The role of swine in the generation of novel influenza viruses

Detection and isolation of Influenza A virus subtype H1N1 from a small backyard swine herd in Colorado

Influenza A virus subtype H1N1 A(H1N1)pdm09 was first confirmed in pigs in the United States in October 2009. In November 2010, lungs and intestines from 2 York piglets from a small, privately owned herd were submitted to the Colorado State University Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory. The submitting veterinarian reported rapid weight loss and signs of pneumonia in the piglets. Gross lesions included caudoventral pneumonia in both piglets, and histologic lesions in the lungs showed characteristics consistent with influenza virus and bacterial infection. Ribonucleic acid extracted from fresh lung homogenates from both piglets was positive for influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 by a real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction. Virus was isolated from lung homogenates from both piglets in Madin-Darby canine kidney cells, as well as in 10-day-old specific pathogen-free embryonated chicken eggs. Sequence analysis showed 98% homology with 2009 H1N1 human isolates from across the United States and 98% homology against two 2009 and 2010 swine isolates from Nebraska and Minnesota. The current report documents the possible transmission of pandemic influenza A(H1N1)2009 virus [A(H1N1)pdm09] from a human being to a small, privately owned backyard swine herd. The owner was employed as a pharmacist, making occupational exposure to the pandemic influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 a possibility.

The avian and mammalian host range of highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza

Highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza viruses have been isolated from a number of avian and mammalian species. Despite intensive control measures the number of human and animal cases continues to increase. A more complete understanding of susceptible species and of contributing environmental and molecular factors is crucial if we are to slow the rate of new cases. H5N1 is currently endemic in domestic poultry in only a handful of countries with sporadic and unpredictable spread to other countries. Close contact of terrestrial bird or mammalian species with infected poultry/waterfowl or their biological products is the major route for interspecies transmission. Intra-species transmission of H5N1 in mammals, including humans, has taken place on a limited scale though it remains to be seen if this will change; recent laboratory studies suggest that it is indeed possible. Here we review the avian and mammalian species that are naturally susceptible to H5N1 infection and the molecular factors associated with its expanded host range.

Airborne detection and quantification of swine influenza a virus in air samples collected inside, outside and downwind from swine barns

Airborne transmission of influenza A virus (IAV) in swine is speculated to be an important route of virus dissemination, but data are scarce. This study attempted to detect and quantify airborne IAV by virus isolation and RRT-PCR in air samples collected under field conditions. This was accomplished by collecting air samples from four acutely infected pig farms and locating air samplers inside the barns, at the external exhaust fans and downwind from the farms at distances up to 2.1 km. IAV was detected in air samples collected in 3 out of 4 farms included in the study. Isolation of IAV was possible from air samples collected inside the barn at two of the farms and in one farm from the exhausted air. Between 13% and 100% of samples collected inside the barns tested RRT-PCR positive with an average viral load of 3.20E+05 IAV RNA copies/m³ of air. Percentage of exhaust positive air samples also ranged between 13% and 100% with an average viral load of 1.79E+04 RNA copies/m³ of air. Influenza virus RNA was detected in air samples collected between 1.5 and 2.1 Km away from the farms with viral levels significantly lower at 4.65E+03 RNA copies/m³. H1N1, H1N2 and H3N2 subtypes were detected in the air samples and the hemagglutinin gene sequences identified in the swine samples matched those in aerosols providing evidence that the viruses detected in the aerosols originated from the pigs in the farms under study. Overall our results indicate that pigs can be a source of IAV infectious aerosols and that these aerosols can be exhausted from pig barns and be transported downwind. The results from this study provide evidence of the risk of aerosol transmission in pigs under field conditions.

Distinction of subtype-specific antibodies against European porcine influenza viruses by indirect ELISA based on recombinant hemagglutinin protein fragment-1

Background

Serological investigations of swine influenza virus infections and epidemiological conclusions thereof are challenging due to the complex and regionally variable pattern of co-circulating viral subtypes and lineages and varying vaccination regimes. Detection of subtype-specific antibodies currently depends on hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays which are difficult to standardize and unsuitable for large scale investigations.

Methods

The nucleocapsid protein (NP) and HA1 fragments of the hemagglutinin protein (HA) of five different lineages (H1N1av, H1N1pdm, H1pdmN2, H1N2, H3N2) of swine influenza viruses were bacterially expressed and used as diagnostic antigens in indirect ELISA.

Results

Proteins were co-translationally mono-biotinylated and refolded in vitro into an antigenically authentic conformation. Western blotting and indirect ELISA revealed highly subtype-specific antigenic characteristics of the recombinant HA1 proteins although some cross reactivity especially among antigens of the H1 subtype were evident. Discrimination of antibodies directed against four swine influenza virus subtypes co-circulating in Germany was feasible using the indirect ELISA format.

Conclusions

Bacterially expressed recombinant NP and HA1 swine influenza virus proteins served as antigens in indirect ELISAs and provided an alternative to commercial blocking NP ELISA and HI assays concerning generic (NP-specific) and HA subtype-specific sero-diagnostics, respectively, on a herd basis.

Antiviral responses by Swine primary bronchoepithelial cells are limited compared to human bronchoepithelial cells following influenza virus infection

Swine generate reassortant influenza viruses because they can be simultaneously infected with avian and human influenza; however, the features that restrict influenza reassortment in swine and human hosts are not fully understood. Type I and III interferons (IFNs) act as the first line of defense against influenza virus infection of respiratory epithelium. To determine if human and swine have different capacities to mount an antiviral response the expression of IFN and IFN-stimulated genes (ISG) in normal human bronchial epithelial (NHBE) cells and normal swine bronchial epithelial (NSBE) cells was evaluated following infection with human (H3N2), swine (H1N1), and avian (H5N3, H5N2, H5N1) influenza A viruses. Expression of IFNλ and ISGs were substantially higher in NHBE cells compared to NSBE cells following H5 avian influenza virus infection compared to human or swine influenza virus infection. This effect was associated with reduced H5 avian influenza virus replication in human cells at late times post infection. Further, RIG-I expression was lower in NSBE cells compared to NHBE cells suggesting reduced virus sensing. Together, these studies identify key differences in the antiviral response between human and swine respiratory epithelium alluding to differences that may govern influenza reassortment.

