the world. In addition, 80.65% of human H1N1 influenza viruses and 74.61% of swine H1N1 influenza viruses exhibited adamantanes resistance, while the frequency was only 1.86% in avian H1N1 influenza viruses. Studies from evolutionary analyses indicated that the avian-origin swine H1N1 influenza viruses replaced the classical human H1N1 influenza viruses and became the circulating strains after 2009; The interspecies transmission among avian, swine, and human strains over the past 20 years contributed to the 2009 swine influenza pandemic. Results of our study clearly clarify the historical drug resistance level of H1N1 influenza viruses around the world and demonstrated the evolution of adamantanes-resistant mutations in H1N1 influenza viruses. Our findings emphasize the necessity for monitoring the adamantanes susceptibility of H1N1 influenza viruses and draw attention to analyses of the evolution of drug-resistant H1N1 influenza variants.

A cluster epidemic of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus infection in four captive cheetahs (Acinonyx jubatus)

In January 2019, four cheetahs (Acinonyx jubatus) kept at a Japanese zoo intermittently showed respiratory signs following the incidence of seasonal influenza in animal caregivers. Respiratory materials (saliva, sputum and food tray swabs) were non-invasively collected from the four cheetahs. Although we were unable to isolate the virus, the NP gene of influenza A virus was detected in three of the cheetahs but not in the fourth cheetah that had nearly recovered. From a food tray swab which tested weakly positive by a commercial influenza detection kit, we were able to obtain the whole-genome sequence of the influenza A virus. Analysis of the genome, A/cheetah/Kanagawa/2/2019(H1N1), revealed that the virus was closely related to influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses isolated from humans in Japan in the 2018-2019 winter. Production of haemagglutinin inhibition (HI) antibodies (64-128 HI) against an A(H1N1)pdm09 virus in plasma samples confirmed infection of all four cheetahs. The animals continued to produce antibodies for at least 314 days after disease onset. These findings strongly suggest that reverse zoonotic transmission of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus occurred from human to cheetah and subsequently from cheetah to cheetah in the zoo. We also show that specimens can be safely and non-invasively collected from non-domesticated animals and used to investigate respiratory infectious diseases.

Reverse Zoonosis of COVID-19: Lessons From the 2009 Influenza Pandemic

Over the past decade, pandemics caused by pandemic H1N1 (pH1N1) influenza virus in 2009 and severe acute respiratory syndrome virus type 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in 2019 have emerged. Both are high-impact respiratory pathogens originating from animals. Their wide distribution in the human population subsequently results in an increased risk of human-to-animal transmission: reverse zoonosis. Although there have only been rare reports of reverse zoonosis events associated with the ongoing coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic from SARS-CoV-2 so far, comparison with the pH1N1 influenza pandemic can provide a better understanding of the possible consequences of such events for public and animal health. The results of our review suggest that similar factors contribute to successful crossing of the host species barriers in both pandemics. Specific risk factors include sufficient interaction between infected humans and recipient animals, suitability of the animal host factors for productive virus infection, and suitability of the animal host population for viral persistence. Of particular concern is virus spread to susceptible animal species, in which group housing and contact network structure could potentially result in an alternative virus reservoir, from which reintroduction into humans can take place. Virus exposure in high-density populations could allow sustained transmission in susceptible animal species. Identification of the risk factors and serological surveillance in SARS-CoV-2-susceptible animal species that are group-housed should help reduce the threat from reverse zoonosis of COVID-19.

Possibility for reverse zoonotic transmission of SARS-CoV-2 to free-ranging wildlife: A case study of bats

The COVID-19 pandemic highlights the substantial public health, economic, and societal consequences of virus spillover from a wildlife reservoir. Widespread human transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) also presents a new set of challenges when considering viral spillover from people to naïve wildlife and other animal populations. The establishment of new wildlife reservoirs for SARS-CoV-2 would further complicate public health control measures and could lead to wildlife health and conservation impacts. Given the likely bat origin of SARS-CoV-2 and related beta-coronaviruses (β-CoVs), free-ranging bats are a key group of concern for spillover from humans back to wildlife. Here, we review the diversity and natural host range of β-CoVs in bats and examine the risk of humans inadvertently infecting free-ranging bats with SARS-CoV-2. Our review of the global distribution and host range of β-CoV evolutionary lineages suggests that 40+ species of temperate-zone North American bats could be immunologically naïve and susceptible to infection by SARS-CoV-2. We highlight an urgent need to proactively connect the wellbeing of human and wildlife health during the current pandemic and to implement new tools to continue wildlife research while avoiding potentially severe health and conservation impacts of SARS-CoV-2 "spilling back" into free-ranging bat populations.

