Transmission Dynamics of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus A(H5Nx) Clade 2.3.4.4, North America, 2014-2015

Comparative pathogenicity of three A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI viruses in blue-winged teal and transmission to domestic poultry

Long-distance migratory ducks play a critical role in the maintenance and dissemination of A(H5N1) viruses. Comparative pathogenicity studies were conducted on blue-winged teal (BWTE; Anas discors) using three distinct genotypes of A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses (A1, B1.3, and B4.1) isolated from wild ducks in Canada. Twenty-four hours post-intranasal infection of BWTE, contact turkeys and chickens were introduced into each of the groups to evaluate viral transmission. The levels of viral shedding in BWTE increased from 3 to 7 days post-infection (dpi) and continued at lower levels until 14 dpi. The A1 genotype virus (MALL/NS/22) was found to be the least pathogenic to BWTE compared to the reassortant genotypes, B4.1 (RBME/BC/22) and B1.3 (BWTE/MB/22). The B1.3 genotype was the most virulent to BWTE and caused 66.7% mortality compared to 12.5% mortality caused by the B4.1 genotype. The extent of transmission from infected BWTE to contact turkeys and chickens showed variations. Turkeys housed with BWTE infected with either virus died within 6 to 10 days post-contact (dpc). Conversely, the transmission and mortality among contact chickens varied. The highest mortality (3 out of 5) occurred in chickens exposed to BWTE infected with the B1.3 genotype. Whilst in the B4.1 genotype, 2 out of 6 chickens died, none of the chickens in the A1 genotype succumbed to infection. No shedding or seroconversion was noted in all surviving chickens. This research underscores variations in the pathogenic traits and transmissibility among the different genotypes of A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses. This finding is vital for understanding the role of migratory birds in the epidemiology of A(H5N1) and the need for continuous monitoring of these viruses.

IMPORTANCE

The recurrent incursions of A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses into North America have resulted in the emergence of reassortant virus genotypes. These genotypes exhibit variations in pathogenicity and host ranges. Blue-winged teal (BWTE) are the most common dabbling ducks in North America and play a crucial role in maintaining and dispersing influenza A viruses (IAVs). In some areas, the migratory pathways of BWTE overlap with densely populated commercial poultry facilities. Despite this, the role of BWTE in the maintenance and spread of A(H5N1) is not well understood, and there is limited data on their susceptibility to A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses. Our study demonstrates differences in BWTE susceptibility to distinct genotypes of A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses. The virus transmission from infected BWTE and lethality in turkeys and chickens were also influenced by the virus genotypes. The findings suggest that BWTE could contribute to the maintenance and spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses, and active surveillance in BWTE is essential.

The One Health challenges and opportunities of the H5N1 outbreak in dairy cattle in the United States

The outbreak of H5N1 in dairy cattle in United States revealed challenges in identification and management of a novel disease. The virus showed an exceptional ability to spread between farms and among cows within a farm. The impact of the virus on dairy cattle varied from nonclinical to severe clinical signs and death. Many dairy producers did not report clinical signs in their cows or test for the virus. Cats and peridomestic birds on many affected dairies died from viral exposure. Dairy workers showed signs of conjunctivitis, which was confirmed to be due to H5N1. With the disease affecting multiple species and showing efficient cow-to-cow transmission, the situation only worsened. There was a negative impact on the relationships among dairy producers, dairy workers, poultry producers, and veterinarians, in which professional and personal relationships were severed and some experienced loss of employment. The regulatory response varied by geographic location, and in some states, animal health and human health authorities elevated producer fears of consequences of reporting. Authorities did quickly confirm that pasteurization inactivated the virus in dairy products and showed that it was very rarely detected in beef from affected cows. In this review, we will describe the relationships among the dairy industry and animal and human health and why the H5N1 outbreak requires a One Health perspective of all stakeholders in order to address it effectively.

Emergence, migration and spreading of the high pathogenicity avian influenza virus H5NX of the Gs/Gd lineage into America

The high pathogenicity avian influenza virus H5N1, which first emerged in the winter of 2021, has resulted in multiple outbreaks across the American continent through the summer of 2023 and they continue based on early 2025 records, presenting significant challenges for global health and food security. The viruses causing the outbreaks belong to clade 2.3.4.4b, which are descendants of the lineage A/Goose/Guangdong/1/1996 (Gs/Gd) through genetic reassortments with several low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses present in populations of Anseriformes and Charadriiformes orders. This review addresses these issues by thoroughly analysing available epidemiological databases and specialized literature reviews. This project explores the mechanisms behind the resurgence of the H5N1 virus. It provides a comprehensive overview of the origin, timeline and factors contributing to its prevalence among wild bird populations on the American continent.

Human Health Surveillance During Animal Disease Emergencies: Minnesota Department of Health Response to Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreaks, 2015 and 2022-2023

OBJECTIVES

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) poses an occupational risk for poultry workers, responders, and others in contact with infected birds. The objective of this analysis was to describe HPAI surveillance methods and outcomes, and highlight the challenges, successes, and lessons learned during the Minnesota Department of Health's (MDH's) public health response to HPAI outbreaks in Minnesota poultry flocks in the years 2015 and 2022-2023.

METHODS

During both outbreaks, MDH staff attempted to contact all potentially exposed people and conduct a standardized interview. People were considered exposed and at risk if they had entered a barn with poultry on any HPAI test-positive premises. With their consent, exposed persons were entered into illness monitoring until 10 days from their last exposure. In 2015, MDH monitored the health of poultry workers only. In the 2022-2023 response, MDH monitored the health of poultry workers, backyard flock owners, responders, and private contract workers. In 2022-2023, interview responses were entered into a REDCap (Research Electronic Data Capture) database in real time, which automatically entered the person into monitoring if they consented. Through REDCap, they received an automated email with a unique link to a short survey asking about any symptom development. Where appropriate, interview responses from poultry workers collected in 2015 were compared to interview responses from poultry workers collected in 2022-2023.

RESULTS

From March 3 to June 5, 2015, MDH epidemiologists interviewed and evaluated 375 (86%) of 435 poultry workers from 110 HPAI-infected flocks. From March 25, 2022 through December 31, 2023, MDH epidemiologists interviewed and evaluated 649 (65%) of 992 poultry workers, responders, contractors, and backyard flock owners associated with 151 HPAI-infected flocks. Among poultry workers, self-reported personal protective equipment (PPE) usage declined significantly from 2015 to 2022-2023 (full PPE usage 51.8% vs. 23.9%, p < .01).

CONCLUSION

MDH's long standing relationships with animal health officials and the poultry industry resulted in strong poultry worker participation rates in surveillance efforts during HPAI outbreaks in 2015 and 2022-2023. Self-reported PPE usage was low, particularly in 2022-2023. Improvements in PPE accessibility and technology are needed to protect workers and responders in the on-going HPAI outbreak.

The global H5N1 influenza panzootic in mammals

Influenza A viruses have caused more documented global pandemics in human history than any other pathogen1,2. High pathogenicity avian influenza viruses belonging to the H5N1 subtype are a leading pandemic risk. Two decades after H5N1 'bird flu' became established in poultry in Southeast Asia, its descendants have resurged3, setting off a H5N1 panzootic in wild birds that is fuelled by: (1) rapid intercontinental spread, reaching South America and Antarctica for the first time4,5; (2) fast evolution via genomic reassortment6; and (3) frequent spillover into terrestrial7,8 and marine mammals9. The virus has sustained mammal-to-mammal transmission in multiple settings, including European fur farms10,11, South American marine mammals12-15 and US dairy cattle16-19, raising questions about whether humans are next. Historically, swine are considered optimal intermediary hosts that help avian influenza viruses adapt to mammals before jumping to humans20. However, the altered ecology of H5N1 has opened the door to new evolutionary pathways. Dairy cattle, farmed mink or South American sea lions may have the potential to serve as new mammalian gateways for transmission of avian influenza viruses to humans. In this Perspective, we explore the molecular and ecological factors driving the sudden expansion in H5N1 host range and assess the likelihood of different zoonotic pathways leading to an H5N1 pandemic.