Functional and structural analysis of influenza virus neuraminidase N3 offers further insight into the mechanisms of oseltamivir resistance

The influenza virus neuraminidase H274Y substitution is a highly prevalent amino acid substitution associated with resistance to the most heavily used influenza drug, oseltamivir. Previous structural studies suggest that the group specific 252 residue (Y252 in group 1 and T252 in group 2) might be a key factor underlying H274Y resistance. However, H274Y has only been reported in N1 subtypes, which indicates that there must be additional key residues that determine H274Y resistance. Furthermore, we found that members of NA serotype N3 also possess Y252, raising the key question as to whether or not H274Y resistance may also be possible for some group 2 NAs. Here, we demonstrate that the H274Y substitution results in mild oseltamivir resistance for N3. Comparative structural analysis of N3, N1, and their 274Y variants indicates that the interaction of residue 296 (H in N1 and nonaromatic for other serotypes) with conserved W295 is another important determinant of oseltamivir resistance.

The need to include animal protection in public health policies

Many critical public health issues require non-traditional approaches. Although many novel strategies are used, one approach not widely applied involves improving the treatment of animals. Emerging infectious diseases are pressing public health challenges that could benefit from improving the treatment of animals. Other human health issues, that overlap with animal treatment issues, and that warrant further exploration, are medical research and domestic violence. The diverse nature of these health issues and their connection with animal treatment suggest that there may be other similar intersections. Public health would benefit by including the treatment of animals as a topic of study and policy development.

Bat cells from Pteropus alecto are susceptible to influenza A virus infection and reassortment

Waterfowl are primary hosts for influenza A viruses (IAVs); however, there is sporadic infection of swine and other species that pose a risk of zoonotic spread. Yellow-shouldered bats were shown to be hosts of an IAV, thereby constituting a potential novel reservoir. We show that Pteropus alecto kidney cells (PaKi) are susceptible to infection and sustain replication of A/WSN/33 (H1N1) and A/Vietnam/1203/04 (H5N1). Importantly, we show that co-infection of PaKi cells results in novel reassortants.

Relationship between airborne detection of influenza A virus and the number of infected pigs

Influenza A virus infects a wide range of species including both birds and mammals (including humans). One of the key routes by which the virus can infect populations of animals is by aerosol transmission. This study explored the relationship between number of infected pigs and the probability of detecting influenza virus RNA in bioaerosols through the course of an acute infection. Bioaerosols were collected using a cyclonic collector in two groups of 7 week-old pigs that were experimentally infected by exposure with a contact infected pig (seeder pig). After contact exposure, individual pig nasal swab samples were collected daily and air samples were collected three times per day for 8 days. All samples were tested for influenza by real-time reverse transcriptase (RRT)-PCR targeting the influenza virus matrix gene. All pigs' nasal swabs became influenza virus RRT-PCR positive upon exposure to the infected seeder pig. Airborne influenza was detected in 28/43 (65%) air samples. The temporal dynamics of influenza virus detection in air samples was in close agreement with the nasal shedding pattern in the infected pigs. First detection of positive bioaerosols happened at 1 day post contact (DPC). Positive bioaerosols were consistently detected between 3 and 6 DPC, a time when most pigs were also shedding virus in nasal secretions. Overall, the odds of detecting a positive air sample increased 2.2 times for every additional nasal swab positive pig in the group. In summary, there was a strong relationship between the number of pigs shedding influenza virus in nasal secretions and the generation of bioaerosols during the course of an acute infection.

Epidemiological and risk analysis of the H7N9 subtype influenza outbreak in China at its early stage

Dozens of human cases infected with H7N9 subtype avian influenza virus (AIV) have been confirmed in China since March, 2013. Distribution data of sexes, ages, professions and regions of the cases were analyzed in this report. The results showed that the elderly cases, especially the male elderly, were significantly more than expected, which is different from human cases of H5N1 avian influenza and human cases of the pandemic H1N1 influenza. The outbreak was rated as a Grade III (severe) outbreak, and it would evolve into a Grade IV (very severe) outbreak soon, using a method reported previously. The H7N9 AIV will probably circulate in humans, birds and pigs for years. Moreover, with the driving force of natural selection, the virus will probably evolve into highly pathogenic AIV in birds, and into a deadly pandemic influenza virus in humans. Therefore, the H7N9 outbreak has been assumed severe, and it is likely to become very or extremely severe in the future, highlighting the emergent need of forceful scientific measures to eliminate any infected animal flocks. We also described two possible mild scenarios of the future evolution of the outbreak.

Pulmonary surfactant protein D in first-line innate defence against influenza A virus infections

Influenza A viruses (IAV) cause respiratory tract infections annually associated with excess mortality and morbidity. Nonspecific, innate immune mechanisms play a key role in protection against viral invasion at early stages of infection. A soluble protein present in mucosal secretions of the lung, surfactant protein D (SP-D), is an important component of this initial barrier that helps to prevent and limit IAV infections of the respiratory epithelium. This collagenous C-type lectin binds IAVs and thereby inhibits attachment and entry of the virus but also contributes to enhanced clearance of SP-D-opsonized virus via interactions with phagocytic cells. In addition, SP-D modulates the inflammatory response and helps to maintain a balance between effective neutralization/killing of IAV, and protection against alveolar damage resulting from IAV-induced excessive inflammatory responses. The mechanisms of interaction between SP-D and IAV not only depend on the structure and binding properties of SP-D but also on strain-specific features of IAV, and both issues will be discussed. SP-D from pigs exhibits distinct anti-IAV properties and is discussed in more detail. Finally, the potential of SP-D as a prophylactic and/or therapeutic antiviral agent to protect humans against infections by IAV is discussed.

Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus among healthy show pigs, United States

Because animals can transmit some diseases to people, it is wise to be cautious around animals that carry these diseases. But how do you know which animals are carrying disease? Sometimes they appear perfectly healthy. A study of 57 apparently healthy show pigs at a 2009 US state fair found that almost 20% were carrying influenza virus and at least 4 were carrying the 2009 pandemic virus. Of concern is the possibility that different types of influenza virus—pandemic, swine, avian—could combine in pigs and emerge as new viruses that then spread to humans. Swine workers, veterinarians, and other persons with pig contact may be at high risk for infection with pig influenza and should receive seasonal influenza vaccines, use personal protective equipment when working with healthy pigs, and limit their contact with sick pigs. Regular monitoring of influenza virus among pigs and testing of sick persons who have been exposed to pigs are needed.

Within 5 months after the earliest detection of human influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, we found molecular and culture evidence of the virus in healthy US show pigs. The mixing of humans and pigs at swine shows possibly could further the geographic and cross-species spread of influenza A viruses.

The pandemic H1N1 influenza experience

The pandemic H1N1 influenza that began in Mexico in the spring of 2009 spread rapidly to southern California within days and around the world within a few months. Because the genetic make-up of the new virus was novel, several months of lead-in time were required before a suitable vaccine for human use could be produced and distributed. The effort to confront the virus on the part of the World Health Organization which included almost every nation on earth and a vast array of scientists and public health officials was extensive and timely. However, it was the moderate severity of the virus itself that saved global public health from catastrophe. Because of the extensive publicity and research that occurred during the H1N1 pandemic, many lessons were learned that will be useful in confronting future influenza pandemics. A "One Health" approach to prevent, detect, and combat future pandemics is essential.

Neutralizing DNA aptamers against swine influenza H3N2 viruses

Triple reassortant influenza A viruses (IAVs) of swine, particularly the North American H3N2 subtype, circulate in swine herds and may reassort and result in the emergence of novel zoonotic strains. Current diagnostic tools rely on isolation of the viruses, followed by serotyping by hemagglutination or genome sequencing, both of which can be expensive and time-consuming. Thus, novel subtype-specific ligands and methods are needed for rapid testing and subtyping of IAVs in the field. To address this need, we selected DNA aptamers against the recombinant HA protein from swine IAV H3 cluster IV using systematic evolution of ligands by exponential enrichment (SELEX). Four candidate aptamers (HA68, HA7, HA2a, and HA2b) were identified and characterized. The dissociation constants (K(d)) of aptamers HA68, HA7, HA2a, and HA2b against recombinant H3 protein were 7.1, 22.3, 16.0, and 3.7 nM, respectively. The binding site of HA68 to H3 was identified to be between nucleotide residues 8 and 40. All aptamers inhibited H3 hemagglutination. HA68 was highly specific to all four lineages within the North American H3N2 subtype. Further, the other three aptamers specifically identified live viruses belonging to the phylogenetic clusters I, II/III, and IV especially the virus that closely related to the recent H3N2 variant (H3N2v). Aptamer HA68 was also able to bind and detect H3N2v isolated from recent human cases. In conclusion, we provide subtype-specific aptamers against H3N2 IAVs of swine that can now be used in rapid detection and typing protocols for field applications.

Evasion of influenza A viruses from innate and adaptive immune responses

The influenza A virus is one of the leading causes of respiratory tract infections in humans. Upon infection with an influenza A virus, both innate and adaptive immune responses are induced. Here we discuss various strategies used by influenza A viruses to evade innate immune responses and recognition by components of the humoral and cellular immune response, which consequently may result in reduced clearing of the virus and virus-infected cells. Finally, we discuss how the current knowledge about immune evasion can be used to improve influenza A vaccination strategies.

Use of influenza A viruses expressing reporter genes to assess the frequency of double infections in vitro

Exchange of gene segments between mammalian and avian influenza A viruses may lead to the emergence of potential pandemic influenza viruses. Since co-infection of single cells with two viruses is a prerequisite for reassortment to take place, we assessed frequencies of double-infection in vitro using influenza A/H5N1 and A/H1N1 viruses expressing the reporter genes eGFP or mCherry. Double-infected A549 and Madin-Darby canine kidney cells were detected by confocal microscopy and flow cytometry.

Simultaneous infection of pigs and people with triple-reassortant swine influenza virus H1N1 at a U.S. county fair

Influenza-like illness was noted in people and pigs in attendance at an Ohio county fair in August 2007. The morbidity rate in swine approached 100% within 1-2 days of initial clinical signs being recognized, and approximately two dozen people developed influenza-like illness. Triple-reassortant swine H1N1 influenza viruses were identified in both pigs and people at the fair. The identified viruses (A/Sw/OH/511445/2007, A/Ohio/01/2007, and A/Ohio/02/2007) were similar to H1N1 swine influenza viruses currently found in the U.S. swine population. This case illustrates the possibility of transmission of swine influenza in settings where there is close human/swine interaction.

Effect of receptor specificity of A/Hong Kong/1/68 (H3N2) influenza virus variants on replication and transmission in pigs

BACKGROUND

Several arguments plead for an important role of pigs in human influenza ecology, including the similar receptor expression pattern in the respiratory tract of both species. How virus receptor binding specificity affects transmission in pigs, on the other hand, has not been studied so far.

OBJECTIVES

  Using recombinant viruses R1-HK, which harbored all genes from the original pandemic virus A/Hong Kong/1/68 (H3N2), and R2-HK, which differed by L226Q and S228G mutations in the hemagglutinin and conversion to an avian-virus-like receptor specificity, we assessed the role of receptor specificity on (i) replication in porcine respiratory explants, (ii) pig-to-pig transmission, and (iii) replication and organ tropism in pigs.

RESULTS

In nasal, tracheal, and bronchial explants, we noticed a 10- to 100-fold lower replication of R2-HK compared with R1-HK. In the lung explants, the viruses replicated with comparable efficiency. These observations correlated with the known expression level of Siaα2,3-galactose in these tissues. In the pathogenesis study, virus titers in the respiratory part of the nasal mucosa, the trachea, and the bronchus were in line with the ex vivo results. R2-HK replicated less efficiently in the lungs of pigs than R1-HK, which contrasted with the explants results. R2-HK also showed a pronounced tropism for the olfactory part of the nasal mucosa. Transmissibility experiments revealed that pig-to-pig transmission was abrogated when the virus obtained Siaα2,3-galactose binding preference.