Serological evidence of influenza virus infection in captive wild felids, Thailand

Influenza virus is known to affect wild felids. To explore the prevalence of influenza viruses in these animal species, 196 archival sera from 5 felid species including Panthera tigris (N=147), Prionailurus viverrinus (N=35), Panthera leo (N=5), Pardofelis temminckii (N=8) and Neofelis nebulosa (N=1) collected between 2011 and 2015 in 10 provinces of Thailand were determined for the presence of antibody to avian and human influenza viruses. Blocking enzyme-linked immunosorbent (ELISA) assay and hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay were employed as the screening tests, which the serum samples with HI antibody titers ≥20 were further confirmed by cytopathic effect/hemagglutination based-microneutralization (CPE/HA-based microNT) test. Based on HI and microNT assays, the seropositive rates of low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) H5 virus, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5 virus and human H1 virus were 1.53% (3/196), 2.04% (4/196) and 6.63% (13/196), respectively. In addition, we also found antibody against both LPAI H5 virus and HPAI H5 virus in 2 out of 196 tested sera (1.02%). Evidences of influenza virus infection were found in captive P. tigris in Kanchanaburi, Nakhon Sawan and Ratchaburi provinces of Thailand. The findings of our study highlights the need of a continuous active surveillance program of influenza viruses in wild felid species.

Procyonidae, Viverridae, Hyenidae, Herpestidae, Eupleridae, and Prionodontidae

This chapter covers the diseases and pathology of multiple taxonomic groups within the order Carnivora including Procyonidae several of the Feliformia carnivores. The overwhelming majority of knowledge about disease pathogenesis for these species is biased toward raccoons and concern for disease spread to humans and companion animals. Procyonids and feliform carnivores are ubiquitous in their environments and share habitat and environmental resources with other nondomestic and domestic carnivores and humans. As reservoirs for a number of important multispecies or zoonotic pathogens, surveys for pathogens that may be harbored or vectored by several of the species in this chapter, for example, raccoons (e.g., canine distemper virus, rabies, and leptospirosis) and civets (e.g., SARS coronavirus), have been active areas of investigation. Unfortunately, less research has focused on the potential effects of these pathogens on their hosts.

Serosurveillance for pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 virus infection in domestic elephants, Thailand

The present study conducted serosurveillance for the presence of antibody to pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 virus (H1N1pdm virus) in archival serum samples collected between 2009 and 2013 from 317 domestic elephants living in 19 provinces situated in various parts of Thailand.

To obtain the most accurate data, hemagglutination-inhibition (HI) assay was employed as the screening test; and sera with HI antibody titers ≥20 were further confirmed by other methods, including cytopathic effect/hemagglutination based-microneutralization (microNT) and Western blot (WB) assays using H1N1pdm matrix 1 (M1) or hemagglutinin (HA) recombinant protein as the test antigen. Conclusively, the appropriate assays using HI in conjunction with WB assays for HA antibody revealed an overall seropositive rate of 8.5% (27 of 317). The prevalence of antibody to H1N1pdm virus was 2% (4/172) in 2009, 32% (17/53) in 2010, 9% (2/22) in 2011, 12% (1/8) in 2012, and 5% (3/62) in 2013. Notably, these positive serum samples were collected from elephants living in 7 tourist provinces of Thailand. The highest seropositive rate was obtained from elephants in Phuket, a popular tourist beach city. Young elephants had higher seropositive rate than older elephants.

The source of H1N1pdm viral infection in these elephants was not explored, but most likely came from close contact with the infected mahouts or from the infected tourists who engaged in activities such as elephant riding and feeding. Nevertheless, it could not be excluded that elephant-to-elephant transmission did occur.

Influenza A Virus Surveillance in the Invasive American Mink (Neovison vison) from Freshwater Ecosystems, Northern Spain

Influenza A viruses (IAVs) are negative-sense, single-stranded and segmented RNA viruses of the Orthomyxoviridae family that may cause acute respiratory disease in a wide range of birds and mammals. Susceptibility of several species within the family Mustelidae to IAVs has been reported as a result of natural or experimental infections. The objectives of this study were to assess whether free-ranging American mink populations from Northern Spain were infected with IAV and try to define the role of this species in the epidemiology of IAV. Sera from 689 American mink from Northern Spain captured between 2011 and 2014 were tested for the presence of antibodies against IAVs using a commercial competition cELISA. Positive sera were further analysed with haemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay. Fifteen of the 689 (2.2%, 1.3-3.6 CI_95% ) of the American minks analysed were ELISA positive. No significant differences were observed between years of capture, provinces, river basins, sexes or ages of the animals. All seropositive sera resulted negative to the panel strains used in the HI assay, showing that the most relevant strains circulating in swine, the most relevant avian subtypes (H5 and H7) and the H10N4 subtype isolated in minks have not been circulating in this free-ranging exotic carnivore from Spain. In the light of these results, the free-range American mink from Northern Spain do not seem to have an important role in the epidemiology of IAVs.

