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Gee J, Shimabukuro TT, Su JR, Shay D, Ryan M, Basavaraju SV, Broder KR, Clark M, Buddy Creech C, Cunningham F, Goddard K, Guy H, Edwards KM, Forshee R, Hamburger T, Hause AM, Klein NP, Kracalik I, Lamer C, Loran DA, McNeil MM, Montgomery J, Moro P, Myers TR, Olson C, Oster ME, Sharma AJ, Schupbach R, Weintraub E, Whitehead B, Anderson S. Overview of U.S. COVID-19 vaccine safety surveillance systems. Vaccine 2024:S0264-410X(24)00224-X. [PMID: 38631952 DOI: 10.1016/j.vaccine.2024.02.065] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/30/2023] [Revised: 02/13/2024] [Accepted: 02/22/2024] [Indexed: 04/19/2024]
Abstract
The U.S. COVID-19 vaccination program, which commenced in December 2020, has been instrumental in preventing morbidity and mortality from COVID-19 disease. Safety monitoring has been an essential component of the program. The federal government undertook a comprehensive and coordinated approach to implement complementary safety monitoring systems and to communicate findings in a timely and transparent way to healthcare providers, policymakers, and the public. Monitoring involved both well-established and newly developed systems that relied on both spontaneous (passive) and active surveillance methods. Clinical consultation for individual cases of adverse events following vaccination was performed, and monitoring of special populations, such as pregnant persons, was conducted. This report describes the U.S. government's COVID-19 vaccine safety monitoring systems and programs used by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, the Department of Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Indian Health Service. Using the adverse event of myocarditis following mRNA COVID-19 vaccination as a model, we demonstrate how the multiple, complementary monitoring systems worked to rapidly detect, assess, and verify a vaccine safety signal. In addition, longer-term follow-up was conducted to evaluate the recovery status of myocarditis cases following vaccination. Finally, the process for timely and transparent communication and dissemination of COVID-19 vaccine safety data is described, highlighting the responsiveness and robustness of the U.S. vaccine safety monitoring infrastructure during the national COVID-19 vaccination program.
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Affiliation(s)
- Julianne Gee
- National Center for Emerging Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, GA, United States.
| | - Tom T Shimabukuro
- National Center for Emerging Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - John R Su
- National Center for Emerging Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - David Shay
- National Center for Emerging Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Margaret Ryan
- Defense Health Agency, Immunization Healthcare Division, San Diego, CA, United States
| | - Sridhar V Basavaraju
- National Center for Emerging Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Karen R Broder
- National Center for Emerging Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Matthew Clark
- Indian Health Service (IHS), IHS National Pharmacy & Therapeutics Committee, Durango, CO, United States
| | - C Buddy Creech
- Vanderbilt Vaccine Research Program, Vanderbilt University Medical Center and School of Medicine, Nashville, TN, United States
| | - Francesca Cunningham
- Department of Veterans Affairs, Veterans Affairs Center for Medication Safety - Pharmacy Benefit Management Services, Hines, IL, United States
| | - Kristin Goddard
- Kaiser Permanente Vaccine Study Center, Kaiser Permanente Northern California, Oakland, CA, United States
| | - Harrison Guy
- Indian Health Service (IHS), IHS National Pharmacy & Therapeutics Committee, Durango, CO, United States
| | - Kathryn M Edwards
- Vanderbilt Vaccine Research Program, Vanderbilt University Medical Center and School of Medicine, Nashville, TN, United States
| | - Richard Forshee
- Office of Biologics and Pharmacovigilance, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, US Food and Drug Administration, Silver Spring, MD, United States
| | - Tanya Hamburger
- National Center for Emerging Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Anne M Hause
- National Center for Emerging Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Nicola P Klein
- Kaiser Permanente Vaccine Study Center, Kaiser Permanente Northern California, Oakland, CA, United States
| | - Ian Kracalik
- National Center for Emerging Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Chris Lamer
- Indian Health Service (IHS), IHS National Pharmacy & Therapeutics Committee, Durango, CO, United States
| | - David A Loran
- Defense Health Agency, Immunization Healthcare Division, San Diego, CA, United States
| | - Michael M McNeil
- National Center for Emerging Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Jay Montgomery
- Defense Health Agency, Immunization Healthcare Division, Bethesda, MD, United States
| | - Pedro Moro
- National Center for Emerging Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Tanya R Myers
- National Center for Emerging Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Christine Olson
- National Center for Emerging Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Matthew E Oster
- National Center for Birth Defects and Developmental Disabilities, CDC, Atlanta GA, United States; Emory University School of Medicine, Children's Healthcare of Atlanta, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Andrea J Sharma
- National Center for Emerging Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Ryan Schupbach
- Indian Health Service (IHS), IHS National Pharmacy & Therapeutics Committee, Durango, CO, United States
| | - Eric Weintraub
- National Center for Emerging Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Brett Whitehead
- Indian Health Service (IHS), IHS National Pharmacy & Therapeutics Committee, Durango, CO, United States
| | - Steven Anderson
- Office of Biologics and Pharmacovigilance, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, US Food and Drug Administration, Silver Spring, MD, United States
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Chavez Ortiz JL, Griffin I, Kazakova SV, Stewart PB, Kracalik I, Basavaraju SV. Transfusion-related errors and associated adverse reactions and blood product wastage as reported to the National Healthcare Safety Network Hemovigilance Module, 2014-2022. Transfusion 2024; 64:627-637. [PMID: 38476028 DOI: 10.1111/trf.17775] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/10/2024] [Revised: 02/16/2024] [Accepted: 02/16/2024] [Indexed: 03/14/2024]
Abstract
BACKGROUND Transfusion-related errors are largely preventable but may lead to blood product wastage and adverse reactions, resulting in patient harm. In the United States, the incidence of transfusion-related errors is poorly understood nationally. We used data from the National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) Hemovigilance Module to describe and quantify transfusion-related errors, as well as associated transfusion-related adverse reactions and blood product wastage. METHODS During 2014-2022, data from the NHSN Hemovigilance Module were used to analyze errors, including near misses (errors with no transfusion), incidents (errors with transfusion), and associated serious adverse reactions (severe, life-threatening, or death). RESULTS During 2014-2022, 80 acute care facilities (75 adult; 5 pediatric) reported 63,900 errors. Most errors occurred during patient blood sample collection (21,761, 34.1%) and blood sample handling (16,277, 25.5%). Less than one-fifth of reported errors (9822, 15.4%) had a completed incident form. Of those, 8780 (89.3%) were near misses and 1042 (10.7%) incidents. More than a third of near misses (3363, 38.3%) were associated with a discarded blood product, resulting in 4862 discarded components. Overall, 87 adverse reactions were associated with errors; six (7%) were serious. CONCLUSIONS Over half of the transfusion-related errors reported to the Hemovigilance Module occurred during blood sample collection or sample handling. Some serious adverse reactions identified were associated with errors, suggesting that additional safety interventions may be beneficial. Increased participation in the Hemovigilance Module could enhance generalizability and further inform policy development regarding error prevention.
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Affiliation(s)
- Joel L Chavez Ortiz
- Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
- Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Isabel Griffin
- Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Sophia V Kazakova
- Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Phylicia B Stewart
- Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
- Chenega Corporation, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Ian Kracalik
- Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Sridhar V Basavaraju
- Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
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3
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Villa CH, Illoh O, Kracalik I, Basavaraju SV, Eder AF. Posttransfusion sepsis attributable to bacterial contamination in platelet collection set manufacturing, United States. Transfusion 2023; 63:2351-2357. [PMID: 37909342 DOI: 10.1111/trf.17589] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/11/2023] [Revised: 10/06/2023] [Accepted: 10/06/2023] [Indexed: 11/03/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- C H Villa
- Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration, Silver Spring, Maryland, USA
| | - O Illoh
- Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration, Silver Spring, Maryland, USA
| | - I Kracalik
- Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - S V Basavaraju
- Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - A F Eder
- Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration, Silver Spring, Maryland, USA
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Kracalik I, Kent AG, Villa CH, Gable P, Annambhotla P, McAllister G, Yokoe D, Langelier CR, Oakeson K, Noble-Wang J, Illoh O, Halpin AL, Eder AF, Basavaraju SV. Posttransfusion Sepsis Attributable to Bacterial Contamination in Platelet Collection Set Manufacturing Facility, United States. Emerg Infect Dis 2023; 29:1979-1989. [PMID: 37561399 PMCID: PMC10521617 DOI: 10.3201/eid2910.230869] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 08/11/2023] Open
Abstract
During May 2018‒December 2022, we reviewed transfusion-transmitted sepsis cases in the United States attributable to polymicrobial contaminated apheresis platelet components, including Acinetobacter calcoaceticus‒baumannii complex or Staphylococcus saprophyticus isolated from patients and components. Transfused platelet components underwent bacterial risk control strategies (primary culture, pathogen reduction or primary culture, and secondary rapid test) before transfusion. Environmental samples were collected from a platelet collection set manufacturing facility. Seven sepsis cases from 6 platelet donations from 6 different donors were identified in patients from 6 states; 3 patients died. Cultures identified Acinetobacter calcoaceticus‒baumannii complex in 6 patients and 6 transfused platelets, S. saprophyticus in 4 patients and 4 transfused platelets. Whole-genome sequencing showed environmental isolates from the manufacturer were closely related genetically to patient and platelet isolates, indicating the manufacturer was the most probable source of recurrent polymicrobial contamination. Clinicians should maintain awareness of possible transfusion-transmitted sepsis even when using bacterial risk control strategies.