Intensive transmission in wild, migratory birds drove rapid geographic dissemination and repeated spillovers of H5N1 into agriculture in North America

Since late 2021, a panzootic of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza virus has driven significant morbidity and mortality in wild birds, domestic poultry, and mammals. In North America, infections in novel avian and mammalian species suggest the potential for changing ecology and establishment of new animal reservoirs. Outbreaks among domestic birds have persisted despite aggressive culling, necessitating a re-examination of how these outbreaks were sparked and maintained. To recover how these viruses were introduced and disseminated in North America, we analyzed 1,818 Hemagglutinin (HA) gene sequences sampled from North American wild birds, domestic birds and mammals from November 2021-September 2023 using Bayesian phylodynamic approaches. Using HA, we infer that the North American panzootic was driven by ~8 independent introductions into North America via the Atlantic and Pacific Flyways, followed by rapid dissemination westward via wild, migratory birds. Transmission was primarily driven by Anseriformes, shorebirds, and Galliformes, while species such as songbirds, raptors, and owls mostly acted as dead-end hosts. Unlike the epizootic of 2015, outbreaks in domestic birds were driven by ~46-113 independent introductions from wild birds, with some onward transmission. Backyard birds were infected ~10 days earlier on average than birds in commercial poultry production settings, suggesting that they could act as "early warning signals" for transmission upticks in a given area. Our findings support wild birds as an emerging reservoir for HPAI transmission in North America and suggest continuous surveillance of wild Anseriformes and shorebirds as crucial for outbreak inference. Future prevention of agricultural outbreaks may require investment in strategies that reduce transmission at the wild bird/agriculture interface, and investigation of backyard birds as putative early warning signs.

Recurring incursions and dissemination of novel Eurasian-origin H5Nx avian influenza viruses in Atlantic Canada

Wild birds are important hosts of influenza A viruses (IAVs) and play an important role in their ecology. The emergence of the A/goose/Guangdong/1/1996 H5N1 (Gs/GD) lineage marked a shift in IAV ecology, leading to recurrent outbreaks and mortality in wild birds from 2002 onwards. This lineage has evolved and diversified over time, with a recent important derivative being the 2.3.4.4b sub-lineage, which has caused significant mortality events in wild bird populations. An H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b virus was transmitted into North America from Eurasia in 2021, with the first detection being in Newfoundland and Labrador in Atlantic Canada, and this virus and its reassortants then spread broadly throughout North America and beyond. Following the first 2021 detection, there have been three additional known incursions of Eurasian-origin strains into Atlantic Canada, a second H5N1 strain in 2022 and two H5N5 strains in 2023. In this study, we document a fifth incursion in Atlantic Canada that occurred in 2023 by another H5N5 strain. This strain spread throughout Atlantic Canada and into Quebec, infecting numerous species of wild birds and mammals. Genomic analysis revealed mammalian-adaptive mutations in some of the detected viruses (PB2-E627K and PB2-D701N) and mutations in the hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) genes that are associated with enhanced viral fitness and avian transmission capabilities. Our findings indicate that this virus is continuing to circulate in wildlife, and confirms Atlantic Canada is an important North American entry point for Eurasian IAVs. Continued surveillance and genomic analysis of IAVs detected in the region is crucial to monitor the evolution of these viruses and assess potential risks to wildlife and public health.

Charles KM, Hutchinson HC, Schoenbaum M, Marusak R, Culhane MR, Cardona CJ. Estimating the time of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza virus introduction into United States poultry flocks during the 2022/24 epizootic

Following confirmation of the first case of the ongoing U.S. HPAI H5N1 epizootic in commercial poultry on February 8, 2022, the virus has continued to devastate the U.S. poultry sector and the pathogen has since managed to cross over to livestock and a few human cases have also been reported. Efficient outbreak management benefits greatly from timely detection and proper identification of the pathways of virus introduction and spread. In this study, we used changes in mortality rates as a proxy for HPAI incidence in a layer, broiler and turkey flock together with diagnostic test results to infer within-flock HPAI transmission dynamics. Mathematical modeling techniques, specifically the Approximate Bayesian Computation algorithm in conjunction with a stochastic within-flock HPAI transmission model were used in the analysis. The time window of HPAI virus introduction into the flock (TOI) and the adequate contact rate (ACR) were estimated. Then, using the estimated TOI together with the day when the first HPAI positive sample was collected from the flock, we calculated the most likely time to first positive sample (MTFPS) which reflects the time to HPAI detection. The estimated joint (i.e., all species combined) median of the MTFPS for different flocks was six days, the joint median most likely ACR was 6.8 newly infected birds per infectious bird per day, the joint median R0 was 13 and the joint median number of test days per flock was two. These results were also grouped by species and by epidemic phase and discussed accordingly. We conclude that this findings from this and other related studies are beneficial for the different stakeholders in outbreak management. We recommend that combining TOI analysis with complementary approaches such as phylogenetic analyses is critically important for improved understanding of disease transmission pathways. The estimated parameters can also be used to parametrize mathematical models that can guide the design of surveillance protocols, risk analyses of HPAI spread, and emergency preparedness for HPAI outbreaks.

The Arrival of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Viruses in North America, Ensuing Epizootics in Poultry and Dairy Farms and Difficulties in Scientific Naming

The highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N1, first isolated in 1996 in China, spread rapidly across Eurasia and caused major epizootics in wild and domesticated birds, as well as spillover infections in humans characterised by high mortality. Avian influenza viruses are therefore candidate viruses for a human pandemic. Surprisingly, HPAIV was not isolated in North America until 2014. With the help of intensive biological sampling and viral genome sequencing, the intrusion of HPAIV into North America could be retraced to two separate events. First, migratory birds carried HPAIV from East Siberia via Beringia and dispersed the virus along the Pacific flyway. After reassortment with genes of local low pathogenic avian influenza viruses, HPAIV H5 caused 2015 a major epizootic on poultry farms in the US Mid-West. After costly containment, HPAIV dropped below the detection limit. In 2021, Eurasian HPAIV H5 viruses arrived a second time in North America, carried by migratory birds to Canada via the Atlantic flyway, using Iceland as a stop. The H5 virus then spread with water birds along the East Coast of the United States and dispersed across the United States. In contrast to the 2015 poultry outbreak, spillover infections into diverse species of mammals were now observed. The events culminated in the 2024 HPAIV H5 epizootic in dairy cows affecting 300 dairy herds in 14 US states. The cattle epizootic was spread mainly by milking machinery and animal transport. On affected farms infected cats developed fatal neurological diseases. Retail milk across the United States frequently contains viral RNA, but so far only a few milk farm workers have developed mild symptoms. The tracing of HPAIV with viral genome sequencing complicated the taxonomical naming of influenza viruses raising fundamental problems in how to mirror biological complexity in written plain language, rendering communication with the lay public difficult.

Mortality in sea lions is associated with the introduction of the H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b virus in Brazil October 2023: whole genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis

Clade 2.3.4.4b highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus was detected in the South American sea lions found dead in Santa Catarina, Brazil, in October 2023. Whole genome sequencing and comparative phylogenetic analysis were conducted to investigate the origin, genetic diversity, and zoonotic potentials of the H5N1 viruses. The H5N1 viruses belonged to the genotype B3.2 of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 virus, which was identified in North America and disseminated to South America. They have acquired new amino acid substitutions related to mammalian host affinity. Our study provides insights into the genetic landscape of HPAI H5N1 viruses in Brazil, highlighting the continuous evolutionary processes contributing to their possible adaptation to mammalian hosts.