CONCLUSIONS

Our data suggest that Siaα2,6-galactose binding is required for efficient transmission in pigs.

Kinetics of lung lesion development and pro-inflammatory cytokine response in pigs with vaccine-associated enhanced respiratory disease induced by challenge with pandemic (2009) A/H1N1 influenza virus

The objective of this report was to characterize the enhanced clinical disease and lung lesions observed in pigs vaccinated with inactivated H1N2 swine δ-cluster influenza A virus and challenged with pandemic 2009 A/H1N1 human influenza virus. Eighty-four, 6-week-old, cross-bred pigs were randomly allocated into 3 groups of 28 pigs to represent vaccinated/challenged (V/C), non-vaccinated/challenged (NV/C), and non-vaccinated/non-challenged (NV/NC) control groups. Pigs were intratracheally inoculated with pH1N1 and euthanized at 1, 2, 5, and 21 days post inoculation (dpi). Macroscopically, V/C pigs demonstrated greater percentages of pneumonia compared to NV/C pigs. Histologically, V/C pigs demonstrated severe bronchointerstitial pneumonia with necrotizing bronchiolitis accompanied by interlobular and alveolar edema and hemorrhage at 1 and 2 dpi. The magnitude of peribronchiolar lymphocytic cuffing was greater in V/C pigs by 5 dpi. Microscopic lung lesion scores were significantly higher in the V/C pigs at 2 and 5 dpi compared to NV/C and NV/NC pigs. Elevated TNF-α, IL-1β, IL-6, and IL-8 were detected in bronchoalveolar lavage fluid at all time points in V/C pigs compared to NV/C pigs. These data suggest H1 inactivated vaccines followed by heterologous challenge resulted in potentiated clinical signs and enhanced pulmonary lesions and correlated with an elevated proinflammatory cytokine response in the lung. The lung alterations and host immune response are consistent with the vaccine-associated enhanced respiratory disease (VAERD) clinical outcome observed reproducibly in this swine model.

Multiple reassortment between pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and endemic influenza viruses in pigs, United States

As a result of human-to-pig transmission, pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 virus was detected in pigs soon after it emerged in humans. In the United States, this transmission was quickly followed by multiple reassortment between the pandemic virus and endemic swine viruses. Nine reassortant viruses representing 7 genotypes were detected in commercial pig farms in the United States. Field observations suggested that the newly described reassortant viruses did not differ substantially from pandemic (H1N1) 2009 or endemic strains in their ability to cause disease. Comparable growth properties of reassortant and endemic viruses in vitro supported these observations; similarly, a representative reassortant virus replicated in ferrets to the same extent as did pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and endemic swine virus. These novel reassortant viruses highlight the increasing complexity of influenza viruses within pig populations and the frequency at which viral diversification occurs in this ecologically important viral reservoir.

Multiple reassortment between pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and endemic influenza viruses in pigs, United States

TOC Summary: Viruses belonging to these novel genotypes are indistinguishable phenotypically from endemic swine viruses.

As a result of human-to-pig transmission, pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 virus was detected in pigs soon after it emerged in humans. In the United States, this transmission was quickly followed by multiple reassortment between the pandemic virus and endemic swine viruses. Nine reassortant viruses representing 7 genotypes were detected in commercial pig farms in the United States. Field observations suggested that the newly described reassortant viruses did not differ substantially from pandemic (H1N1) 2009 or endemic strains in their ability to cause disease. Comparable growth properties of reassortant and endemic viruses in vitro supported these observations; similarly, a representative reassortant virus replicated in ferrets to the same extent as did pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and endemic swine virus. These novel reassortant viruses highlight the increasing complexity of influenza viruses within pig populations and the frequency at which viral diversification occurs in this ecologically important viral reservoir.

A comprehensive analysis of reassortment in influenza A virus

Genetic reassortment plays a vital role in the evolution of the influenza virus and has historically been linked with the emergence of pandemic strains. Reassortment is believed to occur when a single host - typically swine - is simultaneously infected with multiple influenza strains. The reassorted viral strains with novel gene combinations tend to easily evade the immune system in other host species, satisfying the basic requirements of a virus with pandemic potential. Therefore, it is vital to continuously monitor the genetic content of circulating influenza strains and keep an eye out for new reassortants. We present a new approach to identify reassortants from large data sets of influenza whole genome nucleotide sequences and report the results of the first ever comprehensive search for reassortants of all published influenza A genomic data. 35 of the 52 well supported candidate reassortants we found are reported here for the first time while our analysis method offers new insight that enables us to draw a more detailed picture of the origin of some of the previously reported reassortants. A disproportionately high number (13/52) of the candidate reassortants found were the result of the introduction of novel hemagglutinin and/or neuraminidase genes into a previously circulating virus. The method described in this paper may contribute towards automating the task of routinely searching for reassortants among newly sequenced strains.

Swine influenza virus infections in man

Because pigs are susceptible to both avian and human influenza viruses, genetic reassortment between avian, human, and/or swine influenza viruses in the pig host can lead to the generation of novel influenza A viruses (Ma et al. 2009). Since the first serological evidence of a swine influenza virus (SIV) infecting humans in 1958, sporadic cases have continued to occur. In recent years, case reports have been increasing, seemingly in concert with modern pig farming and the emergence of triple reassortant SIVs in swine. SIV infections in man generally are mild or subclinical, and often are not diagnosed; however, SIV infections can be quite serious in patients with underlying medical conditions. As of August 2010, 73 case reports of symptomatic human SIV infections have been documented in the medical literature or reported by health officials (excluding cases of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza virus), of which 7 infections (10 %) resulted in death. While exposure to swine is often considered a risk factor for human SIV infections, 37 of 73 (51 %) reported cases had no known exposure to pigs; consequently, SIV may be crossing the species barrier via transmission routes yet to be acknowledged. In addition, human-to-human transmission was suspected in 10 of 34 (30 %) of the cases with epidemiological investigation. This chapter discusses the observations of illness and infections in humans, risk factors associated with infection, and methods for diagnosing human infections of SIV.