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5
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Kracalik I, Sapiano MRP, Wild RC, Ortiz JC, Stewart P, Berger JJ, Basavaraju SV, Free RJ. Supplemental findings of the 2021 National Blood Collection and Utilization Survey. Transfusion 2023; 63 Suppl 4:S19-S42. [PMID: 37702255 PMCID: PMC10783319 DOI: 10.1111/trf.17509] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/31/2023] [Revised: 08/03/2023] [Accepted: 08/03/2023] [Indexed: 09/14/2023]
Abstract
BACKGROUND The Department of Health and Human Services' National Blood Collection and Utilization Survey (NBCUS) has been conducted biennially since 1997. Data are used to estimate national blood collection and use. Supplemental data from the 2021 NBCUS not presented elsewhere are presented here. METHODS Data on survey participation, donor characteristics, blood component cost, transfusion-associated adverse reactions, and implementation of blood safety measures, including pathogen-reduction of platelets, during 2021, were analyzed. Comparisons are made to 2019 survey data where available (2013-2019 for survey participation). RESULTS During 2021, there were 11,507,000 successful blood donations in the United States, a 4.8% increase from 2019. Persons aged 45-64 years accounted for 42% of all successful blood donations. Donations by persons aged 65 years and older increased by 40.7%, while donations among minorities and donors aged <25 years decreased. From 2019 to 2021, the median price hospitals paid per unit of leukoreduced red blood cells, leukoreduced and pathogen-reduced apheresis platelets, and fresh frozen plasma increased. The largest increase in price per unit of blood component in 2021 was for leukoreduced apheresis platelets, which increased by ~$51. Between 2019 and 2021, the proportion of transfusing facilities reporting use of pathogen-reduced platelets increased, from 13% to 60%. Transfusion-related adverse reactions declined slightly between 2019 and 2021, although the rate of transfusion-transmitted bacterial infections remained unchanged. CONCLUSION During 2021, blood donations increased nationally, although donations from those aged <25 years and minorities declined. The prices hospitals paid for most blood products increased, as did the use of pathogen-reduced platelets.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ian Kracalik
- Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, National Center
for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Mathew R. P. Sapiano
- Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, National Center
for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
- Lantana Consulting Group, East Thetford, Vermont, USA
| | - Robert C. Wild
- Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, National Center
for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
- CACI International, Reston, Virginia, USA
| | - Joel Chavez Ortiz
- Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, National Center
for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
- Oakridge Institute for Science and Education, Atlanta,
Georgia, USA
| | - Phylicia Stewart
- Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, National Center
for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
- Chenega Corporation, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - James J. Berger
- Office of Infectious Disease and HIV/AIDS Policy, Office of
the Assistant Secretary for Health, Department of Health and Human Services,
Washington, District of Columbia, USA
| | - Sridhar V. Basavaraju
- Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, National Center
for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Rebecca J. Free
- Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, National Center
for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
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Faherty EAG, Holly T, Ogale YP, Crisler G, Becht A, Kern D, Nicolae L, Spencer H, Wasz M, Kerins JL, Kittner A, Staton A, Hardnett C, Hutson C, Gigante CM, Quilter L, Kracalik I, Black S, McCollum AM, Rao AK, Tabidze I. Notes from the Field: Emergence of an Mpox Cluster Primarily Affecting Persons Previously Vaccinated Against Mpox - Chicago, Illinois, March 18-June 12, 2023. Am J Transplant 2023; 23:1268-1270. [PMID: 37573130 DOI: 10.1016/j.ajt.2023.07.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 08/14/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Emily A G Faherty
- Epidemic Intelligence Service, CDC; Chicago Department of Public Health, Chicago, Illinois.
| | - Taylor Holly
- Chicago Department of Public Health, Chicago, Illinois
| | - Yasmin P Ogale
- Epidemic Intelligence Service, CDC; Division of Sexually Transmitted Diseases Prevention, National Center for HIV, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention, CDC
| | | | - Ashley Becht
- Chicago Department of Public Health, Chicago, Illinois
| | - David Kern
- Chicago Department of Public Health, Chicago, Illinois
| | - Lavinia Nicolae
- Division of Sexually Transmitted Diseases Prevention, National Center for HIV, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention, CDC
| | - Hillary Spencer
- Epidemic Intelligence Service, CDC; Chicago Department of Public Health, Chicago, Illinois
| | - Michael Wasz
- Chicago Department of Public Health, Chicago, Illinois
| | | | - Alyse Kittner
- Chicago Department of Public Health, Chicago, Illinois
| | - Amber Staton
- Division of Sexually Transmitted Diseases Prevention, National Center for HIV, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention, CDC
| | - Carla Hardnett
- Division of Sexually Transmitted Diseases Prevention, National Center for HIV, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention, CDC
| | - Christina Hutson
- Division of High-Consequence Pathogens and Pathology, National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, CDC
| | - Crystal M Gigante
- Division of High-Consequence Pathogens and Pathology, National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, CDC
| | - Laura Quilter
- Division of Sexually Transmitted Diseases Prevention, National Center for HIV, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention, CDC
| | - Ian Kracalik
- Division of High-Consequence Pathogens and Pathology, National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, CDC
| | | | - Andrea M McCollum
- Division of High-Consequence Pathogens and Pathology, National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, CDC
| | - Agam K Rao
- Division of High-Consequence Pathogens and Pathology, National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, CDC
| | - Irina Tabidze
- Chicago Department of Public Health, Chicago, Illinois
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7
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Faherty EAG, Holly T, Ogale YP, Crisler G, Becht A, Kern D, Nicolae L, Spencer H, Wasz M, Kerins JL, Kittner A, Staton A, Hardnett C, Hutson C, Gigante CM, Quilter L, Kracalik I, Black S, McCollum AM, Rao AK, Tabidze I. Notes from the Field: Emergence of an Mpox Cluster Primarily Affecting Persons Previously Vaccinated Against Mpox - Chicago, Illinois, March 18-June 12, 2023. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2023; 72:696-698. [PMID: 37347713 PMCID: PMC10328474 DOI: 10.15585/mmwr.mm7225a6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 10.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/24/2023]
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8
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Dalton AF, Diallo AO, Chard AN, Moulia DL, Deputy NP, Fothergill A, Kracalik I, Wegner CW, Markus TM, Pathela P, Still WL, Hawkins S, Mangla AT, Ravi N, Licherdell E, Britton A, Lynfield R, Sutton M, Hansen AP, Betancourt GS, Rowlands JV, Chai SJ, Fisher R, Danza P, Farley M, Zipprich J, Prahl G, Wendel KA, Niccolai L, Castilho JL, Payne DC, Cohn AC, Feldstein LR. Estimated Effectiveness of JYNNEOS Vaccine in Preventing Mpox: A Multijurisdictional Case-Control Study - United States, August 19, 2022-March 31, 2023. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2023; 72:553-558. [PMID: 37200229 DOI: 10.15585/mmwr.mm7220a3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 36] [Impact Index Per Article: 36.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/20/2023]
Abstract
As of March 31, 2023, more than 30,000 monkeypox (mpox) cases had been reported in the United States in an outbreak that has disproportionately affected gay, bisexual, and other men who have sex with men (MSM) and transgender persons (1). JYNNEOS vaccine (Modified Vaccinia Ankara vaccine, Bavarian Nordic) was approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 2019 for the prevention of smallpox and mpox via subcutaneous injection as a 2-dose series (0.5 mL per dose, administered 4 weeks apart) (2). To expand vaccine access, an Emergency Use Authorization was issued by FDA on August 9, 2022, for dose-sparing intradermal injection of JYNNEOS as a 2-dose series (0.1 mL per dose, administered 4 weeks apart) (3). Vaccination was available to persons with known or presumed exposure to a person with mpox (postexposure prophylaxis [PEP]), as well as persons at increased risk for mpox or who might benefit from vaccination (preexposure mpox prophylaxis [PrEP]) (4). Because information on JYNNEOS vaccine effectiveness (VE) is limited, a matched case-control study was conducted in 12 U.S. jurisdictions,† including nine Emerging Infections Program sites and three Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity sites,§ to evaluate VE against mpox among MSM and transgender adults aged 18-49 years. During August 19, 2022-March 31, 2023, a total of 309 case-patients were matched to 608 control patients. Adjusted VE was 75.2% (95% CI = 61.2% to 84.2%) for partial vaccination (1 dose) and 85.9% (95% CI = 73.8% to 92.4%) for full vaccination (2 doses). Adjusted VE for full vaccination by subcutaneous, intradermal, and heterologous routes of administration was 88.9% (95% CI = 56.0% to 97.2%), 80.3% (95% CI = 22.9% to 95.0%), and 86.9% (95% CI = 69.1% to 94.5%), respectively. Adjusted VE for full vaccination among immunocompromised participants was 70.2% (95% CI = -37.9% to 93.6%) and among immunocompetent participants was 87.8% (95% CI = 57.5% to 96.5%). JYNNEOS is effective at reducing the risk for mpox. Because duration of protection of 1 versus 2 doses remains unknown, persons at increased risk for mpox exposure should receive the 2-dose series as recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP),¶ regardless of administration route or immunocompromise status.