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5 Clade 2.3.4.4b Virus Infection in Birds and Mammals

Avian influenza viruses (AIVs) are highly contagious respiratory viruses of birds, leading to significant morbidity and mortality globally and causing substantial economic losses to the poultry industry and agriculture. Since their first isolation in 2013-2014, the Asian-origin H5 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAI) of clade 2.3.4.4b have undergone unprecedented evolution and reassortment of internal gene segments. In just a few years, it supplanted other AIV clades, and now it is widespread in the wild migratory waterfowl, spreading to Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Americas. Wild waterfowl, the natural reservoir of LPAIVs and generally more resistant to the disease, also manifested high morbidity and mortality with HPAIV clade 2.3.4.4b. This clade also caused overt clinical signs and mass mortality in a variety of avian and mammalian species never reported before, such as raptors, seabirds, sealions, foxes, and others. Most notably, the recent outbreaks in dairy cattle were associated with the emergence of a few critical mutations related to mammalian adaptation, raising concerns about the possibility of jumping species and acquisition of sustained human-to-human transmission. The main clinical signs and anatomopathological findings associated with clade 2.3.4.4b virus infection in birds and non-human mammals are hereby summarized.

Molecular Characterization of Non-H5 and Non-H7 Avian Influenza Viruses from Non-Mallard Migratory Waterbirds of the North American Flyways, 2006-2011

The surveillance of migratory waterbirds (MWs) for avian influenza virus (AIV) is indispensable for the early detection of a potential AIV incursion into poultry. Surveying AIV infections and virus subtypes in understudied MW species could elucidate their role in AIV ecology. Oropharyngeal-cloacal (OPC) swabs were collected from non-mallard MWs between 2006 and 2011. OPC swabs (n = 1158) that molecularly tested positive for AIV (Cts ≤ 32) but tested negative for H5 and H7 subtypes were selected for virus isolation (VI). The selected samples evenly represented birds from all four North American flyways (Pacific, Central, Mississippi, and Atlantic). Eighty-seven low pathogenic AIV isolates, representing 31 sites in 17 states, were recovered from the samples. All isolates belonged to the North American lineage. The samples representing birds from the Central Flyway had the highest VI positive rate (57.5%) compared to those from the other flyways (10.3-17.2%), suggesting that future surveillance can focus on the Central Flyway. Of the isolates, 43.7%, 12.6%, and 10.3% were obtained from blue-winged teal, American wigeon, and American black duck species, respectively. Hatch-year MWs represented the majority of the isolates (70.1%). The most common H and N combinations were H3N8 (23.0%), H4N6 (18.4%), and H4N8 (18.4%). The HA gene between non-mallard and mallard MW isolates during the same time period shared 85.5-99.5% H3 identity and 89.3-99.7% H4 identity. Comparisons between MW (mallard and non-mallard) and poultry H3 and H4 isolates also revealed high similarity (79.0-99.0% and 88.7-98.4%), emphasizing the need for continued AIV surveillance in MWs.

Inactivation of Three Subtypes of Influenza A Virus by a Commercial Device Using Ultraviolet Light and Ozone

Avian influenza (AI) is a highly contagious disease that can be transmitted to naïve birds through fomites. The survival of AI viruses (AIV) on nonporous and porous fomites also dictates how long the fomite can serve as a vehicle for virus transmission. AIVs are known to be inactivated by ozone and ultraviolet (UV) light. However, the combined effect of UV light and ozone in combating AIV on different fomites has not been investigated. This study was undertaken to determine AIV inactivation by a commercial device called the BioSec shoe sanitizing station. This device generates both ozone and UV light for 8 sec when activated. We evaluated this device against three different subtypes of AIVs applied on seven different fomites. In general, the device inactivated all three AIV subtypes loaded on all fomites but to varying degrees of inactivation. The percentage of virus reduction on nonporous fomites (98.6%-99.9%) was higher than on porous fomites (90.0%-99.5%). In conclusion, this new device has the potential to help reduce the risk of transmission of AIV.

Pathogenicity in Chickens and Turkeys of a 2021 United States H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Clade 2.3.4.4b Wild Bird Virus Compared to Two Previous H5N8 Clade 2.3.4.4 Viruses

Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) of subtype H5 of the Gs/GD/96 lineage remain a major threat to poultry due to endemicity in wild birds. H5N1 HPAIVs from this lineage were detected in 2021 in the United States (U.S.) and since then have infected many wild and domestic birds. We evaluated the pathobiology of an early U.S. H5N1 HPAIV (clade 2.3.4.4b, 2021) and two H5N8 HPAIVs from previous outbreaks in the U.S. (clade 2.3.4.4c, 2014) and Europe (clade 2.3.4.4b, 2016) in chickens and turkeys. Differences in clinical signs, mean death times (MDTs), and virus transmissibility were found between chickens and turkeys. The mean bird infective dose (BID50) of the 2021 H5N1 virus was approximately 2.6 log10 50% embryo infective dose (EID50) in chickens and 2.2 log10 EID50 in turkeys, and the virus transmitted to contact-exposed turkeys but not chickens. The BID50 for the 2016 H5N8 virus was also slightly different in chickens and turkeys (4.2 and 4.7 log10 EID50, respectively); however, the BID50 for the 2014 H5N8 virus was higher for chickens than turkeys (3.9 and ~0.9 log10 EID50, respectively). With all viruses, turkeys took longer to die (MDTs of 2.6-8.2 days for turkeys and 1-4 days for chickens), which increased the virus shedding period and facilitated transmission to contacts.

H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza clade 2.3.4.4b in wild and domestic birds: Introductions into the United States and reassortments, December 2021-April 2022

Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) of the A/goose/Guangdong/1/1996 lineage H5 clade 2.3.4.4b continue to have a devastating effect on domestic and wild birds. Full genome sequence analyses using 1369 H5N1 HPAIVs detected in the United States (U.S.) in wild birds, commercial poultry, and backyard flocks from December 2021 to April 2022, showed three phylogenetically distinct H5N1 virus introductions in the U.S. by wild birds. Unreassorted Eurasian genotypes A1 and A2 entered the Northeast Atlantic states, whereas a genetically distinct A3 genotype was detected in Alaska. The A1 genotype spread westward via wild bird migration and reassorted with North American wild bird avian influenza viruses. Reassortments of up to five internal genes generated a total of 21 distinct clusters; of these, six genotypes represented 92% of the HPAIVs examined. By phylodynamic analyses, most detections in domestic birds were shown to be point-source transmissions from wild birds, with limited farm-to-farm spread.

BAITING AND BANDING: EXPERT OPINION ON HOW BAIT TRAPPING MAY INFLUENCE THE OCCURRENCE OF HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA (HPAI) AMONG DABBLING DUCKS

A Eurasian lineage highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) of the clade 2.3.4.4b (Goose/Guangdong lineage) was detected in migratory bird populations in North America in December 2021, and it, along with its reassortants, have since caused wild and domestic bird outbreaks across the continent. Relative to previous outbreaks, HPAIV cases among wild birds in 2022 exhibited wider geographic extent within North America and higher levels of mortality, suggesting the potential for population-level impacts. Given the possible conservation implications of HPAIV in wild birds, natural resource managers have sought guidance on actions that may mitigate negative effects of disease among North American bird populations, including modification of existing management practices. Banding of waterfowl is a critical tool for population management for several harvested species in North America, but some banding techniques, such as bait trapping, can lead to increased congregation of waterfowl, potentially altering HPAIV transmission. We used an expert opinion exercise to assess how bait trapping of dabbling ducks in Canada may influence HPAIV transmission and wild bird health. The expert group found that it is moderately likely that bait trapping of dabbling ducks in wetlands will significantly increase the transmission of HPAIV among individual ducks, but there is a low probability that this will result in significant population-level effects on North American dabbling ducks. Considering the lack of empirical work studying how capture and handling methods may change transmission of HPAIV among waterfowl, as well as the importance of bait trapping for waterfowl management in North America, future work should focus on filling knowledge gaps pertaining to the influence of baiting on HPAIV occurrence to better inform banding procedures and management decision making.