Novel reassortant influenza viruses between pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and other influenza viruses pose a risk to public health

Influenza A virus (IAV) is characterized by eight single-stranded, negative sense RNA segments, which allows for gene reassortment among different IAV subtypes when they co-infect a single host cell simultaneously. Genetic reassortment is an important way to favor the evolution of influenza virus. Novel reassortant virus may pose a pandemic among humans. In history, three human pandemic influenza viruses were caused by genetic reassortment between avian, human and swine influenza viruses. Since 2009, pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (pdm/09 H1N1) influenza virus composed of two swine influenza virus genes highlighted the genetic reassortment again. Due to wide host species and high transmission of the pdm/09 H1N1 influenza virus, many different avian, human or swine influenza virus subtypes may reassert with it to generate novel reassortant viruses, which may result in a next pandemic among humans. So, it is necessary to understand the potential threat of current reassortant viruses between the pdm/09 H1N1 and other influenza viruses to public health. This study summarized the status of the reassortant viruses between the pdm/09 H1N1 and other influenza viruses of different species origins in natural and experimental conditions. The aim of this summarization is to facilitate us to further understand the potential threats of novel reassortant influenza viruses to public health and to make effective prevention and control strategies for these pathogens.

Pathogenicity and transmissibility of novel reassortant H3N2 influenza viruses with 2009 pandemic H1N1 genes in pigs

At least 10 different genotypes of novel reassortant H3N2 influenza viruses with 2009 pandemic H1N1 [A(H1N1)pdm09] gene(s) have been identified in U.S. pigs, including the H3N2 variant with a single A(H1N1)pdm09 M gene, which has infected more than 300 people. To date, only three genotypes of these viruses have been evaluated in animal models, and the pathogenicity and transmissibility of the other seven genotype viruses remain unknown. Here, we show that three H3N2 reassortant viruses that contain 3 (NP, M, and NS) or 5 (PA, PB2, NP, M, and NS) genes from A(H1N1)pdm09 were pathogenic in pigs, similar to the endemic H3N2 swine virus. However, the reassortant H3N2 virus with 3 A(H1N1)pdm09 genes and a recent human influenza virus N2 gene was transmitted most efficiently among pigs, whereas the reassortant H3N2 virus with 5 A(H1N1)pdm09 genes was transmitted less efficiently than the endemic H3N2 virus. Interestingly, the polymerase complex of reassortant H3N2 virus with 5 A(H1N1)pdm09 genes showed significantly higher polymerase activity than those of endemic and reassortant H3N2 viruses with 3 A(H1N1)pdm09 genes. Further studies showed that an avian-like glycine at position 228 at the hemagglutinin (HA) receptor binding site is responsible for inefficient transmission of the reassortant H3N2 virus with 5 A(H1N1)pdm09 genes. Taken together, our results provide insights into the pathogenicity and transmissibility of novel reassortant H3N2 viruses in pigs and suggest that a mammalian-like serine at position 228 in the HA is critical for the transmissibility of these reassortant H3N2 viruses.

IMPORTANCE

Swine influenza is a highly contagious zoonotic disease that threatens animal and public health. Introduction of 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus [A(H1N1)pdm09] into swine herds has resulted in novel reassortant influenza viruses in swine, including H3N2 and H1N2 variants that have caused human infections in the United States. We showed that reassortant H3N2 influenza viruses with 3 or 5 genes from A(H1N1)pdm09 isolated from diseased pigs are pathogenic and transmissible in pigs, but the reassortant H3N2 virus with 5 A(H1N1)pdm09 genes displayed less efficient transmissibility than the endemic and reassortant H3N2 viruses with 3 A(H1N1)pdm09 genes. Further studies revealed that an avian-like glycine at the HA 228 receptor binding site of the reassortant H3N2 virus with 5 A(H1N1)pdm09 genes is responsible for less efficient transmissibility in pigs. Our results provide insights into viral pathogenesis and the transmission of novel reassortant H3N2 viruses that are circulating in U.S. swine herds and warrant future surveillance.

Extended viral shedding of a low pathogenic avian influenza virus by striped skunks (Mephitis mephitis)

BACKGROUND

Striped skunks (Mephitis mephitis) are susceptible to infection with some influenza A viruses. However, the viral shedding capability of this peri-domestic mammal and its potential role in influenza A virus ecology are largely undetermined.

METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

Striped skunks were experimentally infected with a low pathogenic (LP) H4N6 avian influenza virus (AIV) and monitored for 20 days post infection (DPI). All of the skunks exposed to H4N6 AIV shed large quantities of viral RNA, as detected by real-time RT-PCR and confirmed for live virus with virus isolation, from nasal washes and oral swabs (maximum ≤ 10(6.02) PCR EID50 equivalent/mL and ≤ 10(5.19) PCR EID50 equivalent/mL, respectively). Some evidence of potential fecal shedding was also noted. Following necropsy on 20 DPI, viral RNA was detected in the nasal turbinates of one individual. All treatment animals yielded evidence of a serological response by 20 DPI.

CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE

These results indicate that striped skunks have the potential to shed large quantities of viral RNA through the oral and nasal routes following exposure to a LP AIV. Considering the peri-domestic nature of these animals, along with the duration of shedding observed in this species, their presence on poultry and waterfowl operations could influence influenza A virus epidemiology. For example, this species could introduce a virus to a naive poultry flock or act as a trafficking mechanism of AIV to and from an infected poultry flock to naive flocks or wild bird populations.

Pandemic influenza A H1N1 in Swine and other animals

Influenza A virus infection has been reported in a variety of mammalian and avian species. Wild waterfowl such as ducks and geese are considered the principal reservoir of many influenza A viruses. On May 2, 2009, the first confirmed case of pandemic 2009 H1N1 (pH1N1) in animals was reported in a small swine herd in Canada. A public health investigation concluded that transmission from people to pigs was the likely source of infection. Subsequently the pH1N1 virus has been reported in turkeys, cats, dogs, ferrets, and several wildlife species. Human to animal transmission has been confirmed or suspected in a number of cases. The naming of the virus as "swine flu" in the international media led to a drop in the demand for pork and subsequently a reduction in the price of pork paid to farmers. Estimates of losses to pork producers in North America run into hundreds of millions of dollars. Increased surveillance of swine populations for influenza viruses has been suggested as a control measure against the development of future pandemic viruses. In order to be successful, future surveillance and reporting policies must include provisions to protect the livelihoods of farmers.

Selected emerging diseases in ferrets

Since their introduction as pets several decades ago, ferrets have become an increasingly popular household pet. Great strides have been made in improving their diet and understanding common diseases (eg, insulinoma, hyperadrenocorticism, lymphoma) that affect them. With the frequency with which these conditions are seen, it sometimes is easy to forget that ferrets can be affected by other diseases. Some of these diseases, such as cryptococcosis, are known, but may be increasing in incidence and range, whereas others, such as hypothyroidism and pure red cell aplasia, may be underrecognized or underreported. This review highlights new and emerging diseases not already well reviewed in the literature.

Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in captive cheetah

We describe virus isolation, full genome sequence analysis, and clinical pathology in ferrets experimentally inoculated with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus recovered from a clinically ill captive cheetah that had minimal human contact. Evidence of reverse zoonotic transmission by fomites underscores the substantial animal and human health implications of this virus.

The neuraminidase and matrix genes of the 2009 pandemic influenza H1N1 virus cooperate functionally to facilitate efficient replication and transmissibility in pigs

The 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus (pH1N1) contains neuraminidase (NA) and matrix (M) genes from Eurasian avian-like swine influenza viruses (SIVs), with the remaining six genes from North American triple-reassortant SIVs. To characterize the role of the pH1N1 NA and M genes in pathogenesis and transmission, their impact was evaluated in the background of an H1N1 triple-reassortant (tr1930) SIV in which the HA (H3) and NA (N2) of influenza A/swine/Texas/4199-2/98 virus were replaced with those from the classical H1N1 A/swine/Iowa/15/30 (1930) virus. The laboratory-adapted 1930 virus did not shed nor transmit in pigs, but tr1930 was able to shed in infected pigs. The NA, M or both genes of the tr1930 virus were then substituted by those of pH1N1. The resulting virus with both NA and M from pH1N1 grew to significantly higher titre in cell cultures than the viruses with single NA or M from pH1N1. In a pig model, only the virus containing both NA and M from pH1N1 was transmitted to and infected sentinels, whereas the viruses with single NA or M from pH1N1 did not. These results demonstrate that the right combination of NA and M genes is critical for the replication and transmissibility of influenza viruses in pigs.

Genetic data from avian influenza and avian paramyxoviruses generated by the European network of excellence (EPIZONE) between 2006 and 2011--review and recommendations for surveillance

Since 2006, the members of the molecular epidemiological working group of the European "EPIZONE" network of excellence have been generating sequence data on avian influenza and avian paramyxoviruses from both European and African sources in an attempt to more fully understand the circulation and impact of these viruses. This review presents a timely update on the epidemiological situation of these viruses based on sequence data generated during the lifetime of this project in addition to data produced by other groups during the same period. Based on this information and putting it all into a European context, recommendations for continued surveillance of these important viruses within Europe are presented.