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Kracalik I, Oster ME, Broder KR, Cortese MM, Glover M, Shields K, Creech CB, Romanson B, Novosad S, Soslow J, Walter EB, Marquez P, Dendy JM, Woo J, Valderrama AL, Ramirez-Cardenas A, Assefa A, Campbell MJ, Su JR, Magill SS, Shay DK, Shimabukuro TT, Basavaraju SV. Outcomes at least 90 days since onset of myocarditis after mRNA COVID-19 vaccination in adolescents and young adults in the USA: a follow-up surveillance study. The Lancet Child & Adolescent Health 2022; 6:788-798. [PMID: 36152650 PMCID: PMC9555956 DOI: 10.1016/s2352-4642(22)00244-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 27] [Impact Index Per Article: 13.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/10/2022] [Revised: 08/05/2022] [Accepted: 08/09/2022] [Indexed: 12/15/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Ian Kracalik
- CDC COVID-19 Response Team, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA.
| | - Matthew E Oster
- CDC COVID-19 Response Team, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA; Children's Healthcare of Atlanta, Emory University School of Medicine, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Karen R Broder
- CDC COVID-19 Response Team, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Margaret M Cortese
- CDC COVID-19 Response Team, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Maleeka Glover
- CDC COVID-19 Response Team, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Karen Shields
- CDC COVID-19 Response Team, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - C Buddy Creech
- Vanderbilt University Medical Center, Nashville, TN, USA
| | - Brittney Romanson
- CDC COVID-19 Response Team, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Shannon Novosad
- CDC COVID-19 Response Team, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | | | - Emmanuel B Walter
- Duke Human Vaccine Institute, Durham, NC, USA; Duke University School of Medicine, Durham, NC, USA
| | - Paige Marquez
- CDC COVID-19 Response Team, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | | | - Jared Woo
- CDC COVID-19 Response Team, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Amy L Valderrama
- CDC COVID-19 Response Team, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | | | - Agape Assefa
- CDC COVID-19 Response Team, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | | | - John R Su
- CDC COVID-19 Response Team, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Shelley S Magill
- CDC COVID-19 Response Team, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - David K Shay
- CDC COVID-19 Response Team, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Tom T Shimabukuro
- CDC COVID-19 Response Team, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Sridhar V Basavaraju
- CDC COVID-19 Response Team, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
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10
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Kracalik I, Ham DC, McAllister G, Smith AR, Vowles M, Kauber K, Zambrano M, Rodriguez G, Garner K, Chorbi K, Cassidy PM, McBee S, Stoney RJ, Moser K, Villarino ME, Zazueta OE, Bhatnagar A, Sula E, Stanton RA, Brown AC, Halpin AL, Epstein L, Walters MS. Extensively Drug-Resistant Carbapenemase-Producing Pseudomonas aeruginosa and Medical Tourism from the United States to Mexico, 2018-2019. Emerg Infect Dis 2022; 28:51-61. [PMID: 34932447 PMCID: PMC8714193 DOI: 10.3201/eid2801.211880] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/02/2022] Open
Abstract
Carbapenem-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa (CRPA) producing the Verona integron‒encoded metallo-β-lactamase (VIM) are highly antimicrobial drug-resistant pathogens that are uncommon in the United States. We investigated the source of VIM-CRPA among US medical tourists who underwent bariatric surgery in Tijuana, Mexico. Cases were defined as isolation of VIM-CRPA or CRPA from a patient who had an elective invasive medical procedure in Mexico during January 2018‒December 2019 and within 45 days before specimen collection. Whole-genome sequencing of isolates was performed. Thirty-eight case-patients were identified in 18 states; 31 were operated on by surgeon 1, most frequently at facility A (27/31 patients). Whole-genome sequencing identified isolates linked to surgeon 1 were closely related and distinct from isolates linked to other surgeons in Tijuana. Facility A closed in March 2019. US patients and providers should acknowledge the risk for colonization or infection after medical tourism with highly drug-resistant pathogens uncommon in the United States.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Gillian McAllister
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA (I. Kracalik, D. Cal Ham, G. McAllister, R.J. Stoney, K. Moser, M.E. Villarino, A. Bhatnagar, E. Sula, R.A. Stanton, A.C. Brown, A.L. Halpin, L. Epstein, M. Spalding Walters)
- Utah Department of Health, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA (A.R. Smith, M. Vowles); Washington State Department of Health, Olympia, Washington, USA (K. Kauber)
- Texas Department of State Health Services, Austin, Texas, USA (M. Zambrano, G. Rodriguez)
- Arkansas Department of Health, Little Rock, Arkansas, USA (K. Garner)
- Arizona Department of Health Services, Phoenix, Arizona, USA (K. Chorbi)
- Oregon Health Authority, Portland, Oregon, USA (P.M. Cassidy)
- West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Charleston, West Virginia, USA (S. McBee)
- Secretaría de Salud de Baja California, Mexicali, Mexico (O.E. Zazueta)
| | - Amanda R. Smith
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA (I. Kracalik, D. Cal Ham, G. McAllister, R.J. Stoney, K. Moser, M.E. Villarino, A. Bhatnagar, E. Sula, R.A. Stanton, A.C. Brown, A.L. Halpin, L. Epstein, M. Spalding Walters)
- Utah Department of Health, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA (A.R. Smith, M. Vowles); Washington State Department of Health, Olympia, Washington, USA (K. Kauber)
- Texas Department of State Health Services, Austin, Texas, USA (M. Zambrano, G. Rodriguez)
- Arkansas Department of Health, Little Rock, Arkansas, USA (K. Garner)
- Arizona Department of Health Services, Phoenix, Arizona, USA (K. Chorbi)
- Oregon Health Authority, Portland, Oregon, USA (P.M. Cassidy)
- West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Charleston, West Virginia, USA (S. McBee)
- Secretaría de Salud de Baja California, Mexicali, Mexico (O.E. Zazueta)
| | - Maureen Vowles
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA (I. Kracalik, D. Cal Ham, G. McAllister, R.J. Stoney, K. Moser, M.E. Villarino, A. Bhatnagar, E. Sula, R.A. Stanton, A.C. Brown, A.L. Halpin, L. Epstein, M. Spalding Walters)
- Utah Department of Health, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA (A.R. Smith, M. Vowles); Washington State Department of Health, Olympia, Washington, USA (K. Kauber)
- Texas Department of State Health Services, Austin, Texas, USA (M. Zambrano, G. Rodriguez)
- Arkansas Department of Health, Little Rock, Arkansas, USA (K. Garner)
- Arizona Department of Health Services, Phoenix, Arizona, USA (K. Chorbi)
- Oregon Health Authority, Portland, Oregon, USA (P.M. Cassidy)
- West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Charleston, West Virginia, USA (S. McBee)
- Secretaría de Salud de Baja California, Mexicali, Mexico (O.E. Zazueta)
| | - Kelly Kauber
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA (I. Kracalik, D. Cal Ham, G. McAllister, R.J. Stoney, K. Moser, M.E. Villarino, A. Bhatnagar, E. Sula, R.A. Stanton, A.C. Brown, A.L. Halpin, L. Epstein, M. Spalding Walters)
- Utah Department of Health, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA (A.R. Smith, M. Vowles); Washington State Department of Health, Olympia, Washington, USA (K. Kauber)
- Texas Department of State Health Services, Austin, Texas, USA (M. Zambrano, G. Rodriguez)
- Arkansas Department of Health, Little Rock, Arkansas, USA (K. Garner)
- Arizona Department of Health Services, Phoenix, Arizona, USA (K. Chorbi)
- Oregon Health Authority, Portland, Oregon, USA (P.M. Cassidy)
- West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Charleston, West Virginia, USA (S. McBee)
- Secretaría de Salud de Baja California, Mexicali, Mexico (O.E. Zazueta)
| | - Melba Zambrano
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA (I. Kracalik, D. Cal Ham, G. McAllister, R.J. Stoney, K. Moser, M.E. Villarino, A. Bhatnagar, E. Sula, R.A. Stanton, A.C. Brown, A.L. Halpin, L. Epstein, M. Spalding Walters)
- Utah Department of Health, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA (A.R. Smith, M. Vowles); Washington State Department of Health, Olympia, Washington, USA (K. Kauber)
- Texas Department of State Health Services, Austin, Texas, USA (M. Zambrano, G. Rodriguez)
- Arkansas Department of Health, Little Rock, Arkansas, USA (K. Garner)
- Arizona Department of Health Services, Phoenix, Arizona, USA (K. Chorbi)
- Oregon Health Authority, Portland, Oregon, USA (P.M. Cassidy)
- West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Charleston, West Virginia, USA (S. McBee)
- Secretaría de Salud de Baja California, Mexicali, Mexico (O.E. Zazueta)
| | - Gretchen Rodriguez
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA (I. Kracalik, D. Cal Ham, G. McAllister, R.J. Stoney, K. Moser, M.E. Villarino, A. Bhatnagar, E. Sula, R.A. Stanton, A.C. Brown, A.L. Halpin, L. Epstein, M. Spalding Walters)
- Utah Department of Health, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA (A.R. Smith, M. Vowles); Washington State Department of Health, Olympia, Washington, USA (K. Kauber)
- Texas Department of State Health Services, Austin, Texas, USA (M. Zambrano, G. Rodriguez)
- Arkansas Department of Health, Little Rock, Arkansas, USA (K. Garner)
- Arizona Department of Health Services, Phoenix, Arizona, USA (K. Chorbi)
- Oregon Health Authority, Portland, Oregon, USA (P.M. Cassidy)
- West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Charleston, West Virginia, USA (S. McBee)
- Secretaría de Salud de Baja California, Mexicali, Mexico (O.E. Zazueta)
| | - Kelley Garner
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA (I. Kracalik, D. Cal Ham, G. McAllister, R.J. Stoney, K. Moser, M.E. Villarino, A. Bhatnagar, E. Sula, R.A. Stanton, A.C. Brown, A.L. Halpin, L. Epstein, M. Spalding Walters)
- Utah Department of Health, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA (A.R. Smith, M. Vowles); Washington State Department of Health, Olympia, Washington, USA (K. Kauber)
- Texas Department of State Health Services, Austin, Texas, USA (M. Zambrano, G. Rodriguez)
- Arkansas Department of Health, Little Rock, Arkansas, USA (K. Garner)
- Arizona Department of Health Services, Phoenix, Arizona, USA (K. Chorbi)
- Oregon Health Authority, Portland, Oregon, USA (P.M. Cassidy)
- West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Charleston, West Virginia, USA (S. McBee)
- Secretaría de Salud de Baja California, Mexicali, Mexico (O.E. Zazueta)
| | - Kaitlyn Chorbi
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA (I. Kracalik, D. Cal Ham, G. McAllister, R.J. Stoney, K. Moser, M.E. Villarino, A. Bhatnagar, E. Sula, R.A. Stanton, A.C. Brown, A.L. Halpin, L. Epstein, M. Spalding Walters)
- Utah Department of Health, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA (A.R. Smith, M. Vowles); Washington State Department of Health, Olympia, Washington, USA (K. Kauber)
- Texas Department of State Health Services, Austin, Texas, USA (M. Zambrano, G. Rodriguez)
- Arkansas Department of Health, Little Rock, Arkansas, USA (K. Garner)
- Arizona Department of Health Services, Phoenix, Arizona, USA (K. Chorbi)
- Oregon Health Authority, Portland, Oregon, USA (P.M. Cassidy)
- West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Charleston, West Virginia, USA (S. McBee)
- Secretaría de Salud de Baja California, Mexicali, Mexico (O.E. Zazueta)