A comprehensive review of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1: An imminent threat at doorstep

Avian influenza viruses (AIVs) are globally challenging due to widespread circulation and high mortality rates. Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) strains like H5N1 have caused significant outbreaks in birds. Since 2003 to 14 July 2023, the World Health Organization (WHO) has documented 878 cases of HPAI H5N1 infection in humans and 458 (52.16%) fatalities in 23 countries. Recent outbreaks in wild birds, domestic birds, sea lions, minks, and etc., and the occurrence of genetic variations among HPAI H5N1 strains raise concerns about potential transmission and public health risks. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the current understanding and new insights into HPAI H5N1. It begins with an introduction to the significance of studying this virus and highlighting the need for updated knowledge. The origin and evaluation of HPAI H5N1 are examined, shedding light on its emergence, and spread across different geographic regions. The genome organization and structural biology of the H5N1 virus are explored, providing insights into its molecular composition and key structural features. This manuscript also delves into the phylogeny, evolution, mutational trends, reservoirs, and transmission routes of HPAI H5N1. The immune response against HPAI H5N1 and its implications for vaccine development are analyzed, along with an exploration of the pathogenesis and clinical manifestations of HPAI H5N1 in human cases. Furthermore, diagnostic tools and preventive and therapeutic strategies are discussed, highlighting the current approaches and potential future directions for better management of the potential pandemic.

Diagnostic Detection of H7N3 Low Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in a Commercial Game Bird Flock

Low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) H7N3 was diagnosed in a flock of commercially raised Japanese quail (Coturnix japonica) breeder hens. The birds were submitted with an initial complaint of a drop in egg production and watery droppings. Initial PCR testing of the flock for avian influenza (AI) was negative; however, mortality started increasing drastically, prompting further examination and the submission of more birds to the diagnostic laboratory. On antemortem examination, the birds appeared lethargic, with ruffled feathers, and had labored breathing. Gross examination revealed poor body condition, moderate dehydration, splenomegaly, ovarian regression, and airsacculitis. Several hens produced thin-shelled and shell-less eggs. Microscopically, lymphoplasmacytic encephalitis with neuronal cell necrosis, fibrinoheterophilic pneumonia, and splenic lymphoid depletion with amyloid deposition were seen. AI virus was detected in a follow-up submission and characterized as LPAI H7N3. Quail are a species of interest in the pathobiology of avian influenza viruses, underlined by the ability to serve as an amplification host.

Investigation of risk factors for introduction of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 infection among commercial turkey operations in the United States, 2022: a case-control study

Introduction

The 2022-2023 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 outbreak in the United States (U.S.) is the largest and most costly animal health event in U.S. history. Approximately 70% of commercial farms affected during this outbreak have been turkey farms.

Methods

We conducted a case-control study to identify potential risk factors for introduction of HPAI virus onto commercial meat turkey operations. Data were collected from 66 case farms and 59 control farms in 12 states. Univariate and multivariable analyses were conducted to compare management and biosecurity factors on case and control farms.

Results

Factors associated with increased risk of infection included being in an existing control zone, having both brooders and growers, having toms, seeing wild waterfowl or shorebirds in the closest field, and using rendering for dead bird disposal. Protective factors included having a restroom facility, including portable, available to crews that visit the farm and workers having access and using a shower at least some of the time when entering a specified barn.

Discussion

Study results provide a better understanding of risk factors for HPAI infection and can be used to inform prevention and control measures for HPAI on U.S. turkey farms.

Investigation of risk factors for introduction of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus onto table egg farms in the United States, 2022: a case-control study

INTRODUCTION

The 2022-2023 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 outbreak in the United States (U.S.) is the most geographically extensive and costly animal health event in U.S. history. In 2022 alone, over 57 million commercial and backyard poultry in 47 U.S. states were affected. Over 75% of affected poultry were part of the commercial table egg production sector.

METHODS

We conducted a case-control study to identify potential risk factors for introduction of HPAI virus onto commercial table egg operations. Univariate and multivariable analyses were conducted to compare farm characteristics, management, and biosecurity factors on case and control farms.

RESULTS

Factors associated with increased risk of infection included being in an existing control zone, sightings of wild waterfowl, mowing or bush hogging vegetation less than 4 times a month, having an off-site method of daily mortality disposal (off-site composting or burial, rendering, or landfill), and wild bird access to feed/feed ingredients at least some of the time. Protective factors included a high level of vehicle washing for trucks and trailers entering the farm (a composite variable that included having a permanent wash station), having designated personnel assigned to specific barns, having a farm entrance gate, and requiring a change of clothing for workers entering poultry barns.

DISCUSSION

Study results improve our understanding of risk factors for HPAI infection and control measures for preventing HPAI on commercial U.S. table egg farms.

Potential cross-species transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5 subtype (HPAI H5) viruses to humans calls for the development of H5-specific and universal influenza vaccines

In recent years, highly pathogenic avian influenza H5 subtype (HPAI H5) viruses have been prevalent around the world in both avian and mammalian species, causing serious economic losses to farmers. HPAI H5 infections of zoonotic origin also pose a threat to human health. Upon evaluating the global distribution of HPAI H5 viruses from 2019 to 2022, we found that the dominant strain of HPAI H5 rapidly changed from H5N8 to H5N1. A comparison of HA sequences from human- and avian-derived HPAI H5 viruses indicated high homology within the same subtype of viruses. Moreover, amino acid residues 137A, 192I, and 193R in the receptor-binding domain of HA1 were the key mutation sites for human infection in the current HPAI H5 subtype viruses. The recent rapid transmission of H5N1 HPAI in minks may result in the further evolution of the virus in mammals, thereby causing cross-species transmission to humans in the near future. This potential cross-species transmission calls for the development of an H5-specific influenza vaccine, as well as a universal influenza vaccine able to provide protection against a broad range of influenza strains.

Novel Avian Influenza Virus (H5N1) Clade 2.3.4.4b Reassortants in Migratory Birds, China

Two novel reassortant highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b.2 were identified in dead migratory birds in China in November 2021. The viruses probably evolved among wild birds through different flyways connecting Europe and Asia. Their low antigenic reaction to vaccine antiserum indicates high risks to poultry and to public health.

Protective efficacy of a bivalent H5 influenza vaccine candidate against both clades 2.3.2.1 and 2.3.4.4 high pathogenic avian influenza viruses in SPF chickens

Worldwide, high pathogenic avian influenza viruses belonging to clades 2.3.4.4 and 2.3.2.1 have been circulating in both poultry and wild birds. Since 2018, Korea has built a national antigen bank to ensure preparedness in an emergency. In this study, we developed a bivalent vaccine candidate containing antigens derived from two reassortant KA435/2.3.2.1d and H35/2.3.4.4b strains for Korean national antigen bank. We evaluated its immunogenicity and protective efficacy in specific pathogen free chickens. The two vaccine strains, rgKA435-H9N2 PB2/2.3.2.1d and rgH35/2.3.4.4b, both of which were generated successfully by reverse genetics, were highly immunogenic (titres of haemagglutination inhibition: 8.3 and 8.4 log₂, respectively) and showed good protective efficacy (100 and 147 50% protective dose, respectively) against lethal challenge with wild-type virus when delivered as a 1:1 mixture. Notably, the vaccine provided complete protection against viral shedding at a full dose (512 HAU) and a 1/10 dose (51.2 HAU), with no clinical signs, after challenge with H35/2.3.4.4b. The bivalent vaccine developed in this study may reduce the cost of vaccine production and could be used as a H5 subtype avian influenza vaccine candidate against two clades simultaneously.

Prevalence of the H5N8 influenza virus in birds: Systematic review with meta-analysis

INTRODUCTION

Avian influenza viruses are members of the Orthomyxoviridae family, considered highly pathogenic (HPAI). They result from genetic variations from their low virulence predecessors. HPAI is a global problem. Large outbreaks of HAPI have significant health and economic impacts.

OBJECTIVE

The objective of this study was to assess the prevalence of the H5N8 Influenza virus in birds, as well as to assess its variability according to the countries and years.

METHODS

A systematic review of the literature was carried out in six databases (Web of Sciences, Scopus, PubMed, SciELO, Lilacs and Google Scholar) to evaluate the proportion of birds infected with the H5N8 Influenza virus, by molecular and immunological techniques. A meta-analysis was performed using a random-effects model to calculate the pooled prevalence, 95% confidence intervals (95%CI). A 2-tailed 5% alpha level was used for hypothesis testing. Measures of heterogeneity were estimated and reported, including the Cochrane Q statistic, the I² index, and the tau-squared test. In addition, bird species performed subgroup analyzes.