The modes of evolutionary emergence of primal and late pandemic influenza virus strains from viral reservoir in animals: an interdisciplinary analysis

Based on a wealth of recent findings, in conjunction with earliest chronologies pertaining to evolutionary emergences of ancestral RNA viruses, ducks, Influenzavirus A (assumingly within ducks), and hominids, as well as to the initial domestication of mallard duck (Anas platyrhynchos), jungle fowl (Gallus gallus), wild turkey (Meleagris gallopavo), wild boar (Sus scrofa), and wild horse (Equus ferus), presumed genesis modes of primordial pandemic influenza strains have multidisciplinarily been configured. The virological fundamentality of domestication and farming of those various avian and mammalian species has thereby been demonstrated and broadly elucidated, within distinctive coevolutionary paradigms. The mentioned viral genesis modes were then analyzed, compatibly with common denominators and flexibility that mark the geographic profile of the last 18 pandemic strains, which reputedly emerged since 1510, the antigenic profile of the last 10 pandemic strains since 1847, and the genomic profile of the last 5 pandemic strains since 1918, until present. Related ecophylogenetic and biogeographic aspects have been enlightened, alongside with the crucial role of spatial virus gene dissemination by avian hosts. A fairly coherent picture of primary and late evolutionary and genomic courses of pandemic strains has thus been attained, tentatively. Specific patterns underlying complexes prone to generate past and future pandemic strains from viral reservoir in animals are consequentially derived.

Prospective of Genomics in Revealing Transmission, Reassortment and Evolution of Wildlife-Borne Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Viruses

The outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 disease has led to significant loss of poultry and wild life and case fatality rates in humans of 60%. Wild birds are natural hosts for all avian influenza virus subtypes and over120 bird species have been reported with evidence of H5N1 infection. Influenza A viruses possess a segmented RNA genome and are characterized by frequently occurring genetic reassortment events, which play a very important role in virus evolution and the spread of novel gene constellations in immunologically naïve human and animal populations. Phylogenetic analysis of whole genome or sub-genomic sequences is a standard means for delineating genetic variation, novel reassortment events, and surveillance to trace the global transmission pathways. In this paper, special emphasis is given to the transmission and circulation of H5N1 among wild life populations, and to the reassortment events that are associated with inter-host transmission of the H5N1 viruses when they infect different hosts, such as birds, pigs and humans. In addition, we review the inter-subtype reassortment of the viral segments encoding inner proteins between the H5N1 viruses and viruses of other subtypes, such as H9N2 and H6N1. Finally, we highlight the usefulness of genomic sequences in molecular epidemiological analysis of HPAI H5N1 and the technical limitations in existing analytical methods that hinder them from playing a greater role in virological research.

Novel reassortment of Eurasian avian-like and pandemic/2009 influenza viruses in swine: infectious potential for humans

Pigs are considered to be intermediate hosts and "mixing vessels," facilitating the genesis of pandemic influenza viruses, as demonstrated by the emergence of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic (pdm/09) virus. The prevalence and repeated introduction of the pdm/09 virus into pigs raises the possibility of generating novel swine influenza viruses with the potential to infect humans. To address this, an active influenza surveillance program was conducted with slaughtered pigs in abattoirs in southern China. Over 50% of the pigs tested were found to be seropositive for one or more H1 influenza viruses, most commonly pdm/09-like viruses. Out of 36 virus isolates detected, one group of novel reassortants had Eurasian avian-like swine H1N1 surface genes and pdm/09 internal genes. Animal experiments showed that this virus transmitted effectively from pig to pig and from pig to ferret, and it could also replicate in ex vivo human lung tissue. Immunization against the 2009 pandemic virus gave only partial protection to ferrets. The continuing prevalence of the pdm/09 virus in pigs could lead to the genesis of novel swine reassortant viruses with the potential to infect humans.

Characterization of influenza a outbreaks in Minnesota swine herds and measures taken to reduce the risk of zoonotic transmission

Influenza A virus infections commonly cause respiratory disease in swine and can be transmitted between people and pigs, with potentially novel strains introduced into herds and spilling back into the human population. The goals of this study were to characterize influenza infections in Minnesota pigs and assess biosecurity measures used by swine workers. Veterinarians submitting influenza-positive swine samples to the University of Minnesota Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory between October 2007 and April 2009 were surveyed regarding disease-related information and biosecurity procedures at each farm. Influenza-positive samples were submitted year-round, peaking in spring and fall. H1N1 was the most commonly detected subtype (56%), followed by H3N2 (14%) and H1N2 (12%). Most positive submissions were associated with illness in growing pigs (median age 8.8 weeks, IQR 5-15). Median morbidity and mortality were 25% (IQR 10-48) and 2% (IQR 0.5-3.5), respectively. Vaccination of sows and growing pigs was conducted at 71% and 7.9% of the swine farms, respectively. Specialized footwear was reported as the most common form of protective equipment used by workers. Employee vaccination for seasonal influenza was 19%. The sow vaccination rate in this study is consistent with national data, although growing pig vaccination is lower than the national average. Seasonal and age trends identified here may provide diagnostic guidance when growing pigs experience respiratory disease. Inconsistent use of protective equipment and employee vaccination at swine farms indicates the need for further discussion and research of approaches to minimize interspecies influenza transmission on swine farms.

Emerging swine zoonoses

The majority of emerging infectious diseases are zoonotic in origin. Swine represent a potential reservoir for many novel pathogens and may transmit these to humans via direct contact with live animals (such as swine farmers and large animal veterinarians), or to the general human population via contaminated meat. We review recent emerging microbes associated with swine and discuss public health implications.

A complete analysis of HA and NA genes of influenza A viruses

BACKGROUND

More and more nucleotide sequences of type A influenza virus are available in public databases. Although these sequences have been the focus of many molecular epidemiological and phylogenetic analyses, most studies only deal with a few representative sequences. In this paper, we present a complete analysis of all Haemagglutinin (HA) and Neuraminidase (NA) gene sequences available to allow large scale analyses of the evolution and epidemiology of type A influenza.

METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

This paper describes an analysis and complete classification of all HA and NA gene sequences available in public databases using multivariate and phylogenetic methods.

CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE

We analyzed 18,975 HA sequences and divided them into 280 subgroups according to multivariate and phylogenetic analyses. Similarly, we divided 11,362 NA sequences into 202 subgroups. Compared to previous analyses, this work is more detailed and comprehensive, especially for the bigger datasets. Therefore, it can be used to show the full and complex phylogenetic diversity and provides a framework for studying the molecular evolution and epidemiology of type A influenza virus. For more than 85% of type A influenza HA and NA sequences into GenBank, they are categorized in one unambiguous and unique group. Therefore, our results are a kind of genetic and phylogenetic annotation for influenza HA and NA sequences. In addition, sequences of swine influenza viruses come from 56 HA and 45 NA subgroups. Most of these subgroups also include viruses from other hosts indicating cross species transmission of the viruses between pigs and other hosts. Furthermore, the phylogenetic diversity of swine influenza viruses from Eurasia is greater than that of North American strains and both of them are becoming more diverse. Apart from viruses from human, pigs, birds and horses, viruses from other species show very low phylogenetic diversity. This might indicate that viruses have not become established in these species. Based on current evidence, there is no simple pattern of inter-hemisphere transmission of avian influenza viruses and it appears to happen sporadically. However, for H6 subtype avian influenza viruses, such transmissions might have happened very frequently and multiple and bidirectional transmission events might exist.

Real time reverse transcription (RRT)-polymerase chain reaction (PCR) methods for detection of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus and European swine influenza A virus infections in pigs

BACKGROUND

There is a requirement to detect and differentiate pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (H1N1v) and established swine influenza A viruses (SIVs) by real time reverse transcription (RRT) PCR methods.

OBJECTIVES

First, modify an existing matrix (M) gene RRT PCR for sensitive generic detection of H1N1v and other European SIVs. Second, design an H1 RRT PCR to specifically detect H1N1v infections.

METHODS

RRT PCR assays were used to test laboratory isolates of SIV (n = 51; 37 European and 14 North American), H1N1v (n = 5) and avian influenza virus (AIV; n = 43). Diagnostic sensitivity and specificity were calculated for swabs (n = 133) and tissues (n = 116) collected from field cases and pigs infected experimentally with SIVs and H1N1v.

RESULTS

The "perfect match" M gene RRT PCR was the most sensitive variant of this test for detection of established European SIVs and H1N1v. H1 RRT PCR specifically detected H1N1v but not European SIVs. Validation with clinical specimens included comparison with virus isolation (VI) as a "gold standard", while field infection with H1N1v in swine was independently confirmed by sequencing H1N1v amplified by conventional RT PCR. "Perfect match" M gene RRT PCR had 100% sensitivity and 95.2% specificity for swabs, 93.6% and 98.6% for tissues. H1 RRT PCR demonstrated sensitivity and specificity of 100% and 99.1%, respectively, for the swabs, and 100% and 100% for the tissues.

CONCLUSIONS

Two RRT PCRs for the purposes of (i) generic detection of SIV and H1N1v infection in European pigs, and for (ii) specific detection of H1N1v (pandemic influenza) infection were validated.

Modifications in the polymerase genes of a swine-like triple-reassortant influenza virus to generate live attenuated vaccines against 2009 pandemic H1N1 viruses

On 11 June 2009, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared that the outbreaks caused by novel swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) virus had reached pandemic proportions. The pandemic H1N1 (H1N1pdm) virus is the predominant influenza virus strain in the human population. It has also crossed the species barriers and infected turkeys and swine in several countries. Thus, the development of a vaccine that is effective in multiple animal species is urgently needed. We have previously demonstrated that the introduction of temperature-sensitive mutations into the PB2 and PB1 genes of an avian H9N2 virus, combined with the insertion of a hemagglutinin (HA) tag in PB1, resulted in an attenuated (att) vaccine backbone for both chickens and mice. Because the new pandemic strain is a triple-reassortant (TR) virus, we chose to introduce the double attenuating modifications into a swine-like TR virus isolate, A/turkey/OH/313053/04 (H3N2) (ty/04), with the goal of producing live attenuated influenza vaccines (LAIV). This genetically modified backbone had impaired polymerase activity and restricted virus growth at elevated temperatures. In vivo characterization of two H1N1 vaccine candidates generated using the ty/04 att backbone demonstrated that this vaccine is highly attenuated in mice, as indicated by the absence of signs of disease, limited replication, and minimum histopathological alterations in the respiratory tract. A single immunization with the ty/04 att-based vaccines conferred complete protection against a lethal H1N1pdm virus infection in mice. More importantly, vaccination of pigs with a ty/04 att-H1N1 vaccine candidate resulted in sterilizing immunity upon an aggressive intratracheal challenge with the 2009 H1N1 pandemic virus. Our studies highlight the safety of the ty/04 att vaccine platform and its potential as a master donor strain for the generation of live attenuated vaccines for humans and livestock.

Rapid detection of the pandemic 2009 H1N1 virus M gene by real-time and gel-based RT-PCR assays

Please cite this paper as: Ma et al. (2010) Rapid detection of the pandemic 2009 H1N1 virus M gene by real‐time and gel‐based RT‐PCR assays. Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses 4(6), 397–403.

Background  Since the first pandemic 2009 H1N1 (pH1N1) virus was isolated from humans, it has also been detected in other mammalian (pigs, cats, dogs, ferrets) and avian (turkey) species, most likely because of cross‐species transmission from humans. The pH1N1 contains six genes derived from swine influenza viruses (SIVs) currently circulating in North America of human‐ (PB1), avian‐ (PB2, PA), and swine‐ (HA, NP, and NS) origin and two genes (NA and M) derived from Eurasian SIVs. The novel genetic composition of pH1N1 necessitates development of novel molecular and serological assays to differentiate the pH1N1 virus from circulating human, swine, turkey, canine, and feline influenza viruses.

Methods  To detect and discriminate the pH1N1 from currently circulating SIVs in North America, we developed and evaluated a TaqMan probe‐based real‐time and a gel‐based RT‐PCR assay, both targeting the pH1N1 matrix gene.

Results  The real‐time and gel‐based RT‐PCR assays were able to specifically detect the pH1N1 M gene and differentiate it from SIVs circulating in North America, including the classical and novel human‐like H1N1 influenza virus as well as H1, H2, and H3 subtype triple reassortant SIVs. Both assays were highly sensitive and specific for the pH1N1 virus.