| | - P. Maureen Cassidy
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA (I. Kracalik, D. Cal Ham, G. McAllister, R.J. Stoney, K. Moser, M.E. Villarino, A. Bhatnagar, E. Sula, R.A. Stanton, A.C. Brown, A.L. Halpin, L. Epstein, M. Spalding Walters)
- Utah Department of Health, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA (A.R. Smith, M. Vowles); Washington State Department of Health, Olympia, Washington, USA (K. Kauber)
- Texas Department of State Health Services, Austin, Texas, USA (M. Zambrano, G. Rodriguez)
- Arkansas Department of Health, Little Rock, Arkansas, USA (K. Garner)
- Arizona Department of Health Services, Phoenix, Arizona, USA (K. Chorbi)
- Oregon Health Authority, Portland, Oregon, USA (P.M. Cassidy)
- West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Charleston, West Virginia, USA (S. McBee)
- Secretaría de Salud de Baja California, Mexicali, Mexico (O.E. Zazueta)
| | - Shannon McBee
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA (I. Kracalik, D. Cal Ham, G. McAllister, R.J. Stoney, K. Moser, M.E. Villarino, A. Bhatnagar, E. Sula, R.A. Stanton, A.C. Brown, A.L. Halpin, L. Epstein, M. Spalding Walters)
- Utah Department of Health, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA (A.R. Smith, M. Vowles); Washington State Department of Health, Olympia, Washington, USA (K. Kauber)
- Texas Department of State Health Services, Austin, Texas, USA (M. Zambrano, G. Rodriguez)
- Arkansas Department of Health, Little Rock, Arkansas, USA (K. Garner)
- Arizona Department of Health Services, Phoenix, Arizona, USA (K. Chorbi)
- Oregon Health Authority, Portland, Oregon, USA (P.M. Cassidy)
- West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Charleston, West Virginia, USA (S. McBee)
- Secretaría de Salud de Baja California, Mexicali, Mexico (O.E. Zazueta)
| | - Rhett J. Stoney
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA (I. Kracalik, D. Cal Ham, G. McAllister, R.J. Stoney, K. Moser, M.E. Villarino, A. Bhatnagar, E. Sula, R.A. Stanton, A.C. Brown, A.L. Halpin, L. Epstein, M. Spalding Walters)
- Utah Department of Health, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA (A.R. Smith, M. Vowles); Washington State Department of Health, Olympia, Washington, USA (K. Kauber)
- Texas Department of State Health Services, Austin, Texas, USA (M. Zambrano, G. Rodriguez)
- Arkansas Department of Health, Little Rock, Arkansas, USA (K. Garner)
- Arizona Department of Health Services, Phoenix, Arizona, USA (K. Chorbi)
- Oregon Health Authority, Portland, Oregon, USA (P.M. Cassidy)
- West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Charleston, West Virginia, USA (S. McBee)
- Secretaría de Salud de Baja California, Mexicali, Mexico (O.E. Zazueta)
| | - Kathleen Moser
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA (I. Kracalik, D. Cal Ham, G. McAllister, R.J. Stoney, K. Moser, M.E. Villarino, A. Bhatnagar, E. Sula, R.A. Stanton, A.C. Brown, A.L. Halpin, L. Epstein, M. Spalding Walters)
- Utah Department of Health, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA (A.R. Smith, M. Vowles); Washington State Department of Health, Olympia, Washington, USA (K. Kauber)
- Texas Department of State Health Services, Austin, Texas, USA (M. Zambrano, G. Rodriguez)
- Arkansas Department of Health, Little Rock, Arkansas, USA (K. Garner)
- Arizona Department of Health Services, Phoenix, Arizona, USA (K. Chorbi)
- Oregon Health Authority, Portland, Oregon, USA (P.M. Cassidy)
- West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Charleston, West Virginia, USA (S. McBee)
- Secretaría de Salud de Baja California, Mexicali, Mexico (O.E. Zazueta)
| | - Margarita E. Villarino
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA (I. Kracalik, D. Cal Ham, G. McAllister, R.J. Stoney, K. Moser, M.E. Villarino, A. Bhatnagar, E. Sula, R.A. Stanton, A.C. Brown, A.L. Halpin, L. Epstein, M. Spalding Walters)
- Utah Department of Health, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA (A.R. Smith, M. Vowles); Washington State Department of Health, Olympia, Washington, USA (K. Kauber)
- Texas Department of State Health Services, Austin, Texas, USA (M. Zambrano, G. Rodriguez)
- Arkansas Department of Health, Little Rock, Arkansas, USA (K. Garner)
- Arizona Department of Health Services, Phoenix, Arizona, USA (K. Chorbi)
- Oregon Health Authority, Portland, Oregon, USA (P.M. Cassidy)
- West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Charleston, West Virginia, USA (S. McBee)
- Secretaría de Salud de Baja California, Mexicali, Mexico (O.E. Zazueta)
| | - Oscar E. Zazueta
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA (I. Kracalik, D. Cal Ham, G. McAllister, R.J. Stoney, K. Moser, M.E. Villarino, A. Bhatnagar, E. Sula, R.A. Stanton, A.C. Brown, A.L. Halpin, L. Epstein, M. Spalding Walters)
- Utah Department of Health, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA (A.R. Smith, M. Vowles); Washington State Department of Health, Olympia, Washington, USA (K. Kauber)
- Texas Department of State Health Services, Austin, Texas, USA (M. Zambrano, G. Rodriguez)
- Arkansas Department of Health, Little Rock, Arkansas, USA (K. Garner)
- Arizona Department of Health Services, Phoenix, Arizona, USA (K. Chorbi)
- Oregon Health Authority, Portland, Oregon, USA (P.M. Cassidy)
- West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Charleston, West Virginia, USA (S. McBee)
- Secretaría de Salud de Baja California, Mexicali, Mexico (O.E. Zazueta)
| | - Amelia Bhatnagar
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA (I. Kracalik, D. Cal Ham, G. McAllister, R.J. Stoney, K. Moser, M.E. Villarino, A. Bhatnagar, E. Sula, R.A. Stanton, A.C. Brown, A.L. Halpin, L. Epstein, M. Spalding Walters)
- Utah Department of Health, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA (A.R. Smith, M. Vowles); Washington State Department of Health, Olympia, Washington, USA (K. Kauber)
- Texas Department of State Health Services, Austin, Texas, USA (M. Zambrano, G. Rodriguez)
- Arkansas Department of Health, Little Rock, Arkansas, USA (K. Garner)
- Arizona Department of Health Services, Phoenix, Arizona, USA (K. Chorbi)
- Oregon Health Authority, Portland, Oregon, USA (P.M. Cassidy)
- West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Charleston, West Virginia, USA (S. McBee)
- Secretaría de Salud de Baja California, Mexicali, Mexico (O.E. Zazueta)
| | - Erisa Sula
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA (I. Kracalik, D. Cal Ham, G. McAllister, R.J. Stoney, K. Moser, M.E. Villarino, A. Bhatnagar, E. Sula, R.A. Stanton, A.C. Brown, A.L. Halpin, L. Epstein, M. Spalding Walters)
- Utah Department of Health, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA (A.R. Smith, M. Vowles); Washington State Department of Health, Olympia, Washington, USA (K. Kauber)
- Texas Department of State Health Services, Austin, Texas, USA (M. Zambrano, G. Rodriguez)
- Arkansas Department of Health, Little Rock, Arkansas, USA (K. Garner)
- Arizona Department of Health Services, Phoenix, Arizona, USA (K. Chorbi)
- Oregon Health Authority, Portland, Oregon, USA (P.M. Cassidy)
- West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Charleston, West Virginia, USA (S. McBee)
- Secretaría de Salud de Baja California, Mexicali, Mexico (O.E. Zazueta)
| | - Richard A. Stanton
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA (I. Kracalik, D. Cal Ham, G. McAllister, R.J. Stoney, K. Moser, M.E. Villarino, A. Bhatnagar, E. Sula, R.A. Stanton, A.C. Brown, A.L. Halpin, L. Epstein, M. Spalding Walters)
- Utah Department of Health, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA (A.R. Smith, M. Vowles); Washington State Department of Health, Olympia, Washington, USA (K. Kauber)
- Texas Department of State Health Services, Austin, Texas, USA (M. Zambrano, G. Rodriguez)
- Arkansas Department of Health, Little Rock, Arkansas, USA (K. Garner)
- Arizona Department of Health Services, Phoenix, Arizona, USA (K. Chorbi)
- Oregon Health Authority, Portland, Oregon, USA (P.M. Cassidy)
- West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Charleston, West Virginia, USA (S. McBee)
- Secretaría de Salud de Baja California, Mexicali, Mexico (O.E. Zazueta)
| | - Allison C. Brown
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA (I. Kracalik, D. Cal Ham, G. McAllister, R.J. Stoney, K. Moser, M.E. Villarino, A. Bhatnagar, E. Sula, R.A. Stanton, A.C. Brown, A.L. Halpin, L. Epstein, M. Spalding Walters)
- Utah Department of Health, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA (A.R. Smith, M. Vowles); Washington State Department of Health, Olympia, Washington, USA (K. Kauber)
- Texas Department of State Health Services, Austin, Texas, USA (M. Zambrano, G. Rodriguez)
- Arkansas Department of Health, Little Rock, Arkansas, USA (K. Garner)
- Arizona Department of Health Services, Phoenix, Arizona, USA (K. Chorbi)
- Oregon Health Authority, Portland, Oregon, USA (P.M. Cassidy)
- West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Charleston, West Virginia, USA (S. McBee)
- Secretaría de Salud de Baja California, Mexicali, Mexico (O.E. Zazueta)
| | - Alison L. Halpin
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA (I. Kracalik, D. Cal Ham, G. McAllister, R.J. Stoney, K. Moser, M.E. Villarino, A. Bhatnagar, E. Sula, R.A. Stanton, A.C. Brown, A.L. Halpin, L. Epstein, M. Spalding Walters)
- Utah Department of Health, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA (A.R. Smith, M. Vowles); Washington State Department of Health, Olympia, Washington, USA (K. Kauber)
- Texas Department of State Health Services, Austin, Texas, USA (M. Zambrano, G. Rodriguez)
- Arkansas Department of Health, Little Rock, Arkansas, USA (K. Garner)
- Arizona Department of Health Services, Phoenix, Arizona, USA (K. Chorbi)
- Oregon Health Authority, Portland, Oregon, USA (P.M. Cassidy)
- West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Charleston, West Virginia, USA (S. McBee)
- Secretaría de Salud de Baja California, Mexicali, Mexico (O.E. Zazueta)
| | - Lauren Epstein
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA (I. Kracalik, D. Cal Ham, G. McAllister, R.J. Stoney, K. Moser, M.E. Villarino, A. Bhatnagar, E. Sula, R.A. Stanton, A.C. Brown, A.L. Halpin, L. Epstein, M. Spalding Walters)
- Utah Department of Health, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA (A.R. Smith, M. Vowles); Washington State Department of Health, Olympia, Washington, USA (K. Kauber)
- Texas Department of State Health Services, Austin, Texas, USA (M. Zambrano, G. Rodriguez)
- Arkansas Department of Health, Little Rock, Arkansas, USA (K. Garner)
- Arizona Department of Health Services, Phoenix, Arizona, USA (K. Chorbi)
- Oregon Health Authority, Portland, Oregon, USA (P.M. Cassidy)
- West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Charleston, West Virginia, USA (S. McBee)
- Secretaría de Salud de Baja California, Mexicali, Mexico (O.E. Zazueta)
| | - Maroya Spalding Walters
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA (I. Kracalik, D. Cal Ham, G. McAllister, R.J. Stoney, K. Moser, M.E. Villarino, A. Bhatnagar, E. Sula, R.A. Stanton, A.C. Brown, A.L. Halpin, L. Epstein, M. Spalding Walters)
- Utah Department of Health, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA (A.R. Smith, M. Vowles); Washington State Department of Health, Olympia, Washington, USA (K. Kauber)
- Texas Department of State Health Services, Austin, Texas, USA (M. Zambrano, G. Rodriguez)
- Arkansas Department of Health, Little Rock, Arkansas, USA (K. Garner)
- Arizona Department of Health Services, Phoenix, Arizona, USA (K. Chorbi)
- Oregon Health Authority, Portland, Oregon, USA (P.M. Cassidy)
- West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Charleston, West Virginia, USA (S. McBee)
- Secretaría de Salud de Baja California, Mexicali, Mexico (O.E. Zazueta)
| | - for the Verona Integron-Encoded Metallo-β-Lactamase–Producing Carbapenem-Resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa Medical Tourism Investigation Team2