RESULTS

152 data groups were analyzed, a combined prevalence of 1.6% (95% CI 1.3-1.9%) was found for molecular studies, and the ELISA study yielded a seroprevalence of 66.7%; those results of molecular detection varied by year, from 0.2% in 2014 to 52.6% in 2020 and 96.9% in 2015.

CONCLUSION

The combined prevalence was substantial because large outbreaks have caused severe economic repercussions. In addition, it is considered a serious concern for public health due to its possible zoonotic activity.

Evolution of the North American Lineage H7 Avian Influenza Viruses in Association with H7 Virus's Introduction to Poultry

The incursions of H7 subtype low-pathogenicity avian influenza virus (LPAIV) from wild birds into poultry and its mutations to highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) have been an ongoing concern in North America. Since 2000, 10 phylogenetically distinct H7 virus outbreaks from wild birds have been detected in poultry, six of which mutated to HPAIV. To study the molecular evolution of the H7 viruses that occurs when changing hosts from wild birds to poultry, we performed analyses of the North American H7 hemagglutinin (HA) genes to identify amino acid changes as the virus circulated in wild birds from 2000 to 2019. Then, we analyzed recurring HA amino acid changes and gene constellations of the viruses that spread from wild birds to poultry. We found six HA amino acid changes occurring during wild bird circulation and 10 recurring changes after the spread to poultry. Eight of the changes were in and around the HA antigenic sites, three of which were supported by positive selection. Viruses from each H7 outbreak had a unique genotype, with no specific genetic group associated with poultry outbreaks or mutation to HPAIV. However, the genotypes of the H7 viruses in poultry outbreaks tended to contain minor genetic groups less observed in wild bird H7 viruses, suggesting either a biased sampling of wild bird AIVs or a tendency of having reassortment with minor genetic groups prior to the virus's introduction to poultry. IMPORTANCE Wild bird-origin H7 subtype avian influenza viruses are a constant threat to commercial poultry, both directly by the disease they cause and indirectly through trade restrictions that can be imposed when the virus is detected in poultry. It is important to understand the genetic basis of why the North American lineage H7 viruses have repeatedly crossed the species barrier from wild birds to poultry. We examined the amino acid changes in the H7 viruses associated with poultry outbreaks and tried to determine gene reassortment related to poultry adaptation and mutations to HPAIV. The findings in this study increase the understanding of the evolutionary pathways of wild bird AIV before infecting poultry and the HA changes associated with adaptation of the virus in poultry.

Maintenance and dissemination of avian-origin influenza A virus within the northern Atlantic Flyway of North America

Wild waterbirds, the natural reservoirs for avian influenza viruses, undergo migratory movements each year, connecting breeding and wintering grounds within broad corridors known as flyways. In a continental or global view, the study of virus movements within and across flyways is important to understanding virus diversity, evolution, and movement. From 2015 to 2017, we sampled waterfowl from breeding (Maine) and wintering (Maryland) areas within the Atlantic Flyway (AF) along the east coast of North America to investigate the spatio-temporal trends in persistence and spread of influenza A viruses (IAV). We isolated 109 IAVs from 1,821 cloacal / oropharyngeal samples targeting mallards (Anas platyrhynchos) and American black ducks (Anas rubripes), two species having ecological and conservation importance in the flyway that are also host reservoirs of IAV. Isolates with >99% nucleotide similarity at all gene segments were found between eight pairs of birds in the northern site across years, indicating some degree of stability among genome constellations and the possibility of environmental persistence. No movement of whole genome constellations were identified between the two parts of the flyway, however, virus gene flow between the northern and southern study locations was evident. Examination of banding records indicate direct migratory waterfowl movements between the two locations within an annual season, providing a mechanism for the inferred viral gene flow. Bayesian phylogenetic analyses provided evidence for virus dissemination from other North American wild birds to AF dabbling ducks (Anatinae), shorebirds (Charidriformes), and poultry (Galliformes). Evidence was found for virus dissemination from shorebirds to gulls (Laridae), and dabbling ducks to shorebirds and poultry. The findings from this study contribute to the understanding of IAV ecology in waterfowl within the AF.

Risky business in Georgia's wild birds: contact rates between wild birds and backyard chickens is influenced by supplemental feed

Backyard chickens are increasingly popular, and their husbandry varies widely. How backyard chickens are housed may influence the accessibility of chicken feed and water to wild birds, and thus, the contact rates between both groups. Increased contacts have implications for pathogen transmission; for instance, Newcastle disease virus or avian influenza virus may be transmitted to and from backyard chickens from contaminated water or feed. Given this potentially increased pathogen risk to wild birds and backyard chickens, we examined which wild bird species are likely to encounter backyard chickens and their resources. We performed a supplemental feeding experiment followed by observations at three sites associated with backyard chickens in North Georgia, USA. At each site, we identified the species of wild birds that: (a) shared habitat with the chickens, (b) had a higher frequency of detection relative to other species and (c) encountered the coops. We identified 14 wild bird species that entered the coops to consume supplemental feed and were considered high-risk for pathogen transmission. Our results provide evidence that contact between wild birds and backyard chickens is frequent and more common than previously believed, which has crucial epidemiological implications for wildlife managers and backyard chicken owners.

Ecological divergence of wild birds drives avian influenza spillover and global spread

The diversity of influenza A viruses (IAV) is primarily hosted by two highly divergent avian orders: Anseriformes (ducks, swans and geese) and Charadriiformes (gulls, terns and shorebirds). Studies of IAV have historically focused on Anseriformes, specifically dabbling ducks, overlooking the diversity of hosts in nature, including gull and goose species that have successfully adapted to human habitats. This study sought to address this imbalance by characterizing spillover dynamics and global transmission patterns of IAV over 10 years at greater taxonomic resolution than previously considered. Furthermore, the circulation of viral subtypes in birds that are either host-adapted (low pathogenic H13, H16) or host-generalist (highly pathogenic avian influenza-HPAI H5) provided a unique opportunity to test and extend models of viral evolution. Using Bayesian phylodynamic modelling we uncovered a complex transmission network that relied on ecologically divergent bird hosts. The generalist subtype, HPAI H5 was driven largely by wild geese and swans that acted as a source for wild ducks, gulls, land birds, and domestic geese. Gulls were responsible for moving HPAI H5 more rapidly than any other host, a finding that may reflect their long-distance, pelagic movements and their immuno-naïve status against this subtype. Wild ducks, long viewed as primary hosts for spillover, occupied an optimal space for viral transmission, contributing to geographic expansion and rapid dispersal of HPAI H5. Evidence of inter-hemispheric dispersal via both the Pacific and Atlantic Rims was detected, supporting surveillance at high latitudes along continental margins to achieve early detection. Both neutral (geographic expansion) and non-neutral (antigenic selection) evolutionary processes were found to shape subtype evolution which manifested as unique geographic hotspots for each subtype at the global scale. This study reveals how a diversity of avian hosts contribute to viral spread and spillover with the potential to improve surveillance in an era of rapid global change.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N2 (clade 2.3.4.4) challenge of mallards age appropriate to the 2015 midwestern poultry outbreak

Background

The 2015 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N2 clade 2.3.4.4 outbreak in upper midwestern U.S. poultry operations was not detected in wild birds to any great degree during the outbreak, despite wild waterfowl being implicated in the introduction, reassortment, and movement of the virus into North America from Asia. This outbreak led to the demise of over 50 million domestic birds and occurred mainly during the northward spring migration of adult avian populations.

Objectives

There have been no experimental examinations of the pathogenesis, transmission, and population impacts of this virus in adult wild waterfowl with varying exposure histories—the most relevant age class.

Methods

We captured, housed, and challenged adult wild mallards (Anas platyrhynchos) with HPAIV H5N2 clade 2.3.4.4 and measured viral infection, viral excretion, and transmission to other mallards.