Conclusions  The newly developed pH1N1‐specific real‐time and gel‐based RT‐PCR assays can be used to detect and differentiate the pH1N1 virus from currently circulating SIVs in North America. We suggest a combinational diagnostic approach where the real‐time RT‐PCR is used for high‐throughput detection of influenza positive or suspect samples and the gel‐based RT‐PCR for confirmation and sequencing of the M‐gene.

Pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus infection and avian influenza A (H5N1) virus infection: a comparative analysis

The 2009 H1N1 and H5N1 influenza viruses are newly (re-) emerged influenza A viruses (2009 A(H1N1) and A(H5N1), respectively) that have recently posed tremendous health threats in many regions worldwide. With the 2009 outbreak of H1N1 influenza A, the world witnessed the first influenza pandemic of the 21st century. The disease has rapidly spread across the entire globe, and has resulted in hundreds of thousands of cases with confirmed infection. Although characterized by high transmissibility, the virulence and fatality of the 2009 A(H1N1) influenza virus have thus far remained relatively low. The reverse holds true for A(H5N1) influenza; at a fatality rate that exceeds 60%, it is known to cause severe damage to the human respiratory system, but is not presently capable of efficient transmission from human to human. Apart from the clear differences between the two types of influenza, there are some significant similarities that warrant attention. In particular, the more severe and fatal 2009 A(H1N1) influenza cases have shown symptoms similar to those reported in cases of A(H5N1) influenza. Histopathological findings for these cases, to the extent available, also appear to have similarities for both diseases in terms of damage and severity. Here we review important recent publications in this area, and we discuss some of the key commonalities and contrasts between the two influenza A types in terms of their biology, origins, clinical features, pathology and pathogenesis, and receptors and transmissibility.

Viral reassortment and transmission after co-infection of pigs with classical H1N1 and triple-reassortant H3N2 swine influenza viruses

Triple-reassortant swine influenza viruses circulating in North American pigs contain the internal genes derived from swine (matrix, non-structural and nucleoprotein), human [polymerase basic 1 (PB1)] and avian (polymerase acidic and PB2) influenza viruses forming a constellation of genes that is well conserved and is called the triple-reassortant internal gene (TRIG) cassette. In contrast, the external genes [haemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA)] are less conserved, reflecting multiple reassortant events that have produced viruses with different combinations of HA and NA genes. This study hypothesized that maintenance of the TRIG cassette confers a selective advantage to the virus. To test this hypothesis, pigs were co-infected with the triple-reassortant H3N2 A/Swine/Texas/4199-2/98 (Tx/98) and the classical H1N1 A/Swine/Iowa/15/1930 viruses and co-housed with a group of sentinel animals. This direct contact group was subsequently moved into contact with a second group of naïve animals. Four different subtypes (H1N1, H1N2, H3N1 and H3N2) of influenza virus were identified in bronchoalveolar lavage fluid collected from the lungs of the experimentally infected pigs, with most of the viruses containing TRIG from the Tx/98 virus. Interestingly, only the intact H3N2 Tx/98 virus was transmitted from the infected pigs to the direct-contact animals and from them to the second contact group of pigs. These results demonstrated that multiple reassortments can occur within a host; however, only specific gene constellations are readily transmissible. It was concluded that certain HA and NA gene pairs, in conjunction with the TRIG cassette, may have a competitive advantage over other combinations for transmission and maintenance in swine.

Swine influenza vaccines: current status and future perspectives

Swine influenza is an important contagious disease in pigs caused by influenza A viruses. Although only three subtypes of influenza A viruses, H1N1, H1N2 and H3N2, predominantly infect pigs worldwide, it is still a big challenge for vaccine manufacturers to produce efficacious vaccines for the prevention and control of swine influenza. Swine influenza viruses not only cause significant economic losses for the swine industry, but are also important zoonotic pathogens. Vaccination is still one of the most important and effective strategies to prevent and control influenza for both the animal and human population. In this review, we will discuss the current status of swine influenza worldwide as well as current and future options to control this economically important swine disease.

Can human viruses infect porcine xenografts?

Xenotransplantation exposes the recipient to known and unknown pathogens of the donor pig (donor-derived xenosis). A major effort has been undertaken to minimize the risk of transmission from the donor using specialized breeding techniques. With the exception of endogenous retroviruses and porcine lymphotropic herpesvirus, exclusion of known pathogens was successful and has eliminated a majority of donor pathogens. In the recipient, enhanced replication of many pathogens will be stimulated by the immune responses induced by transplantation and by the immune suppression used to prevent graft rejection. Infection of the graft may occur with unpredictable consequences due to the cross-species situation. Infectivity may be decreased as entry or replication is altered by missing receptors or inability to use the cellular machinery. Replication of organisms in the xenograft and the inability of the human host to respond to human pathogens in the context of a xenograft infection due to immune suppression, or the presentation of such pathogens in the context of pig instead of human major histocompatibility complex (MHC) could impair control of such infections. Recent data suggest that some human herpesviruses infections, such as human cytomegalovirus, may infect porcine tissue and are associated with a pro-inflammatory phenotype. This review focuses on human or recipient-derived pathogens and their potential harmful role in xenograft infection.

First Season of 2009 H1N1 Influenza

The 2009 H1N1 influenza virus is responsible for the first influenza pandemic of the 21st century. Within 5 months after its emergence in Mexico, it had affected more than 290,000 patients and caused at least 3486 deaths on 6 continents. This report provides information about influenza viruses, previous pandemics, and the virology, clinical features, and epidemiology of 2009 H1N1 influenza in order to elucidate the current pandemic and outline the questions that remain.

Contribution of company affiliation and social contacts to risk estimates of between-farm transmission of avian influenza

Background

Models of between-farm transmission of pathogens have identified service vehicles and social groups as risk factors mediating the spread of infection. Because of high levels of economic organization in much of the poultry industry, we examined the importance of company affiliation, as distinct from social contacts, in a model of the potential spread of avian influenza among broiler poultry farms in a poultry-dense region in the United States. The contribution of company affiliation to risk of between-farm disease transmission has not been previously studied.