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA (I. Kracalik, D. Cal Ham, G. McAllister, R.J. Stoney, K. Moser, M.E. Villarino, A. Bhatnagar, E. Sula, R.A. Stanton, A.C. Brown, A.L. Halpin, L. Epstein, M. Spalding Walters)
- Utah Department of Health, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA (A.R. Smith, M. Vowles); Washington State Department of Health, Olympia, Washington, USA (K. Kauber)
- Texas Department of State Health Services, Austin, Texas, USA (M. Zambrano, G. Rodriguez)
- Arkansas Department of Health, Little Rock, Arkansas, USA (K. Garner)
- Arizona Department of Health Services, Phoenix, Arizona, USA (K. Chorbi)
- Oregon Health Authority, Portland, Oregon, USA (P.M. Cassidy)
- West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Charleston, West Virginia, USA (S. McBee)
- Secretaría de Salud de Baja California, Mexicali, Mexico (O.E. Zazueta)
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Miller MJ, Skrzekut A, Kracalik I, Jones JM, Lofy KH, Konkle BA, Haley NR, Duvenhage M, Bonnett T, Holbrook M, Higgs E, Basavaraju SV, Paranjape S. How do I… facilitate a rapid response to a public health emergency requiring plasma collection with a public-private partnership? Transfusion 2021; 61:2814-2824. [PMID: 34510475 DOI: 10.1111/trf.16630] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/02/2021] [Revised: 07/27/2021] [Accepted: 07/27/2021] [Indexed: 12/14/2022]
Abstract
In March 2020, there were no treatment options for COVID-19. Passive immune therapy including anti-SARS-CoV-2 hyperimmune globulin (hIVIG) was a logical candidate for COVID-19 therapeutic trials, given past success treating emerging pathogens with endogenous neutralizing antibodies. We established a plasma collection protocol for persons recovered from COVID-19. To speed recruitment in the first U.S. hotspot, Seattle, Washington, federal and state public health agencies collaborated with Bloodworks Northwest to collect convalescent plasma (CP) for manufacturing hIVIG. During March-December 2020, we identified and recruited prospective CP donors via letters to persons recovered from COVID-19 with laboratory-confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection. Prospective donors were pre-screened and administered a medical history survey. Anti-SARS-CoV-2 neutralizing antibody (NAb) titers were classified as qualifying (≥1:80) or non-qualifying (<1:80) for enrollment based on a live virus neutralization assay. Generalized estimating equations were used to identify characteristics of donors associated with qualifying versus nonqualifying NAb titers. Overall, 21,359 letters resulted in 3207 inquiries, 2159 prescreenings with laboratory-confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection, and 573 donors (27% of all pre-screenings with confirmed infection) who provided a screening plasma donation. Of 573 donors screened, 254 (44%) provided plasma with qualifying NAb titers, resulting in 1284 units for hIVIG manufacture. In a multivariable model, after adjusting for other factors, time (60 days) from COVID-19 symptom onset to screening was associated with lower odds of qualifying NAb (adjusted odds ratio = 0.67, 95% CI: 0.48-0.94). The collaboration facilitated a rapid response to develop and provide hIVIG for clinical trials and CP for transfusion. Only 1 in 12 donor inquiries resulted in a qualifying plasma donation. Challenges included recruitment and the relatively low percentage of persons with high NAb titers and limited screening capacity. This resource-intensive collaboration may not be scalable but informs preparedness and response strategies for plasma collection in future epidemics. Operational readiness plans with templates for screening, consent, and data collection forms are recommended.
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Affiliation(s)
- Maureen J Miller
- Epidemic Intelligence Service, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.,COVID-19 Response Team, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | | | - Ian Kracalik
- Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Jefferson M Jones
- COVID-19 Response Team, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.,Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Kathryn H Lofy
- Washington State Department of Health, Tumwater, Washington, USA
| | | | | | - Michael Duvenhage
- Division of Clinical Research, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, Rockville, Maryland, USA
| | - Tyler Bonnett
- Clinical Monitoring Research Program Directorate, Frederick National Laboratory for Cancer Research, Frederick, Maryland, USA
| | - Michael Holbrook
- Division of Clinical Research, Integrated Research Facility, NIAID, Rockville, Maryland, USA
| | | | - Sridhar V Basavaraju
- Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
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12
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Kracalik I, Mowla S, Katz L, Cumming M, Sapiano MRP, Basavaraju SV. Impact of the early coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic on blood utilization in the United States: A time-series analysis of data reported to the National Healthcare Safety Network Hemovigilance Module. Transfusion 2021; 61 Suppl 2:S36-S43. [PMID: 33990963 PMCID: PMC8242767 DOI: 10.1111/trf.16451] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/05/2021] [Revised: 04/22/2021] [Accepted: 04/23/2021] [Indexed: 01/28/2023]
Abstract
INTRODUCTION The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has disrupted healthcare services worldwide. However, little has been reported regarding the impact on blood utilization. We quantified the impact of COVID-19 on blood utilization and discards among facilities reporting to the National Healthcare Safety Network Hemovigilance Module. METHODS Facilities continuously reporting data, during January 2016-June 2020, on transfused and discarded blood components, stratified by component type (red blood cells [RBC], platelets, and plasma), were included. Interrupted time-series analysis with generalized estimating equations, adjusting for facility surgical volume and seasonality, was used to quantify changes in blood utilization and discards relative to a Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services notification delaying nonessential medical procedures (March 2020). RESULTS Seventy-two facilities included in the analyses, on average, transfused 44,548 and discarded 2,202 blood components monthly. Following the March 2020 notification and after multivariable adjustment, RBC and platelet utilization declined, -9.9% (p < .001) and -13.6% (p = .014), respectively. Discards increased for RBCs (30.2%, p = .047) and platelets (60.4%, p = .002). No statistically significant change in plasma was found. Following these abrupt changes, blood utilization and discards rebounded toward baseline with RBC utilization increasing by 5.7% (p < .001), and platelet and RBC discards decreasing -16.4% (<0.001) and -12.7 (p = .001), respectively. CONCLUSION Following notification delaying elective surgical procedures, blood utilization declined substantially while blood discards increased, resulting in substantial wastage of blood products. Ongoing and future pandemic response efforts should consider the impact of interventions on blood supply and demand to ensure blood availability.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ian Kracalik
- Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Sanjida Mowla
- Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.,Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA
| | - Louis Katz
- Mississippi Valley Regional Blood Center, Davenport, Iowa, USA
| | - Melissa Cumming
- Massachusetts Department of Public Health, Boston, Massachusetts, USA
| | - Matthew R P Sapiano
- Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.,Lantana Consulting Group, Inc, East Thetford, Vermont, USA
| | - Sridhar V Basavaraju
- Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
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Kracalik I, Mowla S, Basavaraju SV, Sapiano MRP. Transfusion-related adverse reactions: Data from the National Healthcare Safety Network Hemovigilance Module - United States, 2013-2018. Transfusion 2021; 61:1424-1434. [PMID: 33880771 DOI: 10.1111/trf.16362] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/14/2020] [Revised: 01/03/2021] [Accepted: 01/23/2021] [Indexed: 12/11/2022]
Abstract
BACKGROUND Despite current blood safety measures, transfusion recipients can experience transfusion-related adverse reactions. Monitoring these reactions can aid in understanding the effectiveness of current transfusion safety measures. Data from the National Healthcare Safety Network Hemovigilance Module were used to quantify adverse reaction risk. METHODS Facilities reporting at least one month of transfused blood components and transfusion-related adverse reactions during January 2013-December 2018 were included. Adverse reaction rates (number per 100,000 components transfused) were calculated for transfused components stratified by component type, collection, and modification methods. RESULTS During 2013-2018, 201 facilities reported 18,308 transfusion-related adverse reactions among 8.34 million blood components transfused (220/100,000). Adverse reactions were higher among apheresis (486/100,000) and pathogen-reduced platelets (579/100,000) than apheresis red blood cells (197/100,000). Allergic reactions (41%) were most common. There were 23 fatalities and 9% of all adverse reactions were serious (severe, life-threatening, or fatal). Reactions involving pulmonary complications (transfusion-associated circulatory overload, transfusion-related acute lung injury and transfusion-associated dyspnea) accounted for 35% of serious reactions but 65% of fatalities. Most (76%) of the 37 transfusion-transmitted infections were serious; none involved pathogen-reduced components. CONCLUSIONS One in 455 blood components transfused was associated with an adverse reaction although the risk of serious reactions (1 in 6224) or transfusion-transmitted infections (1 in 225,440) was lower. Some serious reactions identified were preventable, suggesting additional safety measures may be beneficial. Higher reaction rates identified among pathogen-reduced platelets require further study. These findings highlight the importance of monitoring reactions through national hemovigilance to inform current safety measures and the need for strategies to increase healthcare facility participation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ian Kracalik
- Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Sanjida Mowla
- Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Sridhar V Basavaraju
- Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Mathew R P Sapiano
- Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.,Lantana Consulting Group, Inc., East Thetford, Vermont, USA
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Jones JM, Kracalik I, Rana MM, Nguyen A, Keller BC, Mishkin A, Hoopes C, Kaleekal T, Humar A, Vilaro J, Im G, Smith L, Justice A, Leaumont C, Lindstrom S, Whitaker B, La Hoz RM, Michaels MG, Klassen D, Kuhnert W, Basavaraju SV. SARS-CoV-2 Infections among Recent Organ Recipients, March-May 2020, United States. Emerg Infect Dis 2020; 27:552-555. [PMID: 33327990 PMCID: PMC7853574 DOI: 10.3201/eid2702.204046] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/22/2022] Open
Abstract
We conducted public health investigations of 8 organ transplant recipients who tested positive for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 infection. Findings suggest the most likely source of transmission was community or healthcare exposure, not the organ donor. Transplant centers should educate transplant candidates and recipients about infection prevention recommendations.