Results

All inoculated birds became infected and excreted moderate amounts of virus, primarily orally, for up to 14 days. Cohoused, uninoculated birds also all became infected. Serological status had no effect on susceptibility. There were no obvious clinical signs of disease, and all birds survived to the end of the study (14 days).

Conclusions

Based on these results, adult mallards are viable hosts of HPAIV H5N2 regardless of prior exposure history and are capable of transporting the virus over short and long distances. These findings have implications for surveillance efforts. The capture and sampling of wild waterfowl in the spring, when most surveillance programs are not operating, are important to consider in the design of future HPAIV surveillance programs.

Mutations in PB1, NP, HA, and NA Contribute to Increased Virus Fitness of H5N2 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Clade 2.3.4.4 in Chickens

The H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) clade 2.3.4.4 virus spread to North America by wild birds and reassorted to generate the H5N2 HPAI virus that caused the poultry outbreak in the United States in 2015. In previous studies, we showed that H5N2 viruses isolated from poultry in the later stages of the outbreak had higher infectivity and transmissibility in chickens than the wild bird index H5N2 virus. Here, we determined the genetic changes that contributed to the difference in host virus fitness by analyzing sequence data from all of the viruses detected during the H5N2 outbreak, and studying the pathogenicity of reassortant viruses generated with the index wild bird virus and a chicken virus from later in the outbreak. Viruses with the wild bird virus backbone and either PB1, NP, or the entire polymerase complex of the chicken isolate, caused higher and earlier mortality in chickens, with three mutations (PB1 E180D, M317V, and NP I109T) identified to increase polymerase activity in chicken cells. The reassortant virus with the HA and NA from the chicken virus, where mutations in functionally known gene regions were acquired as the virus circulated in turkeys (HA S141P and NA S416G) and later in chickens (HA M66I, L322Q), showed faster virus growth, bigger plaque size and enhanced heat persistence in vitro, and increased pathogenicity and transmissibility in chickens. Collectively, these findings demonstrate an evolutionary pathway in which a HPAI virus from wild birds can accumulate genetic changes to increase fitness in poultry.IMPORTANCE H5Nx highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage continue to circulate widely affecting both poultry and wild birds. These viruses continue to change and reassort, which affects their fitness to different avian hosts. In this study, we defined mutations associated with increased virus fitness in chickens as the clade 2.3.4.4. H5N2 HPAI virus circulated in different avian species. We identified mutations in the PB1, NP, HA, and NA virus proteins that were highly conserved in the poultry isolates and contributed to the adaptation of this virus in chickens. This knowledge is important for understanding the epidemiology of H5Nx HPAI viruses and specifically the changes related to adaptation of these viruses in poultry.

Comparative infectivity and transmissibility studies of wild-bird and chicken-origin highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses H5N8 in chickens

Despite the recent advances in avian influenza viruses surveillance and genomic data, fundamental questions concerning the ecology and evolution of these viruses remain elusive. In Egypt, H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) are co-circulating simultaneously with HPAIVs of subtypes H5N1 and low-pathogenic avian influenza viruses (LPAIVs) of subtype H9N2 in both commercial and backyard poultry. In order to isolate AIVs from wild birds and to assess their potential in causing infection in commercial poultry, a total of thirty-four cloacal swab samples were collected from apparently healthy migratory wild birds (Anas acuta, Anas crecca, Rallus aquaticus, and Bubulcus ibis) from four Egyptian Governorates (Giza, Menoufia, Gharbia, and Dakahlia). Based on matrix (M) gene-targeting real-time reverse transcriptase PCR and subsequent genetic characterization, our results revealed two positive isolates (2/34) for H5N8 whereas no H5N1 and H9N2 subtypes were detected. Genetic characterization of the full-length haemagglutinin (HA) genes revealed the clustering of two reported isolates within genotype 5 of clade 2.3.4.4b. The potential of a wild bird-origin H5N8 virus isolated from a cattle egret for its transmission capability within and between chickens was investigated in compare to chicken origin H5N8 AIV. Chickens inoculated with cattle egret isolate showed varying clinical signs and detection of virus shedding. In contrast, the contact chickens showed less levels of virus secretion indicating efficient virus inter/intra-species transmission. These results demonstrated the possibility for spreading of wild bird origin H5N8 viruses between chicken. In conclusion, our study highlights the need for continuous and frequent monitoring of the genetic diversity of H5N8 AIVs in wild birds as well as commercial poultry sectors for better understanding and determining the genetic nature of these viruses, which is fundamental to predict any future threat through virus reassortment with the potential to threaten human and animal health. Likewise, an assessment of coverage and efficacy of different vaccines and or vaccination regimes in the field conditions should be reconsidered along with strict biosecurity measures.

Recombinant hemagglutinin glycoproteins provide insight into binding to host cells by H5 influenza viruses in wild and domestic birds

Clade 2.3.4.4, H5 subtype highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) have caused devastating effects across wild and domestic bird populations. We investigated differences in the intensity and distribution of the hemagglutinin (HA) glycoprotein binding of a clade 2.3.4.4 H5 HPAIV compared to a H5 low pathogenic avian influenza virus (LPAIV). Recombinant HA from gene sequences from a HPAIV, A/Northern pintail/Washington/40964/2014(H5N2) and a LPAIV, A/mallard/MN/410/2000(H5N2) were generated and, via protein histochemistry, HA binding in respiratory, intestinal and cloacal bursal tissue was quantified as median area of binding (MAB). Poultry species, shorebirds, ducks and terrestrial birds were used. Differences in MAB were observed between the HPAIV and LPAIV H5 HAs. We demonstrate that clade 2.3.4.4 HPAIV H5 HA has a broader host cell binding across a variety of bird species compared to the LPAIV H5 HA. These findings support published results from experimental trials, and outcomes of natural disease outbreaks with these viruses.

The genetics of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses of subtype H5 in Germany, 2006-2020

The H5 A/Goose/Guangdong/1/1996 (gs/GD) lineage emerged in China in 1996. Rooted in the respective gs/GD lineage, the hemagglutinin (HA) gene of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIV) has genetically diversified into a plethora of clades and subclades and evolved into an assortment of sub- and genotypes. Some caused substantial losses in the poultry industry and had a major impact on wild bird populations alongside public health implications due to a zoonotic potential of certain clades. After the primary introduction of the HPAI H5N1 gs/GD lineage into Europe in autumn 2005 and winter 2005/2006, Germany has seen recurring incursions of four varying H5Nx subtypes (H5N1, H5N8, H5N5, H5N6) carrying multiple distinct reassortants, all descendants of the gs/GD virus. The first HPAIV H5 epidemic in Germany during 2006/2007 was caused by a clade 2.2 subtype H5N1 virus. Phylogenetic analysis confirmed three distinct clusters belonging to clades 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2, concurring with geographic and temporal structures. From 2014 onwards, HPAIV clade 2.3.4.4 has dominated the epidemiological situation in Germany. The initial clade 2.3.4.4a HPAIV H5N8, reaching Germany in November 2014, caused a limited epidemic affecting five poultry holdings, one zoo in Northern Germany and few wild birds. After November 2016, HPAIV of clade 2.3.4.4b have dominated the situation to date. The most extensive HPAIV H5 epidemic on record reached Germany in winter 2016/2017, encompassing multiple incursion events with two subtypes (H5N8, H5N5) and entailing five reassortants. A novel H5N6 clade 2.3.4.4b strain affected Germany from December 2017 onwards, instigating low-level infection in smallholdings and wild birds. Recently, in spring 2020, a novel incursion of a genetically distinct HPAI clade 2.3.4.4b H5N8 virus caused another epidemic in Europe, which affected a small number of poultry holdings, one zoo and two wild birds throughout Germany.