Methodology/Principal Findings

We obtained data on the nature and frequency of business and social contacts through a national survey of broiler poultry growers in the United States. Daily rates of contact were estimated using Monte Carlo analysis. Stochastic modeling techniques were used to estimate the exposure risk posed by a single infectious farm to other farms in the region and relative risk of exposure for farms under different scenarios. The mean daily rate of vehicular contact was 0.82 vehicles/day. The magnitude of exposure risk ranged from <1% to 25% under varying parameters. Risk of between-farm transmission was largely driven by company affiliation, with farms in the same company group as the index farm facing as much as a 5-fold increase in risk compared to farms contracted with different companies. Employment of part-time workers contributed to significant increases in risk in most scenarios, notably for farms who hired day-laborers. Social visits were significantly less important in determining risk.

Conclusions/Significance

Biosecurity interventions should be based on information on industry structure and company affiliation, and include part-time workers as potentially unrecognized sources of viral transmission. Modeling efforts to understand pathogen transmission in the context of industrial food animal production should consider company affiliation in addition to geospatial factors and pathogen characteristics. Restriction of social contacts among farmers may be less useful in reducing between-farm transmission.

Alternative live-attenuated influenza vaccines based on modifications in the polymerase genes protect against epidemic and pandemic flu

Human influenza is a seasonal disease associated with significant morbidity and mortality. Influenza vaccination is the most effective means for disease prevention. We have previously shown that mutations in the PB1 and PB2 genes of the live-attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV) from the cold-adapted (ca) influenza virus A/Ann Arbor/6/60 (H2N2) could be transferred to avian influenza viruses and produce partially attenuated viruses. We also demonstrated that avian influenza viruses carrying the PB1 and PB2 mutations could be further attenuated by stably introducing a hemagglutinin (HA) epitope tag in the PB1 gene. In this work, we wanted to determine whether these modifications would also result in attenuation of a so-called triple reassortant (TR) swine influenza virus (SIV). Thus, the TR influenza A/swine/Wisconsin/14094/99 (H3N2) virus was generated by reverse genetics and subsequently mutated in the PB1 and PB2 genes. Here we show that a combination of mutations in this TR backbone results in an attenuated virus in vitro and in vivo. Furthermore, we show the potential of our TR backbone as a vaccine that provides protection against the 2009 swine-origin pandemic influenza H1N1 virus (S-OIV) when carrying the surface of a classical swine strain. We propose that the availability of alternative backbones to the conventional ca A/Ann Arbor/6/60 LAIV strain could also be useful in epidemic and pandemic influenza and should be considered for influenza vaccine development. In addition, our data provide evidence that the use of these alternative backbones could potentially circumvent the effects of original antigenic sin (OAS) in certain circumstances.

Replication, pathogenesis and transmission of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus in non-immune pigs

The declaration of the human influenza A pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (H1N1/09) raised important questions, including origin and host range [1], [2]. Two of the three pandemics in the last century resulted in the spread of virus to pigs (H1N1, 1918; H3N2, 1968) with subsequent independent establishment and evolution within swine worldwide [3]. A key public and veterinary health consideration in the context of the evolving pandemic is whether the H1N1/09 virus could become established in pig populations [4]. We performed an infection and transmission study in pigs with A/California/07/09. In combination, clinical, pathological, modified influenza A matrix gene real time RT-PCR and viral genomic analyses have shown that infection results in the induction of clinical signs, viral pathogenesis restricted to the respiratory tract, infection dynamics consistent with endemic strains of influenza A in pigs, virus transmissibility between pigs and virus-host adaptation events. Our results demonstrate that extant H1N1/09 is fully capable of becoming established in global pig populations. We also show the roles of viral receptor specificity in both transmission and tissue tropism. Remarkably, following direct inoculation of pigs with virus quasispecies differing by amino acid substitutions in the haemagglutinin receptor-binding site, only virus with aspartic acid at position 225 (225D) was detected in nasal secretions of contact infected pigs. In contrast, in lower respiratory tract samples from directly inoculated pigs, with clearly demonstrable pulmonary pathology, there was apparent selection of a virus variant with glycine (225G). These findings provide potential clues to the existence and biological significance of viral receptor-binding variants with 225D and 225G during the 1918 pandemic [5].

Model or meal? Farm animal populations as models for infectious diseases of humans

In recent decades, theory addressing the processes that underlie the dynamics of infectious diseases has progressed considerably. Unfortunately, the availability of empirical data to evaluate these theories has not grown at the same pace. Although laboratory animals have been widely used as models at the organism level, they have been less appropriate for addressing issues at the population level. However, farm animal populations can provide empirical models to study infectious diseases at the population level.

Influenza virus in a natural host, the mallard: experimental infection data

Wild waterfowl, particularly dabbling ducks such as mallards (Anas platyrhynchos), are considered the main reservoir of low-pathogenic avian influenza viruses (LPAIVs). They carry viruses that may evolve and become highly pathogenic for poultry or zoonotic. Understanding the ecology of LPAIVs in these natural hosts is therefore essential. We assessed the clinical response, viral shedding and antibody production of juvenile mallards after intra-esophageal inoculation of two LPAIV subtypes previously isolated from wild congeners. Six ducks, equipped with data loggers that continually monitored body temperature, heart rate and activity, were successively inoculated with an H7N7 LPAI isolate (day 0), the same H7N7 isolate again (day 21) and an H5N2 LPAI isolate (day 35). After the first H7N7 inoculation, the ducks remained alert with no modification of heart rate or activity. However, body temperature transiently increased in four individuals, suggesting that LPAIV strains may have minor clinical effects on their natural hosts. The excretion patterns observed after both re-inoculations differed strongly from those observed after the primary H7N7 inoculation, suggesting that not only homosubtypic but also heterosubtypic immunity exist. Our study suggests that LPAI infection has minor clinically measurable effects on mallards and that mallard ducks are able to mount immunological responses protective against heterologous infections. Because the transmission dynamics of LPAIVs in wild populations is greatly influenced by individual susceptibility and herd immunity, these findings are of high importance. Our study also shows the relevance of using telemetry to monitor disease in animals.