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Jones JM, Kracalik I, Levi ME, Bowman JS, Berger JJ, Bixler D, Buchacz K, Moorman A, Brooks JT, Basavaraju SV. Assessing Solid Organ Donors and Monitoring Transplant Recipients for Human Immunodeficiency Virus, Hepatitis B Virus, and Hepatitis C Virus Infection - U.S. Public Health Service Guideline, 2020. MMWR Recomm Rep 2020; 69:1-16. [PMID: 32584804 PMCID: PMC7337549 DOI: 10.15585/mmwr.rr6904a1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 39] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/19/2022] Open
Abstract
The recommendations in this report supersede the U.S Public Health Service (PHS) guideline recommendations for reducing transmission of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), hepatitis B virus (HBV), and hepatitis C virus (HCV) through organ transplantation (Seem DL, Lee I, Umscheid CA, Kuehnert MJ. PHS guideline for reducing human immunodeficiency virus, hepatitis B virus, and hepatitis C virus transmission through organ transplantation. Public Health Rep 2013;128:247-343), hereafter referred to as the 2013 PHS guideline. PHS evaluated and revised the 2013 PHS guideline because of several advances in solid organ transplantation, including universal implementation of nucleic acid testing of solid organ donors for HIV, HBV, and HCV; improved understanding of risk factors for undetected organ donor infection with these viruses; and the availability of highly effective treatments for infection with these viruses. PHS solicited feedback from its relevant agencies, subject-matter experts, additional stakeholders, and the public to develop revised guideline recommendations for identification of risk factors for these infections among solid organ donors, implementation of laboratory screening of solid organ donors, and monitoring of solid organ transplant recipients. Recommendations that have changed since the 2013 PHS guideline include updated criteria for identifying donors at risk for undetected donor HIV, HBV, or HCV infection; the removal of any specific term to characterize donors with HIV, HBV, or HCV infection risk factors; universal organ donor HIV, HBV, and HCV nucleic acid testing; and universal posttransplant monitoring of transplant recipients for HIV, HBV, and HCV infections. The recommendations are to be used by organ procurement organization and transplant programs and are intended to apply only to solid organ donors and recipients and not to donors or recipients of other medical products of human origin (e.g., blood products, tissues, corneas, and breast milk). The recommendations pertain to transplantation of solid organs procured from donors without laboratory evidence of HIV, HBV, or HCV infection. Additional considerations when transplanting solid organs procured from donors with laboratory evidence of HCV infection are included but are not required to be incorporated into Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network policy. Transplant centers that transplant organs from HCV-positive donors should develop protocols for obtaining informed consent, testing and treating recipients for HCV, ensuring reimbursement, and reporting new infections to public health authorities.
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Lucas TJ, Holodniy M, de Perio MA, Perkins KM, Benowitz I, Jackson D, Kracalik I, Grant M, Oda G, Powell KM. Notes from the Field: Unexplained Dermatologic, Respiratory, and Ophthalmic Symptoms Among Health Care Personnel at a Hospital - West Virginia, November 2017-January 2018. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2019; 68:1006-1007. [PMID: 31697654 PMCID: PMC6837477 DOI: 10.15585/mmwr.mm6844a2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/23/2022]
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Bardossy AC, Gokhale RH, Hartnett K, Hatfield KM, Jackson KA, Felsen CB, McDonald R, Kracalik I, Lucas T, McGovern OL, Van Beneden C, Vallabhaneni S, Williams SR, Mendoza M, Bohm MK, Brooks J, Asher AK, Magill SS, Fiore A, Blog D, Dufort E, See I, Dumyati G. 1890. Missed Clinical Opportunities to Prevent Infections and Treat Substance Use Disorder (SUD) in People Who Inject Drugs (PWID). Open Forum Infect Dis 2019. [PMCID: PMC6808892 DOI: 10.1093/ofid/ofz359.120] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Background The age-adjusted rate of drug overdose deaths in the United States tripled from 1999 to 2016. Public health surveillance data indicate that an increasing proportion of infections due to bacterial and fungal pathogens is associated with injection drug use (IDU). We describe healthcare encounters (HCEs) of PWID as potential opportunities to prevent infections related to IDU by identifying risks and treating SUD, including with medication-assisted treatment (MAT) for opioid use disorder. Methods At six hospitals in western New York, we abstracted medical records from hospital admissions and emergency department (ED) visits for PWID (i.e., IDU in the preceding year) who had positive cultures for Staphylococcus aureus (any clinical specimen, April–July 2017), group A Streptococcus (invasive specimens, all of 2017) or Candida spp. (blood specimens, all of 2017). We reviewed hospital admission and ED records for 1 year preceding the positive culture to identify visits during which opportunities to prevent infection and treat SUD by addressing SUD and IDU were missed. Results We identified 99 PWID with positive cultures. The median age was 33 years (range 19–68) and 61 were female. Sixty-nine had a skin and soft-tissue infection, 44 had a bloodstream infection, and 20 had both. Thirty-one PWID left against medical advice during a hospital admission or an ED visit. Seventy-nine PWID were hospitalized, of whom 4 died. Ninety-five used opioids and 71 used cocaine in the preceding year. Seventy-five PWID had an HCE in the 12 months prior to the index visit, with a median of two HCE per person (interquartile range 1–4); 53 of PWID had a previous HCE for infection and 28 for opioid overdose. SUD was documented during a prior HCE at the same hospital for 61 PWID, but only 10 (16%) were offered MAT during any prior HCE and for 24 (39%) there was no documentation that any form of treatment for SUD was offered. Conclusion In this cohort, PWID frequently had one or more healthcare encounters documented at the same hospital in the year prior to a serious bacterial or fungal infection. These prior HCEs were often for infections or overdose that signaled the need for MAT, demonstrating that there are critical missed opportunities to identify risks, prevent infection, and treat SUD. Disclosures All Authors: No reported Disclosures.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ana C Bardossy
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Decatur, Georgia
| | - Runa H Gokhale
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Decatur, Georgia
| | | | - Kelly M Hatfield
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, Georgia
| | - Kelly A Jackson
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Decatur, Georgia
| | | | - Robert McDonald
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Decatur, Georgia
| | - Ian Kracalik
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Decatur, Georgia
| | - Todd Lucas
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Decatur, Georgia
| | | | | | | | | | | | - Michele K Bohm
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Decatur, Georgia
| | - John Brooks
- US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia
| | - Alice K Asher
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Decatur, Georgia
| | | | - Anthony Fiore
- DIv of Healthcare Quality Promotion, Atlanta, Georgia
| | - Debra Blog
- New York State Department of Health, Albany, New York
| | | | - Isaac See
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Decatur, Georgia
| | - Ghinwa Dumyati
- New York Rochester Emerging Infections Program at the University of Rochester Medical Center, Rochester, New York
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Hartnett KP, Jackson KA, Felsen C, McDonald R, Bardossy AC, Gokhale RH, Kracalik I, Lucas T, McGovern O, Van Beneden CA, Mendoza M, Bohm M, Brooks JT, Asher AK, Magill SS, Fiore A, Blog D, Dufort EM, See I, Dumyati G. Bacterial and Fungal Infections in Persons Who Inject Drugs - Western New York, 2017. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2019; 68:583-586. [PMID: 31269011 PMCID: PMC6613572 DOI: 10.15585/mmwr.mm6826a2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 26] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/04/2022]
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19
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Kracalik I, Ham C, Smith AR, Vowles M, Kauber K, Zambrano M, Rodriguez G, Garner K, Chorbi K, Cassidy PM, McBee S, Stoney R, Brown AC, Moser K, Villarino ME, Walters MS. Notes from the Field: Verona Integron-Encoded Metallo-β-Lactamase-Producing Carbapenem-Resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa Infections in U.S. Residents Associated with Invasive Medical Procedures in Mexico, 2015-2018. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2019; 68:463-464. [PMID: 31120867 PMCID: PMC6532950 DOI: 10.15585/mmwr.mm6820a4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/01/2022]
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20