A Review of Pathogen Transmission at the Backyard Chicken-Wild Bird Interface

Habitat conversion and the expansion of domesticated, invasive species into native habitats are increasingly recognized as drivers of pathogen emergence at the agricultural-wildlife interface. Poultry agriculture is one of the largest subsets of this interface, and pathogen spillover events between backyard chickens and wild birds are becoming more commonly reported. Native wild bird species are under numerous anthropogenic pressures, but the risks of pathogen spillover from domestic chickens have been historically underappreciated as a threat to wild birds. Now that the backyard chicken industry is one of the fastest growing industries in the world, it is imperative that the principles of biosecurity, specifically bioexclusion and biocontainment, are legislated and implemented. We reviewed the literature on spillover events of pathogens historically associated with poultry into wild birds. We also reviewed the reasons for biosecurity failures in backyard flocks that lead to those spillover events and provide recommendations for current and future backyard flock owners.

Different rabies outbreaks on two beef cattle farms in the same province of China: Diagnosis, virus characterization and epidemiological analysis

Eliminating rabies is challenging in many developing countries, especially in rural areas. In contrast to the annual decline of human cases in China in last decade, the incidence of rabies in livestock has been increasingly reported. This paper reports the rabies outbreaks in beef cattle (Angus) in Shaanxi Province, China, which caused 31 and 5 deaths at an attack rate of 19.4% (95% CI: 13.6%-26.4%) and 0.25% (95% CI: 0.1%-0.6%) in a satellite cow farm (farm A) and a core intensive farm (farm B), respectively. The rabies infection was confirmed by several laboratory tests, and rabies virus (RABV) strains SXBJ15 and SXYL15 were isolated and characterized from farm A and B, respectively. The two strains were found to have a high genomic sequence similarity to the dog-associated China clade I strains previously identified in the neighbouring area. SXBJ15 was shown to have a higher mouse pathogenicity (1.07) than SXYL15 (0.45). RABV was also detected in the saliva and salivary glands from the affected cattle. The potential causes were investigated on the farm, and the biosecurity scores were 20 and 64 (a full score of 82) for farms A and B, respectively. The rabies infection is likely to result from rabid free-roaming dogs (FRDs). On farm A with more cow deaths, the rabies transmission between animals can be attributed to the improper disposal of aborted foetuses and placental materials as a food source for rabid FRDs, high stocking density and drinking water sharing. Additionally, vaccinating cattle with a canine vaccine was shown to help stop the spread of rabies in herds. These results indicate that the occurrence of RABV on cattle farms can be prevented by improving biosecurity measures to control the entry of rural FRDs on the farm and immunizing farm cattle against rabies.

Genesis and spread of multiple reassortants during the 2016/2017 H5 avian influenza epidemic in Eurasia

In 2016/2017, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus of the subtype H5 spilled over into wild birds and caused the largest known HPAI epidemic in Europe, affecting poultry and wild birds. During its spread, the virus frequently exchanged genetic material (reassortment) with cocirculating low-pathogenic avian influenza viruses. To determine where and when these reassortments occurred, we analyzed Eurasian avian influenza viruses and identified a large set of H5 HPAI reassortants. We found that new genetic material likely came from wild birds across their migratory range and from domestic ducks not only in China, but also in central Europe. This knowledge is important to understand how the virus could adapt to wild birds and become established in wild bird populations.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of the H5 A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage can cause severe disease in poultry and wild birds, and occasionally in humans. In recent years, H5 HPAI viruses of this lineage infecting poultry in Asia have spilled over into wild birds and spread via bird migration to countries in Europe, Africa, and North America. In 2016/2017, this spillover resulted in the largest HPAI epidemic on record in Europe and was associated with an unusually high frequency of reassortments between H5 HPAI viruses and cocirculating low-pathogenic avian influenza viruses. Here, we show that the seven main H5 reassortant viruses had various combinations of gene segments 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6. Using detailed time-resolved phylogenetic analysis, most of these gene segments likely originated from wild birds and at dates and locations that corresponded to their hosts’ migratory cycles. However, some gene segments in two reassortant viruses likely originated from domestic anseriforms, either in spring 2016 in east China or in autumn 2016 in central Europe. Our results demonstrate that, in addition to domestic anseriforms in Asia, both migratory wild birds and domestic anseriforms in Europe are relevant sources of gene segments for recent reassortant H5 HPAI viruses. The ease with which these H5 HPAI viruses reassort, in combination with repeated spillovers of H5 HPAI viruses into wild birds, increases the risk of emergence of a reassortant virus that persists in wild bird populations yet remains highly pathogenic for poultry.

Development and evaluation of a TaqMan MGB RT-PCR assay for detection of H5 and N8 subtype influenza virus

Background

Highly pathogenic influenza A (H5N8) viruses have caused several worldwide outbreaks in birds and are of potential risk to humans. Thus, a specific, rapid and sensitive method for detection is urgently needed.

Methods

In the present study, TaqMan minor groove binder probes and multiplex real-time RT-PCR primers were designed to target the H5 hemagglutinin and N8 neuraminidase genes. A total of 38 strains of avian influenza viruses and other viruses were selected to test the performance of the assay.

Results

The results showed that only H5 and N8 avian influenza viruses yielded a positive signal, while all other subtypes avian influenza viruses and other viruses were negative. High specificity, repeatability, and sensitivity were achieved, with a detection limit of 10 copies per reaction.

Conclusions

The developed assay could be a powerful tool for rapid detection of H5N8 influenza viruses in the future.

Spatial spread and emergence of reassortant H5 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses in Iran

Since 2005, H5Nx highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of the Goose/Guangdong (Gs/GD) lineage have spread worldwide, affecting poultry and wild birds in Asia, Europe, Africa and North America. So far, the role of Western Asia and the Middle East in the diffusion dynamics of this virus has been poorly explored. In order to investigate the genetic diversity and the role of Iran in the transmission dynamics of the Gs/GD lineage, we sequenced the complete genome of twenty-eight H5Nx viruses which were circulating in the country between 2016 and 2018. We reported the first characterization of the HPAI H5N6 subtype of clade 2.3.4.4B in Iran and gave evidence of the high propensity of the Gs/GD H5 AIVs to reassort, describing six novel H5N8 genotypes of clade 2.3.4.4B, some of them likely generated in this area, and one H5N1 reassortant virus of clade 2.3.2.1c. Our spatial analyses demonstrated that the viruses resulted from different viral introductions from Asia and Europe and provided evidence of virus spread from Iran to the Middle East. Therefore, Iran may represent a hot-spot for virus introduction, dissemination and for the generation of new genetic variability. Increasing surveillance efforts in this high-risk area is of utmost importance for the early detection of novel emerging strains with zoonotic potential.

A brief history of bird flu

In 1918, a strain of influenza A virus caused a human pandemic resulting in the deaths of 50 million people. A century later, with the advent of sequencing technology and corresponding phylogenetic methods, we know much more about the origins, evolution and epidemiology of influenza epidemics. Here we review the history of avian influenza viruses through the lens of their genetic makeup: from their relationship to human pandemic viruses, starting with the 1918 H1N1 strain, through to the highly pathogenic epidemics in birds and zoonoses up to 2018. We describe the genesis of novel influenza A virus strains by reassortment and evolution in wild and domestic bird populations, as well as the role of wild bird migration in their long-range spread. The emergence of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses, and the zoonotic incursions of avian H5 and H7 viruses into humans over the last couple of decades are also described. The threat of a new avian influenza virus causing a human pandemic is still present today, although control in domestic avian populations can minimize the risk to human health.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘Modelling infectious disease outbreaks in humans, animals and plants: approaches and important themes’. This issue is linked with the subsequent theme issue ‘Modelling infectious disease outbreaks in humans, animals and plants: epidemic forecasting and control’.

Knowledge and remaining gaps on the role of animal and human movements in the poultry production and trade networks in the global spread of avian influenza viruses - A scoping review

Poultry production has significantly increased worldwide, along with the number of avian influenza (AI) outbreaks and the potential threat for human pandemic emergence. The role of wild bird movements in this global spread has been extensively studied while the role of animal, human and fomite movement within commercial poultry production and trade networks remains poorly understood. The aim of this work is to better understand these roles in relation to the different routes of AI spread. A scoping literature review was conducted according to the PRISMA guidelines (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) using a search algorithm combining twelve domains linked to AI spread and animal/human movements within poultry production and trade networks. Only 28 out of 3,978 articles retrieved dealt especially with the role of animal, human and fomite movements in AI spread within the international trade network (4 articles), the national trade network (8 articles) and the production network (16 articles). While the role of animal movements in AI spread within national trade networks has been largely identified, human and fomite movements have been considered more at risk for AI spread within national production networks. However, the role of these movements has never been demonstrated with field data, and production networks have only been partially studied and never at international level. The complexity of poultry production networks and the limited access to production and trade data are important barriers to this knowledge. There is a need to study the role of animal and human movements within poultry production and trade networks in the global spread of AI in partnership with both public and private actors to fill this gap.

Pandemic potential of highly pathogenic avian influenza clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses

The panzootic caused by A/goose/Guangdong/1/96‐lineage highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) viruses has occurred in multiple waves since 1996. From 2013 onwards, clade 2.3.4.4 viruses of subtypes A(H5N2), A(H5N6), and A(H5N8) emerged to cause panzootic waves of unprecedented magnitude among avian species accompanied by severe losses to the poultry industry around the world. Clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses have expanded in distinct geographical and evolutionary pathways likely via long distance migratory bird dispersal onto several continents and by poultry trade among neighboring countries. Coupled with regional circulation, the viruses have evolved further by reassorting with local viruses. As of February 2019, there have been 23 cases of humans infected with clade 2.3.4.4 H5N6 viruses, 16 (70%) of which had fatal outcomes. To date, no HPAI A(H5) virus has caused sustainable human‐to‐human transmission. However, due to the lack of population immunity in humans and ongoing evolution of the virus, there is a continuing risk that clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses could cause an influenza pandemic if the ability to transmit efficiently among humans was gained. Therefore, multisectoral collaborations among the animal, environmental, and public health sectors are essential to conduct risk assessments and develop countermeasures to prevent disease and to control spread. In this article, we describe an assessment of the likelihood of clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses gaining human‐to‐human transmissibility and impact on human health should such human‐to‐human transmission occur. This structured analysis assessed properties of the virus, attributes of the human population, and ecology and epidemiology of these viruses in animal hosts.

Waterfowl occurrence and residence time as indicators of H5 and H7 avian influenza in North American Poultry

Avian influenza (AI) affects wild aquatic birds and poses hazards to human health, food security, and wildlife conservation globally. Accordingly, there is a recognized need for new methods and tools to help quantify the dynamic interaction between wild bird hosts and commercial poultry. Using satellite-marked waterfowl, we applied Bayesian joint hierarchical modeling to concurrently model species distributions, residency times, migration timing, and disease occurrence probability under an integrated animal movement and disease distribution modeling framework. Our results indicate that migratory waterfowl are positively related to AI occurrence over North America such that as waterfowl occurrence probability or residence time increase at a given location, so too does the chance of a commercial poultry AI outbreak. Analyses also suggest that AI occurrence probability is greatest during our observed waterfowl northward migration, and less during the southward migration. Methodologically, we found that when modeling disparate facets of disease systems at the wildlife-agriculture interface, it is essential that multiscale spatial patterns be addressed to avoid mistakenly inferring a disease process or disease-environment relationship from a pattern evaluated at the improper spatial scale. The study offers important insights into migratory waterfowl ecology and AI disease dynamics that aid in better preparing for future outbreaks.

Agricultural and geographic factors shaped the North American 2015 highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N2 outbreak

The 2014-2015 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5NX outbreak represents the largest and most expensive HPAI outbreak in the United States to date. Despite extensive traditional and molecular epidemiological studies, factors associated with the spread of HPAI among midwestern poultry premises remain unclear. To better understand the dynamics of this outbreak, 182 full genome HPAI H5N2 sequences isolated from commercial layer chicken and turkey production premises were analyzed using evolutionary models able to accommodate epidemiological and geographic information. Epidemiological compartmental models embedded in a phylogenetic framework provided evidence that poultry type acted as a barrier to the transmission of virus among midwestern poultry farms. Furthermore, after initial introduction, the propagation of HPAI cases was self-sustainable within the commercial poultry industries. Discrete trait diffusion models indicated that within state viral transitions occurred more frequently than inter-state transitions. Distance and sample size were very strongly supported as associated with viral transition between county groups (Bayes Factor > 30.0). Together these findings indicate that the different types of midwestern poultry industries were not a single homogenous population, but rather, the outbreak was shaped by poultry industries and geographic factors.

Transmission dynamics between infected waterfowl and terrestrial poultry: Differences between the transmission and tropism of H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (clade 2.3.4.4a) among ducks, chickens and turkeys

H5N8 highly-pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs, clade 2.3.4.4) have spread globally via migratory waterfowl. Pekin ducks infected with a UK virus (H5N8-2014) served as the donors of infection in three separate cohousing experiments to attempt onward transmission chains to sequentially introduced groups of contact ducks, chickens and turkeys. Efficient transmission occurred among ducks and turkeys up to the third contact stage, with all (100%) birds becoming infected. Introduction of an additional fourth contact group of ducks to the turkey transmission chain demonstrated retention of H5N8-2014's waterfowl-competent adaptation. However, onward transmission ceased in chickens at the second contact stage where only 13% became infected. Analysis of viral progeny at this contact stage revealed no emergent polymorphisms in the intra-species (duck) transmission chain, but both terrestrial species included changes in the polymerase and accessory genes. Typical HPAIV pathogenesis and mortality occurred in infected chickens and turkeys, contrasting with 5% mortality among ducks.

Confronting models with data: the challenges of estimating disease spillover

For pathogens known to transmit across host species, strategic investment in disease control requires knowledge about where and when spillover transmission is likely. One approach to estimating spillover is to directly correlate observed spillover events with covariates. An alternative is to mechanistically combine information on host density, distribution and pathogen prevalence to predict where and when spillover events are expected to occur. We use several case studies at the wildlife-livestock disease interface to highlight the challenges, and potential solutions, to estimating spatio-temporal variation in spillover risk. Datasets on multiple host species often do not align in space, time or resolution, and may have no estimates of observation error. Linking these datasets requires they be related to a common spatial and temporal resolution and appropriately propagating errors in predictions can be difficult. Hierarchical models are one potential solution, but for fine-resolution predictions at broad spatial scales, many models become computationally challenging. Despite these limitations, the confrontation of mechanistic predictions with observed events is an important avenue for developing a better understanding of pathogen spillover. Systems where data have been collected at all levels in the spillover process are rare, or non-existent, and require investment and sustained effort across disciplines. This article is part of the theme issue 'Dynamic and integrative approaches to understanding pathogen spillover'.

Circulation, Evolution and Transmission of H5N8 virus, 2016-2018

OBJECTIVES

A second wave of highly pathogenic avian influenza A virus (HPAIV) H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 has spread globally, causing outbreaks among wild birds and domestic poultry since autumn 2016. The circulation and evolutionary dynamics of the virus remain largely unknown.

METHODS

We performed surveillance for H5N8 in Qinghai Lake in China since the emergence of the virus (from 2016 to 2018). By analyzing recovered viruses in Qinghai Lake and all related viruses worldwide (449 strains), we identified the genotypes, estimated their genesis and reassortment, and evaluated their global distribution and transmission.

RESULTS

Through surveillance of wild migratory birds around Qinghai Lake between 2016 and 2018, we revealed that the H5N8 was introduced into Qinghai Lake bird populations (QH-H5N8), with distinct gene constellations in 2016 and 2017. A global analysis of QH-H5N8-related viruses showed that avian influenza viruses with low pathogenicity in wild birds contributed to the high diversity of genotypes; the major reassortment events possibly occurred during the 2016 breeding season and the following winters.

CONCLUSIONS

Continued circulation of QH-H5N8-related viruses among wild birds has resulted in the global distribution of high genotypic diversity. Thus, these viruses pose an ongoing threat to wild and domestic bird populations and warrant continuous surveillance.