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Kracalik I, Jackson K, Nadle J, Bamberg W, Petit S, Ray SM, Lynfield R, Harrison LH, Townes JM, Dumyati G, Schaffner W, Lake J, See I. 1230. Epidemiology and Risk Factors for Recurrent Invasive Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus Infection: nine US States, 2006–2013. Open Forum Infect Dis 2018. [PMCID: PMC6253597 DOI: 10.1093/ofid/ofy210.1063] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/02/2022] Open
Abstract
Background Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) causes >70,000 invasive infections annually in the United States, and recurrent infections pose a major clinical challenge. We examined risk factors for recurrent MRSA infections. Methods We identified patients with an initial invasive MRSA infection (isolation from a normally sterile body site) from 2006 to 2013, through active, population-based surveillance in selected counties in nine states through the Emerging Infections Program. Recurrence was defined as invasive MRSA isolation >30 days after initial isolation. We used logistic regression with backwards selection to evaluate adjusted odds ratios (aOR) associated with recurrence within 180 days, prior healthcare exposures, and initial infection type, controlling for patient demographics and comorbidities. Results Among 24,478 patients with invasive MRSA, 3,976 (16%) experienced a recurrence, including 61% (2,438) within 180 days. Risk factors for recurrence were: injection drug use (IDU) (aOR; 1.38, 95% confidence interval [CI]: 1.15–1.65), central venous catheters (aOR; 1.35, 95% CI: 1.22–1.51), dialysis (aOR; 2.00, 95% CI: 1.74–2.31), and history of MRSA colonization (aOR; 1.35, 95% CI: 1.22–1.51) (figure). Recurrence was more likely for bloodstream infections (BSI) without another infection (aOR; 2.08, 95% CI: 1.74–2.48), endocarditis (aOR; 1.46, 95% CI: 1.16–1.55), and bone/joint infections (aOR; 1.38, 95% CI: 1.20–1.59), and less likely for pneumonia (aOR: 0.75, 95% CI: 0.64–0.89), compared with other initial infection types. When assessed separately, the presence of a secondary BSI with another infection increased the odds of recurrence over that infection without a BSI (aOR: 1.96, 95% CI: 1.68–2.30). Conclusion Approximately one in six persons with invasive MRSA infection had recurrence. We identified potential opportunities to prevent recurrence through infection control (e.g., management and early removal of central catheters). Other possible areas for preventing recurrence include improving the management of patients with BSI and bone/joint infections (including both during and after antibiotic treatment) and mitigating risk of infection from IDU. ![]()
Disclosures All authors: No reported disclosures.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ian Kracalik
- Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia
| | - Kelly Jackson
- Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia
| | - Joelle Nadle
- California Emerging Infections Program, Oakland, California
| | - Wendy Bamberg
- Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, Denver, Colorado
| | - Susan Petit
- Connecticut Department of Public Health, New Haven, Connecticut
| | - Susan M Ray
- Emory University School of Medicine, Atlanta, Georgia
| | - Ruth Lynfield
- State Epidemiologist and Medical Director for Infectious Diseases, Epidemiology and Community Health, Minnesota Department of Health, St. Paul, Minnesota
| | | | - John M Townes
- Infectious Diseases, Oregon Health and Science University, Portland, Oregon
| | - Ghinwa Dumyati
- NY Emerging Infections Program, Center for Community Health and Prevention, University of Rochester Medical Center, Rochester, New York
| | | | - Jason Lake
- Centers For Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia
| | - Isaac See
- Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia
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Kracalik I, Malania L, Broladze M, Navdarashvili A, Imnadze P, Ryan SJ, Blackburn JK. Changing livestock vaccination policy alters the epidemiology of human anthrax, Georgia, 2000-2013. Vaccine 2017; 35:6283-6289. [PMID: 28988866 DOI: 10.1016/j.vaccine.2017.09.081] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/15/2017] [Revised: 09/25/2017] [Accepted: 09/26/2017] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
Abstract
Anthrax is a widely spread zoonotic disease found on nearly every continent. To control the disease in humans and animals, annual livestock vaccination is recommended. However, in 2007, the country of Georgia ended its policy of compulsory annual livestock anthrax vaccination. Our objective was to assess how the epidemiology of human anthrax has evolved from 2000-2013 in Georgia, in the wake of this cessation. We used passive surveillance data on epidemiological surveys of human anthrax case patients. Risk factors and rates of self-reported sources of infection were compared, before and after the change in livestock vaccination policy. We mapped ethnicity-adjusted incidence during the two periods and assessed changes in the spatial pattern of risk. The overall risk of human anthrax increased >5-fold, from 0.7 cases per 100,000 in 2000 to 3.7 cases per 100,000 by 2013. Ethnic disparities in risk became pronounced; from 2000 to 2013, incidence increased >60-fold in Azerbaijanis from 0.35 to 21.1 cases/100,000 Azerbaijanis compared to 0.61 to 1.9 cases/100,000 among ethnic Georgians. Food-borne exposures from purchasing meat increased from 11% in 2000-2006 to 21% in 2007-2013. Spatial analyses revealed a shift from a random pattern of reporting pre-policy change to clustering among district municipalities following the change in policy. Our findings indicate there were unintended human health consequences associated with changing livestock vaccination policy. Following a reduction in the immunizations administered, there was a major shift in the epidemiology of human anthrax in Georgia. Current infection risk is now highest among ethnic minorities. Increased reporting among individuals uncharacteristically at risk for anthrax from foodborne exposures suggests spillover from modes of agricultural production. Given the importance of human-livestock health linkages, careful evaluations of policy need to be undertaken before changes to animal vaccination are made.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ian Kracalik
- Spatial Epidemiology and Ecology Research Lab, Department of Geography, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA; Emerging Pathogens Institute, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA
| | - Lile Malania
- National Center for Disease Control and Public Health, Tbilisi, Georgia
| | - Mariam Broladze
- National Center for Disease Control and Public Health, Tbilisi, Georgia
| | | | - Paata Imnadze
- National Center for Disease Control and Public Health, Tbilisi, Georgia
| | - Sadie J Ryan
- Spatial Epidemiology and Ecology Research Lab, Department of Geography, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA
| | - Jason K Blackburn
- Spatial Epidemiology and Ecology Research Lab, Department of Geography, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA; Emerging Pathogens Institute, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA.
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Ngwa MC, Masalla T, Esemu S, Fumoloh FF, Kracalik I, Cella E, Alam MT, Akoachere JF, Liang S, Salemi M, Morris JG, Ali A, Ndip LM. Genetic Studies of Vibrio cholerae in South West Cameroon-A Phylogenetic Analysis of Isolates from the 2010-2011 Epidemic. PLoS Curr 2016; 8:ecurrents.outbreaks.13b4e5e36a5c0831a1663fbdb5713fe9. [PMID: 27617169 PMCID: PMC5001702 DOI: 10.1371/currents.outbreaks.13b4e5e36a5c0831a1663fbdb5713fe9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/18/2022]
Abstract
INTRODUCTION During the cholera outbreak from 2010 to 2011 in Cameroon, 33,192 cases with 1,440 deaths (case fatality ratio 4.34%) were reported to the World Health Organization. Of these, the South West Region reported 3,120 clinical cases. This region is in the Equatorial Monsoon climatic subzone of Cameroon, close to the coast, raising questions as to whether cases were linked with development of environmental reservoirs. METHODS In an investigation conducted by the Laboratory for Emerging Infectious Diseases, University of Buea, toxigenic V. cholerae O1 were isolated from diarrheal stool samples from 18 patients, with ages ranging from <3 to 70 years. Coordinates for clinical centers at which cases were identified were obtained using a handheld GPS, and were mapped using ArcGIS. Antibiotic susceptibility testing was performed using the Kirby 'Bauer agar disc diffusion method. The full genomes of these strains were sequenced with the Illumina MiSeq platform. De novo assembly of cholera genomes and multiple sequence alignment were carried out using the bioinformatics pipeline developed in the Emerging Pathogens Institute laboratory at the University of Florida. RESULTS/DISCUSSION Genetic comparisons showed that isolates were closely related, with pairwise p-distances ranging from 2.25 to 14.52 10-5 nt substitutions per site, and no statistically significant correlation between the pairwise genetic distances and the geographic distances among sampling locations. Indeed, the phylogeny of the Cameroonian strains displays the typical star-like topology and intermixing of strains from different locations that are characteristic of an exponential outbreak localized around a relatively restricted area with occasional spillover to other parts of the country, likely mediated by direct human contact and human movement. Findings highlight the utility of whole genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis in understanding transmission patterns at the local level.
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Affiliation(s)
- Moise C Ngwa
- Emerging Pathogens Institute, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, USA; Department of Environmental and Global Health, College of Public Health and Health Professions, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, USA
| | - Thomas Masalla
- Laboratory for Emerging Infectious Diseases, University of Buea, Buea, South West Region, Cameroon
| | - Seraphine Esemu
- Laboratory for Emerging Infectious Diseases, University of Buea, Buea, South West Region, Cameroon
| | - Foche Francis Fumoloh
- Laboratory for Emerging Infectious Diseases, University of Buea, Buea, South West Region, Cameroon
| | | | - Eleonora Cella
- Emerging Pathogens Institute, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, USA
| | - Meer Taifur Alam
- Emerging Pathogens Institute, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, USA
| | - Jane-Francis Akoachere
- Laboratory for Emerging Infectious Diseases, University of Buea, Buea, South West Region, Cameroon
| | - Song Liang
- Emerging Pathogens Institute, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, USA; Department of Environmental and Global Health, College of Public Health and Health Professions, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, USA
| | - Marco Salemi
- Emerging Pathogens Institute, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, USA
| | - J Glenn Morris
- Emerging Pathogens Institute, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, USA; Department of Medicine, College of Medicine, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, USA
| | - Afsar Ali
- Emerging Pathogens Institute, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, USA; Department of Environmental and Global Health, College of Public Health and Health Professions, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, USA
| | - Lucy M Ndip
- Laboratory for Emerging Infectious Diseases, University of Buea, Buea, South West Region, Cameroon; Department of Microbiology, University of Buea, Buea, South West Region, Cameroon
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Kracalik I, Malania L, Imnadze P, Blackburn JK. Human Anthrax Transmission at the Urban-Rural Interface, Georgia. Am J Trop Med Hyg 2015; 93:1156-1159. [PMID: 26438026 PMCID: PMC4674227 DOI: 10.4269/ajtmh.15-0242] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/26/2015] [Accepted: 08/01/2015] [Indexed: 11/07/2022] Open
Abstract
Human anthrax has increased dramatically in Georgia and was recently linked to the sale of meat in an urban market. We assessed epidemiological trends and risk factors for human anthrax at the urban–rural interface. We reviewed epidemiologic records (2000–2012) that included the place of residence (classified as urban, peri-urban, or rural), age, gender, and self-reported source of infection (handling or processing animal by-products and slaughtering or butchering livestock). To estimate risk, we used a negative binomial regression. The average incidence per 1 million population in peri-urban areas (24.5 cases) was > 2-fold higher compared with rural areas and > 3-fold higher compared with urban area. Risk from handling or purchasing meat was nearly 2-fold higher in urban areas and > 4-fold higher in peri-urban areas compared with rural area. Our findings suggest a high risk of anthrax in urban and peri-urban areas likely as a result of spillover from contaminated meat and animal by-products. Consumers should be warned to purchase meat only from licensed merchants.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | | | - Jason K. Blackburn
- *Address correspondence to Jason K. Blackburn, Spatial Epidemiology and Ecology Research Laboratory, Department of Geography, 3141 Turlington Hall, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611. E-mail:
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24
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Elashvili E, Kracalik I, Burjanadze I, Datukishvili S, Chanturia G, Tsertsvadze N, Beridze L, Shavishvili M, Dzneladze A, Grdzelidze M, Imnadze P, Pearson A, Blackburn JK. Environmental Monitoring and Surveillance of Rodents and Vectors for Francisella tularensis Following Outbreaks of Human Tularemia in Georgia. Vector Borne Zoonotic Dis 2015; 15:633-6. [PMID: 26394283 DOI: 10.1089/vbz.2015.1781] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Tularemia is a re-emerging bacterial zoonosis, broadly distributed across the northern hemisphere. In Georgia, there is a history of human tularemia outbreaks dating back to the 1940s. In response to outbreaks, health officials initiated long-term field surveillance and environmental monitoring. The objective of our study was to obtain information from 57 years of field surveys to identify species that play a role in the occurrence Francisella tularensis subsp. holarctica in the environment in Georgia. We collected historical data on human outbreaks, field collections, population dynamics of the common vole (Microtus arvalis), and conducted surveys on small mammals and vectors from five regions in Georgia during 1956-2012. Bacterial isolation was conducted using standard culturing techniques, and isolation rates for species were obtained for a subset of years. We used a Spearman rank correlation to test for associations between the density of the common vole and isolation rates. From 1956 through 2012, there were four recorded outbreaks of human tularemia (362 cases). A total of 465 bacterial isolates of F. tularensis subsp. holarctica were obtained from 27 species and environmental samples. The number of isolations was highest in the common vole (M. arvalis; 149 isolates; 32%) and Dermacentor marginatus ticks (132 isolates; 28%); isolation rates ranged between 0-0.91% and 0-0.47%, respectively. Population dynamics of the common vole were not correlated with the isolation rate. Given the history of tularemia re-emergence in Georgia, continued field surveys and environmental monitoring may provide an early indication of outbreak risk in humans. In conclusion, our findings provide evidence of long-standing foci of F. tularensis subsp. holarctica that are likely maintained by the common vole-tick cycle.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Ian Kracalik
- 2 Spatial Epidemiology and Ecology Research Lab, Department of Geography, University of Florida , Gainesville, Florida.,3 Emerging Pathogens Institute, University of Florida , Gainesville, Florida
| | - Irma Burjanadze
- 4 National Center for Disease Control and Public Health , Tbilisi, Georgia
| | | | - Gvantsa Chanturia
- 4 National Center for Disease Control and Public Health , Tbilisi, Georgia
| | | | - Levan Beridze
- 4 National Center for Disease Control and Public Health , Tbilisi, Georgia
| | - Merab Shavishvili
- 4 National Center for Disease Control and Public Health , Tbilisi, Georgia
| | - Archil Dzneladze
- 4 National Center for Disease Control and Public Health , Tbilisi, Georgia
| | - Marina Grdzelidze
- 4 National Center for Disease Control and Public Health , Tbilisi, Georgia
| | - Paata Imnadze
- 4 National Center for Disease Control and Public Health , Tbilisi, Georgia
| | | | - Jason K Blackburn
- 2 Spatial Epidemiology and Ecology Research Lab, Department of Geography, University of Florida , Gainesville, Florida.,3 Emerging Pathogens Institute, University of Florida , Gainesville, Florida
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Abstract
We assessed the occurrence of human cutaneous anthrax in Georgia during 2010--2012 by examining demographic and spatial characteristics of reported cases. Reporting increased substantially, as did clustering of cases near urban centers. Control efforts, including education about anthrax and livestock vaccination, can be directed at areas of high risk.
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Kracalik I, Abdullayev R, Asadov K, Ismayilova R, Baghirova M, Ustun N, Shikhiyev M, Talibzade A, Blackburn JK. Changing patterns of human anthrax in Azerbaijan during the post-Soviet and preemptive livestock vaccination eras. PLoS Negl Trop Dis 2014; 8:e2985. [PMID: 25032701 PMCID: PMC4102439 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pntd.0002985] [Citation(s) in RCA: 27] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/12/2014] [Accepted: 05/16/2014] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
We assessed spatial and temporal changes in the occurrence of human anthrax in Azerbaijan during 1984 through 2010. Data on livestock outbreaks, vaccination efforts, and human anthrax incidence during Soviet governance, post-Soviet governance, preemptive livestock vaccination were analyzed. To evaluate changes in the spatio-temporal distribution of anthrax, we used a combination of spatial analysis, cluster detection, and weighted least squares segmented regression. Results indicated an annual percent change in incidence of (+)11.95% from 1984 to 1995 followed by declining rate of -35.24% after the initiation of livestock vaccination in 1996. Our findings also revealed geographic variation in the spatial distribution of reporting; cases were primarily concentrated in the west early in the study period and shifted eastward as time progressed. Over twenty years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the distribution of human anthrax in Azerbaijan has undergone marked changes. Despite decreases in the incidence of human anthrax, continued control measures in livestock are needed to mitigate its occurrence. The shifting patterns of human anthrax highlight the need for an integrated "One Health" approach that takes into account the changing geographic distribution of the disease.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ian Kracalik
- Spatial Epidemiology & Ecology Research Laboratory, Department of Geography, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, United States of America
- Emerging Pathogens Institute, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, United States of America
| | | | | | | | | | - Narmin Ustun
- Republican Anti-plague Station, Baku, Azerbaijan
| | | | | | - Jason K. Blackburn
- Spatial Epidemiology & Ecology Research Laboratory, Department of Geography, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, United States of America
- Emerging Pathogens Institute, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, United States of America
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Abdullayev R, Kracalik I, Ismayilova R, Ustun N, Talibzade A, Blackburn JK. Analyzing the spatial and temporal distribution of human brucellosis in Azerbaijan (1995 - 2009) using spatial and spatio-temporal statistics. BMC Infect Dis 2012; 12:185. [PMID: 22873196 PMCID: PMC3482564 DOI: 10.1186/1471-2334-12-185] [Citation(s) in RCA: 30] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/10/2012] [Accepted: 08/01/2012] [Indexed: 11/15/2022] Open
Abstract
Background Human brucellosis represents a significant burden to public and veterinary health globally, including the republic of Azerbaijan. The purpose of this study was to examine and describe the spatial and temporal aspects of the epidemiology of human brucellosis in Azerbaijan from 1995 to 2009. Methods A Geographic information system (GIS) was used to identify potential changes in the spatial and temporal distribution of human brucellosis in Azerbaijan during the study period. Epidemiological information on the age, gender, date, and location of incident cases were obtained from disease registries housed at the Republican Anti-Plague station in Baku. Cumulative incidences per 100,000 populations were calculated at the district level for three, 5-year periods. Spatial and temporal cluster analyses were performed using the Local Moran’s I and the Ederer-Myer-Mantel (EMM) test. Results A total of 7,983 cases of human brucellosis were reported during the 15-year study period. Statistically significant spatial clusters were identified in each of three, five year time periods with cumulative incidence rates ranging from 101.1 (95% CI: 82.8, 124.3) to 203.0 (95% CI; 176.4, 234.8). Spatial clustering was predominant in the west early in the study during period 1 and then in the east during periods 2 and 3. The EMM test identified a greater number of statistically significant temporal clusters in period 1 (1995 to 1999). Conclusion These results suggest that human brucellosis persisted annually in Azerbaijan across the study period. The current situation necessitates the development of appropriate surveillance aimed at improving control and mitigation strategies in order to help alleviate the current burden of disease on the population. Areas of concern identified as clusters by the spatial-temporal statistical analyses can provide a starting point for implementing targeted intervention efforts.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rakif Abdullayev
- Spatial Epidemiology and Ecology Research Laboratory, Department of Geography, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA
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Kracalik I, Lukhnova L, Aikimbayev A, Pazilov Y, Temiralyeva G, Blackburn JK. Incorporating retrospective clustering into a prospective cusum methodology for anthrax: Evaluating the effects of disease expectation. Spat Spatiotemporal Epidemiol 2011; 2:11-21. [DOI: 10.1016/j.sste.2010.06.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/06/2010] [Revised: 06/08/2010] [Accepted: 06/18/2010] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
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